

ROUTLEDGE/WARWICK STUDIES IN GLOBALISATION

DEMOCRATISATION, GOVERNANCE AND REGIONALISM IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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8 Has the Japanese model ceased to be a magnet in Asia?

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Introduction

Henry A. Kissinger does not claim any special expertise on Japan. Yet in his latest book, *Is American Foreign Policy Necessary?*, he has expounded a 'theory' of Japanese dynamics (Kissinger, 2001). According to his theory, it takes fifteen years for the Japanese to make a major decision and to take a major action. He offers two pieces of evidence and one speculation. First, in 1853 Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy visited Japan to open its ports and market. It took fifteen years for the Japanese to reach a decision, the Meiji Restoration, in 1868. In the meantime, numerous debates and fights, almost endless procrastination alternating with sudden resolute action, and dramatic coalition formation and dissolution took place, culminating in the installation of a modernizing parliamentary monarchy in 1868. Second, Japan was more or less totally reduced to ashes in 1945 in the Second World War. It took fifteen years for the Japanese to reach a decision: the announcement of the income-doubling plan by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in 1960. In the meantime, the Japanese wavered between left and right, between anti-US and pro-US views, between heavy industrialization and light industrialization. But by 1960 they decided to follow the policy line of the Yoshida doctrine (Iriye, 1967), observing the Constitution's non-use of force in the resolution of international disputes, the close alliance with the United States, the preoccupation with the economic aggrandizement of the nation. Kissinger predicts that it will take fifteen years for the Japanese to put an end to the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991. Against all the advice of Japanese and foreign pundits about how to solve the problem, the Japanese have been wavering between resolute action and non-action, between market competition and social protection, already for more than a decade. It will take a few more years before the Japanese take a major drastic action on this issue, according to him.

I mention Henry Kissinger because he is not only influential in moulding public opinion and but also reflective of public opinion. He often mirrors how the public sees human nature and international affairs. In this particular case he seems to be doing precisely that. In the 1970s and much of the 1980s, it was common practice to talk about the Euroscerosis with high unemployment, high government expenditure and budget deficits, and the shortage of the European drive. In the

1980s through mid-1990s, it was the penchant of opinion leaders to bemoan the double deficits (budget and trade deficits) of the United States and the decreasing labor productivity of US industry. Then came the 'lost decade' of the 1990s, at least to the Japanese. Kissinger bandwagons the widely held view that Japan has been struggling with itself without having a clear vision or a good strategy or strong leadership. The two fifteen-year periods he depicted in modern Japanese history to demonstrate his theory of the Japanese as slow movers coincided more or less with the bumpy periods of the Japanese economy, with the former made bumpy by the opening of ports and markets and with the latter made bumpy by the difficult recovery after the war. The third period, presumed to be 1991–2006, coincides with the economic downturns slowly adjusting to the deepening of globalization.

With the advent of a slow or zero or negative growth rate of the Japanese economy, the talk of a Japanese model stopped. This is natural. No one talks about Japan as Number One (Vogel, 1979). No one is worried about Japan's imminent take over of world hegemony (Vogel, 1986). No one is talking about Japan's unbeatable competitiveness (Porter, 1998). No one is talking about 'Asia in Japan's embrace' (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). No one is talking about the 'most important bilateral relations – bar none', with respect to the US's bilateral relationship with Japan (Mansfield, 1995).

One thing that needs to be kept in mind when one examines something that depends on the mood of the day is that two groups of professionals, journalists and market speculators, exaggerate changes in a disproportionate fashion, because it is in their professional and occupational interest to do so. Exaggerated, simplified and often distorted changes bring about increased attention and gigantic profits. To hit the market is often a by-product of academic concepts and ideas and that happens only at opportune moments.

Indeed, looking back at the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, one is struck by the speed at which various models emerged and disappeared in the Asia-Pacific. The rise of the Japanese model, as exemplified by Ezra Vogel's book title, *Japan as Number One* (1979), was phenomenal. A model is called a model because it inspires people and because it leads them to emulate. More precisely, models work at at least three levels: (1) as a heuristic device to aid scholarly understanding, (2) as constructions that serve the interests of politicians and journalists, and (3) as guides to help countries learn from each other. One might be tempted to call them metaphors rather than models. Why metaphors? It seems, as will become clearer later, that the proponents of at least two particular models (the developmental state and one-party dominance) and the derivation of all the models lie in the self-preoccupation of the United States. Furthermore, their inventors perhaps invariably and inadvertently overstated their explanatory power. If they are metaphors rather than models, what will be the implication of the exercise? One can argue that American scholarship is perhaps extremely narcissistic, that a comprehensive synthesis is beyond scholarly grasp, or that the 'owl of Minerva' truly does only emerge after the event. The use of metaphors rather than models tempts one to ask what is the 'truth' that the models reveal. It is understandable that these models do have some truth value.

