ASIA TODAY

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

Contemporary Western Europe and Asia

Edited by
Takashi Inoguchi
and **Jean Blondel**

Political Parties and Democracy

ASIA TODAY

Before 1820, Asia generated more than half of the world's gross domestic product. Since then, the region underwent a period of decay and decline. Today, Asia is in the midst of a great transformation, and it is estimated that by 2035 it will be responsible for more than one half of the world's gross domestic product. Propelled by three decades of rapid economic growth, momentous political transitions, and intensified regional integration, Asia is no longer simply a fast-expanding and evolving region—it is increasingly the geopolitical epicenter for the global system itself. The goal of this series is to offer readers a front-row seat to view and better understand this kaleidoscope of regional change in all its dazzling dynamism and diversity. Who would have thought in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in Beijing, that China would soon begin a generation of double-digit economic growth? Who could have foreseen that Asia would become the region where the world's richest countries, Singapore and Brunei, would live shoulder-to-shoulder with the world's poorest, Afghanistan and Laos? The Asia Today series is designed to respond to the growing demand for sustained research and deep knowledge of contemporary Asia. It covers the full expanse of this vast region—from China to India, Japan to Pakistan, Kazakhstan to Turkey, Mongolia to Israel, Iraq to Indonesia. The series editors, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, aided by a 44-member advisory board, are dedicated to identifying fresh and penetrating studies of Asia by the region's foremost experts.

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

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

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Contents

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Tables

Preface

This book on political parties and democracy aims at capturing the resilience of representative democracy as practiced in Europe and Asia during the period 1990–2010 that witnessed the end of cold war, the galloping tide of globalization, and the steady diffusion of digitalized life. The book is unique in two senses, both of which we recognize as strengths of this volume.

First, our approach is empirical, digging data about political parties, such as elections, votes and seats, organization, finance, manifestoes, and recruitment, with the common framework applied to ten democracies. When the study of political parties is thick on Western Europe and the United States, we have stressed that political parties in other parts of the world are no less alive and well.

Second, while working for this volume, we realized that political parties were recognized as a legitimate and desirable institutional entity only recently, as recent as the mid-twentieth century. From the *Federalist Papers* of the late eighteenth century through Ostrogorski and Mosca in the early twentieth century, political parties were considered as a not-so-legitimate organization. During the tumultuous transformation of the 1990–2010 period, political parties were increasingly considered to weaken their vigor in linking citizens and the state. In this context, it is very important, we realize, to register and analyze their life and vigor, and resilience in particular. With the larger time horizons in the past and toward the future, we endeavor to create this volume.

We are indebted to many people and institutions. We would like to express our gratitude to them. First, all the contributors have done not only their country-specific task but also helped the coeditors to reshape the common framework of analyzing the assigned country's political parties in the ten functioning democracies. For the Tokyo conference in 2010, support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation

was indispensable. Second, at Palgrave Macmillan in New York, Farideh Koohi-Kamali and Sarah Nathan have done the miracle of launching a new book series, *Asia Today*. With G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi as coeditors of the series, Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi were able to start the series with the publication of this volume. Third, staffs at the University of Niigata Prefecture including Yuichi Kubota, Akiko Kanatani, Chizuru Morita, Aki Goto, and Fumie Shiraishi saved us from being forced to slow down the work of putting together the chapters to be revised and completed in the backdrop of the most powerful earthquake and its associated disasters that rocked Japan after the Tokyo conference. Fourth, Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi thank their respective wives for their unstinting support, who were too often immersed in writing for them and almost forgot preparing breakfast. The volume is dedicated to Tess in London and Kuniko in Tokyo.

Takashi Inoguchi, *Tokyo* and
Jean Blondel, *London*

1

Introduction: Political Parties and Democracy in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia

Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi

The present volume is a selective exploration of how similar and how different are the parties of ten Western European and East and Southeast Asian countries in the early years of the twenty-first century with regard to their society, structure, goals, and leadership types. The countries of these two regions should be broadly considered to hold free elections and practice democratic representation. However, they have differed widely in the history of their political institutions and in the introduction of a liberal democratic or at least pluralistic form of government. All the countries of Western Europe became liberal democracies in the 1970s, but liberal democracy prevails in only about half the countries of the Pacific rim.

In addition to limiting the scope of the exploration to ten countries, two conditions had to be met: (1) the selected countries should be representative of the different types of parties and party systems in these two areas; and (2) these countries should be sufficient enough to provide an opportunity to examine in depth the sociocultural background within which these parties emerged and came to operate. Hence, the analysis is limited to five countries from each region. The countries are Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands for Western Europe; Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand for East and Southeast Asia.

To reduce the difficulty of collecting material and to reflect the somewhat recent transition of some countries to a pluralistic political system, the study covers exclusively the period 1990–2010. The study

analyzes only those parties that obtained 10 percent of the votes in one of the elections of the period at least, and/or elected, again during at least one legislature, 10 percent of the members of that legislature: these rules are applied with some flexibility, however. The hope is that based on this "exploration," it will be possible to classify the "relevant" parties and throw new light on the links of these organizations with their society, their structure, their goals, and type of leadership.

Such a study has not been seriously undertaken before: the only "theory" about political party development was exclusively Western European in origin. Lipset and Rokkan developed a theory in 1967.[1] The theory was realistic for its time, and its almost universal adoption was proof of its validity.

Yet the theory was based exclusively on Western European experience. The main finding was that the links between political parties and their society were based on a number of social cleavages existing in the countries concerned. Four of these social cleavages, race, religion, class and gender were regarded as crucial, though their prominence varied. The authors showed that new cleavages emerged over time in the societies analyzed: class cleavage was the most recent and probably the most crucial of the cleavages in Western Europe. It was assumed that such a cleavage resulted from the industrialization process of the nineteenth century.

Problems with the "Classical" Theory of Parties

The theory of social cleavages remained unchallenged for a substantial period as it appeared to explain the characteristics of Western European parties. Yet two sets of developments that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century raised questions about the validity of the theory.[2]

As large numbers of pluralistic parties came to be found increasingly outside Western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, the question arose as to whether these pluralistic parties emerged from the kinds of social cleavages that had prevailed in the West. A concentration of the analysis on Western Europe seemed permissible at the time of the study, but became difficult to justify as the number of non-Western countries with pluralistic parties started to multiply.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, social cleavages as the basis of the link between parties and society were no longer as powerful as they had appeared in the previous decades. Indeed, a reexamination of the earlier Western European experience suggested that the

impact of social cleavages was perhaps less universal and less deep across the whole of Western Europe than had been assumed in the theory. Different types of links were emerging that were not based on the existence of an automatic relationship between the social characteristics of the society and the way people associated with parties.[3] The structure of parties, their goals, and their leadership seemed to be affected in the process.

"Modern" versus "Traditional" Parties

An important question of the difference between what have tended to be called "premodern" and "modern" parties needs to be raised. What Duverger did in his seminal work in the 1950s on political parties was to provide the first "dispassionate" presentation of the structure, and, to an extent, the links with society (perhaps in a somewhat idealized manner) of what could be described as modern parties, in opposition to what had been regarded as the characteristics of premodern parties.[4] The result was an oversimplified dichotomy between traditional parties ("parties of notables") and modern parties ("mass" parties).[5] The drawback of that dichotomy was that it placed all premass parties in a single category: it did not differentiate between elite-based versus grassroots-based parties or between parties focusing on national versus local issues.

One of the weaknesses of the Lipset-Rokkan theory is that it inherited that dichotomous standpoint: the authors incorporated traditional parties in their analysis by stating that some social cleavages had emerged earlier than others in Western societies. However, by suggesting that the links between parties and society were the result of social cleavages, even if there were different cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan did not provide clear means of distinguishing markedly the structure and goals of these older parties from those that had emerged more recently.

Another shortcoming of the theory was the institutional context Western European parties had to consider: that is, overcoming unpleasant historical legacies through safeguards designed to prevent the repetition of past mistakes. The notion that social cleavages could account almost exclusively for the development of parties assumed that parties were able to develop "naturally" and with very little hindrance. And yet institutional "engineering" was introduced in some countries: the adoption of "semipresidentialism" in France in the late 1950s is the most obvious example of such engineering.

"Lateral" Extension of Party Analysis

Analysis of the "lateral" expansion of pluralistic parties since the second half of the twentieth century must assume that the way links, structure, goals, and leadership of parties have emerged and developed in non–Western European countries is different from those experienced in Western European countries. A different historical background in the two regions under study may have been the reason for certain features of parties, even those termed modern, being different from those that prevailed in Western Europe. Although class cleavage did play a part in Western European countries and in Japan, it did not have a similar role in the other East and Southeast Asian countries. "Political engineering" appears to have widely played a significant part. Thus one finds three presidential or semipresidential systems in the five East and Southeast Asian countries under examination, a proportion that is similar to the one found in non-Western pluralistic polities in general, while nearly all Western European countries have adopted and continued to adopt a parliamentary system of government, France being the main exception.[6] Differences from the "classical" Western European party framework need close monitoring as the development of a truly realistic worldwide theory of parties depends on these differences being considered.

The current study includes as many countries of Western Europe as countries of East and Southeast Asia: this makes it possible to see what consequences, if any, stem from the fact that pluralistic parties emerged from authoritarian rule during the last decades of the twentieth century.

"Vertical" Exploration of Parties and Their Supporters in Western Europe

A "vertical" exploration has also to be undertaken with respect to what occurred during the same period to the links with society, the structure, the goals, and the leadership types among Western European parties. A strong alarm directed at the cleavage theory of parties was heard as a number of Western European parties, once successful, started to decline in recent decades. Works by economists on political parties cannot be overlooked.[7] How political parties try to get voter support on a Left-Right ideological continuum and how elites try to avert citizen-instigated disorder and rebellion through

creating democracy is critical knowledge. Influence of political parties loomed large in the mid-twentieth century, but today they have come down to being just a mediating social institution to link the state and citizens. Also, globalization is a new addition to the discussion on political party backgrounds. Several areas need investigation. First, the extent of traditional party decline is not entirely clear, but, if it has occurred, then new parties must have taken a share of the support of the traditional parties. Second, are these new parties broadly similar, in terms of their links with society, their structure, their goals, and their leadership to the traditional parties and whether some changes have occurred in these links? Third, is it the case that all the parties that were traditionally strong in Western Europe belonged to the same broad mass party mold? Were they based by and large on one social cleavage or are there important differences in this respect from party to party and from country to country?

To answer the first question about the extent of decline of traditional parties, a series of elections has to be monitored over. For instance, lower turnout, a drop in electoral support, increased volatility, a fall in membership could individually or collectively impact the decline. Overall size and extent of the decline can be assessed only after the various elements that make up this political snapshot are "disaggregated" and then are assembled to create a composite index.

Second, assuming that the decline is substantiated, we have to conclude that it could not have occurred unless a successful challenge had come from outside these parties: that is, new organizations must have emerged to attack the traditional parties. How far and how successful have these new organizations become and are there significant differences between countries?

Third, these new parties need to be examined to determine how "different" they are from the framework and linkages of traditional parties. It is often argued that these new parties have been successful because classic cleavages no longer provide *the* key link between parties and the society, and because these new parties have attracted electors on the basis of the characteristics of their leaders.[8] These views need examination as does the extent to which "older" parties have "retaliated" on the basis of a similar change in their approach and whether such changes have been relatively successful. It is thus primarily because of the emergence of the "new" parties that the question about the role of social cleavages in linking parties to society is on the agenda.

Fourth, the characteristics of traditional parties (and perhaps some new parties as well) raise the general problem of the extent to which parties can be considered either premodern or modern and whether "traces" of premodernity exist among modern parties too. The characteristics that distinguish modern and premodern parties need to be determined, and that distinction is likely to affect the nature of the links between party and society, the structure, the goals, and of the type of leadership.

Empirical Analysis for a Realistic Theory of Parties

How best to approach the study of political parties? Should one be primarily empirical or should one first solve theoretical problems? There are limitations to both avenues of inquiry, but in the context of a limited exploration such as the one presented here, it seems more realistic to investigate whether some characteristics of parties in the two studied regions provide a picture based on interesting connections. The best way to move toward a general theory of today's pluralistic parties is to see whether the parties of the ten studied countries are linked in ways that were not anticipated but raise questions that may help to build gradually elements of a truly general theory.

Nineteen Indicators and Party Characteristics

The current study aims at assessing how much parties resemble each other or differ from each other both within and between each of the two examined regions. Overall, 19 indicators describe parties, either singularly or in combination with the other parties that exist in a given country. These indicators are listed here and specific points about each of them are found in the appendix.

Societal Links. Eight of these indicators relate to the nature of party-societal links in the 1990–2010 period: (1) general election turnout; (2) nature of the national electoral system; (3) the parties that have either contested elections or disappeared; (4) newly emerged parties; (5) proportion of votes obtained by each party at the general elections; (6) level of volatility affecting the parties; (7) geographical coverage of these parties within the nation; and (8) social background of the electors of the parties.

Party Structure. Five indicators relate specifically to the party structure: (1) number of party members; (2) breakdown of party income; (3) extent to which members participate in the decision-making processes of the party; (4) extent to which members of the party in parliament or in congress participate in the decision-making process; and (5) mechanisms for party leadership and duration of appointment.

Goals. Four indicators relate specifically to party goals: (1) way in which the election program is adopted including the determination of those who decide on the program; (2) size of the party's election program and the breakdown of that program in terms of specific fields of government; (3) extent to which major changes in party programs have occurred; and (4) whether the party has (or has ceased to have) an ideology.

Leadership. Two indicators relate to the leadership: (1) degree of personalization of the leadership with respect to the electorate at large, the party membership, and the elaboration of party policies; (2) extent to which the leaders have adopted populist-type discourses.

* * *

There has been too much emphasis on Western European parties. The present study attempts to penetrate the "texture" of parties in order to determine if general trends apply across regions—at least across the two targeted regions. The ten country-specific chapters provide insight into newly emerging findings. The concluding chapter answers whether the comparative aim of the analysis has been fulfilled.

APPENDIX

Indicators Relating to Party-Societal Links

1. General Election Turnout. There are three reasons for examining general election turnout. First, it is important to know the extent of decline in voter turnout and whether it has had any impact on the East and Southeast Asian countries.

Second, is the turnout country or region specific, or is it affected primarily by a country's given circumstances at a given time? Is it a

rule or certain cases only in which turnout is high in the first pluralistic election of a newly pluralist political system and then falls? Does turnout tend to be generally lower in newly pluralist systems than in more traditional liberal democracies?

Third, is turnout higher at presidential elections than at parliamentary elections in countries described as broadly presidential?

2. *The Electoral System*. The electoral system is well-known to impact patterns of voting and possibly turnout too. However, as the provisions of electoral systems have become appreciably more complex over the decades, the precise effect of each of these complicated systems is unclear.

3. *Parties That Contested the Election Throughout or Disappeared*. These parties need to be listed and the timing of, and reasons for, their disappearance need also to be noted.

4. *Newly Emerged Parties*. These parties need to have crossed one of the two thresholds (10 percent of the votes at least once and/or 10 percent of the seats at least once).

5. *Proportion of Votes Obtained by Each Party at the General Elections*. How many votes were captured by each party at general elections should be taken as the general strength of political parties.

6. *Volatility Level Affecting the Parties*. The level needs to be calculated for each election and overall: if volatility increases regularly, it is an indication that traditional parties are declining regularly.

7. *Geographical Coverage of Parties*. Do some parties concentrate their strength in some areas and what are the reasons for such a concentration? Is there explicit or de facto regionalism?

8. *Social Breakdown of the Electors of the Parties*. The breakdown by gender, age, occupation, and religious belonging informs us about whether a close relationship between voting patterns and social structure exists.

Party Structure

1. *Number of Party Members*. Does every party have a definite conception of what is a member? Are members considered the "backbone" of the party? Do published figures correspond to reality?

2. *Breakdown of Party Income.* This indicates the extent to which parties play a part in national life. Parties that received a large part of their income from state subsidies may lose their need to be involved in campaigning and may also form a "cartel" with other parties, in an effort to prevent the emergence of newcomer parties.[9]

3. *Membership Participation in Party Decision Making.* First, are members entitled to participate in general matters and in leadership selection? Do members participate in party activities? Some findings must be given regarding the level of this participation.

4. *Role of Members of Parliaments or of Congresses in Party Decision Making.* Are there formal rules and arrangements giving members of parliament or congress the right to participate in party decision making? Are there differences in this respect between parliamentary and presidential countries?

5. *Leadership Appointment.* Is there, first, a "leader" of the party or is there more than one leader, that is, alongside the formal leader of the party, is there another person in the government? Also, does the situation differ depending on whether the system is parliamentary or presidential?

Second, what is the period of leadership appointment and can he/she be reelected, indefinitely or not?

Third, was the party created by a leader who has remained continuously as the head of the party throughout the period?

Fourth, are there many cases in which only one person is a candidate for the leadership even when the electoral leadership process is relatively open?

Fifth, when there is leadership competition, what is the election system? Is the leader appointed by rank-and-file members? Or is the leader appointed by a relatively small group, and what part do members of parliament or congress play in this respect? How long is the period of leadership campaign?

Goals of the Party

1. *Decision Taking on the Party Program.* Is the party program decided by the party conference or is it adopted by the executive of the party? What part does the leader play in this context: is it the case that the party leader effectively imposes a program designed by his/her entourage?

2. *Size and Aspects of the Party's Election Program.* Does the party programmed vary in size from one election to the next? What is the relative proportion devoted to various policy areas of the program?

3. *Changes in Party Programs.* Are there significant changes in the party program over time? What prompts a different program, and does it affect the fate of the party? Are specific individuals or a new leader responsible for such changes? Are there cases in which little change has occurred in the party program? What are the reasons for such program stability?

4. *Party Ideology.* Does the party have an ideology and, if so, what? Has it changed over time, including just a few years before the period of investigation began?

If the party has no ideology, has this always been the case? Is there a debate about the matter? What is the argument, if any, for not having an ideology?

Leadership

1. *Personalized Leadership.* The extent of personalized leadership is expected to vary appreciably according to the type and age of party and according to the institutional arrangement. The relationship between personalization and type of ideology needs exploration. Do postauthoritarian countries have more personalized leaders than other parties?

2. *Leadership Discourse.* Leaders may adopt a populist discourse. How far is the populist discourse in the Right-Left continuum and is that type of discourse particularly adopted by the extreme Right? Are populist leaders likely to be drawn from among personalized leaders?

Notes

1. S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).
2. M. Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Methuen, 1954) (French ed., 1951).
3. See Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault, *Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens: The Personalisation of Leadership* (London: Routledge, 2009).
4. Duverger, *Political Parties*.

5. Lord Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1891); A. L. Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1896).
6. Some countries had adopted some type of presidential system in 2010.
7. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997 [1957]); Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
8. Blondel and Thiebault, *Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens,* 30–68.
9. R. S. Katz and P. Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics*, 1 (1) (1995): 5–28.

2

Britain

Jean Blondel

Introduction

Among Western European party systems, Britain's has long been—and continues to be, admittedly with serious reservations—regarded as a "textbook example" of two-party systems, based as it is on the domination of the Conservative and Labour parties, a situation that was markedly helped by the "first-past-the-post" single-member constituency electoral system. Yet the question that now arises is whether a major change is not in the process of taking place under our very eyes: after a period of over 20 years during which the two major parties won handsomely and succeeded each other in office almost "naturally," the classic "two-party system" was sufficiently undermined at the 2010 general election to give rise to a coalition government, a first in the country for over 60 years and indeed for many more years if one excludes the wartime coalition of 1940–1945. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal democrats did continue without very serious hold backs, although there were a number of disagreements on various issues, such as the level of student fees and the question of the reform of the House of Lords.

This new—unique—development seems to show that the two main parties have profoundly weakened their grip on the country, despite the overwhelming part they played under the Conservative Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and the "New" Labour Tony Blair (1997–2007). What occurred was, on the one hand, the rise of other parties—mainly the Liberal Democrats, and the "national" or

nationalist parties at the periphery, in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—and, on the other hand, an internal decline within the two main parties, arising to a substantial extent from the fact that the division that had long prevailed in political contests and had pitted Right against Left or probusiness against prolabor had lost much of its sharpness: the formal links between the Labour Party and the trade unions did remain, but they weakened markedly. Meanwhile, "volatility" had increased as many electors switched their allegiance; party membership fell and, as a result, party finance became a major problem, although the main suggested remedy, that of providing state subsidies to the parties, was continuously rejected.

Thus the growth in the number of seats won by the Liberal Democrats, especially from 1997, and the fact that the regional parties had become a significant feature on the Westminster scene eventually led to the break of the supremacy of the two-party system at the general election of May 1910, when no single party obtained an absolute majority of seats. Admittedly, a similar development had occurred in the 1970s, but the solution adopted at the time was turning back to two-party dominance by means of a small stint of minority government: thus the largest party then, the Labour Party, negotiated an arrangement with a number of small parties designed to obtain their (temporary) support: indeed, the parliamentary supremacy of the two major parties was restored at subsequent general elections.

What was, therefore, wholly new in 2010 was that the largest party, the Conservative Party, took the unprecedented step in modern British politics to negotiate a coalition agreement, and not merely to aim at a temporary minority government in the expectation that the two-party system would once more prevail. What was decided was in effect that the "two-and-a-half party system" was there to stay and that the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats would, therefore, govern together "for the duration," so to speak, in principle for the five years. Whether this move marked a total transformation of the approach to the build-up (and indeed the philosophy) of government in Britain is obviously too early to say immediately after a year under the new experiment: but what can at least be pointed out is that the experiment has been taken seriously at least by the leadership of the two parties concerned.

The Electors and the Parties

Turnout at British general elections has been declining markedly in the 1990–2010 period, although there was a substantial increase in

2010 by comparison with the lowest point that occurred in 2001 (less than 60 percent). Yet it is now typically the case that a third of the electors do not vote at British parliamentary elections, while abstainers were only a quarter of the electors in the 1980s and even only a fifth in the early 1950s.

The Electoral System

The electoral system in force at the British general elections has been throughout the period, as well as previously, the first-past-the-post single-member majority system. It was not altered, although there have been, in particular in the Liberal Party, considerable misgivings about the "unfairness" of that electoral system. This state of affairs had become rather peculiar, as, at the European elections, and, in Scotland, at the regional elections as well as, in Northern Ireland, at both regional and national elections a proportional electoral system had been introduced.

Some change may occur in the British electoral system, since, in 2010, the Liberal Party obtained from its coalition Conservative partner that there be a referendum on the future of that system: in practice, however, what was suggested was not that proportional representation would be one option on the ballot, but that the option merely be the "alternative vote." As this is simply a form of two-ballot single-member majority system, the change that might take place will be limited. Moreover, it is not even clear that any change will occur at all, as many Conservative and Labour supporters were lukewarm toward the reform, and the supporters of the status quo may, therefore, win.

The Political Parties

If the two major parties have declined, the only other "relevant" party across the whole United Kingdom between 1990 and 2010 has been the Liberal Democrats, although, as was already pointed out, "national" or nationalist parties have played a major part in Scotland, have come to have a significant role in Wales and have purely and simply replaced the British party system in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, however, the increase *in seats* obtained by the Liberal Democrats was substantial from 1997, although the percentage of votes obtained by that party truly increased later, in the 2005 and 2010 elections: as a result of these developments the combined support of the two "major" parties dropped below 70 percent for the first time in both these elections.

Table 2.1 Turnout at recent British general elections and percentage of votes obtained by the relevant parties, 1987–2010

Year	*1987*	*1992*	*1997*	*2001*	*2005*	*2010*
Turnout (%)	75.2	72.7	71.4	59.4	61.5	65.1
Seats (% of votes)						
Conserv.	375 (42.2)	336 (41.9)	165 (31.5)	166 (32.7)	197 (32.3)	306 (36.1)
Labour	229 (30.8)	271 (34.4)	418 (44.4)	412 (42.0)	355 (35.2)	259 (29.0)
Libdem	22 (22.6)	20 (17.9)	46 (17.2)	52 (18.8)	62 (22.1)	57 (23.0)

Source: Results published in every British election year in D.E. Butler, The British General Election of 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 (London: Macmillan, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010)

The results obtained by these three parties in the British general elections during the 1990–2010 elections are described in table 2.1.

Volatility

The volatility of the three relevant parties was not very significant from one election to the next, except in 1997, when the Conservative vote collapsed and the Labour vote markedly increased. Specifically, however, volatility did occur primarily between the two main parties up to 1997, but away from these two parties subsequently.[1]

No Relevant New Party Emerged in Britain since the 1980s

The unprecedented move toward a Conservative–Liberal Democrats coalition in 2010 occurred in a context in which no (relevant) new party had appeared on the scene in the country since the 1980s. A new party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), had emerged in 1981, led originally by four prominent members of the Labour Party who objected to the marked left-wing stance taken by that body since the late 1970s as well as to the strong position it had adopted against the European Community (as the European Union was then). The SDP enjoyed some electoral successes to begin with, but came subsequently to decline rapidly in public opinion: its existence was difficult to justify at a time when polarization increased for or against a Margaret Thatcher government intent on pushing forward a markedly right-wing program. The SDP thus found it necessary to negotiate and eventually accept a merger with the Liberal Party: that merger took place in 1988 and, as a result, the Liberals added the

word "Democrats" to their official name. From the 1992 general election onward the same three (relevant) parties, Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrats thus occupied almost all the political scene at the Westminster level, if not in Cardiff or Edinburgh, where, as was noted, "national" parties were also relevant, let alone in Belfast where the national British parties had no place at all.

Since there were no relevant new parties in general in Britain, the political changes that occurred in the country were either due to the growth of the Liberal Democrats (perhaps slightly boosted as a result of the emergence of the SDP in the 1980s and the subsequent merger of that party with the Liberals) or to greater support, especially in Scotland but also to an extent in Wales for "national" parties, while the party system in Northern Ireland came to be entirely different from the party system in the rest of the Western European countries.

Key Changes in the Ideology of the Two Major Parties and in the Structure of the Labour Party

Meanwhile, however, the existing parties did change, even change drastically during the period. Indeed, what occurred in the 1990s in Britain can be described as the second part of the great party ideological transformation that had begun in the 1980s in the Conservative Party with Margaret Thatcher: the monetarist and anti-State policies pursued by the "Iron Lady" resulted in the Conservative Party becoming genuinely "right-wing"; there came to be little social commitment, in contrast to the more "patrician" and somewhat paternalistic approach that had characterized many of the policies followed by the Conservatives from the 1950s.

What then occurred in the 1990s was the ideological transformation of the Labour Party, in part as a result of the moves to the Right that had taken place in the Conservative Party. Indeed, the Labour leader who was largely responsible for the change, Tony Blair, was said to have greatly admired the determination that Margaret Thatcher had shown during the 1980s. Thus, while Blair did not aim at turning Labour into a mirror image of the Conservative Party, he pressed for what he called a New Labour, that is to say, a party that would abandon the most unrealistic aspects of its traditional "dogmas," in particular the emphasis on large-scale nationalization, and would adopt, on the contrary, a positive attitude toward business and competition, including even in the public sector.

The (almost complete) absence of new parties (and in any case the total absence of new relevant parties) in the firmament of British politics at the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first does not, therefore, mean that there have not been profound changes in the programmatic and policy panorama, as well indeed as, at any rate in the Labour Party, deep changes in the structure and decision-making processes in the organization. Indeed, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that the fact that the two main parties profoundly changed their ideology and that Labour altered markedly its internal structure may have been among the key reasons why no new relevant parties emerged. Thus what has to be examined primarily in the British case is the extent to which the two main parties altered their course of action and in a sense rendered unnecessary, perhaps impossible, the emergence of new "dramatis personae" on the political scene.

Social Characteristics of the Electors of the Relevant Parties

The breakdown of support from various social groups at the time of the 2005 general election is represented in Appendix 2.B on the Palgrave website.[2] There remain marked differences in the class breakdown as well as in the age distribution of the two main parties, with young voters being appreciably more likely (at the time) to vote for Labour than for Conservative.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of the Membership

There was a marked decline in membership of political parties in many Western European countries through the second half of the twentieth century: the trend was particularly noticeable in Britain in all three parties.[3] In Britain, the situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that, while the Conservative and Liberal parties relied essentially on individual members, the Labour Party started in 1900 as a federation of corporate bodies, the most important of which were the trade unions: only in 1918 did the party decide to allow individuals to become members. As a matter of fact, even after 50 years or more, trade unions always provided by far the largest numbers of members, partly because membership of union members was for a long time automatic. The difference continued to be substantial even when rules were changed and union membership no longer led automatically to party membership.

Decision Role of Members, Primaries, and Internal Referendums

The real decision role of members, in all three parties, has always taken place essentially at the local level; at the national level the impact of members is at most indirect. The party conference (taking place every year in the three parties) is held to have—or have had—a notably larger influence in the Labour Party than in the other two, but the difference is in reality markedly more limited, the reasons being (1) it was rarely the case that the Labour leadership felt bound by conference decisions; (2) changes that occurred in the 1990s in the Labour Party constitution reduced the power of conference and; (3) the conference came to be taken somewhat more seriously in the Conservative Party.

Primaries and referendums have begun to take place in both the Labour and Conservative parties, mainly at the local level, however, and, at the national level only in the Labour Party so far. For instance, the selection of Conservative parliamentary candidates has now to be formally ratified by a poll of all the constituency members. In the Labour Party, the "one man one vote" principle has been adopted in relation to changes in the party constitution: the result was the abolition in 1995 of the so-called Clause 4 that pressed for widespread nationalization.

Coverage of the Territory by Relevant Parties

All of Great Britain except for Northern Ireland is covered by the three relevant parties: in that part of the United Kingdom, the parties are wholly different; in Scotland and Wales, on the other hand, the national British parties cover the territory, but, in particular in Scotland, the Conservatives have come to be very weak.

Broadly speaking, the Conservatives are more successful in the South-East of the country and to a more limited extent, in the rest of the South. Labour is generally more successful in the North of England, Scotland, and Wales, though nationalist parties are also strong, especially the Scottish National Party, in Scotland. The Liberal Party's strength is greater, broadly speaking, in the peripheries.

Party Finance

Party finance has been a recurrent problem in Britain, largely because of the opposition of the Conservative Party to a form of regular and general yearly state subsidy; moreover, if there were to be large

amounts of yearly state subsidies, the question of the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions would arise since the trade unions have typically exercised great influence in view of their large contributions to the financing of the party. There is a widely recognized perception that, in the absence of large state subsidies, the British parties are condemned to accepting large donations from private individuals and, therefore, the question of "sleeze" tends inevitably to arise. Yet, despite the fact that the question is placed repeatedly on the agenda, in particular since the Houghton committee reported in 1976 that regular state subsidies should be introduced, no positive decision has been taken.[4] (The official figures on income for 2005 presented in Appendix 2.D of the Palgrave website are drawn from that volume, 260–264).[5]

National Decision Organs

All the literature on the decision-making process in the British parties insists on the part played by the parliamentary party. Indeed, the most famous post–World War II work on *British Political Parties*, by R. T. McKenzie (1963) strongly emphasizes the fact that, not just in the Conservative Party, but in the Labour Party as well, and despite the alleged "democratic" basis of that party, the parliamentary party has been the true decision maker.

National Decision Making in the Conservative Party

The Conservative Party structure is based on a sharp legal distinction between the party in the country, in effect a federation of constituency associations, whose representatives "happen to" meet every year at the party conference, and the Conservative Party as such, which is a centralized organization controlled by the leader but where the parliamentary party is by far the most important collegial body; the leader (elected by the parliamentary party in practice) has at his or her disposal a very large array of powers, for instance, of appointment in the cabinet, when the party is in power, in the shadow cabinet, when the party is in opposition, as well as in the "Central Office," which constitutes the civil service of the party; the leader also decides ultimately the content of the party "manifesto" when a general election is about to take place. The conference is merely advisory, but it is prudent for the leader to ensure that his or her image is truly positive at the conference if he or she is not to have subsequent difficulties with the parliamentary party.

National Decision Making in the Liberal Democrats

The situation is, broadly speaking, the same in the Liberal Democrats, Conference being essentially advisory and the parliamentary party being the decision-making body. The only difference is perhaps that the leader does not have the aura of influence that his or her equivalent has in the Conservative Party, almost certainly because the Liberal Democrats' leader is not expected, as the Conservative or Labour leader, to be prime minister, or even, up to 1910, to become a minister, and especially a prominent minister.

National Decision Making in the Labour Party

Formally, the difference is—and even more was—vast, in that the Conference was often described as the "parliament" of the party. In practice, considerable power (presumably by delegation) from the conference was lodged—up to the 1980s—in the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party, which is elected by the conference but on the basis of separate "colleges" of corporate bodies (essentially trade unions) and constituency representatives. The reforms of the 1990s reduced the power of the NEC to the benefit of the leader of the party, who is in effect responsible to the parliamentary party, although he is appointed by the various segments of the membership. The Labour leader is somewhat less powerful than the Conservative leader, but he (no woman has been Labour leader as yet), too, appoints members of the government when the party is in power and to specific positions held by shadow cabinet members when the party is in opposition. The power to determine the content of the manifesto of the party when an election is about to take place is shared between the leader and the NEC, but the influence of the leader predominates. In practice the policy of the party is made by the leader and his entourage, although much effort has to be deployed to avoid as far as possible "rebellions" from backbench MPs; these have indeed been rather numerous under Blair and Brown (who was Blair's successor between 2007 and 2010) in the first decade of the twenty-first century, in particular, but not only, on the question of the Iraq war.

Programs and Ideologies

The programs and the ideology of the parties that are studied in this chapter are based essentially on the findings of the study of party "manifestos" elaborated by Ian Budge and his colleagues.[6]

Moments at Which the Program Is Adopted
Party programs are formally approved a few weeks before each general election in the form of a "manifesto." This program is issued by the "party," but in effect written by and around the leader in all three cases.

Are the Programs of the Relevant Parties Specific or Vague?
The manifestos of the parties are specific and in some cases very detailed. However, many aspects of the financing (or of the reductions in expenditure) proposed by the parties are rather vague, and newly installed governments typically introduce policies that were neither described precisely nor even mentioned specifically in the manifesto. There is also always considerable leeway for varying the proposals that were made. It is typically said that elections give governments a "mandate" and that such a mandate coincides with what is in the manifesto, that it to say, that the government must fulfill but not go beyond what is in the manifesto: the reality is somewhat distinct from that theory.

Description of the Policy Areas Covered
Manifestos cover all aspects of home affairs and many aspects of foreign affairs, especially with respect to the line that the party is to take regarding the European Union. The results of the "Manifesto study" showed that while the length of the Labour and Libdem programs increased overall between 1992 and 2005, with a peak in 2001, the length of Conservative program decreased regularly and indeed markedly throughout the period: the 2005 Conservative program was only a third of the size of the Labour program in that year. Meanwhile, while economic and social matters occupied jointly about half the whole space in 1992 in all three parties, that percentage decreased in all of them as well, though just a little in the Labour case and markedly more in the Libdem and Conservative cases, where economic and social matters occupied a little more than a third of the total space in 2005.

Does the Program Emphasize an Ideology?
The Conservative Party program, in particular since Margaret Thatcher, does emphasize an ideology. The Labour Party's ideology has also been manifest, but it changed drastically from the mid-1990s, as will be examined shortly. The nature of the ideology of the Liberal Democrats is less clear: it can be argued that such an ideology

does not exist and that the party oscillates between the two major parties and attempts to support the issues that appear to be most popular at the time of a given election.

The Nature of the Ideology

The ideology of the Conservative Party is markedly in favor of private enterprise, while that of the Labour Party moved from being ostensibly "Socialistic" (though more in theory than in fact when the party was in government from the mid-1960s); it became appreciably more "moderate" from the mid-1990s as is described in the next subsection.

Have Changes Taken Place in the Ideology of the Relevant Parties?

As was indicated in the introductory section of this chapter, there have been major changes in the ideology of the two major British parties, while no such change can be detected in the ideology of the Liberal Party (an ideology that at best remains rather unclear). The Conservative Party, under Margaret Thatcher, that is to say, in the 1980s, strongly adopted a strict proprivate enterprise ideology. There was consequently large-scale privatization of public bodies, while, on the contrary, these had scarcely been touched when the Conservative Party was firmly in power between 1951 and 1964: thus, in the 1980s, the coal mines, gas, electricity, British telecom, British Airways, even the railways ceased to be run by public bodies. This policy was combined with an emphasis on "deregulation," based on the notion that private enterprise would be at its best if it was not subjected to control or even serious supervision. The social services were not markedly affected, but were not markedly praised either. There was a frontal attack against the trade unions, whose powers were strongly reduced, in order to ensure that there be no repetition of the strikes and other disruptive actions of the 1970s, with a hard battle being fought and won against the miners' union. The Conservative leader and her close entourage were the true initiators and indeed the most determined actors of these policies, policies that were wholeheartedly approved by the Conservative conference, but only after some time had elapsed and in particular after shares in the new private companies were made widely available and very profitable to a large public.

The key changes in the ideology of the Labour Party occurred in the mid-1990s; they were the result of the strong pressure of Tony Blair (who became leader of the party in 1994) and of a small number of

his close associates, although some steps had begun to be taken under Neil Kinnock's and John Smith's leadership: this was so in particular of the decision that "one man one vote" would henceforth replace the classic arrangement by which party decisions were taken in the NEC of the party by union leaders and representatives of the small groups running the local constituency parties. The new ideology, which was symbolized by the expression New Labour, was based on the notion that private enterprise was to be fully recognized; the privatizations of the previous Conservative administrations would, therefore, not be touched. The main positive theme was that the public services were to be expanded in order to benefit better the disadvantaged elements of society; they would also be rendered markedly more accountable. The emphasis was on improvements in the effectiveness of the Health Service, of schools (which are run not by the state but by local authorities in Britain), and of the police, which is operated by a number of independent constabularies. The aim was also to make private companies more devoted to the needs of the community at large and cater to the needs of their employees—on the basis of the notion that these employees should become "stakeholders" in the firms for which they worked. This approach was popular for a number of years, but it was unable to overcome the major economic crisis that originated in the United States in 2008–2009, while major difficulties had already emerged as Tony Blair and the Labour government had become involved in the Iraq war from 2003.

Party Leadership and the Questions of Personalized Leadership and of Populism

Party Leadership

Britain is probably one of the first parliamentary democracies (if not *the* first) to have systematically developed the notion that each party should have a "leader" and that this leader should be in charge of the government (including by means of appointment of members of the cabinet) or, if in opposition, of organizing the political battle that would result in the opposition becoming in turn the government. As a result, the notion of "leadership" (that English word having been adopted in many languages!) is wholly embedded in both the formal and informal arrangements of all the British parties. While, in many countries, the key issue is who is appointed as prime minister because the person who holds that position exercises many powers, including

in his party, by virtue of that position, what is critical in Britain is, on the contrary, the fact that the parties appoint their leader irrespective of what will eventually occur to such a leader.

It follows that leaders are typically selected for reasons that have to do with politics within the party and not with, for instance, the broader question as to whether that leader might or might not be acceptable to other parties (a point that might begin to be relevant if coalitions become common practice). It also follows that the ups and downs of leaders trail behind the fate of the party of which they are the heads and, in particular, that the results of general elections have a marked influence on the extent to which a given person can remain leader. The situation in the Conservative Party (and even the Liberal Democrats) in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century provides examples of the close relationship between the maintenance of a leader in office and the electoral success of that leader's party.[7]

Reasons for Changes of Leader

Conservatives: Margaret Thatcher was replaced in 1990 by John Major, who remained seven years in office, but was defeated in 1997. Four leaders were tried by the Conservative Party while in opposition between 1997 and 2010 and only the fourth, David Cameron, was successful in dislodging Labour: the previous three resigned on the grounds that they were not up to the task! The details are as follows:

- Margaret Thatcher was forced out in 1990 by a rebellion from parliamentarians, after having been prime minister for 11 years;
- John Major resigned having lost the 1997 election very badly;
- William Hague resigned for having lost the 2001 election badly;
- Iain Duncan-Smith was felt to be inadequate to the task of challenging Labour and was forced to resign;
- Michael Howard resigned for having led the Conservatives to their third electoral defeat in a row in 2005.

Labour: Neil Kinnock resigned for not having been able to dislodge the Conservatives, while Gordon Brown was accused of having been unable to provide clear and strong leadership. The details are as follows:

- Neil Kinnock resigned for not having been able to win the 1992 election;

- John Smith died of a heart attack in 1994;
- Tony Blair resigned after having been ten years in power, but his resignation was in part due to pressure from Brown on the basis of an alleged deal that had been made by the two of them;
- Gordon Brown resigned after having lost the 2010 election.

Libdem: Only Patrick Ashdown remained as leader on the basis of the tradition of the party. His two immediate successors were forced out on various grounds, but basically because they did not succeed in dislodging the two main parties. The details are as follows:

- Patrick Ashdown resigned after having been 11 years leader of the party;
- Charles Kennedy was forced out as he appeared insufficiently strong and "charismatic" as leader;
- Menzies Campbell was forced out of office, partly on being allegedly too old.

Occupational Characteristics of Leaders of the Relevant Parties

The occupational background of the leaders of all three parties was basically middle class, except for Neil Kinnock, who had been a trade union organizer. Lawyers played a major part, but alongside journalists and managers.[8]

Personalized Leadership and the Question of Populism

Personalized leadership is a complex and indeed highly controversial issue in the field of electoral behavior. In the British case, received opinion among specialists has been for a very long time that there was little value in studying personalization as overwhelming evidence seemed to be that personalities had little effect on the result of elections. This view was somewhat reinforced by the fact that personalization tended to be examined exclusively at the level of the direct relationship between leaders and electors and not in terms of the other two aspects of the problem, namely the effect leaders may have on the members of their party and (possibly consequently) on the policies adopted by their party. It is also none the less true that it is difficult to find indicators that can enable researchers to distinguish *clearly* between the impact of the leader as a person and the impact of the party, either as such or in view of its policies: this is so because, in many cases, such a distinction is indeed obscure in the minds of many electors—and specifically of many of those who are interviewed. As we shall see, some efforts have

been made successfully in this direction in the election studies that have been undertaken form the late 1990s, however.

The Personalized British Leaders and the Indicators Used to Determine that Personalized Character

The British party leaders about whom it seems permissible to suggest that they were the object of a significant dose of personalization during the 1990–2010 period are Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. As a matter of fact, the personalization effect of Margaret Thatcher scarcely belongs to the period, since her downfall occurred at the end of 1990 and the decline of her influence had taken place somewhat earlier; yet she had ostensibly such an effect on the characteristics of the Conservative Party and of British politics in general that it would seem absurd not to consider her case at all. Meanwhile, Tony Blair's personalized influence—and decline—occurred entirely during the period of the current analysis.

The indicators selected have been (1) answers to survey questions that isolate the *direct* influence of the leader from the influence of the party (such indicators appear to have been used or at least analyzed primarily in connection with Blair's leadership); (2) manifestations of support for the leader within the party, essentially at Conference but also when, as in the case of Blair, decisions relating to the structure of the party directly originate from the leader (together with his close entourage, admittedly) and; (3) the extent of support for specific policies that were put forward by the leader against what were the previous—unpopular—party policies. These three sets of indicators may not amount to a precise determination, and especially the last two may not lead to a quantification of the extent to which the impact of the leader is (or was) personalized; they do at least provide an impression of whether there was likely to have been influence and of what extent that impact may have been.

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred Directly (i.e., Primarily at Election Times) with Respect to the Electorate at Large?

The question of the direct impact of leaders on the electorate at large has been studied with care in Britain, in part because of the long presence at the helm of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and of Tony Blair from 1997 to 2007 and in part because these two leaders emerged in a country context in which, at any rate since World War II, "received academic opinion" had tended to minimize the role of personalities on electoral behavior. It was even suggested that across Western Europe

the direct impact of leaders was typically small. This view has come to be somewhat revised, and sophisticated statistical analyses of voting patterns at the 2001 and 2005 elections in Britain have made it possible to determine that there has been an impact of the leader as a personality as distinct from the impact of the factors which that are typically taken into consideration, such as the background of electors, issues, or party identification.[9]

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred with Respect to Party Members?

The impact of leaders on party members has not been assessed in the same rigorous manner. However, both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair benefited ostensibly from strong support, indeed enthusiasm, among at least a large number of members: the fact that the Labour Party membership agreed by referendum to abolish the "Clause 4" of the constitution on the nationalization of "means of production, distribution, and exchange" appears to provide clear evidence of the influence of the leader on that membership; this is so, even if the majority was small, given the fact that the clause had been regarded as untouchable for decades.

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred with Respect to the Elaboration and Adoption of Party Programs (Indirect Influence on the Electorate)?

There are clear signs that both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair put forward and ensured the adoption of novel party policies that their predecessors had not tried or had failed to obtain. In the case of Margaret Thatcher, there is no doubt about her major influence in changing the policies of the Conservative Party with respect to privatization: such policies had not been tried before and, indeed, were received at first with a degree of skepticism: it was she and her close associates who saw to it that these became part of the program of the party. These policies were indeed associated with a general emphasis on strong competition across the whole economy that came to be regarded as a new "ideology." This was recorded by Ian Budge and his collaborators as indicating a substantial movement to the Right on the part of the Conservative Party.[10] The fact that this movement is to be attributed primarily to Margaret Thatcher appears undeniable.

