

ASIA TODAY



THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE

**Economic and Security Concerns for
the United States, Japan, and China**

Edited by
**Takashi Inoguchi and
G. John Ikenberry**



The Troubled Triangle

ASIA TODAY

Before 1820, Asia generated more than half of the world's gross domestic product. Since then, the region underwent a period of decay and decline. Today, Asia is in the midst of a great transformation, and it is estimated that by 2035 it will be responsible for more than one half of the world's gross domestic product. Propelled by three decades of rapid economic growth, momentous political transitions, and intensified regional integration, Asia is no longer simply a fast-expanding and evolving region; it is increasingly the geopolitical epicenter for the global system itself. The goal of this series is to offer readers a front-row seat to view and understand better this kaleidoscope of regional change in all its dazzling dynamism and diversity. Who would have thought in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in Beijing, that China would soon begin a generation of double-digit economic growth? Who could have foreseen that Asia would become the region where the world's richest countries, Singapore and Brunei, would live shoulder-to-shoulder with the world's poorest, Afghanistan and Laos? The Asia Today series is designed to respond to the growing demand for sustained research and deep knowledge of contemporary Asia. It covers the full expanse of this vast region—from China to India, Japan to Pakistan, Kazakhstan to Turkey, Mongolia to Israel, Iraq to Indonesia. The series editors, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, aided by a 44-member advisory board, are dedicated to identifying fresh and penetrating studies of Asia by the region's foremost experts.

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
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Preface

This book on the United States, Japan, and China aims at capturing the three largest economies weaving the geopolitical triangles with considerable unease. The dissonance between economic allure and security thrust generates complex problems: in terms of economic allure, the United States has global currency, Japan has high technology, and China has manufacturing factory and market. Both China and Japan are two largest dollar-preserving countries in the form of US Treasury bonds. Both China and the United States rely heavily on Japan's high-technology materials and indispensable components. Both the United States and Japan are great utilizers of China's manufacturing products. In terms of security thrust, the United States has primacy, Japan has alliance, and China seeks autonomy. The United States does not give up its primacy even under difficult circumstances. Japan sticks to the alliance with the United States even if the United States wants Japan to shoulder global responsibilities beyond its constitutional restraints. China wants not to be constrained by the United States and its allies and friends. Because these are the economically largest three, uneasy relationships among them cause concerns not only for the three but also for the entire world. In this book renowned experts representing the three countries examine the troubled triangle from their respective country's perspectives.

We are indebted to a large number of people in putting together this volume. We express our gratitude to them. First, all the contributors have done their role despite their sometimes difficult task assigned by the coeditors. Second, for the Tokyo conference in December 2011, we are grateful to The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for funding it despite the financial difficulties indirectly caused by the East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters. Third, at Palgrave Macmillan, New York, Farideh Koochi-Kamali and Sarah Nathan have an opportune time to launch a new book series, "Asia Today." Fourth,

staffs at the University of Niigata Prefecture including Yuichi Kubota, Kimiko Goko, Akiko Kanatani, Chizuru Morita, Aki Goto, and Fumie Shiraishi helped us to put together this volume despite all the imaginable difficulties caused by the March 11 disasters. Finally, we dedicate this book to our wives, Kuniko and Lidia, for their loving support in all our endeavors.

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Introduction

The Troubled Triangle: Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China

Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry

The United States, Japan, and China constitute an important geopolitical triangle. Over the decades, in East Asia, these three states have taken turns as the dominant state. Today, they are the region's leading great powers. They are ranked as the first, second, and third largest economies in the world. The United States is the world's leading military power and China is the fastest growing economic and military power. China and the United States are increasingly interdependent in trade and finance, yet the power transition underway in East Asia also makes them rivals. China is Japan's major trade partner but the United States is its longstanding security partner. For decades, Japan has championed its role as a "civilian" great power, offering leadership through foreign aid and the United Nations. But the growth of Chinese power and the return of old territorial disputes in the East China Sea with Beijing have reignited Japan's debates about its peace constitutional ban on fully fledged armed forces and the need to expand its military capabilities. China is seeking to translate its growing economic and military capabilities into influence and leadership, whereas the United States is seeking to reaffirm its security commitments and hold onto its position as regional hegemonic leader.

In these various ways, the United States, Japan, and China are positioned as a triangle at the geopolitical center of East Asia. If the region is to evolve and take on a more cooperative multilateral character,

these three countries should move forward together. In case the region moves in the opposite direction, erupting into a spiral of militaristic nationalism, arms competition, and threats of war, that would be because these three countries were unable to work together to manage great power relations. This geopolitical triangle could become the site for bold new efforts at multilateral economic and security cooperation that could transform Asia and set the world on a stable path of growth and peace. Or this geopolitical triangle could become the site for escalating distrust and military mobilization that pushes Asia into a dangerous new Cold War.

Indeed, Deng Xiaoping once said that if China and Japan collided in war, then half of the heaven would fall. Today, if he were alive, he would no doubt say that if China and the United States collided in war, then the whole of heaven would fall. After Deng's return to power in late 1978, his first mission was (1) to visit the United States and Japan to strongly assure them that his return to power meant something critically important internally and externally and (2) to militarily intervene in Vietnam "to teach the lesson to Vietnam for occupying Cambodia."¹ What ensued thereafter is called "East Asian peace."² Since 1946 East Asia has experienced two large military conflicts with a huge number of battle fatalities. Since 1979 the world has witnessed the evolution of the norm for state sovereignty and the practice of respect for this concept. Within this evolving geopolitical triangle, there are, clearly, both dangers and opportunities.

The triangular relations between the United States, Japan, and China are rendered particularly complex by the crosscutting forces of economics and security. What makes the triangle distinctive is that economic considerations and security calculations do not move in the same direction. The United States is the leading security provider for the region and China is increasingly the provider of markets and investment. If one country—China or the United States—were the singular center of regional security and economics, relations might be less complicated. It would be easier to see a single hierarchy—or hegemonic order—in the region.³ But it is the emergence of "two hierarchies" that is a defining feature of East Asia, and the triangular relationship between the United States, Japan, and China sits at the center of this complex and shifting regional order.⁴

This book seeks to explore the character of this geopolitical triangle and how it has evolved over the past 20 years. In this introduction, we start our inquiry by identifying the key economic and security concerns of these three key powers. Together with the chapters that

follow, this book offers a portrait of how the dynamics of this “troubled triangle” might evolve to shape stability and conflict in the region in the future.

Security and Economic Hierarchies

In terms of security, the United States seeks to remain in the region, holding on to its position as its hegemonic leader. After all, for half a century, it has been the leading great power in East Asia. It has built a system of alliances, and Asia-Pacific is an economic highway that is both wide and deep. The United States has exported security to East Asia, and it has long established commercial ties with all the states in the region. It is doubtful whether Japan, South Korea, or any of the countries in Southeast Asia would have experienced such rapid economic growth and undertaken political transition without their participation in this US-led liberal hegemonic order. In the shadow of the US-Japan alliance, Japan has been able to grow and modernize without reverting to its older great power identity, and this has made the region more stable and peaceful over the decades. After the Cold War ended, the United States and Japan renegotiated their alliance and concentrated on the preservation of an open and stable East Asian order. Many governments in the region view the larger hub-and-spoke system of alliances as contributing to this same objective.⁵

This old American-hegemonic order is clearly in transition. The United States might like to retain its primacy as the leading state in the region, but that is not to be without difficulties. Lurking in the background are questions about whether the United States can continue to pay the costs and shoulder the burdens to sustain its political and security commitments to allies in the region. And even if it could, there are questions about whether a world-weary American public will want the country to continue to play this global and regional hegemonic role. Contrary to these, it cannot be denied that US withdrawal from its hegemonic role could trigger a great unraveling of order. The alternatives to an American-led order—in East Asia or the wider global system—are not clear or necessarily attractive.⁶

Also, Japan wants to maintain its alliance partnership with the United States. Many Japanese view the alliance as a destiny. The government regards the US-Japan alliance as the key foundation of Japanese foreign and security policy. Differences arise only with regard to how much should be sacrificed or compromised for the alliance. Some Japanese, like former prime minister Yoshihiko Noda, place

utmost priority on the alliance. Still others, like former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama, place more importance on Japan-China relations, envisaging the triangular relations as possessing two equal sides. However, all Japanese realize that the alliance poses two risks: entrapment and abandonment.⁷ When the United States wants Japan to send Self-Defense Forces to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Sudan, the likelihood of entrapment of Japanese soldiers and sailors under attack without sufficient and timely US help comes to mind immediately. When the United States visits China without visiting Japan, Japanese are panicked by what they may think is a precursor to abandonment.

China has its own vision of security relations in the region. At a minimum, China wants to preserve a certain measure of autonomy. It is reluctant to enter into wider regional security arrangements or pursue arms control agendas. Chinese leaders believe that their regime legitimacy is based on an unflinching defense and an aggressive assertion of what the Chinese populace regard as their inherent territories and spheres of influence similar to that enjoyed by the larger Qing Empire (1644–1911) in its heyday. The national memory of being humiliated and exploited by the West and Japan is so strong that security vulnerability must be minimized and relentless arms buildup sustained. After the peaceful resolutions of land border disputes with Russia, Mongolia, and Vietnam, China has turned its attention to maritime affairs with Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and above all, the United States especially with regard to freedom of navigation. Beyond this, China has growing ambitions.⁸ It wants to be recognized and respected as a great power and the future regional leader of Asia. China is focused inward. Economic growth—its rise and fall—and leadership succession are fundamental challenges to the state. More than anything, the maintenance of the political integrity of the state and party control of China remains the focal point. Nonetheless, as China's power grows, opportunities open up for the expansion of China's regional and global influence along with the dangers of backlash. Japan and the United States—together with other countries in the region—worry about growing Chinese military ambitions and capabilities. China wants to expand its ability to project power and influence, but doing so is difficult when other countries feel increasingly threatened by a future in which China is powerful and dominant.⁹

In economic terms, the United States has a strategic interest in maintaining influence over the world economy. It wants to keep the dollar as the global currency.¹⁰ Doing so enables it to hold global

rules and norms broadly in its hand. It wants to see the preservation of liberal internationalist rules and institutions that support the world economy. Japan's interest is to sharpen and deepen its technological edge. Although Japan's comparative advantage with regard to labor-intensive, assembly-line manufactured products such as home appliances, smart phones, automobiles, has been lost, Japan's new products such as lithium ion battery (indispensable to electric vehicles with the top manufacturer being Japanese Carbon Orient) and special steel aircraft wings (indispensable to the manufacturing of FX35, a new US fighter aircraft, the top manufacturer being Mitsubishi Heavy Industry) have been on the steady rise. To preserve many of Japan's niches in science and technology, a stable and peaceful regional and global order is necessary. How does the maintenance of a market niche relate to world order? The reasoning is simple. The widespread use of electric vehicles reduces CO₂ emissions, thereby contributing to the alleviation of global warming. Using robust aircraft wings that allow for complex movements and maneuverings further enhances US airspace hegemony. China's concentration is to retain its capacity to pursue economic-oriented growth, while developing a deeper and more advanced domestic economy. It also seeks to secure access to the world's resources—water, energy, and raw materials. This entails pursuing diplomatic and development assistance strategies that are far-flung in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. China views its own massive economic gains as an engine that would bring wealth and happiness to China and to the world.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the United States was preoccupied with the broader Middle East, fighting the Afghan and Iraq wars and global antiterrorist wars. In the past few years, however, it has “returned” to the Asia-Pacific, which means that it is refocusing on China, Taiwan, South Korea, and North Korea.¹¹ Japan wants to keep neighborly and friendly relations with China for business and other reasons. In the 2008 joint Japanese-Chinese communiqué, both the Japanese and Chinese governments agreed to construct a strategic partnership on the basis of mutual benefits. This document is remarkable in that China has acknowledged that Japan has pursued for the first time, in the past 70 years, the path of a peace-loving and peaceful state, avoiding the old path of war and colonialism. Thus, not only for economic reasons but also for the sake of maintaining friendly and neighborly relations, Japan does not want the United States to “unnecessarily” provoke China or North Korea unless Japanese sovereign territories and other core national interests are jeopardized.

Thus the duality between security and economy has been ubiquitous in the Asia-Pacific. Security calculations and economic calculations of bilateral relations and thus of the triangle of the three major economic powers tend to be disharmonized throughout the region.

How Troubling Is the Triangle?

Chapters by Ikenberry, Inoguchi, and Zhongqi Pan and Zhimin Chen deal with the grand strategy of the United States, Japan, and China respectively. Each author identifies and examines the troubling aspects of each state and its grand strategy in general and toward the triangular relations in particular. In chapter 1, the United States' grand strategy is laid down in terms of its origins, crisis, and transformations. The key concepts are the liberal world order underpinned by rule of law and democratic competence. Ikenberry argues that the United States will not continue exercising hegemonic leadership as it has in the past, but its role in the region as a champion of rule-based open relations and as a counterweight to China will continue to be in demand. The posthegemonic logic of East Asian regional order will depend in large measure on whether the US-led alliance system remains the centerpiece of regional security or if the region moves toward a more multilateral security order. The presence of liberal democracies in East Asia—not the least Japan—means that China will not find it easy to build a China-centered hegemonic order. In chapter 2, the Japanese grand strategy is characterized as self-recognition of being a global power, self-recognition of being a supporter of the US-led world order, and ontological insecurity about its existence. Japan's largely ad hoc adaptation is examined, pointing to some negative consequences of self-marginalization. In chapter 3, the Chinese grand strategy is characterized by peaceful rise in a multipolar world. China's foreign policy line is featured with a combination of partnership bilateralism and tailored multilateralism. Notwithstanding various difficulties such as global financial crisis and regional maritime disputes, China seems to continue its peaceful rise strategy in the foreseeable future.

Chapters by Yoichiro Sato, Qingguo Jia, and David Leheny deal with the triangular legs surrounding the United States. In chapter 4, Sato deals with the Japanese policy toward the United States that is characterized by the primordial importance of the alliance and its development as an "alliance for four seasons," that is, for all purposes as the treaty does not specify the enemy, qualifications, or contexts in which the alliance is deployed, when economic gravity shifts from

the United States to China. It is shown that leadership change exacerbated the inept handling of the triangle by the new Japanese government. Chapter 5 analyzes Chinese policy toward the United States that is characterized by the primacy of domestic factors, especially in the context of Chinese high expectations and subsequent disappointment when the United States does not appear to appreciate positive Chinese initiatives toward accommodating what it wants China to carry out as a responsible stakeholder. The lesson is that the United States does not raise Chinese expectations unnecessarily high by the use of often superficial words and rhetoric that are bound to bring about the nadir of Chinese disappointment. Chapter 6 discusses US policy toward Japan that is characterized by happiness when Japan's agency or subjectivity is not evident. Japan's moves toward autonomous energy security or actions clearly out of sync with the premise of the post-1945 world order are such instances. Otherwise, the alliance remains a "catch-all" alliance for all purposes as enemy, qualifications, and contexts for deployment are not detailed.

Chapters by Jiangyong Liu, Lowell Dittmer, and Emi Mifune deal with the triangular legs surrounding China. Chapter 7 deals with the Chinese policy toward Japan that is rooted in the history of using China's red lines of history and Taiwan issues against what China regards as Japan's deviation of the founding agreements of 1972 and 1978, as they have a great deal to do with the legitimizing principles of the Chinese Communist Party. Chapter 8 elaborates on the US policy toward China that is closely intertwined with the quadrilateral relationship among the United States, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union (the Russian Federation). Four ideal types of the quadrilateral relationship are used to illustrate the features of the policy. Chapter 9 provides details on the Japanese policy toward China that is characterized by the tenacity of Japanese assertion, driven by its ontological insecurity, about its modern historical evolution and is further compounded by its alliance with the United States. The joint statements by the two governments in 1998 and in 2008 are hailed as the ones in which not only the reflection of the past but also the future-oriented thinking are noted *de novo* (1998) and in which Japan's peaceful evolution since 1945 is mentioned for the first time (2008).

Although each of these chapters examines the triangle, they do not necessarily comment directly about the future prospects of the triangle. Here is an effort to provide some oversight and assemble parts of the analysis to construct a larger theme that emerges from this volume as a whole.

First, with respect to the future, Ikenberry is the clearest and the most optimistic from the US angle. In other words, he argues that US primacy will be retained, especially with regard to the norms and rules that guide world order, even when US military and economic preponderance cease to be visibly and tangibly manifested. The norms and rules will be upheld as long as those emerging countries outside the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members socialize themselves and share much of the international and legal values that underpin the US-led world order. To judge from the continuous inflow of immigrants into the United States and the size and vigor of American demography in the intermediate future, military and economic competitiveness of the United States will not go down steadily. Inoguchi is clear with regard to the increasing divergence of public opinion as Japan faces the refocusing of US foreign policy attention and the rise of China. Japanese public opinion is shifting slowly from alliance as a destiny to something more amorphous and floating. It is difficult to determine which direction Japan is heading in the near future because Japan exhibits a decline of trust both in the United States and China, and at the same time manifests an inward-looking preference for more autonomy and independence when the two great neighbors place themselves in contestation. Pan is also very clear about the Chinese grand strategy in that domestic factors loom very large because they determine the future direction of China. Pan asserts that politics take command—in fact domestic politics take command in determining Chinese grand strategy.

Sato's chapter examines Japan's US policy and Jia's chapter examines China's US policy. Sato is clear in that the alliance will continue in an invigorated fashion because Japan views it not only as a destiny but also as an opportunity. Jia is persuaded that the United States will raise high expectations for bilateral relations once China gets along well with the United States, but cautions that the possibility exists for Chinese disappointment and possible frustration with the United States, in particular blocking the Chinese dream of restoring their country and the Chinese people to their rightful place in the world. In other words, too much rhetoric and soft power use by the United States toward China will mislead bilateral relations. Dittmer's chapter examines US policy toward China in the broader context of alliances in the region. Dittmer is lucid in that compared to those alliances in the communist bloc, if they ever existed, the cohesion, solidarity, and duration of those alliances have been admirably clear. He expects such characteristics will hold in the near future.

Leheny's and Liu's chapters examine the policies of the United States and China, respectively, toward Japan. Leheny is excellent in contrasting the unease with which Japan views the United States in its handling of Japan on such occasions as the great disaster of March 11, 2011 (heartfelt admiration and deep gratitude) and on other issues such as the Futenma airfield relocation and other military-related matters (despair and resignation). Leheny shows that the World Women's Football Games in which the Japanese team beat the American team provided insight into Japan's inner strength immediately following the national disaster. Leheny may be hinting at a mix of gratitude and bewilderment that a strong Japan displays in the broad framework of alliance and interdependence. Liu's chapter gives a clear position about Chinese policy toward Japan on history and territory. Liu makes plain the critical role humiliation plays whenever Chinese feel that their legitimate place in the world is being blocked or hampered by Japanese (in the history of war and colonialism and in territorial sovereignty as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands). Mifune's chapter details the bilateral relations between China and Japan from the Japanese perspective of highlighting functionally positive relations and downgrading difficult-to-handle issues such as history, Taiwan, and territory.

The volume as a whole draws a rich and detailed picture of East Asia as the troubled triangle. The six portraits of the troubled triangle are diverse. But the diversity itself is an omen for the picture of East Asia and the world as the rise of China is bringing about different adaptations from East Asian countries.

A collective volume such as this would not or could not venture foretelling and/or prescribing the future evolution of the triangle. However, I would like to cite here two of the latest such ventures. First, the Gallup International, a coalition of international polling companies, posed throughout the world a number of questions in summer 2012 about the US presidential election of 2012, one of which is "Do you agree or disagree about the proposition that the citizens of your country should have the right to vote in the American presidential election?"¹² The results show that 49 percent of respondents in China, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong combined (called North Asia by the Gallup International and approximated to our two legs of the troubled triangle) replied affirmatively to the question! About 80 percent of the respondents replied affirmatively to the question about the impact of the US presidential election of 2012 on the country concerned. A high personal sense of impact is one thing; quite another is the very high agreement about the right to vote in the US presidential

election. It is as high as one-half of North Asia's respondents. Once constitutionalized in all the countries concerned, that is, North Asia and North America, it would become a United States of NANA! It would be a confederation of the world number one (the United States), number two (China), and number three (Japan), plus number fifteen (South Korea) economies. It would be a daunting globalist future.

Second, the recent provocative book entitled *The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power*, authored by Hugh White, an Australian, calls for the loosening of dogged insistence of US primacy.¹³ His prescription is based on the argument that US obstinacy about primacy and rejection of sharing with China poses the difficult problem of a sustainable future, given the still rising trend of China and the gradual rearranging and refocusing of the United States. Although Hugh White is similar in highlighting China and America to figures such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (a proponent of G2) and Niall Ferguson (a proponent of Chiamerica), neither Brzezinski nor Ferguson is prescribing power sharing with China. White is. This volume as a whole differs from White in that it shows that perspectives held by the stakeholders of the troubled triangle differ oftentimes in a very troubling fashion but that a future evolution of the triangle cannot be predetermined as of 2012. More uncertainty is to come and should be kept in mind.¹⁴

Notes

1. Ezra Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).
2. Timo Kivimäki, "Sovereignty, Hegemony and Peace in Western Europe and in East Asia," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2012): 419–447.
3. For classic discussions of hegemony that emphasize its combined security and economic components, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
4. See G. John Ikenberry, "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: China, the U.S., and Middle State Grand Strategies in East Asia," unpublished paper, 2012.
5. For depictions of the US hegemonic order in East Asia, see Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 141–170; and G. John Ikenberry, "American Hegemony and East Asia Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2004): 353–367.

6. See G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
7. On the dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment in US-East Asian alliance partnerships, see Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009–2010): 158–196.
8. See Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011): 41–72. On anticipations of China’s peaceful rise, see Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September–October 2005): 18–24; and Michael Yahuda, “The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power,” in David L. Shambaugh, ed., *Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
9. For a survey of Chinese official thinking about its growing power and regional ambitions, see Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012).
10. Barry Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*, second edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
11. On the strategic pivot of Obama administration, see “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” speech given at Parliament House, Canberra, November 17, 2011. In Obama’s words, “[a]fter a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States in turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region... Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation... As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership without allies and friends.” See also Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century: The Future of Politics Will Be Decided in Asia, Not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States Will Be Right in the Center of the Action,” *Foreign Policy*, November 2011. For Chinese reactions, see Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous,” *Washington Post*, November 16, 2011.
12. WIN-Gallup International, global poll on American Elections, 2012, Zurich, Press Release, September 11, 2012.
13. Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power* (Collingwood, Australia: Black, 2012).
14. As contributors worked on the galley proofs in early autumn of 2012, the triangle’s feeblest leg, the Japan-China leg, experienced serious tensions. The year 2012 is the fortieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization of the two countries. Most events meant to celebrate the anniversary have been cancelled on both sides, especially by the Chinese side. The volume provides ample insights (close to foresights!) into this very troubled triangle!

East Asia and Liberal International Order: Hegemony, Balance, and Consent in the Shaping of East Asian Regional Order*

G. John Ikenberry

Introduction

For over half a century, the United States has played a role in shaping order in East Asia. This East Asian order has been organized around “hard” bilateral security ties and “soft” multilateral groupings and American military and economic dominance, anchored in the US system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other partners across Asia. Over the decades, the United States found itself playing a hegemonic role in the region—providing security, underwriting stability, promoting open markets, and fostering alliance and political partnerships. In the background, the United States exported security and imported goods. Stability, prosperity, and security took hold. Today, this old order is giving way to something new, transformed by the rise of China, the shifting position of the United States, the normalization of Japan, the crisis on the Korean peninsula, and the emergence of old-style rivalry for great power and security competition.

How will this power transition in Asia and the global system work its way out? What sort of regional order—and global order—is likely to emerge? What are the sources of continuity and stability that will help shape the flow of change? What are the sources of conflict and instability? Will China and the United States find themselves increasingly in grand conflict, competing for allies, influence, and

leadership? To what extent will American hegemonic leadership and its longstanding system of alliances and regional partnerships remain critical to the shape and stability of Asia? What can the United States and other countries do to shape and direct the way India and China rise up in the global system?

The “old order” in Asia was a partially hegemonic system organized around American-led bilateral alliances. It was partial in the sense that China was largely outside this hub-and-spoke system. It was a hierarchical order that connected the United States to the region. It was built around security and political and economic bargains. Of course, this old set of arrangements is not disappearing, but the region is expanding and more complex relations are emerging. Paradoxically, there is both more growth in multilateral cooperation across the region and new signs of balance of power politics.

In this new regional order, the United States will not exercise hegemony as it has in the past. At the same time, however, the future will not be a simple story of China rising up and pushing the United States out. The opposite is more likely. The rise of China is actually serving to draw the United States into the region in new ways—particularly Southeast Asia. The recent American entrance into the Asian Summit and the closer ties between ASEAN and the United States on issues relating to the South China Sea reflect this growing American involvement.¹ At the same time, East Asia is increasingly divided between its two spheres—economics and security. China is the dominant economic power in the region while the United States is the dominant security power. How these divergent spheres interact will also help shape the long-term character of the region.

In this chapter, I seek to identify these various aspects of East Asia’s evolving regional order and America’s role in it. I do so in several steps. First, I look at the alternative logics of regional and global order. Order can be organized around three mechanisms—balance, command, and consent. The resulting orders—at least as ideal types—have different sources of stable relations. Balance of power systems are based on a stable equilibrium of power. Command systems are based on hierarchical relations of leaders and followers. Consent-based systems are based on consensual rules and institutions. We can chart the pathway of East Asian regional order by focusing on the changing mix of these ideal-typical features of order.

Second, I explore the logic of the “old” regional order, organized around American-led hegemonic leadership. This old order has proved to be—perhaps surprisingly—a quite stable and mutually agreeable

regional system. The US-led alliance system has done more “work” within the region than is often recognized. The bilateral array of alliances has provided security to states and dampened security dilemmas within the region. It has also provided political architecture that has facilitated consultation and cooperation and a framework around which the United States and other countries in the region can engage in continuous diplomatic exchange and cooperation. This framework has facilitated trade expansion, economic growth, political liberalization, and democratic transitions. The ability of this American-led alliance system to foster cooperation and progressive change has created constituencies that seek to preserve aspects of it, even in the face of power transitions and regional integration.

Third, I sketch alternative regional futures. One possibility is the emergence of a multipolar balance of power system. This is a future where a great power order emerges. China, India, Russia, Japan, and the United States become both more equal and more independent as geopolitical players. A second possibility is the rise of an autocratic-democratic divide. Here the United States builds a coalition of democracies and China and Russia leads a rival coalition that divides Asia. Third, there is the possibility of a China-American cohegemony. Here the United States and China share leadership in the region and build a stable working system. Finally, there is the possibility of the continuation of American security hegemony and alliance cooperation. This is a future in which the changes in the region are mediated and accommodated within the old regional framework. India integrates into this order and China accommodates itself to it. In each of these possibilities there are both more or less conflict-prone variations. A grand transition from order built on hegemony to order built on the balance of power can involve the movement from one equilibrium point to another. Or it can lead to a breakdown of norms and understandings of great power cooperation, ushering in rivalry, arms competition, and instability.

Regarding these alternative futures, a great deal depends on whether the American-led alliance system continues to play a dominant role as a framework for security cooperation in the region. Will that alliance system be extended, updated, and integrated with other transregional security groupings, or will it gradually erode and give way to a more traditional great power system? The future also depends on China and how it adopts strategies for its peaceful rise. The danger for China is that as its power increases it will trigger a balancing response from the United States and other countries in the region.

This is the problem of self-encirclement. Will China come to believe that its engagement and integration into regional and global institutions are necessary for its peaceful rise? Will it see the old American-led institutions as an impingement on its rise and influence or as tools for signaling restraint and accommodation? In this sense, the United States and China both hold the keys to the future. A more free-wheeling balance of power system does seem to be emerging in the region. If the region is to become defined in terms of great power relations—China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States—will it evolve into a cooperative concert of powers or be marked by the traditional patterns of competition and rivalry?

In this chapter, I argue that there are aspects of all four of these potential “futures” unfolding in the region. But I am skeptical that the region will take on the classic patterns of a power transition. To be sure, the region is evolving toward a more decentralized and shifting great power system. China, India, Japan, and other middle powers in the region will increasingly become regional players in their own right. But this order will also retain traces of the logic and character of the American-led global system. Security competition and conflict associated with the ongoing power transitions is not inevitable. This is because of three reasons. First, the old American-led order—at the regional and global level—is still a formidable presence. China is still dwarfed by the scale and scope of the American security order and the liberal capitalist system. Rising states in Asia still have reasons to engage and integrate into this order. Second, the old order has both realist-oriented and liberal-oriented institutions and practices that make it possible for great powers to operate in more cooperative ways than in the danger old days of great power balancing and security competition. Third, possibilities for great power cooperation are also reinforced by the unusually large array of strategic interests that these states share, including the United States and China. Fourth, the countries in the region do not want a Cold War–style struggle between democracies and authoritarian states.

Overall, my argument is that power shifts and full-blown power transitions do not necessarily lead to the collapse and transformation of regional and international order. In the past, regional and international orders have risen and fallen in the wake of great power war. This prospect does not exist today, not only because of nuclear deterrence, but also the primacy of the liberal democracies and world capitalist system. So there will be an evolution in the order and not sharp discontinuities. This is good for stability and peace.

Logics of International and Regional Order

East Asia is an order in transition, but how do we describe the logic and features of regional order—old and new? We can start by discussing what precisely we mean by order, regional or international. After this, we can identify more specifically the mechanisms that allow states to establish stable, ordered relations. For these considerations, we can make some general observations the salient features of order in East Asia.²

International order refers to the settled arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction. Order exists in the patterned relations between states. States operate according to a set of organizational principles that define roles and the terms of their interaction.³ It is manifest in the rules and institutions that embody and guide interstate relations. Order breaks down or enters into crisis when the settled rules and arrangements are thrown into dispute or when the forces that perpetuate order no longer operate. Order is established—or reestablished—when rules and settled expectations fall into place once again.

International orders come in many sizes and forms. Some orders are regional, others global; some are independent of an international order, others fall within its parameters; some are highly institutionalized or hierarchical, others are not; and power distribution can be centralized or decentralized. All these factors can distinguish international orders and provide a means of comparison. Some of these attributes are evident in the two selected regions of comparison: Europe and Asia. The European order when featured against the Asian order is more institutionalized but less hierarchical in its security arrangement with the United States. Power distribution, another distinguishing quality of international orders, can exhibit different “poles” of power, that is, multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar.

Another useful comparison of types of international or regional order is how the order maintains stability. Three different mechanisms—balance, command, or consent—or a combination of these three can establish and maintain an order. Different times and places have called forth a particular mechanism or logic.

An order maintained by balance promotes an equilibrium of power among major states. An order characterized by balance has no single dominant state. States seek power, build alliances, and make decisions to block other states from gathering too much power. In other words, it is a stalemate of power. By ensuring that power remains

somewhat evenly distributed among states, an international order of stability is created. Historical examples of balance of power include eighteenth-century Europe; post-Congress of Vienna in Europe in 1815; and bipolar balance of power during the Cold War. Distinctive to each example is the equilibrium of power among states and the resulting order. In each instance, counterbalancing poles of power among key states or coalitions of states limited and controlled the action of the other.

Command-based order is hierarchical in nature and is enforced by a powerful state through coercion or some degree of bargaining and reciprocity. Dominance by a single state creates superordinate and subordinate positions for the integration of other states. History and the modern world are full of examples of great empires that employed various strategies of rule to impose hierarchical orders. International orders of late, the British- and US-led global orders, used a combination of imperial and liberal qualities to enforce their hierarchical order.

The third organizing mechanism for an international order is consent-based. The rules and institutions used to embody this arrangement provide a framework for international relations that places limits on power and outlines state rights. State power is not eliminated, but it is harnessed. Strong states and weaker states still exist in this order. The critical difference is that the agreements between states are reciprocal and negotiated and, more importantly, are supported and enforced by agreed-upon institutions. The British- and US-led liberal orders forge consent in key areas to construct authoritative arrangements. The regional order of the European Union (EU) takes a similar consensual approach.

In describing and comparing orders, it is useful to make a distinction between the distribution of power and the character of the political formation that exists “on top” of the distribution of power. The distribution of material capabilities may be highly centralized or dispersed. The global system may be unipolar or multipolar, but these characteristics of the distribution of power do not, in as of themselves, tell us about the character of the “political formation” that exists between states. A unipolar system of power can be more or less based on coercive hierarchical relations, and a multipolar system of power can be more or less based on cooperative ties among the leading states.

In the case of East Asia, the regional order has been based on a mix of these mechanisms. As we will note in the next section, the defining feature of the “old” regional order has been a partially hegemonic

one, organized around American-led bilateral security alliances. The United States has been a hegemonic presence in the region. States have tied themselves to the United States for security protection. The United States has forward-deployed its forces and established a system of extended deterrence. At the same time, the United States has been a major market for East Asian trade and investment. Regional economic relations have been transpacific rather than more narrowly arrayed within Asia itself. The old order in East Asia has been a hierarchical one that has also relied—at least during the Cold War—on balancing against Soviet communism and specific regional threats. The American presence in the region has been more hegemonic than imperial. The security order and bilateral alliances have been based more on reciprocal relations and bargains than unilateral American command.

What is changing today is the slow emergence of two hierarchies, one organized around the United States and the other around China. In the security realm, the United States continues to be dominant. The American-led alliance system is still largely in place, and in various ways it is actually expanding. But China is increasingly at the economic center of the region. Countries arrayed around China—from South Korea to Japan and Australia—are all experiencing growing trade and investment ties to China. It is China that now provides expanding opportunities to these neighboring states. The United States is still an important market, but China is the economic center of Asia—and it will be more so in the future.

In this sense, we can see the rise of what amount to two realms of order in East Asia. One is the security hierarchy dominated by the United States and the other is an economic hierarchy dominated by China. Countries in the region are relying on the United States to provide various types of security assistance. The United States is, in turn, projecting power into the region, anchored in bases and other forward deployments. As China has grown more powerful—and as it has articulated a more activist regional orientation—many countries in the region are redoubling their security ties to the United States. At the same time, these same countries have expanded their trade ties with China, and for many of them China has become their largest and most important trade partner.

This double hierarchy presents dilemmas as well as choices for many states in East Asia. It certainly means that these states will need to play multiple games and balance their economic and security interests. It also suggests that the region itself will evolve in complex ways. There will not follow a simple (partial) hegemonic order led by the

United States. China also will not simply rise and assume a hegemonic role in the region. Most of the “middle states” in the region will not want to simply ally themselves with either the United States or China. They will not want to be put in a position in which they must make a choice between the United States and China.⁴ They will want stable relations with China—which is for most states in the region the major trade partner. And they will want stable relations with the United States—which is for many states the major security partner. In turn, China will have incentives not to become too forceful and aggressive within the region over territorial and geoeconomic controversies. To do so is to risk a backlash and a counterbalancing coalition against it by these states and the United States. The United States will also have incentives not to be too aggressive in its approach to China. Middle states will want the United States as a security partner but they will not want to be used as tools in a superpower rivalry. These cross-cutting strategic interests and incentives will produce a complex strategic environment. Now, let us look at the “old” order more closely and the various models of order that might follow.