Perhaps for fortuitous reasons, these models have progressively come to cover the whole 'face' of the political system, although it was only as one scholar disputed the emphasis of colleagues that the broader picture emerged. (Toward the end of this chapter, I will come back to the question of the role of models in building understanding and facilitating action.) At the same time, it is undeniable that these models also served journalistic interests in the United States. They also served politicians in the region (e.g. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad). And they served developmental approaches – the World Bank was forced to at least review its approaches under pressure of protagonists of the 'Japanese model'. Since these and other kinds of influence go perhaps beyond their inventor's original intention, one might be tempted to reflect on the nature of the academic project. One possible line of reflection might be the nature of contemporary Orientalism, permeating East and Southeast Asia. (Again toward the end of this chapter I will come back to this.) In examining various versions of what is called the Japanese model, I would like to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese model and its relevance to regional governance in the Asia-Pacific, in relation to its rise and fall. The following four models are examined here:

- 1 the developmental state, as articulated by Chalmers Johnson (1982) *et al.*;
- 2 one-party dominance, as conceptualized by T.J. Pempel (1998) *et al.*;
- 3 maturing civil society, as discussed by Schwartz and Pharr (2002) *et al.*;
- 4 welfare capitalism, as defended by Dore (2001).

It is striking to find that assembled together they deal with major components – institutions of what is called governance. Johnson deals with bureaucracy, Pempel with political party, Schwartz and Pharr with civil society, and Dore with capitalism.

Developmental state

In discussing the role of the state in economic development, Johnson (1982) argues that the Japanese state was most active in the massive mobilization of resources, labor and capital for the state-led push for development using the advantage of backwardness and that the Japanese state was quite adept at doing so, taking the Ministry of International Trade and Industry as an example. The theme is the capacity of the Japanese state to make full use of the advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron, 1962). The capacity of the state to give the private sector some administrative guidance in the form of industrial and technology policy was stressed. It is called a strong state in contrast to a weak state. Krasner (1978) bemoaned the weak state called the United States in contrast to the strong state called Japan in these areas. The argument on the developmental state was taken very seriously in the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s through mid-1990s (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; Berger and Hsiao, 1988; Deyo, 1987). Japan's rise looked so steady and fast that many Asian neighbours wanted to envisage and emulate their own states to follow Japan in terms of state-led industrialization, especially when Japan

had schemes of official developmental assistance, technological flows and foreign direct investment. The picture of the region thus looked indeed like the flying geese pattern of Japan leading the pack in terms of providing the developmental state model. This culminated, sort of, with the publication of the World Bank Report, *The East Asian Miracle*, in 1993 (World Bank, 1993). Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8, its influence has subsided considerably. Japan and all the East Asian countries suffered from the shortage of capital inflows. The economies stagnated. Some, like Krugman (1994), have gone further to say that the East Asian miracle was hollow and that what the East Asian states did was to assemble capital and labor massively into some targeted industrial sectors successfully, rather than exercising some ingenuity in technological innovation.

One-party dominance

In comparatively examining one-party dominance in party politics, T.J. Pempel (1998) and others, when synthesized, seem to be arguing that interest aggregation was considered most critical in mobilizing support for the governing regime and that one-party dominance was most instrumental in securing a fairly stable and continuous legislative support for the national program which was crafted largely by national bureaucracy. Rather than articulating policy platforms for inter-party electoral and legislative competition, the governing party was more preoccupied with personal networking at the district level so that an aggregation of district-level personal votes could keep its parliamentary majority or working majority with some coalitional schemes, and thereby primarily bureaucratically drafted bills in the parliament could pass with little difficulty. The governing party could benefit from this whole scheme since it was given the privileged status of examining bureaucratically drafted bills in their formative stages so that they made effective intervention to defend and advance their district and sectoral interests under their purview/influence (Inoguchi, 1983, 1993; Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987; Inoguchi, 2005).

As East Asia democratized itself country by country from the Philippines in 1986 and diffusing to Taiwan, Korea, Thailand in the late 1980s through early 1990s (Laothamatas, 1997; Marsh *et al.*, 2000; Inoguchi, 2000a), it seemed as if some neighboring countries including China looked at the Japanese governing party with envy and with a desire to emulate. Given the success of the developmental state, one-party dominance seemed a natural formula to ensure such an economic miracle. To focus on economic development, one needs political stability which a big and inclusive party like the Liberal Democratic Party can ensure. In Singapore, Lee Kwan Yee openly said in his Asian Values offensive that with American-style freedom practised in Asia, competitiveness would be reduced, and chaos would ensue (Inoguchi, 1995). As if to symbolize the need to discipline those tainted by American-style freedom, the court of Singapore gave a naughty American boy who did something wrong in Singapore the punishment of caning.