The same kind of comment can be made about the part played by Tony Blair both in modifying the structure of the party and in

seeing to it that the party was able to adopt new policies favoring competition. The point about the structure has just been made in relation to the attitude of the membership; the support given by New Labour to competition as a general mechanism regulating economic and even social relations was also novel and indeed went markedly against the approach the Labour Party had previously adopted. There seems, therefore, no doubt that, in that manner, indirectly, Tony Blair created conditions that enabled the party to acquire for a decade a dominating position in British politics, despite the negative feelings engendered among many Labour supporters by the war in Iraq.

Which Leaders Have Adopted a Populist Discourse?

Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Tony Blair adopted a populist discourse. The only leader who might have gone to some extent in that direction—though it is not clear that he benefited from the use of such a discourse—was Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrats' leader at the time of the 2010 general election, during TV debates among the three main party leaders in the weeks preceding the election. He repeatedly suggested that it was the function of parties and of their leaders to be at the disposal of those from the audience who made suggestions. He was thus going to the extreme opposite of the Burkian viewpoint according to which representative government was based on the principle that MPs (and by extension party leaders) were to make up their minds independently from whatever pressure they were subjected to, while indeed attempting to convince electors of the validity of their standpoint.

* * *

Most interestingly, the general election of 2010 suggested that British politics were perhaps at a major turning point. Not enough has occurred to suggest that the coalition established in the spring of that year can tell decisively what the future will be. There are indeed still very strong elements that pull in the traditional direction, and among these the dominance of the two major parties, even if they have declined, the first-past-the-post electoral system, even if it is criticized, and, most importantly, a political culture based on century-long notions that there should be "ins and outs" and that there is a need for a united "team" that is fully in charge. It may well be that the 2010 coalition will not be able to finish its five-year term; it may be that even if it finishes that term, there will be such divisions

between the two parties that the idea of continuing along the same lines becomes unrealistic. Only time will tell.

Yet enough changes have taken place and these have sufficiently undermined the foundations of the British political system to lead to the conclusion that it is not preposterous to ask whether, in some sense, the country will not become politically more similar to its geographical neighbors on the continent, if not perhaps The Netherlands, at least Germany. Britain may thus enter a period of "accommodation" in politics, if not of full consensus, and it might abandon the practices of purely "adversarial" party battles. With the electoral decline of the two main parties, with the recognition that the politics of "class" can no longer be the basis for confrontation, some of the "pillars" of the system and some of the underlying ideological support for these pillars may gradually become wholly undermined: the British political system may, therefore, cease to be regarded as characterized by something that it has ceased to be in reality, namely that it is the "textbook" example of a two-party system!

Notes

1. Appendix 2.A.
2. S. Driver and L. Martell, *New Labour* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
3. R. S. Katz and P. Mair (eds.), *How Parties Organize* (London: Sage, 1994), 113 (Appendix 2.C).
4. K. D. Ewing, *The Costs of Democracy* (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
5. Ibid.
6. Ian Budge, H. D. Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, *Mapping Policy Preferences, Estimates for Parties, Governments and Electors 1945–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The faithful support of the electors to "their" parties has been replaced by greater attention given by electors to issues, a move that was helped by the fact that the media in practice obliged parties to clarify their policies. Thanks to the determined efforts of a group of political scientists, led By Professor Budge, the content of party "manifestos" has been systematically recorded and classified. It has thus become possible to trace the evolution of party programs throughout the second half of the twentieth century and consequently to assess the extent to which party ideology has come to be modified over time. Two volumes have analyzed the complex technical problems that needed to be overcome to render comparisons possible and to summarize cross-national findings. While the scope of these inquiries already goes markedly beyond Western Europe, they are being gradually extended further to all the countries in which party competition at elections genuinely takes place.

7. Appendix 2.E.
8. Appendix 2.F.
9. See, for instance, Anthony King (ed.), *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
10. D. Sanders, Clarke, H., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. "The Economy and Voting," in Pippa Norris (ed.), *Britain Votes 2001* (*Hansard Society Series in Politics and Government*) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and G. Evans and R. Andersen, "The Impact of Party Leaders," in P. Norris and C. Wlezien (eds.), *Britain Votes 2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

3

France

Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault

Introduction

The party systems of Western European countries are well-known to be very different from one another. In particular, while Britain's has remained nominally a two-party system, largely thanks to the "first-past-the-post" electoral law, France has had a multiparty system, although the trend has been for a "coalition" of the Right to be set against a "coalition" of the Left and these two coalitions have alternated in office.

Meanwhile, while French parties had been traditionally weak: they became boosted for a while in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but that new strength was largely due to the power of the president of the Republic, elected by universal suffrage since 1962, over the executive and even to an extent over the legislature. The presidential election thus became the key event in national politics, with political strategies being elaborated in the context of that election and with the indirect consequence that French politics started to be "bipolar" in character. Without a candidate who might be a serious competitor at the presidential election, political parties scarcely exist. The presidential election thus leads to the "presidentialization" of political parties.[1] When Chirac became leader of the UDR, then the RPR, power was concentrated in the hands of the president of the party. In the Socialist party, while new rules were aimed at "break centralization," the result was the opposite because the first secretary of the party was the potential candidate for the presidential elections. Meanwhile, new parties

remained too small to be really "relevant," except for that "doyen" of the Far Right parties in Europe, the National Front; but even this was scarcely a new party by 1990 since it had begun its "career" in 1972, on a small scale for a decade, admittedly.

While parties in Western Europe were held in the past to have been very strong in the large majority of countries, France was a well-known exception. Unlike elsewhere in the area, they did not have large numbers of members and many of their supporters did not remain faithful to them. Thus French parties were paradoxically probably less eroded than those of neighboring countries by the end of the twentieth century, their original base having been markedly less strong than was that of parties elsewhere. They may have also been partly helped by the fact that finance was provided by the state, both at election times and on a yearly basis.

Turnout at General Elections

There has always been a difference between a much larger turnout at presidential elections, which are held to be the "key" elections in France, especially at the second ballot, than at the parliamentary elections: the gap could even be as large as 20 percent. Moreover, while a notable decline occurred during the 1990–2010 period in the turnout at parliamentary elections, especially since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a similar movement that had begun to occur at presidential elections was stopped in 2007 when turnout turned to be as large as it had been in 1988 (table 3.1).[2]

The Electoral System

The French presidential and parliamentary elections that took place between 1990 and 2012 were all based on the same two-ballot single-member majority system.[3]

The Parties

Five Main Political Forces in France at the End of the Twentieth Century

During the Fifth Republic, set up under the initiative of De Gaulle in 1958, a marked tendency toward the concentration around two forces occurred, those of the Gaullist party (which changed its name

Table 3.1 Turnout at presidential and National Assembly elections percentage of votes obtained by the relevant parties in France

Year	*1988*	*1995*	*2002*	*2007*	*2012*
Presidential elections					
Turnout (%)					
First ballot	81.4	78.4	71.6	83.9	79.48
Second ballot	84.2	79.7	79.7	84.0	80.35
Percentage of votes					
First ballot					
Hollande					28.63
Mitterrand	34.1				
Chirac	20.0	20.8	19.0		
Barre	16.5				
Jospin		23.3	16.2		
Balladur		18.6			
Le Pen			16.9		17.90
Sarkozy				31.2	27.18
(Mme) Royal				25.9	
Bayrou				18.6	9.13
Second ballot					
Hollande					51.64
Mitterrand	54.0				
Chirac	46.0	52.6	82.2		
Barre	–				
Jospin		47.4	–		
Balladur		–			
Le Pen			17.8		
Sarkozy				53.1	48.36
(Mrs) Royal				46.9	
Bayrou				–	

Year	*1988*	*1993*	*1997*	*2002*	*2007*
National assembly elections					
Turnout (%)					
First ballot	65.7	68.9	68.0	64.4	60.4
Second ballot	69.9	67.5	71.1	60.3	60.1
Seats (% of votes)					
RPR	126 (19.1)	245 (20.4)	139 (16.9)		
UDF	129 (18.5)	213 (19.8)	109 (14.7)		
FN	0 (9.7)	0 (12.4)	1 (15.1)	0 (11.1)	0 (4.3)
PS	275 (34.7)	54 (17.6)	241 (21.5)	149 (23.8)	206 (24.7)
PC	25 (11.3)	23 (9.2)	39 (9.9)	19 (4.9)	24 (4.3)
UMP				359 (33.3)	320 (39.5)
Modem				29 (4.9)	23 (2.4)
Other	22 (6.7)	42 (20.8)	48 (21.9)	21 (22.0)	4 (24.8)

Source: Constitutional Council of the French Republic

several times and became known as the Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle [UMP] in 2002), on the one hand, and, on the other, of the Socialist party, which was revitalized by Mitterrand in the 1970s. There were three other significant parties during much of the life of the Fifth Republic, moreover: the oldest was the Communist party, which declined markedly from obtaining over 25 percent of the votes before 1958 to a minuscule 3 or 4 percent in the twenty-first century. The second was what had been a fairly successful centrist political "grouping"—rather than a party as such—the Union pour la Democratie francaise (UDF), at any rate until several of its components merged with the UMP in 2004, as only a fraction remained independent under the name of "Mouvement democratique" or "Modem." The third of these forces was the Extreme right-wing Front National (FN), which was created in 1972 but remained very weak until the 1980s. The other parties that emerged during the period under consideration were electorally much smaller (garnering under 10 percent of the votes); indeed, despite the fact that it obtained from the mid-1980s 10 percent of the votes and even somewhat more, the FN was scarcely represented at all in parliament, except when proportional representation was briefly introduced between 1986 and 1988.

Thus, although several new parties were set up during the 1990–2010 period, none was "relevant" in the terms of the study (10 percent of the votes and 5 percent of the members of parliament at least in one general election): this was due almost certainly, in part at least, to the two-ballot electoral system, which favored the main parties and in particular the top two among them.

Two-party "mergers" occurred during the period: (1) The Gaullist party was known successively as the Union pour la Nouvelle Republique (UNR) from 1958 to 1968, as Union pour la Defense de la Republique, then Union des Democrates pour la Republique (UDR), from 1968 to 1976, as the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) from 1976 to 2002, and as the UMP since 2002. This last development occurred in order to enable a merger to take place with a substantial majority of the UDF in the hope (which only partly materialized) that there would henceforth be a single Center-Right party in the country. (2) The UDF was set up in 1978, officially as a "federation," but in effect as an electoral alliance among a number of parties and "clubs" with a view to helping those of the Center-Right who were rather more in favor of economic liberalism than the Gaullists and were also markedly more supporting the European integration process than the Gaullist party was at the time. Thus the various components of the UDF, each of them typically highly dependent on their leader, remained in existence;

the most important of these was probably the Parti republicain (PR) set up by Giscard d'Estaing in 1977 when he was the president of the Republic and renamed Democratie liberale (DL) in 1997. While a large number of UDF members and prominent politicians joined the UMP in 2002, a minority led by Bayrou, who had been head of the UDF since 1998, remained independent from the UMP and became the Mouvement democratique or Modem, which was set up as a unitary party in 2007; but this obtained only 5 percent of the votes in the parliamentary election of 2007, which followed the new arrangement. The above discussion is summarized in Palgrave website.[4]

"Apparent" Effect of New Parties on the Results of Older Parties

As pointed out earlier, no new relevant party emerged between 1990 and 2010, despite hopes in some Extreme Left quarters that a new organization (Left Front) might succeed at the polls (and in effect replace the old Parti Communiste [PC]). The FN did have an apparent impact on the parties of the Right and Left: it has been argued that the Communist party lost markedly as a result of the FN, but the bulk of the effect did occur before the 1990s as the FN had reached double figures by then. Going further back, one should point out that the regeneration of the Socialist party (which was formally presented as a "new" Socialist party) by Mitterrand in the 1970s also had the effect of reducing the appeal of the Communist party as well as of Center groups, one of which Mitterrand himself had been a prominent member.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of the Membership

Except for the Communist party, French parties had long been notoriously weak and ill-organized. The arrival on the scene of the Gaullist party, in a first wave in 1947 and in a second in 1958, had the effect of streamlining the Right, but only for a period: the emergence of the PR of Giscard d'Estaing (who was to be president of the Republic between 1974 and 1981) was an indication of the problems the Gaullist party was having to face and from which it never fully recovered: the rather low percentages the Gaullist party achieved under Chirac (except when every other party united behind him in order to stop Le Pen at the second ballot of the 2002 election) showed that the traditional political divisions of the French continued to play a part, although the overall Right-Left "cleavage" remained *the* key characteristic of national political contests: the role of the second ballot at parliamentary and presidential elections was very important in this respect. Not surprisingly, party membership has typically been

very low, and individual "celebrities" played a significant part in each party in rendering unity difficult to achieve.[5]

French political parties have always been divided into "currents" or "factions." Currents were discredited in the Socialist party in 1990, but they persisted: currents have their own network and their clientele. Even the Gaullist party, which used the majority system in order to avoid current and was based on personal allegiance to the president, started having currents, partly because the party wanted to integrate other organizations. Yet the party does remain based on a culture of unity.[6]

Decision Role of Members: Primaries

A marked reduction of the role of members in the central organs of the parties is noticeable as one moves from the two extremes to the Center of the political firmament. The relevant parties at both extremes of the Right-Left divide, the FN and the PC, have been highly centralized and typically dominated by the top. The two parties in the Center-Right and the Center-Left, Gaullists and Socialists, have attempted a difficult equilibrium between the power of the Center and the role of local bodies and of local personalities. The political grouping at the Center of the political firmament, the UDF, has shown little propensity to adopt a united organization until it was markedly reduced in strength in 2002–2004 as a result of the strong pull of the UMP on many members, including key supporters.

In the FN and, in practice, albeit in a different manner, in the PC, members have or have had very little part to play. There is a congress in both parties, that of the FN meeting every three years and having about 1,500 members, while the Communist congress has met more irregularly during the period (1994, 2000, 2001, and 2003). In the FN, the function of the congress is to listen to the president and to elect the central committee and the president; in the Communist party, late twentieth century and early twenty-first century congresses have been markedly more open than their predecessors: in 2001, it was agreed that decisions did not have to be taken on a unanimous basis, while the importance of the lowest unit on which the Communist party was based, the "cell," was markedly reduced. There is little opening of the role of the congress in the FN, where direct allegiance to the president has been the norm, except that a split occurred in 1999, with an entirely new party being created. Le Pen did succeed, however, in limiting markedly the resulting loss to the FN, which continued to be the Extreme Right party with by far greatest electoral appeal.

Some changes have taken place in these two centralized parties. In the National Front, Le Pen abandoned the presidency in 2011: he was replaced by his daughter (Marine Le Pen) who was elected with two-thirds of the votes in a contested primary within the party, a contest that contrasted with the unanimous reelection that characterized Le Pen's regime. A hundred members of the central committee of the party were also elected, while they were previously appointed by the party congress (although a further twenty were appointed by the party president). Also, there is change in the Communist party: new rules were approved by the party congress in October 2010, with pluralism being the principle and the leader being appointed by the congress. The appointment of the party organization by members was one of the most contested proposals at the party congress. There is always more balance between center and periphery in the Socialist party and, in particular since the 1990s, in the Gaullist party.

Such events had occurred much earlier in the Socialist party, including under Mitterrand's presidency, from 1981 to 1995. Although Mitterrand succeeded in strengthening the role of the Center in the new Socialist party from the 1970s by comparison with what had occurred in its predecessor organizations in the 1950s and 1960s, congresses have been the scene of major debates. A move in the direction of "primaries" occurred in the Socialist party as well at the end of the "Mitterrand years" in order to select the presidential candidate of the party: this ended the classical view in that party that indirect elections at various levels within the party should be preferred to referendums and direct democracy in general.[7] There were stages in the process, the presidential candidate of the party being selected for the first time in a competitive election in 1995 within the party: Jospin won by two-thirds of the votes of the members, after a brief campaign. The campaign was longer in 2007 (six weeks instead of two); there was an increase of members for the occasion (over 200,000 members), and Segolene Royal won by three-fifths of the voters of the 82 percent of the members who voted. In October 2011, there was an open primary for the selection of the socialist candidate for the 2012 presidential election. This was the first primary to be open to the general electorate. There were six candidates in the first round of the vote. The two candidates with the most votes contested a runoff election. François Hollande won the primary with 56 percent of the votes.

Originally, the Gaullist party was entirely leader-based. De Gaulle saw it as a "movement" rather than as a party. There were meetings of the party at large, known as "assises," taking place every two years,

but that word by itself indicated that the UNR was not a "classical" party: these assises had no influence, at any rate no formal role in the decision-making process. In fact it took almost 20 years after the departure of De Gaulle in 1969 for the party to adopt a constitution that would render the organization increasingly similar to that of ordinary parties and, for instance, the Socialist party. In 1990, there came to be two different "motions" in the "congress," the "opposition" obtaining nearly a third of the votes overall. In 1998, a procedure was adopted for the election of the party president by the members of the party. A reform was also planned by which the "political committee" of the party would also be elected. There were four candidates at the first ballot, two at the second with Mrs Alliot-Marie being elected with almost two-thirds of the votes of the members. The founders of the UMP were also in favor of direct election of the party president and the presidential candidate in 2002. Juppe was elected with almost four-fifths of the votes. In 2007, Sarkozy was appointed party president. There is no longer a party president of the UMP, however, since Sarkozy became president of the Republic in that year.

Territorial Coverage of the "Relevant" Parties

All five relevant parties examined here have attempted to cover the whole territory of the nation: differences in electoral strength were naturally marked, however, not just at constituency level but in broader geographical terms. Thus the FN had greater electoral strength in the eastern half of the country than in the west, but this was in no way a deliberate policy of the leadership. The Communist party's strength was increasingly related to the constituencies in which it had, for instance, a successful mayor. UDF personalities ensured that they did not compete against each other at the level of their constituency, at any rate up to the parliamentary election of 2007, when, with the absorption of many of these personalities in the UMP, the much more united but also much smaller Modem proved unable to elect more than a much reduced number of members of parliament. It should be noted that the presidential election also contributed to the nationalization of politics, as there are no constituencies in that election, while local constituency issues can play a part in the parliamentary elections.

Party Finance

Receipts of the five relevant parties for 2009 are described in Appendix 3.D in the Palgrave website (from the thirteenth report of

the "Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques").[8] This report takes into account even the tiny parties, in addition to parties, clubs, associations through which donations and public finance did part. The report mentions 296 political bodies, 40 of which were legally entitled to receive public support. These figures show the substantial part played by state financing, indeed in the case of all five parties, but, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, appreciably more for those on the Right and Center than for those on the Left.

National Decision Organs of the Parties

As was pointed out earlier, the congress has played a significant part in the decision-making process in the Socialist party traditionally, while it also came to play a part in the Gaullist party from the 1990s and, to an extent at least, even in Communist party from the turn of the twenty-first century.

RPR/UMP

The assises of the party thus constituted a mechanism by which a degree of discussion occurred in the party. There is a central committee, which decides on the general line of the party, but the real decision makers are found among the top echelons of the leadership and, more and more, in the parliamentary party, especially in the newly set up UMP, in particular under Sarkozy since 2007, as a result of a constitutional reform that gave more power to parliament. Overall, however, the Gaullist party remains understructured, so to speak, the party in the country having limited influence, except indirectly through the members of parliament.

UDF

So long as a large number of its members were not absorbed in or at least closely linked to the Gaullist party at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the UDF was essentially an alliance brought together by the pressure of the Gaullists on its Right and of the Socialists on its Left. It was primarily an association between the "liberals" from the Republican party that was subsequently renamed Liberal Democracy and the "Christian Democrats" who had lost their party when the French Christian Democratic Party, the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP), disappeared in the early years of the Fifth Republic. Up to 1991, there was an appointed national council

of the UDF, which elected the president and was assisted by a "bureau national"; the national council came to be partly elected in 1991 and in 1995 the president of the UDF was also to be elected by the members. The Liberals were dissatisfied and left, which resulted in the Christians, led by Bayrou, pressing for the party to be given a unitary structure. In reality, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the UDF had in effect disintegrated and had been replaced by a unified, but much smaller Mouvement democratique (or Modem), which had as a result the characteristics of a party.

FN

The congress of the FN is dominated by Le Pen; however, in 1997, a challenge to Le Pen's leadership occurred as a result of the election to congress of a number of prominent members wishing to participate in the decision-making process. After a year and a half of a degree of acrimony, the "opposition" left and created a competitive organization (MNR): this turned out to be an unsuccessful move as only a small proportion of electors followed. Le Pen thus continued to run the party and its main organs, that is to say, apart from the congress, a national council of 120 members, partly elected by the congress and partly co-opted, which meets three times a year, and the key executive body, a political bureau of 49 members, elected by the national council. Moreover, there is also an "executive bureau" composed of personalities very close to Le Pen who is periodically reelected unopposed president of the party.

PS

The Socialist party is one of the oldest French parties; it played a significant part before World War I and between the two wars: the 1936 election led to a victory of the Left and resulted in the appointment of the first ever French Socialist prime minister, Leon Blum. The party played an important part in postwar politics up to 1958, but almost collapsed when De Gaulle set up the Fifth Republic, a development the Socialist party opposed. Mitterrand was to be the leader who reconstituted the Socialist party (although he had come from non-Socialist origins): the 10 years before 1981, when Mitterrand was elected president for the first time, saw the gradual "re-creation" of the Socialist party. Yet this re-creation did not mean that the party became a genuine mass party at the level of the membership; indeed, the key characteristic of the Socialist party is the importance that it has at the local level. This constitutes the basis on which a number

of key personalities of the party can play a major part in congresses and form currents or factions, which find themselves represented to an extent in the executive committee (comite directeur) of the party, a body elected on a proportional representation basis, an executive committee that remained dominated by Mitterrand as long as he was president. The politicoadministrative structure of the party is headed by the first secretary who obviously has to play a complicated game with the leaders of the various factions.

Some of the currents are clearly of the Left or of the Right, but even these are largely based on the appeal of well-known "tenors" of the party (often referred to as "elephants") whose really strong base is local; the various motions proposed at the congress then often come to be merged in an effort to produce a majority. The local and regional roots largely account for the fact that the party can have great successes at some types of elections (local or regional in particular) and not at other levels (such as national or European ones). They also account for the fact that despite differences at congresses, the party remains relatively united in parliament or over national issues.

PC

The Communist party is the other French party that can trace its existence back to the interwar period. It was based on a highly centralized structure that, up to the 1990s, prevented internal divisions from emerging on the surface, but did not prevent exclusions or resignations from taking place. Nor was that centralization able to stop what seemed to be an inexorable decline of the party from the moment De Gaulle returned to power in 1958 and even more from the election of Mitterrand to the presidency in 1981.

Yet the party did try to counter that decline by giving up the rule that members had to obey without questioning the decisions taken at the top, that is to say, by the central committee (renamed national council in 2000) elected by the congress, by the political bureau (renamed "college executif") appointed by the national council, and by the general secretary (renamed national secretary) appointed by the congress. As a matter of fact, it was noted in 2000 by the national secretary, Hue, that "two-thirds of the basic units, the cells, did not function."[9] Finally, in 2001, it was agreed by the congress that decisions taken by the party need no longer be taken on a unanimous basis. There were as a result competing resolutions proposed at the 2003 congress, and the new national secretary, Mme Buffet, was elected by 75 percent of the votes "only." Yet neither these moves, nor

the endeavor to modify the policy of the party that will be examined in the next section, did prevent the continued decline of the party at subsequent elections.

Programs and Ideologies

The programs and ideology of the parties studied here are based essentially on the findings of the study of party "manifestos" elaborated by Budge and his colleagues.[10]

Moment at Which the Program Is Adopted

The question of the moment when the election program is adopted is complicated in the French case by the fact that presidential elections dominate the timetable over and above parliamentary elections. This was the case ever since the beginning of the Fifth Republic because of the major national stature of De Gaulle, first, but also by the national part played by his early successors, and especially by Mitterrand. Since then, the fact that the presidential mandate has been reduced from seven to five years from the 2002 election has meant that parliamentary elections follow immediately and are, therefore, directly influenced by the tone and policy content of the presidential campaign. This has indeed been the case in 2007, as that election was the first genuine test of the new system: in 2002, the presidential fight at the second ballot was between Chirac, the incumbent, and Le Pen, since the Socialist candidate, Jospin, had come third at the first ballot and was, therefore, eliminated. In 2007–2012, Sarkozy and Mme Royal, then Sarkozy and Hollande were the candidates of the two major parties, the UMP and the Parti Socialiste (PS), and the lines taken by these two candidates markedly influenced the tone and content of the parliamentary election process as well. It seems, therefore that, in practice, the moment when the presidential candidates are selected, especially in the case of the (two) most relevant parties, will be the moment when the program is in effect announced: as a thumb rule, this is likely to be about a year before the date of the presidential (and parliamentary) elections.

Is the Program Specific or Vague?

The presidential program has typically been expected to appeal to "all the French" and to be stronger in emotional comments than in detailed policy promises. Parliamentary election programs, which are technically finally adopted just before the election campaign begins, have tended to be more policy-specific than presidential programs,

but the difference between the two types may perhaps disappear, with presidential and parliamentary elections closely following each other.

These party programs have tended to be rather less precise than those of other European countries, if one judges by their relative length: this is so of all the programs with the single exception of the FN program of 1993, which was longer than that of the program of any of the relevant parties up to and including those of the 2002 election. Overall, party programs were indeed particularly short in all the parties for the 1997 election, perhaps because parliament was dissolved rather abruptly by the president of the Republic.

Policy Areas Covered

An analysis of the coverage of the manifestos that were published in relation to the elections of 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2007 showed that the combined proportion of these documents devoted to economic and social matters declined appreciably in four of the parties analyzed here. But, with the economic and financiel crisis, the part devoted to economic and social issues became more important for the 2012 elections. In 1993 about half or a little more of the manifestos were devoted to issues in these two broad fields in four of the five parties (the proportion was even of two-thirds in the case of the UDF—where the manifesto was the shortest, however); only under a quarter of the manifesto of the FN was devoted to issues of this type. Overall, in 1993, the programmatic "supply" was limited. Some programs remained unnoticed, notably that of the Socialists: there was no longer confrontation as in the 1980s.

The trend was the same in 1997. For the RPR-UDF the strategic choice was on the reduction of public expenditure, while there was also emphasis on employment and about the key role of the France in the European Union. Meanwhile, the Socialists talked about a choice of "civilization," with 22 commitments in 4 chapters. The NF was based on social justice, priority for the French, and the republican order, while the Communist party referred to five axes of change.

By 2002, the proportion of the manifesto that was devoted to these issues had risen to 40 percent in the FN manifesto. Meanwhile, it had come to be under 40 percent in the UDF and the newly created UMP; only in the Socialist party was the decline very small (49 percent instead of 53 percent), while it was substantial even in the case of the Communist party (from 54 to 41 percent). By 2002, the electoral

competition gave the impression of a race for the centrist voters. The proximity of the standpoints is striking. The Socialist Jospin referred to his "engagement" while the RPR Chirac talked about his "engagement for France."

Does the Program of the Party Emphasize an Ideology?

The only party program that did not emphasize an ideology during the period under consideration was that of the UDF, although this is primarily because the UDF was a grouping of different parties with different origins, despite the fact that they were all from the political Center. The ideology of the Gaullist party was connected with a certain "vision of France"; the FN, the PS, and the PC all have—or have had—ideologies closely connected with the other European parties belonging to the same "families," although the weight and programmatic influence of that ideology has been markedly reduced in the case of the PS and even of the PC, if not of the FN, as the decline of the importance of economic and social issues in the manifestos indicates.

The original ideology of the Gaullist party can be described as having been "old-fashioned" nationalism: it was based on the idea that France was—and remained—a great country and that this inheritance had to be kept alive. It is doubtful as to whether that ideology has truly kept roots in the party; what has survived is the notion that the state is important and that it must be called upon to remedy deficiencies and in particular deficiencies connected with unfettered free enterprise.

The ideology of the FN is markedly more nationalistic, in particular in the sense that immigrants are not "truly French" and that they are the cause of many of the economic and social troubles of the country. With respect to the true French, the party takes a "populist" line, the politicians of the other parties being corrupt, at least in the sense that they are essentially concerned with their own advancement.

The Socialist party jettisoned, under Mitterrand, if not in 1981, at any rate a few years later, and not without internal difficulties, many of the classical tenets of the Far Left in favor, at any rate in practice, of a more middle-of-the-road Center-Left position. The Communist party also moved somewhat from the standpoints of communism: yet it shied away from the notion that it could endorse the views of Western social democracy.

Except for the Communist party, whose ideology changed appreciably during the period under consideration here, the changes in

ideology (or in the broad line) of the relevant parties, which affected the Gaullist party and the PS, occurred in the 1980s or even before, while the FN did not change its ideology and the UDF/Modem can scarcely be credited as having had an ideology.

Party Leadership and the Questions of Personalized Leadership and of Populism

The presidential election is more personalized than the other elections. There are only about ten candidates and they obviously become very well-known. The 1965 presidential election was the first to use television as the key media. The debate about ideas was not altogether killed as a result, but the range of ideological controversies became more limited and electors became more independent from the parties.

Party Leaders: 1990–2012

Party leaders changed frequently in both main parties, while Le Pen was leader throughout a large part of the period and the Communist leaders remained in office for substantial periods. The reasons for the changes of leadership are given in each case.[11]

Occupational Background of Party Leaders[12]

The detailed biographical characteristics of the leaders of the five parties appear in Appendix 3.F in the Palgrave website. The most remarkable characteristics are that, in the RPR, Socialist, and UDF parties, higher civil servants have constituted a large majority of the leaders (10 out of 14): there is in reality little difference in the educational and occupational background of the leaders of these parties, with 5 of the 7 leaders of the Socialist party being higher civil servants, as against 3 of the 4 leaders of the RPR and 2 of the 3 leaders of the UDF.

Personalized Leadership in French Parties

The French leaders who can be regarded as having had a personalized influence during the 1990–2012 period are Le Pen, throughout the whole period under consideration, and, toward the end of the period, specifically in connection with the 2007–2012 presidential election, Sarkozy and Mrs Royal. Chirac was president for 12 years (1995–2007), but, after having been defeated by Mitterrand in 1988, the popular support he received at the first ballot of the French presidential elections of 1995 and 2002 was limited (20 percent or even less): this showed that he scarcely had a substantial popular following.

French presidential elections have naturally been studied in great detail: the three personalities who have been singled out as personalized leaders almost certainly would not have had the national and international renown that they had if there had not been presidential elections.

Has Personalized Leadership Existed with Respect to the Electorate at Large?

Despite large numbers of studies devoted to the FN, there does not appear to have been any attempt to identify specifically the extent to which the influence of Le Pen as such has been greater than that of this party: all that can be noted is that Le Pen did gain substantially higher percentages of votes at presidential elections than his party did at parliamentary elections, even if these elections were taking place, as in 2002, 2007 and 2012, very closely after the presidential election. Since the turnout was very much larger at presidential than at parliamentary elections and since the parliamentary elections are based on two-ballot single-member constituencies it is clearly not permissible to conclude that there was indeed a personal influence of Le Pen over and above the influence of the party, even if it seems likely than this should have been the case. The same conclusion has to be drawn in relation to the possible direct influence of Sarkozy and Mrs Royal: moreover, Sarkozy did not do as well as the UMP at the immediately subsequent parliamentary elections.

Has Personalized Leadership Existed with Respect to Party Members?

The same prudence has to be adopted with respect to the possible influence of these three leaders on the members of their parties. What may none the less be recorded is that Le Pen was able to stem the trend toward a departure of members from his party, in 1999, toward the new party set up by Megret.

Has Personalized Leadership Emerged with Respect to the Elaboration and Adoption of Party Programs?

We noted that Le Pen was the author of the party program: his indirect influence on voters by means of the program is, therefore, manifest. The case of Sarkozy is also clear: the influence of the UMP candidate on the program was significant.

Have Some Personalized Leaders Adopted a Populist Discourse?

The discourse of Le Pen (and of his party) was overtly populist: the leader of FN has presented himself as the only true protector of the interests of "ordinary" French people among those who are in politics; it is not clear, however, whether Le Pen objects to representative institutions in principle: he has remained rather silent on that issue. Neither Sarkozy nor Mrs Royal nor Hollande can be said to have developed a populist discourse, although both insisted that their aim was to give a different tone to French politics and thus distinguished themselves from what had taken place not just in other parties but in their own.

* * *

Over 60 years after De Gaulle launched the Fifth French Republic, there is still a manifest influence of the kind of presidential system he introduced (typically described, perhaps somewhat wrongly, as "semipresidential"): indeed President Sarkozy's regime can probably be regarded as more strictly presidential than that of most of his predecessors, perhaps even of De Gaulle himself. The result has been, ostensibly at least, what might be described as increased visibility of the party system, in particular in connection with the two main parties: yet this has not meant that these two main parties have acquired true internal strength and genuinely internal liveliness. Thus, while it is surely wrong in the French case to claim that there has been a decline of the party system in general, it does remain that parties are not the central part of the political machinery of the state. The two main parties can also be regarded as being, in view of the origin of their leadership, in many ways very closely connected to the "apparatus" of the state. There is perhaps as much a maintenance of the tradition of state "dirigisme" by means of the parties as there is by these parties an opening to the democratic basis of the political system.

Notes

1. H. Portelli, *Le socialisme français tel qu'il est* (Presses universitaires de France, 1980).
2. At the second ballot of the presidential elections only the top two candidates of the first ballot can stand. The presidential term was reduced from seven to five years, effective from the 2007 election.

3. At national assembly elections, candidates must have obtained 12.5 percent of the electors or more at the first ballot in order to be able to stand at the second ballot.
4. Appendix 3.A and 3.B.
5. Appendix 3.C.
6. L. Olivier, "Ambiguïtés de la démocratie partisane en France (PS, RPR, UMP),," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 53 (5) (2003): 761–790.
7. D. Andolfatto, F. Grellet, and L. Olivier, *Les partis politiques* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001).
8. Appendix 3.D.
9. Reported in Pierre Brechon, *Les partis politiques francais* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2011), 216p–end page.
10. The faithful support of the electors to "their" parties has tended to be replaced by greater attention given by electors to issues, a move that was helped by the fact that the media in practice obliged parties to clarify their policies. Thanks to the determined efforts of a group of political scientists, led by Professor Budge, the content of party "manifestos" has been systematically recorded and classified. It has thus become possible to trace the evolution of party programs throughout the second half of the twentieth century and consequently to assess the extent to which party ideology has come to be modified over time. Two volumes have analyzed the complex technical problems that needed to be overcome to render comparisons possible and to summaries cross-national findings. (Ian Budge, H. D. Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Partie, Elections and Governments, 1945–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.) While the scope of these inquiries already goes markedly beyond Western Europe, they are being gradually extended further to all the countries in which party competition at elections genuinely takes place.
11. Appendix 3.E.
12. The occupational background of the various party leaders is given in the Appendix 3.F.

4

Germany

Martin Elff

Introduction

The party system of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that emerged after its reconstitution in 1949 after the trauma of the Nazi regime and World War II bore only little resemblance with its predecessor. While the Weimar Republic had known many parties and fragile coalitions the party system of the newly established democracy has been characterized by simplicity and stability. After a short phase of consolidation in the 1950s, in which many smaller parties were absorbed by the larger parties of Christian democracy and Social democracy, the political landscape was characterized by a relatively stable "two-and-a half" party system until the early 1980s. There were two larger parties, the so-called *Volksparteien* (the people's parties), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on the Left of the Center, and the Christian parties (CDU/CSU) on the Right, with the much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) in between. Although formally the CDU and CSU were different organizations, on the federal level they acted as a single political force, because the CSU restricted itself to the state of Bavaria, while the CDU as its larger "sister" competed for votes in all other states of the FRG. The situation was only moderately changed by the entry of the Greens into the federal parliament. While the newly emerged "two-plus-two" party system in principle opened up new coalition opportunities especially for the SPD, these were not realized before 1998, due to the stability in the voting behavior of the German electorate.[1]

While the German reunification in 1990 clearly was a major event, its consequences for the German party system were remarkably limited. It merely transformed it into a slightly more polarized "two-plus-three" party system: The former ruling party of the Communist eastern part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Socialist Unity Party (SED) transformed itself into the post-Communist PDS (later rebranded into Linkspartei [Left Party], and in 2007 into Die Linke [The Left]), while the preexisting "block parties" as well as the various smaller parties formed by the citizen rights movements immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall were quickly absorbed by their western counterparts.[2]

More precisely, the current German system is characterized by the continuation of the two-plus-two system in the west and the establishment of a three-party system in the east. The unification left the balance between the parties more or less unaltered in the west. At state level, one generally finds either SPD/Greens or CDU/FDP coalitions. Party politics in the eastern part of Germany, however, is characterized by a triangle of CDU, SPD, and PDS/Die Linke, where each pair of parties occasionally forms a coalition to send the third party into opposition.

In the early part of the twenty-first century, the German party system has been in flux, due to a decline of the two largest parties, the SPD and the CDU/CSU. In 2005 electoral losses of both large parties led to a parliamentary stalemate, so that the first Grand Coalition at the federal level was formed since the 1960s. The federal election of 2009 meant further losses for the two largest parties. Again it was the SPD that suffered most: it faced its worst electoral outcome in postwar history. The weakness of the SPD and a surge in the vote share of the FDP made a traditional Center-Right coalition possible. State elections in 2010 and 2011, however, do not provide evidence for the success of the Center-Right parties to persist. For example, the parliamentary elections in Baden-Württemberg of 2011 meant that the CDU suffered the loss of one of its traditional strongholds.

It remains to be seen how much this decline will persist or whether the people's parties will recuperate. The least that can be said is that the German party system is no longer a clear "two-and-a-half" variety as it had been until the 1990s.

The Electors and Parties

Turnout at general elections increased in the 1990s after the unification of the country, but then declined from 1998 onward; between

Table 4.1 Results of elections to the Bundestag, 1990–2009: turnout, vote shares, and seat shares of the main German parties

Year	*1990*	*1994*	*1998*	*2002*	*2005*	*2009*	*1990–2009*
Turnout (%)	77.8	79.0	82.2	79.1	77.7	70.8	
Seats (% of votes)							
CDU/CSU	319 (43.8)	294 (41.4)	245 (35.1)	248 (38.5)	226 (35.2)	239 (33.8)	–80 (–10.0)
SPD	239 (33.5)	252 (36.4)	298 (40.9)	251 (38.5)	222 (34.2)	146 (23.0)	–93 (–13.5)
Seats (vote) share of two large parties (%)	84.3 (77.3)	81.2 (77.8)	81.2 (76.0)	82.7 (77.0)	73.0 (69.4)	62.0 (56.8)	–22.3 (–23.5)
FDP	79 (11.0)	47 (6.9)	43 (6.2)	47 (7.4)	61 (9.8)	93 (14.6)	+14 (+3.6)
Greens	8 (5.1)	49 (7.3)	47 (6.7)	55 (8.6)	51 (8.1)	68 (10.7)	+60 (+5.6)
Linke	17 (2.4)	30 (4.4)	36 (5.1)	2 (4.0)	54 (8.7)	76 (11.9)	+69 (+9.5)
Seats (vote) share of small parties (%)	15.7 (18.5)	18.7 (18.6)	18.8 (18.0)	17.2 (20.0)	27.0 (26.6)	38.1 (37.2)	+22.4 (+18.7)

Source: Bundeswahlleiter (2009) "Wahlberechtigte, Wähler, Zweitstimmen und Sitzverteilung bei den Bundestagswahlen seit 1949" (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt).

2005 and 2009 that decline was most pronounced (7 percent). Turnout at the 2009 general election was the lowest since 1949, although at nearly 71 percent it is still higher than the turnout in several other Western European countries in the same period (table 4.1). This decline in turnout has multiple causes. First, most West European countries have experienced a decline in electoral turnout and there is no reason why Germany should be an exception. Another reason may be a disenchantment of working-class voters with the SPD. In 1998 when federal elections led to a change in government, turnout reached the highest level of the period after the German unification. Turnout reached a low point in 2009, in the same election that meant massive losses for the SPD. It may be a coincidence, but it is also highly plausible that voters who traditionally supported the SPD stayed at home.[3]

The Electoral System

The German "Basic Law," which forms the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, does not in itself prescribe a particular electoral system. It merely states that federal elections for the lower chamber (*Bundestag*) are to be free, equal, and held at least every four years; they may be held earlier if the head of government, the Federal Chancellor, unsuccessfully asks for a vote of confidence from the Bundestag.

The federal electoral system, often referred to as a "personalized proportional law," is a unique example of a mixed system.[4] Every citizen has two votes, but these two votes are linked. The "first vote" (*Erststimme*) is used to elect *one* candidate in each of 328 single-member constituencies on the basis of the "first-past-the-post" system. Half the members of the Bundestag are elected in this way. The "second vote" (*Zweitstimme*) is proportional: electors vote for one party list, drawn by each party in each state (*Land*). These party lists are fixed and the order of the candidates cannot be altered by the voters. The totals of the land votes are added nationwide and determine what is to be each party's proportional share of the Bundestag: the other 328 members of the Bundestag are thus elected to achieve a proportional representation of the parties.

It should be noted how these two votes are linked: unlike in a parallel system used in Japan, the "second vote," that is the party list vote, determines a party's seat share not only with respect to those seats that are filled via the party list system, but with respect to *all* parliamentary

seats, including those that are filled by constituency candidates. The number of members of each party is directly related to its support in the country as a whole: it does not depend on the extent to which parties have candidates who are highly popular in their constituencies.

Most of the time a party's share in terms of "first votes" and "second votes" differs only very slightly and the two principles of the German electoral law, the principle of personalization and the principle of proportionality, rarely come into conflict. For those cases where they do, the electoral law provides for a solution in terms of "surplus seats" (*Überhangmandate*). If a party gains more seats by "first votes" than it is entitled to receive on the grounds of its share of "second votes," then as many seats are added to the regular number of Bundestag seats that are needed to guarantee a seat to every candidate who has won the plurality in his/her constituency.

The second exception from the two principles of the German electoral law is the existence of electoral thresholds. To gain representation in the Bundestag, a party must attain at least 5 percent of the popular vote in terms of "second votes" or attain the plurality of "first votes" in at least three constituencies. These thresholds were introduced in the 1950s to ward off smaller sectarian or extremist parties and to limit the fragmentation of the Bundestag.

Another, temporary exception from the principles of the electoral law was made in 1990 for the first "all-German" election after unification. For this occasion the Federal Constitutional Court decided that proportionality would be calculated *separately* for the eastern and the western parts of Germany instead of jointly for the whole of Germany. Thus a political party would be able to win parliamentary seats even if it passed the 5 percent threshold in the former East German territory alone. The intention was to protect small parties in the East, which had had no time (or no opportunity) to organize on a nationwide basis between November 1989 and October 1990. After 1990, the electoral system reverted to the single national total described earlier for the calculation of the proportion of seats the parties were to receive.

The Political Parties

Two "New" Parties: The Greens and Die Linke

The era of a stable three-party system ended when two new parties, the Greens and the Left (Die Linke), entered the competition. It took

almost 30 years for the Greens and the whole of the 1990–2010 period for Die Linke to become "relevant" in the sense used in the present study: neither the Greens nor Die Linke obtained over 10 percent of the votes before the federal election of 2009. The FDP, in contrast, had oscillated sharply but had reached 10 percent of the votes occasionally before 1990.

The development of the Greens has been slow, but fairly regular, before and since 1990: in West Germany, as it then was, it scored around 5 percent of the votes for a long period. The party also long suffered from an internal division between the *Fundis* (the members of a "fundamentalist" wing) and the *Realos* (the members of a "realist" wing) who differed in terms of not only ideology but also strategy. While the latter were often more moderate and willing to form government coalitions with other parties, notably the SPD, the former had more radical views and preferred a politics of critical opposition to the political system in general. What gave the Greens a boost and showed for the first time that they were acquiring national importance was their entrance, as a junior partner, into a coalition with the SPD in 1998 to form the first Schröder cabinet (1998–2002). This was made possible not only by an electoral shift that was, for the first time in German postwar history, large enough to bring about a change in government, but also by the prevalence of the Realo wing in the internal struggles of the Green party and the acceptance that some members, although not formally being party leaders, were able to play a prominent role as the "image" of the party. It meant that, with Joschka Fischer as foreign minister, for the first time a Green politician played not only a national, but also an international part.

What followed was a slow rise in the party's score (from about 7 percent in 1994 and 1998) to over 8 percent in 2002 and again 8 percent in 2005 (when the SPD-Green coalition ended). For the first time, the party reached over 10 percent of the votes in 2009.

The Left (Die Linke) had a different evolution. It was for a substantial period almost exclusively an East German party. In their earlier guise as the PDS it was heir to the former leading party of the Communist system of the GDR and in some sense represented the losers of the unification. Indeed, the rise of the party was slow and even tortuous up to and including the 2002 election. A crucial turn of fate for the party was the widespread dissatisfaction of East Germans, but also of left-wing Social Democrats with the policies associated with Schröder's "Agenda 2010" of welfare and labor marketreforms. In 2004–2005 several left-wing Social Democrats left the SPD to

found the Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG), which formed an electoral alliance with the PDS (which had already renamed itself the Linkspartei/PDS). WASG eventually merged with the Linkspartei/PDS in 2007 to form the new party Die Linke. As a result, the vote share of the new all-German party alliance jumped from 4 percent of the votes to nearly 9 percent between 2002 and 2005. Already having marginally overtaken the Greens, in the form of an electoral alliance, the position of Die Linke as a serious player was confirmed in the Bundestag election of 2009, winning nearly 12 percent of the votes.