The Old Order in East Asia

For half a century, order in East Asia has been built around American-style hegemonic leadership. The United States has exported security and imported goods. It is an order in which the US-Japan alliance—together with the wider hub-and-spoke system of bilateral security ties—provides the hidden support beams for the wider region. It is an order based on a set of grand political bargains. The United States provides security, open markets, and working political relations with its partners, and in return these countries agree to affiliate with the United States, providing it with logistical, economic, and diplomatic support as the United States leads the wider system.⁵

From the outset, this bilateral security order has been intertwined with the evolution of regional economic relations. The United States facilitated Japanese economic reconstruction after the war and created markets for Japanese exports. The American security guarantee to its partners in East Asia provided a national security rationale for Japan to open its markets. Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes. The export-oriented development strategies of Japan and the other Asian “tigers” depended on America’s willingness to accept imports and huge trade deficits, which alliance ties made politically tolerable.

Over the decades, this American-led alliance system has been quite functional for both the United States and its partners. This is true in at least four respects. First, the hub-and-spoke alliance system provides the political and geographical foundation for the projection of American influence into the region. With forward bases and security commitments across the region, the United States established itself as the leading power in East Asia. Second, the bilateral alliances bind the United States to the region, establishing fixed commitments and mechanisms that increase certainty and predictability about the exercise of American power. Worry is reduced in the region about America's interactions and activities. Third, the alliance ties create channels of access for Japan and other security partners to Washington. In effect, the alliances provide institutionalized "voice opportunities" for these countries. Finally, the US-Japan alliance has played a more specific and crucial role—namely, it has allowed Japan to be secure without the necessity of becoming a traditional military power. Japan could be defended while remaining a "civilian power" and this meant that Japan could rebuild and reenter the region without triggering dangerous security dilemmas.

In these ways, the US-Japan alliance and the bilateral alliance system have been more than defense arrangements—they have also served as political architecture for the wider system. Through this system, American power has been linked and rendered more predictable, while Japan has been able to reassure its neighbors, integrate into the region, and pioneer a civilian pathway to growth and influence. In effect, in the postwar era, if Japan was the Germany of East Asia, the United States played the role of France. Just as the Franco-Germany partnership was the linchpin for the reintegration of Germany into Europe, the US-Japan alliance was the linchpin for Japan's reentry into Asia. Importantly, China's unspoken support for the US-Japan alliance over the decades reflects the fact that these stabilizing and reassurance functions of the alliance were widely appreciated in the region.

Even today, as change erodes aspects of this order, it still has its virtues. Indeed, it is hard to envisage a wholly new logic of order for East Asia that is equally functional. It is difficult to imagine a peaceful and workable regional system without these bilateral security underpinnings and a continuing hegemonic presence by the United States. In the future, the challenge will be to adapt this regional order to accommodate the rise of China and the "normalization" of Japan—but do so in ways that retain the virtues of the old order.

The Return to Multipolarity

One possible future in East Asia is the return to a multipolar system of order. This is a situation in which balance replaces hegemony as the dominant mechanism for order. Such an order could be more or less stable, institutionalized, and peaceful.

Multipolarity is a description of the distribution of power and the relations among states. Three or more major states would occupy roughly equal power positions in the region. China, India, Japan, the United States, and Russia would be the major players, with South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia also involved in the multipolar mix. How such a system would operate is less clear. The centralized security environment could generate competition and arms races that could destabilize the region. But the balance-oriented organization of power could also provide countervailing pressures on China and create a more open and cooperative concert of powers.

The decision toward multipolarity would involve two sorts of movements. First, there would be a decentralization of power. It would entail a diffusion of power away from the United States. China too would rise but its power would be matched by other great powers, including India. Second, there would be a rise on new “poles.” That is, there would be several power centers, each with its own allies and clients. Each of the great powers would be a pole in a multipolar system in which smaller and secondary states would be connected. A pole is a state that organizes and assists an array of smaller and secondary states. It is a pole to the extent that other states connect to and depend on that state for various benefits and services, including stability and protection. They are geopolitical “hubs” around which less powerful states affiliate.⁶

The movement toward multipolar order in Asia would be encouraged and reinforced by the return to multipolarity at the global level. This is a development widely anticipated by scholars and pundits. This is a vision of a world order organized around one dominant power transforming into a system in which several powers exist and compete. The system loses its core. The United States loses its centrality in the operation of the wider global order.⁷ Hegemony gives way to shifting security ties and competing geopolitical centers of gravity. The American alliance system loses its coherence, and other states and regional powers—China, India, Russia, the EU, and so forth—gain positions of power and leadership within various regional spheres.

What would be the consequences of multipolarity—globally and within Asia—for patterns of conflict and cooperation? The American hegemonic order could simply yield to an international system where several leading states or centers of power establish their own economic and security spheres. The global order would become a less unified and coherent system of rules and institutions, while regional orders emerge as relatively distinct, divided, and competitive geopolitical spheres.

This fragmented order might devolve into several competing subsystems, each connected to its own leading state. These could be regional blocs or they could be nongeographical coalitions of states that trade and affiliate together. The borders of these groupings could be more or less exclusive and preferential. The breakdown in American-led liberal international order might be relatively mild in which preferential barriers between groups of states are low but still consequential. The global system could fragment into rival political-economic strategic networks. States—and the groups and firms within them—are able to operate both within and across these networks. But over time, political and economic affairs become increasingly routed through these rival coalitions. The global system is not closed or devoid of multilateral rules, but it is fragmented into subsystems of networked relationships.

Within Asia, a multipolar order could be dangerous and conflict-prone. The great powers in the region would be more or less independent geopolitical actors. The danger and instability would come if the regional powers felt insecure and ignited an arms race. Alliances and America's extended deterrent would give way to states seeking their own security. This might even involve insecurity that drives Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. It is not heartening to note that the European great powers found themselves over several centuries engaged in security competition and war until they found ways to build a stable balance of power system. East Asia would be entering this process without a long regional history of great power balancing.

On the other hand, a multipolar system of great powers in Asia could produce a stable balance that kept the peace. The distribution of power would be sufficiently diffused among several states that no one state—such as China—would be able to reach for regional dominance. Coalitions of states would form and reform in ways that prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. Likewise, the fact that most of the major powers in Asia have nuclear weapons—China, India, Russia, and the United States—the threat of war would be muted. In

Europe, the great powers developed norms of restraint and accommodation that facilitated stable relations.⁸ An Asia with four or five major powers could develop the same norms of mutual respect and forbearance.

But there are some doubts about the likelihood that Asia will move toward a full-scale balance of power system. China and the United States remain substantially more powerful than the other states, and these imbalances will continue to grow as China's economy and military capabilities grow. Japan is not likely to play a truly independent great power role in the next few decades. At the same time, the American alliance system shows no dramatic signs of eroding. The rise of China has had the effect of providing more than a few states in the region with a rationale for holding on to the American security partnership. There are affinities between the democracies that reinforce these alliance patterns. As a result, an old-style balance of power system based on a multipolar distribution of power is not likely.

Democratic-Autocratic Divide

A second possible future in East Asia is a region divided between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. The United States and its democratic allies would begin to organize themselves to counter illiberal adversaries, and Asia would be split down the middle. This ideological and geopolitical fracturing of East Asia would lead to rising regional conflict and impose severe upper limits on regional and global cooperation.

According to some, the world is not marching along a common path toward liberal democracy. Rather it is polarizing into camps and there is growing rivalry between the old Western democracies and authoritarian states, most notably China and Russia. Unlike the autocracies that failed so spectacularly in the twentieth century, the new autocracies are said to be not only compatible with capitalist success but perhaps even to be a rival alternative form of capitalism. Unlike their predecessors, the new autocracies show new forms of adaptiveness and resilience as market economies. But like their predecessors, these autocracies are said to be intrinsically hostile to democratic states and liberal internationalism and harbor far-reaching revisionist ambitions.⁹

Several recent developments seem to support this emerging view. Democratic transitions have stalled and reversed. In China, the

Communist Party dictatorship has weathered domestic challenges while presiding over decades of rapid economic growth and capitalist modernization. Rising oil prices have empowered authoritarian regimes. In Russia, the Putin government has rolled back democratic gains and appears increasingly autocratic. At the same time, relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated from the near amity of the early post-Cold War era. Relations between China and the West remain contentious with divisions over Taiwan, human rights, and oil access. And much less powerful autocratic states, such as Venezuela and Iran, are destabilizing revisionists in their regions. There even appear to be signs that these autocratic states may increasingly make common cause against the hegemonic Western states with nascent alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Council. This newly conflictual international setting has returned the United Nations—particularly the Security Council—back to its Cold War paralysis. In this view, the liberal West confronts a bleak future in which its values and interests are fundamentally contested.

Various leaders and experts have offered visions of a coalition of democracies. Former Prime Minister Aso, in his position as foreign minister, articulated a notion of an Asian “arc of freedom and prosperity” that would bring the region and global democracies closer together. This was a “values” strategy aimed at strengthening Japanese cooperation with Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and putting Japan in a position to exert more leadership in the region. As Aso put it, “I firmly believe that Japan must make its ties even firmer with friendly nations that share the common views and interests, namely, of course, the United States as well as Australia, India, and the member states of the EU and NATO, and at the same time with these friends towards the expansion of this ‘arc of freedom and prosperity.’”¹⁰ American experts have also sketched an agenda for a stronger strategic collaboration among the democracies in Asia.¹¹

Important foreign policy implications follow from this view of a coming democratic-autocratic divide. One of the most prominent proponents of this view, Robert Kagan, insists that it is time for the United States and the other liberal democracies to abandon as illusion their optimistic expectations, hopes, and programs for global convergence, engagement, and cooperation. Instead, the liberal democracies should strengthen ties among themselves, perhaps even through a formal League of Democracies. And they should gird themselves for increasing rivalry and conflict with the resurgent

autocracies.¹² Containment not engagement, military rivalry not arms control, balance of power not concert of power are the guide posts for an American foreign policy appropriate to this coming geopolitical divide.

The spectacular rates of capitalist growth in autocratic China and the reassertion of an authoritarian central state in Russia combined with economic growth have reopened the great debate about the trajectory of modern societies. These developments suggest that there are multiple paths in capitalist modernity and that authoritarian states are quite compatible with capitalism. This implies that there is no inevitable connection between the economic liberalization associated with capitalism and economic globalization, on the one hand, and political liberalization associated with liberal democracy and limited government constitutionalism, on the other. Within the two centuries' sweep of the debate over industrial modernity, the autocratic revival thesis represents a broadening from the "end of history" position but—importantly—accepts that it is capitalism not socialism that is the solely viable economic system.

The autocratic return has also triggered a reassessment of the sources of failure in earlier autocratic states. Historian Azar Gat has argued that the earlier failure of authoritarian capitalist states was due to contingent factors rather than some deep misfit between industrial capitalism and closed authoritarian political systems. He argues that the failure of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan—both of which were capitalist states—resulted from their insufficient territorial size and industrial base rather than some deeper flaw in their logic.¹³ Conversely, the Anglo-American victory derived not from the advantages of liberal democratic political institutions but rather from their greater size in territory, population, and economic output. In short, the "selection out" of these earlier authoritarian capitalist states was inappropriately attributed by the liberal narrative to intrinsic weaknesses rather than contingent circumstance.

The implication of this view is that Asia will break into competing ideological camps. The liberal democracies will be allied, perhaps led by the United States. China will provide the leadership and geopolitical heft for the rival camp. Both China and the United States will offer alternative models of modernity and development. There will be a Washington model and a Beijing model. China will develop its own allies as states within Asia and outside the region move toward illiberal and authoritarian styles of development. The result could be

a new Cold War conflict: a long-term struggle between two visions of modernity.

It is, however, doubtful whether China—as the leading authoritarian capitalist state—really can offer a fundamental nonliberal vision of the future. Of course, some analysts think that China is developing such a global hegemonic vision. Journalist Martin Jacques argues that China is adopting the trappings of Western capitalism but it is pioneering a very different form of hegemony—illiberal, hierarchical, and culturally based—that amounts to a sharp movement away from the Western logic of liberal modernization. China will rule the world and will do so on very different terms.¹⁴ But China has already made moves to integrate within the world capitalist system. As scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, “What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”¹⁵ The result is that China is already increasingly working within rather than outside of this liberal international order. It is seeking to increase its status and authority within the existing system rather than laying the foundation for exerting leadership in an alternative world order.¹⁶

More generally, when we look at the overall situation in China and Russia, we find that there is little evidence for the emergence of a stable equilibrium between capitalism and autocracy that can be dignified as a new model or pathway of modernity. Compared to where these countries were several decades ago, they have made remarkably great progress in throwing off centuries of accumulated economic and political backwardness, and by the yardstick of world historical change they have moved and are moving in directions consistent with the liberal modernization narrative. Russia and China are not liberal democracies but they are much more liberal and democratic than they have ever been, and many of the crucial foundations for sustainable liberal democracy are emerging. To be sure, for Russia, the cushion of plentiful oil and gas is retarding political liberalization; high energy prices and exports help subsidize bad government. But China has no such luxury as it faces an array of developmental restraints, most notably overpopulation, environmental decay, and energy dependence. In the final analysis, autocracy’s deep intrinsic flaws are an impediment to the realization of the full modern development sought by the people of these countries.

American and Chinese Dual Hegemonies

A third future of East Asia would be a regional order in which the United States and China would build a region-wide system of dual leadership. Each would have its own functional hegemonic advantages. The United States would remain dominant in the security sphere and China would emerge as a regional economic leader. At the same time, the two regional powers would find alignments of interests that would create incentives to forge a stable system of regional leadership.

This possible future begins with the observation made earlier, that the United States and China both increasingly stand at the top of different functional hierarchies. American alliances continue to dominate the security order in East Asia, and the rise of China will only reinforce these security ties. But China increasingly sits at the center of the regional economic order. Countries are increasingly dependent on Chinese imports and exports. This situation undercuts efforts.

Also reinforcing dual hegemonic leadership is the extraordinary interdependence that the United States and China have developed. It is clearer today than ever before that each needs the other's cooperation—grudging or otherwise—to realize its own goals. China needs the American domestic market and Washington's continued commitment to uphold an open world trading system. It needs investment and a stable regional and international environment—which only the United States, more than any other state, can make possible. The United States relies heavily on Chinese willingness to hold its debt and work within existing Western-oriented rules and institutions. Chinese cooperation is essential in America's efforts to combat the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The sudden rise of this mutual dependence is striking. The United States has become China's great trade partner, which is essential to China's trade-driven strategy of development. American consumption is tied to China's cheap exports. The United States borrows and consumes. China produces and saves. The result is a symbiotic relationship. As Kenneth Lieberthal describes, "The problem is that high American personal consumption and high Chinese personal savings are directly linked, each enabling the other. Effectively, the United States has borrowed China's savings to finance personal consumption. At the same time, China has accumulated the money to maintain high savings and makes loans to the United States by producing goods that Americans buy with their consumer dollars."¹⁷

This mutual dependency has created massive imbalances that both countries will have trouble unwinding. China needs to find new ways to grow without relying on American consumers who spend with borrowed money. It needs to expand its own domestic demand. The United States needs to find ways to increase its saving over the long run.¹⁸ Over the next decades, China and the United States will be thrown together finding ways to manage their joint problems, consulting on macroeconomic adjustment policies and the wider set of economic policies. The new Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which met in Washington in July 2009, is the harbinger of the new strategic partnership.

Beyond macroeconomic policy cooperation, China and the United States share a range of common interests that will draw them together in closer forms of cooperation—along with other countries in the region. These are global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization. Both China and the United States—as well as Japan, India, and Europe—are heavily dependent on imported oil, suggesting an alignment of interest against petroleum exporting autocracies, such as Russia and Iran. These states have a common interest in price stabilization and supply security that could be the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic and democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but is also likely to be a prominent victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. China's rapid industrialization and its consequent local and regional pollution means that it, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building.

The United States and China also have common security interests in the promotion of stable, rule-governed societies in the developing world. There is a deep shift in the global system that scholars call growing "security interdependence." It is harder and harder for countries to achieve security without the help of others. Globalization and technological revolutions are making it increasingly necessary

to cooperate with neighboring countries to achieve security. Today, where terrorists can gain access to massive violence capabilities and project them worldwide, security interdependence has taken a new leap forward. As Robert Cooper puts it, “the world may be globalized but it is run by states. Spaces with no one in control are a nightmare for those who live there, a haven for criminals and a danger to the rest of us.” Put simply, in the coming age, there are more and more people in more places around the world who can matter to China’s and America’s security. The United States and China should have a growing common interest in ensuring that states in troubled parts of the world are stable and well governed.

The problem with this vision of Asia’s future is that it misses the global scope of America’s hegemonic position. The United States occupies a commanding position at the global level in the provision of security. Its security partnerships ring the world. In Asia, it has an array of deeply institutionalized alliance and client partners. Japan, of course, sits at the center of this American-led regional hegemonic order. The rise of China will only reinforce the usefulness of these partnerships as a hedge on future Chinese behavior. The United States will have obligations to other Asian states. Other states in the region will resist a cohegemonic system of regional governance. The United States and China will surely have important and expanding reasons to cooperate. But it will be done in a more complicated regional and global order.

Conclusion

There are several possible pathways for Asia. One possibility is that China gradually comes to dominate regional institutions, reducing American influence and the pivotal role of the US-led bilateral security pacts. This could happen if regional institutions that exclude the United States—such as ASEAN plus 3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—emerge as serious regional entities. This is not a likely outcome. America’s allies are not likely to accept this evolution in East Asian regionalism. A more likely evolution in East Asian regionalism is a growing pluralism of regional groupings and associations. The region already is marked by this multilayered regionalism. No singular regional organization—an “EU of Asia”—is in the offing. There are simply too many divergent and complex problems that call for different sorts of regional mechanisms and groupings. East Asia will not follow a European pathway.

Almost certainly, the United States and China will struggle and compete for leadership within Asia. The region will become more decentralized and complex. It will not be a straightforward hegemonic order or a traditional balance of power system. It will retain and evolve aspects of both. The United States and China will surely compete for friends and allies in the region. There will also be realms of order in East Asia that are built around consent and mutual agreement. Balance, command, and consent will also make appearances in the evolution of East Asian order from old to new.

In this regard, it is very likely that the United States will actually get further involved in the region, as it is invited by smaller states—from Korea to the ASEAN countries—to play a counterweight role to China. The United States has a long tradition of playing the “offshore” balancing role, and its global system of alliances and security partnerships are easily expandable. At the same time, China is increasingly the center of economic activity in the region, and countries will continue to orient themselves toward trade and investment with China. The result of these dual developments is an interesting bifurcation of economic and security relationships. The Eagle is the source of security and the Dragon is the source of economic opportunity. These dynamics will continue to push and pull the region and shape its future.

The challenge of the United States is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains along the way. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike with China is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s accepting and accommodating Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie down and bind China to the wider region. China has already grasped the utility of this strategy in recent years—and it is now actively seeking to reassure and co-opt its neighbors by offering to embed itself in regional institutions such as the ASEAN plus 3 and Asian Summit. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II, building and operating within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions—thereby making itself more predictable and approachable, and reducing the incentives that other states would otherwise have to resist or undermine the United States by building countervailing coalitions.

Notes

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1. For an account of America's so-called pivot to East Asia, see Jeffrey A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012).
2. This section draws on G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
3. International order in this sense involves shared and stable expectations among states about how they will interact with each other. Hedley Bull has defined political order as "a pattern [in relations among actors] that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values." Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics*, third edition (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2003), 3–4.
4. See Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman D. Levin, Julia F. Lowell, and Angel Rabasa, *Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise* (Washington, DC: Rand, 2008).
5. See also G. John Ikenberry, "Asian Regionalism and the Future of U.S. Strategic Engagement with China," in Kurt Campbell, ed., *America, China, and East Asia* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009).
6. For a survey of the literature on polarity, see Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004).
7. The National Intelligence Council's recent survey of global change sees the "return to multipolarity" as the master trend of the coming decades. As the report argues, "by 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one." "Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken." See *Global Trends 2025* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), iv.
8. Realist accounts of great power balancing and the evolution of its practices and principles include Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812–22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
9. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of the Autocratic Revival," *Foreign Affairs* (January–February 2009): 77–93.
10. Foreign Minister Taro Aso's speech before the Japanese Institute for International Affairs, November 30, 2006.

11. See, for example, Michael Green, "Democracy and the Balance of Power in Asia," *American Interest* (September–October 2006): 95–102.
12. Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008).
13. Azar Gat, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (July–August 2007): 56–69.
14. Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western Order and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin, 2009). See also Mark Leonard, *What Does China Want?* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2008); and Eva Paus, Penelope B. Prime, and Jon Western, eds., *Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game?* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
15. Marc Lanteigne, *China and International Institutions: Alternative Paths to Global Power* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
16. This is the view of Yong Deng, who argues that China's foreign policy is fundamentally oriented toward gaining greater status and recognition in the international system but not seeking a radical reorganization of its underlying organizational principles. The aim is to gain position and respect within the existing system and work with American hegemonic leadership. As Deng suggests, since the late-1990s, the Chinese government has been more concerned "over how the U.S. hegemony is managed than over the power configuration itself." See Yong Deng, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 44.
17. Kenneth Lieberthal, "The U.S.-China Agenda Goes Global," *Current History* (September 2009): 247.
18. See Niall Ferguson, "Team 'Chimera,'" *Washington Post*, November 17, 2008, A19.

Japan's Foreign Policy Line after the Cold War*

Takashi Inoguchi

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has long been searching for a new foreign policy to reflect the change from a bipolar system.¹ Following its convincing defeat in World War II, Japan developed what was later called the Yoshida Doctrine, named after the architect of postwar Japanese foreign policy line, Shigeru Yoshida.² The Yoshida Doctrine is often summarized as doing business for business sake, but with the business of the state being left on the shoulders of the United States. For the first 15 years after 1945, the Japanese public was not entirely persuaded that the Yoshida Doctrine offered the best approach. Rather the opposition captured the postwar pacifist zeitgeist.³ The government was not able to fulfill its own security function, apart from carrying out disaster relief and providing auxiliary assistance in the form of space and freedom to the US forces stationed in, and coming to, Japan, especially during the Korean War, 1950–1953. Thus the Japan-US alliance experienced a bumpy road for a while.

Yet with Japan's miraculous economic rise by the 1960s, Japanese public opinion had shifted to embrace more fully the alliance. The United States fought the Vietnam War, 1966–1973, without being hindered critically by the antiwar pacifism in Japan. The opposition's strategy focused on domestic economic policy of higher wages and shorter work hours.⁴ Meanwhile, the Cold War bipolarity remained

intact. The primary function of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) was to add to US-led deterrence efforts against the Soviet Union. Its focus was anti-Soviet tank forces stationed on the frontier islands of Hokkaido and to support US forces responsible for carrying out the hub-and-spoke operations in the Asia-Pacific. The oil crises of 1973–1974 and 1979–1980 did not cause the bipolar system to break down. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union focused on strategic nuclear forces in the 1970s and 1980s and occurred within the bipolar structure.⁵ The Japan-US alliance under such structural conditions led Japan to develop the notion of it being a systemic supporter of the US-led international system, in tandem with Japan's rise to number two in GNP (gross national product) in the world. Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister from 1983 to 1987, reportedly characterized Japan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the US side in the bipolar competition.⁶

The sudden collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant the disappearance of bipolarity in world politics. At least one of the structural premises of Japan's alliance with the United States seemed to be gone. Yet, in reality, the aim and scope of the alliance was not particularly specified, thereby enabling it to adapt with flexibility to the changing international circumstances.⁷ The alliance looked adrift,⁸ but this was not entirely the case. In the 1990s, Japan moved in two directions. First, it became involved in UN peacekeeping operations and other activities.⁹ Amid the end of the Cold War uncertainties, the role of the UN was highlighted in Japan as well. The disappearance of bipolarity loosened the restraint of third world countries to act in order to get support from either one of the former bipolar powers. Civil wars became rampant in the developing world. So, naturally the role of the United Nations (UN) increased in importance, especially with the appointment of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Second, Japan became active in invigorating the alliance's functions. To Japan the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of communism in its regional politics—China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia practice this ideology. In particular, a Deng Xiaoping-led China heightened Japanese awareness that only a two-to-four-hours flight separated it from this power.¹⁰ Dynastic communist North Korea also created a sense of insecurity with its combination of dire poverty and desperate aspiration for nuclear development.¹¹ On the global stage, the United States waged the Gulf War in 1991 and faced anti-US terrorism in conspicuous terms under the Clinton administration.

In the new millennium, the events of 9/11 shattered governments' thinking about terrorism. Japan was frightened in a way that it had not experienced since 1941 when the United States attacked frontally. The Afghan War also gave many Japanese a sense that the United States had entered another Vietnam War. Then came the United States' Iraq War, a third Vietnam War. Japan aligned its defense posture in the 2000s to support the United States' defense posture.¹² The structure and orientation of the armed forces has been shifting from land-focused to maritime- and air-focused, from northern-focused (Soviet Union) to southern-focused (China). It must be noted, however, that Japan's defense expenditure maintained more or less a flat line over the past two decades (Defense Ministry, 2011). The US imperial overstretch¹³ undermined the boast of unipolarity in the United States. For the two decades after the Cold War, it is safe to say that the Japanese foreign policy line continues to be anchored by the Yoshida Doctrine, although considerable, if not major, modifications have been introduced. Next, I discuss Japanese foreign policy doctrine after the Cold War.

Three Pillars of Japanese Foreign Policy Post–Cold War

Three features are dominant in Japan's foreign policy after the Cold War. First, the recognition that Japan is a global power has been widely shared among leaders but less so among masses.¹⁴ Whether Japan is recognized as such outside of its borders is a moot point. Internationally, Japan is often portrayed as a mostly quiet and low-key actor whose influence is appreciated only mildly in the opinion polls by Pew, BBC, CNN, and the AsiaBarometer Survey. Second, Japan recognizes its role as a supporter of the US-led system,¹⁵ which is the combination of the Japan-US security alliance, the Bretton Woods, and the UN. Third, Japan has been perennially plagued by what may be called ontological insecurity because of its past, especially in relation to its conduct during war and colonialism.¹⁶

Self-Recognition of Japan as a Global Power

The global power status is vindicated by its economic strength as reflected by economic fundamentals. Japan's economic power is widely acknowledged as enabling it to be a global power. Its gross domestic product ranks third after the United States and China;

Japan's economic fundamentals and related indicators are strong; per capita national domestic product is high; the level of technology indispensable in navigating the ocean of globalized competition and uncertainty is generally very high; its currency, the Japanese yen, is sought globally as a dependable, stable currency as indicated by the high exchange rates vis-à-vis other currencies such as the US dollar, the euro, the British pound; Japan is the largest creditor country after China; Japanese foreign direct investment has been on the steady increase as its currency drives business abroad; Japanese savings have been high albeit on a gradual decrease; and although Japanese government deficits are extraordinary large, its negative impact has been alleviated by the similarly extraordinary amount of government bond sales mostly among Japanese nationals.

Thus equipped, the per capita national income level of Japan has not decreased substantially despite long periods of recession since the early 1990s. Its industrial and economic infrastructure has been renewed more or less during the past two decades; its national health indicators, such as infantile death rate, have been remarkable, and average longevity has been on the steady increase, registering second after Iceland; its environmental indicators, such as emission of CO₂ and other pollutants in the air, water, food, buildings, and roads, are reasonably regulated at low levels; even the 2011 nuclear-disaster-related pollutant is assiduously monitored, substantially reduced, and more or less controlled; and national crime rates have been kept very low, with those punished through imprisonment numbering around just 70,000 (compared to some 2 million or more in the United States).

The state constitution stipulates that Japan seeks an honorable place in the community of nations. The government recognizes that Japan is a global power and acts accordingly. Its attempt to get a permanent position in the UN Security Council in the early 2000s is a case in point. Although it ended in failure, Japan's aspiration is alive and well. Its economic, technological, and financial power cannot be disputed. Its weaknesses as a global power are military and political components. The military aspects of its weakness are widely known. Its constitution and zeitgeist of the Japanese public discourage armed buildups, except for self-defense purposes. Yet its JSDF are well armed with very high-tech weaponry and are well trained, especially in coordinated operations with the United States, albeit without combat experience. Surrounded by five military powers—the United States, China, South and North Korea, and Russia—Japan has been consolidating its JSDF according to the changing environments while

maintaining a moderate defense budget in relation to its GNP. Japan's weaknesses include the lack of nuclear weapons and missiles, and aircraft carriers and submarines, and the general ability to project power overseas in terms of weapons and trained personnel. China's nuclear power has established a quasi-equilibrium vis-à-vis the United States in the Asia-Pacific with its long-range missiles targeting most US military bases on the Korean peninsula and the Japan archipelagoes (Yan, 2006¹⁷). North Korea conducted a third nuclear test in 2013, and this gave North Korea the potential to target Japan. In 2011, China built its first aircraft carrier and with plans to build more, China will gain the capacity to act more globally. A critical component is how Japan copes with China and North Korea in the context of the reputed decline of the United States and its highly orchestrated US "return to Asia" strategy.¹⁸

No less easy to surmount is Japan's political power. Japan's political weakness is summarized as a fragmented power center at the highest level. Japan, having not been subject to colonization for any considerable duration by foreign powers, except briefly by the Allied Powers (1945–1952), its politics have retained a premodern structural feature, meaning power fragmentation and consensus building, which often prevents Japanese politicians and bureaucrats from acting promptly in unison in moments of crises and emergencies.¹⁹ The abortion of absolutism, Japanese style, occurred in 1584 when Oda Nobunaga, a military unifier of the warring states period in Japan, was assassinated.²⁰ Tokugawa Ieyasu, a final victor of the warring states period, shaped the framework and structure of modern Japan on the basis of a fragmented power center and a consensus-building process in decision making at the highest level of politics. Henry Kissinger²¹ belongs to the group of scholars who point to Japanese slowness in decision making. In *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (2002), Kissinger has given three examples of this pattern: (1) After Commodore Perry of the US Navy conducted coercive naval diplomacy, it took 15 years for Japan to open its country and initiate the policy of "rich nation, strong state"; (2) After Japan's resounding defeat in World War II, it took another 15 years for the Japanese public to accept the security alliance with the United States; (3) After the collapse of the economic bubble in 1991, Kissinger predicted, it would take an additional 15 years before the Japanese public would accept government spending as a fix for financial failures. In retrospect, Kissinger turned out to be correct in the third case as well. With power fragmentation comes the relative weaknesses of high-level professional competence

and organizational transparency and accountability in political parties and bureaucratic agencies.

Other Japanese strengths are no less important as a global power. First, it has close ties with the United States. Quarrelling with the number one superpower, even if reputed to be in a slow decline, would require a lot of unproductive energy. Second, the economic, technological, and financial strengths of Japan are globally acknowledged. Economically, Japan's GNP ranks third in the world. Technologically, its excellence, as measured by published scientific papers, is ranked fourth, after the United States, China, and Germany. Financially, Japan is the largest creditor country after China. A high exchange rate for the Japanese yen attests to this strength. Third, Japan is ubiquitously portrayed as having a moderately positive reputation in global opinion polls like Pew, BBC, CNN, AsiaBarometer Survey, and Gallup International.

During the 20-year recession that started in 1991 and is often referred to as the "lost two decades" in Japan, government and business made two key achievements. First, Japanese business took advantage of the long recession to go abroad, dispersing the risks and maximizing benefits where opportunities abound. Japanese business has been "Asianized" in the sense that it has become ubiquitous throughout Asia, whether through foreign direct investment, exports of key components and key materials for final products, or imports of key natural resources. One significant point to note is that in terms of final products, Japan has been reducing its profile, whereas in terms of key components and key materials that are used to produce final products, Japan has loomed very large and strong in the whole world, especially in Asia. Here the term "two decades lost" is misleading. Japanese business has been focusing on research and development to reduce costs and to improve quality. For instance, Shin Nihon Seitetsu (New Japan Steel) has reduced the sales of total steel production, but it has gained dominance in terms of special variations of steel in which innovation achieved remains difficult to emulate in India, China, or South Korea. Biyadi, a Chinese car manufacturer, has been forced to shift its focus to hybrid vehicle production from electric vehicle production, because it cannot produce with extreme high precision a consistent and massive quantity of good lithium ion storage batteries. At the 2011 Guangzhou Automobile Show, the electric vehicle was de facto marginalized, a fact that prompted Premier Wen Jiabao to ask why not the electric vehicle. Samsung, the world's largest factory of semiconductor and liquid crystal, located in Gumi,

Gyongsangbukdo, where late President Park Chung Hee was born and raised, operated until recently only with the massive import from Japan of silicon wafers and rare gas. This is not an isolated case. The perennial trade deficits of South Korea vis-à-vis Japan are primarily due to the former's inability to indigenously carry out innovation of manufacturing key components and key materials. Two sales-winning aircraft, Boeing 787 and Airbus 380, both rely on wings composed of complex carbon fiber that are manufactured by Toyo Tanso (Oriental Carbon). Carbon fiber for wings is extremely strong for producing insulators.²²

Second, Japanese business has been able to reduce energy costs significantly. Not only energy supply but also energy efficiency have been achieved in the last two decades! Innovation achieved is so extensive that business firms can now manufacture products with great efficiency. Energy supply has been largely resolved through achieving energy efficiency. Steel production once involved the use hundreds of thousands of tons of water. But nowadays only one-tenth or one-hundredth of water usage is attributed to the manufacturing of special kinds of steel. The same applies to the use of electric power for manufacturing special kinds of steel. Although nuclear energy supply was hampered by the Fukushima I nuclear disaster, energy supply has been secured largely through higher energy efficiency, plus the return of thrifty habits for hard times.

Self-Recognition of Japan as a Supporter of the US-Led World Order

Japan's supporter position in the global system is solid. The security alliance with the United States has been very adaptive to the changing configuration of power and wealth.²³ The Japan-US Security Treaty does not specify the aims and areas where the alliance is valid. Hence, it is sometimes called the alliance for all four seasons. It has weathered many wars and many crises. The Korean War and the Vietnam War would not have been waged more or less successfully by the United States without the supporting policy of Japan with regard to free use of military bases and repair and supply stations. Japan in its supporter position helped in the execution of antiterrorist wars and the Gulf, Afghan, and Iraq wars. It was not easy for Japan to take this position because its dependence on oil from the Middle East was so prohibitively high. Most recently, in 2012, Japan's support of the UN Security Council sanctions against Iran on nuclear

weapons development was acknowledged, as more than 80 percent of Japan's oil comes through the Strait of Hormuz. More directly to the Japanese public, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear disaster occasioned the large rescue operations known as the Operation *Tomodachi* by the US armed forces along the coast of the Tohoku region. The Japanese public appreciated very much the US readiness to deploy a very large number of soldiers and sailors. In fact, pro-American sentiments reached 82 percent,²⁴ the highest figure since the Cold War.

Japan's supporting position on economic and financial areas related to the US-led global system is more straightforward. Japan has been steadfastly and consistently taking common positions with the United States on all matters concerned with the free trade system of the World Trade Organization, the dollar-centered currency system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and associated organizations, the development system of the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and associated organizations. Japan has done so solidly and meticulously, even if the impression given is of a nation eclipsing itself under the shadow of the United States if only because Japan's position is not dramatically exciting. Nonetheless, Japan has been a steadfast supporter of the US-led world order, even when the position sometimes conduces negative short-term consequences, such as supporting the Plaza Accord of 1985, which unleashed the massive supply of Japanese yen in the market under the Maekawa Report and led to the spectacular rise and collapse of the Japanese economic bubble in 1991. The very high sense of public appreciation toward the United States and the Operation *Tomodachi* does not appear to hide the feeling of uncertainty about the alliance. The latest *Yomiuri* poll conducted both in Japan and the United States gives a pervasive feeling of anxiety with respect to Japan-US relations (table 2.1).²⁵

According to Question A, the positive perception of bilateral relations is smaller to the negative perception, 35 percent positive versus 41 percent negative. Those who chose "trust very much" or "trust more or less" amount to 47 percent, whereas those who chose "do not trust very much" or "do not trust a bit" represent 42 percent. The positive answer is larger than the negative answer. However, one cannot overlook the respondents who did not answer the question, 12 percent.