At the peak of the East Asian miracle of the mid-1990s, at least in Taiwan (the Kuomintang) and Korea (the Hannara Party's predecessor), it looked as if the largest

party kept its power for a while. This was not the case. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and subsequent economic difficulties dumped such a desire (Drysdale, 2000; Hagaard, 2000; Nobel and Ravenhill, 2000; Pempel, 1999). In Korea, Kim Dae Jung's Democratic Party took power from the much larger Hannara Party in 1998 amidst the Asian financial crisis (Kim, 2001; Moon and Mo, 1999). In Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party under Chen Shuibian took power from the much larger Kuomintang in 2000 amidst the coercive diplomacy waged by China and the United States over the Taiwan straits (Tien, 1997; Hsiao, 2001). In Indonesia, the semi-forced resignation of Suharto amidst the Asian financial crisis in 1999 created a new democratic multi-party situation. After some difficult transitions of J.S. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, however, its Golkar organization seems to be coming back with Megawati Sukarnopurti (Hill, 1994; Robison, 1997). In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party lost power in 1993, but by 1995 it came back to power with an unprecedented coalition with the Socialist (later renamed Social Democratic) Party (Inoguchi, 1993). Needless to say, in Malaysia, the United Malay National Organization has kept power throughout (Hilley, 2001). In Singapore, the People's Action Party has kept power throughout (Low, 1998).

Is it fair to say that only the United Malay National Organization and the People's Action Party are relatively keen on the Japanese model? Or are the Golkar, the Democratic Progressive Party, and the Hannara Party preparing to become a more nationally based catch-all party like the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan after their respective ordeal? Or is the Chinese Communist Party interested in preparing to become the dominant party after political democratization at the high level, which is bound to come within one to two decade's time, given the already high per capita income level along the Coast and steadily advancing social liberalization (Rowen, 1998)?

Civil society

After the developmental state and one-party dominance ceased to be fashionable in the region, what came as a small surprise was the argument that Japan is becoming a sort of model of a maturing civil society, advanced by Schwartz and Pharr (2002): a small surprise in the sense that there are still some who believe Japan consists of governmental organizations and non-governmental individuals, without much room for vibrant non-governmental organizations and mature civil society. Two good illustrations defy such a belief (Inoguchi, 2002b). In 1995, when the great Kobe earthquake killing some 6000 people took place, a flood of volunteers flocked to Kobe and its vicinities, extending their helping hands to the victims in whatever way they could. In the 1990s, large-scale disasters and famines as well as civil strife took place throughout the world and many millions suffered from them. One small Catholic-church-based non-governmental organization called AMDA (Asian Medical Doctors' Association) keep sending medical doctors and nurses to help those victimized by them, reaching some 60 places in one decade. AMDA has members throughout Asia.

More systematically, looking at civil liberties and political rights as measured by the Freedom House (2001), the World Bank (2001), Vanhanen (1997) or some others, it is very clear that Japanese society is a very robust civil society. The argument that Schwartz and Pharr (2002) seem to be advancing is that because the Japanese state is regarded as a strong state, some tend to believe that Japanese civil society is traditionally weak, but that the state and civil society go hand in hand and when the state is strong, civil society can become very strong because civil society is nurtured by the state, just as much as civil society creates the state it deserves to have. Having graduated from the late-comer's industrializing drive and having reached a high income plateau of a sort, Japan is best situated to enrich a civil society. Benefiting from the fruits of the activist state at the helm and yet liberated from the industrializing and mobilizing drive of the state, its civil society is enlarging its space quite steadily (Inoguchi, 2000b, 2002b). Its civil society is also post-materialist and post-modernizationist (Inglehart, 1973, 1997). It seems to be quite real and its relevance to East Asian neighbours seems very high. As a matter of fact, Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr published a series of monographs under the heading of the Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Reimann, 2002; Witt, 2002; Schipper, 2002; Garon, 2002). Muthiah Alagappa is completing a collective volume on the civil society in the Asia-Pacific (Alagappa, 2004). Yutaka Tsujinaka has started to publish a series of books dealing with interest groups and civil society in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis of his and his collaborators' fieldwork in Japan, Korea, China and the United States (Tsujinaka, 2002). Tadashi Yamamoto (2000) has compiled a handbook on non-governmental organizations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Thus it looks as if Japan led the flying geese's pack in the area of civil society after the boom of the developmental state and one-party dominance passed away.

Welfare capitalism

Quite in harmony with this maturing civil society argument comes the argument of welfare capitalism as contrasted to stock market capitalism, as advanced by Ronald Dore (2001). Of all the comparative capitalism arguments, Dore is one of the few who focuses on the negative consequences of market fluctuations and externalities and the positive needs of retaining and enhancing social safety nets embedded with capitalism itself (Albert, 1991; Aoki *et al.*, 1996; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Dore and Berger, 1996; Esping-Anderson, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001; Vogel, 1996; Wade, 1990). Dore distinguishes two capitalisms, the Anglo-Saxons versus Japan and Germany. Stock market capitalism focuses on efficiency and labour productivity, whereas welfare capitalism stresses equality and employment durability, to exaggerate slightly. Dore argues that in pursuit of human happiness, capitalism should be organized in order to ensure a robust safety net against market fluctuations and externalities. When the global market seems to reign supreme, Dore seems to be saying that the social market capitalism of a German kind and the communitarian market capitalism of a Japanese kind have a lot to be learnt by many others if capitalism can achieve