The Two Major Parties and the Free Democrats

The significant success of the two new small parties was at the expense of both major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which lost more than 20 percent of the votes and of the seats in the Bundestag over the 1990–2010 period. The decline of the CDU/CSU was fairly regular throughout the period—except for a small gain in 2002 compared to 1998, possibly from electors dissatisfied with the SPD-Green government.

In contrast, the SPD gained votes and seats between 1990 and 1998. Its decline began only in 2002 and continued in 2005, but it was moderate in both cases (the 2005 result was still marginally better than that of 1990 in votes, if not in seats). The losses of the SPD were disastrous in 2009, when it lost a third of its vote share and had its worst result in decades, at 23 percent. Already existing dissatisfaction about the Agenda 2010 reforms seems to have been exacerbated by the image of an all too willing junior partner in a grand coalition with the former political opponent, the CDU/CSU.

The vote share of the Free Democrats oscillated throughout the period—as it had done before. Their worst results were obtained during the last years of their participation in the government coalition with the CDU/CSU under Chancellor Kohl, in the Bundestag elections of 1994 and 1998, when they garnered less than 7 percent of the popular vote. They began recovering during their years in opposition between 2002 and 2009 under the SPD-Green and CDU/CSU-SPD coalitions, and they appear to be the main beneficiaries of the disastrous electoral performance of the SPD in 2009. The 2009 result, at nearly 15 percent of the votes and with 93 seats, was almost a record for the FDP, which then was able to enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Volatility

Overall, the German party system has been relatively stable on the aggregate. Yet the individual voting behavior is clearly in a state of flux. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Greens and Die Linke mobilized many voters whose grievances had been ignored by the larger established parties, particularly by the Social Democrats. Both small parties assure their voters that they are doing something at the parliamentary level about the causes of their discontent. By making themselves spokespersons for the discontented, both small parties promote a process by which party loyalties are changed and thereby open the way for increasing volatility. The volatility index substantially increased from 7.5 to 12.9.[5]

Changes in the Ideology of Parties

The political relevance of "small" and "large" parties in Germany depends, however, upon their ideological position. Since 1949, the German party system has been divided into two large ideological blocs, a "left-wing" and a "right-wing" party bloc. From the late 1960s to 1989, government cabinets were formed by one of the established large parties (either the CDU/CSU or the SDP) usually in a coalition with the only other existing (small) party, the FDP. The Free Democrats usually switched their ideological position between Center-Left and Center-Right, depending on the electoral strength of the established parties. The major political aim of the Free Democrats has always been to remain in power and form a government as a junior partner with one of the established parties.

After 1989, and with the emergence of a system of five relevant parties, the situation changed somewhat.[6] Three of these parties are ideologically "Left of Center" and the other two are "Right of Center." The Left group consists of the SPD, the Greens, and Die Linke, while the Right group is composed of the CDU/CSU and the FDP. The size of each group has varied somewhat, but remained relatively stable at between 40 and 50 percent. The Green-Left bloc has tended to become stronger than the Liberal-Conservative bloc over the first decade of the twenty-first century, however. This state of affairs might provide opportunities for new types of coalition formation in the future.

Social Characteristics of the Electors of the Relevant Parties

Social class and religion, together with age and gender, are the most important sociodemographic factors structuring the party vote

in Germany. In 1990, almost 80 percent of the workers and of the employees voted for one of the two large, established parties: this support decreased to about 55 percent in 2009.[7] The majority of the workers and employees who left the traditional parties voted for Die Linke, while civil servants and self-employed citizens who left the CDU/CSU (as well as to an extent those who left the SPD) between 1990 and 2009 turned to the Greens. A large number of the farmers who voted for the Greens in the early 1990s supported the CDU/CSU in 2009. Meanwhile, the Christian parties lost a significant number of Catholic voters who used to be the hard core of their electorate. Similarly, the SPD used to receive substantial support from young voters but lost a large part of that electorate. The younger age cohorts turned predominantly to the new small parties (Greens and Die Linke) and to the FDP. The gender differences are rather small, with women showing a slight preference for the CDU/CSU and the Greens and men for the FDP.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of Membership

Party membership has never been high in Germany and it has declined markedly since the 1980s. In the early 1990s, only 4 percent of Germans were members of a political party, a figure that decreased to 2 percent by 2010 and was then the lowest membership proportion in Europe.[8] The decline was very substantial in the case of the two major parties: the CDU/CSU lost about a third of its members and the SPD almost half. Yet despite the decline of electoral support for Social Democrats between 2005 and 2009, this was not wholly reflected at the level of membership: the massive decline in membership had taken place earlier, between 1991 and 1996, while the party had done relatively well at the federal election of 1994 and between 2001 and 2006.[9] Therefore, there seems not to be a truly close relationship between the movements affecting the electors that are closest to the party (the members) and the movements affecting the electorate at large of these parties.

The same conclusion can be drawn to some extent regarding the small parties. The most surprising case is that of Die Linke. The decline of membership in this party between 2005 and 2009 was spectacular and yet it occurred precisely in 2009 when the electoral result was the best ever. There was less of a dissonance between movements among members and electoral movements in the case of the FDP: that party had lost markedly between 1991 and 1996, but it did gain several thousand members between 2006 and 2009: in this

case, the rise appears to have corresponded to the success of the party in the 2009 federal election. Among the three small parties, only the Greens gained members between 1990 and 2010, although there was some decline between 1996 and 2001.

Decision-Making Role of Party Members

Parties in Germany enjoy special protection by the constitutional law but are also required to have an internal structure that follows the principles of representative democracy. Although these requirements imply an influence of all party members on major decisions made by the party, the impact of members on national party decision making is nevertheless indirect, as in most European political parties. In Germany, the national conference of a party offers an opportunity to discuss and decide on the party program. Usually, all party bodies (from local to national level) can propose motions for the national congress. Party conference members also vote for the national party leadership and for major changes in the party's organizational structure.

Coverage of the Territory by Relevant Parties

As indicated earlier, there is a "special" Christian party for Bavaria (the CSU), while the CDU covers the rest of Germany. The build-up of the CDU/CSU is probably unique in Western Europe and perhaps in the world: it is appreciably more than party decentralization, not only because the name of the party is different, but also because the program of the CSU varies to an extent from that of the CDU and because the whole apparatus of the party is distinct, except for the candidate for the office of Federal Chancellor (*Kanzlerkandidat* or *Spitzenkandidat* [peak candidate]). The peak candidate typically emerges from the CDU, but not always. The fact that the German state is truly federal made such a subtle arrangement possible. The separate existence of the CSU represents the strong sense of regional identity, also reflected in the usual epithet of *Freistaat* (free state) instead of *Bundesland* (federal state) for other federal states of Germany.

While the CDU/CSU thus constitutes a subtle and possibly unique case of distinction that lasted over half a century, it has not prevented the party from being basically united. The evolution of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was the last attempt of maintaining the special character of the party system in East Germany. When it became Die Linke, it became "all-German" as its candidates stood throughout the whole of the Federal Republic, although Die Linke

tends to be stronger in East Germany than in West Germany. Whether this difference is maintained probably depends on the ability of the SPD (and of the Greens) to recover part of the electorate it lost to Die Linke in 2009.

Party Finance

A decline in party membership has affected party finance. With the decrease of membership fees, parties became more dependent on private sponsoring and on public support. While the membership fees decreased substantially within both large parties, they remained rather stable among the three small parties.[10] The total income of political parties in Germany has varied over time: the CDU/CSU increased its party income by 50 percent between 1991 and 2008, but the SPD lost over 15 million Euros (over 10 percent of its funds) during the same period. The income of the FDP increased appreciably in the twenty-first century and that of the Greens grew even more, while that of Die Linke declined, possibly as a result of the decline in membership.

The decline in membership has led some scholars to argue that the character of the parties has changed from mass parties to parties of professional politicians.[11] Yet a breakdown of the party finances[12] shows that German parties have not yet become fused with the state as Katz and Mair's notion of "cartel parties" suggest.[13] First, membership dues are still a substantial part of income for parties, accounting for one-fifth to one-quarter of the income. Second, while state subsidies do constitute a substantial part of the party income, subsidies are not as yet an overwhelming source.[14]

Ironically, the smaller and newer antiestablishment parties, the Greens and Die Linke, seem to depend more on state subsidies than the "established" parties, the CDU, SPD, and CSU. This may be because the CDU, CSU, SPD, and FDP have sources of income that do not flow as well for the Greens and Die Linke. The parties of the Center-Right, CDU, CSU, and FDP, receive a markedly higher proportion of their income in the form of donations than the parties of the Center-Left, SPD, Greens, and Die Linke. Since the parties of the Center-Right tend to be more business-friendly in their policies, large corporations and wealthy families support them. What the SPD lacks in terms of donations, it makes it up by means of income from its economic activities—especially from publications.

Another pattern emerges as one compares the income structure of 2008 and 2009. In 2009 the proportion of income from donations

is markedly larger for all parties except for the CSU. As 2009 was a Bundestag election year, groups and individuals obviously wanted to support their preferred parties in their election campaigns. In the case of the CSU the pattern seems to be reversed: the proportion of income coming from donations is higher in 2008 than in 2009. A possible explanation is that 2008 was a state-level election for Bavaria, the home state of this party.

In sum, the sources of party income are various and balanced between membership dues, donations, and state subsidies. For none of the parties does the proportion of membership dues constitute at least half of the income, an indication that parties have moved away from their members. Yet the variety of income sources still keeps the parties independent from the state.

National Decision Organs

Party decision making is very similar in four of the five parties, only Die Linke has a different formal organizational structure. The most important decision-making institutions within the two large parties, the Liberals and the Greens, are the federal party council and the federal party executive. The party council (*Parteivorstand*) of both large parties consists of about 40 party leaders, elected by the rank-and-file at the party conference, usually on the basis of their party faction affiliation and of their origin in one of the federal states. The party council of the small Liberal Party consists of only 34 members; the Greens elect a smaller council (the *Parteirat*) of only 16 members.

The party executive committee or presidium (*Parteipräsidium*) is the inner circle of the party elite. It is elected by the federal party council and consists of the party chairman, the deputy heads of the party, some state prime ministers, and other leaders of the national parliamentary group. In 2010, the party presidium had 15–20 members in each of the two large parties and 10 members in the Liberal Party. The party executive of the Greens (*Bundesvorstand*) consists of only six members (three men and three women). These bodies meet weekly and take all major party decisions, including those on policy issues, budgetary matters, organizational reform, and electoral campaigning. The federal party executive and the party conference must, however, always ratify major policy decisions taken by the council and the executive.

The organizational structure of Die Linke is more centralized. The federal party council (*Parteivorstand*) is composed of 44 members,

elected by the delegates at the national party conference. Two party chairpersons (one from East Germany and one from West Germany) and their four deputies manage the daily business of the party.

Programs and Ideologies

Two types of programmatic texts exist for German parties. One type is the general party program (*Parteiprogramm* or *Grundsatzprogramm*). These documents set out the basic values of the party, its general aims, and the principal ways and means to attain them. If there is a document that expresses the ideology of a German party, it is the Parteiprogramm or Grundsatzprogramm. The other type of document is the electoral platform or manifesto (*Wahlprogramm*), which is published on the occasion of Bundestag elections. These electoral platforms are less general than the party program. They set out the principles of the campaign and to some degree even contain pledges to specific government policies. Their primary raison d'etre is to coordinate the campaign and to provide an orientation and preformulated arguments to the rank-and-file canvassers. Electoral platforms may revolve around slogans such as "Innovation und Gerechtigkeit" (innovation and social justice) but they may also emphasize specific policy goals such as lowering tax rates or ending the use of nuclear energy.

Program Changes

As a result of their different nature, party programs and electoral manifestos are adopted in different occasions. Electoral manifestos follow the cycle of Bundestag elections. They are usually proposed by the party council and adopted by the general party conference that precedes the upcoming Bundestag election or by the party council directly. Party platforms (Grundsatzprogramme) are seldom adopted anew. A party will adopt a new party program only if it has become apparent that society has changed to such an extent or faces such new challenges that the old program is outdated. Typically, a party conference would elect a special commission to work for a long time on a proposed new program, and a vote would then be taken at a special party conference.

Relevant Parties' Programs

It is difficult to make general statements about the specificity or vagueness of the major parties' electoral manifestos. Usually they are relatively vague on topics that are not at the center of the current

political discussion and electoral campaign. Topics that have been on the political agenda during preceding years or even decades have a higher chance to find a more specific discussion in the manifestos. The programs of the major parties published on the occasion of the 2009 Bundestag election were voluminous and detailed. The 2009 electoral platform of the SPD and of the CDU/CSU both were over 90 pages; the Greens' platform was over 100 pages; the FDP's platform was over 70 pages; and the Die Linke's platform was 37 pages.

Policy Areas Covered
Electoral manifestos published on occasion of Bundestag elections typically cover all relevant areas of domestic policy that are within the executive and legislative competence of the federal level. These areas include foreign policy, taxation, support for families, welfare expenditure and unemployment benefits, measures to equalize the living conditions between East and West Germany, citizenship, and energy policy and protection of the climate and the natural environment in general. However, electoral manifestos also include topics of general interest, even if these do not fall within the federal but within the states' competences. These topics include especially education and culture.

Party Programs and Ideology
Electoral manifestos of German parties do not explicitly espouse an ideology, but the measures they propose, the aims that they set for potential government activities, and the values they put forward justify their aims. These measures clearly reflect the ideological orientation of the parties.

The Nature of the Ideology
The ideology of the CDU/CSU emphasized in the past traditional values, ways of life, gender roles, and family structures. Christian Democrats also have taken a somewhat more authoritarian position in terms of law and order and civic liberties as well as generally moderate positions toward economic policy and welfare state provisions. While generally considered to take the position of the Right on the political spectrum, in terms of economic and welfare policy, Christian Democrats used to be relatively "centrist." More explicitly pro business, anti-interventionist in the area of economic policy is the position of the FDP, which increasingly in recent years has presented itself as speaking for the interests of the "well-to-do" and advocates

low taxes. The FDP is libertarian not only in economic terms but also in civic liberties and social permissiveness: it thus takes a relatively unambiguous stance of "classical liberalism." Although the SPD has long parted from its Marxist origins, the manifestos of the SPD are still characterized by typical Social Democratic thought—although further moderated after 1998 and especially from 2005. The SPD would nevertheless present itself as defending the interests of rank-and-file employees and as fighting for social justice. Similar positions but with less restraint and a more radical standpoint are held by Die Linke, which thereby shows its origin from both the post-Communist PDS of East Germany and the left wing of the SPD. In its electoral manifestos, the Green party is a clear instance of that party's "family": much emphasis is placed on the protection of the environment and on abandoning nuclear energy while moving toward renewable energies. Further, the party gives substantial space in its electoral manifestos to gender equality and sociocultural self-expression, to the protection of civil liberties and to the extension of the participatory opportunities of citizens.

Changes in the Ideology of the Relevant Parties

The most striking changes in party ideology occurred long before German unification, with the Social Democrats shedding the last remainders of Marxism from the party program and electoral platforms. After the unification no major change seems to have occurred except a tendency toward convergence between the two large parties, the SPD and the CDU/CSU, in terms of economic and welfare policies. The most visible change occurred in the position of the SPD between 2002 and 2005: while the SPD was seen most of the time as favoring the expansion rather than the restriction of the welfare state, the coalition government of the SPD with the Greens, led by Schröder and under the auspices of the Social Democratic minister of labor and social affairs, implemented a program of welfare state reform and retrenchment called "Agenda 2010." It was meant to deal with the financial problems of the welfare state connected with increasing long-term unemployment that was partially a consequence of the unification of a relatively noncompetitive post-Communist economy in East Germany with the internationally highly competitive economy of West Germany. Accepting welfare state retrenchment and labor market deregulation was seen by many as a change in the political identity of the SPD, but it may also be seen, and it is seen in this way by centrist members of the SPD, as merely an adaptation of the means

of social policy to a changing economic environment. With regard to the CDU/CSU and the Greens, there are some hints at ideological moderation, the former gradually, though somewhat reluctantly, accepting the ethics of a secular society and gender equality, the latter moderating their skepticism toward the German political and social system to a degree that enabled the party to form a coalition with the CDU in one of Germany's states.

Party Leadership, Personalized Leadership, and Populism

Party Leadership

In German parties there is a formal distinction between the party leader or party chairperson, on the one hand, and the candidate of a party for the office of Federal Chancellor, on the other. There are instances when a party chairperson is popular enough in the population at large or powerful enough within the party so that the same person holds both positions, but this depends very much on the circumstances and the qualities of the individual. At least one party, the Greens, used to operate a strict policy of separation of party office and public mandate. In that regard, party leadership in Germany clearly differs from party leadership in Britain.

As is made obvious by the list of party leaders and their time in office,[15] leadership has become much more volatile in recent decades, a change that seems to affect especially the SPD.

Personalized Leadership and Populism

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred Directly (i.e., Primarily at Election Times) with Respect to the Electorate at Large?
Although the German system of government is not presidential, the larger parties usually nominate a candidate for the office of Federal Chancellor on the occasion of a Bundestag election, because the first act of a newly convened Bundestag is the election of a new federal chancellor. As stated earlier, this nominee may be the party leader but not necessarily so. As in many other political systems it would usually be the incumbent of this office who would be nominated by his or her party for reelection, irrespective of whether he or she is or is not the leader of the party. But even a party in opposition may nominate somebody else than the party leader for the Chancellor's office, for

example, in the case that the leader is more or less popular within the party or is an effective broker between the various wings and factions within a party, but had not yet been very successful in electorally contested public offices. In such cases candidates for the office of Federal Chancellor may be former state prime ministers who had been very successful at state-level elections, as in the case of Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, or Edmund Stoiber, or, in the absence of such promising candidates, may be members of an incumbent coalition with some seniority, such as Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2009.

After Schröder took office as federal chancellor the notion of personalized politics or even the "presidentialization" of politics became somewhat fashionable among political commentators and scholars. This was because the landslide victory of the Social Democrats and Greens was to some degree attributed to Schröder's popularity (and to some degree to the popularity of one of the Green candidates, namely Joschka Fischer) and to the professionalized campaign of the SPD (the "Kampa"). But as compared to campaigns of earlier decades, such as those associated with the chancellorship of Adenauer, Brandt, or Kohl, Schröder's campaign does not seem outstanding in terms of its focus on the leader. The contrast was stronger in comparison with the leadership crisis of the SPD before Schröder's success and still is noticeable by comparison to the SPD's more recent crisis—as evidenced by the frequent change of party chairpersons and chancellor candidates of the SPD before and after Schröder.

The Federal Chancellor and chairperson of the CDU in 2012, Angela Merkel, is the most recent instance of a coincidence of the chancellor's office with the position of party leader. Merkel's reputation is not so much about charisma but about being an effective power broker within the heterogeneous CDU and the grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD.

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred with Respect to Party Members?

German parties have a federal structure and a complex, multilayered organization. They are also characterized by an intraparty competition between a multitude of currents and factions. This and perhaps a mistrust toward charismatic leadership inherited from the experience of the Nazi regime (1933–1945) make personalized leadership in the public sphere and within parties unlikely. Party leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, and Willy Brandt may indeed have had a strong position for a long time and are still remembered

within their respective parties with reverence and admiration, but this is the case less in view of their personal charisma than for their personal influence and authority as a result of their past record of having been opponents of the Nazi regime and of having actively developed German democratization. Party leadership with a high degree of personal power was more characteristic of Helmut Kohl who was less of a gifted orator but a cunning strategist in intraparty power struggles.

The federal structure of Germany and of its parties gives ample opportunities for ambitious politicians to attain intermediate positions of public or intraparty power on a municipal, regional, or state level. Many of the politicians active on a national level have learnt the "ropes" of politics in some subnational party or public elective office. Federalism always means that in every party there may be several contenders for leadership who have established their *Hausmacht*, their regional power base in some of the federal states. To some degree the large collegiate bodies within the larger parties, the CDU and the SPD, function as mechanisms by which are integrated not only different party factions but also different regional groups within the federal party, as if inspired by Arendt Lijphart's notion of consociational democracy. In sum, a party leader appears rarely to be more than a *primus inter pares* of a heterogeneous party elite.

Has Personalized Leadership Occurred with Respect to the Elaboration and Adoption of Party Programs (Indirect Influence on the Electorate)?

The way party programs and electoral manifestos of German parties are adopted gives little opportunity to leave an unequivocal personal mark on them. There are instances of slogans that past leaders had successfully adopted being reactivated in more recent manifestos; the move of the SPD to the political center and toward welfare state reform (Agenda 2010) seems to be closely associated with the incumbency of Schröder. One should not overestimate the role of the leaders in these instances, however. The Agenda 2010, for instance, was not so much a personal project of Schröder as a reaction to the nature of the times, especially to fiscal problems. It was also the product of appointed experts from outside the party and the civil service. This reorientation of the SPD's policy may, therefore, be more the consequence of incumbency in government office than a change in its strategy to attract voters. The policies of Agenda 2010 were markedly criticized inside the party: these criticisms led Chancellor Schröder to advance the end of his term of office in 2005.

Leaders and Populist Discourse

Populist discourse has been used on some occasions by some mavericks of the larger parties. For example, Hessian prime minister Roland Koch used some populist discourse in his campaigns for the state parliament election in Hessia 1999 and 2008 to attack the changes in the citizenship and immigration law enacted at the federal level. Yet he was heavily criticized in the media for associating himself with right-wing politics. Leaders and prime ministers of the Bavarian CSU do not always refrain from populist discourse either. In general the major parties seem to avoid populist discourse, as the risk of losing centrist voters is perceived to be higher than that of gaining the support of voters from either the left-wing or the right-wing fringes.

Conclusion

Despite the unification, German party politics appears to be astonishingly stable overall. Until 1990, politics in West Germany was characterized by gradual rather than abrupt change; despite the appearance of the Green Party in the Bundestag in the 1980s, the effect of this was relatively small. Prior to 1998 no change in government was brought about by a change in voting behavior alone. Even the unification of Germany did not engender any larger change than the emergence of the post-Communist PDS, which on a national level was not strong enough to shift the balance between Left and Right in Germany, because the main parties of the west quickly set foot and gained root in the new eastern part of the FRG. Although Germany is a country with a high proportion of immigrants, populist fringe parties never gained representation at the national level. One can only speculate about the reasons, but it is worth noting that the federal and decentralized character of the German political system gives citizens enough opportunities to voice discontent on a subnational level, by means of elections to the parliaments of the Bundesländer. Thus unusual or "surprising" electoral results happened only at that level, with the SPD losing its stronghold in North Rhine-Westphalia in 2005, the CDU losing its strongholds in Rhineland-Palatinate in 1991 and in Baden-Württemberg in 2010, and the CSU losing its long-standing single-party majority in Bavaria in 2008.

There are signs of crisis beyond such losses of the major parties at *Landtag* elections. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD endured almost a hemorrhage in terms of party members, making them increasingly

dependent on public funding, although the Center-Right parties, CDU/CSU and FDP, continued to benefit from private donations. In the eyes of some critical observers this was both the cause and the consequence of the large Volksparteien losing touch with the people at large. Another sign of crisis is the increasing frequency of change in party leadership, first in the SPD and later in the Bavarian "sister" of the CDU, the CSU. Finally, after 2005 electoral behavior became more volatile even at the national level, with the SPD losing a third of its vote share in 2009 and considerable gains for the smaller parties.

Notes

1. Oskar Niedermayer, "Das Parteiensystem Deutschlands," in Oskar Niedermayer, Richard Stöss, and Melanie Haas (eds.), *Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 109–133; Ulrich von Alemann, *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2001); Oskar Niedermayer, "Parties and the Party System," in Ludger Helms (ed.), *Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Thomas Saalfeld, "The German Party System: Continuity and Change," *German Politics,* 11 (3) (2002): 99–130.
2. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the SED dominated the GDR, although the GDR constitution allowed the existence of a limited number of other parties and guaranteed representation in the GDR parliament (without real influence, however). These so-called block parties included an East German version of the CDU, a liberal party (LDPD), and even a national-conservative party (NDPD). The West German parties of the Center-Right, therefore, easily found political allies (that later merged with them) in the newly democratized East, even before the unification that took place in autumn 1990. The many small, citizen rights movements that had flourished in the second half of 1989 were quickly absorbed by the larger parties. Only some of these groups formed an alliance called *Bündnis 90*, which aligned itself with the West German Greens, but electorally remained almost irrelevant. Another social democratic party was newly formed in the East before the unification and merged later with the SPD.
3. Some preliminary evidence for this can be found in Martin Elff, "Disenchanted Workers, Selective Abstention and the Electoral Defeat of Social Democracy in Germany," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, September 2–5, 2010.
4. Susan E. Scarrow, "Germany: The Mixed-Member System as a Political Compromise," in eds. Matthew S. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55–69.

5. Appendix 4.A.
6. Appendix 4.B.
7. Appendix 4.C.
8. Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, "Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000," *Party Politics,* 7 (1) (2001): 5–21.
9. Appendix 4.D.
10. Appendix 4.E.
11. See, for example, Klaus von Beyme, "Funktionswandel der Parteien in der Entwicklung von der Massenmitgliederpartei zur Partei der Berufspolitiker," in Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, and Richard Stöss (eds.), *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 359–383.
12. Norbert Lammert, "Bekanntmachung von Rechenschaftsberichten politischer Parteien für das Kalenderjahr 2009," *Bundestagsdrucksache 17/4801* (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2011)
13. Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics* 1 (1) (1995): 5–28.
14. Appendix 4.F.
15. Appendix 4.G.

5

Italy

Jean Blondel and Nicolò Conti

Introduction

A revolution truly occurred in the party system in Italy: in the early 1990s, bodies that had dominated political life since World War II and were regarded as rock-solid either simply collapsed to be replaced by new ones or had hastily to protect themselves by changing name and ideology. The old Italian parties had large numbers of members; their supporters had remained faithful to them, a link that was due in part to the division that prevailed in political contests and pitted Right against Left or probusiness against prolabor. These characteristics were markedly eroded by the end of the twentieth century. "Volatility" increased as many electors switched their allegiance; membership declined, and, as a result, party finance became a major problem, the main remedy proposed being for the state to provide large amounts of funds, both at election times and on a yearly basis. The strength of new parties was more often boosted by highly personalized links between leaders and their supporters than by the more traditional bonds provided by class or other social *cleavages*. The Italian case is extreme in this respect as it is the only Western European country in which the old parties were wholly eradicated.

Italian political parties are well-known for having been numerous and for having been dominated, for most of the post-1945 period, by two of them, Christian Democracy (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). This state of affairs lasted up to 1992, when Italian politics, alone among Western European countries, was shaken by an "earthquake" that first destroyed DC and a number of smaller parties

typically allied to it, and, subsequently, affected the PCI. In the case of the DC and its allies, the reason for the collapse was the discovery of highly corrupt practices by means of judicial investigations (known as *Mani pulite*—"clean hands"),[1] in the case of the Communist party, the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in an ideological transformation that was symbolized by the change of the party's name to Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). The Maastricht constraints played a part, as the old government parties were unable to guarantee the economic stability required by the Eurozone.[2]

These changes were so profound that it became the practice to refer to the "First" and "Second" Republics, although there was constitutional continuity throughout the period. The "earthquake" of 1992–1993 was to be only the beginning of chain reactions throughout the 1993–2010 period. The result was a transformation, at any rate temporary, of the party system at four key levels, the setting up of something approaching two coalitions of government, the emergence of a "charismatic" party leader (Berlusconi), the marked decline in the ideological content of party struggles, and substantial changes in the structure of the parties. The characteristics of these changes will have an effect on all aspects of the Italian political life.

The Electors and the Parties

Italian elections were known to have a high turnout, in part due to the fact that voting had been compulsory in the past and the electorate did not seem to be wholly aware that this was no longer the case. Yet turnout did decline somewhat in the course of the 1990–2010 period, especially between 1994 and 1996. The turnout at national assembly elections from 1992 to 2008 is presented in table 5.1.

The Complexity of the Electoral System

Changes to the Italian electoral system not only took place in the watershed period of 1992–1993 when the First Republic collapsed. They occurred also throughout the years of the "Second Republic." Indeed, demands for electoral reform had remained prominent in the political agenda, and the Italian electoral system is far from being stabilized.

Until 1993, Italy had adopted PR for the election of both chambers. Although the smaller size of Senate constituencies made electoral

Table 5.1 Electoral turnout and votes for the Italian parties

Year	*1992*	*1994*	*1996*	*2001*	*2006*	*2008*
Turnout (%)	87.3	86.1	82.9	81.5	83.6	80.5
Percentage of votes						
FI		21.0	20.6	29.4	23.7	37.4 (PDL)
AN		13.5	15.7	12.0	12.3	
Lega	8.7	8.4	10.1	3.9	4.6	8.3
CCD+CDU/UDC		–	5.8	3.2	6.8	5.6
PPI/MARGHERITA		11.1	6.8	14.5	31.3	33.2 (PD)
PDS/DS	16.1	20.4	21.1	16.6		
RC	5.6	6.0	8.6	5.0	5.8	3.0
Others						
DC	29.7					
PSI	13.6					
MSI	5.4					
Center-Right coalition		46.0	40.3	49.6	49.7	45.7
Center-Left coalition		32.8	42.2	43.1	49.8	37.6

Source: The Italian Ministery of the Interior.

contest in that chamber somewhat harder for smaller parties, the political composition of the two chambers was highly proportional and rather similar.

An electoral reform was adopted in 1993 because of the pressure exerted by public opinion and social movements in the early 1990s when two "abrogative" referenda initiatives succeeded despite the opposition of the main governmental parties, and that new electoral system was used three times between 1994 and 2001. The first referendum held in 1991 abrogated the preference vote in use in combination with PR, as that practice was widely perceived by public opinion as a tool for vote trading and clientelist practices. In 1993 the second referendum eliminated PR in the Senate and urged parliament to adopt an electoral system that would satisfy citizens' demands for greater simplification and greater effectiveness.[3] The new electoral law approved by the Italian parliament in 1993 introduced a mixed-plurality system in both chambers, with 75 percent of the seats being allocated in single-member districts on a "first-past-the-post" basis and the remaining 25 percent on a PR basis. The extent to which the two chambers had a similar political outlook was only slightly weakened in the process. The main effect of the new electoral system

was to produce bipolar competition with two coalitions built on a Left versus Right basis; there was greater personalization of electoral contests in single-member districts as well as nation-wide as a result of the unprecedented visibility of the leaders of the two main coalitions.

Finally, a further electoral system introduced in 2005 marked a shift back to PR. In contrast with the 1993 system adopted in parliament by a large majority, the 2005 electoral reform was supported only by a narrow Center-Right majority consisting of the parties supporting the executive. At a time of declining popularity of the government, the Center-Right coalition altered the system in order to create obstacles to the Center-Left in the coming election, while introducing at the same time advantageous rules for itself (the Center-Right coalition always performed more poorly in plurality systems than under PR).[4] The new system reintroduced proportional representation, with large constituencies in both chambers and a blocked list vote. At the same time, in order to reduce fragmentation, a threshold of 4 percent of national votes was introduced for parties contesting the elections alone and 2 percent for those that linked to other parties in a coalition. Coalition-building was also encouraged through a majority bonus providing the winning coalition with 55 percent of the seats. That bonus was allocated at the national level in the lower house and at the regional level in the Senate, however: that difference substantially reduced the extent to which the political composition of the two chambers was similar. For example, in 2008 the Prodi government resigned, thus opening the way to early elections because it could secure a majority in the lower house only, not in the Senate. In the words of Cotta and Verzichelli,[5] the simplest of electoral systems (pure PR) became an intricate game of rules about the allocation of seats, thresholds of representation, and links between parties within each coalition. Not surprisingly, most parties have again called for a change in the electoral system.

Parties

The following older parties disappeared:

(1) DC had been the largest party of the 1945–1992 period, but it had declined gradually from over 40 percent of the votes to less than 30 percent. It disappeared formally in January 1994, when it was replaced by the Italian Popular Party (PPI): this was in fact the old name of the party created after World War I (up until the arrival of Mussolini to

power in the 1920s). The PPI did not inherit all the Christian Democrat voters, nor all of its elite and its parliamentarians. On the contrary, at least two main factions emerged, on the Right and on the Left. The right-wing faction gave rise eventually to the emergence of CCD (Casini) and CDU (Buttiglione) that merged to become the UDC (Democratic Union of the Centre): this regularly obtained somewhat over 5 percent, but not over 10 percent, of the votes. The left-wing faction (which the PPI was indeed originally) changed its name to Democracy and Liberty (DL) before in turn becoming the Margherita ("Daisy") and eventually merging with the Democratic Party (PD) (to which we shall return under point 2). The other parties that emerged from the DC were small and all fell under the level required for "relevant" parties.

The rest of the electorate of the old DC went to various parties and in particular to one entirely new party, founded by Berlusconi in 1993, Forza Italia, and to another renamed and refurbished old party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), hitherto of a fascist character, which was renamed National Alliance (AN) in 1994 and adopted an entirely democratic stance. These two parties eventually merged in 2008–2009 to form the People of Freedom (PDL), a merger that was short-lived, since many supporters of the AN left the PDL in 2010.

(2) The PCI had been originally appreciably smaller than the DC, but by 1976 the party obtained 35 percent of the votes and thus seemed about to become equal to or even overtake the DC. However, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, together with a substantial ideological rethinking that had already taken place under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, who died suddenly in 1984, resulted in 1991 in the abandonment of the old name and its replacement by that of Party of the Democratic Left (PDS); a fraction of the PCI refused to accept the change and created the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC), which obtained only between 5 and 8 percent of the votes and even ceased to be represented in parliament in 2008. The PDS was given in 1998 the shorter title of Left Democrats (DS). In 2008, furthermore, the party disappeared as such by being merged with the Margherita to form the PD. A further complication on the "Center-Left" of Italian politics resulted from the setting up of what has to be described as an "above party" organization, the *Ulivo* (the Olive tree), which was organized and led by Romano Prodi and to which both the PDS/DS and the Margherita belonged in addition to smaller parties. The Ulivo played a highly significant part in the coming together of many parts of the Left between 1996 and 2008. The

main parties of the Ulivo between 1996 and 2006 then merged to create the PD, but the Ulivo was not a "party" in the strict sense of the word.

While the old Socialist Party (PSI) effectively disappeared in the early 1990s as a result of the judicial investigations that led to the disappearance of the DC and of a number of small Center parties, other parties emerged on the Left throughout the late 1990s and the early decade of the twenty-first century, but they never reached a sufficient level to be deemed relevant, not even the Green party or the Radical party: the latter had played a significant part before the 1990s in defending, occasionally with success, a number of "conscience" issues.

(3) The only other party that needs to be mentioned is the Northern League, which emerged in 1990 from the merger of a number of regional "Leagues" that had been set up in northern regions of Italy in the 1980s. It is indeed the party that was found to have changed the least during the period 1990–2010 to which this analysis is devoted.

The parties that need to be considered in the course of this chapter are the following, once a variety of mergers and break-ups have been taken into account:

1. Forza Italia (1993–2008), which was created as an entirely new party in 1993 and was subsequently superseded (temporarily) by the People of Freedom (PDL).
2. The National Alliance (AN) (1994–2008), which replaced the (much smaller) Italian Social Movement (MSI) in 1994 and merged temporarily in the People of Freedom (PDL).
3. The Northern League, which was set up on the basis of the merger of the various "leagues" that had been created in the 1980s.
4. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), a large majority of which became the Party of the Left Democrats (PDS), subsequently named the Left Democrats (DS) and in turn merged in the Democratic Party (PD) in 2008.
5. Communist Refoundation (RC), which broke away from the Party of the Left Democrats (PDS) when that party was set up; it typically obtained 5–6 percent of the votes except in one occasion when it reached 8.6 percent.
6. The Italian Popular Party (PPI), which originated from the DC in 1994, then became the Democracy and Liberty (DL) or Margherita in turn subsequently superseded by the Democratic Party (PD).
7. The Democratic Party (PD), which was created in 2008.

The electoral results of these parties are summarized in table 5.1.

Volatility cannot easily be calculated in Italy during the period 1990–2000, in part because many old parties disappeared entirely and in part because of complicated mergers. Strictly speaking, the only (relevant) parties examined here for which a calculation can be made directly are the Communist party that changed its name to Party of the Democratic Left and the Italian Social Movement (MSI) that became the AN. The PDS obtained in 1992 only about half the votes of the Communist party in 1987 (16.7 percent against 30 percent in 1987); the AN obtained two and a half times the votes of the MSI in 1987 and 1992 (13.5 percent against 5.4 percent).

Subsequently, volatility is difficult to calculate accurately as the Northern League and the UDC, with respect to the House of Freedom, and RC (as well indeed as other small parties), with respect to the Ulivo, have been in and out of the coalition. What can be ostensibly noted is that there was a "swing" away from the Center-Left coalition in favor of the House of Freedom between 2006 and 2008, while the two coalitions were effectively equal in 2006.

None the less, Bardi[6] (for the period 1992–2006) and Conti (for the 2006–2008 period) undertook the calculation.[7]

Social Characteristics of the Electors of the Relevant Parties

The Italian National Election Study (ITANES) published the following account of the distribution of the votes of electors at the 2006 general election according to their age (p. 87), gender (p. 80), education (p. 81), occupation (p. 102), and religiosity (p. 110). The volume is entitled *Dov'e la Vittoria?*[8] (Where Is the Victory?). Variations are sizeable in many respects.[9]

Since, in Italy, none of the "older" parties remained in existence as such (except, marginally, the Northern League), the question of the impact of new parties on the electors of older parties is not directly, if at all, meaningful, but it has an indirect impact, which will be examined in the coming sections.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of the Membership

As was stated toward the end of the introduction, the characteristics of Italian internal party life were profoundly altered as a result of the emergence of new parties. This was so with respect to those parties that were entirely new, Forza Italia, and in effect the Northern League, but this was also so, to an extent and with variations, with

respect to the parties that were altered by mergers or merely by a change of their name, as it happened with the AN and the Party of the Democratic Left.[10]

To begin with, there are appreciable differences in the evolution of the membership from the First to the Second Republic. Italian parties had traditionally a large membership (larger than French and even British parties): indeed the annual "inscription" to parties came to be something of a national "rite." This did not wholly cease to be the case as a result of the "earthquake" of 1992, but major changes did occur. On the one hand, a substantial decline of membership occurred in some of the older parties that changed their name, though not in all of them, the key exception being the AN; on the other hand, an entirely different viewpoint was adopted by Forza Italia, membership being limited seemingly to ensure that loyalty to the chief (Berlusconi) be not in question, while elected representatives were given a prominent position, a move aimed "at preventing any consolidation of power by the extra parliamentary party."[11] Thus Forza Italia never had more than about 300,000 members (in 2000) and declined to under 200,000 in 2006[12] or only about 2 percent of its electors.

Meanwhile, in 2004, the DS had less than half the members of the PCI in 1989 (561,000 against 1,471,000).[13] During the same period, after having given rise to a number of different parties and later essentially to two of them, as we saw, the UDC on the Right and the Margherita on the Left, what E. Pizzimenti called "The post-Christian democracy galaxy,"[14] did have a varying extent of success in their membership drives, although there appears to be some doubt about and some exaggeration in the reported results. While the DC had somewhat over 800,000 members before its dissolution in 1993, the size of the membership was about the same in total in 2006 if one combines the figure for the Center-Left successor party, the Margherita, and the Center-Right successor party, the CCD, which in turn became the UDC: the total is obtained, however, only because of reported vast increases in membership between 2002 and 2006.

Changes in the membership size were small in RC and in the Northern League.[15] The first declined somewhat from its original membership of 112,000 in 1991 to 97,000 in 2004,[16] while, conversely, members of the Northern League increased from 112,000 in 1992 to 130,000 in 2003.[17] Above all, there was a marked increase in membership in the AN. While the organization from which it proceeded, the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), had only 142,000 members in 1990, the AN had 468,000 members in 1995

and 594,000 in 2004: such a success may well have been due to the fact that the AN had been part of the governmental coalition with Forza Italia, while the MSI was typically regarded as "unacceptable," not just by the Left but by the DC as well.[18]

Forza Italia has simply not considered membership as an important part of its appeal; but this is not so for the AN. It has frequently been suggested that this difference in approach was a factor accounting for the difficulty the two parties experienced after their (temporary) merger in the PDL in 2009–2010. A degree of discontent has indeed been noticeable since then among the members and even active supporters of AN who feel their role has been to an extent marginalized. The break-up of the merger was, therefore, in question from the start.

Party Decision-Making Structure

The decision-making structure of Italian parties tends to be at three levels, namely at that of the congress, which is elected in a number of parties by the members themselves or by delegates selected by the members (as was the case in the Communist party and the PDS and DS), at the level of the national council, which is elected by the congress and at the level of the national executive, which is elected by the national council. The role of members is, therefore, typically limited to the participation in the election of the congress, which discusses the general line of the party and meets somewhat infrequently: in the DC, this was twice a year; in the PDS and DS this has taken place somewhat less regularly, but never more than once a year. There is also a Congress in Forza Italia (since 1997)—but nearly half of all its participants (3,000) are "ex officio"—in the AN, in the Northern League—it is composed of representatives of the local sections in this case—and in RC, where it meets every three years. The role of decision making for members may well have been reduced somewhat, but, in practice, individual members were far from being very influential under the First Republic.

However, primaries have been introduced at the local level and even to an extent, in the Center-Left in particular (specifically in the Ulivo, but also in the PD) at the level of the national parties. The role of national primaries tends to take the form of a "ratification" process only, however; on the other hand, primaries help to determine who will be the leaders, mayors, for instance, at the local and regional levels.

Territorial Coverage of Parties

Except for the Northern League, the territorial coverage of Italian parties is national, although, as can be expected, all parties are better represented in some parts of the country than in others: the central regions are typically "Left," whereas the northeast is typically "Right." The PPI has been represented especially in the North, the UDC in the South. On the other hand, there is also a formal geographical division in the case of the Northern League, which is present only in what it calls the "Padania," namely the Po region, from Piedmont to the Venice area, although the party has also expanded (with rather less success) in Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, the "Marche" region, and even to Tuscany.

Party Finance

It was pointed out by Katz and Mair in their 1995 article[19] that parties were becoming increasingly dependent on the state, party finance being one of the elements in this process. This is indeed a marked characteristic of Second Republic Italian parties. While in 1990 the DC received about two-fifths of its income from state subsidies, the UDC received four-fifths of its income and the Margherita 90 percent of its income in the early years of the twenty-first century; similarly, while the Communist party received a quarter of its income in 1990 from the state, its successor parties received over half of their income in the 1990s and at least a third of their income in the first years of the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, RC did receive about two-thirds of its income from the state and the Northern League nearly half.

The sources of income of the relevant Italian parties in the mid-1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first century are described in Appendix 5.D (in percentages of total) (with respect to the various parties).[20]

National Decision Organs

As was noted earlier, the basic decision organ is the congress in each of the parties. This is typically large (1,000 or more) and has only a limited role. The congress normally appoints the national council, which has a smaller membership (a few hundreds). The council in turn appoints the organs that truly direct the party, these having a different name in each organization. In the first decade of the twenty-first century the name and size of the key organs of the parties are shown in Appendix 5.E.

Programs and Ideologies

The programs and the ideology of the parties that are studied in this chapter are based essentially on the findings of the study of party "manifestos" elaborated by Budge and his colleagues.[21]

Moments When the Program Is Adopted

Two characteristics of the evolution of *Italian* politics in the 1990–2010 periods appear to have had an impact on the moment when party programs were adopted. First, as we saw, all the relevant parties were new; second, these new parties differed in character and especially in terms of their structure by comparison with their predecessors in the First Republic: of the significant parties that emerged in the 1990s, perhaps the AN and the RC are the only ones in which the tradition of the pre-1990 parties was partly maintained; but the AN merged temporarily with Forza Italia in 2009, and the RC was eliminated from parliament in 2008 as it did not reach the vote level required to be represented. On the other hand, in the Northern League, in Forza Italia before (and indeed since) the merger with the AN and even in the PD, the contrast with past party practices has been sharp in terms of the conception of the organization, of the role of the leadership and, consequently, of the way in which programs came to be developed.

A further matter rendered even more imprecise the moment when the party program was adopted: this is the existence of the two umbrella groupings under which most of the parties came to locate themselves since 2001. As a result, there were so to speak two "moments" when the parties adopted their program, a "moment" when each component unit debated and adopted its electoral plank and a "moment" when each of the two electoral "groupings" as a whole chose the topics on which to fight the campaign. In practice, it is the second of these two "moments" that is obviously the most important. In 2001, 2006, and 2008, Berlusconi himself played the key part in this context; in the case of the Ulivo, later the Unione, there was also a substantial involvement of the leader, especially in 2006, when Prodi orchestrated the preparation of the program by means of a series of working meetings that took place over a period before that program came to be launched a few weeks prior to the election.

Are the Programs Specific or Vague?

The program of Forza Italia in 2001 for which Berlusconi was primarily responsible was long and detailed: it was hailed to be a "contract

with the Italians" and referred to a large number of promises; this was not the case of the program presented by Berlusconi in 2006, possibly because many of the promises of 2001 had not been fulfilled despite the House of Freedom having been uninterruptedly in power for five years. On the other hand, Prodi took great pains to prepare the election program for that year by involving large numbers of interested members of the "civil society" in working parties covering the whole of governmental activities; the result was a program that was nearly 15 times larger than that of the House of Freedom.[22] Yet even Berlusconi's program was precise, if not as detailed. In 2008 the programs of PDL and PD were also precise, but overall parsimonious in terms of pledges.