A similar set of questions about bilateral relations with China is also posed to respondents. The responses make clear that Japanese

Table 2.1 Japan-US Joint Public Opinion Poll

		<i>Do not answer the question</i>	<i>Very bad</i>	<i>bad</i>	<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Very good</i>	
Ques. A	“Do you think relations between Japan and the United States are good or bad?”	Japanese respondents	5	4	37	20	34	1
		American respondents	6	2	6	34	41	11
		<i>Did not answer the question</i>	<i>Do not trust a bit</i>	<i>Do not trust much</i>		<i>Trust more or less</i>	<i>Trust very much</i>	
Ques. B	“Do you trust or do not trust the United States?”	Japanese respondents	12	7	35		42	5
		American respondents	1	14	17		51	16
		<i>Do not answer the question</i>	<i>Very bad</i>	<i>Bad</i>	<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Very good</i>	
Ques. C	“Do you think bilateral relations between Japan and China are good or bad?”	Japanese respondents	5	8	53	18	16	–
		American respondents	2	5	17	48	25	4
		<i>Do not answer the question</i>	<i>Do not trust a bit</i>	<i>Do not trust much</i>		<i>Trust more or less</i>	<i>Trust very much</i>	
Ques. D	“Do you trust or do not trust China?”	Japanese respondents	7	30	55		8	1
		American respondents	2	30	34		32	2

Source: *Yomiuri Online*, December 18, 2011; <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20111218.htm> (Accessed January 10, 2012).

are uncertain and full of anxieties about the future relations with the United States and China. Japanese perceptions of bilateral relations with China and the degree of trust in China are possibly the worst since 1972 when both countries normalized diplomatic relations.

One of the pronounced features of the troubled triangle is the duality between security and economy. The question posed to Japanese and Americans respondents are given in table 2.1.1.

Question G, “Which country do you think exerts stronger influence in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States or China?” proves this. As reflected in the perception of Japanese respondents, the United States becomes politically more important (55 percent versus 32 percent), whereas China becomes economically more important (67 percent versus 21 percent). As reflected in the perception of American respondents, the duality is less clear: China is both politically more important (52 percent versus 42 percent) and economically much more important (69 percent versus 24 percent).

Thus, the overall perceptions of Japanese and American respondents on influences in the Asia-Pacific region are similar: China exerts larger influences in the Asia-Pacific region—68 percent versus 21 percent in Japan compared to 74 percent versus 23 percent in the United States.²⁶

How best to construct Japanese foreign policy line given the structural duality between security and economy is at the crux of the problem for Japan. The complexity is further heightened when the United States raises the issue of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agenda. When Japanese-Chinese economic relations are deemed to become more important than Japan-US economic relations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership may serve well as a counterbalance in the opposite direction. In particular, it should moderate the duality. However, one cannot overlook the Japanese respondents who did “not answer the question” (18 percent). If you add those negative respondents and those who did not answer the question and make them a broadly negative response, then the positive and broadly negative answers are the same, 50 percent versus 50 percent.²⁷ It appears that the Japanese are perplexed about the huge uncertainty posed by the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its estimated merits and demerits in terms of both economic and political impacts.

One Internet-based poll, Japan and World Trends, run by Akio Kawato, a former diplomat, registers a possibly more nuanced distribution of Japanese public preferences toward Japanese foreign policy line more directly than major polls like the one conducted by *Yomiuri*.

Table 2.1.1 Japan-US Joint Public Opinion Poll

			<i>United States</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Both are important</i>	<i>Do not answer the question</i>
Ques. E	“Of the United States (Japan) and China, which country do you think becomes more important in politics?”	Japanese respondents	55	–	32	5	8
		American respondents	–	42	52	1	5
			<i>United States</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>Both are important</i>	<i>Do not answer the question</i>
Ques. F	“Of the United States (Japan) and China, which country do you think becomes more important in economics?”	Japanese respondents	21	–	67	5	8
		American respondents	–	24	69	2	4

Source: *Yomiuri Online*, December 18, 2011; <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20111218.htm> (Accessed January 10, 2012).

Table 2.2 Results of One-Click Voting (February 28, 2012)

<i>“Where the power disparity between the United States and China narrows, which of the following options do you think is the best?”</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Neutrality with the current level of armed buildup	20.07
Neutrality after nonnuclear armed buildup	13.38
Neutrality with nuclear armed buildup	21.40
Japan-US security alliance kept as the fundamental pillar plus friendship with China managed	27.42
Japan, being an Asian country, should construct a community with China, not allowing Americans and Europeans to interfere	11.04
Other schemes	6.69

The question asked in the Internet poll was, “When the power disparity between the United States and China narrows, which of the following options do you think is the best?” (responses 99) (table 2.2).²⁸

It comes as a no-small surprise to find that many respondents (54.85 percent) choose various schemes of neutrality (options 1, 2, and 3 combined). Option 1 is similar to the pacifist policy line of the leftist parties in the 1940s and 1950s. It may not be sustainable in the current context of an apparent US decline and a possibly aggressive rise of China. Option 2 may be similar to the government policy if one can detach the alliance with the United States from defense buildup efforts. Without the alliance the option may not be sustainable. Option 3 is unthinkable in the sense of Herman Kahn. Whether option 3 is sustainable or not is a moot question. Whether option 3 is productive or not is also a moot question. Still it registers a huge tidal change of thinking to have a combined 54.85 percent of respondents opting for neutrality. In a similar vein, it is not surprising that the government policy of “Japan-US security alliance kept as the fundamental pillar plus friendship with China managed” (option 4) carries no more than 27.42 percent support. When both the governing party and the largest opposition party hold the same position on this foreign policy line, it is a big surprise. The weak support for the government policy line reflects the worrisome power configuration and the perceived incompetence and ineptitude laid bare when the Japanese government handles some key issues. It is no less a surprise to see that the Asianist foreign policy line, option 5, carries as much support as 11.04 percent. The apprehension about the United States and the European Union, which used to blame Japan for its lack of ability to make astute and

agile decisions on various issues, and yet now seemingly “Japanized” for paralyzed nondecisions²⁹ leads some segments of the Japanese public to distance themselves from the United States and the European Union. If one only examines either the *Yomiuri* poll or the “Japan and World Trends” Internet poll, one might err in understanding Japanese foreign policy line after the Cold War as reassured continuity or tidal change. By reading both we can understand that the foreign policy line encompasses both basic continuity and some departure. The *Yomiuri* poll is based on one of the popular newspapers that regularly conducts polls with a large randomly sampled population, whereas the Internet poll captures young and educated segments of the population. On the whole, this Internet poll is corroborated by other poll results, such as the *Yomiuri* poll examined above. Together they seem to reflect the rapidly changing preferences of the Japanese public on the Japan-US security alliance and the Japanese foreign policy line. The whole exercise here is to show the basic continuity of keeping the alliance with the United States and the friendship with China intact albeit the significant portions of public opinion wavers, reflecting the somewhat inept handling of the US military bases and related issues by both governments.

Self-Recognition of Japan Being Plagued by Ontological Insecurity

Japanese ontological insecurity has been metamorphosing slowly and steadily but largely unnoticed. Let me illustrate the possible metamorphosis in territory, history, and other areas. On territory, Japan's position has been tough. The Japanese territory, Senkaku Islands, is regularly challenged by Chinese intrusions into the area. The Chinese “fishing boat” affair of 2010 is the latest violation of Japanese law. Yet the fact remains that the islands are controlled de facto by Japan. The steadfast positioning of the Japanese government in 2010 is reminiscent of the steadfast position the Japanese government assumed in the diplomatic normalization of Japan-China relations in 1972.³⁰ On issues of history, the South Korean president Lee Myung-bak visited Japan in December 2011, and criticized Japan for not compensating South Korean wartime sex slaves individually. The Japanese government replied that this history issue was settled in 1965 when Japan and South Korea signed the Basic Treaty of diplomatic normalization between the two countries. For Japan, the government is only honoring the treaty and all the issues included in the 1965 negotiation.

Japan's ontological insecurity stems from its development in the twentieth century: Japan achieved modernization first among non-Western countries; it joined Western powers in colonialism; and it sided with those powers in World War II that were deemed to have conducted war crimes, resulting, at least initially, in the exclusion as a full-fledged member of the UN. The question posed is, should the achievements of Japan between the mid-nineteenth century and mid-twentieth century be negated? If not, when and how did it go wrong? The Far Eastern Tribunal's verdict and thus Allied Powers' answer was that bands of military cliques derailed temporarily what had been a correct course for Japan and that Japan returned to the correct course after 1945.

Yet ambivalence remains in Japan. It has been difficult for many Japanese to admit that the war in the Pacific was entirely wrong. Yoko Kato³¹ traces each decision that led Japan into war. Kato's narrative of history is contrary to the "standard" history textbook narrative in Japan, in which only the military cliques, headed by General Hideki Tojo, wanted such a war. Two distinguished historians, the late Seizaburo Sato and Takashi Ito, refuse to call the war either the Greater East Asian War or the Pacific War. They agree that there is no better name than "that war."³²

The majority of Japanese believe that there were two wars: one among the imperialist powers and the other against Pacific Asians. In the former, Japan was no guiltier of aggression and exploitation than the others. Regarding the latter war, Japanese will admit that they were guilty of causing great suffering for Pacific Asians. The "two wars" idea is at the root of the ambivalence.

Underlying this majority sentiment is a particular conception of national identity that seeks to combine both a high level of Westernization and national solidarity. Despite "that war," Japanese tend to believe that they have been largely successful in achieving both goals set out in 1868. From the point of view of history, Japan's national identity is thoroughly embedded in the continuity and purpose of the modern history of the nation. To interpret the war as severing that continuity—in other words, to deny the modern history leading to the war as purposeless—would be tantamount to denying the national identity.

Hence, many Japanese find it difficult to dismiss "that war" as totally wrong. They invariably feel some reservations in relation to their conception of national identity and the collective memory of modern history. This explains the discrepancy between the repeated

apologies expressed almost every summer for the past two decades at the official level and the vague but widespread absence at the grassroots level of what the rest of the world may feel about genuine repentance. That lack seems to stem from a sense of skepticism about unilateral Japanese guilt for the war, and from the fact that Japanese sympathy for those who suffered from the war has not been elevated to compassion for human beings in general. Thus, suspicions about Japan's true intentions among its neighbors and other countries are slow to dispel.

The disdain many Japanese feel toward the rest of Asia is the product of modern history. Japan was the only non-Western nation that grew strong in the twentieth century without being excessively dependent on the West. Its first major military victory in 1895 against the Chinese was a major source of the disdain Japanese began to nurture vis-à-vis Pacific Asians. Japan's military victory in 1905 against czarist Russia, a Western power, further boosted their pride as a member of the Western-dominated imperialist powers and by default their disdain toward other Pacific Asians.

Economic success attained after the war reinforced Japan's sense of superiority. Japan was at its nadir in 1945, but by the mid-1960s, it had joined the OECD, a club made up of nations of the industrialized world.

The third characteristic of the Japanese relationship with Pacific Asia, detachment, derives from ambivalence. The profound cultural debt to China has nurtured a certain obsession with keeping that country at arm's length. *Kokugaku*, the tradition of nativist thought known as National Studies that developed during the Tokugawa period (1603–1867), was one such manifestation of Japan's endeavor to develop its *own* distinctive system of thought. It contains a few elements that were later to lead the Meiji state to mobilize all the nation's resources for *fukoku kyohei* (enriching the country and strengthening its army) and to assert that Japan is a supreme, divine country. The reinterpretation of Japanese history using Shinto traditions and myths in the early Meiji era is another.

The political debt incurred to other Pacific Asians during World War II has led Japanese to distance themselves from the issue whenever possible. The importance of the issue is played down by arguing that wartime debts have been settled at the government level by peace treaties and other international agreements. And Japanese can defer the salient issues by insisting on the need for more objective historical research and assessment.

These feelings of debt, disdain, and detachment dominate attitudes toward Pacific Asia and create a strong complex among Japanese on relations with other people of the region. To establish more genuinely harmonious relations with other Pacific Asians, the complex needs resolution. In the “lost two decades,” Japanese did a “return to Asia” and some of this complex has been metamorphosed to the better.

World War II is a focal point to explain Japan’s ontological insecurity. When examined through the three lenses of “democracy against fascism,” “anticolonialism against colonialism,” and “democracy against tyranny of all sorts,” the Japanese narratives that emerge are as follows.³³

The first lens of democracy fighting fascism remolded Japanese foreign policy and domestic politics post-1945. Although a substantial number of Japanese agree that World War II was a struggle by democracy against fascism, beneath this agreement lurks, no matter how weakly, the view that World War II was really a fight among imperialist powers. One may argue that Japan was one of these powers, but ultimately it was disarmed, democratized, and formed an alliance with the United States. The Japan-US Security Treaty is the regional linchpin of stability and prosperity.³⁴

Through the second lens of anticolonialism, we have seen decolonization materialize since 1945. Most Japanese agree that World War II prepared the way for the death of colonialism and the national freedom and liberation of Asia. One footnote is that Japan Westernized itself and thus avoided falling prey to Western colonialism and imperialism. Another footnote is also usually added—that Japan destroyed the Achilles’ heel of Western colonialism and imperialism, their colonies and semicolonies. The first footnote is probably easy to accept. The second footnote, however, could create trouble for several reasons.

First, Japan was imperialist and colonialist, causing havoc and calamities to East and Southeast Asia. Second, equating Japan and the Allied Powers is problematic. This equation contradicts the first lens that all the Allied Powers and thus all the UN member countries adhere to till today. Insertion of this footnote bespeaks the ambivalence of the Japanese identity. For the majority of Japanese, their modern history is a success story of Westernization, beginning in the late 1800s. Since then, the Japanese have worked industriously and ingenuously to achieve the “rich country and strong army” status, digressing from this course only in the 1930s and 1940s. This line of identity construction has the historical continuity justifying what Japan had done wrong during the war—that of aggression and

seeking its own colonies. Thus, this line of thought would not sit well with how World War II is interpreted outside Japan.

The third lens of “democracy against tyranny” appears initially to go well with Japan’s democratic and peaceful position of the past seven decades. The worry of the Japanese is that Japan could be dragged into regional clashes against tyranny and that difficult choices face the country in its steadfast alliance with the United States. In a permissive environment of unipolarity, the US promotion of democracy in China, North Korea, and Myanmar has seen a vindicationist rather than an exemplarist strategy.³⁵ This strategy is militarily aggressive and politically less than adequately contextualized, therefore, imprudently unilateralist. This strategy attempts to alter the politics and economics of many targeted countries by overwhelming military strikes. The development since 2005 of closer linkages in US-Japan political and defense cooperation give Japanese pause for concern. Japan does not want to further aggravate the relationship with China or North Korea, but its US alliance must be kept steadfast. The future may force Japan to choose sides, but for today Japan’s position is that democracy, peace, and prosperity must be the wave for the future in Asia.

The significance of World War II is great and complex to Japan. Its current foreign policy and domestic politics cannot be discussed without even a most cursory reference to this event. Life would be much easier for the Japanese government and people, even if one of the three lenses fits nicely with their construction of their memory, history, and identity. The outpouring of emotions and private histories on August 15 of every year in traditional and online media platforms attests to the struggle the Japanese narrative of the three lenses presents.

Was Leadership Change Prompted by Foreign Policy Needs?

Over the past two decades (i.e., since the end of the Cold War), Japan has had 17 prime ministers (table 2.3). The conventional understanding of leadership change is that weak leaders have to be replaced for domestic reasons, personal incompetence, and ineptitude. A number of factors explain the frequent change of prime ministers in Japan after the Cold War. They include (1) long economic downturns; (2) electoral system change (from choosing two-to-five persons as winners in the medium-sized district to choosing one winner in the small district combined with the proportional representation system);

Table 2.3 Profile of 17 Prime Ministers Who Coped with Foreign Policy (1989–2012)

<i>Prime Ministers</i>	<i>Headache Factors to Prime Ministers</i>
Takeshita	Japan-US trade disputes; consumption tax hike; corruption scandal; resistance to US pressure on SDF shouldering global negotiations
Kaifu	No accomplishment; a trial at improving relations with Russia
Uno	Sex scandal
Miyazawa	Bubble collapsed;
Hosokawa	Political reform; proalliance position adjusted (<i>vis-à-vis</i> Russia and multilateral security)
Hata	No accomplishment
Murayama	Foreign policy alteration reconfirmed; US-Japan alliance reaffirmed; Murayama speech on history issues
Hashimoto	Presidential election defeat; proalliance policy adjustment hinted (responsible stakeholder)
Obuchi	Death; tilting toward non-US (silk road diplomacy)
Mori	Mishaps; tilting toward non-US (Russia)
Koizumi	Party presidential terms ended; political reform executed; proalliance position consolidated; Yasukuni Shrine stalled
Abe	Yasukuni Shrine fixed; coalition extended to India, Australia
Fukuda	Refocus on G8 and global climate; rejected SDF role in Afghanistan
Aso	Proalliance enlarged
Hatoyama	Proalliance position adjustment attempted (Futenma Air Field relocating and East Asian Community Formation)
Kan	Nuclear disaster; crisis management failure
Noda	Proalliance position reaffirmed

Source: Author made this table in reference to the following: Ukeru Magosaki, *Sengoshi No Shotai* [The True Identity of Postwar History] (Tokyo: Somotosya, 2012); Hosokawa Naikaku (1993) *kara Noda Shinshusyo Taniyo Madeno Rekidai Seiken* [Successive Political Power from Hosokawa (1993) to Noda]. <http://jp.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idJPnTK049757320110831>.

(3) diverging career paths of parliamentarians; and (4) foreign policy adjustment needs. This section attempts to highlight the fourth factor. This section examines which factor worked for leadership change to see whether frequent leadership change after the Cold War has something to do with the trial-and-error nature of Japanese adjustments in swift and complex changes in power, interest, and ideational contiguity in Japan and global environments.

The end of the Cold War coincided with the peak of Japan-US trade and economic disputes and intraparty factional struggles for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Economic bubbles fueled both the US frustration and fierce LDP infighting. Japan-US relations were aggravated and corruption scandals abounded. Amid trade disputes and money scandals, Noboru Takeshita accomplished the consumption tax hike legislation. With it he had to go. Toshiaki Kaifu, coming from a minor faction, prolonged LDP rule as a surrogate of the largest faction, the Takeshita faction. Sosuke Uno tried to do the same, but a personal sex scandal forced him to submit his resignation with accomplishing anything. Kiichi Miyazawa faced trade disputes and the collapse of the economic bubble, but failed to attain notable resolutions in either case. The governing party, LDP, lost a substantial number of seats in the general election. The governing party, LDP, was battered by infighting, corruption, mishandling of trade disputes, the bubble, and its collapse.

A wide coalition of opposition parties, excluding the Japan Communist Party, formed the cabinet led by Morihiro Hosokawa. Hosokawa accomplished political reform. His consumption tax hike attempt failed. His foreign policy adjustment vis-à-vis Russia was hinted on one occasion, but not really attempted because of his resignation, for which no clear reason was given. Tsutomu Hata, notable for being the shortest serving prime minister since 1945, left the position without accomplishment. Tomiichi Murayama, the socialist prime minister, accomplished two major tasks, left undone by his predecessors. The proalliance position was reaffirmed and Murayama's speech on the history issues was elevated as the standard government statement for his immediate successors. Ryutaro Hashimoto,³⁶ LDP, accomplished the consolidation of the proalliance position by agreeing to abolish the Futenma Air Base in 1996 with President Bill Clinton. Also, he handled the Asian financial crisis reasonably well. In contrast, his IMF speech was marred by his remark that hinted at the possibility of the Japanese government selling US Treasury bonds, if deemed necessary. The electoral setback of the LDP in an upper house election forced him to resign. Keizo Obuchi, a low-key individual, was lucky in that his tenure coincided with a business minirecovery after the collapse of the bubble. He attempted to adjust what might be termed as the leaning to one side (the United States) line from which his predecessor tried to do so in vain. He died abruptly from the stresses related to political deal making. Yoshiro Mori, the first man who was not under the LDP's largest faction's reign, tried to rescue the LDP but

to no avail. He hinted at improving relations with Russia. However, repeated mishaps characterized his tenure and led to isolation from mass media and the populace, causing him to resign.

Junichiro Koizumi, a maverick prime minister, consolidated the governing party's position and reconstructed to a considerable extent Japan's proalliance position with President George W. Bush, Jr. Japan's full-fledged support of the US policy on the Afghan War and the Iraq War was carried out entirely within the framework of the constitution. His Yasukuni Shrine visits provoked China and South Korea. It must be noted, however, that the stated reason of his visits to Yasukuni Shrine was "to share the sorrow with those killed in war." The universal language employed by Koizumi has been used in later prime ministers' speeches in the National Diet.³⁷ These two sets of bilateral regional relations were semifrozen during his term. Koizumi's two visits to North Korea to seek the release of forcibly abducted Japanese citizens succeeded, if not completely. The late Kim Jong Il admitted to the abduction by North Korea and some of the abductees returned to Japan. It is remarkable that Koizumi personally visited North Korea and that he managed to get Kim Jong Il to confess culpability at a time when the United States was engaged fully in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Koizumi impressed President George W. Bush immensely by providing unflinching support and sending troops to Iraq and naval ships to the Indian Ocean to supply US fighters waging war in Afghanistan. On the domestic front, the Koizumi government also passed successfully the legislation to deregulate the government-run postal service. At the end of his party's presidential term, the prolongment of LDP rule appeared successful. Shinzo Abe, a young man of a sansei (third generation) parliamentarian, ameliorated the tensions on history issues with China and South Korea by not visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Although Abe is known for his hawkish view of the history issue, his personal views were not reflected in his diplomacy policy. Also, he extended proalliance position to India and Australia. Yasuo Fukuda, a son of the former prime minister, focused on the Group of Eight meeting held in Hokkaido and the Kyoto climate change conference, both highlighting an eco-conscious Japan. He rejected the US suggestions that the SDF shoulder some roles in Afghanistan. Taro Aso, another sansei parliamentarian, attempted to consolidate the proalliance position with his Arc of Freedom and Prosperity vision with those Eurasian countries adjoining China. The massive defeat in the general election led the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), to form the government.

Yukio Hatoyama, another son of a sansei parliamentarian with a PhD in engineering from Stanford, attempted to adjust what he thought was too much of leaning to one side (i.e., the United States), by proposing the East Asian community formation and relocating Futenma Air Base to places either outside Okinawa prefecture or abroad. The policy manifesto of the DPJ crumbled as government and tax revenue soured and government expenditure continuously climbed upward to meet rising social policy expenditures for the ever-growing segment of the population over 65 years old. Naoto Kan, a nongovernmental citizens movement leader, faced the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of 2011. He failed to manage the complex crises promptly and professionally. The Lehman Shock that triggered serious US and global recessions permeated Japan as well. Yoshihiko Noda, son of a JSDF officer, managed to legislate a consumption tax hike in August–September 2012. With the party leadership of the DPJ term approaching (September 2012), voices were calling loudly for an early general election, citing the lack of a general election since 2009 despite a prolonged economic recession, government deficit, major earthquake and disasters, foreign policy ineptitude, and nonaction.

To conclude, leadership change is triggered by many factors. The need to fix some unresolved and often hidden foreign policy issues appears to be a major reason for leadership change. Needless to say, leadership change is carried out constitutionally. Most foreign policy issues may not be cited as a major reason for leadership change, however, because it is hidden. It is not difficult to see that domestic issues—such as corruption, scandal, factional infighting, political realignment, inflation, economic recession, collapse of the bubble, administrative reform, consumption tax hike—prepare the way toward political exits and justify these exits. Seen chronologically as a group of prime ministers' achievements and nonachievements, one can see the outstanding structural homework, irrespective of who the prime minister is. Which homework should be prioritized toward resolution depends on the strength of government, the prime minister, the whole context, and whole path of dependence. Trade disputes, transparency and governance of business and government, expansion of domestic market demand, US military bases, transborder JSDF engagement, and so on come to mind as potential homework. It is not difficult to see that the government tries to fix undone homework when a leadership change occurs. It is not difficult to speculate that some homework happens to be foreign policy related since Japan during the past two decades has been more or less stripped of one of the

major rationales of the alliance, that is, their Soviet military threat with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances any attempts at redressing the equation of the alliance by Japanese Prime Ministers must have been confronted by the counterbalancing efforts at home and abroad.³⁸

Is Japan Most Befitting This World Order?

John Mueller³⁹ published a book over 20 years ago arguing that war is possibly like slavery, which was abolished abruptly in the mid-nineteenth century. Mueller's work sounded like the premature announcement of Mark Twain's death at that time. In 2011, Joshua Goldstein⁴⁰ went on to say that wars are on the decline. Since 1945 no nuclear wars have taken place; major powers have not waged interstate wars of global importance bar the US wars; interstate wars have been declining in terms of occurrence; civil wars have taken place as before but also are slowly decreasing; peacekeeping operations have been largely effective in deterring former warring parties from reigniting conflict. Focusing on Asia, we see the same long-term trend: interstate wars are decreasing in number and small-scale skirmishes have taken place only intermittently. But big wars have become very rare. War fatalities and casualties are declining. The number of those killed in war in Asia has not been on the rise and has remained at the lowest level since 1979 till today. In the late 1970s, a number of key events coincided: China's peace with the United States (1978), China's friendship treaty with Japan (1978), and China's peace with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1979), including the termination of China's military intervention in Vietnam and the mutual perception of the quasi-nuclear deterrence between China and the United States.⁴¹ Most pronounced is Japan's noninvolvement in any war, large or small, since 1945. Ironically, the trend of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping and peace-building operations has been increasing. In Cambodia, Japan participated in UN operations. But the personnel sent came from the Police Agency. It meant that Article 9 of the constitution was interpreted as not encouraging JSDF personnel to be sent abroad. One policeman was killed during the mission. The Police Agency took action to legislate a law, whereby the death of an on-duty police personnel be compensated by the state, even if occurring abroad. JSDF are eager to have a similar set of legislation passed. But Article 9 of the constitution was effective in preventing legislators from passing a new law that would have allowed JSDF

personnel to be dispatched to foreign countries. It was early 1990s. After the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations were activated in part due to the activism of the UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. UN peacekeeping operations became less active by the mid-1990s. The unipolarity and associated tendencies of the United States in the 1990s and its unilateralism in the 2000s led observers to think peacekeeping and peace-building operations were not really effective. International relations were overshadowed by the United States. Peacekeeping and peace-building operations were highlighted not by their effectiveness but by their messy processes. After the US unilateralism of George W. Bush, the international community started to realize that UN peacekeeping operations overall have prevented conflicts from starting again. These findings are based on the long-term decrease of wars and the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peace-building operations in terms of combat death and civilians negatively affected. Steven Pinker,⁴² a psychologist, argues in his book *The Better Angels of Our Nature* that human beings are becoming less violent as they evolve over thousands of years, even with the two violent wars of the past century being located in the context of the civilized evolution of human nature.

If peace and stability prevail, Japan's strength will be more appreciated. In the region around Japan, what has taken place tends to be skirmishes and small-scale disputes. North Korea's bombardment of Yongbyungdo in 2011 was small in scale. Thai-Cambodian skirmishes in 2008–2011 were also small in nature. Japanese-Chinese skirmishes near Senkaku Islands in 2010 were also restrained. All of these factors must have contributed to the rise of the Japanese yen exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar and other currencies. Stability is strength. Amid economic difficulties in the United States and the European Union, Japan is recognized as an oasis of stability and strength, even if it is a somewhat wounded-knee-holding power.

After characterizing the three key features of the Japanese foreign policy line after the Cold War, self-recognition of a global power, self-recognition of a US-led world order supporter, and self-recognition of ontological insecurity and their evolutions, I now turn to the question: Is Japan most befitting this emerging world order in its ongoing transition? It must be noted that the three key features of the Japanese foreign policy line remain the same. But the metamorphosis of each feature is in the offing with unprecedented speed: (1) Japan's rank of GNP has become number three after the United States and China; the United States may be losing "its superpower status"⁴³ and

may be becoming more like Britain after World War II; (2) Japan is replacing “bilateralism at any costs” by “multilateral regionalism.” In tandem with the transition from the hub-and-spoke hierarchical order to the “ad hoc coalition of the temporarily willing” and further to the multilateral regional groupings by the United States, Japan is placing the key terms of its foreign policy line from loyalty to trust, from compliance to coordination; (3) Japan’s ontological insecurity has become less acute, gaining in self-confidence to assert that foreign policy action is more often justified, not narrowly by national interests, but more broadly by the universal language such as “sharing the sorrow with those killed in war.”

If nuclear war has not taken place since 1945; if war among major powers has not taken place since China’s war against Vietnam in 1979 and Britain’s war against Argentina in 1982; if interstate wars are rare, except for such wars as the Thai-Cambodian war on the border; if civil wars have not seen a reduction in frequency then they have witnessed a reduction of those killed, combat or civilian; if peace-keeping and peace-building operations have proved their effectiveness in preventing conflicts from reigniting, the question should be asked: Is Japan most befitting the twenty-first century? In other words, is Japan *zeitgemäss* (in harmony with the time)?

Of course, asking this question does not lead to the view that Japan should disarm itself. Rather the opposite is the case, in that at each stage of history and at each level of war, playing the classical American football strategy of pitting oneself against the enemy step by step and making advances two inches or ten inches forward or absorbing retreats three inches or seven inches backward. The game is not necessarily among sovereign nation-states but sometimes among various war institutions. Nuclear powers have been reducing nuclear weapon-loaded missiles on a steady basis, primarily between the United States and the Russian Federation. Conventional forces may not be disarming themselves in terms of procurement costs. But in terms of the kind of frontier technology weapons, the Richardson-like dynamics seems to be working. That is to say, not the fatigue of nations but the long-term and astronomical costs of research and development processes of frontier technology weapons seem to reduce the very utility of the exercise. This dynamics applies primarily to the United States. Why primarily only to the United States? Because of the structural unipolarity of the United States. Although the unipolarity has started to erode, multipolarity remains to be formed. But in terms of military forces, the unipolarity of the United States is still fairly absolute, distancing itself from

the rest in terms of technological level of weapons produced (precision, delivery vehicle, and destructive capability) and armed forces trained and tested in combat. What happens is not the balancing but the nearly endless catching up with the slowly declining unipolar power. Balancing needs a few actors whose power is more or less equal, a fact that does not exist. What exist are the superpower and the far distanced rest that are trying to modernize and catch up with the superpower. Among those few who modernize and dare to catch up with the superpower, fatigue will sooner or later come. Meanwhile the superpower steadily overstretchers itself not only in its self-appointed missions but also in terms of astronomical budgets for weapons research and development. The question—Is Japan most befitting the changing world order in the current transitional phases?—must be continuously asked.

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Peaceful Rise, Multipolarity, and China's Foreign Policy Line*

Zhongqi Pan and Zhimin Chen

Along with China's increasing engagement at regional and global levels, its foreign policy and strategy have attracted a flood of research. Many researchers have highlighted a far-reaching change in China's foreign policies and diplomatic practices. For example, Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel argued, in their 2003 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "China's New Diplomacy," that China's foreign engagement had become more active, more moderate, and more diverse.¹ Liu Guoli similarly claimed, in his 2004 edited volume entitled *China's Foreign Policy in Transition*, that "in conjunction with rapid economic growth and profound social transformation, China's foreign policy is experiencing a significant transition."² Against the background of the 2008 global financial crisis, Barry Buzan, who believes in China's peaceful rise, felt that "China is at a turning point bigger than any since the late 1970s" and that the rather successful policies China has adopted for the past 30 years will no longer be equally effective in the next 30 years. He concluded, China's "continuing with 'peaceful rise' is going to get more difficult."³ At the same time, however, some others were inspired by the prospect that China was overtaking Japan as the world's second largest economy in 2010 to ask questions such as "will China change the rules of global order." Notwithstanding no convincing answer to this ambiguous question, two authors were very sure to articulate that "Beijing's growing economic power and political influence have promoted a transformation in its foreign policy."⁴

While various indicators, factors, and effects of China's foreign policy change have been explored, many scholars including the Chinese themselves still feel frustrated when trying to understand and explain China's foreign policy and strategy. Hao Yufan even complained, "[F]ew subjects are more complicated and mysterious than Chinese foreign policy... As in any major country, foreign policy in China is a multidimensional puzzle, and western scholars have been trying to explain it since the establishment of the People's Republic. So far there has been little consensus and much frustration in this field of study, to say nothing of the failure to bring it into the mainstream of theoretical inquiry."⁵ The complexity and mysteriousness of China's foreign policy and strategy lies not only in that too many dynamic driving forces, both domestic and international, are underlying and that China's foreign policymaking process remains somehow opaque, but more importantly in that there is still short of a theoretical framework useful in explaining states' foreign policy in general and China's foreign policy in particular.

This chapter makes an attempt to explain why peaceful rise is China's strategy, why China favors a multipolar world as a desirable order, and what main approach China is undertaking to achieve its foreign policy goals. We argue that China's foreign policy line is featured with a combination of partnership bilateralism and tailored multilateralism. Notwithstanding various difficulties such as global financial crisis and regional maritime disputes, China will most likely continue its peaceful rise strategy in the foreseeable future.

Peaceful Rise as China's Strategy

It is hard to say peaceful rise is China's grand strategy. It was in 2003 that the very term "peaceful rise" was coined by Zheng Bijian, chair of the China Reform Forum.⁶ But it was in 1978 that the process of China's peaceful rise was actually kicked off. And, China's original intention by initiating the notion of peaceful rise is to roll back the "China threat theory" rather than to propose a grand strategy for its own national development.

A country's grand strategy must clearly define its long-term national interests, potential threats and challenges it faces, and the ways to achieve its national goals by dealing with various difficulties. Given that the Chinese government has never disclosed any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the ways to achieve them, it is open to debate whether China has any grand

strategy today or in the past. According to Wang Jisi, even under Mao Zedong's leadership, "Beijing had no comprehensive grand strategy to speak of." Today, China is still searching for its grand strategy. "For both policy analysts in China and China watchers abroad, China's grand strategy is a field still to be plowed."⁷ He is right by his criteria. However, if we pay more attention to the substance than to the form, we may arguably take peaceful rise as a strategy, though it may not be so grand. China's national interests and the ways to achieve them are definitely in the mind of the leader, even though not written in ink.

Peaceful rise is the best term that captures the Chinese leadership's long-term understanding and policy designs of China's national development. To put it simply, Deng Xiaoping's proposal to quadruple China's gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of the twentieth century, for example, is actually his definition of China's strategic goal. While peaceful international environment brings China a window of opportunity to achieve that goal, "peace and development" have been perceived as two main problems facing the world and thus top challenges that China needs to deal with in the development process.⁸ The reform and opening policy constitutes the way that Deng Xiaoping initiated to achieve China's goals. Necessary ingredients for a grand strategy, even though not clearly articulated as such, all present in Deng Xiaoping's guidelines that have been followed by succeeding leadership. In a sense, even though the process of China's peaceful rise has not been guided by a designed strategy as such, we can fairly argue that such a strategy is underlying China's experience.

