Governance, Democracy, Consolidation and the 'End of Transition'

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The notion of governance: a multi-level phenomenon

There is a substantial literature on governance, but little agreement on precisely what it means, as a result of which the term is often used in different ways. A sophisticated and flexible formulation is offered by *The Commission on Global Governance*, which defines governance as 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest' (1995: 2).

Many have used the term governance in a normative sense, as a rough synonym for democracy. But some use the term governance more instrumentally, simply to refer to any political system which maintains order. It is important to note that democratic governance is but one form of governance, and that democratic governance can itself take a variety of forms, as we will see below. Moreover, in some circumstances, far from being a synonym for democracy, the term governance is often used to avoid diplomatic difficulties when international organizations draft documents relating to the conduct of non-democratic states. These are valid caveats, and may represent a more classically accurate representation of what the term has meant in the past. But language changes with use, and since the end of the Cold War the term has more often than not been used in its normative sense to refer to processes whereby democracy is promoted, established and consolidated.

Table 1. *Levels and types of governance activity*

	Private	Governmental	Third sector
Supranational	TNCs	IGOs	NGOs
National	Firms	Central	Nonprofits
Subnational	Local	Local	Local

Source: R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr. (2002), 'Governance in a globalizing world', in R.O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (New York: Routledge), p. 202.

This brings us to the next element of the governance problematique, the existence of multiple levels of governance. Governance is also often used to convey the sense that social forces are not as easy to govern, rule, control or regulate, as used to be the norm, within the ambit of the territorially based sovereign nation-state. Thus, governance is a matter of making the rules of a game sufficiently clear in a setting where forces from above and forces from below are loosening the traditional grip which sovereign states have held on the reigns of power. The term governance also evokes notions of transparency, accountability and the rule of law. The term has come into use in this way precisely because the coercive power and regulatory authority of the sovereign state is being called into question. In this sense the use of the term governance places emphasis on a willingness and capacity to learn, and an ability to adapt to change. One might say that conceived in instrumental terms, the antonym of governance is anarchy, but that conceived in normative terms, the antonym of governance is coercion.

However, as Keohane and Nye note, '[c]ontrary to some prophetic views, the nation-state is not about to be replaced as the primary instrument of domestic and global governance. The nation-state is the most important actor on the stage of global politics, but it is not the only important actor. If one thinks of social and political space in terms of a nine-cell matrix [see Table 1], more governance activities will occur outside the box represented by national capitals of nation-states' (2002: 202).

The definition offered by the *Commission on Global Governance* subtly begs two questions to which we have alluded: whether governance should be used in a normative or instrumental sense, and at what level of analysis the term governance should apply. But, as one Chinese scholar puts it, 'It is critical for good governance that people have sufficient power and rights to participate in elections, decision making and supervision of a government. Obviously, only under democratic conditions can people be entitled to such power and rights. Therefore, good governance and democracy coincide here: no good governance without democracy is actionable and vice versa. There might be good government under an authoritarian regime but never good governance without a functioning democratic mechanism' (Yu 2002). Having duly noted some definitional caveats, then, we advocate this normative interpretation. In this special issue, all of the contributors assess the prospects for the establishment and consolidation of democratic governance, at a variety of levels of analysis, in their respective domains of expertise.

Democratic consolidation and the (end of the) transition paradigm

Wolchik finesses this normative definition of governance further in her helpful discussion and comparison of the definitions of democracy offered by Huntington (1991) and Linz and Stepan (1996). She notes that in the early 1990s it was common to employ a 'thin' definition of democracy such as that offered by Huntington, emphasizing free and fair elections and at least one peaceful change of government. But Linz and Stepan argued that more attention should be paid to the *consolidation* of democracy, rather than focusing on a limited and procedural definition of a transition to democracy. They set out a number of criteria for assessing whether or not a democracy is consolidated, which include, as did the earlier and more permissive definitions, the existence of democratic political institutions and the rule of law. But for a democracy to be consolidated, they argue, it is also necessary that there be a well-developed political society, an active and extensive civil society, and a functioning market economy. One further influential criterion which they introduced is that a new regime can only be considered a consolidated democracy when elections are 'the only game in town', as both losers and winners accept election results as the only legitimate means of deciding who governs. This is a criterion which we will return to below. **Wolchik** argues that all of the Central European states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and indeed most of the other European post-Communist states could be characterized as democratic on the thin procedural definition offered by Huntington. However, the picture is far less clear with regard to the more ambitious or 'thicker' conceptions of democracy offered by Linz and Stepan. These concerns, which **Wolchik** defines and highlights, proved to be a persistent feature of the discussions which took place at the conference, across a range of case studies.

At this point, it is instructive to turn to the important argument recently put forward by Thomas Carothers (2002), which has also generated much discussion, and which speaks directly to some of the concerns to which our own discussions consistently returned. Carothers suggests that what he refers to as the 'transition paradigm' might have outlived its usefulness. He argues that in response to the third wave a range of governmental, quasi-governmental and non-governmental organizations, which were devoted to democracy promotion, came into existence. This new democracy promotion community required an analytic framework to both conceptualize and guide their responses to unfolding events. Carothers argues that the US democracy community conceived a model of democratic transition, principally based on this community's own interpretation of events, and partially based on early works in the field of transitology. As the third wave spread, Carothers argues that this model's remit was extended and it became a 'universal paradigm for understanding democratization'. This paradigm continues to dominate, implicitly or explicitly, the thinking of the democracy community, so pervasive have its precepts become. Carothers believes this to be a mistake; he believes that 'the transition paradigm was a product of a certain time – the heady early days of the third wave – and that time has now passed . . . it is

time to recognize that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness and look for a better lens' (2002: 6, 20).