Policy Areas Covered by the Programs

In his analysis of party manifestos, Conti was able to determine that the economy and welfare occupied one half of the manifestos of the two "groupings" and that another quarter was related to "political institutions," the concern being mainly with governmental and administrative efficiency. The last quarter of the manifestos, in both cases, was devoted to the rest of the projected activities.[23] The coverage thus corresponds to what are the main areas of activities of government: it is not surprising that the economy and welfare should be given most space—and indeed in both cases.

The Extent of Ideology

There is manifest ideology in the programs of the Northern League and of RC, these two parties having belonged intermittently to one of the two groupings. The ideology of Forza Italia was more apparent in the early part of the period under consideration than later on, while the AN and the Ulivo had a less clear-cut ideology and presented themselves as attempting to solve the problems of the country in a "practical" manner.

The ideology of the Northern League is specifically "regionalist," but it is also "nationalist": there is support for the Padania area against Rome and the South (a support that led to an early claim for independence), but there is also opposition to immigration into "Italy." RC defends the interests of the working class along the lines Communist parties have tended to do. Forza Italia entered the electoral arena in 1993 with a major stress placed on the need for Italy to break with the Communist domination of the "left-wing" political

culture, which had prevailed since World War II and to take steps to remedy the effect that culture had had on preventing the full development of a spirit of private enterprise in the country.

There have been substantial changes in the ideology of the parties that are now relevant in Italy. First, there have been major changes away from a "classical" ideology in both the AN and the Ulivo (that is to say, essentially the Margherita and the DS that came together in 2008 to form the PD). The AN abandoned totally the "fascist" elements of the program in the party from which it originated (the Italian Social Movement) while the party of the DS, which was issued primarily from the PCI, wholly abandoned the Communist ideology to adopt a Left-of-Center standpoint about ideology and welfare. Meanwhile, Forza Italia also markedly reduced its ideological stand especially from 2006 as a result of its long control of the government in the previous legislature. Both the Northern League and RC also had to tone down their ideological stance to take part in the electoral grouping that they joined when they felt it was to their advantage to do so. In the process, the programs of the two coalitions moved closer to each other and "although adversarial, the tones of the electoral campaign were less dramatic than in the past and, may be for this reason, too, the turnout declined to 80.5 percent [in 2008, excluding the constituencies abroad]."[24]

Leadership

Between 1990 and 2010 the leadership of Italian parties was remarkably stable, in part because of the absence of any change in the three parties of the Right and in part because the moves were by and large regular in the Center and Left. There was thus simply no change at all in the leadership of the parties of the Center-Right. In each case the leader (Berlusconi, Fini, Bossi) who was at the origin of the party (or, as in the case of AN, of the "reconstituted" party) remained in his position of leader during the whole period.

In the Center and on the Left some changes did occur. RC was founded by Bertinotti who remained secretary until he became speaker of the lower house in 2006. Giordano replaced Bertinotti in 2006 and resigned when the party was defeated at the polls in 2008 and was eliminated from parliament by the operation of the minimum percentage vote. He was then replaced by Ferrero. In the PDS/DS, changes occurred regularly every four years. The leader of the Margherita was Rutelli from the creation of the party in 2001 to its

merger in the newly created PD in 2008. The first leader of the PD, Veltroni, resigned after the 2008 election defeat of that year of the party and a ballot of the membership took place and the winner was Bersani.

Finally, Prodi led the Ulivo twice. In the first case he was prime minister from 1997 to 1999; his government was defeated in parliament and he became president of the European Commission. In the second case he was prime minister again from 2006 to 2008. His government collapsed internally and the Unione was defeated at the polls in 2008: Prodi decided to leave politics altogether after that defeat.

Appendix 5.F provides a list of the party leaders and of the occupational background of these leaders. Party officials, journalists, and professors are well represented, but the best-known case is that of the business tycoon Berlusconi who dominated most of the period, mainly in government but also in opposition.

Personalized Leadership and the Question of Populism

For 40 years Italy was the Western European country in which prime ministers succeeded each other, and indeed often returned to office, without having any "emotional" link with the population: suddenly, in 1993, that tradition was abandoned and Italy became the one Western European country in which the personalization of leaders became the key feature of the political scene. Admittedly, a (rather long-standing) prime minister of the 1980s, Bettino Craxi, not only fully controlled the Socialist Party but did appeal directly to a substantial segment of the electorate; also, in the 1980s, Umberto Bossi came to be "in tune with" an important segment of the electorate of the North of the country by stressing the extent to which the skilled and hardworking people of the Po Valley area were exploited by the rest of the country. Craxi finished badly a few years later, however, together with his Socialist Party, being destroyed by the corruption scandals the clean-hands magistrates had been uncovering, while Bossi was on the sidelines in the 1980s and early 1990s, being rejected by the "establishment" of the "regular" parties as unacceptable, indeed almost as unacceptable as Le Pen was (and remained ever since) in France.

These attitudes changed in 1993 with the end of the old party system: the "bureaucratic partitocracy" for which Italy had been known for so long was swept aside and a new party system emerged whose main and most ostensible character was that it was "personalized." Thus, when examining Italian politics from the 1990s, the question

seems not to be whether there is personalization in Italian political parties, but whether all parties have come to be affected by that new development and whether there are variations in the forms and extent that personalization takes.

It is, therefore, difficult to circumscribe the list of "personalized leaders" of Italian parties from 1990 to 2010. There is no doubt whatsoever that one finds in that group Bossi and above all Berlusconi, the latter having, almost single-handedly, created a party at his devotion, Forza Italia: even France's De Gaulle had not been as successful, since De Gaulle was in the wilderness during the four years of the occupation of the country between 1940 and 1944 and had then to build a party twice, the first, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), having disappeared ignominiously in 1953 after having been failed to win decisively in 1951.

The question that arises, therefore, is whether other leaders of Italian parties, perhaps benefiting from the new "fashion" in party leadership that Bossi and Berlusconi seemed to have rendered popular, can also be said to have been personalized. One does indeed find some elements, less strongly featured, admittedly, in the case of Casini who has been the seemingly undisputed head of the fragment of DC that became the UDC. There was perhaps something similar in the AN, but only in the sense that the undisputed leader of that party has been Fini, who has been consistently the most popular of all Italian leaders during the period, but the extent to which his "personalization" influenced voting patterns appears to have been rather small; the question may arise again since the merger with Forza Italia to form the "People of freedom" turned out to be temporary. There have also been "symptoms" of personalization elsewhere, including in tiny parties, but perhaps the two clearest cases in sizeable parties were those of Rutelli in the Margherita and of Veltroni, first among the DS and later in the PD: but neither of these leaders was truly successful, at any rate at the national level: they both quickly retired from the leadership of their party. Finally, Prodi might have become a "personalized" leader as head of the Ulivo; but he did not seem to have the temperament or perhaps even the taste to adopt such a posture. Thus the glaring cases of Bossi and Berlusconi remain the only true instances of personalization in the Second Republic, Casini being perhaps the only other example, albeit at a lower key. There has thus been an "opening" of the link between the leaders and the led in the direction of personalization: but, while many tried to move in that direction, only two of the leaders succeeded in it.

Yet, even in the cases of Bossi and Berlusconi, the extent to which personalization played a part in voting behavior needs to be assessed rigorously. The analysis of voting patterns at the 2006 election does provide some indications in this respect.[25]

Analyses of the votes at the 2006 election do indeed suggest a degree of influence of leaders, but that influence is in large part indissolubly linked with the support for the party or the coalition grouping with which these leaders have been associated: the precise extent of the influence of leaders is, therefore, difficult to determine. In conclusion to the article just mentioned and after having stated that what has to be referred to as the direct influence of the leader is more visible on the Center-Right than on the Center-Left, Barisione adds: "Overall, even on the centre-right, the orientation towards the leader does not appear to be a marked characteristic, at least among the electors of the three most important organisations, the League, the UDC and the National Alliance." The true difference is provided by the permanent case of Forza Italia, which is confirmed to be the "personal party" par excellence, including with respect to the attitudes which the electors of that political formation display "in the way they look at politics and at the vote."[26] If there seems to be little doubt that party members have been associated with the leader in the context of Forza Italia and of the Northern League, there is no evidence that this has also been the case in the other parties, not even in the UDC with respect to Casini.

Admittedly, personalized leadership has unquestionably played a part in the elaboration and adoption of party programs. This has clearly been the case with respect to Forza Italia and the Northern League. Both Berlusconi and Bossi "invented" the program of their party and saw to it that it was formally adopted by their respective organization. Much of the literature on the program did indeed originate from the leaders themselves. Fini also appears to have exercised a substantial influence in moving the AN away from the "Far Right" posture of the Italian Social Movement. There is less evidence that the program of the UDC was essentially the responsibility of Casini.

Personalized Leadership and Populism

There is no trace of populism in the discourses of either Fini or Casini in relation to their respective parties, the AN and the UDC. There was a degree of "populism" in Forza Italia especially at the origin, the appeal of that party and of Berlusconi himself having been built

against all other parties and in the name of "the people" in general. Particularly at the beginning of his political career, Berlusconi presented himself as "the new man" with no political background who wanted to defend people's rights against the rapacity of professional politicians. He represented the man in the street as naturally wise and as opposed to self-interested and corrupt political elites and intellectuals.[27] Since Forza Italia and, later, the "People of freedom" came to be in power for long periods, the populist tone decreased but never completely disappeared: Berlusconi had to defend the policies of his party and his own position as prime minister. Over the years Berlusconi was also involved in a number of corruption and bribery scandals: although he always denied his involvement, these scandals might have contributed to downplay his rhetoric of being "man of the people."

Thus the only Italian leader who can be regarded as having been uniformly populist is Bossi in view of his repeated attacks against the behavior of "classical" politicians and of his promise to act in favor of the people of the North. However, even in the case of the Northern League, the "populist" discourse was toned down in the language used by those ministers who were in charge of the administration of such policies as immigration; but the same language continued to be used by other members of the party, including ministers, when their departmental responsibility was not at stake.

* * *

The Italian party system "revolution" has been unique in Western Europe and it has probably been highly exceptional in the history of party systems. There is no doubt that the transformation that took place provided substantial political stability to the country; political contests also had a highly simplified and, therefore, rather more meaningful character. Yet there always seemed to be a degree of "impermanence" in the new system, since it appeared to depend entirely on the ability of one man, Silvio Berlusconi, to constitute the link between people and government. Admittedly, there have been other examples of a similar character, the case of De Gaulle and of the Fifth French Republic being perhaps the most similar: yet there was a difference in that "Gaullism" had an ideological resonance, partly nationalistic and partly designed to provide an opportunity to change the character of politics. This has not been the case with Berlusconi: it would be hard to talk about "Berlusconism" (as we

do for "Gaullism") to characterize the political line and the overall policy direction of the Italian leader. As difficulties have emerged in 2010 between the two key leaders of the Right, Berlusconi and Fini, almost as soon as the merger of their parties occurred, it is difficult to believe that there will not be, first, a break-up of the foundations of Forza Italia when Berlusconi leaves the scene and, second, subsequently, a return to something analogous to the practices of the First Republic. Indeed, in the past few years, Berlusconi showed clear signs of difficulty in maintaining his leadership. He forced Fini (the party cofounder) out of the PDL. In turn, Fini created a new party, splitting from PDL and establishing an anti-Berlusconi alliance with the Centrist UDC. Together, they are strong enough to play a pivotal role and seriously undermine Berlusconi's leadership. Although it gained a large majority in 2008, the Berlusconi government resigned three and a half years after the election, as votes of confidence in parliament could not be assured with Fini and Casini in the opposition. By and large, Berlusconi's dominance will probably become viewed as a parenthesis, not as a step toward a break in the political practices of the Italian republic.

Notes

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3. Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli, *Political Institutions in Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
4. Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Electoral Context," in James Newell (ed.), *The Italian General Elections of 2006* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
5. Cotta and Verzichelli, *Political Institutions in Italy.*
6. Luciano Bardi, "Electoral Change and Its impact on the Party System in Italy," *West European Politics*, 4 (2) (2007): 711–733.
7. Appendix 5.A.
8. ITANES, *Dov'e la Vittoria?* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006).
9. Appendix 5.B.
10. Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007).
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12. Caterina Paolucci, "Forza Italia," in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 97–148.
13. Roberto De Rosa, "Partito Democratico della Sinistra-Democratici di Sinistra," in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milan: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 55–96.
14. Bardi, Ignazi, and Massari, *I Partiti Italiani,* 1–54, especially p. 7.
15. Appendix 5.C.
16. Enrico Calossi, "Rifondazione Comunista e Comunisti Italiani," in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 218–247.
17. Lorella Cedroni, "Lega Nord," in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 247–268.
18. Mara Morini, "Movimento Sociale Italiano—Alleanza Nazionale," in Luciano Bardi, Piero Ignazi, and Oreste Massari (eds.), *I Partiti Italiani* (Milano: Università Bocconi Editore, 2007), 149–174.
19. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics*, 1 (1) (1995): 5–28.
20. Bardi, "Electoral Change and Its Impact on the Party System in Italy," 711–733.
21. Thanks to the determined efforts of a group of political scientists, led By Professor Budge, the content of party "manifestos" has been systematically recorded and classified. It has thus become possible to trace the evolution of party programs throughout the second half of the twentieth century and consequently to assess the extent to which party ideology has come to be modified over time. Two volumes have analyzed cross-national findings: these are Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-war Election Programs in 19 Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Ian Budge, H.D. Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, *Mapping Policy Preferences, Estimates for Parties, Governments and Electors 1945–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
22. Nicolo Conti, "The Italian Parties and Their Programmatic Platforms: How Alternative?" *Modern Italy*, 13 (4) (2008): 451–464, at p. 459.
23. Ibid., 460.
24. Ibid., 461.
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6

The Netherlands

Rudy B. Andeweg

Introduction

In the first election under universal suffrage (1922), Dutch voters had a choice between a Labour party, a Conservative Liberal party, a Catholic party, two Protestant parties, and a variety of small parties. The Catholic party and the two Protestant parties merged into one Christian Democratic party in 1977, but other than that these parties still form the backbone of the Dutch party system. Each of these three established parties faces competition from smaller, ideologically more radical rivals.[1] On the Left, the Labour party (PvdA) faced competition primarily from a Communist party in the past, and from the Socialist Party (SP) more recently (and from a Green Left party, which has not passed the 10 percent threshold used in this study to attain "relevance"). The Christian Democrats are challenged primarily by fundamentalist Protestant parties, none of which has crossed the 10 percent threshold. The Conservative Liberals recently face competition from the populist Right. These three party families can trace their roots in strongly organized subcultures ("pillars"), separated by deep social cleavages of religion and social class. As a result, competition between (and even within) the party families primarily served to mobilize the party faithful, not to attract voters from other subcultures.

The only relevant party that does not fit into this scheme is Democrats 66 (D66), a maverick Progressive Liberal party that was founded in 1966 to challenge the existing party system and to

advocate democratic reform. By that time (i.e., 1966), however, the old social cleavages had started to erode, and the established parties became autonomous political organizations, rather than their subculture's embassy in The Hague (the seat of government). Competition between the party families' core parties and their radical challengers increased, as did competition between the core parties.

Electors and Parties

The start of this process, known as "depillarization," more or less coincided with the abolition of compulsory voting in 1970. Before that time, election campaigns were not very demanding on the parties: because of compulsory voting, parties did not have to get out the vote, and the core parties could rely on the loyalty of their respective social constituencies, with competition only from the small radical parties of their own party family. Compared to that period, turnout is lower, but it has not declined much since then, at least not in parliamentary elections. Turnout fluctuates considerably, according to what is at stake in the elections (see Table 6.1). The low point of 73.3 percent in 1998 can be explained by the fact that the country was governed by a "purple" coalition of Labor ("red") and Liberals ("blue") almost spanning the entire Left-Right political spectrum, and by the fact that this government was widely perceived as being responsible for strong economic growth. The subsequent rise in turnout from 2002 to 2006 is due primarily to the entry of the populist Right, causing polarization and mobilizing some hitherto apathetic voters.

Table 6.1 Election results for relevant Dutch parties, 1994–2010

Year	*1994*	*1998*	*2002*	*2003*	*2006*	*2010*
Turnout (%)	78.8	73.3	79.1	80.0	80.4	75.3
Percentage of votes						
CDA	22.2	18.4	27.9	28.6	26.5	13.6
PvdA	24.0	29.0	15.1	27.3	21.2	19.6
D66	15.5	9.0	5.1	4.1	2.0	6.9
VVD	20.0	24.7	15.4	17.9	14.7	20.5
SP	1.3	3.5	5.9	6.3	16.6	9.8
LPF			17.0	5.7	0.2	
PVV					5.9	15.4

Source: Official Election Results

The big changes have not been in turnout, but in the election outcome. In 1963, for example, the core parties combined commanded 87.5 percent of the vote, and total volatility (counting all parties) was a mere 5 percent.[2] This is very different in the 1990–2010 period (see Table 6.1). The core parties attracted an average of 64.4 percent of the vote in the six elections during these two decades (almost a quarter of the electorate less), with a high of 73.8 percent in 2003 and a low of 53.7 percent in 2010. In other words, they faced much stronger competition from other and particularly new parties.

Old subcultural loyalties had eroded. The dealignment of the electorate is best illustrated by the volatility figures.[3] In the Netherlands, taking part in government always carried electoral risks, as it is rare for a Dutch governing coalition not to lose votes in the next elections, but party loyalty cushioned such losses. Today, this is no longer the case, and the largest fluctuations in the election results tend to be associated with government incumbency: in 2002 PvdA and VVD were punished for perceived government failures, and in 2010 the CDA was associated with ineffective government. As a smaller party, D66 finds it particularly difficult to maintain visibility when in government. This party even lost in 1998, one of only four postwar elections in which the coalition as a whole made electoral gains. The peak of the SP in 2006 does not fit this pattern. It is generally attributed to the popularity of SP party leader Jan Marijnissen (which is discussed in detail in the later section).

Counting all parties, total electoral volatility averages 21.4 for the 1990–2010 period, with a peak of 30.7 in 2002. Only Italy, where the entire party system changed, shows higher levels of aggregate volatility.[4] According to the 2006 election study, 53 percent of the voters waited until the last week before election day to decide which party they preferred.

Electoral System

One explanation for this high volatility is that the electoral system does nothing to dampen the effect of decreased party loyalty.[5] At elections, each party presents a list on which it has ranked its candidates; the party leader is the highest ranked candidate and called the "list puller." Formally, votes are cast for an individual candidate on a party list in one of 19 electoral districts. However, the electoral system treats these votes primarily as choices for a national party by adding up all votes in all districts for a party's individual candidates, and

distributing the seats proportionally on the basis of those aggregates. To obtain 1 of the 150 seats in the lower house of the national parliament, a party needs only 1/150th of the vote (0.67 percent), making the Dutch electoral system one of the most proportional systems in the world. The electoral districts have no impact on the distribution of seats. If a party has put different candidates on its party lists in the various districts (which not all of them do), it influences which individual candidates are elected: to have been on the list in a district in which the party has received many votes increases the chances for that candidate. Other than that, the districts primarily serve administrative purposes for the organization of the elections. Candidates are declared elected in the order in which the party has put them on its list, regardless of the number of votes they received individually. The only exception is that individual candidates jump the queue if they have received at least 25 percent of the electoral quota, provided the party has won sufficient seats.

Political Parties

Old and New Parties

The weakening of the social cleavages since the 1960s has led to an "unfreezing" of the party system in terms of mergers and new parties. The most important merger in Dutch politics—of the Catholic and main Protestant parties into the CDA in 1977—took place well before the start of the 1990–2010 period and hence is not discussed here. After 1990, Leftist parties merged to form Green Left, and two fundamentalist Protestant parties merged into the Christian Union, but neither the merging parties nor the resulting merged party were ever relevant in the terms of this study.

New parties have regularly emerged, and usually disappeared after a while. A few new parties crossed the 10 percent threshold at least once. Apart from D66 (which entered parliament for the first time in 1967), the relevant new parties are listed in Appendix C.

The SP was formed from fringe Leftist, primarily Maoist, groups in 1972. It participated in national elections since 1977 and first entered parliament in 1994. Since then, gradually dropping its Maoist heritage, the party grew steadily, culminating in a result of 16.6 percent in 2006. In that year, the party was invited to join the negotiations for a new government coalition, but it was widely perceived as not entering those negotiations seriously and preferring opposition. This

contributed to a drop in popularity in the 2010 elections, but since then the party presents itself as a potential governing party and has made a recovery in the opinion polls.

The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) was named after its founder and leader, Pim Fortuyn. In the run-up to the 2002 parliamentary elections he was leader of another newly founded party, but was dismissed by that party because of statements he made about Islam. He then founded the LPF with a platform against immigration and big government. He was assassinated by an animal rights activist only days before the elections. His party became the second largest party in the 2002 elections and was invited to join a government coalition with Christian Democrats and Conservative Liberals. However, without its leader, and without a detailed program, the party was riddled with internal conflicts. When the coalition fell apart after only a few months, the LPF lost heavily in the 2003 elections and failed to meet the electoral threshold (0.67 percent) in the 2006 elections.

The Freedom Party (PVV) can be seen as the ideological successor to the LPF. Formally, however, there are no links to the LPF. The party was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders, an MP who had left the Conservative Liberal Party in a conflict about the party's position on EU membership for Turkey. His party fights primarily on an anti-Islam platform. The party won 5.9 percent of the vote in its first elections, in 2006, and became the third largest party in the 2010 elections. From 2010 to 2012 it joined a government coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Conservative Liberals, without actually participating in the government with ministers. A detailed agreement spelled out which government proposals were to be supported by the PVV, and party leader Geert Wilders met the prime minister weekly to coordinate his party's position and that of the government. Such a combination of a majority coalition and a minority cabinet seems to be occurring more frequently across the world.[6] However, the experiment soon ended when the PVV withdrew its support after a failure to reach agreement with the other coalition parties over new austerity measures. This prompted early elections in September 2012.

Sociological Party Profiles

The decline of subcultural party loyalty has resulted in less distinctive social profiles of the core parties, but the differences have not disappeared altogether: according to the 2006 National Election Study, the Christian Democrat CDA attracts more religious voters; only

52.8 percent (almost) never attends religious services compared to 74 percent of VVD and 84 percent of PvdA voters. Likewise, the class distinction between the Conservative Liberal VVD and the Social Democrat PvdA is still visible: 42 percent of PvdA voters consider themselves working class or upper working class, compared to only 13 percent of VVD voters.[7]

The social background of voters for the other parties is less distinctive. The average age of these younger parties' voters is also slightly lower. D66 is an exception in this respect, but these figures are from 2006, when the party was at an electoral low, being supported only by "die-hards." D66 attracts primarily secular and highly educated (upper) middle class voters: by presenting itself as the "reasonable alternative" to the established parties, and through the intellectual profile of its leaders, the party has always been most popular in university towns. This stands in contrast to the new parties that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. The SP and in particular the LPF and the PVV attract the less well educated voters: these three parties have the lowest percentages university educated voters. Other than the left-wing SP, the right-wing LPF and PVV also stand out as male parties; just over a third of their voters are female. This seems to be characteristic of right-wing populist parties in general. PVV voters are also less religious than those of other parties. The party is very critical of Islam, including Islamic teaching on homosexuality and the position of women—views that can be heard among orthodox Christians as well. In order to be consistent, the PVV also seeks to reduce the role of religion in public life generally, for example, giving priority to freedom of speech over the right not to be offended by blasphemy. For these reasons, not only Muslims, but also Christians, feel less attracted to the PVV.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of the Membership

Party membership figures have never been high in the Netherlands and they have been declining ever since they have been recorded. In 1946 an estimated 15 percent of the electorate was a party member, in 1956 12.5 percent, in 1967 6.7 percent, in 1977 4.4 percent, in 1986 3.5 percent, in 1994 2.9 percent.[8] This decline is caused by a drop in absolute membership figures while the electorate expanded (from 3.5 million in 1946 to 11.5 million in 1994). In the 1990–2010 period the decline slowed down and membership as a percentage of the electorate fluctuated somewhat (slightly up after 2002, slightly down more

recently). It was 2.5 percent of the electorate in 2010, one of the lowest figures in Europe.[9] Of the established parties, the CDA still has most members in absolute terms. As a percentage of its electorate, the Christian Democratic membership is usually higher than that of the PvdA. This is probably due to the fact that the vote of the CDA (and its predecessors combined) has declined more than that of the PvdA: it is the most committed voters who are also party members, and hence party membership declines more slowly than a party's electoral support. This mechanism also explains why short-term fluctuations in the vote have an opposite effect on the percentage of voters who are members: a decline leads to a higher membership rate and vice versa.

The three new parties that emerged during the most recent decades followed very different strategies with regard to membership. The SP has developed a relatively large membership base. As the party also attracted more voters, membership as a percentage of the vote declined, but it is still quite high compared to that of the core parties. The party invests in its rank-and-file by offering legal advice and in some towns even health clinics. The new parties of the Right, the short-lived LPF and the PVV, put much less emphasis on membership. The PVV went furthest, having only one member: the party leader, Geert Wilders. The party does not admit other members. According to Dutch law, a party needs to take the legal form of an association to be able to register a party name; the party complied with that requirement by setting up an association with only one member.

For the decision role of members, see Appendix 6.E. With the exception of the PVV where the party leader is the only party member, and all decisions are taken by the leader, Dutch political parties have an organizational structure that parallels the structure of the Dutch state: local branches, provincial branches (in larger provinces branches for each electoral district), a national party conference, and a national party executive, headed by the national party chair. (All parties have national territorial coverage, although the CDA is stronger in the countryside and the PvdA is stronger in urban areas, for example.) Some parties also have a national party council, an organ between the party conference and the party executive, to which the party executive is accountable when the party conference is not in session. However, these party councils have been abolished by the two largest membership parties, the CDA and PvdA. Of all these branches and bodies, the local branches were most important for individual party members, even with regard to national politics: it is in local branch meetings that members would discuss the draft election manifesto, the nomination

of candidates, and so on. Local party branches would then send delegates to the national party conference that would elect the party chair and the national party executive. Since 2002, probably in an effort to make party membership more attractive, individual party members are given more influence at the expense of the role of the local branches.[10] Each individual member was given the right to attend national party conferences in CDA and VVD, although delegates from local party branches retain some rights in both parties. The PvdA rejected such a reform on the grounds that it would advantage party members living close to the venue of the conference, but individual party members were allowed to attend some recent conferences. Obviously, giving access to national party conference to individual members makes the size of the national party conference unpredictable. It fluctuates with conflicts within the party. In 2007, when the VVD had to resolve a conflict between the party leader and the number two on the party list, about a thousand party members attended the conference. The CDA national conference of 2010 swelled to 5,000 members when the controversial decision to join a coalition with the PVV was on the agenda. Individual party members were also given more direct influence. Within the PvdA individual members elect the party chair and the top candidate on the party list. Within the VVD individual members elect the top candidates on the party list for parliamentary elections, and they also decide the position on the party list of other candidates, although the outcome of that procedure must be confirmed by the national party conference. In 2006, the election of the top candidate followed a vitriolic campaign and the candidate who lost the election among the party members was preferred by the party voters. Within the CDA, individual members elect the party chair. In all three parties, referendums can be held to consult individual members, but such a referendum has taken place only in the PvdA.

In many ways, the three core parties follow the example of D66, in which party individual members always had more influence, having access to national party conferences, and deciding the ordering of candidates on the party list. Oddly, the top candidate was nominated by the party conference until 2006; this has changed to election by party members in 2006.

The declining influence of local branches, and the growing influence of individual members is not extended to the new parties. The SP still follows the classic hierarchical model with candidates being nominated by a national party conference composed of local representatives. The PVV has no members other than the party leader.

Party Finance

The decline of the membership base of most parties also had financial consequences. To compensate for the loss of income from membership dues, parties increasingly turned to the state. Before 1999, parties received relatively small subsidies for specific activities (a research bureau, a youth organization, etc.). Since 1999, parties receive a lump sum from the state. The total subsidy for a party consists of a basic amount—which is the same for all parties—plus an amount based on the number of seats and the number of members. In addition, parties from the Left also levy a "party tax" on party members elected to parliament or holding appointed political offices. The SP goes furthest in this respect: MPs for the SP donate their entire salary to the party and receive a modal salary from the party in return. Gifts play a relatively minor role, except for the new parties on the Right.[11]

The amounts of money from different sources vary considerably across parties. Obviously, with only one member, the PVV receives little income from membership dues. Moreover, to qualify for government subsidies a party should have a minimum of 1,000 members. As a consequence, the PVV receives no state funding either. It relies primarily on gifts the party is rumored to receive from US donors, but it has steadfastly refused to make them public. According to a 2010 newspaper report,[12] the SP is least reliant on membership dues (10 percent of the party's total income) probably because the party receives large sums through its party tax. For all other parties membership dues and government subsidies together account for 80–90 percent of the parties' income.

New legislation on party finance has been announced for years. It is delayed primarily because of controversy about new rules to disclose all gifts in excess of 1,000 euro; the PVV is strongly opposed to both state subsidies and such obligatory disclosure.

Programs and Ideologies

Dutch political parties may have two types of programs: a program of principles that outlines the party's ideology, and an election manifesto containing the party's policy proposals for the coming parliament. Both programs are usually prepared by a committee and screened by the national party executive, but eventually decided on by the national party conference. The program of principles may last a decade or longer, and there is no fixed timetable for its adoption. The election manifestos are adopted by the parties' national conferences before each

parliamentary election. Occasionally, when a parliamentary elections is called shortly after the previous one (e.g., 2003 following 2002), parties often decide to issue a short update in combination with the existing manifesto.

The manifestos are quite specific. This is partly due to the fact that the manifestos are used during the negotiations for a new government coalition: a party cannot credible demand concessions if its position on the issue in question was not mentioned in its manifesto. There are also two more recent developments that make it unwise for parties to be vague. First, since 1986, it has become customary for parties to submit their manifestos to the government's Central Planning Bureau. The bureau uses its standard macroeconomic model to estimate the economic consequences of the proposals in the manifestos, in terms of employment, economic growth, the government's budget deficit, and so on. These results are made public and provide input to the campaign. Second, since 1989, the manifestos are used for applications to help voters find the party that is closest to their own policy preferences. Since 1998 these applications can be consulted electronically. The most popular one, *Stemwijzer*, was consulted 4.7 million times during the 2006 election campaign. The specificity of the election manifestos can be gauged from their length. In 2010, the average manifesto of the six relevant parties counted about 17,150 words, with considerable variation.[13]

There is not much difference between the parties in terms of the policy areas covered. All cover macroeconomic issues and social affairs, education, health care, housing, transport, immigration, security, environmental affairs, political institutions, foreign affairs, and public finance. Where parties differ is in issue saliency; the proportion of words in the manifesto devoted to each of these policy domains. For example, in its 2010 manifesto, the PVV pays relatively more attention to immigration (under the heading of "fighting Islam"), in a separate paragraph, but also in the paragraphs on foreign policy, education, social affairs, political institutions, and security.

The parties also differ in the direction of the policies they propose; their issue positions. The two Leftist parties, PvdA and SP, advocate social security, solidarity, "putting the heaviest burdens on the strongest shoulders." The ideological profile of the PvdA has become less distinct over time. Party leader Kok famously proclaimed that his party should "shed its ideological feathers." The SP moved from a Maoist position to a Social-Democrat position, but most of that development took place before the SP entered parliament in 1994. The

Conservative-Liberal VVD seeks to protect the market from government intervention and regulation, and advocates stricter security measures and more police. When it was founded, D66 argued that ideologies were outlived, and it advocated a nonideological "pragmatic" approach. Gradually, however, the party developed into a Progressive Liberal party, combining a market-oriented approach with a strong position on environmental protection, civil liberties, and others. It is the only party that became more rather than less ideological over time, although this development should not be overestimated.

These party positions are primarily related the Left-Right ideological dimension, defined primarily in social economic terms (more or less government intervention in the economy; more or less income equality, etc.). However, the Dutch party system has always been defined by two ideological dimensions, the second one relating to religious and ethical choices, ranging from religious orthodoxy to secularism. This religious dimension has gradually lost ground. For the Christian-Democrat CDA religious issues (abortion, euthanasia, Sunday rest, etc.) used to be important, but have all but disappeared. Even the short paragraph on medical-ethical questions in the party's 2010 manifesto argues that not everything that is medically possible should be allowed, but it makes no choices. From the second half of the 1990s onward, the "second dimension" of the Dutch party system has been redefined in cultural terms and linked to globalization. According to Kriesi and Frey,[14] the "losers" of globalization are attracted to the "authoritarian-nationalist-monocultural" pole of this dimension, whereas voters who stand to gain from globalization can be found at its "libertarian-cosmopolitan-multicultural" end. Under the leadership of Bolkestein, the VVD was the first party to move to a more monoculturalist position, but its thunder in this respect was soon stolen by the LPF and specially by the PVV. The success of these parties has also affected the core parties with PvdA and CDA becoming more critical of multiculturalism and European integration. By contrast, D66 has become more multiculturalist, assuming a pronounced "anti-Wilders" position.

Electorally, the black hole in the Dutch party system is the combination of a Leftist position on economic issues with a conservative position on the cultural dimension. According to some voting experts, the proportion of voters preferring that combination could be as high as 45 percent,[15] but there is no party catering to this potential electorate. Both SP and PVV have staked out claims. The SP has always been critical of European integration and was one of the leaders of

the movement against the EU constitution in the 2005 referendum. It has also been in favor of policies to prevent the concentration of non-Western immigrants in just a few (urbanized) parts of the country. However, the party is still perceived more as a Leftist than as a monoculturalist party. Geert Wilders' PVV faces a similar problem: it has adopted Leftist positions on some social issues such as care for the elderly and opposition to raising the age of retirement, but without much success: before leaving the VVD, Wilders was a rather right-wing party spokesman on social affairs, and within hours after the polls had closed, he dropped his opposition against raising the age of retirement. As a result, the PVV is seen primarily as a monoculturalist party.[16]

Personalities

Party Leaders

The organizational structure of the parties outlined above refers to the membership organization, not to the parliamentary party. In many respects, the parliamentary party is the center of gravity within the party, and the executive board of the membership organization is not. The function of "party leader," for example, does not exist formally, but usually this position is taken by the chair of the parliamentary party (or by the party's leading minister when in government), not by the chair of the party organization. Of the party leaders in the 1990–2010 period, only SP leader Marijnissen chaired both the parliamentary party and the membership organization. Occasionally, the party leader and the party chair are in conflict, sometimes provoking a change of leadership. The clearest example is the conflict between the two within the CDA in 2001, leading to the replacement of both protagonists. Pressure from the party chair after disastrous election results also played a role in the resignation of PvdA leader Melkert in 2002, and in the resignation of VVD leader Dijkstal in that same year.

During the two decades under study, there have been 24 transfers of leadership in the seven parties.[17] It is interesting to note that in each of these parties, the first leader in this period served longest, with the exception of LPF leader Pim Fortuyn, who was killed after only a few months: The SP was led by Jan Marijnissen for 20 years; Wim Kok was leader of the PvdA for over 15 years; Hans Van Mierlo led D66 for almost 12 years after an earlier tour of duty from 1966

to 1973; Ruud Lubbers had been CDA leader for more than 11 years when he resigned; and Frits Bolkestein led the VVD for over 8 years. None of their successors has come close to such figures. The increased electoral volatility helps account for this leadership instability, in particular in the 2001–2003 period. This is true not only for the LPF, but also for other parties: for example, when Ad Melkert, just a few months in office, resigned with immediate effect after leading the PvdA to electoral defeat in 2002, Jeltje van Nieuwenhoven took over as interim leader until a new leader could be elected by the members. She was a candidate herself in those elections, but she lost to Wouter Bos who became his party's fourth leader in less than a year:14 of the leadership changes occurred when the incumbent leader decided to resign, either because he wanted to retire (6), or because the leader took responsibility for poor election results (6), poor results even in local elections (2). Leadership changes because of intraparty conflict are rare, with a notable exception for the LPF, which was riddled with conflict during its brief existence.

With only three exceptions (Jeltje Van Nieuwenhoven [PvdA], Els Borst-Eilers [D66], and Agnes Kant [SP]) the party leaders have been male. The average age at the time when they first became party leader is 47, with Marijnissen (SP) being the youngest (36) and Borst-Eilers (D66) the oldest (65). Only a few (five) did not study at university level (although some never finished their degree). Law has been the most common study (10 leaders), with Political Science and Economics taking second place (4 each). As can be expected, most of them held a political position (usually that of MP) at the time that they became party leader, except for Fortuyn and Herben, as they led a new party (LPF) that originated outside parliament.

Personalized Leadership

There is considerable controversy over the question of personalized leadership in Dutch electoral politics (compare, for example, Van Wijnen[18] and Aarts[19]). If we define personalized leadership as leadership that is based more on loyalty to the person of the leader than on support for the party and its ideology or program, this chapter takes a skeptical view on the development of personalized leadership in Dutch elections. First, as discussed earlier, Dutch voters must cast their vote for an individual candidate on the party list: they can vote for the party leader (the number 1 on the list) or for a candidate placed lower on the list. In their discussion of "presidentialization" in the Low

Countries, Fiers and Krouwel assert that, in Belgium, "the share of preference votes won by party leaders and prospective prime ministers has (…) increased. Looking at the share of preference votes that is given to the various heads of list compared to the total number of preference votes for their respective parties, a clear picture of personalization emerges. (…) In the Netherlands, a similar personalization of voting behavior can be identified, even though hard data on preference voting are lacking."[20] However, hard data on preference votes in the Netherlands are available, and they show a *declining* percentage of votes being cast for party leaders.[21]

If we look only at the 1990–2010 period we see fluctuation rather than a trend, but if we take a longer time perspective, the decline in the percentage of votes cast for parties' top candidates is clear.

Second, even votes cast for party leaders do not necessarily indicate support for that individual leader. Voting for the top candidate can also indicate support for the party as such, rather than support for the top-ranked person. To find out to what extent a vote for a party leader indicates a preference for that person, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg asked respondents in the National Election Study who had voted for the party leader, whether they would still have voted for that person in the hypothetical situation that (s)he had been put on a lower position on the party list, and whether they would still have voted for that person in the equally hypothetical situation that (s)he had been nominated by another party[22] (Appendix 6.K).

From the answers to these questions, it is clear that most votes for the party leaders are intended as support for the party rather than for the person. Personalization does exist, but within the party of preference; some voters would still have voted for the person if placed lower on the party list, but very few voters would still have voted for the person if on the list of another party. At the same time, Van Holsteyn and Andeweg found interesting cross-party variation. It is clear that the leadership of the SP (Marijnissen) and of the PVV (Wilders) attracted more personalized support than the leadership of the core parties and of D66. These two parties are also the parties most commonly described as "populist" and we shall return to the link between populism and personalized leadership below.

We do not have good indicators of personalized leadership within parties, and only anecdotal evidence is available. At first sight it would seem reasonable to assume that the trend toward intraparty elections of the party leader (PvdA, VVD, D66) provides more personalized leadership. After all, a leader who is elected by the party

rank-and-file is in a powerful position vis-à-vis other decision-making organs within the party, such as the national party executive, or the parliamentary party. However, there is some evidence that this need not automatically be the case. Wouter Bos was the first PvdA leader to be elected by the party members in 2002. He did use the legitimacy thus acquired to carve out a greater autonomy for himself in the party, in particular with regard to campaign strategy. This led to tensions, but not to full-blown conflicts with the party chair. However, the party members did not accept his leadership in every respect. His party's election manifesto, for example, called for city mayors (currently appointed by the central government) to be elected by the city council. Bos wanted mayors to be elected by the local population instead. A referendum was held within the PvdA, and Bos was defeated. Mark Rutte is the first VVD leader to be elected by his party's members in 2006. In that election, he defeated VVD minister Rita Verdonk. Verdonk, however, proved more popular among VVD voters: in the 2006 parliamentary elections, for the first time in Dutch electoral history, the party leader (Rutte) obtained fewer votes than the number 2 on the list (Verdonk). As Verdonk was perceived as a populist politician, her case provides further evidence of a link between populism and personalization. Verdonk used the election result in an effort to weaken Rutte's position and to seek a new contest for the leadership. Repeated public conflicts between the two paralyzed the VVD and made it impossible for Rutte to put his stamp on the party. Eventually, Verdonk was perceived to have gone too far, and she was dismissed from the party. She then started her own populist right-wing party that seemed successful for a while, but her support had evaporated by the time of the next elections.

Populist Discourse

As with "personalized leadership," "populism" is a slippery concept. From the literature[23] we can conclude that the core characteristic of populism is a distinction between the "pure" people and the "corrupt" political elite. Some populists define the people in exclusionary terms (on the basis of ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.), others do not. In a comparison of the election manifestos of all Dutch parties, De Lange and Rooduijn[24] conclude that the manifesto of the PVV is distinct from that of the established parties in being anti-elitist and in defining the people in exclusionary terms. The same is true for the short-lived LPF, but to a lesser degree. In 1994 the SP was even more

anti-elitist than the PVV, but it did not define the people in exclusionary terms. Since 1994, however, the anti-elitist characteristics of populism have become less visible in the SP's manifestos. De Lange and Rooduijn conclude that the SP can now no longer be regarded as a populist party. The other relevant parties cannot be classified as populist in the 1990–2010 period. It is interesting to note that the only signs of personalized leadership in elections were found in the PVV and, to a lesser extent, in the SP. We would probably also have found personalized leadership in the third populist party, LPF, if we had the data for those years. This link between populism and personalization can probably be accounted for by the fact that populism is not a fully fledged ideology. This programmatic void is probably filled by the personal popularity of the populist leader.

Conclusion: Changes and Challenges

The established parties in the Netherlands have gone through significant changes and are increasingly challenged by new parties. The established parties have lost the automatic loyalty of a subcultural constituency and face an increasingly volatile electorate; and they have seen their membership base decline. There are no signs of a realignment along new social cleavages, and the current situation is best described as one of permanent dealignment. Volatility oscillates, receding when the incumbent coalition is relatively popular, and rising when voters are eager "to throw the rascals out." Party membership also oscillates, but with more modest fluctuations: when electoral politics is polarized and exciting, both turnout and membership go up; when voters are less interested, turnout and membership decline.

In reaction to the less predictable electoral context, the established parties have lowered their ideological profile; and in reaction to the loss of party members, these parties increasingly rely on government funding, and they have given their members more influence. This has slowed down, but it has not stopped their long-term decline. Together, the core parties used to dominate the political arena, but now they would barely command a parliamentary majority if all of them join the governing coalition.

The gap has been filled by new parties. There have always been smaller parties challenging the dominance of the core parties, but the latest generation of new parties have in common a more radical ideological profile, and rely more on a populist discourse and personalized

leadership. They are less reliant on government subsidies and have not followed the example of giving party members more influence, but rather opt for a classical hierarchical structure (SP) or—even more hierarchical—for a party organization without members (PVV).

In combination, the changes affecting the established parties and the characteristics of their new challengers indicate that the days of the mass membership party, firmly rooted in social cleavages within society, are over. In that sense, Dutch political parties have become more similar to parties in new European democracies and other parts of the world.

Notes

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3. Appendix 6.B.
4. Mair, "Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective," 238–239.
5. R.B. Andeweg, "The Netherlands: The Sanctity of Proportionality," in M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell (eds.), *The Politics of Electoral Systems* (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005), 491–510.
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8. G. Voerman and W. van Schuur, "De Nederlandse Politieke Partijen en hun leden (1945–2009)," in R. B. Andeweg and J. Thomassen (eds.), *Democratie Doorgelicht; het functioneren van de Nederlandse democratie* (Leiden:Leiden University Press, 2011), 203–220.
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11. Appendix 6.F.
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16. Appendix 6.H.
17. Appendix 6.I.
18. P. Van Wijnen, "Candidates and Voting Behaviour," *Acta Politica,* 35 (2000): 430–450.
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21. Appendix 6.J.
22. J. J. M. Van Holsteyn and R. B. Andeweg, "Demoted Leaders and Exiled Candidates; Disentangling Party and Person in the Voter's Mind," *Electoral Studies,* 29 (2010): 628–635.
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7

Japan

Takashi Inoguchi

Introduction to Japanese Parties

During the period that concerns the book, that is, between 1990 and 2010, there are two benchmark years that are noted by "tremors" of big proportion. First, 1993–1994, second, 2009–2010. Prior to 1993–1994 the one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the hall mark of Japanese party system. Some[1] say it is a one-and-a-half party system in which the governing party occupied two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives whereas one-third was occupied by the opposition parties, most importantly by the Japan Socialist Parties and the Japan Communist Parties. It is a party system in which a united Conservative Party and a united Socialist party competed without the former giving a chance to the latter. The one-and-a-half party system was the result of a fierce and fluid party system that prevailed after Japan's defeat and the occupation by the United States, roughly between 1945 and 1955. In 1955 both the Conservatives and Progressives were united among themselves. Prior to 1955 the Progressives, especially the Socialists, diverged over the terms of the Peace Treaty and the Japan–United States Security Treaty, the right-wing and left-wing Socialists. Prior to 1955 the Conservatives diverged over the distance with which Japan held vis-à-vis the United States, the occupier and the key and only ally. The Liberals were in power and close to the United States whereas the Democrats were out of power and only with coalition with some progressive force stayed in power, albeit briefly. The strong progressive

forces in the National Diet and in terms of public opinion during the immediate postdefeat years reunited in 1955 toward the capturing of power in 1955. To make a counterstrike, the Conservatives united themselves in 1955 too. The end of the Korean War (1950–1953) had an indirect impetus to make such realignments in party system that resulted in the one-and-a-half party system that lasted till the first big tremor in 1993–1994. However, it must be noted immediately that the parliamentary number one position, if not a parliamentary majority position, was held by the LDP in 1993–1994.