In retrospect, it was since the reform and opening in the late 1970s that China has embarked on the road of peaceful rise. That the implementation of reform and opening serves as a historic starting point for China's peaceful rise lies in the fact that China adopted totally different national development strategies before and after initiating the reform and opening.⁹

For the sake of national survival, People's Republic of China (PRC) in its beginning years adopted a strategy of "leaning to one side" that was to ally with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and to confront with the United States. With the breakup of the Chinese-Soviet alliance, China took a strategy of "fighting with two fists" against both the USSR and the United States at the same time. Primarily, the weakness of national power and the desire for national sovereignty drove China to side with one of the two superpowers initially and then with none of them. The main perceived threat to regime security and legitimacy comes from outside China. Either

way, Mao Zedong could easily rally domestic support for its foreign strategies. And, by identifying China as a revolutionary power in the international system, China could strengthen its regime security and legitimacy internationally and gain support from the developing world. Mao Zedong proposed theories of “two middle-zones,” “one line and one huge block,” and “three worlds,” which best epitomized his strategic thinking that seems more appealing to countries that saw hegemonism by either the United States or the USSR or both as threatening. Obviously, putting the United States and the USSR in a same world, as well as insisting on the inevitability of the third world war while downplaying the contradictions between the two camps, not only constitutes a logical paradox but also contradicts the historical realities of the Cold War. But that was useful for China to secure its independence of national sovereignty, a more vital interest comparative with economic development to a young country.

Mao Zedong's assessments on global situation were in flux, changing according to his definitions of national interests. From the founding of PRC in 1949 through its return to the United Nations (UN) in 1971, China had played a role of an opponent and revolutionary in the international system. During this period, China tended to solve international conflicts by using force, refused to participate in international organizations, and rejected most international norms except the principle of sovereignty. China's military involvement in most international conflicts stemmed from China's reactions for the purposes of survival and independence when its national security faced a severe threat (e.g., the Korean War in 1950–1953) or when its sovereignty and territorial integrity encountered a serious destruction (e.g., the China-India border war in 1962, the China-Soviet Union border conflict in 1969, and the China-Vietnam border war in 1979) while it had no alternative recourse. With that being said, however, military rather than diplomatic engagement rendered China a “facilitator” of the bipolar international system¹⁰ and a victim of the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. Even with the principle of sovereignty, the degree of China's internalization of it was quite low. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that China proposed based on the concept of sovereignty implies China's confrontation with and defense against the West.¹¹

Only after the reform and opening, could China initiate the historical process of peaceful rise. The successful implementation of the reform and opening resulted from China's new outlooks on both domestic and international situations. Deng Xiaoping as China's top

leadership was visionary to argue that China needs more economic development than military buildup. He redefined China's top national interest as economic construction. He saw the Communist Party of China's (CPC) ruling legitimacy resting on Chinese people's welfare that needs to be improved. And even though he continued to identify China as a developing country, he did not take that identity as a factor that necessitates China's antagonist policies toward the developed world. He even argued that China should lift itself from a developing country to a middle-developed nation in the future. Consequently his strategic thinking puts emphasis on international cooperation instead of on conflict.

Partially due to China's seat in the UN being resumed in 1971, China's improved relative power position in the international system changed its perceptions. Deng Xiaoping believed that the third world war will not happen and "peace and development" have become the themes of the times.¹² Going beyond ideology and pursuing a diplomacy of "nonalignment," "not seeking hegemony," and "not seeking leadership", China normalized its relations with the United States first and then with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, leading to a stable grand triangle among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In this strategic structure, China was no longer a victim of bipolar confrontations and even functioned as an important fulcrum keeping strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the later phase of the Cold War.

Even after the downturn of the 1989 Tiananmen incident deteriorated China's international environment, Deng Xiaoping insisted on his general judgment on global trend and helped China to continue its reform and opening policies. To deal with unexpected isolation, he proposed a strategy of *Taoguang Yanghui and Yousuo Zuowei* (keeping low profile and getting something accomplished) as China's guiding principle of foreign relations that has been creatively carried out by following generations of Chinese leadership. With the end of the Cold War, China further conformed with the trends of world multipolarization and economic globalization, arguing that "peace and development remain the themes of our era" and grasped "a period of important strategic opportunities" brought by the peaceful transition of international system.¹³ By doing so, China has been proactively and successfully building a diplomatic framework that features relations with major powers as critical (or key), relations with neighboring countries as primary (or the first), relations with developing countries as the foundation (or base), and multilateral arrangements as the

important stage (or platform). This new strategic layout, reflecting a spirit of keeping pace with the times, paved a solid foundation for China's peaceful rise.

As a result, China perceived itself as a developing country that was on the primary stage of socialism and hence aimed to quadruple its GDP by the end of the twentieth century, a simple but ambitious target. China has no longer behaved as a steadfast opponent to the international system and instead become an active participant in and a pragmatic beneficiary of it. At the beginning of its founding, China put emphases on safeguarding its national independence and integrity of sovereignty at any cost, even by the use of force. Since the reform and opening and especially after the Cold War, China has paid more and more attention to solving international disputes by peaceful and diplomatic means. In the post-Cold War era, China has settled most of its land territorial issues through diplomatic channels, and thus laid a foundation for solving its maritime territorial disputes in a similar way.¹⁴ Even on the Taiwan issue, which directly concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and has always been regarded by the mainland Chinese as a domestic problem, China has displayed a strong intention toward a peaceful resolution. Besides, since its return to the UN in 1971, China, for the purpose of domestic economic development, joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (in 1980), the World Bank (WB) (in 1980), and the Asian Development Bank (in 1986), and applied for rejoining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as a founding member (in 1986; China finally joined the World Trade Organization [WTO] in 2001). Afterward, China has extensively participated in multilateral international institutions in various areas.¹⁵ The initiation of the reform and opening helped China immediately put military buildup down on its domestic agenda. Taking economic development as the top priority instead, China has fully taken advantage of the long-term and peaceful international environment and got rid of its negative national image as a challenger to the international system. A new orientation of China's national development has thus been crafted.

Multipolarity as China's Desirable World Order

China has championed a multipolar world for a long time. Neither a bipolar world in the Cold War era nor a possible unipolar one after the

end of the Cold War is seen by China as a desirable world for China and other developing countries. First and foremost, for China, a multipolar world can restrain the development of hegemonism and unilateralism by dominating superpower(s). In the post-Cold War years, China has been looking forward to the emergence of a real multipolar world where the hegemonic behavior of the remaining superpower, the United States, can be checked and restrained in the real sense. Second, in such a multipolar world, developing countries can be better protected in their own pursuit of economic and social development, without unwarranted external intervention motivated by the Western efforts to universalize their values and systems. Third, in a multipolar world, real reform of the existing international institutions established by the United States and its Western allies can be possibly foreseen, and leads to fair rule-making powers and interests representative of developing countries in regional and global governance. Finally, China would surely obtain a much lifted position as one pole in this multipolar system, better to protect its own political institutions and development model, more capable to defuse the restraining or containing efforts from a relatively declined superpower.

China hence conducted active diplomacy to promote multipolarization from the mid-1990s. On April 23, 1997, in a Chinese-Russian Joint Statement on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order, the two countries proclaimed that “in a spirit of partnership,” they “shall strive to promote the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order.”¹⁶ On May 17 of the same year, in a Sino-French Joint Statement, China and France also “decided to engage in reinforced cooperation, to foster the march towards multipolarity” and “to oppose any attempt at domination in international affairs, so that a new world that is more prosperous, more stable, more secured and more balanced can be brought about.”¹⁷

For some scholars in China, this kind of multipolar diplomacy could be problematic for China. Several reasons were raised in the internal debate from the late 1990s. First of all, as history indicated, multipolar world used to be an unstable one, and no one can guarantee that a future multipolar world would be a peaceful and stable one. Second, in an increasingly unipolar world after the American invasion of Iraq, championing multipolarity represents a challenge to the hegemon, the United States, and hence it may trigger backlash from a pointed counterbalance from the unipole. At the height of new empire discourse in the United States, China's key partners of

multipolar diplomacy—Russia, France, and Germany—all backed down from their open call for a multipolar world, and China also had to dilute its official endorsement of multipolarization as its policy goal. Third, multipolar diplomacy represents a big power diplomacy, which would unnecessarily alienate other middle and small states, mostly the developing countries that are China's natural allies for a long time.¹⁸

Hence, increasingly, Chinese official discourse started to water down its emphasis on multipolarity as a desired policy goal, but to see it more as an objective statement of the unfolding trend in the international system. New concepts, such as multilateralism, were introduced as a replacement. In a major foreign policy white paper, Chinese government states in 2005 that “the international community should oppose unilateralism, advocate and promote multilateralism, and make the UN and its Security Council play a more active role in international affairs.”¹⁹ A “harmonious world” has also been articulated as China's design of ideal model for world order. In 2005, the Chinese president Hu Jintao began calling for the building of “a harmonious world” in international affairs. Initially, “a harmonious world” is no more than an external manifestation of China's internal policy of building “a harmonious society.” Most recently, in 2009, at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly, Hu put forward a four-point proposal for building a harmonious world. He said: “In the face of unprecedented opportunities and challenges, members of the international community should continue the joint endeavor to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity, and to contribute to the noble cause of peace and development for all mankind.” To attain it, Hu proposed, “first, the international community should view security in a broader perspective to safeguard world peace and stability. Second, countries should take a more holistic approach to development, and promote common prosperity. Third, members of the international community should pursue cooperation with a more open mind, and work for mutual benefit and common progress. Finally, countries should be more tolerant toward one another in order to live together in harmony.”²⁰

Nevertheless, promoting multipolarity does not entirely disappear from China's official discourse. For example, as recently as in 2009, President Hu Jintao in his speech to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Russia praised the two nations in their “unremitting efforts to promote multipolarity in the world and democracy in international relations.”²¹ As the financial

and economic crisis hit heavily the Western countries, Yang Jiemian offered a broad remapping of the power shift in the world with his “Four Groups” theory in early 2010. Yang argued that after the 2008 global financial crisis, the correlation of international forces is evolving in favor of developing countries with emerging powers as their representatives, which is unprecedentedly shaking the Western powers’ dominance of world affairs. The regrouping of international forces is forming the Four Groups of gaining, defending, losing, and weak forces. Specifically, in Yang’s view, the Gaining group is comprised by major emerging countries, like China; the Defending group includes the United States, which has lost its “dominating” status; the Weak group is formed by those developing countries in their difficulties; the European Union (EU), along with Japan and Russia, belongs to the Losing group.²² For Chinese analysts, the fact that China and emerging powers have managed to weather off the financial and economic crisis while the US and European economies suffered heavily is a clearer indication that the multipolarization process is “accelerating.”²³

A world heading toward a multipolar one has its blessings as well as misgivings. For China, it seems that the trend itself is inevitable, and desirable, even if China has muted its championing for such a new international system. While instability is often associated with multipolarity, Chinese analysts and leaders still have the confidence in the stability and governability of a future multipolar system.

On the stability side, seeing from China, the forthcoming multipolarization is not a simple repetition of the past history. As the 2011 white paper on China’s Peaceful Development issued by the Chinese government specified, today’s world differs from the past ones in at least three aspects. First of all, it is coupled with other irresistible global trends, like peace, development, and cooperation. In the world today, to share opportunities presented by development and jointly ward off risks is the common desire of the people of the world. Second, economic globalization has become an important trend in the evolution of international relations. Countries of different systems and different types and at various development stages are in a state of mutual dependence, with their interests intertwined. This has turned the world into a community of common destiny in which the members are closely interconnected. Third, global challenges have become major threats to the world. Terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), financial crises, natural disasters, climate change, and security of energy, resources, food,

and public health all have a major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social development. No country can handle these issues on its own; they should be addressed by all countries together.²⁴

Therefore, if countries adopt an enlightened view of national interests, seeing that their interests are intertwined with others and the realization of these interests relies on continuous cooperation with other countries, then in multipolar world, the old power politics, though may not die out, will be much mitigated by the need for cooperation, thus bringing stability to the system.

On the governability aspect, China also believes that a sovereignty-based intergovernmental cooperation can address the cooperation problem and produce more just and lasting solutions to the challenges that states in today's world are facing. It is undeniable that in the future multipolar world, most of the poles will be sovereignty proponents. Zaki Laidi labeled the BRICS countries—China, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa—as “a coalition of sovereign states defenders.”²⁵ Joseph Nye also sees that the United States, China, and India—the world's most populous—“are among the most protective of their sovereignty.”²⁶ European states tend to see sovereignty and nation states as the roots of international wars and conflicts, therefore, they chose to embrace a kind of supranational regional integration, strong institutions, and rules. For China and many other developing countries, strong states and sovereignty are the starting point for international cooperation.

From a philosophical angle, one of the leading Chinese thinkers in international relations, professor Qin Yaqing, developed a new concept of “relational governance” (*guanxi zhili*) to capture the Chinese thinking of societal governance. For Qin, the Western governance tradition adopts a rationalist and individualistic approach, focusing on how to govern through contracts, governments, rules, and institutions. While not rejecting the value of this kind of institutional governance, Qin believes that relational governance, which bases itself on the relational interconnectedness, a view deep-rooted in Chinese culture, can play an important role in the governance of international affairs. He defines relational governance as the process to manage complex relations within a group through a deliberative political and social arrangement, in order to establish order, render group members to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation, and build mutual trust through the forming of common understanding of the social norms and human morality.²⁷

Partnership Bilateralism and Tailored Multilateralism

A combination of bilateral partnership and multilateral engagement constitutes China's major approach to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As China's former ambassador to France Wu Jianmin once wrote, "for a fairly long period, Chinese diplomacy was mainly a bilateral affair, while multilateral diplomacy played a very limited role in the conduct of Chinese diplomacy."²⁸ Being a strong supporter of the principle of equal sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, China has long championed an independent foreign policy. This overall foreign policy line finds bilateralism a more comfortable form of conducting China's relations with the outside world.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has established a range of bilateral strategic partnerships, with a slight difference in their names. China's bilateral strategic partnerships are multidimensional, for example, economic, cultural, political, and security. They thus serve as important venues for China to extend its influences on the resolution of regional conflicts and global challenges.²⁹ This is in particular the case after China's bilateral strategic partnerships have densely networked in corresponding regions. Only in the Middle East is China's bilateral strategic partnership a weak link. China's bilateral strategic partnerships with regional players in Asia involve Japan and South Korea respectively and jointly to China's northeast; Afghanistan, the ASEAN, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, among others, to China's southeast and south; Kazakhstan and Russia to China's west. China's such arrangements in Africa include Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa, and Africa as a whole; and in Latin America Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru. China has also attempted at building bilateral strategic partnerships with global powers, Russia in Eurasia, the EU and its main members in Europe, and the United States and Canada in North America. China's road to forge a bilateral partnership with the United States is bumpy. Yet, in January 2011, President Hu Jintao and President Obama proclaimed in a joint statement that "China and the United States are committed to work together to build a cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit in order to promote the common interests of both countries and to address the 21st century's opportunities and challenges."³⁰

Besides strategic partnerships, China initiates high-level "strategic dialogues" with several major powers.³¹ This mechanism started

in 1996 with Russia, though it was not titled so until a few years later. Then it was extended to other major global and regional players, with France in the late 1990s, with the UK in 2002, with the United States, India, Japan, and the EU in 2005. Such strategic dialogues cover a wide range of security issues, such as longstanding territorial disputes, international terrorism, arms control, WMD non-proliferation, and nontraditional security threats. Since those strategic dialogues usually occur above the deputy ministerial level, this mechanism works to promote mutual trust and establish itself as one of confidence-building measures.

Even though not all of China's bilateral strategic partnerships and strategic dialogues are as substantial as their name may signify, they do make a difference in China's efforts to stabilize its regional and global security environment, to secure its national interests, and to shape international order. Through these bilateral partnerships and strategic dialogues, China can develop closer cooperation with other countries on an equal footing, and to address challenges and problems in their bilateral relations. Moreover, these partnerships are meant to help forge a positive mutual identification between China and other countries, avoiding China being negatively defined as an enemy or threat.³² Overall, China's partnership strategy has served fairly well in advancing China's foreign policy, though the success of this strategy does raise the level of anxiety in some countries, such as the United States and Japan, over the rise of China's power.

In addition to this bilateral partnership diplomacy, China since the end of the Cold War has stepped up its efforts in engaging in multilateral diplomacy. China's foreign policy approaches are more and more embedded in various multilateral institutions.³³ As Bates Gill puts it, "as part of its new security diplomacy, Beijing has shed much of its traditionally skeptical, reluctant, and often contrarian approach toward regional security mechanisms and confidence-building measures to adopt more proactive and constructive policies."³⁴ Statistics shows that China's intergovernmental organization memberships expanded from 1 in 1971 to 21 in 1976; by 1989, the number had increased to 37; and by 2005, over 50, encompassing the political, economic, social, scientific, technological, and even security realms.³⁵ China, which had isolated itself through much of the three decades prior to 1979, is now fully engaged internationally through its memberships in the majority of IGOs and as a signatory to more than 250 international multilateral treaties.³⁶ Multilateral institutions, being the UN Security Council, WTO, IMF, G8, or newly emerged G20, have

been defined as important platforms of China's foreign policy and diplomacy. Chinese policymakers now see multilateral organizations as central to the Chinese goals of advancing "multipolarization," fostering the emergence of a "just and rational international order" and "building a harmonious world." China thus embraces multilateral institutions in virtually every part of the world, creates them such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Six-Party Talks when necessary, and reforms them including the UN, IMF, WB, to China's own advantages.

China's multilateral diplomacy is a combination of practical multilateralism and strategic multilateralism. The former applies to China's participation in the existing global and regional multilateral institutions that were mainly founded or initiated by other actors. In its home region, for example, China joined in 1991 the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a pan-Pacific bloc to advance trade and investment liberalization. In 1994, it started to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a confidence-building forum hosted by ASEAN countries with the involvement of the United States and the EU. In 1997, China became a dialogue partner of the ASEAN, leading to the establishment of China-ASEAN strategic partnership in 2003. Also, in 1997, China joined, along with South Korea and Japan, the "ASEAN plus 3" mechanism, a major platform in East Asia to promote regional cooperation.

In the twenty-first century, China's multilateral diplomacy has become more proactive and acquired a strategic aspect, with a growing understanding that multilateralism could be used by China to shape favorable surrounding environment that is conducive to the realization of long-term foreign policy goals. China started to work with global and regional players in initiating a number of mechanisms to address various issues. To promote economic ties with ASEAN countries, in 2002, China and ASEAN, upon China's proposal, signed an agreement to establish a China-ASEAN free trade area by 2010, which has been achieved as designed. In 2007, they further signed the Agreement on Trade in Services, the first of its kind inked by China and other countries and regions. In 2005, China and other countries in the ASEAN plus 3 convened the first East Asian Summit, which also included new members like Australia, India, and New Zealand. In March 2010, to enhance the regional capacity, to provide financial support to countries with short-term liquidity needs, and to supplement existing international financing arrangements, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Pact came into effect. As one of

the major supporters of this liquidity mechanism, China contributed US\$38.4 billion to the total package of US\$120 billion, a share equal to that of Japan, with South Korea offering US\$19.2 billion.³⁷

In Northeast Asia, to deal with North Korea's nuclear issue, China played a leading role in initiating the Six-Party Talks, along with North and South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Russia. China had already hosted six rounds of talks, which at a certain point "scored successive achievements, [with] the tension in Northeast Asia [...] much released"³⁸ before they were stalled by the renewed confrontation between North and South Korea since 2009.

On the western front, under Chinese initiative, the SCO as a formal intergovernmental organization comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was founded in Shanghai in 2001. The SCO aims to fight three so-called evil forces—terrorism, separatism, and extremism—and maintain regional security. This security arrangement serves as a channel, through which China can present itself as an important security player in Central Asia.³⁹ To further engage in this direction, China proposes to add new layers of cooperation with Central Asian countries, including trade, investment, energy, environment, and so on.⁴⁰

China also participates in two major trilateral dialogue mechanisms. The China-Russia-India trilateral dialogue began in September 2002. While the start of this mechanism was quite tentative due to the precarious bilateral relations between India and China,⁴¹ recent developments indicate that it now plays a growing role in coordinating the trilateral cooperation policies of the three countries, as well as in making their joint voices heard on the international stage. Leaders from China, Japan, and South Korea already met regularly at the ASEAN plus 3 summits. Yet, in December 2008, they decided to create an independent China-Japan-South Korea dialogue mechanism. During their first meeting in Fukuoka, leaders from the three countries agreed that they should form a trilateral partnership based on their respective bilateral partnerships.

China's multilateralism is tailored in the sense that China does not apply a unified model of multilateralism to all regions or countries in the world. Instead, China will take different modes of multilateralism to fit different geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions in its near abroad and beyond. For example, in Southeast Asia and the broadly defined Asia-Pacific region, China evidently prefers a loosely structured and open-ended multilateralism, but to the west, in the case of the SCO, China spares no effort to push for institutionalization. The

top priority in China's multilateral diplomacy may also differ from one region to another. For example, while Beijing has put emphasis on economic multilateralism in Southeast Asia, it has taken a "security first and economy second" approach in Northeast and Central Asia, challenging the logic of traditional functionalism.⁴²

Furthermore, China embraces only consensus-based multilateralism, which is firmly rooted in the equality of member states, with consensus as the general rule of decision making. This type of multilateralism may not generate strong rules, but it is comfortable for China and other developing states and is successful in averting external interference and safeguarding sovereignties. Under such an institutional framework, China enjoys no privileged leadership in the mechanisms in which it participates. China may have a stronger influence in the agenda-setting of the SCO and the Six-Party Talks, but any decision has to be agreed upon by all participating parties. In the ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asian Summit, it is ASEAN that firmly controls the agenda-setting process, and China can exert influence only in the later consensus-building stage. In 2004, China took the lead in proposing an East Asian community to be built upon the ASEAN plus three, but had to give in to pressure from Japan and Singapore to expand membership to Australia, New Zealand, and India. The expanded membership, it was thought, would prevent China from dominating proceedings.⁴³ Fully aware of this kind of apprehension on the part of its neighbors, China has been very cautious to engage in "region-building" in order to avoid any unnecessary counterproductive repercussions.⁴⁴

Prospect for China's Continuing Peaceful Rise Strategy

Since founded more than 60 years ago, China has grown up to a big developing country with substantial international influence from a semifeudal and semicolonial nation that was impoverished and weak. China has attempted to write the most successful and legendary story of peaceful rise. Nowadays, few people question whether China could achieve its alleged peaceful rise. Many facts unequivocally make pertaining debates irrelevant, even out of the question.⁴⁵ Questions remain, however, on whether China could further its peaceful rise in years to come. While for John Mearsheimer "the rise of China will not be peaceful at all,"⁴⁶ since China, like all previous potential

hegemony, will change its intention so long as its power continues to grow, for Barry Buzan, among others, the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 may interrupt China's peaceful rise.⁴⁷

Admittedly, the financial crisis has posed an unprecedentedly severe challenge to the continuation of China's peaceful rise. Due to the crisis, China has seen its imports and exports tumble, foreign currency reserve, and USD-denominated assets severely shrink, foreign direct investment fall, and economic growth slow down. The negative effects of the crisis on China's economy are obvious and concrete, and have caused unprecedented difficulties to the continuation of China's peaceful rise. In a sense, these serve as arguments for the skepticism that China's peaceful rise may not be sustainable. Nonetheless, it seems more reasonable to believe that the 2008 financial crisis is but another obstacle in the path of China's peaceful rise. This obstacle is bound to be conquered, just like all other roadblocks that China had stridden over, such as the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, etc.

The 2008 financial crisis has brought many difficulties to China's peaceful rise; yet it has put China in a quite favorable position that most likely enables China to carry on its peaceful rise chapter. Arguably, the crisis has provided China with a rare historic opportunity to maintain its economic growth, to elevate its international status, and to improve its national image.

Economic development is the most important source of China's increasing power and expanding national interests, the most reliable guarantee of the CPC's regime security and legitimacy, and the most imperative force driving China's identity and strategic thinking. The widespread economic downturn highlights China's relative advantage of economic growth. Due to the financial crisis, major economies including the United States, Europe, and Japan all saw negative GDP growth by different degrees in 2009. According to the statistics of the CIA World Factbook, the 2009 GDP growth rate for the US economy was minus 2.4 percent, for Britain, France, and Germany as the big three in Europe minus 4.8 percent, minus 2.2 percent, and minus 5.0 percent respectively, and for Japan minus 5.3 percent. Comparatively, although China and India in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries saw a downward trend in economy size as well, they were still able to maintain reasonably high rates of growth, with 8.7 percent for China and 6.5 percent for India in 2009.⁴⁸ As expected, China attained its official target of ensuring an 8 percent growth. This unique performance won China

a better momentum for economic development among world's major economies. China's economic growth stands out as an even greater advantage in the context of a worldwide recession, notwithstanding an apparent slowdown comparing with the precrisis period.

When judging who has the upper hand in economic competitions, relative growth is more important than absolute one. Just as professor Robert Pape from the University of Chicago has pointed out, it is relative power that matters, not absolute power. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the US economy had already been on the decline, with economic growth dropping from 4 percent during the Clinton administration to 2 percent during the Bush administration. The proportion of the US GDP to the world total also saw a significant fall by 7.7 percent from 2000 to 2008. Yet, on the other hand, China's economy has sustained a fast pace growth of 10 percent for a relatively long period. The financial crisis simply furthered the imbalance of economic growth between China and the United States. According to Pape's calculation, this round of financial crisis has led to a 32 percent drop of the relative power of the United States, while that of China soared by 144 percent.⁴⁹ Similar gap of growth can also be observed between China and other major economies, and likewise, the advantage rests on China. The Centre for Economics and Business Research reported in mid-2009 that the United States, Canada, and Europe accounted for about 49.4 percent of the world economy in 2009, down from the 60–64 percent range between 1995 and 2004.⁵⁰ Therefore, there have been international comments that China not only suffered the least in the financial crisis, but also enjoyed relative benefits from other states' comparatively severer damage. Even if China's economy keeps growing at only 8 percent, it would take much less time to overtake the United States.

Note that the key to China's peaceful rise remains its faster and sustainable economic growth in a long run. It is, therefore, expected that China, with a comparatively favorable position, will stay its current course of peaceful rise. And this continuation is also justified by several factors.

First, the multipolarization process has notably sped up, with China's relative power position in the international system further improved. As many scholars have pointed out, the financial crisis trapped the United States in "an unprecedented recession," both the United States and Europe are suffering from a serious "geopolitical setback," and the world balance of power is quickly shifting eastward.⁵¹ The rise of China and other new powers is considered

by Fareed Zakaria as the third round of world power shift after the rise of Europe and the United States in history. Furthermore, it is the first time rise of non-Western and nondemocratic states. The immediate consequence is the ending of the longstanding dominance by the United States and Europe over international affairs, and thereof resulting in major transitions in power configuration and international relations.⁵² Other academics have even acknowledged that the American unipolar era since the end of the Cold War has come to an end, and that the financial crisis has given the “global multipolar system” an early arrival.⁵³ China, on the other hand, is both an impetus and a beneficiary of this accelerated process of multipolarization. The world is now undergoing a transition from disorder to order, in which the Western influence is apparently on the decline, while China’s strategic status and capability of shaping international affairs are ascending.

Second, new development of international institutions grants China more influence. China today figures strongly in a variety of global topics, from solving the financial crisis to handling global climate change, from nuclear nonproliferation to countering piracy, from reforming international financial system to establishing the G20 mechanism. It is becoming an increasingly indispensable actor both in solving almost all major global issues and in the effective functioning of every multilateral international institutions. The ongoing reform of existent international institutions such as the WB and the IMF has lifted China’s weight. In April 2010, the WB approved a new resolution of reform and elevated China’s voting power from 2.78 to 4.42 percent, enabling China to become its third largest shareholder, second only to the United States and Japan.⁵⁴ To the end of 2010, China, along with other emerging countries, benefited likewise from realignment of quota shares and voting power in the IMF, becoming its third largest member country.⁵⁵ Also, within the newly established international institutions, notably the G20, China has become a key player, with ever-greater weight in handling various international issues, and ever-stronger ability of framing international regulations and improving international institutions in fields of trade, finance, security, climate change, and so on.

Third, the financial crisis also deepened international perceptions of China’s political and economic systems and its development model, with people beginning to view China more rationally and more objectively. The once-popular theories of “China threat” and “China collapse” have been obviously marginalized. They are now replaced by

theories of “China responsibility” and “China opportunity.” More and more countries believe the rise of China is inevitable and unstoppable. David Miliband, the then British foreign secretary, highly praised China’s position and role in the world in an interview with the *Guardian*. According to him, China is becoming an “indispensable power” for the twenty-first century.⁵⁶ Differing from Western liberal capitalistic models, as well as values—which met with wide blame for the financial crisis—the “China model” is receiving a never-seen-before wave of favor and applause. The “Washington Consensus” has been gradually eclipsed by the “Beijing Consensus.” Although there yet is a common understanding of the “China model,”⁵⁷ the indisputable fact is that a growing number of countries are paying more attention to the East, intentionally drawing on experience from the “China model.” The positive changes in the world’s perspectives on China, and the growing approval of and expectations from China, are advantages China can take to push its further peaceful rise.

In addition to the financial crisis, maritime conflicts in the China seas, which have been most recently escalating and intensifying, may also deviate China’s road of peaceful rise. Many incidents, such as Chinese fishing boats being detained by Japan, South Korea, and North Korea in the East China Sea, the Japanese intention to “buy” the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the Philippines’ confrontation against China’s sovereign claim over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea, to name just a few, have only made China more nervous about its territorial integrity. China has been widely believed getting tougher in her maritime policy, which is more likely to terminate its alleged peaceful rise strategy.

However, China’s actions and reactions derive not from its growing power but from its continuous concern of regime security and legitimacy. The Chinese people have inherited a strong nationalistic belief in the importance of China as a single unified entity. This belief is not something to be compromised. China’s rising power might have this belief further strengthened. Here, it is worthwhile to note that China’s sovereign claims over Taiwan and other islands in the China seas are not ambitions that are derived from its improved power position in the international system. The issue of Taiwan is perhaps the best testing stone of China’s lasting obsession of its sovereign integrity. Weak or strong, China has always sought to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Friendly or hostile of the cross-Strait relations, Beijing has always maintained its political ruling legitimacy over Taiwan.⁵⁸ This logic is also applicable to China’s claims over other islands in

the China seas. And the same logic signifies that China will be more cautious to use its policy options in dealing with its maritime issues. It would be against China's intention, as well as interests, to take a sudden turn, simply because of island disputes, away from its current effective strategy of peaceful rise.

Conclusion

After more than 60 years' endeavors of searching and building, China has arguably achieved its alleged peaceful rise, at least provisionally. As both a great challenge and a great opportunity, the 2008 global financial crisis signified that China's peaceful rise has stepped into a new historical stage. Although the worldwide financial crisis posed serious challenges to China's peaceful rise, it highlighted China's relative advantage in economic growth. Meanwhile, the obviously faster process of multipolarization has made China's international influence ever-increasing, with many players now competing to seek help and support from China. Furthermore, the increasing rationalization of the world's perspectives on China also creates favorable conditions for China to mitigate international pressures and to improve its national image. Consequently, China has achieved a favorable position during the financial crisis, and has thus gained a historic opportunity to carry forward its peaceful rise.

As far as China's relationship with the outside world is concerned, "how China should embrace the world" was the key question that China attempted to answer by reform and opening and peaceful rise in many years of the past and "how China should be embraced by the world" is going to be the next. As widely expected, China has already integrated and will further integrate into the international society, internalize various international norms, and realize state socialization. However, what is out of the expectations of the international community is, to some extent, the speed of China's peaceful rise. The outside world is not yet ready to accept and accommodate a rising China.

At the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic, China had been misplaced by the world. Now China should not make the world misplaced by its peaceful rise. In the coming new age of China's further peaceful rise, the imperative question is how China will develop and spread its international ideas with both Chinese characteristics and universal value in order to facilitate and deepen the outside world's acceptance of and adaptation to China's peaceful rise.

Notes

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Japan's US Policy under DPJ and Its Domestic Background: Still Recovering from the Unarticulated "Changes"*

Yoichiro Sato

Introduction

The devastating electoral defeat of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in fall 2009 resulted in a period of turmoil in the US-Japan relations. A *de jure* of the 1993 defeat of the LDP to long-term observers of Japanese foreign policy, the current state of US-Japan relations suffers from both amateurism of the inexperienced politicians and lack of cohesion in the new ruling party.

As a new ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) attempted to differentiate itself from the LDP in many ways. Most importantly, its rejection of the LDP-style backdoor dealings among the faction leaders resulted in the adoption of the party manifesto. The catch-all manifesto—creation of the master election strategist Ichiro Ozawa—however, was full of internal inconsistencies and contradictions.

Experienced politicians would know which electoral promises were not to be fully pursued, carefully reading not only the percentage figures in the public opinion polls, but also the intensity of the public interests in each issue. They might even anticipate such a situation and avoid explicit policy commitments in the first place. Such was not the case with DPJ in its recent ascend to power. The party's uninformed clarity on many issues, from the consumption tax, the pension system, to the alliance politics, has collided with difficult realities.

The DPJ government's Asia shift has been ambiguous, not because careful calculation of Japan's strategic interests in the region requires it to be deliberately left ambiguous. Rather, it is because it truly lacks substance and is not based on a solid unified interpretation within DPJ. The very question of whether Japan can retain an effective leadership role in Asia without solid backing of the United States¹ yields diverse answers from different DPJ politicians.

The existence of pro-US conservative politicians within the DPJ has saved the US-Japan relations from a more serious debacle, but without necessarily improving their mutual understanding. In anticipation of the LDP loss of power, US security planners met these internationally active DPJ spokespersons including Seiji Maehara and Akihisa Nagashima. Their personal views on US-Japan relations, however, were much too comfortable to the Americans, who developed an illusion of continuity in Japanese foreign policy. When the US leaders saw Hatoyama become prime minister, they overreacted to what they perceived as Hatoyama's foreign policy recourse away from the United States.

The goodwill generated out of the joint disaster relief Operation *Tomodachi* in the aftermath of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake of March 2011 and the new DPJ leadership of conservative Yoshihiko Noda marked the beginning of a much needed repair work in US-Japan relations. However, his weak standing within DPJ faced constant threats from the Ozawa group to withdraw its support. Outside the DPJ, unwanted stirrups of Japan-China relations by the right pushed the US-Japan alliance beyond America's comfort level.

DPJ and US-Japan Relations

The fall of the LDP from the ruling party status in 2008 had an important ramification for Japan's foreign policy in general and US-Japan relations in particular during the following years. Against the backdrop of the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance under the LDP government since the mid-1990s, the DPJ in anticipation of the coalition politics with the Socialists differentiated itself from the LDP on foreign policy issues during the fall 2008 lower house election campaign. The DPJ platform called for a pro-Asian shift and regional and global multilateralism (as opposed to US-Japan bilateralism). Domestically, the DPJ policy manifesto emphasized reversing the overdoing of the Koizumi-era LDP economic reforms and restoring some of the previous regulations and subsidies to protect the less competitive economic

sectors and social groups like agriculture, poor, elderly, women, and children. It was these domestic measures, not foreign policy, that boosted the DPJ into power in fall 2008. However, binding of the DPJ manifesto in the newly competitive political system in Japan meant that the DPJ had to lead recourse of the Japanese foreign policy against the continuity of the pro-US bilateralism under the LDP and the bureaucratic inertia to sustain such policy.