According to Carothers the transition paradigm contains five core assumptions. The first, which serves as 'an umbrella' for the others, is that 'any country moving *away* from dictatorial rule can be considered to be moving *toward* democracy' (2002: 6, emphasis in original) Many countries, he argues, were permissively defined as transitional. The second assumption is that countries moving away from authoritarianism tend to follow a three-part process of democratization, which consists of opening, breakthrough, and consolidation, with the third stage 'a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new "rules of the game"' (2002: 7).

Carothers concedes that many democracy activists and scholars make caveats about the tidiness of this process; elections do not equal democracy; transitional countries can go backward or stagnate as well as make progress, sometimes the breakthrough process is drawn out, sometimes it is rapid. But according to Carothers these caveats miss the central point; the problem is that even acknowledged deviations from the paradigm are rationalized in terms of the paradigm itself. As a result, the transition paradigm contains elements of teleology. This is the third assumption of the transition paradigm: that 'the establishment of regular, genuine elections will not only give new governments democratic legitimacy, but will also foster a longer term deepening of democratic participation and accountability' (2002: 8).

During the Cold War it was a commonplace that most Third World countries were not ready for democracy. The transition paradigm marked a break with that way of thinking, as the idea that there were a range of preconditions for democracy, relating to issues of wealth, class, institutional legacy and political culture, lost ground to the belief that 'all that seemed to be necessary for democratization was a decision by a country's political elites to move towards democracy' (2002: 8)

Carothers argues that enough time has now elapsed for us to make some form of assessment of the performance of the transition paradigm, and that the results are not encouraging. Of the 100 or so countries that could be identified as transitional, less than 20 are clearly on a path to becoming successful well-functioning democracies; the majority of third-wave countries do not look like consolidating their early democratic promise. Some have regressed into explicit authoritarianism, but most transitional countries are 'neither dictatorial nor clearly headed for democracy' (2002: 9). Instead, they have entered what Carothers characterizes as a political 'gray zone'. Countries in the gray zone

> have some attributes of democratic political life, including at least limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens' interests,

low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state (2002: 9–10).

Carothers notes that a number of 'qualified democracy' terms have been coined in an attempt to identify and delineate the various types of regime that inhabit this gray zone. These include; semi-, formal, electoral, façade pseudo-, weak, partial, illiberal and virtual democracy. Again, Carothers notes that these terms, although they are helpful in identifying the fact that a number of states are not strictly democratic, still implicitly locate states within the rubric of the transition paradigm by giving them the qualifier 'democracy'. The problem here is that 'by describing countries in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in fact trying to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question' (2002: 10).

In an attempt to remedy this problem, Carothers sketches two broad political syndromes which are present in the gray zone, political patterns that he believes have become entrenched. These are, respectively, feckless pluralism, and dominant power politics. Both patterns have elements in common but differ in crucial ways and should be considered mutually exclusive. They include elements of democracy but should, Carothers argues, 'be understood as alternatives, and not way stations to liberal democracy' (2002: 14). Feckless pluralism and dominant power politics are not permanent syndromes; countries can move into different categories, and it is possible for countries to move from one category into the other, or to move out of either in the direction of liberal democracy or authoritarianism.

Although comprehensive characterizations of both syndromes are beyond the scope of this introduction, both share the negative attributes and implications for democratic transition which are summarized in the extract above. The key difference, as the names which Carothers ascribes to the syndromes suggest, is that in the former case there are alternations of power between genuinely different groupings, whereas in the latter one political grouping, whether a movement, a party, an extended family, or a single leader, dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of even an alternation of power in the foreseeable future. Carothers is suggesting that the parameters of the debate within the democracy promotion community are wrong. The democratic transition paradigm does not provide a realistic background explanation of what is happening in the majority of transitional countries. But for Carothers, 'what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world' (2002, 18).

The dynamics of governance in transitional states: the articles

To summarize, then, we have reached three conclusions so far. We have argued that governance should be associated with democracy, and that governance is a multi-level phenomenon. But it is also clear that Carothers' critique of the transition paradigm

contains an important truth that we should bear in mind; it is not necessarily the case that all transitional states are unambiguously on the path to democracy. Governance is related to democracy, it is multi-level, but it may not lead to democratic outcomes. These three themes are each engaged by all of the contributors to the volume in different regions and at different levels of analysis. **Berglund** and **Wolchik** offer comparative analyses of East Central European transitional states. **Shin** (South Korea), **Sukma** (Indonesia), **Rose** (Russia) and **He** (China) focus on individual countries, and the relationship between national and subnational levels of democracy within them. These four writers are sanguine about the prospects for democracy in their given areas of expertise. **Wolchik**, **Sadagata** and **Sudo** provide illuminating discussions of the supranational element of governance, by considering the role that international organizations play in the consolidation and promotion of democracy. In what follow we offer a brief summary of the key conclusions offered by each of the contributors.

Having noted Carothers' strictures against naïve transitology, it is important to note that both **Berglund** and Carothers reach optimistic conclusions about the general prospects for the consolidation of democratic governance in East Central Europe. **Berglund** draws on the seminal work of David Easton (1965), who argues that for a political regime to survive or persist it must rely on a number of key variables. One of these key variables is support, which can be specific or diffuse. Specific support is characterized as an expression or feeling of support for services rendered, whereas diffuse support is more generalized and often occurs as a result of successful political socialization. Easton identifies three objects of support: the political community, the regime, and the authorities. With regard to the survival of a political system, support for all three is obviously important. It is fundamental that the norms, values, principles, and authority structures of the regime enjoy support. It is also important to note that in all political systems, even non-democratic ones, the incumbent regime normally benefits from a reservoir of diffuse support which has been built up over a number of years.