The first big tremor took place after the quasi-end of the cold war. By quasi-end I mean that the cold war ended in Europe but not necessarily in Asia. While the Soviet Union collapsed, the People's Republic of China went through the brutal suppression of democratic protesters in 1989, emerging as a vigorous economic actor after the disembargo of the Western and Japanese governments against China in 1991. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained alive and well at a very low-level equilibrium albeit occasional emergencies amidst the rumor a bit like those exaggerated reportings about Mark Twain. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam embarked on the road of opening and reform. So did the Lao People's Republic, if much more slowly and selectively. In terms of preparations for party system change in 1993–1994, however, the domestic demographic and economic factors loom large. Most important is the trend of demographic increase that contributed to 35 years of high-level economic growth since early 1950s. The domestic market demands for products were continuously large to absorb the increasingly mass supply of products, especially consumer products. The governing party switched its support bases from farmers and small business to what was called the new middle mass comprising a huge chunk of those white colors. But as time went on, demographic increase slowed down and was reinforced by the two oil crises in the 1970s and in the 1980s. The Plaza accord of 1985 triggered the bubble formation in Japan toward 1991 when it collapsed and brought Japan to a 15-year-long stagnation. It was during the early period of stagnation that the long-governing party lost power. The much-vaunted new middle mass disappeared during the stagnation period. The bundle of smaller opposition parties was formed and took power if briefly in 1993–1994.

The second benchmark was 2009–2010. After the 1993–1994 interlude, the LDP regained its power in coalition with the Socialists in 1994–1996 and then with the Komei Party 1996 onward. However, the support bases of the LDP kept shrinking amidst

stagnation. The reformist and populist prime minister Junichiro Koizumi (r. 2001–2006) boosted the fortunes of the governing party for a while with its policy line of deregulation and market liberalization. Three mishap-ridden prime ministers (r. 2006–2009) holding power for one year or less, one after another without holding general elections, thoroughly disappointed the electorates, however. The Democratic Party of Japan's party manifesto singularly emphasizing on sustaining people's daily life is number one priority amidst post-Lehman hard time and enabled it to gain a parliamentary super majority in 2009. Yet the no less prepared and mishap-full prime ministers Yukio Hatoyama (2009–2010) and Naoto Kan (2010–present) brought down popularity ratings quickly after assuming premiership. Anticipating the almost inevitable decrease of parliamentary seats in a general election Kan cannot call for one. It looks as if avoiding holding a general election were preparing the downfall of Naoto Kan in an intermediate term. In terms of support bases of the Democratic Party and the LDP increasing convergence is the most important feature. Next important is the weight unions and quasi-public sectors carry for the Democratic Party in a negative reaction to the Koizumi-led liberalization and privatization policy line. A bulk of the support bases of the LDP was largely dispersed. Increasingly atomized and left alone electors are lured by simple slogans, good looks, and apparent charisma reasonably well mixed. This feature of politics is getting universal. But the crux of the problem is that such politicians rarely come to center stage. *Zeitgemaessheit* (harmony with the time) is not easy to achieve. Therefore, most of the time politics becomes that of scandals and mishaps amplified hundred times and full of policy promises yet devoid of achievements. This is the time of what John Keane[2] calls monitory democracy as contrasted to representative democracy. Not only government monitors citizens but also citizens monitor government both relentlessly and whimsically.

Old Parties and New

Four kinds of new parties can be identified: (1) mushroom parties that sprang during 1945 and 1955; (2) those parties in the opposition that tried to fill the gap between the opposition for its own sake, that is, ideological opposition and the opposition that aims at achieving policy during the period of solid dominance of the LDP, for example, the Komei Party, the Democratic Socialist Party; and (3) splinter parties that made exit from the LDP, for example, the New Liberal Club, the

Japan Renewal Party, the new Liberal Party, the Conservative Party during the period of LDP dominance; (4) smallish parties that are meant to serve a well-specified social group, for example, women's party, Okinawan People's Party.

1. Mushroom Parties. Year 1925 legislated established universal male suffrage. But it was only during the occupation universal suffrage was established, male and female, was established. It was also only during the occupation that some Leftist parties were liberated from the 1925 legislated internal security law. The Social Mass Party made advances in the 1931 House of Representatives election. But the Japan Communist Party and some anti-imperial parties were banned even before 1925. Thus the first postwar general election in 1946 gave rise to many parties that sprang like mushroom after rain. Those mushroom parties disappeared as extreme hunger, semipermanent unemployment, and shortage of food and medicine steadily increased.

2. *Nonideology-First Parties Exit.* The one-and-a-half party system was a product of the cold war. The issue of the Peace Treaty and the Japan–United States Security Treaty made electorates straitjacketed by the Left-Right confrontation on security, free trade, and many others. Some of those who felt bound by rigid ideological tenets went out like the Democratic Socialist Party (b. 1962) who quit the Japan Socialist Party. Some of those who felt left alone without assistance formed a religiously oriented political party like the Komei Party (b. 1956), which was built on the Buddhist organization called the Soka gakkai. The former was amalgamated by the Democratic Party of Japan. The latter is now called the New Komei Party.

3. Splinter Parties A. The big tremors gave birth to many splinter parties before and after. The long hegemony of the LDP inevitably gave rise to many leader-aspirants who anticipated that they might not be able to reach the top leader's position due to overcrowded competition in an established large party. In Chinese proverb, you had better become hen's mouth than cow's tail.[3] When the LDP was thrown out of power in 1993 some party members formed splinter parties.

When the anti-LDP coalition government collapsed in 1994, some formed new parties in an attempt to become hen's mouth rather than cow's tail. The newly legislated political reform laws in 1993–1994 stipulated that each political party receive a certain amount of money from the Ministry of Internal Communications and Affairs in proportion to the size of party members and parliamentary members.

Its primary aim is to prevent politicians from receiving bribes and to discourage politicians from collecting a huge amount of money by themselves. Secretary general of each party assumes power to allocate money for those purposes of advancing each party's strength. Some formed one party after another in order to get complete control of such money. Therefore post-1993 years witnessed many splinter parties. The fall of the LDP from power in 2009 witnessed a few splinter parties.

4. *Splinter Parties B*. The extraordinary ups and downs of popularity ratings of prime ministers and political parties seem to encourage some to form new splinter parties from the Democratic Party of Japan. Most prominent is the Ichiro Ozawa-led splinter party called People's Life First (LF) Party. And more lately, the extraordinary ups and downs of popularity ratings of prime ministers and political parties seem to encourage some to form new splinter parties from the Democratic Party of Japan.

Electors and Parties

Turnout at General Elections

Turnout at general elections (table 7.1) points at an important trend, that is, an earlier trend under one-party-predominant system of a slowly declining trend of turnout started to rebound after 1996. Note that the House of Representatives has two election rules, that is, proportional representation and one person chosen with one vote per person from a district. It is clear that the election law legislated in 1993 and implemented since 1994 did impact turnouts.[4] Uncertainty and fluidity in party politics seemed to increase the level of turnout. Note also that the trend of dealigning and realigning were taking place. During 1993–1994 the coalition of the anti-LDP parties lasted for one year. In 1994–1996 the Socialists formed coalition with the LDP. Since 1996 the LDP allied with the Komei Party till 2009. During Junichiro Koizumi's reign (2001–2006) it looked as if the LDP had come back to a self-sustaining strength. The oppositions looked seemingly exceeding feeble as can be guessed from the low figure of turnout in 2003. And a resounding victory of the LDP in 2005 gave such speculation a modicum of credibility. Yet after the three LDP prime ministers who dodged calling for a general election successively for three years gave the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) a serendipitous

Table 7.1 Turnout of Japan's general elections and votes obtained by relevant parties, 1990–2009

Year	*1990*	*1993*	*1996*	*2000*	*2003*	*2005*	*2009*
Turnout (%)							
P	73.3	67.2	60.0	64.5	59.9	67.5	69.3
D			59.6	62.5	59.8	67.5	69.3
Seats (% of votes)							
LDP	275	223	269	233	237	296	119
	(46.1)	(36.6)	(38.6)	(41.0)	(43.9)	(47.8)	(38.7)
			(32.8)	(28.3)	(35.0)	(38.2)	(26.7)
DPJ				127	177	113	308
				(27.6)	(36.7)	(36.4)	(47.4)
				(25.2)	(37.4)	(31.0)	(42.4)
DP			52				
			(10.6)				
			(16.1)				
Lib				22 (3.4)			
				(11.0)			
KMP	45	51		31 (2.0)	34 (1.5)	31 (1.4)	21 (1.1)
	(8.0)	(8.1)					
				(13.0)	(14.8)	(13.3)	(11.5)
JSP	136	70					
	(24.4)	(15.4)					
SDPJ			15 (2.2)	19 (3.8)	6 (2.9)	7 (1.5)	7 (2.0)
			(6.4)	(9.4)	(5.1)	(5.5)	(4.3)
JCP	16 (8.0)	15 (7.7)	26 (12.6)	20 (12.1)	9 (8.1)	9 (7.3)	9 (4.2)
			(13.1)	(11.2)	(7.8)	(7.3)	(7.0)
JNP		35 (8.0)					
RebP		55 (10.1)					
HarP		13 (2.6)	2 (1.3)				
			(1.0)				
RenP			156				
			(28.0)				
			(28.0)				

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Home Office Election Department, 'Results of the House of Representatives Election, complete edition, 1990–2009')

opportunity to grab power in 2009 with its overwhelming victory and turnout level.

Votes Obtained by Relevant Parties, 1990–2010

The key trend of 1990–2010[5] is that of a formation of a two-party system. Prior to 1990 splinter parties from the LDP were looking for opportunities to join possible anti-LDP coalitions. It came in 1993. Most small parties joined it to lead the LDP to step down from power. But it lasted only for one year. After 1994 those small parties searched for ways to beat the LDP. One of those searches resulted in the merger of two anti-LDP parties, the Democrats and the Liberals in 2001. The newly born DPJ comprised most of the 1993 anti-LDP coalition. Since 2001 both the LDP and the DPJ competed self-consciously, as is clear from those figures in Appendix 7.A. It represents clearly the formative process of a two-party system. Besides these two large parties, the old smaller parties were on the steady decline. The Japanese Socialist Party disappeared in 1994 and its successor, the SDPJ, is shrinking fast. The Japanese Communist Party have been on the steady decline. So is the Komei Party. It internal feud split itself into two, more or less, in 1996. Since then it has also been on the steady decline. The LDP's loss of power in 2009 resulted in a few splinter parties.

The volatility of relevant parties[6] shows one striking result: high volatility figures vindicate the high level of uncertainty and fluidity, uncertainty about how electors vote for parties and fluidity about how parties form coalition. At this point it may be useful to note that old-fashioned representative democracy seems to metamorphose itself into what John Keane[7] calls monitory democracy, by which Keane means that instead of assuming electors of a certain type of sociological and ideological attributes and parties of similarly conceived deputies and doctrines, both electors and government have become monitoring actors in both directions with the slogan of transparency and accountability making best use of mass media and micro media (personal computer and mobile phone), electors swing intermittently. The adoption of the mixed electoral system, proportional representation, and one person from one district, in 1993, has reinforced this trend. Prior to 1993 the electoral system basically accommodated both large and small parties in one district by electing one to five persons (mostly two or three persons) from one district with one vote. In a similar vein, the adoption of the scheme of publicly funding political parties in proportion to votes and seats obtained and members registrated, in 1993, has reinforced this trend.

Social Characteristics of the Electors of Relevant Parties

Most important of what sociological profiles of relevant parties tells us is that the sociological explanation of party membership does not bring us very far. Nevertheless, some general observations which go beyond[8] are useful. The old parties, the LDP, the Communist Party of Japan (JCP), and the Komei Party (KMP), are generally older in their support bases. Gender-wise the LDP is weaker than the other two. Education-wise, the support bases of the JCP and the KMP are very well educated at cadre level whereas at the mass level they are slightly less educated. The support base of the LDP is slightly less educated and close to national average. The support base of new parties including the DPJ is slightly better educated especially at cadre level. Occupation-wise, the LDP used to be based on farmers and small business in the early years. In the high-growth period its support bases relied on what Yasusuke Murakami (1986) calls the new middle mass, that is, those varying middle income strata riding high on the steady income rise during the 1960s through the 1980s. Now its support base has shrunk, because of demographic decline, income decrease, and government deficits and associated decline of local party chapters. The occupational support bases of the DPJ comprise the new middle class of reduced size. Salient of its support bases is the weight of trade unions of government and semiprivatized formerly government agencies (including postal unions). The former contains Democratic Socialist Party- (DSP) backed (earlier Japan Socialist Party [JSP]) union members. The latter contains postal, railroad, telephone enterprise managers and workers, especially postal enterprises unions and managers whose vaunted solidarity made a difference in the 2009 general election as well. Religion does not seem to differentiate political party support patterns very much. But the Komei Party is based on a Buddhist sect called *Sokagakkai* whose members are all religious. The LDP and the DPJ contain some religiously organized groups as their supporters. Important to note here in relation to religion is the Yasukuni shrine. The LDP contains the right-wing groups that tend to be conservative, nationalistic, hawkish. The DPJ contains very small groups that are against respecting the national flag and reciting the national anthem because of their legacy of war. None of the DPJ cabinet members participated in the ritual of paying respect to those dead in the war at the Yasukuni shrine the last summer in 2010. Prime Minister Naoto Kan paid a visit to the Arlington Cemetery in the United States in his first official visit to the United

States though. In relation to immigration, citizenship, and religion, Japan has steadfastly kept its policy line of limiting immigrants. Yet a large number of Chinese immigrants are granted citizenship largely because of marriage with Japanese citizens. A large number of Koreans have chosen Japanese citizenship. Although size is small, Philippines and Brazilians (largely of Japanese ancestors) work at service and manufacturing sectors. A small number of Indians work as professionals in information technology and financial service sectors. The Islamic population is very small. But foreign students from Islamic societies like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran have built a tiny mosque-space on campus at some large universities. Members of the National Diet include those whose parent(s) are from Korea, Taiwan, and Finland. The current minister of administrative renovation Ren Ho (Lian Fan) was born of a Taiwanese father and educated at Aoyama *Gakuin* and Peking universities.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of Membership

Party membership was not very high in Japan until 1993 except for the JCP and the KMP, both vaunting of party organizational discipline.[9] When the law of publicly funding political parties was legislated in 1993, those parties that seek public subsidies have been arduous about recruiting and registering party members and building local chapters because the amount of money that comes from the Ministry of Internal Communications and Affairs depends primarily on these figures.[10] The JCP steadfastly refuses relying on government subsidies. To turn to the long-governing party, the LDP, prior to 1993, party finance was dependent on each politician's personal organizations that receive donations from business firms and associations and individual supporters. Party leaders were always chosen by forming the coalition of clentelistic factional bosses. However, that's not the case any longer. Party president is now chosen in the election by electoral college that comprises parliamentary party members and nonparliamentary party members of local chapters. Party finance's purse is controlled by secretary general in principle. But practice seems to be guided by consensus of party executive position holders unless party president is a very strong man. The governing party, the DPJ, a party of merger gradually enlarging itself, seems to run the party with intermittently strong personalistic flavor. Prime Minister Naoto Kan has

refused to contain any one of his rival, Ichiro Ozawa's followers in his cabinet, for instance. Most parties are national. Only two or three from Okinawa and Hokkaido, new and peripheral territories, contain parties only locally alive and active like the Okinawa Social Mass Party (Okinawa) and the Party of Our Land (Hokkaido).

I now turn to leaders.[11] Let me start with Naoto Kan, DPJ leader and prime minister. He was long a man of nongovernmental organization. His education was in engineering at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. For some unknown reasons, most opposition party leaders in Japan have been educated in science and engineering. Naoto Kan is one. DPJ's former president, Yukio Hatoyama, was a professor of computer science with his Ph.D. at Stanford. JCP's leaders' education was predominantly physics. LDP leaders like Yoshida, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Fukuda, Ohira, Nakasone, and Miyazawa have been educated mostly in law. Kan is from Yamaguchi, the prefecture that has produced the largest number of prime ministers since 1868 including Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Abe. He does not have many solid and loyal followers and most cabinet positions were assigned by the preference of his cabinet secretary, former lawyer, Yoshito Sengoku, who belongs to Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara's faction. Kan climbed the ladder largely by his sharp tongue against government and bureaucracy and when inside government as health minister in 1993 by his audacious heroic action that Health Ministry abide by court decision when government was sentenced as guilty for its mis-permission of a certain medicine for a certain disease. Sadakazu Tanigaki, LDP's president, was a lawyer. He did law at the University of Tokyo. When his father, a parliamentary member, passed away, he was a very young second-generation politician. He is a tall athlete, strong at kendo and cycling. He is best known for his persuasion of Koichi Kato, his factional boss rising to compete with the then prime minister Yoshiro Mori, not to run for party presidential election called Kato uprising. Tanigaki's district is located in a mountainous district of Kyoto prefecture. This prefecture happens to contain the castle town of Mitsuhide Akechi, a general who assassinated Nobunaga Oda, the unifier of Japan of the warlord period in the mid-sixteenth century. Akechi was executed shortly after. The popular memory of him is that he is haunted by Akechi's precedent of his district and that he hesitates from taking bold action (remember his mild and moderate words about the DPJ government). JCP's leader, Kazuo Shii, was educated in physics at the University of Tokyo and climbed up the party ladder. He speaks clearly and with smile. Natsuo Yamaguchi, representative of

the Komei Party, was educated at the University of Tokyo and studied economics. Yamaguchi speaks very clearly with his astuteness and agility. Ichiro Ozawa, who is often called a shadow shogun, was most recently defeated by Kan in the party presidential election in autumn in 2010. He is one of the rare politicians in Japan who directly speak to the point. He has the record of manipulating prime ministers from behind for many years and the record of quitting parties and creating new ones a number of times. He was educated in law at Keio University and like Tanigaki, his father politician, passed away when he was in his early twenties. He was secretary general of the LDP at 43. He is most likely to be indicted by special prosecutors' office this autumn, 2012, for his handling of political money.

Programs and Ideologies

Japanese political parties have two kinds of documents/statements. First, parties have the founding documents that declare their abiding political doctrines and principles, second, election manifestos that are announced normally in January in party annual congress in anticipation of elections.[12] The founding documents tend to reflect those years of founding parties and sometimes appear arcane. Like the Japanese constitution, parties rarely change the documents on principles and passions at the times of founding parties. The founding documents tend to be vague, not necessarily policy specific.[13] They tend to be aspirational. Issuing election manifestoes is a recent practice, dating back to just 20 years. Prior to 1990 or thereabout political parties responded to a set of questions put forward to them by newspapers in a very limited space, area by area, like the economy, security, aging, demographic decline, and innovations. The coverage was comprehensive. This style of election manifestoes were most commonly used for academic analysis of manifestoes like in the Inoguchi[14] chapter included in the Budge et al.[15] volume. Nowadays election manifestoes use perhaps more than 1,000 times as many letters as old-style election manifestoes. Essentially election manifestoes have become visibly important for the past two decades, 1990–2010. The preceding three decades witnessed old-style manifestoes of crisp tone. The further preceding period, 1945–1960, was characterized by no manifestoes but by passions and slogans. Over years of more than half a century some ideologies have changed. Most notably, the Japan Socialist Party changed its own name to become Social Democratic Party of Japan, and ceased its opposition to the Japan–United States

Security Treaty. The Japanese Communist Party explicitly changed sometime in the 1960s that its political strategy is through parliamentary means not by revolutionary methods. The LDP has not changed the two abiding political goals of constitutional revision and defense empowerment. But in practice no way of securing two-thirds of parliamentary members, a constitutional requirement for revision and no prospect for securing defense budget which has been in fact declining for the past decade.

The two-dimensional mapping reveals that there are two key dimensions, conventional macroeconomic policy versus reform oriented social policy and Conservative foreign policy versus Liberal foreign policy.[16] Most striking in this map is the closeness between DPJ candidates and DPJ supporters on foreign policy dimension and the remoteness between LDP candidates and LDP supporters on both dimensions of economic policy and foreign policy. The latter contributed to the downfall of the LDP in the 2009 general election.

Personalized Leadership and the Question of Populism

During the period between 1990 and 2010 personalization of leadership is intermittently visible whereas populism is increasingly tangible.[17] Suggested good indicators of the two concepts are: (1) appointment patterns of ministerial and executive positions surrounding leaders and (2) a certain mix of oratorical appeals, good looks, and charisma, ranked by newspapers, TVs, blogs, twitters. But more measurable indicators are (1) prime minister's popularity (%) minus support for his party (%) and (2) party local chapters' support over parliamentary support in party presidential election.

Personalization of leadership is intermittently visible during the period.[18] Most visible and widely recognized is Junichiro Koizumi (r. 2001–2006). He is a man of individualism and individual initiatives. He does not like having his parliamentary followers. He delegates key matters on two persons, his elder sister-secretary in charge of accounts and his chief secretary in charge of appointments and logistics. He is a man of pithy words. He loves seeing opera, kabuki, playing to learn how to perform his politics of leadership. When he called for general election in 2005 focusing on postal reform, he quoted passages from Don Quixote, that is, encouraging himself before moving on to fight. Half a year before his announcement of

retirement, he gave a big garden party when *sakura* blossomed; he quoted a sixteenth-century warrior's wife, Galasha Hosokawa and her poem, sung immediately before her suicide when the castle was besieged by her husband's rivals in his absence; that is, like *sakura,* which knows when to bloom and when to end, men become men only when they know when they should put an end to their life.

He is a man of sharp prioritizing. His appointment style is keeping secrecy until the last moment of his announcement consulting no one except for those whom he wanted to appoint. Most importantly, he plays politics of targeting an enemy by portraying it as if he were an enemy who did not think of moving forward to a bright future. When the House of Councilors voted no to his policy of postal privatization, he asked rhetorically that if the National Diet said no to his policy, he wanted to call for general election to see whether people agreed or not with Koizumi and thus twisted the policy issue to the issue of popular confidence in prime minister. Populism is defined as engineering popular support for whatever policy prime minister wants to put forward.

Populism is not necessarily as prime minister's tendency to focus on the kind of policy folks like to see materialized. Government deregulation and trade liberalization are not normally a popular policy candidate at hard time. Postal liberalization was not a popular issue. But he transformed it as confidence in a determined and self-confident prime minister who wanted to move forward with people despite considerable pains. Next to Koizumi, Morihiro Hosokawa (r. 1993–1994) evinces personalized leadership and populism.[19] Having spent a decade as governor of Kumamoto, he formed a personalized new party with the manifesto essentially of getting rid of LDP-style old politics and jointly shaping a new politics. In the 1993 general election all the anti-LDP parties advanced their number of votes and seats. Yet the LDP was the largest party still if not a majority party. The anti-LDP coalition was formed with Hosokawa as prime minister to overwhelm the LDP in the House of Representatives. Hosokawa was media-savvy and successfully legislated a set of political reform in 1993, some consequences of which we live in: a fledgling two-party system, personalized leaders, and atomized electors.

A little controversially, Ichiro Ozawa should be considered under this category.[20] Ozawa got a resounding victory in the 2009 general election after three poor LDP prime ministers hesitated to call for a general election successively. Ozawa as secretary general of the DPJ put the slogan right: livelihood first at hard time with concrete and

specific promises of two tangible money provision to weak social actors: children and farmers. His leadership style is literally personalized leadership style. He was a key drafter of political money reform bill as secretary general of the party coalition under Hosokawa to make public money allocated in proportion to the number of votes obtained and seats secured for each party in the National Diet. Also, he saw to it that political money thus supplied by government be controlled by secretary general of each party. When he lost secretary generalship, he quitted an old party and created a new one that he now controls effectively. However, his money scandals arose and he was forced to quit after the 2009 general election. In the 2009 general election he amassed his followers elected successfully with nearly half of the DPJ seats in the House of Representatives. He speaks clearly but normally slowly and with one- or two-second-long silence intermittently inserted in speech, and his head moves as if he nods to what he has just said, which gives the impression that he is a man of country folks. His campaign style is also populist in the sense that he targets for his campaign speech demographically thin and industrially weak places. Instead of standing at a big podium, he stands on a shabby-looking wooden box used for packing fruits, with audience amounting to just two dozens or so. He is televised wherever he goes. This gives a favorable impression that he cares for people. The combination of personalized leadership and populism is increasingly salient in Japanese politics. Those prime ministers who are not mentioned here are basically neither mass-media-savvy nor adept at catching popular cause, and nor able to carry out such performance successfully. "Calm down and carry on" does not apply here. "Heat up and carry out" should be the slogan. Therefore, even if politics increasing calls for personalized leadership and populist performance, many leaders cannot carry such a role well. If one asks who adopted a popular discourse, it is sensible to choose Juinichiro Koizumi, Morihiro Hosokawa, and Ichiro Ozawa. *ZeitgemäBheit* does matter in personalized leadership and populist discourse.

*Postscript

The prospect for a next general election is clear: both the governing party head, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and the largest opposition head, Sadakazu Tanigaki, agreed in August 2012 in a tet-a-tet secret meeting that a next general election will be called for by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda "chikaiuchini (in a near future)." (28 August, 2012)

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8

South Korea

Cheol Hee Park

Introduction

South Korea was democratized in 1987 after contentious civil protests against authoritarian leader.[1] Before democratic transition, Korean party politics was characterized not by free competition among political parties but by a struggle between a ruling Democratic Justice Party, which backed up authoritarian leader, and *jaeya*, or an opposition bloc composed of resisting political parties and civil movement organizations.[2] In the opposition bloc, two civilian political leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Daejung, stood out in leading courageous struggle against the authoritarian regime.

After democratic transition, these two Kims, who were political rivals, refused to get united and consolidated their political parties separately. They organized highly clientelized and intensely personalized parties of their own, whose support bases were geographically circumscribed. Kim Young Sam established Unification Democratic Party (UDP) in 1987, which was mostly supported by southeastern Kyoungsang province. Kim Daejung formed Peace Democratic Party (PDP) in 1987, mainly supported by his followers in southwestern Cholla province. Also, another civilian leader who always belonged to the ruling camp, Kim Jong Pil, organized New Democratic Republican Party in 1987 whose support came mostly from Choongchung province. Rivalry among three Kims made it possible for Roh Tae Woo, military-turned-civilian leader who represented Democratic Justice Party, to be elected president in 1987.

During the Roh presidency, Democratic Justice Party—which inherited the legacy of authoritarian past—Kim Young Sam's Unification

Democratic Party, and Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republic Party unified to become a Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990 for the purpose of isolating Kim Daejung. This eventually led to the victory of Kim Young Sam in the presidential election in 1992, which made him the first civilian political leader after democratic transition. However, in 1995, Kim Jong Pil split from the ruling DLP, claiming that Kim Young Sam did not keep the promise of revising constitution to introduce a parliamentary system on the Korean political soil. He set up another personalized and geographically circumscribed political party by the name of United Liberal Democrats (ULD), whose strong support basis lied in Choongchung province. On the other hand, after Kim Jong Pil walked out of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, President Kim Young Sam changed the party name into New Korea Party. Also Kim Daejung reshuffled his own party and named it as Unified Democratic Party in 1995. Kim Daejung coalesced with Kim Jong Pil right before the presidential election in 1997, which brought about his victory against challengers.

For ten years between 1992 (when Kim Young Sam was elected president) and 2002 (when Kim Daejung's presidential tenure ended), South Korean party politics was characterized by the prevalence of highly personalized political parties whose support bases have been geographically circumscribed. Three Kims—Kim Young Sam, Kim Daejung, and Kim Jong Pil—dominated the Korean party political scene with their own personalized political parties. However, after three Kims stepped down from party presidency, party politics in Korea has begun to take a renewed look.

This chapter aims at analyzing the process of party political transformation in Korea for more than 20 years between 1990 and 2012. During this period, Korean democracy has been consolidated under the new party political umbrella. This chapter analyzes changing voter turnout as well as the emergence and disappearance of political parties. Then, internal party life like membership, finance, and programs will be addressed. The last section deals with the leadership change in the Korean political parties.

Turnout: Parties in the Electorate

Declining Voter Turnout

Like other industrial democracies, voter turnout in South Korea continued to decline over the two decades. Compared to the early 1990s,

Table 8.1 Voting rate for presidential elections and general elections in South Korea

Year	*1992*	*1997*	*2002*	*2007*		
Presidential elections						
Turnout (%)	81.9	80.7	70.8	63.0		
Percentage of votes						
Kim Young Sam	42.0					
Kim Daejung	33.8	40.3				
Chung Ju Young	16.3					
Lee Hoi Chang		38.8	46.6			
Lee, Inje		19.2				
Roh, Moo Hyun			48.9			
Kwon, Young Kil			3.90	3.0		
Lee Myong Bak				48.4		
Chung Dong Young				26.0		
Moon Kook Hyun				5.79		
Year	*1992*	*1996*	*2000*	*2004*	*2008*	*2012*
General elections						
Turnout (%)	66.1	63.9	57.2	60.6	46.1	54.3
Seats (% of votes)						
Democratic Liberal Party	149 (38.5)					
Democratic Party	97 (29.2)				66 (25.2)	
New Korea Party		139 (34.5)				
National Congress for New Politics		79 (25.3)	115 (35.9)			
United Liberal Democrats		50 (16.2)	17 (9.9)	4 (2.9)		
Grand National Party			133 (39.0)	100 (36.7)	131 (37.4)	
Open Uri Party				129 (39.2)		
Democratic Labour Party					5 (5.7)	
Saenuri Party						152 (43.3)
Democratic United Party						127 (37.9)
United Progressive Party						13 (5.9)

Source: http://www.nec.go.kr/sinfo/index.html (each election year)

voter turnouts in the 2000s are on the drastic downhill (table 8.1). For example, the voter turnout for the 1992 presidential election was 81.9 percent, while it recorded 63.0 percent in 2007. In 15 years, the voter turnout declined by almost 19 percent.

Also, voter turnout for general elections shows a similar trend. Voting rate for the 1992 general election was 66.1 percent, but it dropped to 46.1 percent in 2008. In 16 years, voter turnout for general elections declined by 20 percent.

Voters show varying degrees of interest in the elections, depending on the political significance of the elections. South Korean voters participate in the presidential elections more than general elections. This means that South Korean voters are deeply concerned about national political elections rather than local political affairs. Debates in the presidential elections are widely covered by mass media on a national scale, which prompts the electorate to be more issue-alert. Also, Korean voters show stronger interest in the presidential election because the Korean president exerts immense political power, affecting daily lives of ordinary people.

In general, like in other countries, young voters' turnout rate is much lower than that of the elderly voters. Politicians are at a loss on how to draw attention from young voters in the districts. Declining turnout was once reversed in 2004, when young generation voters in their twenties and thirties rushed to the ballot to save the impeached incumbent president Roh Moo Hyun. However, this was rather an exception. In 2008, voter turnout showed a marked fall, because the general election in 2008 took place only four months after the presidential election in 2007, which made voters complacent. In particular, young voters turned out much less than before. Only 24.2 percent of voters in their twenties went to the ballot in 2008.

Generation and Voter Orientations

Under the authoritarian regime, a major political controversy that divided Korean voters has been a choice between democratic governance and authoritarian efficiency.[3] After the democratic transition, regional rivalries cultivated by three Kims, substituted the democracy-authoritarian axis. But, after Kim Daejung—who had a liberal political orientation—assumed power, ideological cleavages emerged as a new frontline that divides voters. Voters in South Korea began identifying themselves as advocating either Conservative or Progressive ideological lines. In particular, after Roh Moo Hyun was

elected president, ideological cleavages stood out as a major dividing line among voters. Appendix 8.A suggests the linkage between generations and ideological orientations manifested during the 2004 general election.

The appendix shows that younger generation in South Korea tends to be more Progressive while older generations identify themselves as being Conservative. Also, the data indicates that, across generations, voters prefer to be identified as Center rather than belonging to the Conservative or Progressive camp. This means that many voters are ready to serve as swing voters depending on the trends of the times.

Appendix 8.B illustrates the linkage between generations and party support in times of the general election in 2004. It is certain that Grand National Party (GNP) is supported more by the older generation than by the younger generation. On the other hand, voters in their 20s and 30s voted more to Progressive Open Uri party. In the general election in 2004, when more 44.7 percent of voters in their 20s and 56.5 percent of voters in their 30s went to the ballot, Progressive Millennium Democratic Party gained 129 seats while GNP won 100 seats. On the other hand, in the general election in 2008, only 28.1 percent of voters in their 20s and 35.5 percent of voters in their 30s went to the ballot. In that election, GNP won 131 seats while Progressive Democratic Party barely secured 66 seats.

In general, floating voters are young, urban, and educated. They can hardly be mobilized by traditional networks. They rely on electronic means of communication for information. They do not move collectively; they move individually. They do not live in a small neighborhood; they live in apartment complexes where people do not have face-to-face contacts. Their lifestyle makes it hard for political aspirants to catch them through traditional or even modern means of communication and networks.

Trust in Public Institutions and Civil Society

Overall trust in public institutions is another indicator of how the Korean electorate engages in political affairs. In South Korea, government and national assembly[4] get less trust from ordinary people than from scholars and civic organizations. The survey data in Appendix 8.C[5] illustrates that public institutions are much less trusted in South Korea than in the United States. Also, central and local governments as well as legislative institution are least trusted in South Korea. Supreme

Court was an exception. In particular, legislative institutions, main venue for party politicians, scored the lowest in the survey.

Relevant Parties: Consistency and Change

Political fortune of parties in Korea is so volatile that a number of new parties emerged and disappeared over the decades. In a single year of 2008, 8 new political parties registered while 16 political parties disappeared. Out of those 16 political parties that disappeared, three parties merged with others or changed their names into another. It seems as if many parties rise and fall, but most of the disappearing parties have been irrelevant ones. It is usually the case that big relevant parties change their names or merge with others.

As of October 11, 2010, 22 political parties are registered in the National Election Commission.[6] Out of these, only eight parties have succeeded in sending representatives to the national assembly. In other words, 14 political parties are totally irrelevant political parties. Appendix 8.D[7] shows the distribution of national assembly members in South Korea by political party affiliation.

Before democratization, South Korean parties had been mostly personalized and their support bases were deeply anchored in the different regions of the country. For example, Kim Young Sam's party, whatever the name may have been, was supported by Kyoungsang province, while Kim Daejung's party mobilized votes mostly from the Cholla province. Kim Jong Pil's party collected votes mostly from Choongchung province. It is not doubtful at all that South Korean political parties had been immensely personalized. All these parties organized by three Kims have been supported by regionally dispersed loyal voters.

After the democratic transition in 1987, Korean president has been elected by popular votes every five years. He who gets the plurality votes, not necessarily majority, in the ballot gets elected president. Korean president is to serve only a single-term of five years with no chance of running for the election again. After the presidency, they officially retire from politics. On the other hand, parliamentary elections take place every four years. The electorate cast two votes: one for a district candidate and the other for a party in the proportional representation. Out of 299 members, 243 members are elected in a single-seat constituency by a plurality vote. Remaining 56 members are elected by the proportional representation. These PR seats are allotted to the candidates named in the closed list provided by each party in proportion to the size of total votes cast for a political party.

In each presidential and parliamentary election, many political parties presented their own candidates. But the number of relevant parties is relatively small. Table 8.1 shows the number of parties and the votes gathered by them in the presidential elections.

As shown above, it is usually the case that only three major political parties present competitive candidates while other parties are almost irrelevant. Even among three relevant political parties, main competition for the presidential post takes place between two big parties. In 1997 when the presidential election was conducted, presidential candidate Lee reshuffled the then ruling party, Democratic Liberal Party, and renamed it as Grand National Party. GNP kept its name for 15 years until 2012. Kim Daejung and his followers changed the name of the political parties in every presidential election, but kept the term "Democratic" in the name of reestablished parties to show the legacy of Kim Daejung's leadership. Appendix 8.E shows the reshuffling of political parties in every national election after 1996.

We can find a new trend after the three Kims retired from politics. Kim Daejung's tenure, which ended in 2002, represented the fall of the three Kims period in Korean politics.

First of all, a Conservative political party in the name of GNP, or Hannara Party, has kept its name for 15 years from 1997 to 2012 despite several presidential and general elections. When three Kims dominated the political scene, the names of political parties have always been altered when they established new personalized political parties. That usually happened around the presidential electoral moment. However, since Kim Young Sam stepped down from the presidency, the GNP avoided being personalized by a single political leader. Lee Hoi Chang who ran the party for more than five years as the president of the party was unable to personalize the party. As Lee Hoi Chang eventually left the party after two consecutive failures in the presidential elections, GNP survived without changing party names. Lee Myung Bak was elected president as an official candidate of the GNP in 2007, but he has kept arms' length distance from the party. He showed little interest in personally manipulating the intra-party politics of the GNP. From early 2011, incumbent GNP members began trying to distance themselves from President Lee whose popular endorsement rate was declining because of corruption scandals. After a surprising defeat in the Seoul Mayor by-election in October 2011, GNP members went further to reshuffling party leadership and even party name. In February 2012, GNP changed its name to Saenuri

Party, electing would-be presidential candidate Park Geun Hye as a chairman of the emergency committee.

Unlike the GNP, DP inherited a strong legacy from a former president Kim Daejung. As a personalized party, the name of the party has been changed when Kim Daejung reshuffled the party after he became president. In preparation for a general election in 2000, Kim Daejung picked up Roh Moo Hyun as a new party leader after composing New Millennium Democratic Party. After Roh became president, he also reshuffled the party and renamed the party as Open Uri Party. This was like a virtual personalization of the party. When Chung Dong Young became the candidate for the presidential election, he renamed the party as Democratic New Party (DNP). It is only after the defeat in the presidential election in 2007 that DNP changed its name to Democratic Party (DP). However, as Kim Daejung and Roh Moo Hyun both passed away in 2010, an element of personalization drastically weakened. Not a single political leader could dominate the party. DP again changed its name to Democratic United Party in December 2011 not because personal charismatic leader recaptured its leadership but because DP's popularity showed a rapid downfall. In other words, it is not political leaders but pressures from the electorate that led to party name change.

Table 8.1 illustrates the electoral performance of two major political parties in South Korea since 1990. The share of votes mobilized by two major parties has been 67.7 percent in 1992, 59.8 percent in 1996, 74.8 percent in 2000, 75.9 percent in 2004, 62.6 percent in 2008, and 81.2 percent in 2012. But, the proportion of seats occupied by the two major parties has been higher than the votes gathered by them. It varied from 82 percent in 1992, 72.9 percent in 1996, 83.0 percent in 2000, 76.5 percent in 2004, 65.9 percent in 2008, and 93.0 percent in 2012. Accordingly, we can say that competition between two major political parties has been institutionalized in the period of democratic consolidation.

The Emergence and Disappearance of New Parties

New parties come and go, but there have been three types of new parties that emerged after the 1990s.

One is the split party, ULD, or *jamiinryon*. ULD was formed in March 1995, by Kim Jong Pil (see table 8.1). Realizing that he had no chance of getting a party nomination for presidential election, he

bolted out of Democratic Liberal Party where he shared power with Kim Young Sam and made his own party. ULD located its support bases in Choongchung province where Kim was from. Also, this party was truly a personalized party in that Kim Jong Pil, its party leader, organized it with his followers. From March 1995 to November 1997, Kim Jong Pil served as a party leader. After he became prime minister under President Kim Daejung, he still kept his party position as honorary president. Only in 2004 when he officially retired from politics, party leadership went to Kim Hak Won, one of his followers. ULD had been integrated into GNP on April 7, 2006.

Another category of new parties are Progressive ideological parties that are supported by labor unions. Democratic Labour Party first organized its party in January 2000.[8] The party is also locally based in the areas where large number of industrial workers is concentrated: Ulsan, Changwon, Sachon, and Geoje. These cities are well known for ship-building, automobile production, and machineries. Geographical concentration of party supporters for Democratic Labour Party stems from the worksites of massive laborers, not from emotional sentiments attached to party leaders.[9] Democratic Labour Party absorbed two small parties in the Progressive camp, Progressive New Party and People's Participation Party, in December 2011 and renamed its party into United Progressive Party (UPP). By elaborating electoral cooperation with the biggest opposition party, Democratic United Party, UPP, gained 13 seats, including 6 elected in the proportional representation section.

The third category of new parties is another split party from the GNP. Liberal Advance Party was organized by the former president of the GNP, Lee Hoi Chang. In preparation for the general election in 2008, dropouts of the GNP gathered around Lee Hoi Chang and formed a political party on February 1, 2008. Sixteen members were elected under this party banner. This was a personalized party in that Lee continues to serve as a party president since its inception until October 2011. Another political party that emerged newly in 2008 was the Pro-Park Alliance. Under the leadership of Suh Chung Won who supported Park Geun Hye in the primary for the presidential candidate within the GNP, several members bolted out of the party when they could not get party endorsement for the 2008 general election. In that Pro-Park Alliance was organized by people who were supportive of Park Geun Hye, former party president of the GNP, this is highly personalized party. But, ironically, Park Geun Hye herself did not belong to this party. Pro-Park Alliance was formed on March 21, 2008, to serve as a springboard for general election in April that year.

In the general election in April 2008, 14 members were elected under the party banner. Six of them were elected in the districts and eight of them were elected in the PR section. In the 2008 general election, Pro-Park Alliance gathered 2,258,750 votes, recording 13.18 percent of total votes. Out of 14 members elected under the Pro-Park Alliance, 6 members joined GNP in 2010. In February 2012, this minor party merged into the GNP.

Party Membership and Finance

In the case of Korea, there are two types of party members. One is those simply registered in the party headquarter. They are usually solicited by national assembly members or local politicians of a particular party. They appear in the mailing list for party pamphlets and other propaganda materials. The other type of party members are those who are not simply registered but also pay party dues. They should be regarded as core party members.

Party Members

As of December 2008, 7.8 percent of total South Korean population, which is 49,540,367, identified themselves as party members. Also, out of the total electorate of 37,796,035 persons, party members constitute 10.3 percent. Appendix 8.H shows the annual changes in the number of party members.

Appendix 8.I shows the number of party members as of December 2008. Two major parties, GNP and DP, occupy 88.7 percent of total party members. Democratic Labour Party that has grown out of the labor movement steadily increased its party members until 2007, when it was a peak. However, in 2008, DLP party members decreased to 70,670 (Appendix 8.J).

Despite the registered number of party members, only a small percentage of party members party fee, except the Democratic Liberal Party members who are mainly composed of the organized labor. An average of only 7.1 percent of party members pay dues to political parties they belonged to (Appendix 8.K).

Party Finance

Again in terms of party revenues, South Korean political parties reveal two-party centeredness. Party revenues of the two major parties constitute 78.7 percent of total revenues of political parties. Appendix 8.L is a summary of party revenues in South Korea as of 2008.

Appendix 8.M shows how political parties in South Korea have spent their revenues. Grand National Parties spent more on basic expenses and organizing activities, while DP allotted more money for electoral expenses.

Programs and Ideologies

Shifts in Major Political Cleavages

Under the authoritarian regimes in South Korea, political parties had been divided along the cleavages of prodemocracy and proauthoritarian leadership. Struggles for democracy aligned with extraparliamentary civil forces had also been fractionalized. However, after South Korea attained political democracy, new cleavage line developed. Regional cleavages predominated, at top of which stood three charismatic leaders: Kim Young Sam, Kim Daejung, and Kim Jong Pil. However, these three powerful political leaders faded away from the late 1990s, especially after two of them served as presidents.

It is from around 1998, when Kim Daejung was elected president, ideological cleavage developed as a new force that divided South Korean politics. Kim Daejung's party represented a Progressive political force, while GNP inherited a Conservative policy line. Ever since, South Korean political parties represented ideological cleavage lines. Lee Myung Bak's victory in 2007 symbolizes the return of power to the Conservative political party from the reign of Progressive party where Roh Moo Hyun was a representative political figure.

This attests the case that South Korean party cleavage line is horizontally widening than before. Before the advent of the Progressive political parties, most South Korean political parties had been Conservative parties. Now South Korea has both ideologically Conservative and Progressive parties. This horizontal widening contributed much to the democratization of the representation of interests in South Korea. In the general election in 2012, ideological horizon of Korean party politics further widened with the entrance of 13 members of the UPP into the national assembly.

Major Policy Differences Defined in Security and Foreign Policy Arenas

Policy platforms of political parties in South Korea are not drastically different from each other.[10] However, political parties in South Korea are categorized as being Progressive or Conservative. The meaning of being Conservative or Progressive has been defined more by the

security and foreign policy lines than by socioeconomic or cultural policy lines. GNP has been called a Conservative Party, because the party emphasizes the importance of the US-Korean alliance and takes more principled approach toward North Korea. On the other hand, DP put emphasis on reconciliation with North Korea and comprehensive and all-directional diplomacy rather than focusing on US-Korean partnership. Liberal Forward Party led by Lee Hoi Chang advocates hawkish principles toward North Korea. Reflecting the division of the Korean peninsula, attitude toward North Korea defines the foreign policy orientation of the parties.