Futenma Relocation

The issue of relocating the US Marine Corps Airbase in Futenma, Okinawa, became a major sore spot in the US-Japan relations under the DPJ government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Urbanization of Futenma had made the airfield operation unsafe, and relocation of the Marine Corps air assets from Futenma to Henoko, Okinawa, was agreed between the LDP government and the United States after some 16 years of bilateral and domestic negotiations since the 1990s. Hatoyama, who has advocated an “alliance without military basing” with the United States, insisted the revision of the LDP plan of Futenma relocation must meet the bottom line of placing it “out of Okinawa,” if not out of Japan.

Hatoyama's electoral pledge immediately faced opposition from everywhere—the US Departments of Defense and State, the Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and the local municipal government of every alternative site he casually mentioned without prior consultations. The US determination to stick to the agreement with the LDP government directly collided with Hatoyama, whose poorly and hectically prepared alternative plans were neither bilaterally nor domestically supported. Hatoyama resigned from his premiership to take responsibility for the strained bilateral relationship. The succeeding DPJ prime minister Naoto Kan took little initiative to break the deadlock, and his verbally expressed resolve to repair the US-Japan relations was quickly tested by incursion of a Chinese fishing boat into the territorial water around the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and its collisions with the Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats.² However, Kan was saved from acting decisively on the base issue when his cabinet was preoccupied with the disasters of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear plant accident of March 2011. The importance of the US-Japan alliance was actively propagated through the Operation *Tomodachi* (Friendship) joint disaster relief mission, and there was a shared incentive to downplay the Futenma issue for the time being. As the nuclear

plants stabilized by fall 2011, Kan with declining popularity ran out of excuses to stay in power and resigned.

The DPJ elected a conservative, Yoshihiko Noda, as the prime minister. Noda's effort to solve the Futenma issue was met by a corresponding easing of the US position. The US tying of the Futenma relocation with the reduction of Marine Corps Third Expeditionary Troops in Okinawa (due relocation to Guam) was partially untied when new Marines deployment to Australia was taken from Okinawa. Comments by influential defense policymakers in support of integrating Futenma functions into the existing Kadena Air Force base in Okinawa³ and the US consideration to deploy the MV-22 (Osprey) transporter planes first to bases in the Japanese mainland before redeployment to Futenma⁴ all indicated US willingness to flexibly cooperate with the Noda government to smoothen the domestic "root-binding" process toward solving the Futenma issue through relocation within Okinawa. Noda's visit to Okinawa in February 2012 was met with cold reception by Okinawan leaders, however. Even worse, another Osprey accident in Florida in June 2012 made persuading the governor of Okinawa more difficult.⁵

Earthquake/Tsunami Relief

The double disasters in March 2011 of an earthquake (with magnitude 9) that hit the northeastern Japan and the meltdown of nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Number One Power Plant, which the earthquake triggered, cemented the proalliance public opinion of the non-Okinawan Japanese mainlanders. The combined force of the US military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) immediately mobilized in the Operation *Tomodachi* in order to respond to the extraordinary scale of destruction caused by the earthquake, tsunami, and the nuclear disaster. Effectiveness of the US troops in cleaning up the tsunami-washed rubbles and reopening the Sendai Airport to smoothen shipment of the relief supplies into the northeastern region was complemented by equally successful reconstruction of devastated roads by the Japanese troops. The rapid recovery of the transportation infrastructure was possible only with contributions from the well-prepared engineering corps troops, which enabled other humanitarian relief operations by themselves and later increasingly by civilian governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

Japanese people's perception about the SDF and the US-Japan alliance has steadily improved over the past decade and a half, and the 2011 earthquake removed much of the remaining skepticism. Prime

Minister Tomiichi Murayama, a socialist, of the coalition government with the LDP decided not to deploy the SDF troops at the time of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995, citing the ambiguous legal foundation for such a domestic deployment of the troops in natural disasters. Shortage of rapid response personnel in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake worsened the spread of fire and resulting deaths. Legislations since then have clearly identified SDF roles in natural disasters domestic and overseas, resulting in frequent deployments of the troops to regions hit by earthquakes, typhoons, and heavy rain and snow. The increased visibility of the SDF troops to the Japanese eyes and the increased understanding of the noncombat missions of the SDF troops have raised the support for both the SDF and the US-Japan alliance.

Strategic Review

The positive Japanese perception about US troop presence in Japan, however, has been accompanied by their increasing fear of abandonment by the primed ally. While antialliance and antibase movements among the Japanese mainlanders during the Cold War period was based on the fear of entrapment into America's wars elsewhere, the post-Cold War period has witnessed the shift in the balance between the entrapment fear and the abandonment fear toward the latter. Combined with the increased fluidity of the power balance structure in the post-Cold War period, advance in long-range weaponry and the resulting tactical considerations by the United States are also contributing to this shift in Japanese public perceptions.

During the Cold War period, the formidable Japanese left advocated unarmed neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union. The mercantilist wing of the ruling LDP utilized the left's opposition in order to restrict Japan's defense commitment and spending and one-sidedly rely on the alliance to the maximum extent possible. While the left believed that unarmed neutrality would keep Japan out of the bipolar conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the mercantilists believed that the Cold War gave Japan a geopolitical advantage in its diplomatic dealing with the United States⁶—abandoning Japan was not a choice the United States could afford, despite numerous bilateral trade conflicts between them.

Japan's steady waking up from the peace amnesia during the 1980s under renewed Cold War (after the *détente* of the 1970s) was led by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's efforts to integrate the SDF strategy into a broader US strategy. His talk of turning the Japanese

archipelago into an unsinkable aircraft carrier and closing the three straits to contain the Soviet nuclear submarines in an elevated crisis invited a major controversy, yet to some extent prepared the public opinion to the new security environment of the post-Cold War period.

The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990–1991) confronted the post-Cold War Japan with a new challenge. While Iraq's challenge to the oil supply was a threat to Japan's economic viability, Japan responded with an offer of financial contribution to the coalition military operation against Iraq. The backlash from the United States against Japan's lack of human contributions was traumatic for Japan, as Congressmen openly advocated abrogation of the alliance treaty. During the following two decades, Japan has passed a series of legislations in order to enable SDF dispatches in concert with the US military operations globally.⁷ The active military contributions by Japan have been driven partly by its own sense of international responsibility as an economic superpower, yet its continuing activism despite the economic stagnation during the past decade is an indication that the other main driver is its increasing fear of abandonment by the United States.

This Japanese fear reached its height during the early years of the Bush administration. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld initiated a global review of the US force posture and determined that its forward deployment of troops in East Asia made them vulnerable to the increasing range of ballistic missiles by North Korea and China. Japanese security experts feared that anticipated reduction of forward deployed US troops, if done at a large scale, might send a wrong signal to Japan's potential adversaries that the alliance was weakening.⁸ They also feared that this US move might suggest that the United States is reducing its commitment to the defense of Japan in favor of more flexible responses to regional crises.

The proposed reduction of US forward deployed troops was good news for many Okinawans, who have shouldered a disproportionately heavy share of the burden of hosting US forces. As long as the scale of proposed US troop reduction remained modest, Japanese policymakers welcomed this opportunity to gain some political scores by claiming credits to reduction of US military footprints. Particularly, relocating the Marine Corps Airbase in Futenma, Okinawa, was viewed as a move toward removing the politically difficult tactical issue out of the way of discussing a more fundamental strategic review.⁹

Since the end of the Cold War, thus, the US-Japan alliance has endured crises of two sorts. First, US perception of Japan's cheap

riding on (or lack of contributions to) the alliance was mostly overcome by Japan's increasing military activism and the domestic opinion that supported such a shift. Second, Japanese perception that the United States may abandon Japan due to its prevailing unipolar tendency in the post-Cold War period did not gain much currency as the US view of China steadily eroded in a synchronized manner with the Japanese view of China during the past decade.

Maritime Disputes with China and the US-Japan Alliance

The year 2010 marked a new peak in the steadily eroding relations between China and Japan, especially in their maritime frontier. The two governments' willingness to suppress domestic nationalist expressions for the sake of sustaining good overall bilateral relations has been overtaken by the increasing mutual distrust between the two governments and their temptations to mobilize the domestic public opinions to support their diplomatic claims.

The continuing disagreement about the maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary between China and Japan, further complicated by their disputing sovereign claims over the Senkaku Islands and the Chinese exploitation of the natural gas resources in East China Sea, has escalated in close encounters between the two navies and civilian maritime law enforcement agencies.¹⁰ As China entered the final years of the Hu Jintao leadership, the weakening control of the central government leadership in both China and Japan over their own agencies meant that the two countries were more likely to engage in a competitive behavior best described as diplomatic "game of chicken." As far as Japan is concerned, how closely to drag the United States into this game is both a diplomatic issue and a domestic politics issue.

Coast Guard Patrol Boat Incident and Leaked Video

The incursion of a Chinese fishing boat into the territorial water of the Senkaku Islands in October 2010 was not a new incident. Chinese (and Taiwanese) fishermen and activists have attempted to enter into the EEZ or even land onto the islands since China started claiming the islands in the late 1970s. In June 2008, a Taiwanese recreational fishing boat entered the territorial water around the Senkakus, collided with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol boat, and sank. All passengers were rescued and released, but the captain of the Taiwanese boat was arrested.¹¹ He was quickly released after questioning by the Coast Guard. In October 2010, a similar collision incident happened,

but this time with a PRC fishing boat. The Coast Guard patrol boat arrested the captain of the Chinese fishing boat for obstruction of law enforcement activities after the fishing boat collided with the two Coast Guard patrol boats. Faced with severe protests from the Chinese government, however, the DPJ government decided not to file a charge against the captain and released him. The Coast Guard kept video recordings of the collision incident for its instructional archive, and a Coast Guard officer dissatisfied by the government decision posted the video recording on YouTube. The release of the video caused a domestic furor against China.

Hillary Clinton Comment and Foreign Minister Maehara

The increasing domestic sense of vulnerability in Japan's southwestern island front has driven a shift in Japan's defense strategy from the northern (Soviet Union) focused strategy of the Cold War period to a southwestern (China) focused one. Unlike the Soviet (Russia) administered northern islands that Japan claim as its territory, the Senkaku islands are presently administered by Japan. Since the Sino-US rapprochement of the early 1970s and more specifically US diplomatic recognition of the Peoples Republic of China in the late 1970s, the Chinese claim to the Senkaku islands has tested the US-Japan alliance.

The official Japanese policy on the Senkaku islands is that sovereignty over these islands undisputedly belongs to Japan—hence there is no international dispute to discuss. The US policy tacitly recognizes the existence of a dispute between Japan and China, avoids taking side between the two claims, but recognizes the present administrative control by Japan. The United States thereby implicitly avoids automatic invocation of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in an event the Senkaku islands are militarily occupied by the Chinese force.¹²

Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara's visit to Washington in September 2010 and meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the wake of the collision incident was aimed at reassuring the domestic public with strong words of commitment from the US officials. Although Clinton merely reiterated the standard US line that the defense treaty applies to "all areas under Japanese administration," Maehara successfully (though somewhat misleadingly) sold the line to the Japanese public to mean that the United States was strongly committed to the defense of Japan including the Senkaku islands.¹³ Maehara's reputation representing the foremost pro-US wing of the ruling DPJ placed him in a position to gain a political score for repairing the US-Japan

relations when Prime Minister Hatoyama's call for a revision of the Futenma relocation plan caused a major rift in the bilateral relations. Intra-DPJ leadership competition is thus one of the drivers of the Japanese response to the Senkaku island crisis of the fall 2010.

The Ishihara Factor

The actions of Tokyo governor and a former LDP national parliamentarian, Shintaro Ishihara, represent the lack of effective central government control over the Senkaku issue. Ishihara had a background of committing the Tokyo Metropolitan government's budget to developing and utilizing the remote Okinotori island, which was under the administration of the Tokyo government. The island gives Japan a large area of 200 nautical mile EEZ, but its highly eroded state and strategically important location between Taiwan and Guam has urged the Chinese government to dispute Japan's claim.¹⁴

Ishihara during his speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, in April 2012 announced that he was going to have the Tokyo government purchase one of the Senkaku islands from their private Japanese owner. The announcement was a kind of surprise as the Senkakus were placed administratively under the Okinawa government. The announcement came in the wake of the national government's decisions to name and nationalize numerous uninhabited remote islands to ascertain territorial ownership, but to exclude the Senkakus for their political sensitivity. Ishihara's announcement aimed at "doing the job on behalf of the reluctant national government."¹⁵ His desire for returning into national politics, against the advice of his son who has reached a prominent leadership role within the LDP, came true when he won a lower house seat in December 2012.

Following the Ishihara comment, Maehara (who did not have a cabinet post in the Noda government) said that the national government should purchase the Senkaku islands.¹⁶ Ishihara's move also echoes conservative foreign policy rhetoric of the Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto. Hashimoto's Osaka Restoration Party, joined by Ishihara, seized an opportunity to step into national politics during the December 2012 lower house election and became a force to be reckoned with by the two major parties (DPJ and LDP). In response to the pressures from the conservatives, Prime Minister Noda announced on July 7, 2012, that the government planned to nationalize the Senkaku islands and entered a negotiation with the islands' private owner.¹⁷ His decision to nationalize one of the Senkaku islands allowed the

national government to more fully implement the ongoing ban against landing onto this island by both foreign and domestic activists. However, China bitterly protested the Japanese act and intensified incursions into the contiguous and even the territorial water around the islands using civilian government vessels. The US Congress eventually passed a resolution to reassure Japan of US commitment to the defense of the Senkakus.¹⁸ Thus, domestic political contexts in Japan currently is conducive to intensifying maritime disputes with China in the face of increased Chinese assertiveness, and this puts pressure on the US-Japan alliance. Japanese desire for more explicitly supportive US commitment to Japan's territorial and maritime claims contradicts the strategy of the United States to avoid entrapment.

East Asia Summit

Japan's policy toward regional community building was aimed not at excluding the United States, but at anchoring its commitment to the region. Integration with the broader East Asian region was for increasing the US stakes and interests. US skepticism about Japanese proposals has been observable, and once engaged, the United States demonstrated many disagreements with Japan over the mode of integration.¹⁹ At the grand strategic level, this rationale behind Japan's effort to promote regional integration has not changed throughout the post-Cold War period. The manner with which Japan promotes regional integration, however, was more influenced by the domestic politics since the Koizumi government.

Koizumi on EAC

Japanese foreign policy under the Koizumi administration is often characterized by its pro-US shift and military activism.²⁰ However, this outcome was not exactly the administration's original intent. The unachieved part of the administration's policy was to join the rest of Asia with added diplomatic strength of US backing. Although Prime Minister Hatoyama has been credited for proposing an "East Asian Community" at the fourth East Asian Summit meeting in April 2009, Prime Minister Koizumi has earlier spoken of an East Asian Community in 2002.²¹ However, Japan, China, and Korea kept themselves from opening more concrete working-level discussions to detail the contents of and the process of building such a community. The strained diplomatic relations among them due to Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and opposition to Japan's drive for a permanent

membership in the United Nations Security Council by China and Korea, among other issues, have delayed the negotiations.²²

The EAC concept under the Koizumi government did not achieve a high priority for two additional reasons. First, Koizumi focused on domestic administrative reforms based on economic deregulation and privatization of public enterprises, with a heavily symbolic emphasis assigned to privatizing postal services. Foreign policy did not receive much attention with an exception of highly controversial and visible overseas deployment of the SDF. The binary framework Koizumi could employ on the SDF questions fit well with his populist administration's style. On the other more complex foreign policy issues, such as regional integration, did not have an equal amount of the leader's attention. Second, Koizumi saw that not repairing the diplomatic damage from his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine was not hurting his domestic political standing. With poor relations with the two most immediate neighbors of Korea and China, regional community building was put on a low gear by Koizumi.

Hatoyama on EAC and His Poor Political Leadership

The DPJ electoral victory in fall 2009 caused a major shift in the Japanese policy toward regional community building. After the period of constrained relations with China and Korea, Koizumi's LDP successors pledged to repair the diplomatic damage, sincerely (Yasuo Fukuda) and rhetorically (Taro Aso and Shinzo Abe). Little progress was made, however, as Japan reentered a period of frequent leadership changes, which eventually led to the end of the LDP regime in fall 2009. Prime Minister Hatoyama of the victorious DPJ brought up foreign policy issues, diverting the public attention from the domestic political-economy issues on which his own party was highly divided.

Hatoyama has been a consistent advocate of the US-Japan alliance without US bases in Japan.²³ The idea, revolutionary to the traditional managers of the US-Japan alliance, differentiated him from both the status quo supporters of the LDP and the former socialists within the DPJ, who accepted the alliance only reluctantly. Despite Koizumi's personal popularity and a broad public support for the overall US-Japan alliance structure, a dormant criticism against Koizumi's being too close to the United States characterized him as Bush's dog. In the post-Koizumi political market, Hatoyama staked his reputation on pursuing equality with the United States and joining Asia based on "friendship and love." Hatoyama's policy was popular among a broad range of domestic groups as long as it remained general and abstract.

Voters who saw the Koizumi-era enhancement of bilateral security cooperation as lacking balance with regional and UN-based global approaches gravitated toward Hatoyama's policy. Sympathy toward Okinawa by the Japanese outside Okinawa remained strong, as long as discussions of relocations of US troops to the Japanese mainland did not happen. Only some experienced politicians and bureaucrats who understood the complexity of the base issues were alerted by the danger of tossing the LDP-era agreement on Futenma.

Hatoyama emphasized that the US-Japan relations remained the most important bilateral relations for Japan. It is unlikely that Hatoyama meant otherwise and his pro-Asia shift was to be carried out at the neglect of the United States. Rather, it was Hatoyama's lack of understanding of the US perceptions of his actions and his *naivete* that *yu-ai* (friendship and love) would bind the transpacific region. Furthermore, poor governing experience of the DPJ politicians also caused lack of coordination within the party and outside. While Hatoyama was emphasizing the primacy of the US-Japan relations, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada openly commented that the United States needed not be a member of the East Asian Community (EAC) proposed by Hatoyama.²⁴ Hatoyama's proposal in the context of Okada's comment contradicted Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd's proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community, which was explicitly inclusive of the United States. The total absence of coordination between Australia and Japan on the matter of engaging the United States in the region contrasted their close coordination in the launching of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)²⁵ and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).²⁶ Hatoyama's EAC proposal confused even the Chinese. China failed to extend a warm reception to Hatoyama, although doing so could drive a wedge between Japan and the United States.

Despite the political fanfare, Hatoyama's EAC proposal lacked new contents. His own expectation was also modest. Hatoyama saw gradual accumulation of functional cooperation initiatives in various policy fields, which would eventuate in a more structured community.²⁷ The view also finds adherents even among the US conservatives, including Victor Cha who served in the National Security Council during the Bush administration.²⁸ Without strong political commitments to detail the contents of functional cooperation by his successors, such initiatives were left to the working-level bureaucrats. Furthermore, escalating disputes over the Senkaku islands frequently slowed and interrupted the working-level discussions on security and economic cooperation. With Korea, sinking of a Korean navy corvette, Choenan,

and shelling of the Yeongpyeong-do island by North Korea in 2010 provided a momentum for upgrading the Japan-Korea security cooperation. A limited progress was achieved in this bilateral cooperation between America's two Asian allies in a quiet diplomacy despite intermittent flare-ups of the Takeshima dispute.²⁹

Transpacific Partnership

On the foreign economic policy front, Japan's policymaking under the DPJ has been directly taken hostage by the party's internal division. The LDP under Koizumi's strong leadership forcefully promoted liberal, promarket economic reforms domestically, and this reform policy was conducive to market opening to foreign imports through plurilateral and bilateral free trade agreements. Despite the lack of progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round of negotiations during the same period, Japan has signed and initiated official negotiations for numerous bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements.

The alliance of the domestic farm lobby, the agriculture bureaucracy, and the rural LDP politicians formed a formidable opposition to market opening in the past,³⁰ but the power shift from the LDP to DPJ and the market-oriented reform of agricultural production and distribution policy since the mid-1990s have weakened the opposition's cohesion. Because the LDP lost power when its leading faction leaders turned against the popular reform-minded Koizumi, the DPJ policy had to both criticize the "resistance forces" within the LDP against the Koizumi reforms and at the same time pay careful considerations to those whose well-being was neglected under the Koizumi reforms. The task of differentiating those whose economic interests were unduly protected at the cost of the broader public and those who should be duly protected from the brute force of market for the good of the whole society is nothing but political, which depends on skillful steering of the public opinion. In order to win a majority in the parliament, which overrepresents the rural voters by a 2-to-1 margin, the DPJ policy (despite the party's strength in urban districts) cannot be a dynamic pursuit of market opening to champion urban consumer interests.

The US decision to enter the expanded TPP negotiations in 2010 altered Japan's calculation. The US effort during Bush administration was focused on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) framework, rather than a transpacific framework initially pursued under the APEC. While the United States gradually saw TPP as a possible

tool to back its strategic approaches to key Asian security partners with tangible mutual economic benefits, Japan was seeking such solidarity with the United States via a bilateral FTA only unsuccessfully. Japan's Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO or *Keidanren*) representing the industrial and some service sectors has been actively lobbying the Japanese government for a bilateral FTA with the United States, and such a call is consistent with the security interests in keeping the United States engaged in the regional security matters that affect Japan. Maehara understandably has been a consistent proponent of Japan's entry into TPP. However, opposition from the farming sector played a veto power against DPJ taking a proactive stance on such an FTA proposal.

The Naoto Kan administration's decision to explore joining the TPP negotiations came after TPP evolved from an FTA proposal among smaller liberal traders (such as Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia) into a bigger grouping including the United States. With the smaller grouping, the economic and political costs to Japan's farming sector was significant even without the United States, whereas gains to Japan's industrial export sector was much smaller without the United States. Entry of the United States into the TPP negotiation altered Japan's domestic power balance between the liberal and protectionist groups. The public perception that Japan would be "left out" by the United States was a necessary condition before the government announced its decision to start bilateral prenegotiations toward formally entering the TPP negotiations.

Japan's joining into the TPP preparatory negotiations was a blessing for its industrial sector for another reason. The increasing Japanese manufacturing investments in China and growth of regional supply networks have raised the proportional share of trade with China within Japan's overall trade portfolio. The trilateral FTA proposal among China, Japan, and Korea faced not only Chinese and Korean reluctance out of its fear of Japanese economic dominance, but also opposition from Japan's farming sector. While Korea awaited ratification of the Korea-US bilateral free trade agreement, Japan was concerned that absence of even negotiations for a similar FTA between the United States and Japan would soon put Japan at disadvantage vis-à-vis Korean producers in exporting to the US market.³¹ Japan's entry into the TPP negotiations is viewed as a means to level the competition vis-à-vis Korea and improve Japan's negotiating position vis-à-vis both China and Korea in their anticipated trilateral free trade negotiations.

Conclusion

Japan's drifting away from the United States under the Hatoyama government was not based on a clear policy shift based on a concrete alternative strategy. The rhetoric of change derived from Japan's domestic politics and Hatoyama's personal views nonetheless bound the inexperienced DPJ politicians under the two-party competition. Overestimation of the Japanese change by the US policymakers in turn worsened the bilateral relations more than necessary.

Japanese public's worsening perception of China and how Japanese politicians deal with this domestic perception have affected the US-Japan relations. Prime Minister Koizumi chose to ride popular support for his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine at the expense of bilateral diplomacy with China. This approach was possible only in combination with his totally leaning toward the United States through closer military cooperation. The following LDP prime ministers attempted to repair China-Japan relations by refraining from visiting the Yasukuni and thereby betraying the populist nationalism, but only from the position of strength backed by the US alliance. Under the first two DPJ prime ministers, the government's approach to China oscillated just as its approach to the United States drifted. Hatoyama's naive approach to China with poorly articulated regional multilateralism only invited China's more assertive policy toward Japan. Kan's toughening of the China policy as seen in the arrest of the Chinese fishing boat captain in fall 2010 quickly collapsed in the face of strong Chinese protest.

The turmoil in the US-Japan bilateral relations during the DPJ rule under Hatoyama and Kan has gradually been subsiding. Consignment of the DPJ leadership into the conservative Noda created a brief window of opportunity to repair the damaged bilateral relations based on the old strategy of the LDP. Faced with internal opposition against the tax reform bill, the Noda government called a snap election of the lower house in December 2012. Although the government-proposed bill passed the lower house with support of the LDP and the Clean Government Party (Komeito) in exchange for a promise of an early election, the DPJ suffered from extensive internal defections by members of the factions led by Ichiro Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama. The DPJ entered the lower house election with less incumbents due to defections and came out with even less elected members.

The LDP victory in the December 2012 lower house election returned it to power in coalition with the Komeito (Clean Government

Party). The pro-US foreign policy will likely continue under the LDP prime minister Shinzo Abe. However, how LDP performs in the upcoming upper house election in the summer 2013 will affect the extent of rightward shift of Japanese foreign policy. Ironically, a strong showing of the LDP will likely keep Abe more constrained, for there will be many moderates within the electorally victorious LDP. On the other hand, the rise of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) based on its Koizumi-like populist and neoliberal capitalist reform agenda has pushed it to the forefront of all opposition parties except DPJ. Its performance in the upper house election will be a key factor in the coalition game.³² If LDP needs JRP as a coalition partner, the latter will demand LDP's clear break from the old politics of rural subsidies and a more autonomous security policy.

Notes

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1. For more elaborate discussions of the diplomatic utilities of the US alliance for Japan, see Yoichiro Sato, "Transitions in Japan's Strategic Landscape," in Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye, eds., *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 1–18.
2. The conservative foreign minister Seiji Maehara of the Kan government managed to have US secretary of state Hillary Clinton reiterate the US position that the US-Japan alliance was applicable to all areas under Japanese administration. Kan, however, released the Chinese boat captain without a charge out of political consideration to the vocally protesting Chinese government.
3. Influential senators, such as Jim Webb, John McCain, and Carl Levin, publicly supported consolidation of the Futenma base into the Kadena Air Force Base. *AFPBB News*, May 12 2011; <http://www.afpbb.com/article/politics/2799371/7202085> (Accessed April 19, 2012); *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 5, 2012; <http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20120406k0000m030041000c.html> (Accessed April 19, 2012)
4. Nicknamed among the Marines as the "window makers," the Osprey planes have met with many accidents. Okinawan residents have expressed their opposition to the deployment of the Ospreys into Futenma. *Asahi Shimbun*, March 7, 2012; <http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0307/TKY201203060867.html> (Accessed March 7, 2012)
5. "Osprey Accident; Detailed Description of U.S. around Mid-June," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 23, 2012; <http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0623/TKY201206220719.html> (Accessed June 26, 2012)

6. See Akitoshi Miyashita, "Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan's Postwar Pacifism," in Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata, eds., *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 21–46.
7. Yoichiro Sato, "Nihon no kaigai hahei kettei no bunseki" [Analysis of Japan's overseas troop dispatch decisions], in Kimie Hara, ed., *Zaigai Nihonjin Kenkyusha ga mita Nihon Gaiko* [Japanese diplomacy as seen by overseas Japanese scholars], 85–115, 290–292 (notes).
8. *MSN Sankei News*, February 7, 2012. <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/120207/stt12020711190000-n1.htm> (Accessed April 19, 2012).
9. For divergent US-Japan perspectives on the Futenma issue, see Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato, "Alliance Constrained: Japan, the United States, and Regional Security," in Takashi Inoguchi, John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–12.
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 27. An interview of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 17, 2009.
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 29. A defense ministerial meeting in January 2011 resulted in agreements on regularizing defense vice-ministerial meetings and starting a negotiation for an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. *Daily Yomiuri Online*,

January 12, 2011; <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110111004914.htm> (Accessed April 19, 2012). It was expected that memorandums of understanding would be signed in May 2012 between the defense ministers on intelligence sharing and acquisition and cross-servicing agreement in order to enable intelligence sharing on North Korea and cooperation during peacekeeping operations abroad. "Japan and South Korea Share the Military; Notes on Communications Security Around May," *Asahi Shimbun*, April 22, 2012; <http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0421/TKY201204210554.html> (Accessed April 22, 2012). Signing was postponed twice and unscheduled for the time being, however, due to domestic disputes between the Lee administration and the Korean parliament over the alleged lack of consultation. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 29, 2012; <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/news/20120629-OYT1T01015.htm?from=popin> (Accessed July 7, 2012).

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China's US Policy and Its Domestic Background*

Qingguo Jia

The objectives of China's US policy have been rather consistent over the years. They are, respectively, to maintain and improve the relationship so as to create a favorable international environment for domestic reforms and development and to resist the alleged US attempts to impose its will and wishes on China, which China believes threaten its important and even core national interests. Over time, China's policy toward the United States has been oscillating. Accordingly, sometimes one sees China making great efforts to mend and promote the relationship and some other times one finds China furiously condemning and displaying its defiance to the United States for meddling with its internal affairs.

This chapter is an attempt to analyze the role of the domestic factors on China's US policy. It will first try to identify the major domestic factors that are believed to have a significant influence on China's US policy. Then it will do a case study to illustrate how these factors have influenced China's US policy since President Obama came into office. And, finally, it will attempt to draw some tentative conclusions.

Identifying Domestic Factors

What are the domestic factors that have a significant influence over China's US policy? A brief review of the literature suggests that the following factors play an important role: (1) ideology; (2) nationalism;

(3) institutional rivalry; (4) expectations; and (5) media, especially the Internet.¹

To begin with, ideology still has a significant influence on China's US policy. China officially abandoned the practice of using ideology as a criterion to define its foreign relations in the early 1980s.² However, this does not mean that ideology does not matter or does not matter significantly. Rather it has played a significant role in a different way. That is, people of different ideological persuasions in China tend to push for different foreign policies. On China's US policy, those with a Marxist or new left perspective tend to be more suspicious of US intentions on China and thereby advocate a more confrontational policy toward the United States whereas those with a more liberal inclination tend to have a more benign view of US intentions and, therefore, advocate a more cooperative policy with the United States.³

As a political force, nationalism usually plays a significant role in shaping foreign policy in all countries. In this regard, Chinese nationalism is no exception. Many have argued that Chinese nationalism is on the rise and this has contributed to more Chinese assertiveness in foreign affairs. However, this view is debatable. The reality is much more complicated in that Chinese nationalism is on the rise in some aspects but on the decline in others.⁴ Whether Chinese nationalism is on the rise or not, it affects China's foreign policy behavior significantly anyway including China's policy toward the United States. Such a nationalism cuts across both the liberal and left groups. For various reasons, Chinese tend to regard the United States as a country that is insensitive to Chinese feelings and sensitivities and that tries to impose its own will and wishes on China with little regard for China's interests and concerns.⁵ They tend to perceive conflicts between the United States and China as a contest between the strong and unreasonable on the one hand and the weak and bullied on the other. This view is reconfirmed repeatedly by the US insistence that it has a right to sell weapons to Taiwan, an island province that Chinese believe the United States has helped to remain separate from China and intends to make the separation permanent. Accordingly, one finds popular support for the Chinese government whenever it takes a tough position against the United States, be it on trade, intellectual property rights, Tibet, or Taiwan.

Chinese state institutions, like those in other countries, have their own respective responsibilities, priorities, and perspectives. This has made institutional rivalry on policy matters an inescapable reality. For this reason, institutional rivalry over policymaking such as that

between the various ministries over China's accession to the WTO and top leadership's ultimate intervention contributed significantly to the terms and timing of China's decision to join that organization.⁶ Similarly, institutional maneuvering such as those between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, the military and other concerned institutions helps define China's policy toward the United States.

Expectation also helps shape foreign policy behavior. This is the case especially for China, a large country rising rapidly. As China rises, Chinese expectation on how their country should be treated in the world changes quickly and may have changed at a more rapid pace than the actual change in China's power capabilities. Such a situation usually leads to increase in popular pressures on the government to take tougher actions on foreign policy matters than before and should have also contributed to more willingness on the part of Chinese foreign-policymakers to act assertively on increasing number of issues. As the chapter is going to demonstrate, this also helps one explain China's policy toward the United States in recent years.

Finally, the extensive use of modern communication technologies such as Internet also plays an increasing role in shaping China's foreign policy behavior. Among other things, it magnifies the more populist and nationalistic views and in turn increases popular pressures on government to take tougher and more assertive actions. People making comments on international affairs in the Internet tend to have strong views and more often than not strong nationalistic views.⁷ Various studies show that such views tend to simplify what is going on in the outside world and blame outside forces for what is going wrong in China and China's relations with other countries. For example, they have blamed the Western influence for domestic political problems such as corruption, polarization, and even pollution. They have blamed the alleged US "return" to Asia for the deterioration of relations between China and its neighbors during 2010. They often incite antiforeign sentiments with conspiracy stories that have no factual basis. In part because they invoke people's ignorance and fear about the outside world and in part because they tap into the dissatisfaction of their audience with their life one way or the other, such stories are usually popular. The modern communication technologies have helped such people to spread their views quickly and extensively. As the leadership pays more attention to the views expressed in the Internet, such views gain power and affect the behavior of the foreign policy establishment.⁸

These and other factors interact and help shape China's foreign policy in general and its US policy in particular. In the next section, I will try to recount and analyze the domestic debates over China's US policy during the Obama administration to illustrate how these factors influence and affect China's policy toward the United States.

Politics at work: China's US Policy during the Obama Administration

When President Obama came into office, China had much to look forward to. Unlike other opposition leaders running for office in history, for various reasons, Obama largely refrained, during his presidential campaign, from attacking his predecessor's China policy. Accordingly, when he came to power, he did not have many campaign promises to fulfill on China. That is to say that he did not need to get tough on China as previous opposition leaders did when they came to the White House. His top China policy advisors, Jeffery Bader and James Steinberg, were widely regarded as pragmatic and supportive of a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Under the circumstances, China had good reason to believe that the good relations between the two countries forged during the latter part of the Bush administration could be maintained and indeed further developed. As Zhang Deguang, the secretary general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China's former vice foreign minister, put it, the Obama administration was different from the previous US administrations in that, instead of regarding China as a strategic competitor, it sought cooperation with China.⁹

Since China regarded this as an important opportunity to strengthen cooperation between the two countries to a new and higher level, it tried its best to translate that into reality. Among other things, it actively participated in the US-led international efforts such as G20 summit to deal with the global financial crisis.¹⁰ It endorsed US separate engagement with North Korea on the Korean nuclear issue outside the framework of the Six-Party talks.¹¹ It expressed its support to Obama's efforts to promote international cooperation to address the problem of climate change.¹² Confronted with US trade sanctions against specific commodities China exported to the United States, China did not try to politicize it. Instead it merely encouraged Chinese companies to take legal actions to protect themselves.¹³

In return, the Obama administration reciprocated China's cooperation with positive gestures on its part. Among other things, it agreed to combine and upgrade the strategic or senior dialogues between the two countries of the Bush administration from the ministerial level to the cabinet level.¹⁴ President Obama praised China's contribution to the global efforts to cope with the financial crisis.¹⁵ He also stated that the United States would not seek to contain China.¹⁶ On Taiwan, he publicly endorsed China's handling of the cross-strait relations and expressed the hope that cross-strait relations would continue to improve.¹⁷ The Obama administration also took extra caution not to let the differences between the two countries hamper the relationship. For example, during their visits to China in February and May 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and even speaker Nancy Pelosi refrained from criticizing China's human rights record as they used to do in the past.¹⁸ And James Steinberg, US deputy secretary of state, came up with a new concept for managing US-China relations, that is, strategic reassurance.¹⁹ According to Steinberg, "strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's arrival as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain must be a priority in the U.S.-China relationship."²⁰

The positive interaction reached a climax with Obama's high-profile visit to Beijing in November 2009. During his visit, Obama held talks with Chinese leaders including President Hu Jintao and the two countries issued a Joint Statement. In the Joint Statement, they reiterated their commitment to building a "positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship in the 21st century" and promised to cope with various common challenges together.²¹

Even as the two countries tried to improve and deepen their relationship, however, Chinese critics were skeptical of the intent of the Obama administration. Those holding a realist view argued that the United States as the hegemonic state would never tolerate China's rise. Therefore, it was wishful thinking to seek strategic trust between the two countries.²² Leftists argued that despite its rhetoric, the United States will not change its practice to undermine and subvert China as a socialist country and China has no choice but to get prepared to fight.²³ Both raised serious doubts about "strategic reassurance" and argued that it was impossible for China and the United States to obtain that.