Norris (1999) builds on Easton's work and identifies five levels of support. Easton's political community and authorities categories are retained, but the regime category is now divided into three: regime principles, regime performance and regime institutions. **Berglund** believes that the distinction which Norris makes between regime principles and regime performance is a crucial one. He argues that support for regime principles is more fundamental than support for regime performance, although it is of course possible for dissatisfaction with regime performance to precede dissatisfaction with regime principles. **Berglund** believes that regime principles and regime performance are the most crucial dimensions of support, and as such the most crucial to an evaluation of the long-term prospects of a political system.

Berglund draws on data from two surveys, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys, and the 2001 New Europe Barometer to construct his argument. The NEB item 'reject all non-democratic alternatives' is used as an indicator of support for regime principles, and, of course, has clear parallels with the Stepan and Linz epigram. Most

citizens of Central and Eastern Europe have experience of at least one non-democratic regime, so respondents from this region are therefore more likely than most to see democracy as one potential form of governance among many. Respondents are asked their views on whether there should be a return to communist rule, strongman rule, or military rule. Only those who reject all three non-democratic alternatives are held to give unqualified support to the principles and values of the democratic regime. This is the indicator which **Berglund** uses to assess support for regime principles, and results from this survey item demonstrate that there is considerable backing for the principles and values of democracy throughout the region, with large majorities rejecting all non-democratic alternatives.

Berglund also uses four regime performance indicators in his research – satisfaction with democracy, respect for human rights, the prevalence of corruption and economic performance. He finds that many Central and East Europeans are dissatisfied with the development of democracy and the human rights situation in their respective countries, but that these concerns are not as widespread as the concern with bureaucratic corruption. Two previous studies of Central and Eastern Europe have suggested that satisfaction over human rights issues is a more powerful predictor of satisfaction with democracy than self-ascribed economic prospects (Klingemann and Hofferbert 1998; Berglund *et al.* 2001). Based on the analysis presented in this special issue, **Berglund** argues that the human rights item remains the key predictor of satisfaction with democratic performance, but less decisively than in these two previous studies: economic performance is becoming an increasingly salient factor in explaining satisfaction with democratic performance.

But the most significant conclusion **Berglund** draws is that 'the rejection of democratic rule and the acceptance by default of democratic values and principles is not necessarily a function of a positive evaluation of the performance of a democratic regime, at least not in the short run, and particularly in consolidating democracies' (p. 18). For him this is good news because it suggests that there is a reservoir of diffuse support for the values and principles of democracy which, in the short term at least, is likely to remain unaffected by fluctuations in support for the performance of democratic regimes. To the extent that this is true, he argues that the foundations for a sustainable democratic consolidation are in place.

In his analysis of South Korea, **Shin** also deploys this distinction between procedural and consolidated democracy. He notes that South Korea is widely perceived as one of the success stories of the 'third wave' of democratization. Since the country formally began its transition to democratic rule in 1987, it has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy. Free and competitive elections have been held regularly at all levels of government, and in the 1997 presidential election South Korea established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power. In Korea today, **Shin** argues, the signs are ubiquitous that free and competitive elections constitute the only political game in town. But

elections are a necessary and not sufficient condition of consolidated democracy. For **Shin**, to become a fully democratic state, a new democracy requires a functioning system of governance in which the parliament and its elected representatives play a key role in the process of policy making.

Shin defines democratic governance as a process of transforming public preferences into substantive outcomes according to the principles and rules of representative democracy, which are prescribed in the constitution. In order for a fully functioning democratic system of governance to emerge, citizens and elected officials must interact on a continuing basis. There must be a democratically elected parliament vested with institutional powers and other necessary resources to represent the electorate, this Parliament must play a key role in legislation, and it must oversee the actions of the executive branch on behalf of the electorate. The most significant question to be addressed in the systematic study of democratic governance is to determine whether a parliament functions as the primary representative institution. Theoretically, this notion of democratic governance is predicated on the two fundamental principles of representative democracy: popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Operationally a separation of powers and adequate checks and balances are required, as is a legislature which can simultaneously both hold the executive branch to account and be responsive to the electorate.

Shin argues that, although there is no doubt that South Korea meets all the criteria necessary to be considered as a robust procedural democracy, there are legitimate concerns regarding the performance of the South Korean polity as a consolidated system of democratic governance. However, it should be noted that Carothers is perhaps more optimistic than **Shin** with regard to the particular case of South Korea, including it in the second tier of his 20 or so countries in which he believes that the democratization process continues to make progress. South Korean democracy features a presidential system of governance. Despite the formal appearance of a semi-presidential system that allows the sharing of executive power between the president and the Prime Minister, the former in practice dominates not only the executive branch but also the legislature. **Shin** argues that the demise of military rule has enabled the Korean legislature to exercise a more active role than it did in the authoritarian past, although the National Assembly falls far short of being a continuing deliberative legislative institution. The lawmaking process remains dependent upon executive leadership even in the democratic era. The democratization of military rule in 1988 has brought no discernible changes in the pattern of the National Assembly's budget review process. The Assembly remains a passive reviewing body. Among those lawmakers who are most directly involved in budget deliberations, there is very strong consensus that the National Assembly and its lawmakers are not the key players in the budget-making process.

The 'imperial' power of the South Korean presidency is not statutory; it is derived from the president's status as the leader of a highly coherent and disciplined ruling party, which has a strong regional vote base. Specifically, the president exercises strict control over the process for selecting candidates for parliamentary elections and the financing

of their electoral campaigns. This is significant because no South Korean party is truly national in scope; the major parties all have support bases which are concentrated in particular regions of the country. To date therefore, no party has been able to win a majority of parliamentary seats. All the democratically elected governments to date have served a regional minority rather than the whole nation. Institutionally South Korea has a presidential system of governance combined with multiple minority parties. To compound the problems this creates, multiparty presidentialism is combined with a system of staggered elections. To date, this system of governance has produced a divided government in which different parties control the presidency and the legislature at the same time. Generally this has led to 'immobilizing executive-legislative institutional deadlock' (Mo 1998; J.C. Park 2002).