both market efficiency and individual happiness. At a time when many negative consequences of globalization painfully manifest themselves, the argument attracts some adherents. The argument can be either social democratic or communitarian. Dore's argument can be illustrated with special reference to the recovery of Korea and Japan (Drysdale, 2000; Hagaard, 2000; Noble and Ravenhill, 2000; Pempel, 1999) from the Asian financial crisis and its negative consequences (Tiberghien, 2002; Moon and Nishino, 2002). The International Monetary Fund imposed strict discipline on the economic policy package of the Korean government. The government and banks acted swiftly and firmly, especially in the areas of banking and bad loans. The positive annual economic growth rate came back much faster in Korea than in Japan largely because of this factor. The negative consequences include the much higher number of bankruptcies in Korea than in Japan. More than twenty banks went bankrupt in Korea, whereas in Japan there were only a few bank bankruptcies (Moon and Nishino, 2002). Also a high rate of unemployment ensued in Korea. In Japan, the unemployment rate is the highest since the late 1940s and early 1950s, but unemployment was produced in a relatively orderly fashion. Sudden and large-scale unemployment did not take place as it did in the United States or in Korea. Thus labour disputes raged in Korea whereas in Japan the annual spring wage increase struggle ended with virtually no increase or sometimes with wage reduction without bringing about large-scale labour strikes. Korea adopted the Anglo-Saxon model via the International Monetary Fund, whereas Japan kept its Japanese welfare capitalist model. The question arises: Is the Korean adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model of an enduring nature? In other words, will Korea come back to the partial adoption of Japanese welfare capitalism after swallowing temporarily the imposed Anglo-Saxon model at a time of real crisis once the crisis is overcome and once positive economic growth starts again? With regard to the Japanese model, most Asian neighbours seemed to let it go and try to ride on the tide of globalization. Important to note, however, is the fact that other than the Japanese model and its influences, most of East and Southeast Asian economies have had strong legacies originating from their respective endogenous or quasi-endogenous practices and institutions.

Comparative examination

Let me examine major East Asian cases one by one in terms of the applicability/feasibility of the above four models. By East Asian cases I mean such major countries as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Developmental state

Whether the concept and practice of the developmental state as experienced by Japan applies to other East and Southeast Asian states depends in part on the stage of economic development and the affinity of the regime type. In terms of per capita income level, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore seem to be beyond the stage of

industrializing drive of the normal developmental state. But they are all interested in continuing its developmental-state drive at home and abroad (or near-abroad) as long as its surplus capacity leads them to expand their outlets (Woo, 1999). It is directed most clearly at China as China's developmental momentum has not yet subsided. Taiwan's huge direct investment in China has led the governing Democratic Progressive Party's original policy line of one China, one Taiwan to amend somewhat in the direction of very substantially loosening the barriers of communication, commerce and direct investment with China. Korea's enthusiasm about China has been accelerated by Japan's prolonged recession and China's continuing developmental momentum. Its interest in forging a trilateral free trade agreement among Korea, Japan and China comes from its strong desire to enhance its market to the two great neighbours, to strengthen its economic integration with Japan, and to offset its too-strong links with Japan once the bilateral ties thicken by bringing China into a common framework. South Korea's interest in North Korea stems from that same drive although North Korea (the category of near-abroad) seems to be too risky for the time being. But the predominant thinking of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyung governments of South Korea is that unless the economic gap between South and North is to be reduced step by step by helping the North to come back to the path of economic development, no prospect arises for them to have closer transactions and communications, let alone integration and unification (Moon and Mo, 1999; Kim, 2001; Inoguchi, 2002d).

China itself has kept its developmental momentum (Lardy, 2002). But the catch is that one of the very foundations of the governing party, i.e. those public sectors where party members keep their positions, power, income and all other privileges, has to be reduced in size as they cost too much public money (Fewsmith, 2001). China's line of thinking on how to deal with the public sector and how to keep developmental momentum seems to be very similar to the Japanese experiences of the 1950s and 1960s. China has started to invigorate its developmental momentum, not privatizing the public sector drastically but moving to its frontiers (development of the less-developed, less-inhabited non-coastal provinces of China) and its maritime frontiers to the south (the Association of the South East Nations). This serves the purpose of letting the governing party adjust step by step to the tide of marketization and globalization without jeopardizing the foundation of their power and yet making best use of economic developmental momentum outside the slow-moving public sector. China's call for a free trade agreement with the Association of South East Asian Nations is the case in point. Although Singapore has virtually no manufacturing industrial basis and Richard Rosecrance has called Singapore a virtual state, it surely designs and implements its developmental policy (Rosecrance, 1999). It has been forging strong links with China (1) in the form of direct investment in China and (2) in the form of inviting Chinese engineers and accommodating Chinese workers as it designs and implements its information technology revolution policy in addition to (3) the coming free trade agreement between the Association of South East Asian Nations and China. In other words, despite the imminent demise of the classical developmental momentum in such countries as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and