Some nationalists also took the issue with China's adherence with Deng Xiaoping's dictum, *Taoguang yanghui* (take a low profile). They argued that Deng Xiaoping might be right to make it a principle for China to conduct its foreign relations when China was weak in the late 1980s. However, time has passed and China has grown stronger. It makes no sense for China to stick to it now. Instead of *Taoguang yanghui*, China should dare to "liang jian" (show sword), meaning to show courage when confronted with international provocations.²⁴ Some also questioned Obama administration's efforts to get China take the lead in promising greater cuts in green house emission in the forthcoming Copenhagen summit. They argued that the true intent of the United States was to slow down China's economic development.²⁵ These views were especially popular in the Internet.

What happened at the Copenhagen summit on climate change and the subsequent tide of Western criticism of alleged uncooperative behavior of China at the summit appeared to have confirmed the view that the West led by the United States harbored no good intention toward China. Instead of acknowledging the strenuous efforts and many achievements China has made to reduce emission, the West focused only on China's reluctance to make greater commitments at the summit. To them, what the west intended to do was to shift responsibility of the failure of the Copenhagen summit to China when they failed to force China to make commitments at the expense of China's developmental interests.²⁶

Then in early 2010, the Obama administration's handling of the Google case heightened the Chinese government's concern about US meddling in China's internal affairs. In January 2010, Google claimed that the Chinese government had hacked Google to obtain information on Chinese dissidents. Claiming that it did not wish to provide information under Chinese censorship, Google announced that it might pull out of China.²⁷ On January 12, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement to the effect that Google's allegations raised "serious concerns and questions." She said that the United States looked to the Chinese government for an explanation.²⁸ On January 21, Clinton delivered a major speech on Internet freedom. Although she did not name China, it was clear that she was talking about the Google problem. Among other things, she said, "Some countries have erected electronic barriers that prevent their people from accessing portions of the world's networks... They've expunged words, names and phrases from search engine results. They have violated the privacy of citizens who engage in non-violent

political speech.” Clinton’s remarks solicited a strong rebuke from the Chinese government.²⁹

Though China did not cave in to the US pressures on Google, it did not wish to let the issue hamper relations between the two countries. Accordingly, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said that the Google case was a commercial one and should not be linked to China-US relations.³⁰ However, some in China did not think so. In an article on the Google case, three researchers of the Research Center of World Media of the Institute of Journalism and Communication took a realist/nationalist position and argued that the Google case represented a contest between China and the United States over the moral high grounds. Whereas the United States tries to impose its values on the world, China fights against such efforts.³¹

As the two countries wrestled with the Google problem, Obama made two other decisions: one was to meet Dalai Lama and another was to sell weapons to Taiwan. Chinese consider both as great offenses, that is, gross violations of China’s sovereignty. However, the Obama administration felt it had to do it for moral and domestic political considerations. To make it easier for China to accept it, the administration took pains to select the timing and the manner of meeting Dalai Lama and announce its weapons sale decision.

The US decisions fueled a debate among the Chinese as to how to react to these perceived provocations. To many Chinese, the United States had been talking about China’s rise and that China should take up more international responsibilities. And China had cooperated with the United States on a whole range of issues including the global financial crisis, North Korea, climate change, sending warships to the Gulf of Aden to protect commercial sea lane from pirates, and many other international issues. However, instead of showing more respect for China, the US president still felt he should meet Dalai Lama and sell weapons to Taiwan, actions the Chinese government and the Chinese people strongly resent.³² Yes, as American officials argued, previous US presidents had met Dalai Lama and sold weapons to Taiwan. In those instances too China protested against the action but did not do much about it. However, that happened when China was weak. Now after many years of sustained development, China is no longer weak and there is little reason for China to accept it any more.³³ Accordingly, they argued that the Chinese government should take a stronger position than before on these issues.

Some Chinese shared the view that Obama interfered with China’s internal affairs by meeting with Dalai Lama and that the United States

has no right to sell weapons to Taiwan. However, they pointed out that the Obama administration was the most “friendly” one toward China as an opposition leader coming into office. In addition, the it did make efforts to minimize the offense to China when it arranged the meeting and arms sale in terms of timing, location, quantity, and quality of weapons to sell to Taiwan. Finally, as a result of the growing gap in military capabilities between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, compared to previous arms sales to Taiwan, the current arms sale package probably had the least impact in changing the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Accordingly, they argued, although China should protest against the US decisions, it should do so in a measured way. In particular, given the importance of military relations between the two countries, China should avoid suspending China’s military relations with the United States again in its protest.

As the policy circle debated over how to react to the perceived US provocations, people’s reaction expressed on the Internet was decidedly on the tougher side. According to *Global Times*, one person posted a letter to President Obama protesting his decision to sell arms to Taiwan and he received ringing endorsement from the netizens.³⁴ Ultimately, in part because of domestic political considerations, China took the tougher approach. It reacted to US arms sales to Taiwan in a way that surprised many. Among other things, it suspended Military-to-Military Relations between the two countries and threatened to impose sanctions on those companies involved in the arms sale.³⁵ By this time, the Obama administration probably began to feel frustrated that its efforts to take care of the Chinese sensitivities were not paying off.

In the meantime, Chinese felt more frustrated with the US reaction to their protest. They found that it had little impact. The United States sold the weapons to Taiwan anyway and there was little China could do about it. And the Obama administration said it would not change the US-Taiwan arms sales policy. Against this background, the Internet was full of comments criticizing the Chinese government for its hesitation in reacting.

Chinese frustration might have also influenced its handling of the North Korean issue. In their view, since the United States showed little respect for China’s core national interests, China did not have to make additional efforts to help the United States on other issues especially when it is perceived as hurting its own security. This includes the Korea problem.³⁶ China may not like the way the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) manages its domestic

and international affairs. However, with the DPRK on its side, China's northeastern border is believed to be secure. Accordingly, China made more efforts to befriend the North Koreans. It did not join other countries to condemn the DPRK for its alleged sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in March 2010. It turned down a ROK invitation to participate in an investigation of the incident. But when the investigation results came out, it refused to accept the findings on the ground that it was inconclusive. Then, when the deeply disappointed and frustrated ROK sought US help to display its anger and determination to fight against the alleged North Korean provocation through conducting joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea, the Chinese government became concerned and repeatedly voiced its opposition. The Chinese military went out of its way to protest against the exercise.³⁷ Some uninformed generals even issued harsh warnings on their own initiative.³⁸ China's Internet was full of nationalist comments urging the Chinese government to take countermeasures such as conducting a naval military exercise of its own in the Yellow Sea.³⁹

As China protested against the planned US-South Korea military exercise in the Yellow Sea, the *New York Times* published a story on April 23, 2010, about the development of China's naval capabilities and how it had caused anxieties among China's neighbors. The author reported that, according to one US official, a Chinese official told senior officials of the Obama administration that the Chinese government would not tolerate external intervention in the South China Sea because it regarded the area as part of China's core national interests. An American official allegedly said that this was the first time the Chinese government claimed the South China Sea as China's core national interest.⁴⁰ The story spread quickly causing much alarm throughout the region.

The story also received much attention in China. The first wave of Chinese reaction to the story was a ringing endorsement on the Internet of the alleged official designation of the South China Sea as China's core interests. *People's Daily* published a month-long survey it conducted on its webpage asking whether it was necessary for China to designate the South China Sea as China's core interest: 97 percent of the 4,300 respondents said yes.⁴¹ Probably without the knowledge of real Chinese government's official position, some Chinese military officers also endorsed the alleged Chinese official position and said that the reason China said so was because China had more military capabilities to defend its interests in the South China Sea.⁴²

The *New York Times* story and the subsequent strong public reactions both in and outside China caught the Chinese government by surprise. It checked with its people and concluded that its officials had not said what the *New York Times* story had alleged. It had not advocated a change in China's official positions on the South China Sea nor did it believe it should although some in and out of the government might have regarded South China Sea as China's core interests in private. However, the South China Sea question is very complicated. It involved territorial disputes, disputes over exclusive economic zones, and interpretation of the principle of the freedom of navigation. And facing strong nationalistic sentiments, the Chinese government probably did not feel politically comfortable to clarify its position. The only thing it felt appropriate to say was to repeat China's official positions on the South China Sea and deny that China has changed its policy regarding to the South China Sea.⁴³

By this time, the Obama administration had given up on its previous efforts to promote the relationship with China through encouragement and conceptual innovation. Increasing number of Americans in policy circles questioned such an approach, and the credibility and influence of James Steinberg and Jeffery Bader declined quickly. By August, many in the administration believed that China was taking advantage of Obama's goodwill and patience. As one former senior American official privately confided, the Obama administration officials felt that whenever they made a concession to China, the Chinese government took it as a sign of American weakness.⁴⁴ Those who had always been skeptical about the Steinberg and Bader approach toward China began to press their more hardline approach toward China.

China's failure to clarify its view on whether the South China Sea is core interest or not in simple and definitive terms and the renewed anxieties of China's Southeast Asian neighbors offered hardliners in the Obama administration a good opportunity to push for a new and tougher approach toward China, that is, to develop closer political and security ties with Chinese neighbors on the basis of their fear of uncertainties in their relations with China. On June 23, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting held in Hanoi that the United States had grown increasingly concerned about the competing claims for territory in the South China Sea. She told reporters that she opposed "the use or threat of force by any claimant." She said that Washington was seeking to work with ASEAN nations, China, and other countries to develop an international mechanism to resolve the disputes.⁴⁵

Although Clinton might have just restated a longstanding US policy on the issue, many Chinese interpreted Clinton's statements as an effort to intervene on the South China Sea and to pit the ASEAN countries against China, complicating an already very complicated problem. Accordingly, following Clinton's statements, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi delivered an unusually strong rebuke to Clinton's argument. He said that, first, the situation of the South China Sea was peaceful and stable rather than dangerous and unstable. Second, the South China Sea disputes were between China and some countries, not between China and ASEAN. One should not confuse it. Third, the regional consensus on how to resolve the disputes in the South China Sea was friendly and peaceful consultation. That rejects attempts to internationalize and multilateralize the disputes. Fourth, the role of the Declaration of Code of Conduct in the South China Sea is to promote mutual trust so as to create favorable conditions and atmosphere to resolve the disputes. China and ASEAN countries would make more efforts to improve on it. Fifth, there is no problem with the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Sixth, there is no point to talk about coercion. As a large state, China also has its legitimate concerns; expressing such concerns should not be interpreted as coercion. Finally, internationalizing the disputes would make peaceful resolution of the problem more difficult to attain. Asian countries can address their respective concerns on the basis of equality and mutual respect.⁴⁶ Minister Yang's comments reflected the strong suspicion of the US intentions on the South China Sea shared by the realists, nationalists, and the new left.

Minister Yang's rebuke, however, did not discourage the United States from acting tough on China. In August, it conducted a high-profiled joint military exercise in the South China Sea with Vietnam.⁴⁷ In September, in the wake of the fishing boat incident near the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island, Secretary Clinton was reported to have assured the Japanese foreign minister Seiji Maehara that the US-Japan Defense Operation Guidelines applies to the Diaoyu Island, although she maintained that the United States does not have a position on to which country the island belongs.⁴⁸ In November, President Obama visited India. During the visit, he promised to strengthen strategic relationship with India and announced the US decision to lift the embargo on export of certain sensitive technologies to India. Some Chinese took this as another step on the part of the United States to encircle and contain China.⁴⁹

The perceived US "provocations," in turn, led to perceived Chinese "uncooperative" behavior. Despite North Korea's refusal to return to

the Six-Party talks and its alleged sinking of the South Korea navel vessel in March, China hosted Kim Jong-il twice—first between May 3 and 7 and second between August 26 and 30. During Kim's second visit to China, Hu Jintao even flew to Changchun to meet him, a rare gesture of support to North Korea.⁵⁰

By the end of the year, China's relationship with its neighbors appeared to be in serious trouble. Reflecting on this development, Chinese foreign policy circle began to debate its causes. Two different arguments emerged. One was that the US "return to Asia" was the culprit. According to this argument, now that the United States finally managed to get out of Iraq and was in the process of getting out of Afghanistan, it could divert more resources to contain China, something that the it had always wanted to do. Accordingly, one could find the United States behind every problem China encountered in its relationship with its neighbors.

The other was that although what the United States did complicate China's relations with its neighbors, China's own poor management of the problems was a more likely cause for the current predicament. They argued that the US "return to Asia" argument grossly exaggerated the US ability to undermine relations between China and its neighbors and underestimated the intelligence and ability of China's neighbors to conduct their foreign relations. And it totally ignored China's role. To them, China could have done better. For instance, China could have reacted more realistically to the US arms sales to Taiwan to avoid a situation in which it embarrassed itself with threats that they would not carry out. China should have taken a more even-handed approach to the sinking of the ROK's navel vessel to avoid disappointment and frustration of the South Koreans with China; and it should have clarified its position on the South China Sea, and done so earlier in order to avoid the impression that China was changing its policy on the South China Sea.

Should China stick to a tough posture to counter the alleged "US return to Asia" or should China return to a more pragmatic approach so as to restore the relatively good international environment it had enjoyed before 2009? This is a question that Chinese policy circle had to wrestle with. The debate was multifaceted and heated with all the groups discussed at the outset of the chapter. Ultimately, the top leadership intervened. On December 13, 2010, State Counselor Dai Bingguo published an article on *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) entitled "Jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu" (Adhere to the Road of Peaceful Development). In the article, Dai argued that globalization

has changed the world into a global village. In a way, it has become a community of common interests. The old way of military expansion or ideological rivalry has lost its appeal. The new situation requires countries to adopt the spirit of *tongzhou gongji* (sharing the same boat) rather than *tongzhou gongji* (squeezing each other off the boat). Dai points out that in the pursuit of peaceful development, China stands for international cooperation rather than confrontation and for promoting common interests rather than unilateral interests. Dai states that China's strategic objective, which the outside world often questions, is to seek peaceful development through improving itself and cooperating with other countries and to become a most responsible, civilized, and law-abiding member of the international community. Dai clarifies China's core interests as stability of China's state system, political system, and politics; China's sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unity; and the basic conditions for sustaining China's social and economic development. What will China do with its growing influence? Dai points out that China will continue to do three things: it will actively participate (1) in international efforts to address global challenges and regional problems; (2) in international efforts to improve on the existing international system; and (3) and advocate a developmental agenda so as to work with others to promote world prosperity and progress.⁵¹

State Counselor Dai's article carried much weight because it represented top Chinese leadership's thinking on China's relationship with the outside world and how China should conduct itself in international affairs. The article was directed both at domestic and international audiences. At home, it was intended to bring the debate over the direction of China's foreign policy to a conclusion and rally people to a pragmatic and constructive approach to foreign relations. Abroad, it was intended to reassure the international community that China's foreign policy orientation had not changed, that is, China would adhere to peaceful development on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit and that it would not seek territorial expansion or challenge the existing international order. The basic ideas outlined in Dai's article were later incorporated in the white paper on China's peaceful development issued by the State Council Information Office on September 6, 2011.⁵²

Following Dai's article, especially the publication of the white paper on peaceful development, Chinese foreign policy behavior largely returned to the previous level of moderation. There was tough rhetoric here and there. However, for the time being, China was determined

to be prudent and pragmatic in managing its foreign relations. This included its management of relations with the United States. Thus, despite the US efforts to build up its relations with China's neighbors to form a balancing coalition against China, China did not reciprocate it with strong actions. Even when the Obama administration decided to approve another round of arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese government protested at a level less than that of the 2010. This time, it did not threaten sanctions against US companies and only partially suspended its military ties with the United States.⁵³ In addition to the pragmatic management of conflicts, China made efforts to improve the relationship. During the visit of Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to China between August 17 and 22, China gave him a warm reception. President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and NPC National Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo met him. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is widely expected to succeed Hu Jintao as China's top leader, accompanied him all the way during his stay in China.⁵⁴

At the same time, however, the United States reciprocated China's friendly gestures with some positive steps. It refrained from naming China as a currency manipulator despite strong domestic political pressure in the United States to do so. It continued making positive comments about China. During his visit to China, Vice President Biden said that it is extremely important to develop close China-US relations. Nothing is more important than that for the United States. Speaking at the official reception in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, Biden said: "I am absolutely confident that the economic stability of the world rests in no small part on co-operation between the United States and China." He said that in his view this is "the key" to global stability. He also emphasized that the United States wants to maintain the relationship with China on a stable track for the next few decades.⁵⁵ The United States also seemed to lend its support to Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan's "presidential" election in January 2012, something that the Chinese wished for.⁵⁶

While trying to be friendly to China, however, the Obama administration appeared to believe that China's moderation was a result of US assertiveness. Accordingly, Obama met with Dalai Lama again in July. Following Biden's visit to China, the United States announced its new arms sales to Taiwan in August. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hawaii, it talked loudly about its "pivot" to Asia, which at least partly means efforts to build coalition to hedge against, or perhaps even balance against, China. It also promised military assistance to countries and undertook military

exercises with countries that have disputes with China in the South China Sea. Finally, in his visit to Australia, the United States, and Australia announced that they agreed to station US Marines in Australia's northern region.⁵⁷

For the Chinese who have supported a more cooperative relationship with the United States, especially liberals and those who question the extent to which China's relative power has increased, all this has caused much frustration and disappointment. They still hope to persuade the Obama administration to take a more nuanced approach in its China policy. As they prepared for Vice President Xi's visit to the United States, they argued that the two countries should make greater efforts to overcome suspicion and mistrust and engage in genuine cooperation. The question remains how long they can persist in their efforts to pursue cooperation with the United States against a background in which Chinese realists/nationalists are hungry for additional rationale to push the Chinese government to act tough if the United States continues its assertiveness in its Asian policy.

Implications for US-Japan Relations

In the short run, China's domestic politics on China-US relations favors US-Japan relations. Despite the arguments for cooperation, on balance, it exaggerates the ideological differences between China and the United States, promotes anti-Americanism in China, and creates an impression that China and the United States, the rising power and the hegemon, cannot live in peace and the two countries are preparing for an ultimate showdown. All this enhances the arguments that Japan, as a liberal democracy, is a better partner than China and that Japan, as an US ally, deserves greater attention and closer cooperation than China.

In the long run, however, it is possible that Chinese domestic politics on China-US relations may take a different turn. Despite the current confrontational rhetoric and mindset, the reality on the ground has been changing. Economic relationship between the two countries has become closer than ever. Value differences between the two countries such as views on market economy, rule of law, human rights, and democracy have been narrower than ever. And as a beneficiary of the existing international order, China has acquired increasing interests in seeing it function properly just as the United States. If politics ultimately has to reflect the reality on the ground, there is good reason to believe that China's domestic politics would become more favorable to

closer relations between the two countries. Under the circumstances, given the difference in size and influence between China and Japan, although US-Japan relations will remain important to each other, the importance the United States would assign to China-US relations is likely to exceed that assigned to US-Japan relations. Japan may have to find ways to adapt to the new situation rather than just lamenting on “Japan passing” as before.

Concluding Remarks

The previous analysis demonstrates that China’s policy toward the United States reflects an interaction between a complicated domestic political process and US policy toward China. First, ideology matters. It matters in the sense that people of different ideological persuasion in China try to push for different policies toward the United States. In the Chinese political context, their maneuvering may be subtle, but it is real. It affects China’s US policy as the strength of different ideological views varies. Second, nationalism matters. It matters in the sense that for historical and political reasons it is popular to show defiance to the United States. It provides a good opportunity for those who advocate a tough policy toward the United States whenever something goes wrong in the relationship, especially when a US president decides to meet Dalai Lama or approves another arms sale to Taiwan. Third, institutional rivalry matters. It matters in the sense that different institutions have different responsibilities, priorities, and views as to what to do with the United States. As in other countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to favor moderation and the Ministry of Defense is inclined to favor a show of strength. The outcome of their rivalry in policy debates affects China’s policy toward the United States.

Fourth, expectation matters. It may matter more in terms of policy deliberation than reality. This is especially the case with China, a country undergoing rapid and fundamental transitions. People’s expectation of how China should be treated changes faster than China’s actual capabilities. This has led to extraordinary pressures on the Chinese government when it has to make difficult choices on matters such as how to react to US arms sale to Taiwan. Finally, modern media technology matters insofar as it simplifies as well as magnifies what is going by presenting issues in nationalistic terms and indirectly placing more pressure on policymakers.

Understanding these five domestic factors and their interactions with developments in American policy toward China provides for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of China's US policy.

Notes

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1. Fang Lexian, "Is China's Foreign Policy Becoming Less Ideological?" paper presented at the international workshop on "Regional Governance: Greater China in the 21st Century," October 24–25, 2003, University of Durham, United Kingdom; Chen Zhimin, "Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China* (February 2005): 35–55; Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Nina Hachigian and Yuan Peng, "The US-China's Expectation's Gap: An Exchange," *Survival: Global Politics & Strategy*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2010): 67–86; Susan Shirk, *Changing Media, Changing China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2. Robert Stone, "Speaking to the Foreign Audience: Chinese Foreign Policy Concerns as Expressed in China Daily, January 1989–June 1993," *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 53 (February 1994): 43–52; Fang Lexian, "Is China's Foreign Policy Becoming Less Ideological?" paper presented at the international workshop on "Regional Governance: Greater China in the 21st Century," October 24–25, 2003, University of Durham, United Kingdom.
3. In the Chinese context, Marxists and the new left are those who stand for public ownership of the means of production, larger role of the state, and more equitable distribution of wealth. The former advocates the practice of the Mao period other than the Cultural Revolution and the latter that of the northern European countries. They are small in number but very active and some times very effective in swaying popular opinions. Between the Marxists/the new left and the liberals, Li Shenming, a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), may represent a Marxist perspective whereas Zi Zhongyun, former director of the Institute of American Studies, of CASS, the liberal view. For their respective views, please refer to Li Shenming, "Shijie yao fangfan meiguo zhuanjia weiji" [The world should guard against US shifting crisis to others]; <http://blog.gmw.cn/blog-43491-55667.html> (Accessed April 15, 2009); "Zhongguoren weisheme yao yanjiu meiguo: Zi Zhongyun xiansheng fangtan" [Why should Chinese study the

- US? An interview with Madame Zi Zhongyun]; http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5cd3ae010100apbb.html (October 21, 2008).
4. Jia Qingguo, "Disrespect, Distrust: The External Origins of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 42 (February 2005): 11–21.
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 8. Hu Jintao reportedly gets on the Internet to gage public opinion quite often; http://database.ce.cn/media/12/cm12cmgc/200806/25/t20080625_15956465.shtml (Accessed June 25, 2008).
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 11. <http://news.qq.com/a/20091119/001782.htm> (Accessed November 19, 2009).
 12. <http://news.qq.com/a/20091113/000668.htm> (Accessed November 13, 2009).
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 15. During his visit to China in November 2009, President Obama said that cooperation between the United States and China had played an important role in confronting the financial crisis; http://www.wccdaily.com.cn/epaper/hxdsb/html/2009-11/18/content_118773.htm (Accessed November 18, 2009).
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- of China-US relations]; <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/10924684.html> (Accessed February 4, 2010).
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Sibling Rivalry? Domestic Politics and the US-Japan Alliance*

David Leheny

Though frequently reported in the United States in summer 2011, it left little impression that the name of the Japanese women's national soccer team, Nadeshiko, refers to an ideal of female beauty symbolized by a pink carnation. Particularly in the run-up to the final match of the 2011 Women's World Cup, the more frequent metaphor in the US media was of family—or specifically a “big-sister, little-sister” relationship between, respectively, the American and Japanese sides. Frequently repeated by the American announcers calling the match, and even used by the American team's coach Tom DiCicco,¹ the trope was almost always affectionate but touched with a kind of condescension that, however natural, seemed completely out of place when compared to Japanese coverage. Those reports were, of course, sentimental as well, coming as they did so soon after the catastrophic March 11 tsunami that had left nearly 20,000 dead or missing and displaced tens of thousands of others, and they certainly placed additional symbolic burdens on the players themselves. But Japan's coverage uniformly represented the US team as a familiar and tough (not to mention physically large) opponent: an obstacle to be overcome, not a caring older sister charitably encouraging and guiding the spunky Japanese.

Coming so soon after the tsunami, the Women's World Cup was portrayed even in the United States as an inspirational moment for Japan. After all, it would have been difficult to root against an underdog team (Japan's previous record against the United States

was 22 losses against 0 wins and 3 ties) from a country still reeling from a combined natural and nuclear disaster, particularly when its members circled the field after each match with a banner thanking the world for its support. At the forefront of this assistance was, of course, the United States itself. Operation *Tomodachi* (Friendship) was the first joint field operation of American and Japanese forces in the five decades of the US-Japan alliance, after many years of joint training and planning.² While the overwhelming nature of the tsunami's devastation made actual immediate rescue missions mostly impossible—the wave itself killed nearly everyone it touched, and very quickly—by virtually all accounts these military rebuilding and relief efforts were both successful and appreciated. Indeed, in the invective that followed the disaster, particularly over the government's handling of the meltdowns at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant, virtually none has been directed at either the Japanese Self-Defense Forces or the US armed forces.

It is, however, unclear what consequences Operation *Tomodachi* might have. There can be little doubt that leaders in both countries hoped that it might reduce some of the recent tension in the relationship and lead to stronger cooperation in the future. But for all the attention among the officials charged with managing the US-Japan relationship and those many others who, in one way or another, benefit directly from it, it has been a remarkably light topic of conversation among the people of each nation. Most Japanese are certainly aware of international assistance, particularly America's; indeed, Japanese fans of American television dramas on the AXN cable network were treated for many months to repeated announcements from the casts of shows like *CSI*, *Hawaii Five-O*, and *Grey's Anatomy*, all of them expressing sympathy for the country and concluding with the sentence, "We are *tomodachi*."³ But the story was a small part of the daily coverage of horrors and heroes from the Tohoku region, with the vast majority of attention focusing either on grieving family members, victims struggling in cold evacuation shelters, temporary workers struggling to stop the Fukushima meltdown, and the radiation leeching into the soil, air, and ocean, and into Japan's famously safe food supply. Operation *Tomodachi*, for all its good intentions, was a bit of an afterthought in much of Japan, and far less noticed than even that in the United States.

And so any analysis of domestic politics on the American side of the US-Japan alliance has to begin with the simple note that most Americans care very little about the relationship. This is not to imply

either malice or hostility, but rather a disinterest fueled by distance, competing political concerns, and usually an absence of noteworthy incident. With most Americans (like most democratic citizens) primarily interested in domestic challenges and problems, foreign policy typically rises to the level of public notice with war (of which America faces no shortage) or potential threats (a bumper crop, from China through the Middle East and up into the shaky European common market). Japan—a stable democracy, an economy that has slowed from threat to cautionary tale, and now an expected ally that can assist the United States in balancing against a rising China—usually does not make headlines without a natural disaster or the defeat of a popular American sports team. And so an examination of the politics behind the relationship America has with Japan, would sensibly begin with a small array of highly interested institutions: the Pentagon and other security policymakers in Washington, as well as financial and manufacturing actors either supported or challenged by Japan's economic performance.

In this chapter, while I will turn in part to these institutions, I want to consider that metaphor—America as Japan's big sister (or big brother)—and what it might imply about the cultural and intellectual architecture behind American views of the US-Japan relationship. My point is neither to castigate American debates about Japan nor to suggest that the alliance is especially troubled. Instead, I want to call attention to relatively durable motifs in the way in which Japan is described and understood in American policy circles, as well as suggest how it might be related to the exasperation that appears with strange frequency in US-Japan discussions. Whether Japan is described as America's unsinkable if occasionally querulous aircraft carrier in the Pacific⁴ or a humbled trade competitor still struggling with the aftermath of its economic decline, its public depiction in the United States has displayed a remarkable consistency. I argue below that this consistency reflects a kind of paternalism that shapes how American policymakers and opinion leaders tend to view relations with Japan. This paternalism is, I suggest, more durable and consequential than are the occasional divisions of opinion in Washington's Japan policy.

In making this argument, I draw critical attention to American interaction with Japan and the Asia-Pacific, but my goal is theoretical rather than practical or political. Without either the benefit of a crystal ball or faith in the good intentions of other local actors or the hardiness of existing regional institutions, I do not advocate a radical

change in US policy toward the region or even necessarily a rethinking of it. Instead, I aim to show that one of the consequences of a broad consensus in American politics on its interests and behavior in the Asia-Pacific is a series of blind spots regarding both the transparency of American decisions and the mistrust they can engender. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the occasionally nettlesome relationship with Japan, a country that rarely describes itself as America's younger sibling.

Parties of Interest

Diplomacy enters American political debate only rarely, and usually around a small number of hot-button issues. Some—particularly those surrounding Cuba, Israel, and previously Northern Ireland— attract the attention of deeply committed religious and ethnic groups in the United States, particularly when concentrated regionally and enhancing their political clout. Others, like immigration and narcotics, are matters of deep domestic concern that often become mapped onto American efforts with specific regional partners, including Mexico and Colombia. Others are represented in the United States as perennial challenges to American national security, with certain states (principally Iran and sometimes North Korea) able to inspire headlines because of missile tests or proposed nuclear plans. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars that followed the 9/11 attacks, as well as the myriad terrorism alerts since then, dominated American concerns about foreign policy for much of the succeeding decade. To put it bluntly, to be considered a serious presidential candidate, one would need to spell out proposals on Iran, Israel/Palestine, narcotics, immigration, and Iraq and Afghanistan; one might be able to get away with only general comments on sub-Saharan Africa, on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and even (for a time) on the US relationship with Russia.

East Asia represents a weirdly liminal space for American foreign policy. President Barack Obama's much ballyhooed if somewhat unclear announcement of a "pivot" toward the region captures a broad sense that the next century will be a Pacific century, that the challenges and opportunities of the region likely exceed those elsewhere. And it is well understood that American foreign policy will deal for many years with a rising China, though the extent to which China represents a threat to American interests and security remains the topic of substantial debate and little clarity. Indeed, the general

hedging strategy of the United States in the Asia-Pacific government has continued with little in the way of major change since the Clinton administration: continue the robust alliances with Japan and South Korea, encourage general economic growth in an area that supplies much of the capital that finances American debt, encourage specific kinds of Chinese participation in multilateral engagement, and maintain substantial levels of American military presence that might discourage Chinese or North Korean adventurousness.

That is, whatever the remarkable and even unhinged intensity of American political debate (which have famously included recent accusations that President Obama is, in essence, a Kenyan-born socialist working on behalf of fundamentalist Muslims), little of it extends to ferocity about East Asia itself, which we might consider somewhat remarkable. Asian Americans, while potentially a powerful political force, are in many ways too diverse a community to have been able to speak with one voice that might shape congressional and presidential action. After all, while we might expect strong regional interest from those who came directly from or still have family ties in the region, the millions of Chinese Americans, Taiwanese Americans, Korean Americans, and Japanese Americans (to name only East Asian groups) would be unlikely to coalesce around a single set of goals for how the United States ought to define and pursue its interests in the region.

And whatever rhetoric is used about China in presidential elections—from the nearly trade-war levels of invective hurled by Democratic candidates in 2008 to the explosive critiques leveled by Republicans in 2012—foreign policy specialists in Washington, including those likely to work for an administration of either party, are remarkably consistent in their views. Virtually all hope for a more cooperative and democratic China, virtually all want a prosperous region, and virtually all want a resolution to the North Korea nuclear crisis that leaves American security interests well protected. And virtually no one wants these ends to be accomplished through actual war. These are simple enough areas of agreement that mask various ways in which progressives and conservatives might try to achieve these goals (more engagement with NGOs and multilateral institutions by the former, more demonstrations of military resolve for the latter), but these are matters of degree rather than fundamental philosophy. East Asia is, as far as American political debate is concerned, a crucial region that demands positive but cautious American engagement: in other words, many rows of hedges.

Within this discussion, the space for wide public debate about Japan is both highly constrained and mostly invisible. While this might be described as “Japan passing”—the fairly ugly expression that played off the earlier notion of “Japan bashing” and represented concerns that Japan was largely ignored⁵—it is perhaps more realistic to say that Japan really mattered in American public debate only when it seemed to represent an economic threat, back in the 1980s and early 1990s.

In those days, of course, Japan was an ambiguous problem for American politics. It was, to be sure, the subject of intense debate. One of the quickest ways to build a reputation as a foreign policy intellectual was to spend some time in Tokyo and return with a book simultaneously touting Japan’s culture of growth, recognizing that it might not represent a model for growth in a *laissez-faire* and/or multicultural America, but suggest that the United States could learn some important lessons anyway. Indeed, one of the most widely circulated foreign policy ideas from that era—Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power”—was a reaction to much of this, with the argument that the United States had soft power resources (a kind of national attractiveness) that insular, homogeneous Japan could not hope to emulate.⁶ Professor Nye’s policy work from that era, however, hints at the complex nature of the relationship; at the same time that the Clinton administration, in which he served, pushed for tougher trade talks with Japan, Nye’s office in the Pentagon aimed to firm up the military relationship with this trusted American ally, yielding the famed “Nye Initiative.” Indeed, enthusiasm over the alliance with Japan has long been a core aspect of American policy toward East Asia as well as its global security posture, but it has hardly ever been something on which voters or citizens were expected to have much interest or clear opinions. Particularly with the waning of the view of Japan as a threat, debates about Japan in American politics have been really centered around the small few of the committed and engaged, whether motivated by concerns about national security or economic fortune.

Economic Debates

We can take the latter set of concerns first. As John Ikenberry describes in his chapter in this volume, American foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific is marked by efforts to maintain a stable presence while building institutions that can allow the countries of the region to coordinate with greater transparency and to overcome at least some of the challenges that accompany China’s rise. In doing so,

the United States faces a region marked by institutional activity that it has not always led, such as the creation of Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APEC), the Chiang Mai Initiative, and so forth. In part because of the rapid expansion of intraregion free trade agreements (FTAs) including two or more countries of the area, the Obama administration promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that could simultaneously integrate American interests into the United States effectively into the emerging economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific, preserve American regional leadership, and, ideally, overcome some of the potential domestic opposition that can challenge nearly any free trade agreement.⁷ Put simply, free trade may benefit the country as a whole (as neoliberal arguments emphasize), but its costs will be felt clearly and acutely by actors who will likely be mobilized to prevent trade liberalization, while potential beneficiaries may be too diffuse and hardly interested to provide much support. If the Obama administration's logic is sound, a multilateral arrangement in East Asia could provide sufficient benefits to such a wide swath of American industry that sectoral opponents might find it difficult to generate sufficient pressure to prevent it.