Are South Koreans satisfied with their democracy, and is it the only game in town? **Shin** finds that a substantial proportion, nearly one-third of the Korean population, still does not perceive the regime to be democratic. When asked to rate how well democracy works in their country, the survey respondents as a whole expressed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction with its performance; only two-fifths of South Koreans believe that the current regime functions well as a system of democratic governance. As **Shin** demonstrates, some of this dissatisfaction can be explained in terms of the institutional structure of the Korean polity, but there are other factors too.

Illegitimate practices such as conducting unwarranted prosecutions, questionable tax audits, and illegal wiretapping reveal that South Korea today, as in the authoritarian past, suffers a great deal from the absence of an authentic rule of law. More recently, news reports said that the Kim Dae Jung government secretly paid for a historic visit to its capital city in June 2000, which helped him to win a Nobel Peace Prize. Such abuses and misuses of mandated authorities, and misappropriations of state funds by the executive branch, constitute the most notable features of democratic governance in Korea today. Even after more than a decade of democratic politics, political leaders as well as ordinary citizens have yet to internalize the democratic procedural norms of competition, compromise, cooperation and tolerance as the basic principles of democratic governance. For this reason, **Shin** concludes that institutional reforms without the further democratization of authoritarian hearts and minds will not bring about significant improvement within the current system of democratic governance.

Collusion, corruption and nepotism have also been, and indeed remain, at the heart of Indonesia's governance problems. **Sukma** argues that the problems facing contemporary Indonesia are largely attributable to the legacy of bad governance from the Suharto era. The personalized rule of President Suharto made it difficult for civil society to develop and mature. It has also prevented the growth of genuine democratic institutions. Rampant corruption and lack of public accountability has caused deep popular distrust of the state. The weakness of the legal system has contributed to members of society taking the law into their own hands. Excessive centralization has removed local ability to resolve conflicts. The previous circumscription of

public participation has allowed the explosion of freedom without a well-established democratic mechanism to channel competing interests and resolve conflicts. While the removal of Suharto from power does provide an opportunity for political reform and an improvement in the quality of governance, **Sukma** argues that such imperatives should be exercised within the context of a democratic transition.

Reform, however, has taken an encouraging turn in two significant regards. The first is the introduction of a decentralization policy that gives the regions greater autonomy in the management of local affairs. The second is in the field of democratization, which not only creates freedom of speech and paves the way for greater public participation in the policy process, but also presents the country with the opportunity to move towards pluralist democracy. The momentum behind these trends remains far from certain; the implementation of the regional autonomy program remains plagued by formidable problems, and the democratization process also faces considerable challenges. Indeed, the process of democratic transition has not shown signs of moving substantively towards a consolidation. There remain a number of impediments to democracy that need to be removed.

First, a genuine and sustainable democracy cannot flourish in a society where ethnic and religious divisions continue to beset social and political relations. A sustainable democracy can only flourish in a society imbued with a culture of tolerance where harmonious inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations exist. In a country as diverse as Indonesia, democracy can only survive if pluralism is adopted as the basis of the state Second, democratic rules are not observed as meticulously as they could be. For example, it is not yet well understood that in democratic competition, differences of opinion should be resolved through constitutional or procedural means, and not through political violence. Thirdly, there is the question of the ability of political parties to establish themselves as practitioners of democracy as well as guarantors of civilian supremacy in politics. Authoritarian tendencies in policy making remain a major problem, especially in terms of the internal decision-making mechanisms of many political parties. Moreover, many political parties have not yet established themselves as modern political institutions. Heavy dependence on individual figures remains a major characteristic of many political parties. Finally, there is still the question of the military's role in politics. There are encouraging signs that the army has realized that the *dwifungsi* doctrine – which gave the Indonesian military the legitimacy to play both political and defence roles – is no longer relevant. However, it is not yet clear whether the military has genuinely abandoned its interest in politics altogether.

As Indonesia has only been in democratic transition since 1998, **Sukma** argues that it is unrealistic to expect that the country will soon function as a mature democracy. Carothers agrees with this assessment, arguing that because Indonesia only moved away from authoritarian rule recently it is too early to discern a clear political trajectory. It can be argued that the country's move towards democracy and the quest for good governance has been constrained by unabating ethnic and religious conflict and also by separatist challenges. The problem clearly presents a dilemma for Indonesia. On the

one hand, conflict resolution in the country requires democracy. On the other hand, democracy cannot flourish in a society torn by serious ethnic and religious conflicts. Indonesia appears unable to resolve this dilemma.

This could clearly pose a serious threat to the future of democracy itself. As conflicts and instability continue, there have been indications of a deterioration of people's confidence in the values and merits of the democratic transition process in Indonesia. If this mood intensifies, the political climate in Indonesia could once again prove conducive to the re-emergence of authoritarianism. In such circumstances, the army would once again be the only actor capable of reinforcing order and stability. Indicators that this is possible exist. If this proves to be the fate of Indonesia's ongoing political experiment, one could be forgiven for concluding that the main obstacle to the maintenance and consolidation of democracy in Indonesia is the weakness of the pro-democracy forces themselves. The best hope for democratization rests with civil society. The democratization process in Indonesia will not succeed if the forces of civil society do not play an active and responsible role. The presence of a vibrant civil society constitutes a key requirement for democracy to function properly. The resilience of Indonesian society in dealing with the protracted economic and political crises, whilst simultaneously attempting to maintain momentum towards democratic reform and consolidation, owes much to the role played by the forces of civil society. Indonesia could therefore be characterized as a procedural democracy whose prospects for consolidation are uncertain.