Singapore, these countries envisage continuing their developmental momentum near-abroad, i.e. in China and North Korea, and Southeast Asia. That is why there have been assiduous efforts to materialize (and benefit from) the developmental potentials by the advances of regional inter-governmental financial arrangements to shelter local economies better from the global system such as the Miyazawa scheme, as already adopted and practised by the cooperative arrangements between the Asian Development Bank and national governments. And that is why imaginative schemes have been made especially by Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, to use bilateral and regional free trade agreements to stimulate and invigorate regional economies. Although not much has been achieved in lieu of free trade agreements in the region, strategic planning and tactical manoeuvring have been quite vigorous. Two examples suffice. First, Japan's initiative toward concluding a bilateral free trade agreement with Korea has been stalled for years by Korea's counterproposal to include China into such a scheme. Japan and Korea are the two most competitive economies at a high technological level in the region. Second, China and the ASEAN have concluded a free trade agreement. They are more complementary to than competitive with each other. In response, Japan and the ASEAN have started talks toward a free trade agreement. More recently, China's Greater West and North Korea, near-abroad to the more industrialized countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, do not seem to stimulate potential foreign investors' appetite. Rather they seem to expect Japan to initiate substantial flows of official developmental assistance focusing on communications, transportation, energy and water supplies.

In terms of regime type, Korea and Taiwan have reduced the weight of state-led economic management significantly in the course of post-industrialization and democratic consolidation. Thus, the term developmental state is a misnomer for these countries. Furthermore, compared with Japan, Korea and Taiwan are much more influenced by the Anglo-Saxon market capitalism model in the first place than Japan is, despite the change of regime type. Also their accommodation of foreign capital and technology especially in conjunction with foreign direct investment inflows is done with more ease than Japanese accommodation. China and Vietnam are in the midst of industrialization drives with the heavy weight of accommodating large-scale foreign direct investment. Ironically, their eagerness in attracting foreign direct investment slightly resembles that of comprador colonialism in the past. Its industrialization drive is not necessarily primarily led by the state but more importantly by both local and foreign private sectors. Their accommodation of foreign capital and technology is in a great contrast to the Japanese developmental model, however. For the last century and half, Japan has adopted a 'self-reliant' model of containing foreign capital and technology to a minimum. Only for the last decade or so has Japan been seeing the large-scale accommodation of foreign capital and technology. That is why the purchase of the Long Term Credit Bank by foreign capital and Nissan's alliance with Peugeot were received with surprise and dismay, at least initially. If the 1970s and 1980s are characterized by 'Asia in Japan's embrace' (Hatch and Yamamura, 1996), the 1990s and beyond seems to be characterized by 'Asia lured by the China market'

(Inoguchi, 2002c). Once East and Southeast Asian markets were hit hard by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the continuously thriving Chinese market was an obvious choice for the US and European business to make direct investment (Lardy, 2002). Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia are in various stages of industrializing drives (Robison, 1997). But the state is not necessarily strong in the sense of orchestrating its economic developmental policy. Perhaps most importantly, the international economic environment changed drastically between the time when Japanese industrial policy was given high acclaim and the time when market globalization penetrated every corner of the world. 'Bending with the wind' seems to be an apt characterization of most ASEAN governments' industrialization policy. Accordingly, the likely impact of a state-led developmental push seems to have been reduced significantly. Therefore it seems fair to say that the conceptual lure of the developmental state à la Japanese seems to have been half dissipated. Yet Japan itself looks at near-abroad more from the developmental perspective than from the purpose of trade liberalization when a free trade agreement is the subject of discussion in such frameworks as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

One-party dominance

State-led industrialization required strong legislative power in order to mobilize resources at hand for its concentrated drive. One-party dominance suited the purpose perfectly. At one time, Korea resembled Japan in terms of nurturing a predominant party. But its regionalistically inspired cleavages plus democratic consolidation seemed to make that orientation more difficult to realize. Regionalistic clientelism and nepotism are a hotbed for corruption charges. In addition, the fundamental difference in orientation to the near-abroad North Korea, among South Korean leaders and populace, one school headed by Kim Dae Jung, the other school headed by Lee Hoi Chang, makes the formation of one-party dominance much more difficult. In a similar vein, Taiwan at one time looked as if it aimed at transforming the Kuomintang into a democratically chosen predominant party (Tien, 1997). But the one-China versus two-states division within Taiwanese politics split the Kuomintang into three parties. Instead, the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party seems to aspire to becoming a predominant party. Yet as long as the Democratic Progressive Party collides with Beijing over what status Taiwan gets *vis-à-vis* Beijing, sustaining predominant party status would not be easy. After all, Taiwanese massive direct investment in China makes collision more difficult. The erstwhile sharply articulated Taiwanese independence policy line of the governing Democratic Progressive Party has become more difficult to sustain and the increasing convergence of the policy lines on economic interdependence with China ironically makes it extremely uncertain whether a predominant party will emerge in the near future.