And it might assure that the region remains a largely American-led one. Although the initial proposal for the TPP focused on Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—collectively representing less than 10 percent of American overseas trade—the signaling of the Japanese government that it would consider discussions on joining the TPP provided the possibility of a dramatic expansion of a regional trade agreement with the United States as a leader. Just as crucially, it would be a non-Chinese arrangement that might signal an alternative to the seeming juggernaut of a Chinese Pacific.⁸ The news, however, was greeted with some alarm in industrial sectors that had previously struggled against Japanese competitors, particularly when the terms of that struggle seemed unfair to American manufacturers and farmers. The US automobile producer Ford released a statement shortly after Japan's expression of interest, laying bare American economic concerns about Japan in ways that would have seemed more natural in 1991, when Michael Crichton's *Rising Sun* topped the bestseller charts, than in posttsunami 2011:

In this economy, we should be creating American jobs, supporting American manufacturing and growing American exports. Allowing Japan—the world's most protectionist country—to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership would do the opposite.⁹

While the US government registered Ford's complaint and dealt with pressure from legislators representing agricultural districts to widen access to Japan's beef and produce markets, the message from the Obama administration was relatively constant in support of further exploration of TPP possibilities with Japan.

The TPP's future is questionable, of course, not only because of potential opposition within the United States but also within Japan, where it is a far more contentious issue. American pressure to open Japanese markets has always had a few allies within Japan, but the mixed economic outcomes of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's staunchly neoliberal administration have left many deeply suspicious of rhetoric supporting a smaller state, more open markets, and less government protection. It is no surprise, therefore, that Prime Minister Noda was cautious in announcing his intentions regarding the TPP, and consistently emphasized the role of the TPP within the larger US-Japan relationship.¹⁰ This may matter with the late 2012 return of a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an advocate of tighter ties with the United States, though the LDP's electoral reliance on rural voters largely opposed to the TPP raises further questions about its political viability. In Tokyo, the persistent feeling has been that the nascent debate about entering the TPP—a debate that could take years with a highly uncertain outcome—was an effort to right the ship of the US-Japan alliance after the turbulent first years of the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) control of the government.

Security Concerns

The ship had, by most accounts, entered rocky waters with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's suggestion that the United States and Japan should renegotiate the terms of a 2006 agreement to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma that had long been a sore spot to local residents in Okinawa. The agreement, approved by the Diet only a few months before the DPJ took power, had set timelines and requirements for both the Japanese side in building a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in the city of Henoko while shifting 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. As a long-negotiated and still controversial decision, the agreement had at once corresponded with American rethinking of its Pacific force posture and with fraught Japanese efforts to reduce controversy within Okinawa about the

presence of the bases, often viewed as noisy, obstreperous sources of crime and menace to local residents.

It is possible that Hatoyama, who frequently referenced Obama's ability to symbolize "change" as a source of inspiration to his own path to unseating the LDP, had expected a warmer embrace of dialogue in Washington. Quite aside from the strategic issues—even within Washington, there are questions about the value of having substantial forces in Japan rather than in Guam—a willingness to side with a new Tokyo government against a "done deal" supported by the Pentagon brass would have been a politically costly move for the new president. And yet some of Hatoyama's advisors seemed both surprised and disappointed in the immediate announcement by the United States that it had no interest in renegotiating the agreement. This surprise came despite Hatoyama's having penned a piece, translated and published in the *New York Times* just before the DPJ's election, in which he argued against "US-led globalization" and emphasized "our identity as a nation located in Asia."¹¹

Hatoyama's stance was widely criticized by American sources,¹² even as he clearly struggled to find a solution in early 2010 that would simultaneously respond to American concerns while maintaining his own party's commitment to rethinking the myriad postwar bargains established by the long-reigning LDP. Okinawa is, of course, a complicated place, more complicated than it often appears in policy debates. While there is a sizable portion of the Okinawan population that is resolutely against the existence of US bases there, public opinion tends to fluctuate depending on what exactly is being discussed and how the bases are portrayed in surveys. Struggles over bases fit into a larger symbolic world in which Okinawan residents, activists, political figures, and transplants from Tokyo negotiate over the prefecture's place within Japan and its troubled and violent history.¹³ In an outstanding analysis, Christopher Hughes argues that the DPJ's vision on Okinawa was focused primarily on maintaining the alliance while reducing the burden on Okinawans themselves, given longstanding grievances as well as the dissatisfaction that many had expressed at the LDP's 2009 agreement. Hatoyama's "one-sided ruminations" and somewhat undisciplined approach, however, made the entire policy seem less thoroughly planned and clear than it really was.¹⁴

Hatoyama's initial efforts, which perhaps pleased mainland progressives more than Okinawan activists, were taken in Washington not as an opportunity to work with a progressive ally on an issue that

married security debates to human rights, but rather as an irritant to the Pentagon and profoundly unhelpful to an Obama administration still struggling with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It seems undeniable that Hatoyama's stance on Futenma followed some unwise campaign work on his part, making a promise to voters to push the United States on the alliance without having thought through the next step on the decision tree: what do I do if the United States simply says no? And to the extent that Hatoyama could be described as irresponsible, jumpy, unpredictable, and even flaky, it partly reflected his probably ill-considered desire to voice something that had been a part of the Japanese *zeitgeist* for some time. The existing Okinawan relocation plan, while reducing the problems in one part of the island, promised to cause new problems for another city, and without structurally altering the terms of a bilateral relationship that left Japan's former colonial outpost as the host of thousands of foreign soldiers from a country currently demanding Japanese and other allies' participation in wars that were not Japan's choice. But the response from the United States—particularly from those policymakers who had worked assiduously, especially since the 1995 rape case, to improve America's image in Japan and to respond to Okinawan concerns—suggested that Americans were exasperated with Hatoyama's ineptitude, rather than reflective about the nature of a bilateral relationship that could be so troubling to one side that Hatoyama would feel compelled to demand a shake-up as part of his effort to win election.

Over the succeeding months, as Hatoyama was pressured routinely and publicly by Washington (including a snub by President Obama, who met with him in only a sidebar at a multilateral meeting in Washington), these events being far more widely reported by the Japanese media than by America's. While the United States quietly entered into discussions with the Hatoyama government to resolve the impasse, Hatoyama clearly had to back down on a number of his promises, earning the ire of both the activists who had supported his initial proposal and the conservative voters who felt he had damaged the bilateral relationship. When he resigned in summer 2010, his messy relationship with Washington was a central element of public debate.¹⁵ The bipartisan rancor among Washington's Asia hands clearly helped to shape that image, with members of both the Bush and Clinton administrations inveighing against Hatoyama's ostensible recklessness.¹⁶ Indeed, the next government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan—a longtime critic of the United States, and without the Stanford pedigree of his predecessor—worked emphatically to rebuild the relationship.

The narrative of Hatoyama's irresponsibility vis-à-vis the relationship with the United States thus fits well within prevailing American views of the alliance, a bipartisan consensus on the need for American engagement and the crucial role that bases in Japan, as well as Japanese military support, play in that engagement. From this perspective, the Okinawa base issue had been a longstanding concern, one negotiated by two governments in good faith, with Japan deciding recklessly to rethink the terms of that agreement. Of course, one might make the case—as the Japan scholar and alliance critic Gavan McCormack has—that the terms changed because, in many ways, the situation in Okinawa did, with shifting plans for the Henoko construction that seemed to place more of a burden on the local residents than they had been promised at the time of the initial agreement.¹⁷ Whether this provides a sufficient explanation for Hatoyama's behavior is open to debate, but it at least raises the question of why a push for a rethinking of diplomatic and military practice by a new government, the first cabinet dominated by a single non-LDP party in over 50 years, would be so quickly interpreted by virtually all American voices (alongside many moderate and conservative Japanese ones) as an example of prime ministerial irresponsibility.

Indeed, within just two years, the speed with which agreements might be renegotiated would become apparent to those few Americans actually interested in the US-Japan relationship. One such case also provides an opportunity to see how rapid changes in policy might be understood as something other than the failings of an emotional and unpredictable younger sibling. In December 2011, as part of a defense appropriations debate, the US Congress quietly cut, at least temporarily, the funds supporting the relocation of the Marines to Guam.¹⁸ While this might have been in part a response to the shakiness in Tokyo, it more likely reflected the balancing decisions within a Congress seeking to reshape the military budget in ways that would support existing deployments and not challenge key defense contracts benefiting economic interests spread out in myriad congressional districts around the country. That is, the situation in Washington changed—a fiscal and financial crisis not foreseen in 2006—and shaped the way in which the US government planned to follow through on the agreement itself. This is hardly the same as Hatoyama's campaigning to rethink the alliance; indeed, it is hard to imagine how many votes an American candidate could secure by pushing against the US-Japan relationship in the way that Hatoyama did. But this particular vote, even when criticized, was taken as part

of the normal if lamentable business of Washington, not the unsteady work of jittery and unpredictable, not to mention fundamentally unserious political leaders.

Nearly Tangible Alternatives

In an excellent overview of an American perspective on the costs and benefits of the US-Japan alliance, Michael Mastanduno points to three key areas of interest in East Asia for which the alliance is especially important: relations with China, dealing with North Korea, and “reassuring Asia and maintaining U.S. military presence.”¹⁹ The first two are in many ways self-explanatory from the perspective of power politics; one rising superpower and another nuclear adversary (still officially at war with America’s South Korean allies); both pose obvious challenges for which a major regional ally would be a clear asset. But regional reassurance and the maintenance of an American presence together point to a larger expectation that US forces in East Asia play a powerful role stabilizing the region. And it is this expectation—one that is broadly accepted by American officials on both sides of the political fence—that sheds some light on American views of the region.

Since the development of the “constructivist” strand in international relations theory, there has been considerable attention to the role of state identity in foreign policy. At its worst, much of this literature has a decidedly reductionist and ad hoc character, typifying identity in static and immutable ways that betray a nearly essentialist take on culture and national character, and then fixing these to nearly whatever political outcomes one finds: Americans are X, therefore, they do Y—and occasionally Z. Without ascribing any particular disposition to either an “imagined community”²⁰ of people or to an institution as deeply impersonal as *any* modern state, however, it is at least possible to think that nationally available discourses set formidable boundaries around the range of acceptable state action.²¹ With regard to foreign policy in Asia, these boundaries are notable for what they suggest not only about the relative tightness of specific constructions of American interest but also about their incompatibility with similarly constrained views elsewhere, particularly Japan.

Indeed, America’s twentieth-century history in Asia is remarkable in large part for the ways in which it is narrated at home, as part of an overall stance of reluctant but now committed engagement that is essential for the safety and security of the region. After all,

few Americans today could even identify that there was a Spanish-American War, let alone that it involved the Philippines. Not formally called a US colony, the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Philippines is usually elided in debates about American isolationism, as is the construction of Hawaii as a territory that could, by the time Michael Bay made his famous but critically panned 2001 film *Pearl Harbor*, be portrayed as nearly all-white, a stereotypically all-American tableau of clotheslines and Little League improbably in the middle of the Pacific. There is little current controversy surrounding the American role in the Korean War, long viewed as a straightforward if exceptionally violent test of NSC-68 and Washington's new containment doctrine. The Vietnam War, in contrast, is generally described as a series of tragic mistakes, either (by the Left) by leaders too blinded by anticommunist fervor to reach out to the nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh, or (by the Right) by a government that lost its nerve in the face of domestic opposition, letting victory against the Soviet-sponsored North Vietnamese slip away. Rarely is either war described today as reflective of a long-term American presence in East Asia, one that predated both the Pearl Harbor attack and George Kennan's "long telegram" about Soviet goals.

When we consider East Asia or the Asia-Pacific as an arena of great potential conflict—"Ripe for Rivalry," in Aaron Friedberg's justly famed depiction²²—we need to at least consider the possibility that the alliance structures and colonial practices in which the United States was or has been an eager participant have encouraged those rivalries, not just dampened or tamed them. Doing so challenges the broad postwar American narratives that repeatedly present the United States as an essential if essentially disinterested participant in East Asia. It is either drawn into conflict by the aggression of others—the Japanese, the Chinese, the North Vietnamese—or the basic weakness of other Western powers in the region: an overextended British navy that collapsed in the face of Japanese expansion, a French imperial army that viewed the consolidation of its colonial military inside of a valley vulnerable to enemy artillery as a brilliant tactic. Similarly, the story of twenty-first-century East Asia is one of a rising China with a chip on its shoulder, a nervous Japanese ally with the potential to build a major military force, a divided Korea with its democratic half hedging its bets with China, and a southeast Asia simultaneously inclined to emphasize the importance of an "Asian way" to do things and to press for a strong US role to balance against a China seemingly bent on claiming all littoral territory in the South China Sea.

American interests are frequently described not in terms of power and access to resources, but rather in terms of stability: the US presence is the “cork” in the bottle of Japanese remilitarization, the bulwark against Chinese expansion, the security promise to Korea and Southeast Asia, as well as the guarantor of prosperity and political development that such stability ostensibly encourages. But if we are to take America’s role in the region seriously, particularly in terms of the way in which its presence may have established the space within which much of the region’s economic growth and its fragmentary democratization have taken place, we need to consider as well the possibility that this seismic map of political risk and regional military danger was also structured by the nature of the American presence.

My goal here is not to castigate American narratives or even American behavior, nor to provide a revisionist history of its position in East Asia.²³ And it is certainly not to recommend that the United States radically break from the bipartisan prescription of continued military and political engagement, institution-building, and hedging against China. It is instead merely to note that if we are to think about American views of Japan, it is important that we place them within a larger cultural imaginary surrounding the US roles in East Asia. These images of America as a stabilizing force in the region are so powerful as to limit contestation between the country’s political parties over how the region ought to be engaged and what role our ally Japan needs to play. They also make it more difficult for American officials to grasp occasional disagreements from Japan as emanating from something other than an inferior Japanese understanding of what the region, and, therefore, Japan itself, really needs. But this broad set of understandings within Washington, covering most policymakers and advisors within the Democratic and Republican parties alike, differs dramatically from what is being imagined elsewhere, including in Japan.

After all, in much of Japan’s “long postwar,” East Asia has discursively represented a region of far more than just economic opportunity and military risk. It is instead a lost empire, one imbued with regret, guilt, longing, desire, and possibility. Indeed, it is crucial to note that whatever the astonishing brutality of the war and of Japanese occupation in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, it was justified and legitimated at home as a liberation of Asia from the West. The ironies of this have not been lost to Japanese writers. Since the Meiji intellectual and education theorist Yukichi Fukuzawa suggested that Japan “leave Asia and join the West” (*datsu-A, nyu-O*), Japan’s liminal position as

a country that sits between East and West has been a routine source of reference for Japanese political figures on both the Left and the Right. Often romanticized as sites that remained true to their cultural values while Japan modernized and (by some accounts) lost its way, Asian countries have become elements of a free-flowing nostalgia that informs and shapes even the way Japan's regional political strategies are defined. And yet these discourses almost invariably position Japan as "ahead" of the region, and, therefore, especially able to provide help and economic guidance to Asian neighbors.²⁴

Part of what made Hatoyama's decision to push for discussions on the Futenma plan so unnerving to American eyes was the way it fit into a larger electoral appeal to Japan's Asian roots. Building on the widely circulated critique that Japan had drifted too far into the hands of the United States, Hatoyama had pledged as a candidate that a victorious DPJ would shift Japan's diplomacy back toward Asia while building a more equal (i.e., less subservient) relationship with the United States. It was in many ways an incoherent promise, as there was little discussion of what precisely this would mean. Would it represent a partnership with China? With other nations in the region against China? With everyone against the United States? Rather than debating whether this was a path on which the DPJ government might have meaningfully embarked—given its indeterminacies as well as the certain opposition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, both of which have close ties with the United States—it is perhaps worth considering why Hatoyama might have made the promise.

As Michael Green has noted in an oft-cited formulation, Japan's foreign policy relationship with the United States has been marked by an entrapment-abandonment dilemma.²⁵ The United States has proved itself willing to encourage Japanese participation in a number of its military campaigns, with many Japanese strategists voicing concern that Japan would be entrapped in American efforts. Too much distance, however, raises fears of abandonment, of the United States leaving Japan more or less alone in a menacing neighborhood. And Green notes that the majority of Japanese were not eager either to sever the US alliance or to build a tighter relationship with China, widely viewed as at best untrustworthy or even hostile, even when Hatoyama made his pledge.²⁶

But the pledge itself raised little ire from most voters and clearly did the DPJ no damage in the overall campaign, despite its clear visibility in Hatoyama's speeches and publicity. And this suggests something

about the view of the United States as well as Asia. After all, one might view the promise as a simple matter of righting the scales, of pulling Japan back from its assertive connection to the United States during the Koizumi years, which witnessed the dispatch of Japanese troops to the Indian Ocean in support of the Afghanistan War as well as to Iraq itself. But there may well have been something more to it, representing the legitimacy of a broad cultural discourse. After all, as an American, one need not believe that democracy should be spread at gunpoint, to be emotionally drawn to the idea that a core American foreign policy goal should be the promotion of democracy overseas. The idea is so broadly legitimate in the United States, so widely supported, that its absence in a political campaign would be almost remarkable. The same is true of romanticism about Japan's special relationship with Asia, and it represents—particularly when presented in a particularly gauzy form, as Hatoyama did—a core stance that can at least provide the makings of what the United States lacks in its approach to East Asia: a visible alternative, though one that has been rendered nearly inoperable due to the alliance with the United States.

Crises and the Illusion of Transparency

For an institution as storied as the US-Japan alliance—one that emanated from the wreckage of World War II, became the defining feature of the Cold War in East Asia, and has in some views grown to maturity since the 1990s—it is interesting to note how often it seems to be in crisis. At its real inception in 1960, protests in Tokyo surrounded the Diet Building and provoked a massive backlash by Tokyo's riot police and the subsequent collapse of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's government. Left-wing activists continued to decry it loudly, particularly through the years of the Vietnam War. In the 1980s, the burgeoning confidence of the Japanese Right, especially embodied in the novelist and politician Shintaro Ishihara, added prominent conservative voices to the mix. By the 1990s, Shunya Ito's highly popular film *Pride: Unmei no Toki* (Pride: The Moment of Fate) could aim to restore the obviously tarnished reputation of wartime prime minister Hideki Tojo largely by painting the US occupation as a nearly criminal conspiracy bent on distorting history to secure his conviction at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.²⁷ Combined with reports of crimes by American servicemen and highly publicized trade disputes, the United States could appear as something of a bogeyman in a variety

of mostly independent Japanese circles. Whether with the publication of the *Japan That Can Say No* (by Ishihara and Sony chairman Akio Morita), the 1995 rape, or the 2009 Futenma dispute, the US-Japan alliance seems to be in a state of continual crisis, at least in myriad media reports.

These reports of crisis are almost invariably overblown; the key diplomatic and military actors in each government are committed to maintaining the alliance, and a sudden departure of American troops from Japan seems as unlikely as a Japanese request for them to leave. Positioning oneself as an opponent of the alliance guarantees virtually that one will be able to publish an article from time to time mostly in leftist outlets like *Sekai* in Japan or the *Nation* in the United States. In more polite company, the gripes about the alliance have to be kept to the level of the mundane: Japanese claims (frequent in major journals like *Bungei Shunju* and *Chuo Koron*) that the United States never listens to Japan and American judgments (less frequent, but still predictable in *Foreign Affairs* and the *Washington Post*) that Japanese leaders should understand that US preferences are in their best interest as well. The US-Japan alliance may not be as American as apple pie (or Japanese as *onigiri*), but it is virtually impossible to shake to its core—voluble protests or violated children notwithstanding.

These crises, then, are never really threats to the alliance, but may still be instructive, both in their rhetorics and resolutions. In the alliance's early days, with the United States facing a Soviet Union armed not only with nuclear weapons but also alarming rocket technology, it is perhaps understandable that Americans would have seen protests against the security treaty as, in essence, the work of a communist conspiracy. Without noting Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's participation in the wartime regime, for which he served as an industrial policymaker in occupied Manchuria, the *New York Times* repeated his insistence that the 1960 riots that forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's Tokyo trip were the result of overly restrictive regulations on the police as well as their reluctance to use force against student participants.²⁸ And famed *New York Times* columnist Arthur Krock,²⁹ while considering the possibility that Japan's relatively recent experience of atomic bombings might have shaped participation in the protests, placed their organizers squarely alongside a worldwide communist conspiracy. That is, Kishi—a highly controversial figure in Japan, and one who had been jailed but not tried as a Class A war criminal by the US occupation—could be largely presented as having relatively straightforward, pro-American motives, while opposition

was subsumed within a larger anti-American, procommunist conspiracy. And the relevant context for the protests is understood as the Cold War, with which American journalists and policymakers would be primarily concerned, rather than either the continuity Kishi represented to many of the Left with the wartime regime, or to the betrayal that many felt when the US occupation purged communists and deeply constrained organizing by the Socialists. It is interesting that even Krock describes the police as having been unfortunately powerless to stop the riots because of Japan's "new 'democratic' law."³⁰

The riots left in their wake a period of relative political calm, marked both by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's promotion of the "Income Doubling Plan" and by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's commitment to a tamed and constrained alliance. Indeed, Sato's unmatched longevity as prime minister rested in part on his promotion of the "three nonnuclear principles" that purportedly dictated that Japan would not host American nuclear weapons and on the 1969 agreement to return Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972. That is, the political calm rested not on full consensus about the US-Japan alliance but rather on the government's acceptance of strict limits on where that alliance could lead and what it would mean.³¹

Opponents of the alliance have, of course, long included different representatives of the Far Left, but the doubts and concerns raised about it are much more widespread. In crises particularly since the end of the Cold War, the logics behind these doubts have been absent in American accounts of the discussions. The 1995 schoolgirl rape case, for example, yielded substantial changes in the administration of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), given the intensity and near-uniformity of outrage among Japanese across the political spectrum. To be sure, long-term opponents of the US bases included pacifists, Okinawa rights activists, and residents primarily concerned about the safety and lifestyle issues associated with having military bases nearby, with jet fighters taking off and landing at a variety of hours and flying over congested urban spaces. The rape itself became a rallying cry for these myriad complaints, resulting in the uncomfortable use of a child who had been gang-raped as something of a stand-in for the perceived long-term victimization of Okinawans both by US forces and by the Japanese government.³²

Some of the damage control on the American side, however, was curiously tone-deaf regarding the depth of the resentment within Japan. Leaving aside Admiral Richard Macke, who was fired from his post as commander of United States Pacific Command for saying

to reporters that “for the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl,” the post-rape damage control has involved not only reforms in the training and monitoring of US military personnel on the island but also emphasized the relatively safe nature of having troops on the island. *Stars and Stripes*, the American military newspaper, reports routinely on crime statistics showing that arrest rates of US service members by the Japanese police have dropped consistently since 2003.³³ More curious are the occasional comparisons to local criminal patterns. Citing a report in the *Japan Times*, one *Stars and Stripes* article focused on a fact I myself have heard repeated at several discussions on the US-Japan alliance, usually by American officials or researchers who work closely with the US government: “the arrest rate for Americans on Okinawa under the Status of Forces Agreement in 2006 was about half that of the prefecture’s general population.”³⁴

I myself have no reason to doubt the figure, though these comparative reports are less clear about Japanese categories of “heinous” (like murder and rape) and “violent” (including assault) crimes. In any case, although crime rates are notoriously difficult to explain concretely, the decline may indeed be the result of sustained, good-faith efforts to show the US military as good neighbors. And there is little doubt that the Japanese news media’s sensationalistic coverage of crimes committed by foreigners outdoes even the often panicky attention they draw to crime rates more generally.³⁵ But there is something odd about the comparison as a point of public relations. After all, “we commit less crime than Okinawans do” seems, to put the matter as delicately as possible, unlikely to be the kind of slogan on which strong friendships are built. Significantly, it focuses on the unfairness of the media rather than on the underlying structure that would make these crimes so easy to sensationalize. The *Stars and Stripes* article makes the following perplexing point:

Crimes by U.S. servicemembers on the Japanese mainland don’t generate the same sense of public outrage. But on Okinawa, even a report of a drunken Marine stumbling into a stranger’s house and falling asleep on the sofa is likely to get at least a formal complaint filed by the local town or city hall.³⁶

Needless to say, the *Stars and Stripes* is written by and about, and principally for, American military personnel, and it is understandable that its articles would point both to the good behavior of the majority of American military personnel as well as to the unfairness

of media reports that single out specific incidents for criticism. But it is odd that a drunk Marine stumbling into a stranger's house—in a foreign country—is normalized as an episode that should yield no particular complaint, with the protest itself treated as representative of both the brittleness of the locals and the eagerness of the media to blow the incident out of proportion. If these were foreign troops drunkenly collapsing on the couches of Americans, one assumes, the repercussions in Washington would be profound. Indeed, this reference, to make any sense at all, must rely on an expectation of the full understanding of both parties—the Okinawans and the US military—of the protective role of the US military and its friendship to the people of Okinawa. What it, therefore, assumes is the transparency of America's good intentions.

Depending on one's perspective, the goodness or malevolence of these intentions were on clear display six years after the rape, in the aftermath of the *Ehime Maru* incident. Just south of Honolulu, on February 9, 2001, the *USS Greeneville*, a nuclear submarine, struck a Japanese fisheries training vessel carrying over a dozen high school students as well as more than 20 crew members and teachers. At the time, the *Greeneville* was carrying 16 guests as part of the US Navy's "Distinguished Visitors Embarkation" program, with visitors chosen because of their visibility and/or their political influence. Wishing to show them something dramatic, Commander Scott Waddle ordered a series of evasive maneuvers, culminating in an emergency blow of the ballast tanks that sent the submarine rocketing to the surface. Insufficient checks of the vicinity resulted in the *Greeneville*'s slicing through the *Ehime Maru*, killing nine people on board.

The rancor in Japan was reported extensively in the United States, with the US Navy working assiduously to respond to Japanese concerns without having to eliminate the Distinguished Visitors program, seen as essential to its public relations. In doing so, it pursued administrative but not criminal punishment of Waddle and other officers, apologized repeatedly to victims, and engaged in a sustained and relatively expensive effort to raise the *Ehime Maru* and locate the victims.³⁷ While the US government raced to deal with the fallout in Tokyo, some expressed irritation at the extent of Japanese outrage. Writing in the *Washington Post*, columnist Richard Cohen struck a remarkably defiant tone:

So, one more time: We're sorry. All of America is sorry. Something went terribly wrong on the *Greeneville* and of course we apologize for

the loss of the *Ehime Maru* and the apparent deaths of nine persons aboard. But we are the same guys who have provided Japan with a security shield ever since World War II, helped rebuild the country and have been its steadfast ally and best friend.

Don't make *us* sorry.³⁸

In late 2001, after a US\$60 million mission authorized by a special budgetary outlay (much of it going for the use of the *Rockwater 2*, a diving support vessel owned by the Halliburton Corporation), Navy divers located eight of the nine bodies, in a mission widely described by officials as an act of kindness for America's stricken ally, and an act eagerly accepted by the new Koizumi government, then eager to work closely with the United States on the burgeoning War on Terror.

But the crisis—despite some of the more hyperbolic rhetoric by Cohen and the harshest Japanese critics of the United States—never came close to threatening the alliance. To the contrary, both governments demonstrated extraordinary eagerness to resolve the issue as quickly as possible, an eagerness that reportedly, on the Japanese side, culminated with local pressure on some of the grieving parents to accept American apologies and to move on quietly and stoically.³⁹ It is instead more remarkable for what it revealed in terms of some of the deep ambivalence within Japan about the alliance, an ambivalence born not of anti-Americanism or communism but rather by a structure seen to be deeply unequal. The Michigan-trained political scientist Yoshihide Soeya is far from a leftist critic of the United States, and indeed it seems likely that his credentials as a supporter of the alliance were part of the reason that the US Navy invited him to tour a nuclear submarine and have a briefing as part of a Japanese delegation shortly after the accident. In subsequent testimony to the Diet, Soeya made the point that he felt uncomfortable about being “handled sensitively” by the Americans before going on to say that there is something far more unnerving about the nature of the relationship:

...If you we think about what postwar Japan as become, and we set up a framework that can't be structurally freed from the US-Japan alliance, we end up not even considering of the alliance as a choice that Japan, as an agent, has actually made on its own. As a result, if I can use an old expression, even from the right there's lingering discontent about the US-Japan alliance, and from the left there's also lingering discontent about the US-Japan alliance. That means that from whatever direction the debate develops regarding the absence of Japanese agency in the US-Japan alliance, the more you cry out for

this subjectivity (*shutaisei*), you end up choking yourself on it. And I feel that within that structure, the loss of agency has actually operated unconsciously in informing these perspectives.⁴⁰

That is, a crisis that might have represented to the United States a regrettable incident that perhaps threatened the viability of the Navy's Distinguished Visitors public relations program was instead considered within Japan to be representative of a relationship in which Japan had virtually no choice at all. The alliance simply was. It constrained Japan, preventing the articulation of meaningful alternatives and choices, and left Japan more or less in the hands of a perhaps well-intentioned ally that itself made the meaningful decisions.

On Choice

That the US-Japan alliance is the bedrock of American security interests in the Asia-Pacific is so deeply institutionalized as a political understanding that it would be virtually unthinkable for a major politician or mainstream analyst to challenge or question it. And it is not my goal here to do so, despite my having tried to present alternative perspectives on the US role in the region. Instead, I merely want to note that the general Washington consensus about America's role in the Asia-Pacific—that it promotes regional stability and relies heavily on the alliance with Japan—ends up, by necessity, obfuscating the range of alternative visions elsewhere. In considering how domestic politics in the United States shapes approaches to the US-Japan alliance, we need to start with the recognition that very little about the relationship is in public debate and that, aside from predictable concerns by economically interested parties in the nature of a potential free trade agreement with Japan, there is wide agreement on the importance of working closely and cooperatively with Japan to deal with the uncertainties of the Asia-Pacific. But there is almost equal agreement that Japan is the junior partner in the relationship.

From the perspective of power politics, there is no reason to think otherwise; the United States commands resources that dwarf Japan's, and America's military likely means a great deal more to the security of Japan than does Japan's Self-Defense Forces to the American mainland. But this agreement has the curious effect of creating the assumption that Japanese policymakers themselves understand their own best interest as do their American counterparts, and that critics are motivated primarily by special political interests (pro-Soviet

tendencies, Okinawan nationalism, historical amnesia, or racism). It, therefore, misses the extraordinary variability of what America can symbolize within Japan, as well as of the myriad centripetal and centrifugal forces associated with it. After all, descriptions of an Asia to which Japan is particularly close (at least, far more so than is the United States) have enough political and cultural cache that they can appear in a speech by a progressive politician like Yukio Hatoyama or a book by the right-wing former prime minister Taro Aso. And concerns about what the United States has, in a sense, taken away from Japan are not merely the phantasmagoria of the Far Left or the Far Right; they appear routinely in the comments and arguments by moderate and even pro-American writers.

In a sense, this perhaps means less rather than more trouble for the triangle that the countries share with China. After all, Japan's expected acquiescence to American policy leadership on the region's security relations might actually make things more predictable for all sides, and particularly for a China tasked with the otherwise unenviable responsibility of grasping the motives and interests of counterparts in Tokyo and Washington. This is part of the logic that American policymakers use when encouraging Japanese colleagues to commit to stronger security contributions: a strong alliance is not only a bulwark against China but also a stable and predictable force in the region, one all other countries, including China, can depend upon in making their plans and policies.

But it may also limit or undermine efforts to rethink the region's security relations. American suspicion of Japanese independence means that progressive initiatives toward Beijing from Tokyo will likely have to pass through Washington lest American diplomats and foreign policy writers team up with Japan's security specialists to undermine new ideas, as clearly happened during Hatoyama's year in office. At the same time, American efforts to thread the needle in disputes between China and Japan—including a qualified endorsement of Japan's claims to the disputed Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands—have raised doubts among Japan's rightists about how far the United States would go to prevent its “unsinkable aircraft carrier” from sinking, or at least taking on worrisome amounts of water. They, like other foreign policy intellectuals, have not forgotten the “Nixon shocks,” in which Kissinger's and Nixon's overtures to Beijing took place without consulting Tokyo. These appear to be quiet tensions in the United States, known only to a small number of Japan hands in Washington. But they are as clear and well-known in Japan as the daily and detailed

television news reports throughout much of 2012 about safety risks associated with the deployment of Osprey tiltrotor aircraft to US bases in Japan. And this means that efforts by the United States to improve security relations with China can be depicted without difficulty in Japan as fundamental compromises of Japan's interests. The handcuffs on Japanese progressives and the megaphones available to anti-American rightists together may help to keep the troubled triangle stable, both as a triangle and as deeply troubled.

The Japan that is often seen in American domestic political debate—a sometimes quarrelsome younger sibling whose best interests are really our own—is a far different place from the one its own inhabitants tend to describe, however variously and contentiously. And the America often portrayed in Japan—a quasi-imperial country that frequently misunderstands Asia and is committed to Japan's defense purely out of self-interest—is greatly at odds with the prevailing consensus in US politics. Operation *Tomodachi* no doubt increased goodwill within Japan toward the United States, and increased friction with China has only enhanced public support for the alliance itself. But it has not effaced the possibilities offered by an Asia to which Japan maintains strong if idealized ties, and it may have only deepened the sense that Japanese live in a world in which Americans and not they make the relevant decisions. There is no reason to believe that this sense will itself endanger the alliance; it only suggests the likelihood of further short-term “crises” that seemingly demand rapid government responses from both sides. Even then, they will likely not register strongly in an America accustomed to indulging its little sibling while continuing to direct the path that both follow.

Notes

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China's Japan Policy and Its Domestic Background*

Jiangyong Liu

In comparison with Japan's chaotic politics and ever changing policies, there has been relative stability and continuity in China's policy toward Japan. While there have been adjustments in the emphasis and specific contents of China's Japan policy at different points in time, these have primarily been in response to changes in Japan, while also relating to China's own domestic and international factors. This chapter aims to analyze China's Japan policy and the domestic context behind it.

The Japan Policy of the People's Republic of China

In the 60 plus years since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's Japan policy and its diplomacy toward Japan have taken on the following main characteristics:

Developing Coordinating Frameworks for China's Japan Policy

To realize normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the first generation of People's Republic of China (PRC) leaders invested tremendous energy and emotion. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, Deputy Director of the Office of the State Council Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group,

Liao Chengzhi took direct responsibility for establishing a Japan Working Group under the State Council Foreign Affairs Office. This Working Group occasionally convened meetings of Japan experts from a number of different departments to analyze the situation in Japan, and research engagement with Japan. Throughout the course of normalization of relations between the countries, this coordinating mechanism played a critical role in implementing and executing central government policy toward Japan. After diplomatic normalization, related work was transferred over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's Japan policy continues to be the responsibility of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time though, the office of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group coordinates research and discussions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and other relevant bodies, and provides services to central level party policymaking. Under the Central Party's leadership, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advances foreign affairs with Japan, developing collaborative relations through conferences and friendly exchanges between parties, and on defense, education, athletics, and culture and between civil society, sister cities, and youth of the two countries.