However, since mid-2011, both Conservative and Progressive parties turned their eyes on socioeconomic conditions of the Korean society, especially social welfare dimensions of policy profiles. This reflected a worsening employment situation for the youngsters and college graduates, increasing contract and part-time workers in the age of globalization, and deteriorating welfare benefits for the elderly in the Korean society. Still, Conservative GNP and newly named Saenuri Party focused on maintaining fiscal balance, though they are for the idea of generally spending more for social welfare benefits. On the other hand, Democratic United Party, which is Progressive, suggests that social welfare functions should be assumed more by the government expenditure without raising taxes.

Party Leadership

Grand National Party and Saenuri Party

Though Cho Soon served as a party leader of the GNP, Lee Hoi Chang had power on the basis of his presidential bid in 1997. Even after he failed in the presidential election, he survived and continued to exert influence within the GNP until the next presidential election where he failed again. Cho Soon and Suh chung Won, who assumed party leadership, were considered to be temporary caretakers. After the repeated defeat in the presidential election, GNP had politically hard times. Park Geun Hye, who served as a party president in times of 2004 general election, succeeded in consolidating her political power within the GNP with her skilled management of party and mild public images. In a bid to candidacy for the 2007 presidential election, Lee Myung Bak defeated Park Geun Hye. After Lee Myung Bak became president, the GNP had long been engaged in power struggle between pro-Lee and pro-Park followers. However, it is noteworthy

that former lawyers and prosecutors, not professional party politicians, assume party leadership. In most cases, they are moderate caretakers rather than the politically ambitious.

After the GNP renamed the party to Saenuri Party in February 2012, potential presidential candidate Park Geun Hye assumed more power as a chairman of the emergency committee. She exerted power in nominating candidates for the general election in April 2012. Her popularity contributed a lot to winning 152 seats out of 300 seats in the general election. She is likely to be the dominating personality in the newly reshuffled Saenuri Party (Appendix 8.O).

Open Uri Party and Democratic United Party

Political party that inherits the legacy of Kim Daejung whose regional political support basis has been Cholla province changed its names several times. However, as soon as they dissolved themselves, they merged into the political parties that sustained regional party identity as well a party that keeps Kim Daejung and Roh Moo Hyun's legacy (Appendix 8.P).

Other Small Parties

Appendix 8.Q.

Declining Personalization

After the retirement of the three Kims, South Korean parties gradually stepped out of personalization. Ruling party management has been more institutionalized by separating president of the party and president who runs government. Also, in each political party, different political leaders assumed key party positions such as party president, secretary general, and whip on the floor. Party finance relies more on state subsidy for the party than mobilization of political money by a single charismatic leader or a group of party leaders. Accordingly, even an ambitious political leader can hardly personalize the party, because it will bring about intense intraparty frictions or rivalries.

Despite this general trend, out of crisis consciousness about losing majority in the general election and presidential election in the end of 2012, Conservative GNP changed its name to Saenuri Party, gave more power to Park Geun Hye who was a chairman of the emergency committee. In an election on April 11, 2012, unlike the election forecast that Saenuri Party would lose vast number of seats, Saenuri Party obtained 152 seats, which was 2 seats more than the majority.

Opposition UDP increased its seats to 127 from 80, but failed to get majority in the election. Because of this election result, influence of Park Geun Hye witin the party increased. After the general election on April 11, 2012, key party posts have been taken by pro-Park members. This tendency contains a possibility of repersonalizing the party. Still, Park Geun Hye is unlikely to dominate the whole party affairs because of the division of labor among party executives, limited personal funding sources, and contending rivals within the party.

In the case of newly named Democratic United Party that inherited the DP, no single individual dominates the scene, especially after two eminent political leaders, Kim Daejung and Roh Moo Hyun, passed away.

UPP, which inherited Democratic Labour Party, is struggling to establish a new leadership after the general election in April 2012. Ultra left wing within the UPP is a hindrance to party unity rather than a facilitator of party solidarity. UPP faces a potential to be divided again. However, as Progressive labor unions compose the basic units of party membership, not a single party leader is likely to be influential in all party matters.

Hence, it is fair to say that South Korean political parties are passing through the stage from personalized parties to depersonalized parties.

Conclusion

Korean party politics has developed different features from West European or American parties in several senses. First of all, there have been no religion-based parties like Christian Democratic Party. Other primary identities like ethnicity, language, and race have not constituted the cleavages that divide the nation on a political front. Also, as immigrants from foreign countries pose little threats to native workers yet, no right-wing political parties have been proactive in Korea. Instead, the division of the Korean peninsula and threats from North Korea presents a substantial danger to the life of Koreans. Thus, how to deal with North Korea works as a primary ideological cleavage that divides the electorate in the Korean political setting. Second, like Western democracies, there exists a Progressive party that stemmed from the labor movement. However, Democratic Labour Party is relatively a latecomer. It is hard to say that social movements in Korea laid the foundation for lively political controversies. Many political parties have their roots in the struggle for democracy under the authoritarian

regime. Another distinct feature of Korean party politics may be the urban concentration of the Korean population. About a half of Korean voters live in the metropolitan area, where they remain informative of political affairs while lacking personal contacts among neighbors. Accordingly, political mobilization through traditional network is not effective, which produces massive number of floating voters that make Korean politics volatile in times of major elections.

Despite these distinctive features of Korean party politics from a comparative perspective, political parties have shown a steady and meaningful development over time. First of all, it is fair to say that personalization of political parties is generally on the downturn, especially after the so-called three Kims retired from politics. During the three Kims' tenure, party politics had been characterized by highly personalized parties with geographically circumscribed support bases. In times of presidential and parliamentary elections, it was not odd at all that one finds different party names reshuffled by the same political leaders. During the electoral moments, particular political leader whose popularity is endorsed by the electorate more may exert immense influence temporarily. However, after each and every election, party affairs are highly likely to be managed by the accepted rules of game among incumbent elected party members rather than dictated by a party leader. Second, after democratic transition in Korea, democracy-authoritarian divide does not constitute a major political controversy among major parties. Instead, for most of the 1990s, competition among regionally oriented parties has presented a major dividing line of differentiation among political parties. Yet, from the late 1990s when Kim Daejung became ideologically assertive, Korean political parties have presented themselves as ideologically anchored. They identified themselves as being either Conservative or Progressive. This means that ideological difference has been established as a major point of conflict among political parties. Socioeconomic dimensions of ideological cleavage have been newly added up since 2011 after existing political parties focused more on social welfare functions of the government. Third, like other democracies, new parties emerge and disappear. However, Korean party politics has long been dominated by two major political parties whatever their ideologies or the nature of competition have been. There has been a third party that challenged the major two parties, but those challenges may remain temporary. In that sense, two-party rivalries have been a major feature of interparty competition in Korea, especially during the period of democratic consolidation.

Remaining serious challenge in Korean party politics may be that legislative institutions and political parties are less trusted by ordinary people than other public institutions. How to restore legitimacy of representation and trust among the people may pose a fundamental challenge in coming years.

Notes

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9

Thailand

Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee

Introduction

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was able to avoid colonization by European countries. Thus Thailand never experienced the imposition and transfer of institutions from the West as happened in many developing countries. This arrangement also meant that traditional institutions—principally the monarchy, the Buddhist Sangha closely linked to the monarchy, and the military and civil bureaucracy—were not disrupted.[1]

Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has been a "constitutional monarchy." The monarch stays aloof from politics, but has a record of intervening at key moments in Thai history.

Following the adoption of democracy as its system of government in 1932, Thailand has experienced 21 coup d'états, suggesting a core lack of commitment to democratic governance. During the prelude to the 1946 elections (4 coups had already occurred) competitive party politics finally emerged. For the prolonged era from 1946 until the late 1980s, the military and bureaucratic elites effectively maintained control over political parties.

Yet for a brief period during 1974–1976, called "the great democratic era," more than 40 political parties organized and nominated their candidates for elections.[2] The October 14, 1973, popular uprising that successfully overthrew the reigning authoritarian regime of Field Marshall Thanom Kittikajorn had a very constructive impact

on the party system; it opened the floodgate of popular demands, which had previously been suppressed, via such associations as political parties, student movements, labor unions, and peasant associations.[3] It was during this phase that Thailand had, for the first and only time, a meaningful left-right wing political party spectrum. The right-wing parties that sprang up to contest the 1975 and 1976 elections represented traditional order and favored direct involvement of business in politics. In contrast, the Leftist parties advocated social change and equitable distribution of wealth. A military coup ended this open political system on October 6, 1976, imposing martial law and an anti-Communist law.

Against the background of transition from absolute monarchy to limited experience with party-based democracies, this chapter aims to examine key features of political parties in Thailand during the period of 1990–2010, during which two incidents occurred that are imperative to the understanding of Thailand's political and party development. The first event was "Bloody May" 1992;[4] that is, the popular protest against the military government of General Suchinda Kraprayoon who came to power after overthrowing the elected prime minister, Chartchai Choonhavan, in 1991. The military brutally quelled the demonstrators, but the violence ended only when the monarch intervened. General Suchinda resigned, new elections were announced, and the crisis was defused. Attempts to restore a democratic atmosphere and experiences learned from the incident culminated in the 1997 constitution.[5] The 1997 constitution's intention concerning political parties was based on a popular assumption among Thai academics during the 1980s–1990s that multiparties had negative effects on public attitude toward political parties and on political stability.[6] Therefore, among the many aims of the political reform of this period was the intent to have a stable government with strong executive power and to establish barriers against small parties. The electoral system under the 1997 constitution generated a new basis for party competition by inducing political parties to pursue a more viable electoral strategy and tangible policy platforms.[7] The 1997 constitution set the stage for Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) electoral victories in the 2001 and 2005 general elections.

The second incident was the September 2006 coup d'état, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, which brought an end to Thaksin Shinawatra's government when the military junta declared martial law, repealed the 1997 constitution, dissolved both Houses of Parliament, the government, and the Constitutional Court, restricted

political meetings and political party activities, and barred the establishment of new parties. Subsequently, in May 2007, Thai Rak Thai was disbanded by the Constitutional Tribunal's verdict on electoral fraud charges, and its 111 party executives, including Thaksin, were banned from running for political posts for five years. A year later, Thailand's first-ever referendum endorsed the country's eighteenth constitution. The 2007 constitution was criticized as intentionally weakening the role of political parties.

Following the 2007 general election, the People Power Party (PPP), publicly acknowledged as TRTs reincarnation, managed to win most seats and form a coalition government, but after nine months, Samak Sundaravej, the PPP's leader and prime minister, was stripped of his post by the Constitutional Court for conflict of interest. His replacement, Somchai Wongsawasdi, Thaksin's brother-in-law, was elected prime minister by the national assembly. Then in the midst of fierce opposition-led protests, the Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP and two coalition member parties, namely the Chart Thai Party (CP) and the Matchima Tippatai Party, on charges that the parties' executive members were guilty of electoral fraud. After the PPP was disbanded and its many executive members were prohibited from participating in politics for five years, the Democrat Party (DP) was able to form a government with other minor parties through a parliamentary vote, not a national election. According to a series of media reports, army commanders and other military officials had pressured the then government coalition partners and factions of the PPP to switch sides.[8] It should also be noted that, officially, seven political parties were elected to the House of Representatives after the 2007 general election, but two new parties within the coalition government, formed by MPs who defected after the general election—namely the Bhumjai Thai Party and the Matupoom Party—held the balance of power. In addition, the Social Action Party reemerged within the coalition government without contesting the election.

The banning of nearly 200 politicians in the course of four years resulted in a distinct lack of leadership, both in terms of quality and quantity. The banning of politicians has undeniably reduced the scope of viable competition in the political market, an indispensable component of a free and true democracy.

By and large, the endemic problems found inhibiting the effectiveness and power of Thai political parties include lack of ideology, lack of discipline, numerous cliques and factions, instability, discontinuity and disruption, lack of organization, lack of funding, and finally,

incoherent coalition governments. At the same time, the process of party development in Thailand has often been interrupted by the military elite, who tend to view political parties as the cause of political instability and as the primary challenge to their power position. Ironically, however, to legitimize the power of the military leaders, sometimes the parties were organized and paved way for military generals into the political arena. Every election came with newly formed parties, mostly established to foster their party leaders to the premiership. Thai political parties have been the instruments of ambitious leaders for obtaining political power rather than being organizations with apparent ideologies.

Old and New Parties: Persistence and Disappearance

Thai political parties that operated during the period 1990–2010 are considered "relevant" parties in this study; that is, those parties with at least 10 percent of the votes and 5 percent of parliamentary seats. This group includes the Democrat (DP: 1964–present), the Chart Thai (CP: 1974–2005), the Social Action (SAP: 1974–1996), the Samakhi Dham (SDP: 1992), the Palang Dham (PDP: 1992–1995), the New Aspiration (NAP: 1992–2001), the Chart Pattana (CPP: 1992–2001), and the Thai Rak Thai (TRT: 2001–present) parties. Note that TRTand Chart Thai were dissolved by court order in 2006 and 2007. The TRT reappeared as the PPP, but was barred again by the Constitutional Court; it is currently operating as the Pue Thai Party (PT). The Chart Thai is now known as the Chart Thai Pattana Party (CTP).

The above-mentionedrelevant parties can be categorized into four groups: (1) the parties that emerged (or reemerged) during the 1974–1976 democratic era, for example, the DP, the CP, and the SAP; (2) splinter parties that faction members of the existing parties moved away from in order to form new parties, for example, the SAP, the CPP, and the TRT; (3) military parties founded to foster their leader to the premiership, for example, the SDP and the NAP; and (4) a party thatset out to attract a certain social group, namely the religiously oriented PDP.

The Following Sections Chart the Course of Each of These Groups

1. The 1974–1976 democratic era gave birth to many parties, most of which perished after the October 1976 military crackdown. Only three of these political parties have remained pertinent actors in

Thai politics, specifically, the DP, the CP, and the SAP. The DP is Thailand's oldest political party still functioning today. It was established under the first political party act of 1946 as a Conservative, monarchist party. Throughout the years, the DP, the CP, and the SAP were repressed many times by military juntas, but reemerged whenever electoral democracy was restored.

The CP was originally established in 1974, by a group of three retired generals from the same clan, related by marriage, with a Conservative/Rightist, aggressively anti-Communist ideology. Today, the CP is a coalition of provincial entrepreneurs and traditional politicians, led by Banharn Silpa-archa, the business tycoon from Supanburi Province. Despite being a medium-sized party, the CP joined the coalition governments as many as five times during 1986–2005. The CP sheltered all kinds of politicians who wanted to be a part of the government coalition. In 2008, the Constitutional Court dissolved the CP with a guilty verdict of electoral fraud against a CP executive member. The Silpa-archa family was banned from politics for five years. The CTP was organized as "the nominee" of the former party and Banharn's younger brother currently heads the new party.

The SAP was a 1974 offshoot of the DP. More than any other party, the SAP, at its inception, was identified with a free enterprise economy. Although the SAP won only 6.69 percent of the votes, or 18 seats, in its first election in 1975, the party leader, M. R. Kukrit Pramoj, was able to corral 16 political parties to form a coalition government. But the government lasted less than a year,[9] and since then the SAP's electoral viability has been continually diminished. It did not contest the 2007 general election, but reemerged out of defectors from the dissolved parties, joining the DP-led government. The SAP's current leader, Suvit Kunkitti, ran for the 2011 general election, but failed to get elected.

2. The splinter parties might represent the most common disposition of Thai political parties. One example is the Chart Pattana Party (CPP), formed before the September 1992 election by former prime minister Chartchai Choonhavan who was the CP's leader before he was overthrown by the military junta. At its onset, the CPP was able to attract prominent members not only from the CP, but also from the NAP, the SDP, and the DP. The CPP's stronghold was in the northeast region, home of the party's core leaders. After the 2001 general election, several MPs and party executives moved to the TRT; subsequently, the CPP's 27-person executive board dissolved and merged with the TRT in 2004.

The TRT was built largely by amalgamating preexisting parties and factions, led by one of Thailand's billionaires, Thaksin Shinawatra, who had left the PDP. Before the 2001 general election, the TRT was able to draw as many as 117 incumbent MPs with strong networks from several parties. The Thaksin government, a coalition between the TRT and the CP, made history by being the first democratically elected administration to complete a four-year term. The outcome of the 2005 general election allowed the TRT to govern Thailand as a single-party government. Subsequently, the Thaksin government was overthrown by the 2006 coup d'état; the TRT was found guilty of conspiring to gain administrative power by illegal means and was dissolved by the Constitutional Tribunal's verdict in May 2007. After the TRT was dissolved, the PPP became the legal holding company of the TRT. The PPP was publicly viewed as a "nominee" of the TRT since the party comprised mostly of former members of the TRT—as many as 171 of the PPP's candidates were the TRT's incumbent MPs, and more particularly Thaksin remained a major funder of the PPP. However, in 2008, the Constitutional Court handed down a verdict to dissolve the PPP on electoral fraud charges, and a new party was established under the name Pue Thai (For Thai Party [PT]). The court has been widely criticized for exercising an overly broad scope of power. Some people see its rulings as an alternative means of accomplishing a coup, dubbing it a "judicial coup."

The appearance and disappearance of the TRT resulted in a fundamental change in the political landscape.[10] It is widely perceived that the Thai party system took on a new form, more or less a modern character, especially in terms of policy competition and the mode of electoral contest, as a result of the TRT.

3. Several military parties were founded primarily to foster their leaders to the premiership; that is, the NAP and the SDP. The NAP was formed in October 1990 mostly by former high-ranking military officers and bureaucrats. With strong financial support and public attention, the party gained more than 10 percent of the votes in every election until 2001. Yet rumors swirled about TRT campaign sponsorship of NAP's 2001 general election and about discussions of a merger. The NAP merged with the TRT in 2002. The SDP was established in 1991 and suddenly won the largest number of parliamentary seats, 79, or 17.61 percent, in the March 1992 general election (table 9.1). The common perception was that the party was established to support General Suchinda for the country's top position. And for this reason, it lost legitimacy after the 1992 Bloody May

Table 9.1 Voter turnout, proportion of seats, and percentage of votes, 1992–2011 general elections in Thailand

Year	*1992 (March)*	*1992 (September)*	*1995*	*1996*	*2001*		*2005*		*2007*		*2011*	
					District	*PR*	*District*	*PR*	*District*	*PR*	*District*	*PR*
Turnout (%)	*59.4*	*61.6*	*62.0*	*62.4*	*69.9*		*72.6*		*74.5*		*75.0*	
Seats (% of votes)												
DP	44 (9.4)	79 (19.2)	86 (22.3)	123 (31.8)	97 (26.2)	31 (26.6)	70 (22.4)	26 (22.3)	131 (30.2)	33 (40.5)	115 (31.9)	44 (35.2)
CP/CTP	74 (16.1)	77 (15.1)	92 (22.8)	39 (9.9)	35 (8.6)	6 (5.3)	18 (9.8)	7 (6.4)	30 (8.9)	4 (4.0)	15 (4.8)	4 (2.8)
SAP	31 (7.1)	22 (3.7)	22 (4.0)	20 (5.4)	1 (–)	–	5 (–)					
PDP	41 (10.2)	47 (15.9)	23 (7.6)	1 (–)								
NAP	72 (19.9)	51 (13.2)	57 (12.3)	125 (29.0)	28 (9.3)	8 (7.0)						
SDP	79 (17.6)											
CPP		60 (14.6)	53 (12.0)	52 (12.4)	22 (8.9)	7 (6.1)					5 (4.0)	2 (1.5)
TRT/PPP/PT					200 (37.0)	48 (40.6)	310 (51.0)	67 (58.7)	199 (36.8)	34 (41.1)	204 (44.9)	61 (48.4)

Source: 1992–1996 from Interior Ministry, 2001–2011 from Election Commission of Thailand.

incident. After one election, the SDP was dissolved and its members were dispersed.

Likewise, the Matupoom Party, founded in 2008 with three MPs who defected after the PPP was banned, is identified as a party organized to promote General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the 2006 coup leader. The Matupoom received only two parliamentary seats with 1.16 percent of the constituency votes in the 2011 general election. This indicated a growing negative attitude toward military coups among Thai voters.

4. One party, the religiously oriented Palang Dham Party (PDP)—Force of Virtue—targeted a certain social group. The PDP, a Bangkok-based party, supported Chamlong Srimuang in his Bangkok 1985 gubernatorial election. The PDP had been growing steadily, drawing its support from the religiously oriented Buddhist segment in Thai society, advocating adherence to strict moral principles. After Chamlong resigned, its popularity dropped to 7.62 percent in 1995, it won only 1 seat in the 1996 general election, and failed to get elected after that. The party was dissolved on October 19, 2007.

Although most of the parties established after the 1974 democratic era no longer exist, the founders and active party members have continued to play significant roles in Thai politics.

The Electors and the Parties

An overall lack of understanding, knowledge, and enthusiasm for the political process might be accountable for the low voter turnouts, averaging 41.95 percent, for the first 50 years after the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932. Since 1983 turnout has increased steadily, and after the 1992 general election, voter turnout has never dropped below 60 percent. In general, heavy get-out-the-vote campaigns sponsored by all kinds of state apparatus are probably responsible for such an escalation. More specifically, a high voter turnout of 61.59 percent in the 1992 September general election can be explained by the special political circumstances of the election after the Bloody May incident, which served as a means of breaking a political impasse between the prodemocracy and the promilitary forces.[11] Under the 1997 and 2007 constitutions, voting is compulsory for eligible voters age 18 and above, and is used as a step to fight against prevalent vote-buying. This partially explains the stark rise in voter turnout since 2001 (table 9.1). But most of all, the recent upsurge of voter turnout

can be explained by an increased awareness among the majority of the Thai population that they have the ability to influence the outcome of the elections and that these outcomes directly impact their lives. In Bangkok, where the best-educated people in the country are concentrated, voter turnout has never been high, compared with other regions, especially the Northeast, which is usually described as the poorest region of the country.

To appreciate fully how parties obtain votes in Thailand, one needs to understand the electoral system. Prior to 1997, Thailand used the plurality, multi member constituency system (Block Vote) to elect the House of Representatives, while the Senate was entirely appointed. The electoral districts were divided into one-, two- and three-seat districts. Voters were to vote for as many candidates as there were seats in a district and they tended to vote for candidates rather than parties. They could not cast all their votes for a single candidate, but could split their votes between candidates from different parties. The multi seat districts tended to produce multiple parties in each district, which in turn contributed to the presence of a large number of parties in the house. The average effective number of national parties between 1975 and 1996 was more than six.[12]

In 1997 Thailand adopted a parallel electoral system. Under this system, the House of Representatives, or lower house, elected 400 members of parliament in single-member constituencies and 100 through a proportional representation system based on a nationwide constituency. A party had to reach a threshold of at least 5 percent of the party-list votes to be eligible for seats in this tier. The drafters of the 1997 constitution hoped that through electoral reform they could encourage the development of party cohesion and meaningful party labels, and bolster the incentives of candidates and politicians to respond to broad, national constituencies. The 1997 constitution also provided for the first elected Senate in Thailand. Two hundred senators were elected using the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. And since the constitution drafters wanted the Senate to remain a neutral body of politics, senators were prohibited from belonging to a political party and were not allowed to campaign for election.

The move to single-member districts and especially the 5 percent electoral threshold in the party-list tier made it difficult for small-and medium-sized parties to compete. In 2005, the three parties that won seats via the proportional representation system collected altogether 91.02 percent of the nation's popular votes. Exactly 2,782,849 votes tallied for party-list candidates were wasted. In effect, the TRT and

the DP benefited most because of small party eliminations. The effective number of parties in the legislature fell dramatically from an average of 6.2 before 1997 to 3.1 in 2001 and 1.6 in 2005. Moreover, for the first time in Thai electoral history, political parties, led primarily by the TRT, put significant effort into developing coordinated party-centered electoral strategies. Parties began to differentiate themselves in terms of their policy platforms. A new political environment in the context of a more modern party system gave advantage to the top two parties, especially the more affluent, more resourceful TRT. It has been argued that the shift toward party-centered strategies was primarily confined to the campaign for party-list seats, while contests in the single-member districts generally remained candidate-centered affairs.[13] The CP always receives more constituency seats than the PR system (table 9.1) because the party still relies more on the strength of its individual candidates and is incapable of developing a party-centered platform appealing to the electorates nationwide.

The 2007 constitution brought back the multimember constituency system for 400 MPs. Inthe proportional representation system, all provinces are grouped into eight province clusters or electoral zones, and each cluster is considered a constituency, with ten representatives. Each province cluster consists of adjacent provinces, and all province clusters have similar total populations. In this system, each voter chooses one political party, and the ten members from a province cluster will be in proportion to the number of votes each party receives. The 1997 constitution's 5 percent requirement, which had put small parties at a disadvantage, was removed. Changes in the electoral system were believed to promote smaller parties' election chances and erode the TRT's electoral advantages. Dividing the country into eight PR constituencies was designed to prevent anyone from claiming to be popularly elected by the whole country. From the 2007 general election results, the effective number of parties had increased from 1.6 in 2005 to 2.73. But it was the DP that benefited the most from the new adjustments, trailing the PPP by a 200,000 votes, or less than one percentage point under the PR system, far less than in the previous election. The inability of small-and medium-sized parties to adapt to new electoral rules and methods and to develop an inclusive national vision resulted in fewer votes at the PR level than at the constituency level among all parties, except for the PPP and the DP, the two major exceptions.

For the Senate, 76 senators are popularly elected using the "first-past-the-post" electoral system in which a province is counted

as a single representative constituency; 74 senators are "selected" by the selection committee.[14] This latter development is a backward move for democracy as the bureaucracy and the military regain significant influence over the Senate.

In February 2011, the 2007 constitution was amended. The total number of MPs increased from 480 to 500. Multiple-seat constituencies again shifted back to single-seat constituencies. The change from multiseat to single-seat constituencies, cynics said, would make it easier for smaller political parties to compete, since they would have smaller areas to canvass and fewer votes for their small budgets to buy. The number of constituency-based members of parliament shrank from 400 to 375, while the party-list parliamentarians rose from 100 to 125. As a major party, the DP hoped to benefit from an enlarged party-list system. The move was speculated to weaken the then opposition TRT because 16 of the constituency-based seats eliminated were located in the North and Northeast, a stronghold of the TRT, whereas only 8 constituency-based seats were removed from Southern and Central Thailand, where the DP was strongest.

Although considerable volatility has existed from election to election in terms of number of MPs from each party, the share portion of seats obtained by the three largest parties—DP, the CP, and the NAP—during 1992–1996 was substantial (table 9.1). There has been a movement toward the reduction and stabilization of parties since 1996; party fragmentation of the previous era was no longer predominant. The DP and the CP have consistently and continually managed to gain sizeable numbers of parliamentary seats in every election. The growth of the DP between 1992 and 1996 was remarkable. From the September 1992 general election onward, the DP, by promoting itself as a principled and integrity-based party, either won the elections or came in second. The electoral success of the CP in 1995 and the NAP in 1996 came from employing similar patterns by skillfully encouraging numerous politicians to defect from various parties and spending heavily in the election campaign.[15] In 1995, the CP was the most successful party in attracting 23 incumbents from their original parties. The CP met with a similar fate before the 1996 general election when its secretary-general, Sanoh Tientong, defected to the NAP along with more than 40 MPs under his control. It was recorded that the NAP was able to galvanize as many as 51 incumbents.[16] In a way, this gave way to the TRT's victory in 2001. Moreover, the improved performance of the Northeast provincial-based NAP was criticized for utilizing state power and influence,[17] and engaging in money politics through vote-buying.[18]

The TRT was built largely by amalgamating preexisting parties and factions; the TRT was able to draw in as many as 117 incumbent MPs before the 2001 general election. Fifty-four of the veteran MPs came from the NAP's Sanoh Tientong and his faction. In this year, the NAP had a –19.79 volatility rate. Appendix 9.A shows volatility of the relevant parties (the constituency votes) between 1990 and 2011. The electoral volatility from 1992 until the 2001 general election was mainly a result of groups of incumbent MPs moving to more promising parties before the next election. Notable volatility occurred in 2001–2005 when the TRT's popularity was at its peak. The overwhelming success of the TRT led to several mergers with those parties formed in 1992. In addition, the CP's Chonburi faction, with its support base in the eastern provinces, counted approximately 10–15 MPs under its wing also split to join the TRT. As a consequence, the TRT entered the 2005 election race with the most number of incumbent candidates. All told, the popularity of the TRT and its success in forming alliances with the potential power of the rural voting masses should not be underestimated.

Thevolatilityof the recent two general elections, 2007 and 2011, has been a result of various forces and a shift in voter sentiment. The dissolution of the TRT, the banning of its 111 party executives, and efforts to expose a series of allegations of corruption scandals against Thaksin weakened the party's image and popularity. Thus explained the TRT/PPP's high electoral volatility in 2007 general election: dropping from +14.01 to –14.15. The divide between the red-shirts and the yellow-shirts, and the 2010 violent clashes may have perpetuated a highly polarized and potentially volatile Thai electorate. However, it is hard to say that the 2011 electoral volatility swing was the harbinger of any fundamental shift. Both the PT and the DP had a positive volatility rate, +8.11 and +1.71, respectively. It seemed people tended to mark their ballots based on the current circumstances, and those circumstances could change. In all, the most observable pattern was the continued decline of third-party electoral support over the past 16 years since 1996.

Party Structural Characteristics: Membership and Finance

Social characteristics of the Thai electorate have not been officially documented. Appendix 9.B shows data obtained through a survey of

the 2007 Referendum and 2007 general election, conducted in January 2008 by Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee and Thailand Democracy Watch, Chulalongkorn University. According to the survey, the most striking differences between the DP's and the TRT/PPP support bases are in the categories of educational background and occupation. People who vote for the DP tend to have better education than those who vote for the PPP and the CP. Occupation-wise, the DP supporters generally come from government and state enterprise sectors; the PPP largely base their support on low-income occupations, for example, workers, farmers, and small business owners. Religion has not been a significant variable in Thai voting behavior because the population is overwhelmingly Buddhist (about 95 percent), with a small Muslim minority (2–4 percent) concentrated in the south.

The political conflicts in the past six years have caused speculation on the political affiliations of the red- and the yellow-shirts and their voting patterns. According to research, most yellow-shirts are big supporters of the DP, while the red-shirts are ardent supporters of Thaksin and vote for the PT, the TRT/PPP's reincarnation.[19]

Political support bases reflect patterns of regionalism that reemerged at the 1992 general election[20] and remain still. Appendix 9.C. shows differences in electoral strongholds in the 2007 and 2011 general elections. The DP has had a southern base for 25 years and its support bases are still concentrated in the southern region. The CP continues to have a strong base in the central region where the party leader's clan and allies are solid, winning most seats there. The TRT/PPP/PT's traditional stronghold has been in the Northeast and the North, where Thailand's rural majority lives and are believed to have benefited most from the Thaksin administration's populist policies. Bangkok is the battlefield between the TRT/PPP/PT and the DP, and has been considered a "dead-zone" for other parties since the 2001 general election.

The concept of political party membership in Thailand is different from what it means in the West. In general, Thai political parties collect no membership fees (as do some European parties) and there is no tradition among the general public of volunteering or contributing money to political parties. The DP is the only party that collects 20 THB (about 60 cents) for entrance fee and 20 THB for annual fee, and requires its cabinet ministers, MPs, and all committee members to donate monthly 5 percent of their salary (5,000 THB or 160 US$) for constituency MPs and 10 percent of salary (about 10,000 THB or 320 US$) for ministers, party-list MPs, and committee members. The

TRT and the CP do not collect an entrance fee. The TRT seemed to be the only party that paid attention to building its membership base from the start. Since Thaksin ran the TRT like a corporation and acted as CEO, party members were treated like corporate employees and the party's cheerleaders, drawn to the party by a "direct sale" method through party canvassers, prospected candidates, and MPs. As a result, in 2006, after the 2005 landslide electoral victory, the TRT's membership reached 14,432,383 membersor 32.38 percent of the electorate. Appendix 9.D shows party membership figures between 1990 and 2011. That year, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) recorded the highest ever in party memberships. In the December 2007 election, the PPP, the TRT's successor, received 12,148,504 party-list votes, while the DP with 2,822,178 members and 194 party branches won 12,338,903 votes. Hence, a correlation between voting and membership cannot be firmly established.

The accuracy of membership figures is questionable. The political parties present unsubstantiated, presumably exaggerated numbers of party members to the ECT, and the ECT does not have the apparatus to efficiently check the reported numbers. The ECT later revealed that some people had been simultaneously members of several political parties. The DP and the CP initially reported membership in 2004 as over 4 million each, but after the ECT asked for verification membership dropped to 2.7 million for the DP and just over 1 million for the CP. High party membership enhances the public image and reputation of parties. Members offer a source of political legitimization to parties,[21] and party identification is an extremely evasive concept for Thai voters and politicians alike.

Exaggerated membership reached a high with the promulgation of the Fund for Development of Political Parties (FDP) under the 1998 Political Act.[22] The FDP gives an incentive to parties to register their members with the ECT in order to maximize their share of the FDP.

State subsidies in Thailand have not achieved much. Appendix 9. Eshows party finance figures and Appendix 9.F shows comparison of donations and state subsidies of three relevant political parties. The total amount of state funding is far too small to cover the expenses of most parties. Yet for small parties like the CP that cannot collect such large donations, the subsidies have helped.

Remarkably, the Political Party Act forbids registered organizations such as labor unions, trade, and professional associations from supporting parties or engaging in explicit political affairs such as campaigning. Thus, alliances between parties and certain social

groupings have been curtailed. This has left the parties dependent on the financial handouts of their leaders and/or on the narrow interests that finance them. Donations from party leaders and business sectors have been the main source of income for political parties.

Party Programs and Ideologies

Before the current ongoing crises, Thai party leaders convinced voters not with ideology or platforms, but simply with promises that the party would join a coalition and hold cabinet posts. After the success of the TRT in employing policies as vote-getting tools, Thai political parties now try to use platforms and programmatic policies to attract voters. Appendix 9.G shows a summary of party manifestoes, 2011. All these policies manifest similar populist tendencies that include promoting democratic values, people's rights, economic development, social welfare, education, health care, security, political institutions, and foreign affairs. Party programs mostly derived from debates among party policy experts and leaders are then adopted at party conventions as regulated by the ECT.

Among the specific programs of the relevant parties that should be mentioned are as listed below.

DP: The DP was founded as a Conservative-royalist party. Nowadays, the DP is usually described as Conservative liberalism. The DP claimed that its policies give first priority to the people, and the DP advocates clean, transparent, and noncorrupt politicians. Its major populist policies included raising minimum wage; reducing personal income tax; free public schooling; increasing free public health expenditures; and monthly pension allowances.

CP/CTP: Chart Thai has long been known as a Conservative-royalist party. It never developed policy platforms that were clear, concise, and nationally appealing. During the 2007 and 2011 general elections, the CP focused on welfare benefits to the people, reform of the education system, and freedom of the press. The CP/CTP also proposed a "reconciliation prime minister" during the 2011 general election.

SAP: The SAP's specific programs were put forth during Kukrit's administration in the 1970s. In the past, the SAP's strength was in its foreign policies. The SAP's last publicized policies were in 1982.

NAP: Chavalit Yonjaiyuth, NAP's only leader, initiated a number of development programs in the 1990s, especially in the poverty-stricken northeastern region and in the south. The project in the south was concentrated on the three southernmost provinces where Thailand's Muslim population is concentrated.

TRT/PPP/PT: The success of TRT in using policy platforms as a vote-getting strategy was first evident in the 2001 general election. The core of TRT's economic policies was based on modest Keynesian economic stimulus programs with state support for entrepreneurialism and export competitiveness.[23] The TRT's policy platform in the 2005 election was an extension of populist policy, with a heavy focus on poverty alleviation and a new method of direct budget allocation to rural areas.

The PPP and the PT, TRT's successor, vowed to carry on the TRT's populist policies. In general, the PPP and the PT's policies aimed to drive strong consumption and investment spending.

Ideologically, the major political parties in Thailand are mostly Right-of-Center. Thai parties generally are not divided along class, ethnic, or ideological lines. Thailand's political parties are "catch-all," meaning they cut across these socioeconomic divisions and capture votes from all strata of the population.

Also, Thai political parties nowadays are donning the idea of being the savior of the monarchy. For example, the Bhumjai Thai Party proclaims to protect the stability of the monarchy and the survival of Thailand, under the motto "Populism Happy Society" (Prachaniyom Sangkhom Pensuk).

Party Leadership

Thirteen out of a total of twenty-eight prime ministers in Thailand since 1932 are former military officers, the most recent holding office after the 2006 coup d'état. The 2007 general election gave Thailand three civilian premierships and now it has the first female prime minister. Appendix 9.H shows reasons for changes of leadership.

The DP is the only party thathas a formalized electoral process to select party leaders and Executive Committee. It was widely perceived that critical decisions were made during the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva by the DP's secretary-general who controlled the party's purse as well as its directions. For the DP, it is customary that the party leader is less powerful than in most other parties, especially in

appointing people to political positions; he or she needs to receive consent from the Executive Committee as the collective decision-making organ of the party.

For CP leaders, once known as the "party of the generals" because the founders and the first three party leaders were all army generals, today its image has changed. The de facto party leader since 1994 is Banharn Silpa-archa, a business tycoon from Supanburiprovince. Banharn held ministerial positions several times. Banharn became Thailand's prime minister in 1995 and was involved in numerous corruption scandals, one of which diminished the unity of his administration and caused him to resign in 1996. His short-lived and highly incompetent government is widely considered to have paved the way for the 1997 economic crisis.

The most controversial party leader is Thaksin Shinawatra. In 1994 he entered politics under the PDP's umbrella. He left the PDP with many of its MPs in 1996 and founded his own party, the TRT, in 1998. After a historical electoral victory in 2001, Thaksin became prime minister, Thailand's first to serve a full term. The Thaksin government faced many allegations, among them policy corruption, conflicts of interest, tyranny of the majority, and media intrusion. In 2008, Thaksin was found guilty of violating the National Counter Corruption Act and sentenced to two years imprisonment. He has yet to serve the sentence and has been living in self-imposed exile. Samak Sundaravej, a 72-year-old Extreme-Rightist, royalist, seasoned politician, was picked to head the TRT, but Samak's premiership was disqualified by the Constitutional Court for accepting a salary from a private company in exchange for hosting a cooking show on television. Somchai Wongsawasdi, Thaksin's brother-in-law, was chosen to lead the party before it was disbanded by the Constitutional Court.

It is undeniable that Thaksin remains the de facto leader of the PT, a cloned party of the TRT and the PPP. Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's younger sister, led the PT in the 2011 general election while flags with Thaksin's image fluttered outside the PT headquarter. It is reasonable to say that Yingluck was elected prime minister because the voters expressed their confidence in Thaksin's leadership.

Leaders of two defunct political parties worth mentioning are Chavalit Yongjaiyuth of the NAP and Chamlong Srimuang of the PDP. In 1996, the NAP won the most seats in the house and with the support of five coalition parties Chavalit became the twenty-secondprime minister. During the 1997 Asian economic crisis, he was pressured

from many Bangkok middle class protests and resigned from the premiership that year. It was said that "it's the rural poor who elected the government, and the Bangkok rich who toppledit."[24]

Chamlong Srimuang founded the PDP and drew heavy support from the Bangkok voters in1988–1992. During Bloody May 1992, he led the protest against General Suchinda. It was Chamlong who persuaded Thaksin into politics, and it was Chamlong who supported the military coup that overthrew Thaksin in 2006.

Now we turn to the subject of personalized leadership and populism. Most Thai political parties are formed by individuals as a means to legitimize their power through the electoral process. In political parties with personalized leadership, decisionmaking remains largely informal and is solely controlled by the party leader; such personalization of leadership usually leads to party centralization without institutionalization or a "leader-centric party." Thai voters tend to base their votes on a candidate's image, charisma, and performance delivering pork barrel projects, not on ideology or party programs. Personalized leaders fail to link people to parties and to the political system in the long term. This failure has not supported a reconstruction of the party system.

Indicators of personalized leaders and populism suggested by Blondel/Thiebault[25] and Inoguchi[26] include (1) appointment patterns of ministerial and executive positions surrounding leaders and (2) a certain mix of oratorical appeal, good looks, and charisma. Strongevidence of personalized leadership and populism is observable in Thaksin (2001–2006). During Thaksin's leadership, decisionmaking within the TRT and in the government was highly vertical and centralized. He retained the sole authority for appointing, dismissing, and determining all matters. Many Thais loved Thaksin for his decisive, active, think-fast-and-get-things-done style of leadership. He was viewed as a billionaire prime minister who cared and had direct contact with people of various regions. Most importantly, he was able to fulfill most of his campaign pledges. Thaksin had brought the importance of a party label and party leader to a new magnitude. During the 2005 electoral campaign, the TRT claimed "a vote for the TRT was a vote for Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to lead the country with his particular style of leadership."[27] Even today as a fugitive Thaksin continues to exert influence on the new proxy PT from abroad; the PT's 2011 electoral campaign ran on a platform "Thaksin Thinks, Pue Thai Acts."

The "populist" discourse of the TRT's and former PM Thaksin's policies led to electoral success in 2001 and 2005. The terms "Thaksinomics" and "Thaksin Regime" says it all.[28] Thaksin changed the modes of political competition and the patterns of relation with the electorate. In addition, he was responsible for decisive modification in many other aspects of Thai politics, including bureaucratic structures and government spending patterns. Thaksin is still enormously popular among the rural poor, but among many Bangkok residents and urban middle class he is seen as a rich businessman winning elections through massive vote-buying, party acquisition, and an extravaganza of policy content that could damage Thailand's long-term macroeconomy, as well as a prime minister who used disciplined party votes to erode democracy, and who became corrupt and autocratic.

Conclusion

Thai leaders have dominated the political scene, not the parties. In an attempt to mimic Thaksin's style and success, most Thai political parties and leaders have jumped on the bandwagon of his populist trend; that is, they regularly call for more social welfare, rural development, and other propoor policies. Almost all political parties are attempting to manifest their policies as even more "populist" in nature than in previous elections.[29] However, none of the party leaders in Thailand can truly be coined populist, notwithstanding their endeavors to apply and exercise populist policies.

Recent developments of Thai political parties, in particular, the unprecedented success of the TRT have forced all political parties to pay more attention and devote more resources to policy platforms, party organization, and management. In recent years, Thailand has witnessed new modes of electoral campaigns, especially policy promotion as an important method of gathering electoral support. Some parties have even begun to employ professional staff to get their messages across to broader and more varied groups of voters. On the surface, it appears as if political parties are transforming into a more professional mode with specific national policy orientations. In this context, it also appears that small- and medium-sized parties will have a more difficult time to compete on a significant scale.

Such assessment should be taken very cautiously. With Thaksin's removal from electoral competition, the effects of personalized and populist leaders have grown fainter. The existing majority of

atomized, fragmented voters who remain all too easily seduced by individual fame and local influence might lead to a return of "deal breaker" medium-sized parties of 5–7 seats, a trend that was already visible in the 2007 and the 2011 elections. These parties are established to bargain for cabinet positions in exchange for their support to form a secure grand coalition government. Rather than promoting systemic and contextual change of populism, they are much more like old wine in new bottles.

The notion of electing a populist charismatic authority versus a "democratic authoritarian" with moral authority is of central concern in Thailand's political discourse at the moment. The narrative suggests that there is a great divide between electoral democracy, advocated by the majority poor and Thaksin's supporters versus Conservative tradition, defended by the middle class, social elites, and the aristocratic establishment. The continuing influence of authoritarian-Conservative groups inThailand is evident in the prolonged direction of imbalanced social development, economic inequality amid rapid industrialization, and the political sphere. The overthrow of an elected prime minister, the dissolutions of political parties, the disqualifying of elected leaders, and the interference in government formation are all concrete examples of the sturdiness of Conservative-authoritarian forces in Thailand. Thailand's great divide culminated in the April–May 2010 clash when the so-called Red-Shirts were pitted against these retrograde Conservative forces. And, moreover, the political consensus once held together by the monarchy has now collapsed. As long as the prolonged problems of judicial, socioeconomic, and political inequality remain unresolved in the psyche of the underprivileged mass of the electorate, the divide in Thai society and politics will likely to continue and even worsen.

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10

Indonesia

Sunny Tanuwidjaja

Introduction

Indonesia gained its independence in 1945 and adopted a democratic form of government afterward. In 1955 it conducted its first democratic election, the only one prior to the authoritarian government. Then, during the New Order authoritarian regime, several elections were held every five years. Two of the three elections in the 1990s were held in 1992 and 1997. After the fall of the regime in 1998, the 1999 election was the first democratic election during the *reformasi* era, followed by the 2004 and 2009 elections.

There were only three political parties in the authoritarian period: *Golongan Karya* (Golkar), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI). Golkar was the party of the regime; PPP was established as the channel for Islamic aspiration, and PDI was the party that represented the minority groups, those who were ex-Communist sympathizers, and the nominal Muslims. In all elections (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) during the New Order period, Golkar controlled between 62 and 75 percent of the total votes. During this authoritarian period, parties acted as the instrument of legitimacy of the regime and their members in the parliament were the "rubber stamp" of the government.

With the opening of political space in the post–New Order era, hundreds of political parties were established. All the parties from the authoritarian period continue to exist, and surprisingly Golkar did not die along with the regime. PDI split into two parties: PDI and PDI-P. PDI-P, led by the daughter of the first president Soekarno, was

the representation of resistance against the New Order regime and became the biggest party in 1999. Forty-eight parties competed in the 1999 election. Twenty-four and thirty-eight parties competed in the 2004 and 2009 general elections respectively.