Singapore enjoys one-party dominance which seems to be at times close to authoritarianism. Malaysia resembles one-party dominance with more democratically competitive characteristics. The United Malay National Organization has

been predominant over more narrowly ethnically or religiously inspired political parties of much smaller size. Yet the United Malay National Organization seems to be threatened by the surge of the radical Muslim party steadily undermining the Malay constituents of the organization. That is why Malaysia – along with Bosnia – was one of the only two countries which denounced terrorism in the World Muslim Conference in April 2002. The message is that the radicalized Muslim population should be discouraged. Indonesia's Golkar lost power with the resignation of Suharto. But as Megawati Sukarnopurti became President after J.S. Habbibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, Golkar seems to be reviving its position and power steadily, and thus may be again becoming a predominant party, now under the name of democracy and aided by strong support from the military (Suryadinata, 2002).

Thailand has been under a multi-party system of intense personality-focus and money-focus, as played out mostly within Bangkok. The process of democratic consolidation seems to intensify the flexible party formation and coalition, even though political participation has been visibly broadened and deepened at the same time. The Philippines has been under a multi-party system of intense focus on clientelism. But it seems that the process of democratic consolidation since Marcos's forced resignation in 1986 has deepened not only democratic participation but also class-related cleavages (Inoguchi, 2001). If the departure of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 was called people power, the departure of Joseph Estrada in 2000 was called people power without people (Overholt *et al.*, 2001; Inoguchi, 2002a). In other words, when Marcos was forced from power, not only the United States government and the Philippine establishment but also those Philippine people who watch TV in Tagalog, not in English, acted against Marcos. But when Estrada was forced down, those Philippine masses who watch TV in Tagalog did not go out on the streets en masse and remained more or less pro-Estrada.

Only China and Vietnam, the countries run by the Communist Party, seem to be aspiring to transform the predominant incumbent party into a democratically elected predominant party in some near or nebulous future. China especially has been undergoing fairly steady economic and social liberalization for the last quarter of a century. Once its per capita income level goes beyond some threshold in coastal China, it is likely that some regime change will take place. After all, Jiang Zeming's decision in 2001 on the prerequisites of party membership now accommodating capitalist business managers is a clear and irreversible departure from the class-based state and society as shaped by Mao Zedong. In other words, China is becoming an all-people state as contrasted to a class-based state (Inoguchi, 2001; Fewsmith, 2001). Therefore, given the diversity in developmental stages and regime types, it is fair to say that one-party dominance is not popular in rhetoric but in practice it still has a strong appeal in some countries.

Civil society

Market globalization (Held *et al.*, 1999) and democratic diffusion (Huntington, 1993; Vanhanen, 1997) seem to be major external forces accelerating to make

a civil society more prominent and robust in relation to the state in East and Southeast Asian countries (Alagappa, 2004). Internally, economic development and democratic consolidation are two major sources of the birth of a maturing civil society. That Japan has been spearheading this movement in East and Southeast Asia is not questioned. After all, Japan has been among the highest per capita income countries for more than two decades and Japanese commitment to democratic values and norms seems to be quite robust, befitting its high Freedom House (2001) ranking in terms of civil freedom and political rights. Furthermore, Japan is quite high in terms of post-materialist ranking in the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1997). Korea and Taiwan seem to be on a par with Japan in terms of the solid maturation of a civil society. In particular, political participation seems to be much more vigorous in Korea and Taiwan (Inoguchi, 2001). Following Korea and Taiwan closely are Thailand and the Philippines. In terms of values upheld by people, Thailand and the Philippines are poles apart from their Northeast Asian neighbours (who appreciate more Confucian values like hierarchy, deference, and diligence) and look closer to a set of values upheld by Americans (who appreciate values like freedom, association and adventure). The surge of non-governmental organizations in Thailand and the Philippines cannot be underestimated (Yamamoto, 2000).

In terms of a number of governance indicators like transparency and accountability of government *vis-à-vis* civil society (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2001), Japan overall surpasses the rest of East and Southeast Asia. What makes some countries in East and Southeast Asia look more illiberal, even when the practice of democratic competition is solid, is the existence of those laws that justify strong governmental authority in terms of internal security and in terms of political neutrality in mass media. Korea and Malaysia, for instance, have retained the internal security act since the times of more authoritarian rule. Singapore has a no less stringent internal security act although Singapore's regime is not so democratically competitive as Malaysia's or Korea's. Civil society is fairly strong in democratic countries like Thailand and the Philippines, but social capital or trust exhibited in society tends to be narrowly defined along the line of strong clientelism. In countries that are plagued by ethnically or religiously inspired dissidents or rebels, such as China (Fa Lung Gong whose members are said to surpass the Chinese Communist Party in number and Uigur Muslims who are suspected to have ties with Al-Qaeda), the Philippines (Moro Muslims who are suspected to have ties with Al-Qaeda), Indonesia (dissidents in Ace, Iriyan Jaya and Selawesi), Malaysia (radicalized Muslims disenchanted with the government), the fast growth of mature civil society is more difficult (Lake and Rothchild, 1998).