Much the same could be said of Russia. As **Rose** claims, a modern state requires order which is guaranteed by the rule of law, but in Russia the Stalinist legacy is an anti-modern society whose polity and economy did not behave according to laws and transparent public norms, which were instead used instrumentally in pursuit of unrestrained self-interest. As a result of this legacy, Russians view freedom *from* political participation as a big gain. This goes against the grain of much influential political science literature which views political participation as desirable (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993) **Rose** argues that the weakness of the state is the best guarantee that Russians have of freedom. Referring back to the Easton/Norris taxonomy of regime support, then, we might say that Russian freedom and satisfaction is conceived in terms of a resistance to incorporation into political society.

As for the authorities, Putin is popular but most Russian institutions of authority are not. Russians therefore have the capacity to distinguish between their attitude to the president and their attitude towards the government. Another key to Putin's popularity lies in the contrast between himself and Boris Yeltsin. Despite Yeltsin's achievements in ending the command economy, introducing competitive elections and destroying the Communist party's monopoly on power, popular approval of the new system he founded was often higher than his personal approval. So Russians are unhappy with the state institutions of their anti-modern system and define their freedom in terms of their capacity not to have to participate. But how much support do they give to the values and principles of their democratic regime? Is democracy the only game in town

to the extent that was suggested in **Berglund** and **Wolchik**'s analyses of Central and Eastern Europe and Shin's assessment of South Korea?

Rose draws on the New Russia Barometer nationwide sample surveys which are updated using monthly nationwide monitoring surveys conducted by VCIOM, the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion. Asked about their political outlook, half of Russians say that they do not have one, and more (20 per cent), define themselves as Communists than democrats (18 per cent). The remainder of respondents are divided among a variety of alternatives. If these data are correct, it suggests that democracy is not the only game in town, and is not even the most popular. The largest bloc of electors in VCIOM's polls are anti-party; 44 per cent of respondents said they would not vote, did not know how they would vote, or might vote 'against all', as is permitted on the Russian ballot paper. Much of Putin's electoral support is drawn from the politically apathetic section of Russian society, who are older, less educated, and have lower incomes. This, combined with the Russian antipathy towards political participation which was noted above, does not augur well for the development of civil society in the medium term.

Since CSPP Barometer surveys cover both Russia and the ten countries seeking entry to the European Union, it is possible to assess the extent to which Russians see governance in the same terms as people who will become EU citizens in 2004. The CSPP Barometer regularly asks whether people think it likely that democratic institutions could be suspended, and whether they would approve if this happened. In the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there is strong popular confidence in the consolidation of electoral democracy. Only 11 per cent think that parliament and parties might be abolished, while 89 per cent think it very unlikely or not at all likely. However, in Russia the picture is much more mixed. A total of 29 per cent think it possible that democratic institutions could be suspended, and 51 per cent would approve if this happened. The substantial minority supporting undemocratic governance in Russia is not unusual in the world today – but it is outside the bounds of public opinion in established democracies and in new democracies now entering the European Union. (Carothers supports this analysis, arguing that Russia is a borderline dominant power system, and that it is hard to imagine any of the existing opposition parties coming to power for many years to come).

According to **Rose** this discrepancy can partly be explained as an aspect of Russia's indifference to Europe. It may also be a function of Russia's comparative lack of interdependence sensitivity to developments in the European Union (Keohane and Nye 2002). **Rose** notes that obstacles to the management of the governance issues which Russia faces in transforming itself into a modern society are not to be found in the international polity or the international economy. The chief obstacles to Russian modernization come from within the state itself, because the fair or unfair administration of law is a unique responsibility of government. (It might also be said that China's interdependence sensitivity is low compared to that of the Central and East European countries). Russia can therefore be characterized as an anti-modern procedural democracy which is not consolidated, and a borderline candidate to be

considered an example of dominant power politics. Antipathy towards participation, as conventionally understood in the political science literature, means that the short-term prospects for a flourishing of civil society are not strong.

This makes for an interesting contrast with China, which is not yet even a procedural democracy, but where participation at the grassroots level is tentatively establishing a regime of democratic local governance. **He** alludes to the perceived existence of a governance crisis in China, noting that it is widely predicted that the Chinese Communist Party will collapse in the coming few years. However, **He** also notes that the Chinese political system has demonstrated stability and resilience, and that one of the explanations for this stability is joint local governance. Drawing on survey results and the work of international evaluation agencies, he examines the performance of Chinese local governance in both urban and rural areas. **He** approvingly cites Dai Changzheng, a Chinese academic who argues that the governance discourse provides the basis for a potential paradigm revolution in the discipline of political science and public administration. This is because governance contains the ideas of plural powers, plural centers, responsiveness, openness, transparency, justice and effectiveness, and is therefore conducive to the development of civil society (2002: 22–25).

Urban local governance is a well-established social control system and it involves a kind of partnership among local governments, market forces, and non-governmental organizations. Paradoxically, this control system also involves self-governance, elections and democratic participation. Democratic local governance in the urban community has forced local party organizations to reform the party to some extent into a charity party whose job is to provide social welfare to the urban community.

Local governments at street level have their own enterprises, and have powers of taxation. They are able to provide necessary financial support to local urban communities. However, if governments cannot provide sufficient funding, market forces then come to play a role in urban communities. Urban communities have also developed new participatory institutions. Consultation meetings are designed to solicit people's support for local projects, or to listen to people's opinions. Evaluation meetings give people an opportunity to rate and evaluate the performance of local cadres, meetings which will seriously affect the political futures of these cadres, or the level of performance bonus which they receive. Conciliation meetings are designed to resolve urban conflicts. Urban assemblies are representative meetings designed to discuss local issues and development projects. The most interesting development is urban direct elections. These direct elections for self-governing communities establish a mechanism through which non-governmental organizations are expected to play a significant role in urban governance.