The number of parties in the three elections was an outcome of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system adopted in Indonesia. There is, however, a minor variation of the PR system adopted in the three elections particularly in the vote-to-seat conversion and how parties allocated their seats to their candidates. The conversion of votes to seats in the 1999 and 2004 elections was based on the largest remainder method. In 2009 the largest remainder formula was retained but with the condition that the parties can only received seats in the second allocation phase when they reach a certain quota. Regarding the seat allocation from parties to candidates, the 1999 election adopted a closed list PR in which the electorate vote only for parties, and the seats each party gained were awarded to candidates who are at the top of parties' list. In contrast, the 2009 election adopted an open list PR where voters can also vote for a candidate name in the party list. Seat gained by a party was given to the candidates with the largest vote in the party list. The 2004 election adopted a "semiopen list" PR where voters were allowed to mark a candidate's name alongside the party's symbol; however, the seat allocation from a party to its candidates was still based on the candidates' ranking in the party list, with one exception: if there was a candidate who received more than 30 percent of the votes, he or she received a priority in receiving the seats the party gained.[1]

Public expectation ran high for political parties in the beginning of the reform period in 1999, and political parties and the parliament were the locus of politics at that time. Three of the four well-known key reformers have their own parties, in which two were newly established. The first Indonesian indirectly elected president, the late Abdurahman Wahid, was impeached by parties' representatives in the parliament due to his inability to accommodate and to satisfy parties' interests.

Due to this experience, two major constitutional amendments were ratified to avoid future instability, making it difficult if not impossible for presidential impeachment. Parliament, however, retained many of its important political roles such as budgeting, legislation, and monitoring. In addition, individuals vying for key bureaucratic positions, such as ambassadors, police and military chiefs, central bank governors, and others are required to obtain the approval of the

parliament. This means that parties retain much influence in day-to-day politics and government. The combination of presidential and a multiparty system, which can be problematic,[2] adds to the urgency of studying parties and their evolution in both electoral and policymaking politics in Indonesia.

Parties and Elections

Old and New Parties

In the New Order period, there were three political parties. Golkar, established in 1964, was the party closely associated with the New Order authoritarian regime; PPP, established in 1973 as a "forced" fusion of Islamic parties into a single entity and; PDI, established in 1973 as a "forced" fusion of nationalist, secular, and minority parties. PDI continues to exist in the reform era, but later changed its name to PDI-P *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* because it failed to pass the electoral threshold in 1999: most supporters supported PDI-P.

PDI-P, a splinter party of PDI, was declared in 1999 as a result of an internal split within PDI orchestrated by the New Order regime, and was established by the more popular leadership within PDI, and is closely linked to Soekarno and his legacy as the first president of Indonesia. PKB was established in 1998 and is closely linked to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, claiming around 40 million members. Since PKB was established primarily for the NU, it can be categorized as a special issues party. In addition, PKB can also be considered a splinter party of PPP, which also has a strong base among the NU members.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) was established in 1998 by key leaders within Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia claiming to have approximately 30 million members, and its founders consist of both secular-nationalist and a more religious conservative group. Because many Muhammadiyah leaders supported Golkar during the New Order era, and due to its Islamic credentials, PAN can be considered a splinter of Golkar and PPP. The Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) was established as the Justice Party (PK) in 1999. It failed to achieve electoral threshold in 1999. PK merged with PKS when it was established in 2003. PKS can be categorized as a special issue party in its initial period because PKS focused much of its energy in promoting an Islamic State in Indonesia.

PDI-P, PKB, PAN, and PKS can all be categorized as mushroom parties because they were established during the initial year of reform when hundreds of political parties were established. *Partai Demokrat* (PD) Party was established in 2001 to become the political vehicle for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) after his failure to become the vice president of Megawati in 2001. Since many of its senior politicians come from Golkar, PD can somewhat be considered a splinter of Golkar.

It is difficult to comment on the high turnout rate during the pre-1998 era when the authoritarian regime closely controlled and manipulated the election process and results. Maintaining high turnout was an important goal for the regime. Elections can provide legitimacy for the regime only when significant numbers of people participate. With the opening of access to politics in 1999, there was a democratic euphoria and high public expectations that led to a high turnout rate. In the two subsequent general elections, high turnout rates relative to other democracies continued. However, a declining trend in the general election is clearly observable. One common explanation is the increasing pessimism among voters toward democratic processes particularly on political parties due to the weak performance of parties. Turnout in presidential elections shows a slight increase from 2004 to 2009, which reflects a high level of public satisfaction and the popularity of SBY the incumbent.

One interesting point is that in 2004, turnout for the presidential election was lower than the general election, whereas in 2009 turnout was higher for the presidential election. Keep in mind that the presidential election was conducted approximately three months after the general election. In 2004 people's exhaustion toward political campaigns possibly led to a lower turnout in the presidential election. In 2009 it was more due to the public dissatisfaction and distrust toward political parties and public satisfaction toward SBY that led to a significant decline of turnout in the general election and a higher turnout in the presidential election.

Golkar, the party closely linked with the Soeharto regime dominated every election during the New Order era. PDI's vote in 1997 declined significantly. Because it was getting stronger toward the 1997 election, the regime orchestrated an internal conflict within the party and sidelined Megawati, the increasingly popular politician at that time, from the party.

In the first democratic election after the fall of the authoritarian regime, PDI-P under Megawati was able to gain the largest votes due

Table 10.1 Results from the past five elections in Indonesia: 1992 and 1997 are the last two elections in the authoritarian era; the other three are elections in the democratic period.

Year	*1992*	*1997*	*1999*	*2004*	*2009*
Presidential elections					
Turnout (%)	Indirectly elected	Indirectly elected	Indirectly elected	68.5	72.5
Year	1992	1997	1999	2004	2009
Parliamentary elections					
Turnout (%)	90.9	88.9	93.3	84.1	70.7
% of Seats (% of votes)					
Golkar	73.1 (68.1)	68.1 (74.5)	26.0 (22.5)	23.3 (21.6)	19.1 (14.5)
PPP	16.0 (17.0)	17.0 (22.4)	12.6 (10.7)	10.6 (8.2)	6.6 (5.3)
PDI	10.9 (14.9)	14.9 (3.1)			
PD				10.4 (7.4)	26.8 (20.9)
PDI-P			33.1 (33.8)	19.8 (18.5)	17.0 (14.0)
PKS			1.5 (1.4)	8.2 (7.3)	10.2 (7.9)
PAN			7.4 (7.1)	9.4 (6.4)	7.7 (6.0)
PKB			11.0 (12.6)	9.4 (10.6)	4.8 (4.9)
Gerindra					4.6 (4.5)
Hanura					3.2 (3.8)

Source: Indonesia General Election Commission

to their reformist credentials. Surprisingly Golkar was able to come out as the second strongest party despite losing the majority of its votes. Two other parties led by reformist figures, PAN and PKB, also gained significant votes although still less than Golkar.

If we look across three democratic elections, we can notice that the three parties from the New Order era appear to be experiencing a consistent decline. There is no evidence to suggest that the trend will reverse in the near future. PDI-P's dependence on Megawati, its main vote getter and iconic figure, is a liability in the long run because her charisma is consistently fading. PPP's identity as the political channel of the Muslims is overtaken by other Islamic parties, particularly PKS. Meanwhile, Golkar's lack of ideological clarity and appeal, its lack of a credible national figure, and its lack of internal party solidity make the party's prospect look dim.

New parties, particularly PD and PKS, are emerging as the parties of the future, at least for the next ten years. Both PD and PKS were able to establish themselves as medium-sized parties in 2004 gaining around 7.3 and 7.4 percent of the total votes. This was an achievement since PD was just newly established and PKS gained only less than 2 percent in the 1999 election. PD was able to make significant electoral gain because of SBY's rising popularity and Megawati, whose popularity equaled that of the PDI-P, was considered a failure. Those who were disappointed with PDI-P changed to PD, which was considered an alternative party with similar nationalist credentials. Meanwhile PKS was able to make significant gain because the public was disappointed with the Islamic parties at that time. In the near future, SBY's strong performance, that is, its ability to maintain a positive public image was to significantly boost PD's image and support. PKS, despite its failure to improve its standing in 2009, has better organizational characteristics compared to other parties, which provides a promising base for future success.

The emergence of new parties can be attributed to the decline of public trust and expectation toward parties that led people to look for alternative parties. High public expectation in the beginning of the reform period gradually declines as parties become more of an elitist institution and less as the channel for public aspiration. Parties and the parliament were and still are considered to be two of the most corrupt institutions in Indonesian politics by the public. Survey results have also shown that party identification declines significantly overtime,[3] and the primary culprit for this pattern is the underperformance of political parties marked by corruption, internal party bickering, and weak parliamentary performance.[4]

However, it is still too early to conclude that the old traditional parties (Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP) will fade away in the near future. All three parties, realizing that they must evolve in order to survive, are currently undertaking different strategies to improve their chance of survival. For example, Golkar and PDI-P are currently pushing for a higher parliamentary threshold in an attempt to prevent new parties from entering the political space. Both parties are also becoming a more visible catch-all party by accommodating more religious aspiration.[5] PPP is currently trying to position itself back as a true Islamic party by taking an increasingly rightist position in many issues. In the mean time, it is still difficult to see any of the new parties (particularly PD and PKS) performing and behaving any differently from the old parties. What we can safely predict is that there will not be a trend toward a two-party system as well as a more fragmented party system than today. Instead the current level of party system fragmentation will remain into the near future. Table 10.1 summarizes the results and characteristics of the last five election.

Voters Characteristics[6]

Several social factors can be used to indicate the support base of some political parties. PKS is stronger among voters with an education above high school. Less so but similar is PAN. In contrast, PDI-P is significantly weaker among voters with education higher than high school. In terms of religion, almost all PKS and PPP voters are Muslim, while PDI-P and less so Golkar, are relatively stronger among non-Muslims due to their nationalist-secular credentials. In terms of age, PKS voters can be characterized with their youth. Golkar is relatively stronger among the entrepreneurs while PDI-P is stronger among voters with low-income professions.

Traditionally more important characteristics in differentiating support for parties are two geographical variables: urban versus rural and Java versus Non-Java. PKS and PD are relatively more urban compared to other parties, while PDI-P and PPP are more rural. Golkar is traditionally considered as a non-Java-base party, while PDI-P, PPP, PKB, and to a less extent PKS, are competing for voters in Java.

Liddle and Mujani[7] have suggested that social characteristics are becoming less relevant in the post–New Order era. Instead, they argue that it is the leadership factor that is becoming more central in explaining voters' choice of parties. This study remains to be confirmed. Keep in mind that the primary reason for the decline of explanatory power by social characteristics in explaining party support is due primarily to the rise of catch-all parties.

Effect of New Parties on Old Parties

It is difficult to trace the influx and outflux of supporters between new and old parties. There is, however, an indicator that we can use to approximate the flow of votes/supporters. Using district-level data, we can determine whether there is a relationship between the changes in support for one party to the others at the district level. This indicator is preferable over individual survey data for several reasons. First, there is no tracking survey that has covered two elections. Second, asking respondents to recall their party choice in the previous election produces "recalling problem." Third, in such analysis, problem of small sample size occurs. Recall that in actual election results in 2009, one party received almost 20 percent of votes, two others around 14 percent, and other mid-sized but still relevant parties received less than 8 percent. In our survey, almost 30 percent of voters were undecided, reducing the number of respondents who can be analyzed. Thus, analyzing voters of mid-sized parties is constrained by a small sample size problem.

Analysis of circulation of votes from the 1999 to 2004 election has been done by Baswedan.[8] His primary conclusion was that voters who changed parties between the two elections voted for parties with similar ideological positions. For example, those who no longer voted for PDI-P in 2004 voted for parties such as PD, not PKS. The results of district-level analysis of vote circulation between 2004 and 2009 are presented below. I created a simple regression model in which the change of votes each party received is a dependent variable, while the vote change for other parties is an independent variable. Ignoring autocorrelation problem, the model shows how the vote change in one party relates to another.[9]

Two new parties in 2009 that performed relatively well and were able to pass the parliamentary threshold are Gerindra and Hanura. Both parties are led by two ex-military generals and both were key leaders in Golkar. Due to changing leadership in Golkar both left the party and established their own parties. The impact of Gerindra and Hanura in absorbing votes is clearly observable on PD, Golkar, and PDI-P. In relation to other parties' gains, Gerindra's has the most negative influence on PKB.

Among the seven relevant parties, if we categorize Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP as old parties and the other four as new parties, there are several indications on vote transfer between the two groups. Relative to other parties, vote change of PD is closely related to Golkar, PDI-P,

and PAN. Golkar's change is related more to PD's and PDI-P's than others, while PDI-P' vote change is related more to PD and Golkar. Relationship with PKS might not be relevant considering the small change of PKS votes from 2004 to 2009 across districts.

Party Structures

Membership

In order to participate in elections during the reform era, parties are required to fulfill a membership threshold. In 2004 election, in order to participate in elections parties have to have official organizational representatives in a minimum two-thirds of the total provinces, and within each of these provinces an official organizational representative in a minimum two-thirds of the total districts in each of the provinces. Within each of these districts, parties have to have at least 1,000 or 1/1,000 of the total population. To approximate, the total districts in Indonesia is around 450, each party has to have at least 300,000 members to participate in the 2004 election.

A national survey done by an Indonesian-based think tank—Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)—in 2008 shows that around 7 percent of voters have membership cards. Of the Indonesian population, 64 percent claim that they are not a member of a political party and are not active in party activities, while another 29 percent have never heard about party membership. In total, approximately 7.2 percent of Indonesian voters are party members, and only 3 percent are active members. Active does not mean that they are involved in decision making but active in participating in party activities. Appendix 10.C[10] shows the distribution of approximate membership numbers in 2008 based on the data above. The potential for overestimation exists. One reason is that it is not uncommon for Indonesians to have more than one membership card.

It is logical that membership for Golkar and PDI-P are relatively larger compared to other parties. Prior to 1999 Golkar was able to have an entrenched structure within Indonesian society up to the local level. PDI-P was the largest party in 1999, and although experiencing decline, has strong loyal support bases and was also one of the parties from the New Order Era. Both parties were the two largest parties in 1999 and 2004, and the second and third largest party in 2009. Meanwhile those who support the PD are mainly those who support the party's figure, that is, the current president,

SBY. As party identity declined, one can speculate that the support for SBY came from those who are somewhat antiparty. Also, PD's strategy is less on rigid organizational emphasis and more on modern media campaigns.

It is difficult to get official and accurate membership information. Parties in Indonesia do not have good membership databases. This tells us that membership does not matter much for parties other than to fulfill a legal requirement for electoral participation, because membership size is not equal to party support and parties do not depend on members to provide financing.

Party members in general do not participate in key decision-making processes. Indonesian parties in general do not have party programs and activities other than during the campaign period. Major decisions parties have to make are selecting candidates for parliamentary members, candidates for executive positions both at the local and the national levels, candidates for the presidential election, party's position vis-à-vis the government, and major policy decisions in parliament that are under public scrutiny. Although with varying degree, other than in electing a party chairman, in making decisions about key issues the Central Board has the strongest influence. Local branches have some say when it comes to determining which candidate to support in local elections, although the Central Board still has the final say.

The strong influence of the Central Board fluctuates over time depending on whether internal party competition and conflicts are present. Different party's leadership also has different approaches. After 1998, Golkar is the party with the least centralized control. Parties like PD and PDI-P are centered more on the leading figure of the party, that is, SBY and Megawati. For PKS, the Majelis Syuro is the one who makes decisions on key issues mentioned above.

Organization

While commenting on parties' geographical coverage, it has to be noted that all relevant parties have organizational representation in almost all districts. About 60 percent of Indonesian population resides on the island of Java that covers less than 20 percent of land area. The rest of Indonesia can be divided into four regions: Sumatra, Borneo, Bali, and the eastern part of Indonesia. Each party has its own traditional stronghold. By party strongholds or bases I am referring to areas where a specific party obtains significant percentage of its votes

or areas where the party is competitive. Golkar is considered to be a non-Java party, with strongholds in the eastern part of Indonesia, West Sumatera and Aceh, and some support in West Java. PDI-P is traditionally strong in Central and East Java, and Bali. PKB, with its Nahdlatul Ulama constituents, is strong in Central and East Java. PAN, with its Muhammadiyah base, has strongholds in Yogyakarta, West Sumatra, and Jambi. PPP has support in West and East Java and Aceh.

Two new parties, PD and PKS, are changing the balance in several older party strongholds. In 2009, PD became the dominant party in Aceh and West Java, while significantly undermining support for dominant parties in East and Central Java (PDI-P and PKB) as well as in the eastern part of Indonesia (Golkar). PKS also emerged as a strong party in West Sumatra, West Java, and in the southern part of Sulawesi, undermining support for parties such as PPP, Golkar, and PAN.

Financing

Accurate data on party financing in the New Order is difficult to find. One certainty is that all three parties were funded by the regime. Both PPP and PDI received a substantial amount of money to maintain their organizational activities. The amount, however, is far below than allocated to Golkar.

Similarly, in the post–New Order era, it is still difficult to find credible figures. Between 2001 and 2004, the amount of party financing from the state is calculated based on how many votes a party gets in the 1999 election. For each vote received in the national parliamentary election, a party is awarded 1,000 rupiah. The provincial and the district/municipality governments have to provide subsidies to local party branches based on the local government's financial capacity. In general, the local governments follow the national-level formula.

A new rule was put in place in 2005, reducing the amount of state subsidy to almost 90 percent. The formula was changed from vote-based to seat-based calculation, for example, each seat in the national parliament equals 21 million rupiah worth of state subsidies per year. Again in this case, local governments generally followed the national-level formula. In 2009, the government released a new regulation, changing the calculation of state subsidy back to the vote-based formula, where state subsidy for each vote equals the amount of total subsidy from the previous year divided by the total

valid votes. In other words, the total amount of state subsidy for the parties does not change. Appendix 10.D[11] shows the amount of state subsidy each relevant party received.

The reduction of state subsidy/public funding does not mean that party spending is declining. Instead, the implementation of direct elections at the national and local level starting in 2004 might have increased the cost for running political parties. This rising cost of politics along with the reduction of public funding have led parties to seek alternative and often illicit sources of funding.[12] Mietzner has listed several sources for parties to seek additional funding: increasing allowances for parliamentarians and in turn requesting a share of their salary, requesting ministers from political parties to contribute funds and provide business projects to companies that have close links with party members, selling public offices that requires party supports (such as parliamentarian seats, local executives, and government positions that requires fit and proper test in the parliament), and requesting donations in exchange for support for certain legislation and political protection.

Private donation for political parties is regulated within the law. There are two general types: one is regular donation and the other is campaign donation. Appendix 10.E[13] provides the breakdown of the maximum amount that parties can receive from individuals and private organizations.

One inference from the numbers above is that the size of party funding that comes from private donations increases over time. While no data is available on the amount of membership dues, one can assume that the amount is insignificant. The prevailing mindset among Indonesians is that parties and elites have to give them something instead of the other way around. Such a trend is supported by the fact that Indonesians are increasingly suspicious and pessimistic toward political parties and elites, as shown by the consistent decrease of party identification.

The share of private donations, particularly from big businesses, is the largest. If a businessman owns several companies then he is able to donate to a party much more than the legal limit. The share of this donation for each party's finance fluctuates because businesses tend to give more to the stronger and more popular parties. Thus, it is a strong probability that the dominant source of financing for parties comes from private donations and political elites themselves through illicit fundraising, followed by public funding, and membership dues that cover the least amount of party financing.

Program and Ideology

Programs

With regard to party programs, there are three general ways to interpret. First, party programs mean policies that parties are pursuing through government representatives and strategies. According to this definition, programs tend to be ad hoc in nature, that is, parties will try to consolidate when they perceive that a certain piece of legislation is strategic and crucial for their political and financial interests. Most of the time, parties provide significant freedom for their representatives to consolidate their position between members of the parties within the parliament commissions. Another important note is that, parliamentary members in Indonesia do not have adequate capacities and most of the time they use the budget for hiring experts to hire staff with questionable expertise.[14]

Second, programs can mean party activities in society. According to this definition, there are not many party activities in between elections. Most of the activities relate to image building and socialization, such as providing natural disaster relief, organizing events in which parties distribute basic needs, conducting free social entertainment, and so on. Parties also attempt to conduct internal party building through their cadre development program and recruitment for public offices. These activities are more sporadic than systematic.

Third, programs are goals (or what parties try to achieve) mentioned in official party documents. While the documents exist, access to such documents is difficult although not impossible. One can easily get the impression that parties try to have an agenda for everything. Based on statements made by party leaders, they will have an official position for issues such as anticorruption, legal reform, poverty, employment, macroeconomy, military, security, foreign policy, political reform, local government, social cohesion, education, health, and many others. The wide coverage of party programs, naturally leads to vagueness. Such vagueness is both intentional and unintentional. On the one hand, parties lack the ability to propose long-term concrete programs, but, on the other hand, parties intentionally have vague programs in order to provide them with room to adapt and improvise without being inconsistent.

It is in the national congress that parties decide future plans for their programs, if any. Other than PKB that holds their congress one year prior to the election, all parties hold their congress after the election. Decisions with regard to party programs are not a main concern

for parties; thus despite being able to exert influence, party leaders give room for participation to members of the congress. Some programs are promised, but not formalized, by parties prior to elections. Most of the time, if not always, parties do not bother to fulfill their promises. Most of the time too, voters do not pay attention to see whether promises had been fulfilled.

Ideology

The primary division between parties in Indonesia is not in programs but "ideology," that is, between nationalist-secular and religious-Islamic. The category as expected is not a dichotomy. The word "ideology" is used loosely. What differentiates nationalist-secular parties from religious-Islamic ones is their preference over the spread of Islam in society and politics. Meanwhile, the relevance of such ideology in day-to-day issues such as economy, education, health, is almost nonexistent. Over time, ideological division between parties is declining.

Religion and economy are the two prime issues in Indonesian politics. The issue of religion and Islam reemerged in the beginning of the reform period. Previously under the Soeharto regime, religious and Islamic movements were suppressed and channeled to nonpolitical activities such as social activities and religious teaching. Only in early 1990 with the apparent split between the regime and key generals within the military, did the influence of religion reemerge in politics. However, Pancasila, which was and is the ideological base of Indonesia and is a mix of nationalist and religious ideology, was not debatable at that moment. Not until 1999 did Islamic movements begin to question the relevance of Pancasila and begin proposing the establishment of an Islamic state. While the idea of building an Islamic state was bluntly rejected by many, more subtle debates on key pieces of legislations and laws both at the national and local level continue until today. At the start of the reform era, a clear division between nationalist-secular and religious-Islamic existed. Over time, this division becomes vague as most of the relevant parties move to the "Center."

PD, since its inception, has been a party that positions itself as a Centrist party with no strong religious rhetoric and yet maintains support for the importance of religion in public life. Prior to the 2009 election PD openly stated that it is a nationalist-religious party. During the parliamentary voting on the antipornography bill that was considered by many as a bill with strong Islamic flavor, PD voted for the bill. The head of the special commission of the bill was a PD member.

Many Golkar politicians were members of the Islamic Student Organization (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and thus Golkar has been linked closely to this Muslim organization. Baswedan[15] considered Golkar as a secular inclusive party, that is, a party that proclaims itself as a nationalist party and yet did not reject the injection of Islamic religious values into public and legal space. Similar to PD, Golkar voted for the antipornography bill. In 2003 when parliament was voting for the education bill, Golkar also supported the bill that was considered controversial from a religious perspective since it forced both public and private schools to provide religious lessons in accordance to the religion of the student. Another indicator that Golkar is supportive toward Islamic religious aspiration is that many sharia-based laws were passed in districts in three provinces where Golkar was and is strong at the local parliament. Some have argued that these provinces were the base for an Islamic separatist movement;[16] however, the fact that these are also the stronghold of Golkar shows the willingness of relatively more conservative Muslims to vote for the party.

Most minority groups support PDI-P since it is considered as the pure nationalist and pluralistic party. PDI-P is considered to be the most nationalist-secular party among all others. PDI-P rejected both the education bill and the antipornography bill. In 2007, PDI-P established Baitul Muslimin (home of the Muslims) in order to provide the party with religious credential. PDI-P has also grown tolerant toward religion in political space, since PDI-P did not aggressively challenge the growing number of Islamic bylaws at the local level and did not openly voice concerns about the persecution of some religious minority groups.

In its latest move, PKS reaffirmed its commitment to openness and pluralism during its second national congress in June 2010 by declaring itself as the "party for all." This is part of continual attempts by PKS to position itself more as a Moderate or Centrist political party in order to achieve its goal of finishing in the top three in 2014 election. PKS understands that to improve its electoral performance it has to widen its support base by courting the bulk of Indonesian voters who are Moderate or Centrist. In the last two elections, PKS positioned itself as a party that is clean—its rhetoric concerned more with good governance—and it attempted to create a perception that it is no longer a Rightist or Conservative political party. In other words, PKS has become more pragmatic in approach.[17] Its success in surviving the onslaught of PD in the 2009 election can be attributed to this strategy.

PAN's position on religion shifted over time. Initially it was a mix of nationalist-secular and religious-Islamic parties. The founders of this party are a mix between a secular camp and a conservative religious one. Around 2001, the conservative religious camp grew stronger, which led key politicians within the secular camp to leave the party. With Soetrisno Bachir elected as chairman, PAN became a more Centrist party until today. Unlike PAN, PKB tends to be consistent in positioning itself as a mix of secular-religious party because its NU base remains a mix of supporters of the two camps. PPP is identified as a party that channeled Islamic aspiration during the New Order era and is known to take an Islamic conservative stance, but in many cases has acted pragmatically at the expense of its ideological position.

While the issue of religion has been and continues to be contested, economic issues are less elaborated within each ideological camp. Despite claims and counterclaims about other parties as "Liberal," as the "accomplice of the West," as having prorich interest, and not nationalist in a sense failing to protect the national economic interests; most parties are Socialist in their rhetoric in the sense that all of them claim that they are propoor, proemployment, and agree that national economic interests must be protected.[18] In other words, there has not been much difference between parties on the economy.

Overall, the relevance of ideology is still significant. The fact that all parties are trying to move to the center of the ideological spectrum shows that ideology still influences party and voter behaviors.

Leadership

Changes and Characteristics[19]

In the ten years of democratization, Indonesia's political parties have experienced vibrant internal dynamics. Other than PDI-P in which Megawati continues to hold a grip as the party's chairwoman, all relevant parties have experienced leadership changes periodically. New party chairmen always emerge during internal party election. It is not unusual for parties to face internal party conflicts during party leadership competitions. Golkar, PKB, and PPP, along with PD in its last internal election, have to deal with intense internal conflict.

Apart from the latest PKB chairman, the age range of party chairmen is from 40 years to around 65 years. PKS is the party that seems to have the youngest chairmen. This is consistent with the fact that

PKS is a party that emerged from campuses and has a strong support base among university students and the young generation.

The consistent leadership changes, however, disguise the presence of certain individuals that actually control certain parties, that is, SBY in PD and Hilmi Aminuddin in PKS. SBY is still the primary decision makers in PD regardless of who the party chairman is. In PKS, it is Hilmi Aminnudin who continues to retain the chairmanship of the Majelis Syuro, the highest decision-making body of the PKS.

Thus, of the seven relevant parties discussed in this section, three parties—PD, PDI-P, and PKS—continue to have a central figure who has a strong grip on party decision making. Each of these parties is currently experiencing internal party "democratization" where the individuals who control them are experiencing challenges from other factions within the parties. This trend makes clear that the prospect of a more vibrant internal party dynamics is unavoidable and parties have to be prepared to manage internal party conflict and factionalism to avoid decline.

Personalization

Liddle and Mujani[20] utilized the "leadership" variable to argue that it is the best predictor for the electorate's party choice in Indonesia for the 1999 and 2004 elections.

In 2009 election, the influence of personal leaders varied across parties. PD, PDI-P, and PKB are certainly dependent upon certain leaders while PKS, Golkar, PAN, and PPP are less dependent. Observing the fluctuation of support for Megawati and PDI-P one can easily see how the trend of support for PDI-P mirrors the support for Megawati.[21] Similarly, the fluctuation of support for PD mirrors that of SBY. These two patterns show the importance of both Megawati's and SBY's popularity on their respective party and how their parties are identified closely with them.

The difference between Megawati and SBY is that while Megawati's popularity approximately equals PDI-P, SBY's popularity is significantly higher than that of PD. The trends for SBY and Megawati presented above are support for presidential elections. The reason why SBY's support base goes beyond PD is his relative success as president compared to Megawati. Megawati's presidency was considered a failure; SBY enjoyed a relatively high approval rating throughout his presidency.

Additional data confirm the importance of the two individuals. Calculating from the exit poll of the 2009 general election, conducted

by the Indonesian Survey Institute in April 2009, 86 percent of those who voted for PD would vote for SBY as president. Of those who voted for PDI-P 65 percent would vote for Megawati as president. In comparison, only 22 percent of those who voted for Golkar would choose Jusuf Kalla, the party's chairman and presidential candidate at that time.

Data on Abdurahman Wahid's influence in PKB is not as detailed. However, one can just look at PKB's performance in three elections. In 1999 and 2004 PKB was able to obtain a double digit in percentage of votes. Prior to the 2009 election, the dispute between Wahid and Muhaimin Iskandar (the current PKB's chairman) led to the unofficial split within PKB. With Muhaimin winning the legal battle, Wahid and his supporters declared that they would no longer support Muhaimin's PKB. As a result, PKB gained only 4.9 percent. While there is no doubt that Wahid's charisma was no longer as strong as in the previous years, this decline shows that Wahid still matters for a significant number of PKB's voters. Even those among Muhaimin's camp still considered Wahid to be their charismatic leader, despite dissatisfaction with his leadership style.

The evidence on personalized leadership within parties among party members can be observed through internal party divisions. Other than PKS, internal party divisions are based not on certain policy positions but on certain influential individuals. Most of the time, if not always, such divisions occur due to competition in seeking the party's chairmanship.

Division within PKS is based on the difference of strategy in pursuing party goals. One group prefers the course of moral integrity and purity. Another group argues that in order to achieve party goals compromise and adaptation to existing "culture" is necessary. Division within PDI-P is less observable because of the strong presence of one individual, Megawati. In PD, despite the centrality of SBY, party members are divided into three camps, in which each camp is led by individuals who were chairman candidates in 2010. In Golkar, the party's members are divided between followers of the current chairman Aburizal Bakrie, the followers of the previous chairman and who was also SBY's first vice president, and the followers of Surya Paloh who was defeated by Aburizal in the latest Golkar chairmanship election. In the other three medium-sized parties—PPP, PAN, and PKB—the divisions within their members are also based on key figures. PKB's members are divided between the followers of

Muhaimin, the followers of the party's secretary general, and the followers of Wahid. PAN's division is less visible because of the dominant position of the current chairman. In PPP, division is between those who supported the current chairman and those who are disappointed with his leadership.

The influence of individuals on party programs is much less visible. Most of the time, the party chairman delegates the writing of official party programs to a group of politicians or party members. Thus, party programs are developed collectively and require direction and approval of the party's central figure.

Megawati is the most populist character compared to other central figures. Her party is known as the party of *wong cilik* or "grassroots" PDI-P.[22] When she declared her candidacy as president, she chose a place that is known as garbage storage for the city of Jakarta. SBY has a more balanced rhetoric, since as president he has to address more concrete issues compared to Megawati. However, he is known as a person who puts high priority in his public image, and in many key decisions he would order a survey to gauge public tendency.

Overall, personalization is a prevalent factor for party support and party organization. In the era of democratization where political parties as an institution are experiencing decline, personalization is an ideal and easy substitute and thus will endure for at least the near future in Indonesia.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Indonesian democracy has been able to get several notable successes from conducting three relatively free and fair elections, improving its corruption eradication programs, limiting military presence in politics, subduing social conflicts and separatism, and establishing effective horizontal checks-and-balances. However, political parties have been considered to be one of the weakest links in Indonesian democracy. From the above analyses, one can make several notable conclusions about the pattern and trend of Indonesia's political parties:

1. Two new parties, PD and PKS, will continue to become the major parties. PD has become the largest party in the 2009 election, and PKS has the potential to perform better than Golkar and PDI-P.

2. The traditional old parties, Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP, are experiencing consistent declines for various reasons. They are currently undergoing internal changes in order to survive the decline.
3. The party system will remain fragmented because political power is still relatively distributed and the current relevant parties are still trying to prevent other parties from becoming too dominant.
4. Party ID and public trust toward party are declining steadily overtime. This will lead to the continuing decline of voter turnout and an increasing number of swing voters.
5. The loyal support base of parties will continue to erode. This will encourage parties to become more centrist in order to capture different voter segments. The rise of centrism among political parties has led to a decreasing ideological gap across parties.
6. Decline of party ID and public trust will lead to the decline of financing from people. In addition, state funding for parties continue to decline. As a result, party financing will mainly come from big business, party elites, and illicit funding.
7. Internally, relevant parties are experiencing democratization. Other than PD, PDI-P, and PKS, relevant parties have experienced genuine leadership changes as a result of intense internal competition. Even central figures in PD, PDI-P, and PKS are now facing internal challenges. The outlook for internal party democratization looks promising. However, parties have to learn to manage internal party conflicts in order to survive.
8. The decline of parties is paralleled by the persistence of personalization in some parties. PD's and PDI-P's voters have strong affinity with SBY and Megawati. Factionalism within parties is in line with specific party figures instead of differences in policies and strategies. The current charismatic figures are on the verge of "retirement" from politics and a change of generation in politics is on the way. This creates uncertainty on how durable personalization will be in the near future.

Overall, parties in Indonesia are experiencing a decline. They are moving in the direction of Centrism and a decreasing ideological gap across parties. Links with grassroots have weakened and parties are losing their loyal support base as more and more voters no longer identify with parties. Parties are experiencing unexpected internal democratization, and more internal competition and conflicts will further weaken the organizations if not properly managed. Finally, some major parties depend more on personalization and less on organizational and programmatic strength, and the future pattern remains unclear, leaving the institutionalizations of the party and party system elusive.

Notes

1. The quota in the three elections was the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats competed for in an electoral district. In reality only one candidate in the 2004 election received a vote equal to 30 percent of the quota.
2. Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies,* 26 (2) (1993): 198–228.
3. Appendix 10.A.
4. Paige Johnson Tan, "Indonesia Seven Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* 28 (1) (2006): 88–114.
5. Sunny Tanuwidjaja, "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline," *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* 32 (1) (2010): 29–49
6. See Appendix 10.H.
7. R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies,* 40 (7) (2007): 832–857.
8. Anies R. Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey,* 44 (5) (2004): 684–689.
9. Appendix 10.B.
10. www.csis.or.id
11. The documents of the elections law of Indonesia can be accessed in www.kpu.go.id
12. Marcus Mietzner, "Party Financing in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Between State Subsidies and Political Corruption," *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* 29 (2) (2004): 238–263.
13. Appendix 10.E.
14. Stephen Sherlock, *Consolidation and Change: The Indonesian Parliament after the 2004 Elections* (Canberra: Center for Democratic Institution Report, 2004).
15. Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," 684–689.
16. Robin Bush, "Regional Shariah Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptoms?" in Gerg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 174–192; Michael Buehler, "Shari'a By-Laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption," *Southeast Asia Research*, 16 (2) (2008): 165–195.
17. A. Bubalo, G. Fealy, and W. Mason, *Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey* (Sidney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008).
18. Kuskrido Ambardi, *The Making of the Indonesian Multiparty System: A Cartelised Party System and its Origins* (Jakarta: Gramedia and LSI, 2009), 161–171.

19. Appendix 10.I.
20. R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujanix, "Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (7) (2007): 832–857.
21. Appendices 10.F and 10.G.
22. Appendix 10.D, which shows that PDI-P is relatively stronger in low-income than high-income segments.

11

The Philippines

Julio C. Teehankee

Introduction

The Philippines had once been the showcase of Western-style democracy in Asia. From 1946 to 1972, a formal two-party system functioned to stabilize intraelite competition in the former American colony. Two parties—the Nacionalista Party (NP) founded in 1907 and the Liberal Party (LP) founded in 1946—contested elections and alternated in power by taking control of the presidency and both chambers of the Philippine congress. However, despite their regular political intramurals, the two parties were identical in their structures, social makeup, and policies. Both parties were controlled by the educated and landed elite who did not seek mass membership, only mass support.[1]

The Philippine two-party system was shattered when President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and established a dominant one-party dictatorship for 14 years. Since the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, a number of parties and coalitions were organized and dissolved in successive local and national elections under a nascent multiparty system. But only a handful of "relevant" parties flourished. Hence, the absence of strong and credible political parties continues to exact a prime democratic deficit on the Philippine political system.

The standard approach to analyzing Filipino electoral and party politics had been to view power relations within the context of the patron-client factional (pcf) framework.[2] Popularized in the 1960s

by Carl Lande in his work entitled "Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics," the pcf framework posited that social relations in the Philippines were not structured by organized interest groups or individuals who perceived themselves to be part of a specific social class like in Western democracies. What existed was a network of mutual aid relationships between pair of individuals that he called "dyadic ties." The dyadic ties that are reflected in the Philippine politics are vertical and unequal that bind prosperous patrons who dispensed material goods and services and dependent clients who recompensed with their support and loyalty.

These relationships formed the basis of local factionalism that constituted the organizational base of national parties. The premartial two-party system was anchored on the dominance of only two factions in local areas, which allowed for only two national parties.[3]

However, the potency of the kinship system as an instrument of patronage was largely believed to have diminished and replaced by the emergence of the political machine.[4] The onslaught of economic transformation and modernity has largely depersonalized patron relations in the rural areas. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become contractual in nature.

Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the purpose of mobilizing and influencing voter outcome through the dispensation of social, economic, or material benefits. These benefits are essentially patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors, and money distributed to voters and supporters. Patronage-driven parties built around coalitions of political machines have become vehicles for raiding the state and distributing political and economic largesse. In this regard, Philippine state has been characterized as being "weak" or "captured" in competing and diverse social interests since it enjoys little autonomy from dominant social classes, political clans, powerful families, and other entrenched particularistic groups.[5]

More than 100 years since the establishment of the first Filipino political party in 1900 under the aegis of American colonialism, parties in the Philippines continue to be candidate-centered coalitions of provincial bosses, political machines, and local clans, anchored on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms.

Indeed, there is some truth to the observation that "political clans are the real political parties in the Philippines."[6] Some 160 families have dominated the two chambers of the Philippine congress since the 1900s. These families have had two or more members who have

served in congress, and they account for nearly 20 percent or 424 of the 2,407 men and women who have been elected to the national legislature since 1907. According to a study conducted by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) in 2007, around 250 families have dominated Philippine politics at the national and local level and have monopolized political power for the past 30 years or more. They constitute less than 1 percent of the country's total of 15 million families. Limited party competition as a result of dynastic and clientelist politics is not limited to the developing democracies like the Philippines. Even in well-developed democracies like Japan, hereditary politicians or *Seshū Giin* "inherit" their parliamentary seats through family connections and well-oiled political machines. For each parliamentary election, the average percentage of dynastic legislators elected is about 25 percent.[7]

In accounting for the reasons why the Philippine party system changed from a stable two-party system to a fluid multiparty system in the post-Marcos period, Yuko Kasuya[8] noted that the increased number of parties competing particularly in legislative elections was a result of the increase in the number of viable presidential candidates in the post-Marcos period. In her "presidential bandwagon framework," the introduction of a single term limit for the office of the presidency has destabilized the legislative party system since legislative candidates tend to affiliate with the most viable presidential candidates by switching parties. Aspiring presidential candidates think they have a higher chance of winning without an incumbent running for reelection. The absence of a reelectionist incumbent coupled with weak party loyalties serve as incentives for potential presidential aspirants to launch new parties and entice legislative candidates to switch parties with the promise of access to patronage. Unlike in the pre-Marcos era in which there were only two viable candidates who used two-party labels, NP and LP, the post-Marcos era saw an increase in the number of viable presidential candidates and new parties resulting in the wide fluctuation in the set of parties from one election to another.

Party-switching is widely practiced in the Philippines. There are two types of political parties that most Filipino politicians affiliate with: (1) one during the electoral period to raise campaign funds; and (2) another when serving their term of office to have access to patronage. As Kasuya[9] observed, on the average "about 40% of incumbent House members and about 25% of incumbent Senators switched their party affiliation from one election to the next during the period from

1946 to 2004. These ratios are comparable to or even higher than Brazil, where party-switching is known to be rampant."

Party-switching has also fuelled the rise of monolithic parties that have dominated several presidential administrations in the past three decades—from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement [KBL]) under Ferdinand Marcos, to the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Fight of the Filipino Democrat [LDP]) during the term of Corazon Aquino, followed by the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP (Strength-National Union of Christian Democrats-Union of Muslim Democrats) founded by Fidel Ramos, and the Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Nationalist Philippine Masses [LAMMP]) of Joseph Estrada. These parties, however, were largely built around vast networks of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their affiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage.

Voter Turnout

Despite the perceived flaws of Philippine political parties, a large majority of Filipino voters continue to exercise their right of suffrage. According to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the total number of registered voters for the May 10, 2010, national and local elections had reached a total of 50.7 million. The number represented an increase of 13.6 percent, the highest increase since the 1978 national elections.

The actual number of voters who voted on May 10, 2010, was 38 million representing the highest actual voter participation in more than 30 years. The number of Filipinos who voted represented close to 75 percent of the 50.7 million registered voters in 2010. The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), however, noted that the 2010 figure represented a lower percentage than 77 percent voter turnout registered during the 2004 national and local elections. But the actual number was higher than the 33.5 million who turned up for the May 2004 elections (see table 11.1)

High voter turnout is common in patronage-based democracies where the distribution of patronage is contingent on electoral support. From a comparative perspective, the Philippine case is consistent with other developing democracies (e.g., Russia and India) where regional and local elites are able to marshal votes, especially from rural areas. Moreover, the promise of patronage and clientelist rewards is a strong incentive for poor voters to go out and vote.[10]

Table 11.1 Percentage of votes/seats obtained by all relevant parties in the House of Representatives, 1992–2010

Year	*1992*	*1995*	*1998*	*2001*	*2004*	*2007*	*2010*
Turnout (%)	75.5	70.7	81.3	76.3	84.1	65.5	74.3
Presidential elections							
Percentage of votes (winning candidate)							
Ramos	23.6						
Estrada			39.9				
Macapagal Arroyo					39.9		
Aquino							42.1
General elections							
% of Seats (% of votes)							
LKC	20.1 (21.2)	49.0 (40.7)	53.9 (49.0)	35.6 (35.0)	44.3 (35.3)	38.0 (25.5)	37.1 (38.5)
LDP	66.7 (45.0)	8.3 (10.8)	27.0 (26.7)	10.2 (10.0)	5.2 (7.6)	1.3 (1.5)	0.7 (0.5)
NPC	15.1 (18.7)	10.8 (12.2)	4.4 (4.1)	19.5 (21.0)	25.2 (19.6)	11.6 (10.9)	10.8 (15.3)
LP	4.2 (6.9)	2.5 (1.9)	7.3 (7.3)	9.2 (7.0)	13.8 (11.0)	6.6 (8.7)	15.8 (20.3)
NP	3.5 (3.9)	1.0 (0.8)		–(0.1)	1.0 (0.5)	3.3 (1.5)	9.0 (11.4)

Source: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB); International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

Electoral System

Under the 1987 constitution, all elective officials—president, vice president, senators, representatives, local chief executives, and local legislators—are chosen under a "first-past-the-post" electoral formula.[11] It also mandates the shift from a two-party system to a multiparty system under a presidential form of government. According to Section 7, Article IX of the constitution, "a free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people."

The president and the vice president are separately elected by a direct vote of the people through simple plurality nationwide. Both serve a term of six years. The president is not eligible for any reelection while the vice president sits one term out after serving for two successive terms. Since 1935, the COMELEC has administered all electoral exercises in the Philippines.

The Philippine congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Half of the 24 senators are nationally elected at large every six years through simple plurality. At least one term out is imposed on senators who have served two consecutive terms. On the other hand, members of the House of Representatives are elected from single-member districts every three years. In addition, the constitution introduced a list proportional representation scheme of electing one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives to open legislative recruitment and represent other sectors in society.

"Relevant" Political Parties

The country's multiparty system is gradually stabilizing around four relevant political parties divided into two old parties (formed before 1990) such as the LP and the LDP; and two new parties (formed after 1990) like the Lakas Kampi CMD (LKC) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC). All of the governing and opposition coalitions that have emerged since the 1992 synchronized national and local elections were formed around these four political parties. More recently, the country's oldest party—the NP—is making a gradual comeback in the electoral arena.

Evolution of Old and New Parties

In the post-Marcos period, the Lakas NUCD-UMDP became the country's dominant political party, when it defeated the LDP in the

1992 presidential elections. The LDP (founded in 1988) was the dominant party in the ruling coalition under the administration of President Corazon Aquino. Lakas, on the other hand, was formed in 1991 by allies of President Aquino who opted to support Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos and not the LDP presidential candidate.