Welfare capitalism

When contrasted with Anglo-Saxon stock market capitalism, Japanese welfare capitalism seems to accord more with what is called Asian values, e.g. equality, harmony, collective happiness (Inoguchi, 1995). How much such Asian values are in fact practised in East and Southeast Asia is sometimes questioned. On the surface,

most Asians seem to exhibit more individualism than communitarianism, let alone social democracy. Again on the surface, American influence seems to permeate every corner of East and Southeast Asia, taking competitive enhancement very seriously. In an apparent contrast, the Japanese seem to take the orientation of enduring hard times together in a business firm rather than firing employees in order to recover from a deficit. One such example is Toyota, which has been one of the top profit-earning business firms in Japan. The Toyota scheme is summarized as (1) keeping employees as much as possible; (2) encouraging innovations within the firm so that greater profits can be sustained in the future; (3) encouraging employees to purchase Toyota's stocks with the anticipation that stock values are likely to rise, which the Toyota leadership says depends on employees' ingenuity and efforts; (4) urging everyone to be efficient in production and thrifty in life. It looks as if capitalism exists in order to keep the members of the organization happy rather than raise the absolute figure of profits higher and higher. Capitalism exists to keep people employed and happy. Whether such an orientation prevails in other Asian societies or not is something that needs to be explicated empirically. A quick survey seems to show that one cannot find many followers and emulators of the Japanese model in Asia in this regard. The era of globalization seems to make welfare capitalism somewhat difficult to envisage other than in Japan, and possibly in China and Vietnam, communist-led capitalist roaders.

The lesson of the United States

The two models, the developmental state and one-party dominance, are those models that were most fashionable when Japan was still enjoying its developmental momentum. The other two models, the civil society model and the welfare capitalism model, were becoming more fashionable as the developmental drive subsided and the globalization tide accelerated. The former two models were developed when the United States was undergoing a difficult structural transition and suffering from weaknesses. The developmental state and one-party dominance seem to answer the American conundrum of why the United States is so different from the then alarmingly steadily rising Japan. The latter two models are being debated, as it were, when the United States is enjoying a unipolar moment and an unprecedented long economic boom and when Japan is plagued by the loss of its developmental momentum and a long economic recession. Both the civil society model and the welfare capitalism model are not threatening to the United States. The civil society model seems to give assurance to Americans that Japan too finds it useful to have a vibrant civil society and the welfare capitalism model seems to give assurance to Americans that despite some positive aspects of welfare capitalism, the Anglo-Saxon model of market capitalism seems to be superior after all, as is vindicated by the long economic boom in the United States and the long recessionary impasse in which Japan has been seemingly placed for so long, nearly fifteen years!

To summarize, the former two models were food for thought for Americans when they were examining the strengths and weaknesses of America and re-

envisioning a new American system to emerge again to stand tall and strong. It is not that academics are always explicitly thinking in such politically inspired terms, but that their concepts and ideas sometimes hit the minds of journalists and readers most importantly in the American market. That is the time when the so-called model is invented and consumed. The developmental state and one-party dominance were close to hitting the market. A maturing civil society in Japan is most welcome when the state's limit to the provision of public policy is acutely felt and a rediscovery of welfare capitalism in Japan is reassuring when globalization arouses concerns about the need for a social safety net. The latter two models do not arouse sensational interests, whereas the former two did in part because the United States now stands seemingly tall and strong.

Conclusion

Has Japan ceased to be a magnet to East and Southeast Asia? Has Japan ceased to be a template for them? Yes, in the sense that no one marvels at many wonders of Japan these days. No one warns that Japan is on the alarmingly fast rise to establishing regional or global hegemony. Newspaper headlines about Japan are mostly about the Japanese inability to make a major decision and to take a major action on bad loans and about endlessly revealed political scandals. Newspaper headlines all give dismal tones and flavors. There is no reason to think of Japan as a template for the region.

However, Japan can claim that it is a template for the region in a number of ways. Once the state-led developmental momentum is gone, a civil society has to play more active roles. Once post-materialist preference dominates the citizens, a maturing civil society where non-governmental individuals and organizations flourish and thrive must be robustly forged. When the tide of globalization brings about its positive and negative aspects simultaneously, Japanese-style welfare capitalism has the merits of preventing high-level unemployment and sustaining individual dignity even if the recovery requires the fifteen-year long procrastination about bad loans and indecision on which banks and firms should be allowed to go bankrupt and which ones should not.

After all, looked at from inside, there has been robust continuity: per capita income is as high as before; egalitarianism is as strong as ever; politics has been as stable as before, including scandal-proneness and the lack of leadership; the continuing critical importance of manufacturing in the Japanese economy; the flying geese pattern of manufacturing and trade; the dominant GNP size of Japan *vis-à-vis* the rest of the region. But the regional projection of its image has been neither active nor effective, as if Japan has been asleep in bed for years. Hence the Kissingerite perception of Japan as summarized at the beginning of this chapter.