In terms of local governance in Chinese rural politics, **He** argues that there has been a decrease in direct interference by the state. This can be seen in a number of different developments: emerging delivery of social goods by non-state agencies; the operation of self-governing village committees, the impact of village elections on village power structures; partnership between local governments and other social organizations; the

increasing role of the market, and the involvement of the new rich in local rural governance.

In theory, Chinese rural governance works in the following way. Village elections transfer and redistribute power in favor of elected village committees, which attract young, educated and rich people. Elections in turn change the behavior of village chiefs, who are more responsible and accountable to villagers. Village elections set up an institutional constraint on township leaders, who cannot dismiss village chiefs at their will. When facing conflict between party secretaries and village chiefs, township leaders tend to emphasize the core leadership of the party while also stressing respect for and protection of elected village committees. This would appear to challenge the party's domination of the village power structure and also to suggest that the elected village committee has become the center of village power.

But **He**'s field research leads him to conclude that the directly elected village head is emphatically not the most powerful person in the village. He finds that both elected village heads and party representatives unambiguously acknowledge this. There are many reasons, the most obvious being the legally defined leading role of the party organization. The second cause has to do with the fact that the party secretary controls all the economic resources of the village. Third, in their efforts to maintain party dominance, village party secretaries have attempted to limit the impact of democratic elections through a number of measures. **He**'s field research demonstrates the methods by which the party branch can manipulate or even specifically direct elections. It is clear that the contention that the village committee will replace the party branch as the core of the village power structure distorts and oversimplifies reality.

He identifies five models of the village power structure. In the first, party secretaries dominate within the village power structure; that is, there are strong party secretaries but weak village chiefs. The second is a merged model; that is, some members of the party branch are members of the village committee, the village head is a deputy or at least a member of the party branch, and many village committee members are party members. The merged model is a deliberate attempt to strengthen the party branch and to overcome the problems arising from conflict between the party secretary and the village chief. Under such a model, the party secretary assumes both the duties of party secretary and of village chief. The merged model lacks checks against corruption and the abuse of power.

The third model entails the domination of the elected village committee and village assembly. It occurs in only a limited number of cases. Power sharing is the fourth model. To some extent the elected village committee led by the village head plays the role of a check and balance to the village party branch. As a result, party secretaries consult more with the village committee. It is impossible to make any major decision without the agreement reached by both village institutions. The fifth model details a rift between the village committee and the party organization. Village elections create or widen this conflict. The contest for power arises from a conflict between two ideas of governance. According to the principle of party organization (as being at the core of leadership), the

party secretary should be the number one of the village. However, in the spirit of the governance of law, the village head, rather than the party secretary, should be in that top position. An elected village leader claims to have more authority than that of the party secretary because he is elected. Consequently, the elected village head constitutes a challenge to the power of the secretary, and rivalry and power struggle follow.

It should be noted that elections have been introduced in both urban and rural governance systems, and that this in turn creates a context in which there is more pressure to justify oneself to an electorate. In the last three of **He**'s models it was clear that either the village chief is more important then the party head, that power was shared, or that there was disagreement between the party and the village chief. Although this is only tentative progress, there is evidence of the emergence of a more democratic and pluralist culture. In some areas village meetings or assemblies are gradually replacing the party branch meeting as the final decision-making institution to decide the most important matters concerning the welfare of all villagers. Villagers can now use the village assembly to check the power of the party branch and village committee to influence decision making in the village. Village elections and the system of village assembly have changed the power game at village level, making it more rational, more balanced and more responsive to villagers. However, it is clear that at present China is neither an electoral nor a consolidated democracy.

Thus far we have considered governance through a comparative regional lens in the case of East and Central Europe. We have also looked at governance relationships at the national and subnational levels through case studies of South Korea, Indonesia, Russia and China. But the supranational dimension of governance can also be extremely important, as we will see from the contributions of **Sadagata**, **Sudo** and **Wolchik**. **Wolchik** argues that a consideration of the result of democracy-building efforts in Central Europe would not be complete without an analysis of the role of external actors. Post-Communist societies were given extensive support, encouragement, and assistance in their efforts to create successful democratic states. External funding for efforts to increase transparency, foster the repluralization of political life, and support the adoption of democratic values has been an important element of the transition process in all of these countries.

Although the value of these efforts has been questioned by numerous observers, **Wolchik** claims that it is indisputable that outside actors have had a major impact in supporting the development of democracy in Central Europe. Central European leaders have adopted new institutions, changed the orientation of existing institutions, and 'harmonized' existing legislation or passed new legislation to meet the requirements for membership of NATO and the EU. Aspirant NATO members were required to demonstrate that they had resolved territorial and other significant disputes with their neighbors, established democratic political institutions, and adopted certain guarantees of political liberties and civil rights.

But in **Wolchik**'s estimation, the impact of anticipated NATO membership on domestic policies, significant though it was, has been dwarfed by the influence of the

EU. In addition to the requirement to harmonize legislation and adopt the 80,000 pages of the *acquis communitaire*, Central and Eastern European leaders have adopted new governmental units (regions), changed the administration of certain services and benefits, and implemented changes in visa regimes that affected relations with their neighbors in order to improve their chances of being invited to join the EU.

Anticipated membership in the EU has also had a significant impact on the democracy-building process. Early support for normalization of relations among neighbors and greater respect for the civil rights of minorities by the Council of Europe have been followed by increased EU pressure in these and other areas of governance. Reports by the EU Commission routinely highlighted shortcomings in the performances of aspirant countries in both the economic and political realms, and public officials in Central Europe, not without debate and acrimony in many cases, attempted to address these concerns with legislation and government programs.

Policies with regard to the Roma and other minorities are a clear example of this process. Although levels of prejudice remain high among the population as a whole, government officials have enacted numerous programs designed to address EU objections with regard to treatment of the Roma and other minorities. At the same time, the Roma issue illustrates the limits of influence of outside actors in a fundamental area of democracy.