Under the administration of President Ramos, the LDP entered into a short-lived coalition with Lakas NUCD-UMDP to contest the 1995 congressional elections. In 1998, the LDP coalesced with the opposition NPC and a minor party to form the LAMMP to defeat the Lakas presidential candidate. In the 2004 synchronized elections, the ruling Lakas CMD, LP, and a handful of minor parties formed the victorious Koalisyon ng Karanasan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future [K4]). On the other hand, the LDP together with some minor opposition parties formed the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of United Pilipinos [KNP]) (table 11.1). The NPC split its ranks to support both the administration and opposition coalitions. In 2010, Lakas CMD merged with the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free Filipino, Kampi) to form the LKC.

The two major parties that comprised the country's two-party system from 1946 to 1972—the NP and the LP—have enjoyed a revival in the 2010 elections. The NP managed to win 11.9 percent of votes and capture 10 percent of seats, its best performance since 1969. The LP recaptured the presidency after 49 years. Founded in 1947, the LP is the second oldest existing party in the Philippines. It has also won a plurality of seats in the lower house of congress, and managed to cobble up a majority coalition to elect the speaker of the house (table 11.1).

Consistent with the nature of party politics in the Philippines, the ranks of the LP swelled prior to and immediately after the 2010 elections as a result of party-switching. In this election, Lakas lost its dominance in the national and local elections; the LDP failed to exert the same political influence it had in previous elections; and the NPC again split into two political camps.

The seeming resilience of these parties is largely derived from the moderate polarization and high volatility of the electorate. There is moderate polarization since only one among the post-Marcos parties—Lakas—has consistently enjoyed positive gains as compared to the LDP and NPC. This is partly due to the fact that it had been the ruling party under two presidential administrations. Historically, the effective number of parties (ENP) in the Philippines is 2.6.[12] There is

also high volatility and fluidity in the voters' choice since candidates constantly shift from one party to another. The LDP has continuously lost its share of the votes while NPC has managed to maintain its modest share. The two traditional parties—NP and LP—have shown positive signs of revived strength as they slowly gain significant shares of the votes.[13]

Aside from the four relevant parties, a plethora of new parties have emerged in the post-Marcos period. Adapting the typology introduced by Takashi Inoguchi in this volume, these new parties can be classified as *mushroom parties, ideological gap-filling parties, splinter parties exiting from other parties, and special issues parties* (regional, special section).

Mushroom Parties

Since 1992, several minor (often short-lived) parties were organized around personalities who were then perceived to be viable presidential candidates. These "parties of one" include the following: the People's Reform Party (PRP) of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (Force of the Filipino Masses [PMP]) of former president Joseph Estrada; Aksyon Demokratiko (Democratic Action [AD]) of the late former senator Raul Roco; Progressive Movement for Devolution of Initiative (PROMDI) of former governor Emilio "Lito" Osmeña; Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma (Party for Democratic Reforms [Reporma]); and Bangon Pilipinas (Rise Philippines) of televangelist brother Eddie Villanueva.

Ideological Parties

The introduction of the Party-List System (PLS) in electing one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives has provided an avenue for left-wing (formerly underground and revolutionary) ideological social movements to compete in the legal electoral arena. The Philippine Left historically consists of an underground component—the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)—waging a revolutionary struggle against the state through a variety of legal front organizations. In the 1990s, intense debates regarding party ideology and strategy resulted in a three-way split in the CPP. The three factions organized party-list organizations to contest the PR seats in the House of Representatives. These party-list organizations include the Bayan Muna (Nation First); Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (One Strength and Workers' Party); and Akbaya*n* (Citizen's Action Party). Bayan Muna was organized by the aboveground followers of the main faction of the CPP,

while Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa were formed by activists who broke away from the dominant faction loyal to the CPP. Akbayan is an amalgamation of former Communists, Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and other left-wing tendencies.

Splinter Parties

Weak party discipline and low party institutionalization in the post-Marcos period have resulted in breakaway factions constantly forming new political parties. Curved out of the major faction of the anti-Marcos party PDP-Laban, the LDP) was organized in 1988 by relatives and close allies of President Corazon Aquino to merge all political parties supportive of her administration. The Lakas National Union of Christian Democrat-United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas NUCD-UMDP, later renamed Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats or Lakas CMD) was formed in 1991 when then defense secretary Fidel Ramos lost in the presidential primaries of the LDP. The NPC was formed in 1992 out of a splinter group from the NP and the remnants of the KBL. The Kampi was formed in 1997 by then senator Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a breakaway faction of the LDP. Kampi was later merged with the Lakas CMD, under Arroyo's presidency, to form the LKC. After the defeat of the LKC in the 2010 presidential election, former members of Kampi left the LKC to organize the National Unity Party (NUP). The NUP then entered into a coalition in the House of Representatives with the victorious Liberal Party. Soon after, the merger between Lakas CMD and Kampi was dissolved leaving the former as the surviving party. In preparation for the 2013 congressional and local elections, two minor parties—PMP and PDP-Laban—have formed a coalition called United Nationalist Alliance (UNA) under the leadership of Vice President Jejomar Binay. UNA is positioning itself to act as "constructive opposition" to the newly-formed administration coalition of the LP, NP, and NPC under the leadership of President Benigno S. Aquino III.

Special Issue Parties

The party-list system has also allowed civil society organizations and social movements (i.e., nongovernmental organizations, people's organizations, faith-based organizations, sectoral and mass organizations) to contest seats in the House of Representatives under a List Proportional Representation system. As a result, a multitude of parties have been organized, some too small to garner the vote threshold required to gain seats in congress. Thus, in the five congressional

elections between 1998 and 2010, an average of 95 parties contested the party-list election, but only an average of 25 seats of the 50 plus seats allocated in the house were filled out.

Internal Life of Parties

Voters identification with political parties has been weak in the post-Marcos period. A survey conducted by Pulse Asia in March 2010 confirms the extremely low voter identification with political parties. In that survey, 91 percent of respondents do not identify with any party. Among the 9 percent of respondents, 3.8 percent identified with the LP, while 1.9 percent identified with the NP. The bulk of LP supporters come from urban, middle to upper classes, mostly middle-aged, with some college education. It also managed to draw significant support from the lower, jobless classes. To a much lesser extent, the NP also drew support from the same demographic base, except for those who had only some high school education, in which the NP scored higher. The other parties such as PMP, Lakas, and NPC scored less than 1 percent in all categories.[14]

Party membership in the Philippines is transient, fleeting, and momentary as most political parties are active only during election season. No actual data on party membership can be culled since political parties and the Commission on Election (COMELEC) do not keep accurate records of party membership. Nonetheless, a Social Weather Station (SWS) survey on political parties in the Philippines conducted on November 2006 approximated the number of party members.[15]

The territorial coverage of all relevant parties is national in scope. National political parties are organized either at the regional or provincial levels. Local party branches extend to city or municipal levels. In most instances, ordinary party members have little influence on party decisions, which are usually made by higher party organs such as a national executive committee or national directorate composed of a select group of party leaders and personalities.

Party members who have been elected to both houses of congress or to local government positions, or have been appointed to cabinet or subcabinet positions are usually given seats in higher party organs. On paper, all the relevant party constitutions indicate the party congress, national assembly, or a variation thereof, as the highest decision-making body in their respective parties.[16] In practice, however, the major decisions are made by a smaller group of party

leaders and personalities sitting as a national executive committee or national directorate. The day-to-day activities of the party are usually overseen either by the party secretary general or executive director.

Most political parties in the post-Marcos period were organized around personalities who were then perceived to be viable presidential candidates. All the four relevant parties contested the first presidential election in the post-Marcos period in 1992. Each was organized around a viable presidential candidate. Since then, the leadership of these parties was handed over to potential presidential candidates or their trusted lieutenants. A profile of the leadership of the post-Marcos relevant parties would show that most of them have professional background in law and business. Party leaders are predominantly male, well-educated from middle to upper class background. The LP has the most regular change in party leadership, while the LDP has the longest sitting party leader.[17]

The financing of electoral campaigns in the Philippines had reared fundamental political problems that impact on the quality of democratic representation and processes. Given the country's underdeveloped and archaic electoral system, money has become the crucial determining factor in waging a successful electoral campaign at the national and local level. At every step of the process, funds are necessary to establish political machinery and assure its smooth functioning. Since the Philippines suffer from a weak party system most do not even maintain organizations or headquarters between elections. Thus, fundraising activities for candidates and parties usually occur at least a year before the elections. Incumbent officials take advantage of their term of office to accumulate enough financial resources "in aid of reelection."

Given the ad hoc nature of Philippine political parties, candidates personally decide to contest elections based on their calculation of how much they can raise and the possible return of their investments once they win political office. Money is essential for candidates to secure nominations, to gather votes, and to have them counted, and in most cases, to have votes for their opponents miscounted or voided.

Party financing, most especially electoral campaign financing, are largely derived from private donors (usually from the business sector). *The Philippines does not provide any public financing or subsidies to political parties.* Existing election laws only regulate party spending and contributions, that too during the campaign period, and do not require political parties to file financial reports outside the campaign period. Most, if not all, parties do not collect party dues from

members. More often than not, the burden of financing the day-to-day activities of the party lie on elected party members who have access to state funds (i.e., pork barrel). It is also not uncommon for individual politicians who are viable presidential candidates to finance the entire operation of a political party.

Reliable data on campaign contributions and expenditures do not exist. Since all the parties and their candidates underreport the actual amount of contributions they receive during the campaign period, it is important to track down their actual expenditures to approximate their realistic party income. Elections in the Philippines are known to be immensely cost-intensive. Not surprisingly, the statements of expenditure of most candidates are reported way under the legally allowable amount and are submitted only to comply with the requirements of law. The NP, for example, spent the most amount of money in the 2010 elections at $4.9 million but reported an income of only around $1.7 million.[18]

Program and Ideologies

Given the personality and candidate-centered nature of Philippine electoral and party politics, little or no importance is given to serious programmatic development. Party programs and platforms are usually drafted at the early part of election campaigns, usually by a select group of party operators or consultants. Seldom are rank-and-file party members included in the process of drafting the party program and platform.

Party programs and platforms are usually a hodgepodge of vague motherhood statements. Usually, the programs of most parties are similar with one another. A more recent trend is the use of campaign programs and platforms for political marketing purposes. Candidates seek to distinguish themselves from others by projecting an ideal image and articulating the proper issues through their campaign message and platform, in the hope of gaining popularity in the surveys.

All the platforms of the major political parties invariably promise to do all or a combination of any of the following: (1) address poverty; (2) promote social justice; (3) stimulate economic development; (4) eradicate graft and corruption; (5) provide social services (health and education); (6) implement good governance; (7) ensure peace and order; and (8) protect the environment. These are also reflected in the Party Platforms presented by the top four political parties that

contested the 2010 presidential election, namely the NP, LP, LKC, and the party of former president Joseph Estrada—the PMP).[19]

True to its heritage as a nationalist party, the recently revived NP offered a platform anchored on the promise of economic protectionism. To reflect the rags-to-riches background of its presidential candidate—Senator Manuel Villar—the NP platform was generously peppered with populist commitments to the farmers, workers, and the poor. On the other hand, the LP campaigned on a strong anticorruption platform. Promising good governance, the LP platform targeted the reformist sector of Filipino society, particularly the educated middle-class professionals. Similarly, the LKC Party targeted the middle-class sectors with an aspirational platform but suffered from allegations of corruption against the Arroyo administration. Finally, the PMP stuck to the core populist and propoor issues espoused by former president Joseph Estrada.

Ideology can be understood in two ways: first, as a comprehensive set of ideas and beliefs that either justify or challenge an existing social system; and second, as a concrete set of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organized political action. From the first perspective, Filipino political parties are indistinguishable from one another since they are mostly instruments of the same upper classes whose ideological interest is to preserve the status quo.[20] Nonetheless, in applying the second perspective, one can observe the nominal ideological posturing on the part of the relevant political parties. On paper, most relevant political parties have articulated and adhered to some form of party ideology: (1) NP—Nationalism; (2) LP—Liberalism; (3) NPC—Conservatism; and (4) LKC—Christian/Muslim Democracy.

Personalized Leadership and the Question of Populism

From the outset, personalized politics has been the hallmark of Philippine elections. Historically, the Lipset-Rokkan societal cleavages failed to be rendered political form by Filipino parties. Strict regulations by the American colonial powers prevented the emergences of a class-based, counterelite challenge to the hegemony of the dominant clans. Thus, the Filipino party system was built upon the personal and factional interests of the socioeconomic elites.[21]

More recently, Filipino-style personality politics has turned to media celebrities and populist leaders. The failure "to address the

problem of poverty, coupled by the ascendancy of the mass media, has fueled…image-based populist campaigns. Ultimately, the rise of media and public opinion polling as influential conduits between national candidates and the electorate underscores the need to find the right mix and astute use of image, issues and machinery" for political parties.[22]

Populism found fertile grounds in Philippine politics given the continued weakness of the urban middle class, the resilience and adaptability of the diversified landowning elite, weakness of the political Left, and the growth of the urban poor squatter communities. Although the populist image that emerged from the Philippines was not similar to the one held by nationalist leaders like Soekarno, Nkrumah, or Nyerere, or the charismatic militarist leaders like Nasser, Péron, or Chavez. Filipino-style populism emerged from the cinema with larger-than-life action heroes like Joseph Estrada becoming the protector of the poor *masa* (masses).[23]

List of Personalized Leaders and Indicators Used to Assess Personalization

The personality-centered orientation of Filipino politics continued to be manifested in the May 10, 2010, presidential election. Much attention was given on the "image" of the top three candidates and their campaign "messages." In turn, these messages were woven into "narratives" to capture the empathy of their target voters. These narratives are storylines that attempt to highlight the virtues of the respective presidential candidates. Thus, "politicians offer competing 'populist,' 'rich-versus-poor' and 'reformist,' 'good governance' narratives in the struggle for voter support."[24]

Most of the presidential candidates wanted to emulate the successful campaign of Joseph Estrada in 1998 by capturing the crucial masa vote. The Estrada campaign is remembered for one of the most successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential campaigns—*Erap para sa mahirap* (Erap is for the poor). The slogan did not only capture the core message and issue of the Estrada campaign, it was also in synch with his image as an idol of the masses. In 2010, Estrada attempted replicate his initial electoral success by taking a second run for the presidency after being ousted in 2001.

However, Estrada's hold on the masa vote was challenged by Senator Manuel Villar. While Estrada was born from an upper middle class family, Villar was born from a lower middle class family

and managed to work his way up to becoming a self-made billionaire along the lines of Thailand's Thaksin Shinwatra and Italy's Silvio Berlusconi. He made his fortune by building low cost mass housing projects. He mobilized his vast fortune to finance the revitalization of the moribund NP as his vehicle for the presidency. Using the network he has built as former house speaker and Senate president, Villar has either directly raided other parties or quietly secured the support of local and national politicians. He has invested large amounts in political advertising, which has translated into positive survey ratings.

Estrada and Villar closely competed for the masa vote. The former reinforced his claim as the one true movie idol of the masses, while the latter evoked the fact that he truly grew up poor and had to sell fish at the market when he was a young boy. The competition between the two so-called candidates of the poor was disrupted with the sudden entry into the presidential contest of Senator Benigno S. Aquino III.

The massive outpouring of national grief over the death of former president and democracy icon Corazon C. Aquino on August 1, 2009, reawakened a sense of collective nostalgia for the democratic struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. Similar to the events of 1983 after her husband Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. was assassinated, thousands representing a cross-section of Philippine society—from street vendors to middle-aged professionals and their children—literally lined up in the streets of Manila to pay their last respects to the former president. The tremendous national grief, coupled with deep frustration over the scandal-ridden Arroyo administration, rekindled the flames of reformist aspirations.

Suddenly, national attention shifted to Aquino's son, Senator Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III, as the bearer of the reformist struggle. In a repeat of his mother's path to the presidency, several individuals and private organizations launched a signature drive urging the young Aquino to consider running for president under the LP in 2010.

The entry of Aquino brought about a revival of the issue-based, middle-class-backed reformist crusade reminiscent of the campaigns of former presidents Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon Aquino in 1986. The young Aquino's campaign sought to counter the prevailing populist discourse of the 2010 election by adding a layer of anticorruption and good governance theme to its own slogan—*kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap* (no corruption means no poverty).

In the end, Aquino emerged victorious capturing almost 43 percent of the total votes cast for the presidency. He was followed by Estrada and Villar, who placed second and third respectively, with a combined

total of 42 percent of the vote. Political parties did not figure prominently in the eyes of the voters as indicated in a series of Pulse Asia surveys. Thus, the 2010 presidential election further underscored the personalized and populist nature of Filipino politics. [25]

Personalized and Populist Leadership

Charismatic and popular leaders like former movie actor Joseph Estrada emerged to the presidency in the Philippines by espousing populist causes and winning the votes of the downtrodden, amidst the failure of previous reformist leaders to institute social reforms and consolidate democracy.

Estrada began his political career in the urbanizing municipality of San Juan where he served as mayor for 17 years. After topping the senatorial election in 1987, he organized the PMP in anticipation of the 1992 presidential election. Because of lack of money and organization, he decided to run as vice president under the ticket of Eduardo Cojuangco of the NPC. He won the vice presidency and was appointed by President Fidel Ramos as chair of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. He won the presidency in 1998 with one of the highest mandates in Philippine presidential elections, but his term was cut short when he was ousted in a second people power uprising due to his alleged ties with illegal gambling syndicates. Estrada was the epitome of populism in Philippine politics. His machinery was provided largely by the LDP, which coalesced with the NPC, and his own party Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP). The coalition LAMMP served to supplement his popularity with the electorate.

Estrada's popularity was formidable; his support from the masa was solid. His popularity compensated for the relative handicap of his LAMMP coalition vis-à-vis the administration of Lakas Party. Although rejected by a small but significant ABC or middle-to-upper classes, Estrada nevertheless won as a result of mass support from the D and E classes—the so-called masa vote. The 1998 election was the first time that the masa came out solidly behind a single candidate. Estrada captured 38 percent of the class D and 48 percent of the class E votes.

Conclusion

Party politics in the Philippines is best explained within the context of a "patronage-based, party-voter" linkage that weakens democratic

"citizen-party" linkages. The mobilization of material resources by political machines, instead of propagation of issues and ideologies in Philippine election campaigns, has resulted in the proliferation of patronage and clientelism that reinforces elite democracy. In a society characterized by weak party linkages, regular splits and mergers of political parties into ad hoc coalitions replaces "democratic accountability" with "clientelistic accountability."[26]

While the Western-style presidential electoral democracy was successfully transplanted in the Philippines by American colonialism, the main vehicle for its proper functioning—the political parties—failed to develop the requisite democratic "citizen-party" linkages. Instead, Filipino political parties were built around vast networks of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their affiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage.

More recently, Philippine political parties in the post-Marcos period have been organized around an incumbent president or a viable presidential candidate. The president's control over patronage resources has further encouraged constant party-switching by politicians to the political party or coalition in power. A prospective presidential candidate must not only be perceived as having a good chance of winning, he or she must also possess the requisite resources to finance national and local candidates.

Since 2002, there have been efforts by civil society activists, and even some political party operatives, to push for political party reforms. A proposed "Political Party Development Act" has been introduced in congress to promote the institutionalization of political parties in the Philippines by addressing four essential reform issues, namely, campaign finance reform, state subsidy to political parties, a ban on party-switching, and strengthening citizen-parties linkages. In turn, it is the hope of reform advocates that political parties will be institutionalized by revising the "rules of the game." There are essentially two ways by which institutions can either restrict or mitigate political behavior. First, the "rules of the game" can provide incentives and disincentives for individuals to maximize their utilities. And, second, institutional choices can influence future decision making of individuals through a process of path dependency.

While the proposed law can be seen as another positive step toward enhancing democracy in the Philippines, some caveats are in order. The unintended consequences of well-meaning reform initiatives in the past have uncovered the limits of a purely institutional approach

to political and electoral reform. In recent years, decentralization has further empowered some local clans, term limits hastened generational shift among clans and increased their numbers; ban on political advertisement led to ascendance of celebrity politicians; and, party-list elections has been co-opted by local clans and nonmarginalized sectors. Thus, strengthening institutional capabilities necessitate the enhancement of legitimacy through the mobilization of popular support for particular policy choices. The vehicle for this political action is the establishment of a well-defined and differentiated political party system that contributes to the formation of government and the forging of legislative majorities. To this end, the Party Development Act seek to build meaningful political identities, policy-based platforms, and agendas; internal democratic structures; a reliable core of supporters and leaders; the ability to raise funds to support party activities. Parties and candidates that demonstrated innovative approaches in gaining grassroots support should receive encouragement and incentives.

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12

Conclusion: Toward the Elaboration of a General Theory of Parties—The Cases of Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia

Takashi Inoguchi and Jean Blondel

The aim of this volume is to move in the direction of a general theory of parties by considering jointly the characteristics of these organizations in two regions of the world, Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia. The move is a limited one both because no *general theory* of parties has so far successfully emerged and because many scholars have pointed out that immense problems would have to be overcome in targeting such a goal. Perhaps the main reasons for such a seemingly insurmountable situation are that a precise definition of what constitutes a party still remains elusive and that the characteristics that have to be considered in order to undertake a comprehensive anatomy of parties are too numerous to be taken into account jointly in a study that proposes to be empirical.

Indeed in an endeavor to list these characteristics, in 1976, K. Lawson noted that six different planes of party life would have to be analyzed, these being origins, organization, membership, leadership, issues, and role in government. Meanwhile, it was noted that academic approaches aimed at examining these characteristics of parties fell within five categories, namely "historical, structural, behavioral, functional-systemic, and ideological."[1]

To undertake a comprehensive analysis of the achievement of parties would mean examining systematically a very large, perhaps

impossibly large, number of variables in the process of such an undertaking. However, even assuming that one might be able to locate each party from the point of view of all of these variables, the question would still arise as to how a synthesis could be elaborated from the empirical material collected and thus lead, if obviously not to a "parsimonious" classification of party types, at least to one in which the constitutive elements of the analysis would be sufficiently linked together to provide the basis for a meaningful general theory of parties.

To overcome the difficulties that a comprehensive theory would face, the research would have to be based on a more limited list of characteristics than the one presented by Lawson in 1976.[2] This was the purpose of the list that was proposed in the introductory chapter of this volume and was described in some detail in the Appendix to that chapter. As the indicators concerned fall into four categories covering "the links between party and society," "the structure of the parties," "the goals of the parties," "leadership" combined with "the relationship between party and government," the one topic mentioned by Lawson that was left aside was the history of the parties. We return to the question of history, as it is a crucial, although almost an impossible matter to handle when considering, that is to say, attempting to compare, parties that have had a very different historical background and duration. The analysis of the relationship between party and government is difficult to undertake in general, admittedly: but, as the situations to which we are confronted vary appreciably depending on whether the system is or not presidential, it was necessary to examine party-government relations at least in relation to leadership, given that presidentialism has prevailed in four of the ten countries analyzed in this inquiry.

Yet the difficulties arising in the context of the "six" broad aspects of the characteristics of parties proposed by Lawson are not the only ones that have to be overcome.[3] There are two others about which not enough attention has been drawn.

These two questions fall under the general rubric of what is to be the geographical scope of the analysis, and which is bound to emerge as a general theory of parties can deserve its name only if it is worldwide. Yet the extension of the analysis to parties found outside the West raises two further matters of major concern. First, as noted in the introductory chapter, the analysis with a limited scope such as this one should include only parties that operate in a competitive context, not in a single-party context.

The second question relates to history: it is indeed not at all clear prima facie how one can best compare parties at different points of their "ageing" process, one key difference between Western parties and parties outside the West is that the latter emerged often markedly subsequently, primarily because the countries concerned became independent in the last decades of the twentieth century only. A worldwide analysis would clearly have to consider how far the extent of ageing affects the character of political parties. In this study we specifically examine the general differences that can be found between older and newer parties, specifically on structures, goals, and type of leadership. The extension of the analysis to East and Southeast Asia makes it possible at least to see whether these differences exist even in the context of a region that, with the exception of Japan, has had few or even no older parties at all.

Yet the extension of the analysis to countries in which parties tend to be recent has to be undertaken with care so that one might be able to determine with some degree of precision whether there was any profound difference between the two groups of countries. This is the key reason why the current analysis was devoted to two regions only, Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia. While the case of Japan was special, the other countries of East and Southeast Asia have been undergoing a process of social and economic change that made it intriguing to discover whether they were comparable in political terms and in the present context in terms of the characteristics of their parties, despite the fact that these parties were typically new, indeed even entirely new. One of the questions that needs to be examined in this context is the extent to which the "class cleavage"—so important in the build-up of Western parties in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—appears to have played a similar part in the parties that have been established much later, as has been the case generally in East and Southeast Asia.

As a result, the step that was taken in the present inquiry was an intermediate one: it consisted in comparing parties in countries from two regions that were different in many of their characteristics and yet were not so different that one would feel that they had little in common. This meant that one might be able to move for the first time outside the West and thus break the concentration of the analysis on the West that has characterized what passes for "overall comparative" analyses of parties and party systems so far. In the process, one might be able to begin to assess the part to be allocated to "history." The question is of importance as it relates directly to the notion of

"party change," that P. Mair[4] rightly states as having been replaced by the more limited notion of "party system change," not because the latter is more important but because it is simpler to handle.

In the course of this conclusion we examine the parties that have emerged and developed to being "relevant" with respect to the five aspects we identified earlier on the basis of the categorization of Lawson,[5] namely the relationship between parties and citizens, the structure of parties, the programs and possible ideology of parties, and the party leadership patterns together with the relationship of the parties concerned with the government. However, in order to place this analysis in the general context of the ten-targeted countries, we begin by presenting in the most general manner the parties that were in existence prior to the 1990–2010 period or emerged and became relevant during that period (or very few years previously).

Relevant Parties

There were in total 42 relevant parties, 23 older and 19 new, during the 1990–2010 period, in the 10 studied countries. These 42 parties divide almost equally between "old" and "new" (22–20); but, perhaps more significantly, the proportions in which they divide among the Western European and the East and Southeast Asian regions are not very different: there were 9 new relevant parties out of 22 in Western Europe—40 percent—against 50 percent—10 out of 20—in East and Southeast Asia. Given the newness of pluralistic party developments in East and Southeast Asia, one might have expected a higher percentage of new parties in that region.

Relationship between Parties and Citizens

Three matters need to be examined in some detail to achieve a closer understanding of the relationship between parties and citizens in the two analyzed regions. First, one must consider turnout and in particular determine whether it has shown a substantial decline during the 1990–2010 period, as it is often suggested, at any rate in the West, that a decline in turnout constitutes an aspect of party decline in general. Second, we need to compare older and new parties to see whether older parties age and decline and whether new parties come to replace "decaying" older parties. Third, we need to identify the bases, social or economic, that link the electorate to parties. In this context, has

the "class" basis of the vote become insignificant in the West where it was strong and never really emerged in East and Southeast Asia? Overall, is there a profound difference between the two regions or, on the contrary, do variations not have a strong regional basis?

Turnout. Turnout at parliamentary or congressional elections did decline between the early 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century: there are two exceptions, however, both from East and Southeast Asia, Thailand, where turnout increased from 2001 onward, and the Philippines where it remained stable. Moreover, turnout at parliamentary and congressional elections was on average higher in Western Europe (74 percent) than in East and Southeast Asia (66 percent), and the ranking of the countries is such that conclusions from this difference are difficult to draw, although Japan and South Korea are the bottom countries in this study.

There is a contrast in the electoral systems between the two regions, which is majoritarian *or* proportional in the Western European countries, but mixed, in East and Southeast Asia, that is to say, both majoritarian *and* proportional, as in many new pluralist states, in Eastern European countries, for instance. There are exceptions to the rule and the general pattern, but so far it remains unclear whether differences in the electoral system have a systematic effect on turnout.

In presidential elections turnout is higher than at parliamentary or congressional elections in at least three of the four countries that have a presidential system: France, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Old and New Parties

The overall conclusion from developments in the two regions is not that older parties age so much that they disappear but that they come to be challenged, sometimes strongly challenged, as in Japan or Thailand. Yet these older parties are resilient even in the face of dictatorships in the Philippines or even emerge from the dictatorship, as in Indonesia. However, there is genuine decline among older parties on the Left (French Communist party, Japan Socialist and Communist parties), and a decline of the religious party, Komei, in Japan.

New parties have thus many forms. They may emerge because older parties have lost (some of) their capacity to deal with the problems of their society: this seems to have been the case in an extreme manner in Italy and Thailand. Elsewhere, changes may have not taken place at all (Britain) or taken place on a relatively small scale (Germany, the

Netherlands, France, probably Japan despite the DPJ, perhaps even the Philippines). They may occur for somewhat cosmetic reasons (South Korea and to an extent Italy) or because the forced pluralistic system established under a dictatorship continues to remain partly in being under genuine pluralism (Indonesia, but, also, to an extent, Germany because of East Germany with Die Linke). There is, therefore, some doubt as to whether one should conclude that a major difference exists between the two regions over the old/new parties distinction.

Geographical, Social, and Economic Cleavages and the Parties

The socioeconomic impact on voting is geographical, especially in two ways. First, some parties may be ideologically "regional" in character: in this study there is only one relevant example, the Northern League of Bossi that, by and large, has candidates only in the northern part of Italy.

The other reason why parties can be regional is because they obtain enormously different results in some parts of the country by comparison with others, a difference that goes beyond the fact that, for instance, an area has more workers or more middle-class voters than another. In this study, such a situation occurred in South Korea at the time when the "Three Kims" dominated political life and ceased after this period.

The other aspects of the socioeconomic impact on voting tend to be national. Analyses of voting patterns with respect to three key variables—social class, gender, and age—were undertaken in terms of the Left-Right divide in eight of the ten countries, all five Western European countries and Japan, Thailand, and South Korea; in the remaining two countries, Indonesia and the Philippines, an analysis was conducted on the basis of the distinction among socioeconomic voting patterns between the more Liberal and the more Conservative of the 2004 presidential candidates.

In relation to gender, only minor variations were found in Left-Right voting patterns: in Britain, France, and the Netherlands, there was practically no difference in terms of gender between supporters of the Right and those of the Left; elsewhere men did vote more for the Left and women more for the Right, but differences were small, except in South Korea and Thailand. There is thus globally some difference between the two regions in this respect.

Although differences in the distribution of support for the main parties were larger with respect to the other two variables, age and

class, there was no systematic divide between the two regions. With respect to age, among the eight countries in which the distinction is truly meaningful (with one exception only, Thailand), younger voters tended to vote more for Left-leaning parties and older voters for Right-leaning parties. In terms of "class," in the eight countries for which the Left-Right division is truly meaningful, the parties of the Right are in all cases more supported by voters who belong to the middle class and the parties of the Left are more supported by voters who belong to the working class.

One cannot detect sharp differences between the two regions in types of relationships between parties and electorate, despite differences in the electoral systems, for instance; nor does one detect vast differences between the two regions, surprisingly perhaps, in terms of the extent to which new parties come to take the place of older parties, although the extent of such a replacement varies markedly, but on a country basis.

Structure of Parties

Two questions emerge in the examination of the "modern" or mass party. First, how realistic a picture is the party model when applied to Western Europe? Second, did such a model spread to other regions, in particular to East and Southeast Asia? The answers are found by examining the size and role of the membership, the nature of party finance and the character of party decision-making structures.

The range is substantial in the principles of party membership when one considers both Western European countries and countries of East and Southeast Asia. Membership in Western Europe remains based in theory on the modern type, but it is declining. Membership increased in several countries of East and Southeast Asia, but on a basis in which trust in the leadership is the key substantive part. What is, therefore, emerging is probably a new model, new at least for pluralist polities, a model that might be referred to as "postmodern" and in which the significance of membership is based on allegiance, not on the active role of members in the decision-making process.

Party Finance

In the concept of the "mass party," party finance is to come from within the organization rather than from outside: hence the emphasis on membership dues. In practice, these have come to be merely a

fraction of the large sums that parties need, except, among the countries examined here, in the Netherlands where they constitute about half the total income. Elsewhere in Western Europe, they provide much smaller proportions—10–25 percent at most. South Korea is the one country of East and Southeast Asia where membership dues constitute a similar proportion of income. In Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, members' contributions are either nonexistent or merely token amounts.

A substantial amount of party income comes from donations, both in Western Europe and in East and Southeast Asia. State subsidies also represent another source of party income. For some Japanese parties, and some French and Italian parties, state subsidies have constituted a major proportion of their income.

Party Decision-Making Processes

We expected to encounter serious difficulties in assessing the nature of party decision-making processes. To obtain a realistic comparative picture, the best approach seems to consist in looking at the role of grassroot membership, the intermediate and upper echelons of the party structure, and the position of leaders in this process.

The role of members at the local level is not insignificant, both in the Western European and in East and Southeast Asian countries. The powers relating to local matters appear to be spread widely in all ten studied countries.

National conferences, national executives, and presidiums constitute the formal party mechanisms of decision making. While these bodies are representative of different opinions in the party in some cases, especially Western European, they are in other cases in the hands of the leader, particularly in newer parties, whether in Western Europe or in East and Southeast Asia. There is also another route in which national decisions can be and are often taken, the parliamentary route. It is through the parliamentary route that local influence filters to the national level: this was so in traditional parties in Western Europe and this appears to be still the case, for instance, in the Philippines. The postmodern parties are unlikely, in contrast, to provide much opportunity for parliamentarians to be involved in the national party decision process.

The question of leadership appointment is one in which, perhaps rather surprisingly, the role of the party decision-making process is perhaps even more unclear. This is so for three reasons. First, who is

the real leader of the party, in which there is a party chair or party president and a party "leader"? Second, in presidential systems, the elected president may not have been the leader of his or her party. Third, even outside presidentialism, someone who launched a new party or significantly transformed an existing party may win the majority for that party at the national election and thus become the leader of the country without having been formally appointed by anyone in the winning elected party. All three of these characteristics alongside the "regular" appointment of the leader are found, at least at some point, in one or more of the ten countries analyzed in this study.

It is, therefore, simply not true that Western European countries and Japan embody the classical modern model of party decision making; nor is it true that East and Southeast Asian countries, even the Philippines, embody fully the traditional "decentralized" model. Not only is the relatively new postmodern model, at least in pluralist polities, playing some part in the political systems of both regions, but also the "traditional" elements continue to play a part even in some Western European parties alongside modern and postmodern ones.

Programmers of Political Parties

One key question is whether policies and programmers are seriously held and pursued; another is whether and, if so, when and under what influence parties change their policies; and the third is whether the policies and programs of parties are sufficiently "compact" to constitute "ideologies." In all ten countries examined here, there are substantial variations in the extent to which these election programmers, often referred to as "manifestoes," are fully prepared and debated.

The size of the programmed reveals to an extent how seriously the leadership views this matter, although this is not an entirely reliable indicator: it does give an impression of the extent to which a program is taken seriously by the party concerned. In the Netherlands in 2010, programmers varied between 24,500 words in the Christian Party and 8,400 words in the Liberal Party; in the Philippines, they ranged from 7,000 words in the Liberal Party to 2,000 words in the Nationalist Party. On the whole, there does seem to be a difference between Right and Left with respect to program development, parties of the Right tending to be less specific than those of the Left.

Manifestoes relate to the election that is about to take place: what is also at stake is whether and, if so, when parties alter what can be described as their basic "philosophy of government," a question that would appear to relate to the age of parties and may be connected to party decline, as well as to the extent that new parties challenge the older ones. This process obviously arises primarily, perhaps even almost exclusively, in the case of this study, in Western European and Japanese parties, as pluralism emerged by and large more recently in the other countries of East and Southeast Asia.

The ways in which these new goals have emerged in the older pluralistic countries are an indication that parties do age with time. While these societies were becoming more Conservative, the Left was unable to put forward truly realistic proposals to replace those that had gradually become out of tune with the mood of even much of their own electorate. On the other hand, in East and Southeast Asia, the changes that have taken place have had a different character: what seems to be occurring is a "recasting" of the parties within a new framework. Not much has happened in the Philippines in that direction; little has occurred so far in Indonesia: but Thailand and South Korea have moved appreciably in that direction from the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Overall, one has to conclude that the extent to which and the direction in which there is ideology may well be subjected to something like a pendulum movement in the context of established pluralistic polities. The move toward the Right combined with the apparent inability of the Left to respond to this move in the majority of Western European polities can thus be an instance of such a pendulum move in countries in which pluralism had lasted for some generations and in which many of the parties have come to be rather old. A different movement may be taking place in political parties in East and Southeast Asia where parties did not have the time in the past to give programmers and ideologies the possibility to mature and subsequently to age. Perhaps what occurred in Thailand without the presidency but under the mantle of the monarchy and what occurred in South Korea with the presidency have been mechanisms by which political parties began to "gel" in these two countries. One has, therefore, to wait and see whether, in Indonesia and in the Philippines, the presidency will help to develop parties to mature and to propose programmers and ideologies within a pluralistic framework that will gradually result in these parties ageing.

Party Leadership, Personalized or Not, Populist or Not

It is difficult to disentangle in a convincing manner allegiance to a party from allegiance to the leader of that party. One conclusion though is that, the stronger and the better established the parties are, the more it is likely that the party, rather than the leader, will be the key element in the equation. This may indeed explain why newer parties in Western Europe appear more likely to have routinely personalized leaders at the top. The fact that parties are in a sense "cushioned" by the presidency may also account for personalized leadership having developed rather more strongly where the political system is presidential.

Of the ten country studies, only in the South Korean chapter is it categorically stated that personalized leadership had declined since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In Thailand, perhaps political life before Thaksin could be described as being based on a "traditional" and clientelistic form of personalized leadership: the arrival of Thaksin on the scene did not mean the end of personalized leadership, however, but the emergence of a new form that was in no way "traditional" but was on the contrary postmodern. Meanwhile, developments that have taken place in Indonesia and the Philippines, especially in the context of presidential elections, suggest that there is also at least a move in these countries toward postmodern personalized leadership and away from the "traditional" that which had typically characterized at least the Philippines.

The question of personalized leadership is often closely associated with the extent to which these leaders are adopting a "populist" discourse. Admittedly, what a populist approach to programmers consists of is imprecise and indeed very different, despite the fact that many studies have been devoted to the subject especially since the 1990s.[6]

Although populist programs and a populist discourse were not put forward in Western Europe in the older larger parties, they were associated with the new radical right parties as well as, to an extent, with some parties of the Far Left.

Populism does play a part in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, but on the basis of a different kind of discourse from the one that has prevailed currently in Western Europe. Alongside what might be regarded as the "defensive" populist discourse of Western

Europe, Thaksin's populist appeal in Thailand is associated with an attempt to provide advantages to parts of the population.

It is, therefore, difficult to expect to obtain a single comprehensive definition of populism on a worldwide basis. This is indeed perhaps the reason why there is a tendency to equate populism with personalized leadership: apart from personalization, there is in reality little that can bring under the same general umbrella the "populist" positions held by Le Pen or by Bossi and the positions held by Thaksin or by Megawati: what brings them together is the fact that all of them appeal to the people and, except perhaps in the case of the last one mentioned, that the people respond positively to that appeal. There is thus little basis on which, in pluralist systems, one can bring under the same rubric the "opposition" populism of the new small parties of Western Europe and the "governmental" populism of the leaders of large parties in power.

* * *

At the end of a study that intended to go beyond classical regional boundaries, it is worthwhile examining the extent to which both substantive and methodological goals suggested at the beginning were achieved. To do so, we follow the sequence adopted throughout, in particular in this conclusion, and examine five aspects of party development. This means considering first the sociopolitical framework within which parties tend to develop, and referring then to the four key characteristics of parties that were discussed during the analysis, old and new parties, party membership, party programs, changing over time or not and constituting an overall ideology or not, and party leadership, the extent to which it is personalized and/or includes a populist discourse.

The sociopolitical characteristics of party development in the pluralistic and, therefore, competitive context that was the framework of this study were naturally concerned with turnout and the electoral process. Regional distinctions did play some part, but not overwhelmingly; this was the one segment of the study that suffered from the smallness of the sample. A systematic study of patterns of abstention for all pluralistic countries not only would be doable but almost certainly would lead to clearer results; this may not be so to the same extent about the consequences on political parties of electoral systems, and in particular of the recently emerged distinction between mixed proportional-majoritarian systems and systems that

are either majoritarian or proportional on the other: but little could be said here about the effect of this distinction in the context of this ten country study.

The value of the small sample across two regions did emerge, on the contrary, in relation to the other four aspects of party life that were listed earlier. The distinction between old and new parties turned out to be not just important, but complex. What constitutes a new party is not altogether clear: some older parties may only change their names or at most some parts of their program. Meanwhile, some new parties emerge at the margin, in this sample mainly on the Right, while others take over the government by gaining almost instantaneously large majorities. This may be because older parties were ageing, in terms of either structure or programs. There was some difference between the two regions, but there were also cases of interregional similarity.

The distinction between old and new parties was reflected to an extent not so much in the number of members, but in the very notion of what constitutes membership. Political party analysis has tended to be based on the distinction between early localized traditional bodies and modern mass parties, with membership being expected to play a major part in the latter. This part has markedly declined even if, on balance, the political parties themselves have not declined as markedly in terms of their electoral appeal: members have in effect ceased to be truly important, by and large, except at the grassroots, and occasionally, in some parties, through primaries. Hence the view that many parties are now based on rather passive allegiance, an allegiance that entails that there be global support, but not that members should be active or should want to "participate." While these developments are somewhat more likely to occur in countries where pluralism is recent, the movement toward that kind of postmodern relationship does affect both regions.

The question of the development of party programs is one in which, on the contrary, differences between the two regions are larger, though not overwhelmingly so, partly because party behavior in Japan is similar to party behavior in most though not all Western European countries and partly because there is a range in the extent to which programs are truly specific. Meanwhile, matters of substantial programmatic change tend to arise more in old pluralistic countries while the question as to whether programs should be taken seriously arises most in the Philippines where "traditionalism" is regarded as being prevalent, not in Thailand or South Korea. Nor is it clear that parties are moving away from being concerned with developing an

ideology, as some of the new parties, in both Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia are more ideological than some (though not all) of the older ones.

The matter that probably raises the most controversy in the combined study of the two regions is the nature of leadership and in particular the extent to which it may be becoming more personalized, and, in some cases, may be using a populist discourse. The subject is complex, as there is difficulty even in identifying these concepts, let alone in measuring them. This is indeed where it is particularly important to study jointly old and new (pluralist) countries, as it is probably too easily assumed that new pluralist countries are also likely to be those where personalization and types of populist discourse are more frequently adopted. In such a case, a small sample is indeed a necessity, as only in this way can one hope to discover the extent to which these characteristics do apply and have applied over time more or less.

Detailed empirical studies of parties across two or perhaps three regions are the only way of ensuring that one can truly *perceive*, let alone begin to understand, the developments that are taking place with respect to such a key political institution as parties. Studies of Western European parties alone probably lead too easily to a degree of despondency, perhaps in part justified, but to an extent also based on idealized versions of the past of these parties. The joint examination of the characteristics of parties across regions, if undertaken on the basis of small samples, does reveal an intricate variety of movements that one cannot imagine *a priori* and can simply escape the net of broader surveys, especially so long as these are not guided by directions that studies of small samples had already identified. By using both methods, can one hope to come gradually to what the ultimate goal must be, namely to provide a realistic general theory of parties that has so obviously escaped us so far.

Some readers, judging merely from the title, may find that our book is basically along the rational choice theoretical tradition. The fact is that the book's approach is very much inductive in an endeavor to find out some noted regularities of political parties in the 20-year period in West Europe and East Asia. We must note, however, that the inductive approach adopted in the book is not disharmonious with the rational choice theorization attempt. Also, we must note that rational choice theorization has focused dominantly on American political development. When the number of democracies has gone beyond 100, the urgent need is to dig systematically and empirically the kind

of noted regularities and irregularities of political parties across 100 odd democracies. The sad fact is that for those democracies, systematic and empirical data of political parties are not easy to collect. The book has attempted to do such a job of carefully examining some representative democracies in West Europe and East Asia during the most recent period, between 1990 and 2010. Our hope is that rational choice theorists as well as other kind of theorists of political parties' studies may find our book a useful and productive endeavor even when the direction of theorization might diverge at times.

For other readers who may find the book less theoretically oriented, here is a summary of our bolder propositions based on systematic and empirical findings as found in the text.

1. Political parties are institutionally durable especially in a society where economic activities are voluminous.
2. A society where the tide of globalization is high tends to accommodate smallish political parties of extreme kind.
3. The characteristics of electoral system and political party organization may go side by side. In other words, when both variables are jointly taken into account, the kind of party politics can be relatively easily profiled.
4. The period of great transformations gives rise to new parties and results in old parties declining or even disappearing.
5. The kind of party leadership quality is determined by what political parties desperately need at a time of crisis.

Needless to say, there are other propositions that are to be further explored in more comprehensive studies covering 100 odd democracies.

The prospect for political parties as we see it is as follows. The models of political parties go through three stages: (1) the period when political parties are perceived as being undesirable if perhaps inevitable (from the time of *Federalist Papers* United States to the time of post–World War II Western Europe); (2) the period when political parties are perceived as being desirable and sustainable since the end of World War II till today; (3) a future period when political parties are perceived as being increasingly weak entities sitting with unease between citizens and the state. The resilience of political parties is undeniable. But the political parties will face an increasing degree of uncertainty given a strong civil society and the deepening of forces beyond national borders. The future prospect for political parties in the 100 odd democracies remains to be pondered with another

volume or more. Indeed, political parties' research has just started its new beginning. We can't allow political parties' research to be confined to only one (the United States) or only 27 (the European Union) when 100 odd democracies are about to blossom and possively thrive in other regions!

Notes

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Index