Besides the Kissingerite perception, the following questions must be posed: Where is the Japanese system heading? When might Japan emerge in a new exemplary role? The organizing principle and disciplining norms of a society are normally hard to change in the short span of half a century. If one is to be serious, one should broaden the span of observation to ten times that fifty-year span.

In approaching the future direction of Japanese political development, I want to emphasize the historical metamorphosis it has undergone over several centuries. Eiko Ikegami (1993) delineates with impressive skill the metamorphosis of early modern Japanese society from honorific individualism to honorific collectivism. She analyzes the transformation of society's organizing and assessing principles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In medieval times, what mattered most was the individual capabilities of warriors. Thus a battle was prefaced by announcements by the leaders of their names, places of origin, and commitment to fighting for the honor of their name. Fighting was everything, and it was driven by the individual pursuit of honor.

When Japanese absolutism floundered midway through the sixteenth century, what emerged instead was the decentralized quasi-feudal, highly bureaucratic Tokugawa regime. It demanded the collectivist pursuit of honor. The individualism of warriors was replaced by the collectivism of disarmed warrior-cum-bureaucrats honoring their collective organization, an organization derived from the structure and rules of the feudal lord's domains and family. It was very different from European absolutism (Anderson, 1974). Despotic lords tended to be superseded by their bureaucrats, who ruled the territory honoring the spirit of a sort of extended family and collective decision-making by bureaucrats. They treasured loyalty, rectitude, honesty, diligence, commitment to the welfare of the populace, frugality, and physical and mental fitness to serve the collective cause. This spirit developed during the early modern period (from the seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century) and was inherited by the modern Japanese state. Its modern bureaucracy further extended and expanded this spirit into a version of nationalistic and collectivist spirit for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

When the regime based on honorific collectivism was solidified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the challenge facing the Tokugawa shogun and the provincial lords was internal unity and stability. But with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry at Shimoda in 1853, the challenge facing Japan became how to cope with external threat, be it military, economic, institutional, or ideational. This was an entirely new challenge for the leaders of the Meiji state. They were assiduous in establishing a 'wealthy nation and a strong military' (Samuels, 1996). The key was the mobilization of nationalism under the emperor and the creation of a national bureaucracy meritocratically recruited nationwide. The Meiji bureaucracy was manned primarily by former samurai and their sons, who had lost their status and occupation after the Meiji state abolished class distinctions; they tended to be well educated, and their ideology of honorific collectivism suited the needs of the Meiji state. Thus the honorific collectivism of the early modern period was further developed in the modern period.

The modern Japanese state failed in its nationalistic outburst in 1941. But its leaders succeeded in getting the country to catch up with the West in terms of wealth and equality by 1989, the end of the Showa period (1926–89). Yet the problem of Heisei Japan (that is, Japan during the reign of Akihito, which began in 1989) is that the Japanese have been gradually undermining the bastions of honorific collectivism. The guiding spirit of the nation seems to be changing

slowly but steadily toward something that is increasingly neither honorific nor collectivist. Needless to say, the new guiding spirit is not likely to be entirely similar to the kind of individualism observed in the United States.

The success of the postwar Showa state in terms of catching up with the West, however, began to decrease the intensity of the nation's forward-directed drive. Having savored the fruits of achievement, people are far more cautious and averse to taking risks. On the issue of security, their basic starting point is to avoid involvement in conflict. In direct investment, corporations may study an investment opportunity for ten years and still not take the risk. In domestic politics, they abhor the exercise of strong leadership because it disturbs the comfortable web of vested interests (Inoguchi, 1993). The bipolar confrontation that formed the bulwark of the global security system has ended. The market, further empowered by borderlessness and globalization, now reigns supreme. And the social and transnational forces that were inadvertently suppressed by the Westphalian framework of nation-states have been unleashed (Inoguchi, 1999).

These, in short, are three aspects of the metamorphosis that Japanese political development has undergone. A fourth is in the offing. In this process, individualism will be resuscitated to a significant extent and organizations will become more flexible and more functionally malleable, thanks to the individualist legacy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as well as to the merciless forces of globalization that have been tangible at least since the Plaza Accord of the Group of Seven countries in 1985.

This brief summary of Japanese political development in terms of content and direction can offer a broader, more long-ranging, deeper historical context in which to examine and assess various Japanese models. Today, old, stylized images of Japanese society cannot remain tenable for long.

Finally, I come back to the question of the role of models in building understanding and facilitating action. On this question, I see positively the truth value of models especially in sensitizing the otherwise underobserved and underestimated aspects of dynamics. But at the same time, I see 'what passes for empirical observation is revealed to be permeated with myth, prejudice and wishful thinking' (Dower, 1986). When they are simplified and articulated by academic concepts, it is easy to see something of what might be best termed Orientalism emerge in the popularized diffusion and distortion of academic writings.

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