It should also be noted that EU influence in other areas, and the negotiation process that preceded the invitation of the Central European countries to join the EU in November 2002, have both fueled Euroscepticism. Although popular opposition is unlikely to derail the accession process, public attitudes toward EU accession vary in the countries which **Wolchik** discusses. Given the impact of Brussels on all aspects of decision making in member states, and trends toward increasing integration within the EU, conflict around this issue and resistance to the imposition of a supranational layer of governance is likely to increase.

The performance of NATO's Central European members after admission illustrates some of the limits of influence of outside actors, once aspirants have become members. No longer required to prove their worthiness for admission, the Central European allies have reneged on promised reforms in the military and failed to meet agreed upon spending targets for defence. For **Wolchik** this experience suggests that the EU may in fact have already exerted its greatest influence on the countries in the region, particularly with regard to changes designed to support or increase democracy in the region. Thus, the membership of the Central European countries in NATO and the EU bodes well for the maintenance of the structures of democracy in the region and decreases the likelihood that these countries will move in a non-democratic, authoritarian direction. But while the integration of these countries into supranational organizations may serve to guarantee that these countries will continue to meet a minimal definition of democracy, it should not be expected to remove all impediments to the thoroughgoing consolidation of democracy, at least in the short run.

As **Wolchik** suggests, there may be problems with and limitations to the socializing influence of international forces on the consolidation of democracy in East and Central Europe. But these countries wanted to return to Europe, and European and Transatlantic institutions wanted them back too. In this respect it is interesting to contrast the approach of the international community to the regions of East and Central Europe and the Balkans respectively. **Sadagata** claims that the international community has viewed these regions in very different ways, and that the consequences of these different approaches have been profound for the states, republics and peoples of the Balkans.

The fragmentation of Yugoslavia wrought extensive political change in Europe as well as the Balkans. The involvement of the international community, above all EU countries adjacent to the Balkans, has greatly influenced the origins, progress and resolution of the conflict, and also the prospects for the reconstruction of Balkan society. Post-Cold War developments in the Balkans can be intimately related, for better or worse, to European involvement in the Yugoslav conflict. The West's initial perception of the Yugoslav conflict was that problems should be solved internally; Western countries would refrain from intervention in these conflicts as long as they were not related to their national interests. However, for EU countries, regional instability and the outflow of refugees as a result of the Yugoslav conflict came to be problems that could not be ignored. Following the end of the Cold War, while Central Europe was unquestionably in the strategic plans of the European and Transatlantic institutions, the place of the Balkans in these plans was less clear. The US focused its energies on preparing the Central European states for membership of transatlantic structures.

In 1991 the German government unilaterally recognized Croatia and Slovenia. The EC followed the German lead and within a few days more than 50 states formally recognized the independence of these two republics. In contrast to its recognition of Slovenia and Croatian rights, the EC denied legitimacy to Serbian and Albanian national aspirations to self-determination. Thus the German/EC preventive recognition was an act of regional governance and a decisive intervention which contributed to the process of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. **Sadagata** claims that the European act of recognition reflected its belief that the two republics of Slovenia and Croatia belonged to Central Europe, whilst the others republics of Yugoslavia were part of the Balkans.

The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia three times during the 1990s. However, the 1991–5 arms embargo was criticized for contributing to political and military chaos in Yugoslavia and inadvertently conferring a military advantage on Serbian forces. After the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, the EU intervention and assistance policies in the Balkans were mainly shaped in response to emerging crisis, often on a purely *ad hoc* basis. Although in 1996 the EU developed its Regional Approach by inviting the Balkan countries to implement regional cooperation, the approach lacked in substance and concrete measures of support.

However, a turnaround in EU policy came in 1999, immediately after the NATO bombardments of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. Considering the failure to stabilize the Balkans throughout the 1990s, the international community decided to elaborate a new, more comprehensive, and longer-term strategy for the Balkans. This led to the adoption of the 'Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe' in June 1999, which was designed to facilitate the reconstruction efforts of the Southeastern European countries which were affected by the 1999 military conflict.

The Stability Pact was created by countries from the Balkan region, major donor countries and international organizations such as the EU, World Bank, EBRD, EIB, and the OECD. The Pact represented a political commitment by all the countries and international organizations concerned to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated and strategic approach to the region, replacing crisis management with preventive diplomacy, focusing on democratization and human rights, economic development and reconstruction, and the provision of internal and external security. The aim of the Pact would be to bring peace, stability and economic development to the region and to governance of the region's affairs. EU countries had become more aware that the controversies in the region not only threatened the stability of Southeast Europe, but also threatened to affect the processes of EU enlargement and the unity of NATO's southern command.

An important aspect of the Stability Pact is the fact that the Balkans are finally being perceived as a part of Europe. This is expressed through the Pact's consistent use of the term 'Southeastern Europe' instead of 'the Balkans'. The reference to Europe and European integration makes it clear that the Stability Pact is intended to be something of a springboard towards the ultimate goal of European integration of the region. The key objectives of the project are twofold. The promotion and, where necessary, rehabilitation of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, and the development of democratic citizenship. Most of the countries in the Balkans are undergoing difficult processes of economic and social transformation which are at different stages in different states. Their democratic structures are insufficiently developed and the building of a functioning civil society is at an early stage. Social and economic and ethnic problems are extensive. To this end **Sadagata** defines governance as the realization of democratization, economic development and reconstruction, and the construction of external and internal security in society.

Sadagata volunteers a number of suggestions for the governance of the region: NGOs should play an important role in reinforcing the involvement of civil society in the democratization process. Furthermore, no lasting solution to the political problems of Southeast Europe can be developed without including Serbia. Every effort should be made to support Serbian civil society, NGOs, and human rights activists in their work at home, and they should be encouraged to participate in cross-border dialogue with their colleagues from neighboring countries. Moreover, to accomplish the main goals of the Stability Pact such as economic, political and social stability, it is important to ensure democratic decision making which involves all stakeholders from all Balkan

countries. If Kosovo becomes independent, then it must be embedded in a broader, regional settlement.

The international missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo share similarities. While Bosnia-Herzegovina has in effect evolved into an international 'protectorate' over the past five years, Kosovo is emerging as an international 'ward'. Serious problems have surfaced in the imposition of an international mandate in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Although international organs have clearly ensured security in both places, they have also been accused of creating colonial bureaucracies, of favoring foreign organizations over indigenous ones, of duplicating efforts between different international agencies, and of wasting reconstruction and democratization resources. Given such drawbacks, constructive steps for promoting indigenous institutions that can give structure and content to democracy and self-determination must be considered. The indigenous approach to governance should be regarded as the most effective means by which to place the governance of the Balkans on a secure footing.

Sudo also identifies the need for comprehensive regional strategies of democratic governance to mediate some of the dangers and risks in the international system. **Sudo** traces the historical evolution of democratic governance in East and Southeast Asia, arguing that many states in the region adopted the developmentalist principle of 'governance that works.' After the 1997 financial crisis, however, they have come to recognize that democratization and regional security are mutually intertwined. As a result, good governance has been pursued in most countries in the region. Even Singapore and Malaysia, both strong authoritarian regimes, adopted critical elements of the good governance package, albeit in different ways. The Indonesian case amply demonstrated that it is critically important for states in transition to put their houses in order. To make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy smooth, regional cooperation needs to be strengthened, as the current efforts toward ASEAN plus three suggests. Should it progress further both at domestic and regional levels, vulnerable states in the region such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and China will be able to realize their soft-landing by managing state–society tensions.

The financial crisis in 'East Asia' has renewed interest in regional approaches to peace and security. Compared with Western Europe, East Asia is more vulnerable because of the lack of democracy, poorly coordinated but highly significant economic interdependence sensitivity, and a comparative lack of credible multilateral institutions. The financial crisis is said to have hit East Asian countries hard because of these weaknesses. It is therefore necessary to redefine state–society relations, stabilize economic interdependence through policy coordination, and strengthen civil society for the purposes of regional security. Many of the smaller states in the region, despite their developmentalist-based successes, were poorly equipped to address and manage their high levels of interdependence sensitivity. States have realized that their best response to this sensitivity to globalization is to develop an explicitly regionalist approach, but that in order to do this they have had to adapt to different and more transparent proto-democratic norms of political and economic self- and collective governance.

Sudo argues that the financial crisis has proved that in the age of globalization East Asian countries need to reconstruct their state–society relations. In the past Asian countries have preferred development to democratization, and good governance and the rule of law to human rights and democratic pluralism. East Asian countries need to redefine their state–society relations with a special emphasis on institutional plurality, since the crisis has indicated that democratic regimes may be more effective at dealing with economic travails than authoritarian ones. Democratization improves the prospects for regional peace and stability by strengthening regional institutions in a number of ways: it encourages states to take foreign policy initiatives, which could break longstanding stalemates in regional conflicts; it creates more domestic transparency in ways beneficial to regional understanding and trust; it leads to more open and regularized interactions among states, reducing the importance of inter-personal contact; it creates a deeper basis for regional socialization by according space to civil society and accommodating its concerns; it broadens the scope of the agenda of regional institutions, allowing them to address issues which might have been considered too sensitive for authoritarian states; and it secures stronger support for regional integration and cooperative projects from powers external to the region (Acharya 2001).

The second issue concerns the ways and means to manage emerging economic interdependence in the Asian region. Ever since the Plaza Agreement in 1985, the rapid rise of the yen created a dramatic inflow of Japanese capital into Asian economies, thereby promoting economic interdependence, especially in the field of production. Economic interdependence has in turn created multilateral networks, some of which are embodied in formal intergovernmental institutions, and others in overlapping second track networks. However, it was clear that neither state policies nor institutional responses were adequate to deal with the financial crisis. Policy coordination among Asian countries was sorely lacking. In the past the meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have been confined largely to the exchange of opinion, resulting in a lack of meaningful policy coordination. There are many reasons for the lack of policy coordination, but the doctrine of non-interference is the most serious problem. Since the financial crisis, the gradual erosion of the non-interference doctrine in Southeast Asia can be seen in the form of the mutual surveillance of economic policy. This economic monitoring agreement may in time develop into greater institutionalization and closer coordination of national economic policies and performance, and the fostering of greater rule-based transparency in governance.

The financial crisis has also shown that regional institutions could not respond adequately due to the lack of a strong civil society, which can be considered, according to **Sudo**, as the missing link in Asian development. In strengthening multilateral institutions in the Asian region, ASEAN and its extended forum ARF need to be restructured. The model would be the European Union. As **Sadagata** and **Wolchik** have suggested in other papers, EU choices and initiatives can have a significant

bearing on regional governance outcomes. There is still more evidence of this potential in the democratic transitions in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, all of which were influenced by the consideration of membership or potential membership of the EU, which requires all members to observe democratic practice and respect human rights.

According to the World Bank governance is defined as 'the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs' and 'good governance' includes: 'an efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press'. In other words, since good governance aims to achieve efficiency in the public services, governance is to be linked to an advocacy of democracy and neo-liberalism (Rhodes 1996: 656). As they have recovered from the financial crisis, East and Southeast Asian countries have embarked on a series of reformist policies designed to create stable, responsive and effective polities, healthy economies and responsible civil societies. This shift in emphasis suggests a significant transformation of strategy, from the cultivation of developmentalism to the promotion of the regulatory state (Jayasuriya 2000).

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