Consistent Long-Term Objectives, Changing Short-Term Goals

The major goal of China's Japan policy is extremely clear—as the late Deng Xiaoping put it: “In sum Sino-Japanese relations is one generation of friendship after another,” “This is our long term national policy.” “The first step was in the 21st century, next will be the 22nd century, then the 23rd century and then friendship will continue into perpetuity.”¹ To achieve this long-term goal, foreign policy toward Japan must work toward specific objectives in different periods. During the first phase following the establishment of the PRC discussed above, the main objective of Chinese foreign policy toward Japan was the normalization of diplomatic relations. At the time, China opposed the Cold War policy of the governments of the United States and Japan toward China, and demanded that both the United States and Japan cut off relations with the Taiwanese authorities. With the needs of China's modernization and its reform and opening, China's Japan policy shifted toward the conclusion of

the *Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship*, the stabilization and development of Sino-Japanese relations, and cooperation aimed at obtaining capital and technology from Japan. This enhancement of Sino-Japanese relations also promoted the establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China. As Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations improved, China discontinued its opposition to the *US-Japan Security Treaty*.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the objective of China's Japan policy shifted to use Japan as a platform for making a breakthrough in China's relations with the United States and other Western states, which was made possible by a visit by the Japanese emperor to China. Another objective was to oppose the inclusion of Taiwan as part of the "areas surrounding Japan" in the self-defense cooperation guidelines between the United States and Japan. Moving into the twenty-first century, China's Japan policy focused on preventing the shift in Japanese politics toward the right from disrupting Sino-Japanese relations, and encouraging the Japanese leadership to cease making visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and to carefully handle sensitive issues between the two countries such as the Diaoyu Islands. Together these efforts functioned to promote strategic cooperation between China and Japan.

Consistently Adhere to Principles on Major Issues

On Taiwan and other historical issues, China always maintains a consistent position in its diplomatic engagement with Japan. During the course of diplomatic normalization, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai proposed the "three principles of politics towards Japan," "the three principles of Sino-Japanese trade and commerce," and the "three principles of the resumption of ties between China and Japan." China will absolutely not make any concessions on matters of principle, and it explicitly opposes the so-called theory of ambiguity on Taiwan's Sovereignty.² Precisely because China consistently maintains these principles, Japan finally wrote in the *Joint Communiqué between China and Japan* that it "firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration" in which it recognized Taiwan as a territory of China. With respect to historical issues, Premier Zhou Enlai regularly noted that China should "never forget, but learn from the past." Deng Xiaoping further pointed out that if one attempts to balance the accounts of history, Japan owes more to China than China to Japan. The main objective of discussing history is absorbing its lessons for

the future. On the issues of the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese textbooks, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that “when looked at in isolation these problems are not so significant, but taken together as a whole, they represent a particular tendency, a force which can destroy friendship between China and Japan,” and as such, the leaders of the two countries must resolve these issues in a timely manner.³ Because Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao firmly maintained these principles throughout each of their respective periods of leadership, Japanese leaders from Junichiro Koizumi on have acted with great caution when it comes to the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine.⁴ It is quite evident that if China were to abandon its principles in engagement with Japan, China’s national interests would be damaged, the fruits of Chinese diplomatic struggles would be lost, the Chinese people would be disappointed, and progressive forces within Japan would also be disappointed.

Focus on the People, Follow a Commonsense Approach

The Chinese leadership has long emphasized that people desire Sino-Japanese friendship and that the foundation for friendship between China and Japan is rooted in public sentiment. With respect to Japan, the Chinese government has always advocated treating the majority of the Japanese people differently than the country’s small handful of militant elements; maintaining a distinction between a peacefully developing postwar Japan and a fascist prewar Japan; and maintaining a distinction between the majority faction of the Japanese government and public that are friendly or moderate toward China, and right-wing anti-Chinese elements. During their visits to Japan, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao always set aside time to meet with Japanese people to engage in sincere dialogue. On March 11, 2011, when Japan was hit by a powerful earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear accident, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited the Japanese embassy to the PRC to offer condolences. In May 2011, before attending the fourth China-Korea-Japan leadership forum, Premier Wen Jiabao made a special visit to the shelter in Fukushima for victims of the nuclear accident to express condolences to the Japanese people. Premier Wen looked as if he was visiting his own relatives, giving gifts of toy pandas, music CDs, and flashlights to children and accepting an invitation by the Japanese people to leave an inscription encouraging them to persevere. Premier Wen brought with him to Fukushima the good wishes of the people of China and sincere condolences to the victims of the disaster.

Take a Long-Term Perspective, Focus on Youth

The Japanese people have a tremendous capacity for friendship. The PRC's diplomatic relations with Japan began with the return of Japanese citizens, prisoners of war (POWs), and war criminals to Japan. During a period when the two countries did not yet have diplomatic relations, China adopted a practice of working first at a society level, promoting official ties through Japanese people, a strategy that proved to be very effective. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai met with a wide range of Japanese people. Many of the young politicians who Zhou Enlai met went on to make great contributions to Sino-Japanese relations. For example, the former Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the former speaker of the Diet Yohei Kono, and the late former foreign minister Sonoda all played a role in the process of normalization and the conclusion of the *Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship*. The friendly relations established by the former Chinese ambassador to Japan Yang Zhenya and the late Japanese prime minister Takeshita when they were young ensured the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations in the early 1990s. Chinese officials often emphasize that youth are the future of friendship between China and Japan. In 1965, a Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Gala was held in Beijing, while in 1984, the Chinese government invited 3,000 Japanese youth to visit China to promote the long-term, positive development of relations between the two countries. President Hu Jintao participated in these activities, establishing deep friendship with Japanese youth. Meeting with some of these old friends two years later, he stated emotionally that "time might have changed our external appearances, but it cannot change the friendship between us." This experience tells us that "the seeds of friendship planted in us as youth will stay with us all of our lives. We must work together to spread the seed of friendship between China and Japan widely, and ensure that the flag of friendship is passed down from generation to generation."⁵

Carefully Handle Sensitive Issues, Work for Win-Win Cooperation

The normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan and the conclusion of the *Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship* functioned to shelve the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. On September 27, 1972, when Prime Minister Tanaka met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, Tanaka proactively asked Zhou how he saw the issue of the

Senkaku Islands. Premier Zhou responded that he did not want to discuss the matter on that particular trip. By avoiding the issue of sovereignty over the islands, China and Japan were able to achieve diplomatic normalization. On October 3, 1974, Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping received a delegation from the Japan-China Friendship Association and the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association, during which he raised for the first time the idea that the issue of the Diaoyu Islands be shelved in order to conclude the *Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty*. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping clearly stated that “on this issue we have a dispute with Japan, Japan refers to the Diaoyu Islands as the Senkaku Islands—a completely different name. This issue can be put aside for now; perhaps the next generation will be more intelligent than us, and will be able to find a practical solution. At the time I was thinking that on this issue we might perhaps not consider the dispute over sovereignty between our two states, but develop them jointly. Joint development would just involve the offshore oil and undersea resources near the islands, which could be operated by a joint venture bringing benefits to both sides.”⁶ Responding to questions from reporters on October 25, 1978, Deng Xiaoping noted that “when we normalized diplomatic ties, the *agreement between the two sides* did not involve this issue. This time in discussing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we similarly did not need to *come to a consensus* with respect to this issue, and were able to temporarily shelve it.”⁷ On August 6, 2001, in his talk on *Developing Friendly Relations with the Neighboring Countries*, Jiang Zemin reaffirmed this point.⁸ Even though there is no written agreement between China and Japan, both sides sought common ground in their negotiations, and were able to reach a political understanding to shelve the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. In 2008, China and Japan came to an initial understanding with respect to joint and cooperative development of the East Sea.

Pay Attention to the Media to Enhance Mutual Understanding

In the 60 plus years since the establishment of the PRC, as one generation led way to another, perceptions between the peoples of the two countries have undergone considerable change. The way through which information is disseminated at a popular level has also fundamentally changed with the advent of the information age. In addition to newspapers, television, radio, and other traditional forms of media, new media including the Internet and cell-phone-based media have come to play an increasingly important role, especially

with respect to youth in the two countries. In 2008, before his visit to Japan, President Hu Jintao met with the Beijing-based correspondents of Japan's major media outlets to set the tone for his visit. This proved to be particularly successful. The *People's Daily*, *China Daily*, Xinhua News Agency, China News Agency, CCTV, China Radio International, China People's Magazine, and other mainstream Chinese media all maintain exchanges and cooperation with the Japanese media. For quite some time, Japanese domestic newspaper and television reports on China have been relatively negative. Some Japanese anti-Chinese right-wing magazines and books can also be found all over the country. Comparatively speaking, Chinese mainstream media provide more objective and comprehensive coverage of Japan. With the development of the Internet though, emotional and extremist opinions regularly appear in the Chinese web sphere. This has brought new challenges to relations between China and Japan.

Relationship between Historical Problems, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands

As figure 7.1 shows, Chinese policy toward Japan is determined by a number of domestic and international factors. Of these, historical problems are one key factor. Historical problems can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense. In a narrow sense, they refer to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese history textbooks, and statements of Japanese political figures. In a broad sense, historical problems include the issue of Taiwan, sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, and other issues linked to our deeper understanding of history. In this section we discuss historical problems between China and Japan from a broad perspective.

Why Have There Been Anti-Japanese Protests in China?

From April 2001 until September 2006, Junichiro Koizumi's government insisted on making an annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, seriously shaking and damaging the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations, and placing the two countries in the most difficult position in their relationship since the normalization of their diplomatic relations.⁹ In 2005, the Chinese public spontaneously demonstrated against the visit, marking the first time such demonstrations had been held since Prime Minister Nakasone visited the Shrine back in 1985. In October 2010, a series of further protests and demonstrations




Figure 7.1 Factors Effecting China's Japan Policy: Domestic and International Background of China's Japan Policy.

against Japan broke out in a number of China's cities around the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.

A different view of the anti-Japanese protests that occurred in April 2005 has been advanced in Japan. The argument goes that popular frustration was on the rise in China as a result of increasing economic disparities generated by China's reforms, but because of a lack of freedom of speech, this frustration could be expressed only in the form of an "anti-Japanese" protest. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe argues:

In reality the deeper issue is the "legitimacy of the Communist Party." While China maintains a "communist" philosophy, the wealth gap has increased following its introduction of a market economy, and as the Communist Party possibly looks to bring capitalists into its ranks, its original ideology has become completely bankrupt. Under these circumstances, China has looked to its glorious history of "defeating Japan" to find legitimacy for the regime. The Party is the only force which can protect and liberate the people. This is the source of their confidence, and the basis of the claim that "only we can become leaders." On this basis, it makes perfect sense to reflect the brutality of the Japanese army to the greatest extent possible"¹⁰

Such a biased view does not reflect the reality in China. All three of these protests shared a commonality in that they were all

in response to incorrect behavior on the part of the Japanese with respect to historical problems, Taiwan, or the Diaoyu Islands. What is different about the two later protests is that first, during Koizumi's administration, these problems were particularly concentrated, naturally provoking a strong diplomatic response by the Chinese government and adamant condemnation by the Chinese people; Second, Internet penetration and the spread of information technology in China enabled people to exchange information freely through computers and telephones, enabling them to freely express their views. As a result, the scope of the protests was much broader and they occurred in more locations, including even Shanghai, where there are a large number of Japanese companies; third, the spread of information technology makes it much more obvious that the Chinese public rapidly mobilizes protests to "confront and oppose" anti-Chinese right-wing elements in Japan. As this continues to play out, there have been cases of Chinese activists taking extreme steps. In order to ensure stability in Sino-Japanese relations and the social order in China, the Chinese government has worked to guide and control popular protests against Japan, while simultaneously ensuring people's freedom of speech.

China's former state councilor Tang Jiaxuan has pointed out that "during the half century from the Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War II, Japan continuously launched imperial incursions against China, and maintained colonial rule over Taiwan. In the post-war period, the central issue in rebuilding and developing Sino-Japanese relations is Japan's approach to and proper handling of historical issues and Taiwan."¹¹ The experience of Sino-Japanese relations in the postwar period illustrates that as long as these two major problems are properly handled, the two states can make smooth progress in their relations. If the political foundations of Sino-Japanese relations are damaged, relations between the two states will suffer a setback or even unravel.

Historical Problems, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands are Intertwined

From China's vantage point, historical problems, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands are all interrelated. The Japanese government claims that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are Japan's sovereign territory," and that they are under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture. However, Okinawa Prefecture was once the independent

Kingdom of Ryukyu, and was not even itself the sovereign territory of Japan. The Diaoyu Islands similarly were not a part of the Ryukyu Kingdom, but have been the sovereign territory of China since ancient times. Historically, Japanese expansion into neighboring countries in Asia has been in two directions: first into the Korean peninsula; second, toward Ryukyu and Taiwan. The problem of the Diaoyu Islands arose during the time of the Japanese Meiji government, during which Japan took advantage of the decline of the Qing Dynasty to annex Ryukyu and occupy Taiwan. This problem has continued to the present.

After Hideyoshi unified feudal Japan, in 1592 and 1597, he launched military incursions into Korea. This is considered to be the beginning of the Japanese invasion of its neighboring states in Asia. Both times, the Chinese Ming dynasty responded to requests by Korea to deploy troops and defeated the Japanese army. In March 1609, 12 years after Japan's defeat in Korea, at the behest of the *Tokugawa* Shogunate, the Japanese feudal domain of *Satsuma* attacked Ryukyu. From that point on, while Japan permitted the existence of the Ryukyu Kingdom, it demanded that Ryukyu pay tribute to Japan.

China declined following the Opium War of 1840, while Japan began to rise and expand outward after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1871, the Meiji government placed Ryukyu under the administration of the Japanese foreign minister as the Ryukyu *han*, and forced it to cease its tributary relationship with China. In December of the same year, 54 people were killed when islanders from Yaeyama district of Ryukyu drifted into Taiwanese waters. The Japanese government did not agree to attack Taiwan, but instead further consolidated its rule over Ryukyu. In October 1872, Japan terminated Ryukyu's foreign policy rights, and named King of Ryukyu the governor of the Ryukyu *han*.

In March 1873, four subjects of *Oda* county (today's Okayama Prefecture) were killed after drifting into Taiwanese waters. In February 1874, Saigo Tsugumichi led a Japanese force in an expedition against Taiwan. The former US consul in Xiamen Le Gender, C. W. served as Japan's advisor to the expedition.¹² The Qing dynasty government lodged a protest against Japan, noting that Taiwan is an integral part of China and demanding that it withdraw its troops. Faced with resistance in Taiwan, Japan's troops also suffered heavy losses from malaria, and finally relented to negotiations with China through which it agreed to a conditional withdrawal of its troops.

In October 1874, China and Japan signed the Peking Treaty, which declared that “the aboriginal people of Taiwan had recklessly harmed subjects of Japan,” and made three provisions of “goodwill measures following the withdrawal”: (1) Japan’s actions were taken “as righteous measures to protect its people,” and that China would not make any allegations contrary to this; (2) China would pay an indemnity in silver taels to the families of the deceased and to compensate Japan for the roads and homes built there (a total of 500,000 taels); (3) All previous correspondence between the two states related to the matter was rescinded, and China pledged that visitors to Taiwan would no longer be harmed.¹³

Japan claimed that through the Peking Treaty, China had acknowledged that the people of Ryukyu were Japanese subjects, and that this was the equivalent of recognizing Ryukyu as a possession of Japan. The Qing government expressed its opposition to this, declaring that Ryukyu was a vassal state of China, and that the “people” referred to in the Peking Treaty were those from Oda County (present-day Okayama Prefecture) who were killed by aborigines in Taiwan in 1873, and did not include the islanders from Ryukyu who were killed in 1871.

The Meiji government, which had already determined to annex Ryukyu, disregarded the Chinese explanation, deploying troops to Ryukyu in March of 1879, and renaming Ryukyu han as “Okinawa Prefecture.” After receiving China’s objection to this, Japan made a proposal to win a concession from China that involved dividing Ryukyu into two parts: Naha and all islands to the north of it would go to Japan, while Yaeyama and the Miyako islands would go to China. China countered by proposing a three-part division: China and Japan would take the southern and northern islands of Ryukyu respectively, while Naha would remain as the Kingdom of Ryukyu. However, because of a disagreement within the Qing Court over the proposal, negotiations between China and Japan over the issue soon ceased.

After its annexation of Ryukyu, Japan immediately began to use it as a stepping stone for outward expansion, searching for new islands to take possession of. This was the background context against which the Diaoyu Islands were discovered by Japan in 1884. In a secret investigation of the Diaoyu Islands conducted in 1885, Japan concluded that “the islands were in close proximity to the boundary of the Qing Dynasty.”

The Imperial Qing dynasty has a definite name for nearly every island and it has been reported in its newspapers and records that our government plans to occupy islands near Taiwan that are possessions of the Qing State. These papers have raised concerns about many of our actions, and urged the Qing government to pay attention to this matter. Should Japan now publically demarcate boundaries and possessions, it will inevitably attract the attention of the Qing government. For now, it is best to only survey the shape of the harbors and determine whether there are any mineral resources or other materials that might be developed in the future and write a detailed report on this matter. Regarding demarcation of the boundary, it is best to wait for a more appropriate opportunity.¹⁴

In July 1894, Japan launched the Sino-Japanese War. Facing a certain victory in the war, on January 14, 1895, Japan secretly placed the Diaoyu Islands under Okinawa Prefecture through a “cabinet resolution.” In the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed by China and Japan in April of that year, China was forced to cede “all of Taiwan Island and all subsidiary islands” to Japan, which included the Diaoyu Islands. From that point until Japan’s surrender in 1945, China’s province of Taiwan, including the Diaoyu Islands, were under Japanese colonial rule for 50 years.

From the end of World War II until September 1972, Japan followed America’s Cold War policy, maintaining a deep division with China over Taiwan, historical problems, and the Diaoyu Islands. This resulted in a prolonged delay in the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Under these circumstances, China promoted Sino-Japanese relations first at the civilian level, opening civilian ties to advance official ties in a semiofficial way. This created a foundation for diplomatic normalization between China and Japan.

In September 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited China. China and Japan worked to emphasize commonalities and downplay their differences, and agreed to handle historical problems, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands with care, “putting aside conflicts” in order to realize political understanding. Along with the publication of the Joint Sino-Japanese Declaration of September 29, 1972, China and Japan realized normalization of diplomatic ties. With this as a foundation, the two states concluded the *Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship* on August 12, 1978. China’s position advanced by Deng Xiaoping of “putting aside differences, and engaging in joint development” with respect to the Diaoyu Islands, which continues to reflect China’s policy today.

Chinese Patriotism and Nationalism

Some Japanese commentators blame China's patriotic education for the chill in Sino-Japanese political relations. They argue that popular "anti-Japanese sentiment" in China is the result of patriotic education programs initiated in the 1990s.

On this point, former Japanese ambassador to China Yuji Miyamoto has clearly pointed out: "We Japanese absolutely cannot forget that the roots of this sentiment include what the Chinese people have learned from their parents and grandparents about the great pain experienced during the Japanese invasion and occupation of China. In English, we might call this their 'family story.'" He went on to emphasize: "I sincerely hope that those working in China or who will work in China keep this in mind. If you do not have an understanding of the pain and anger felt by the Chinese people, it will be very difficult to communicate with them, and real communication might even be rendered impossible."¹⁵

Sun Yatsen's Nationalism and the Chinese Communist Party's Patriotism

There is no contradiction between patriotic education in China and Sino-Japanese friendship. In China, nationalism is the foundation of patriotism, but nationalism is not equivalent to patriotism. Nationalism includes nationalism in the strict sense, extremist nationalism, and healthy nationalism. In the strict sense, nationalism is national egoism, which is concern only for the national interests without reference to or even at the expense of the interests of other states. Extremist nationalism is an extreme version of strict nationalism, which manifests itself in the form of extremist statements, blind exclusion, and might even evolve into fascism. Healthy nationalism emphasizes patriotism that is characterized by equality between nationalities and win-win cooperation.

The awakening of contemporary Chinese nationalism can be traced to the Opium War of 1840. The "three principles of the people" advanced by Sun Yatsen, the leader of the 1911 *Xinhai* Revolution, include nationalism. Sun Yatsen's nationalism included two important factors: the first was with respect to the feudal rule of the *Manchu* Qing dynasty government, for which he advocated transition to an ideal republic; the second was with respect to the Western powers, from which he sought independence and liberation of the Chinese nation.

While the *Xinhai* Revolution overthrew China's feudal imperialist system, it was not able to achieve the independence of the Chinese nation. It was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that later realized the wishes of Sun Yatsen. Different from Sun Yatsen's nationalism though, the CCP viewed and handled nationalist issues in accordance with the Marxist Leninist Theory of class struggle. The call to arms of Marx and Engels that "the workers of the world unite" best represents the internationalist spirit of the proletariat.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, CCP leader Mao Zedong insisted on maintaining a distinction between Japanese militarism and the Japanese people. During the eight-year long war, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army took a total of 7,118 Japanese POWs. In accordance with the suggestion of one of the founders of the Japanese Communist Party, Sanzo Nosaka, a Japanese Workers and Peasants School was established at *Yan'an* with Nosaka as headmaster to educate and reform the Japanese POWs. In October 1937, Zhu De, general commander of the Eighth Route Army, issued an order consisting of six articles on the handling of POWs: "1. Offer preferential treatment to and do not kill enemy POWs; 2. Do not take the possessions of POWs, only military articles should be confiscated; 3. Offer medical treatment to wounded enemy soldiers; 4. Where possible, send POWs back and provide them with travel expenses; 5. Those willing to serve our army shall be provided with appropriate work; 6. Do not interfere with the religious beliefs of POWs."¹⁶ As a result, some Japanese POWs willingly joined the Eighth Route Army and played a role in opposing the Japanese militarist invasion of China.

In December of the same year, after the Japanese army attacked and occupied Nanjing, it committed the Nanjing Massacre, in which Chinese POWs and civilians were slaughtered. While this is now history, the psychological scars of the harm and the humiliation suffered by the Chinese nation from the foreign invasion remain deep in the hearts of the Chinese people. Today, not only do right-wing elements in Japan fail to express their regret for this, but they even deny that these events ever took place. This inevitably arouses the anger of the Chinese people. How to prevent such nationalistic sentiments from becoming extremist and maintaining rational patriotism is the responsibility of the Chinese government and the Chinese media.

The CCP's Patriotic Education and Sino-Japanese Friendship

With its establishment in 1949, the PRC determined to maintain a policy of Sino-Japanese friendship. As early as 1954, Mao Zedong

said: "Japan's position has now changed to become a half-occupied country. It is in a position of hardship. The Chinese people do not hate Japan so much, but maintain an attitude of friendship."¹⁷

The new PRC government did not advocate nationalism, but encouraged patriotism and internationalism. Two slogans were painted on the red walls of the gate at Tiananmen Square: (1) "Long Live the People's Republic of China" and (2) "Long Live the Unity Among the People of the World." This second slogan represents internationalism. China's Japan policy is focused on the people and on the long term, and it distinguishes between the crimes of Japanese militarism and Japanese civilians, opposing retribution by the victors of war against the defeated. As a result, in the Joint Sino-Japanese Communiqué of 1972 it clearly states that "for sake of the friendship of the people of China and Japan, China forgoes demands of war reparations against Japan."

The PRC government has long opposed extremist or strict nationalism. After 1978, even though internationalism is no longer emphasized, and China started to avoid creating the impression of the "exportation of revolution" to other states, in its patriotic education it continues to stress reform and opening and developing friendly cooperative relations with other states. Even though there are difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations from time to time, the Chinese government continues to emphasize friendship between the people of the two countries; even in the Marco Polo Bridge Memorial to the War Against Japanese Aggression, the final exhibition hall emphasizes how the two nations have worked toward friendship for future generations following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.

The direction of the Japan policy of the government of the People's Republic of China has remained consistent, and the policy that was originally determined under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai has not changed with changes in Chinese leadership. To ensure long-term Sino-Japanese friendship, the Chinese government and leadership have always emphasized that the period of unfortunate history between China and Japan must be correctly handled, and that "the past should not be forgotten, but should offer lessons for the future."

Once in receiving a delegation from Japan, Deng Xiaoping said:

As our countries are neighbors, I have a special type of feeling with respect to Sino-Japanese friendship. Even when the Japanese Militarists invaded China, many Japanese people were in opposition. We must take a comprehensive view of history, and while looking at the history of Japan's invasion of China, we must also discuss the history

of efforts made by the Japanese people for Sino-Japanese friendship. Many people worked for this friendship! There are certainly some people unhappy that such a large delegation like yours has come to visit China, but your courageous action demonstrates that the people of Japan are the same as the people of China; both hope that friendship between our two countries can continue from generation to generation. In the face of the handful of people who do not want friendship between China and Japan, the only thing we can do in response is to continue to enhance our friendship, and develop our cooperation.¹⁸

In 1989 when political turmoil occurred in China, Western states lead by the United States moved to “sanction” China. Japan, however, took the lead in restoring Japanese yen loans to China and in high-level exchanges between the two countries, and in a leadership summit between seven Western states, Japan urged them that they “should not isolate China.” In 1991, Japanese prime minister Toshiki Kaifu visited China, becoming the first Western head of state to visit Beijing following the political chaos.

Year 1992 was the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. In April of the same year, President Jiang Zemin made a visit to Japan, contributing to Emperor Akihito’s visit to China that took place in October of the same year. During his visit Jiang Zemin pointed out that properly treating the period of unfortunate history in Sino-Japanese relations is of extreme importance for the healthy development of ties between the two countries. He expressed his hope that Japan might learn from history, and continue to follow the path of peaceful development. “The past should not be forgotten, but should offer lessons for the future.”¹⁹

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, China had grown and developed, but it did not change its Japan policy. President Hu Jintao advocated the “realization of peaceful development, lasting friendship, mutually beneficial cooperation, and joint development to become the objective of Sino-Japanese relations.”²⁰ During his visit to Japan in 2009, Vice President Xi Jinping expressed that “the Sino-Japanese relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships for both Japan and China, and is an important factor in promoting peace, stability and development in both Asia and globally.”²¹ To present, the Chinese government has always emphasized that the two countries must respect the *Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué*, the *Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty*, and other related political documents and promote the healthy development of their bilateral relations.

*China's Democratization, Information Technology,
and Sino-Japanese Relations*

On historical memory and its impacts on international relations, there is a tendency to consider only human factors or political factors, overlooking the tremendous impacts of the development of video technology and information technology. This is the perspective taken by the author in the analysis below.

*The Development of Video and Information
Technology and International Relations*

Contemporary history saw other major powers invade China, but as there were not yet video images, posterity can learn about this history only through books. With the development of video technology in the twentieth century, the aggressions and violence of the Japanese empire were widely recorded through video and photographs, enabling people today to see up close the cruel nature of the war and the evil acts of the invaders. With the dawn of information technology in the 1990s, the way in which people communicate information underwent a fundamental change as the influence of the Internet and other new media have spread rapidly. This has resulted in a major change in public opinion related to China's Japan policy.

By the end of the 1980s, the telephone had yet to become a household item for ordinary urban Chinese families, and by the mid-1990s ordinary households could not yet use the internet at home. Beginning in the twenty-first century though, the rapid development of information technology in China enabled the country to leap ahead into the information technology age. In 2002, the total number of Internet users in China surpassed that of Japan, reaching 59.10 million, ranking second in the world. By June 2011, the number of Chinese netizens reached 485 million, and they are expected to surpass 500 million by the end of the year. This is far more than the total number of users in Japan and the United States combined.

The victim mentality of Chinese youth does not come entirely from historical memory, but from personal experiences. In China, those who had praised Western "liberal thinking" in the 1980s because of frustration from the Great Cultural Revolution gradually shifted away from such thinking. Since the 1990s, the patriotism of the Chinese public and especially Chinese youth has taken on two characteristics: (1) it is autonomous, occurring without government mobilization; (2) it is targeted mainly toward the United States and especially Japan. It is much less the result of the Chinese government's patriotic education,

and more aggravated by negative acts by Japan or the United States. For example, in 1993 it was the *Yinhe* incident manufactured by the United States; in 1999 it was the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia; in 2001, it was the EP-3 incident, involving a collision between Chinese and American aircraft above Chinese waters near Hainan Province; from 2001 to 2006 it was Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; in 2010, it was the Japanese detainment of Chinese crew members following a boat collision near the Diaoyu Islands. All of these factors stimulated patriotic sentiment among the Chinese public.

China's Spread of Information Technology, Democratization, and Feelings between the People of China and Japan

The Internet and cell phones have already become the primary media through which young Chinese obtain and exchange information. The interest of the Chinese public in China's foreign relations has clearly increased, as has desire for participation. At the same time, freedom of speech has also increased to a great extent. Incorrect statements by Japanese leaders that harm Sino-Japanese relations and negative news regarding the relationship will cause a rapid reaction on the part of the Chinese public. As figure 7.2 shows, the way in which popular sentiment in Japan and China interacts and influences the




Figure 7.2 Interaction between Factors Impacting Popular Sentiment between China and Japan.

relationship has undergone a structural change. The spread of information technology throughout Chinese society is a material change that inevitably brings with it increased freedom of speech and political democratization. The problem here though is that such a change is not necessarily completely positive when it comes to Sino-Japanese relations. For example, part of the Chinese and Japanese attack each other on the in Internet, aggravating sentiments between the two countries.

Information technology, democratization, and the turn of Japanese politics toward the right all impact the feelings of the Chinese public toward Japan. A simple formula can be applied to summarize these impacts: Extent of Exacerbation of Chinese popular sentiment toward Japan = [Internet + Democratization] \times right-wing of Japan. This formula means that the level of Exacerbation (E) is determined by the combined spread of Internet usage and democratization (D) multiplied by the extent of the impact from rightward shift in Japanese politics (R). Based on an analysis of this logic, we can come to the following conclusion: it is possible to reduce the level of exacerbation of popular sentiment toward Japan (E), but the critical factor is reducing the multiplier effect, that is, suppressing the right wing in Japan (R). This will enable a positive turn in Sino-Japanese relations.

The spread of information and expressions of popular sentiment impact one another, causing changes that are completely different from the past. Chinese diplomacy has come to place more importance on listening to public opinion and suggestions. In September 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a “public open house” for the first time. In December of the same year, the then minister of foreign affairs Li Zhaoxing held direct conversations with the public through the websites of the Foreign Ministry and *Xinhua* New Agency. Beginning from 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao engaged in three consecutive years of dialogue with the netizens from all around the country through *Xinhua* Net. Wen noted: “I turn on the Internet every day, and go to *Xinhua* Net first. For someone who wants to understand what is happening in the world, *Xinhua* Net makes everything clear. It offers a wide array of important news.”²² On June 20, 2008, Chinese president Hu chatted with netizens online over People Net (bbs.people.com.cn). He noted: “when I go online, one, I want to see both domestic and international news; two, I want to understand the issues that concern netizens, their points of view; three, I hope to understand the opinions and suggestions that netizens have with respect to the Party and the work of the State.” “The views and

opinions raised by netizens are extremely important to us,” “the Internet is an important channel for understanding public sentiment, and collecting public wisdom.”²³

The spread of information technology and the Internet in China has advanced progress toward democratization in the country. This is most evident through the “public right to discourse” and “the public right to release information” created by the Internet. On June 18, 2008, after the release of the Sino-Japanese Consensus on the Joint Development of the East Sea, Chinese netizens immediately expressed strong concerns. Chinese netizens voiced strong disagreement to the Japanese reference to the *Chunxiao* Gas Field as *shirakaba* and to the idea that the countries would develop it jointly. The Chinese government cannot ignore the opinion of the Chinese public, but will still prevent being undermined by extremist points of view.

Views of the Chinese Public and Youth toward Japan

In 2004, the *China Daily* and the “Japan Speech NPO” collaborated to launch an annual “Sino-Japanese Relations Public Opinion Survey.”

The survey results revealed that during the administrations of Yasuo Fudaka and Yukio Hatoyama the level of positive feelings among the Chinese public toward Japan increased; and that during the administration of Taro Aso and Naoto Kan positive feelings of the Chinese public toward Japan declined. Since 2006, when Junichiro Koizumi took office, as Japanese prime ministers have forgone visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the impact of historical problems on Sino-Japanese relations has lessened. While this may be the case, because of the “boat collision” in waters adjacent to the Diaoyu Islands in September 2010, practical contradictions have become one of the primary obstacles to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.

In 2011, Negative Impressions of Japan among the Chinese Public Reached a Historical High

In June 2011, the *China Daily* and the *Genron* NPO (Japanese Nonprofit Organization) implemented the seventh China-Japan public opinion survey in both the countries.²⁴ The survey results revealed that 28.6 percent of the general Chinese public maintain a positive impression of Japan, a decrease of 10 percentage points over the previous year.

Of youth, 43.1 percent maintained positive impressions of Japan, a fall of 2.1 percentage points over 2010. The percentage of the Chinese general public maintaining negative impressions of Japan reached a new high in 2011 at 65.9 percent, an increase over the previous year of 10 percentage points.

The survey further revealed that the main reason why members of the Chinese public held poor impressions of Japan was historical issues. However, while 74.2 percent of the Chinese public pointed to the Japanese invasion of China, this was raised as a concern by only 46.3 percent of young students and instructors. A total of 71.2 percent of the general public responded that Japan fails to correctly understand the history of its invasion of China, while 86.1 percent of young students and instructors held this view. An additional 56.3 percent selected that Japan follows the United States in meddling in Taiwan affairs, while 53.9 percent selected that the Japanese government maintains a hardline on the Diaoyu Islands. This illustrates that young students and instructors pay more attention to practical issues.

*The Chinese Public Believes that America Represents
the No. 1 Military Threat to China and Japan
the No. 2 Military Threat*

Around 60.5 percent of the Chinese public believe that the United States is a threat to China, and 42.7 percent believe that Japan is a threat; 78 percent of young students and instructors feel that America is a threat, and 66.3 percent identify Japan; 51.1 percent of the Chinese general public believe that Japan is a threat to China because it follows the United States in its strategy, while 49.7 percent feel that the threat stems from Japanese attitudes with respect to historical problems. The reason for young students arguing that Japan is a threat is because Japan has a history of colonizing China, but many Japanese lack recognition of this and the ration is highest, at 58.3 percent; and second to this is that Japanese strategy follows the United States (41.6 percent). In addition, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands was identified as a significant issue impacting bilateral relations for the first time. This survey reveals that 58.4 percent of the general public blame “territorial issues” for obstructing the development of bilateral relations and 42.8 percent of students and instructors hold this view; if disputes over maritime rights and interests are added to this, the numbers increase to 84 percent (for general public) and 79.3 percent (for students).

Importance of Increased Sino-Japanese Strategic Cooperation and Areas for Cooperation

More than 40 percent of the Chinese general public support the enhancement of cooperation between China and Japan, with more than 70 percent of young students advocating the enhancement of strategic cooperation between the two countries; 52.6 percent of the general public believe that cooperation in trade and economics should be improved and 37.8 percent of students hold this view. The enhancement of cooperation in “education” and “culture” was supported by 13.5 percent and 16 percent of students and instructors, respectively.

How to Resolve Historical Problems between China and Japan

In the survey, 60.1 percent of the Chinese general public believe that the key is “Japan’s recognition of its invasion of China”; 54.6 percent believe it is “Japan’s recognition of the Nanjing Massacre,” while 43.9 percent believe it is the “issue of Japanese history textbooks”; 81.4 percent of young students and instructors feel that the key is “Japan’s recognition of its invasion of China”; 55 percent feel that it is “Japan’s recognition of the Nanjing Massacre,” while 58.1 percent believe it is the “issue of Japanese history textbooks.”

Nearly 50 percent of young students argue that progress in civil society exchanges is “extremely important” for improving relations between the two countries, while 31.6 percent feel that this is “relatively important.” Of the general public, nearly 60 percent feel that this is “relatively important,” while 20 percent identify it as “extremely important.” Ranking first and second among young students and instructors are the belief that “exchanges in the cultural field” should be advanced between China and Japan (49.3 percent), and that “media exchanges” should be enhanced between the countries (31.2 percent).

Conclusion: Sino-Japanese Cooperation Is Mutually Beneficial; Confrontation Is Extremely Costly

This survey shows that more than 80 percent of the Chinese general public believe that Sino-Japanese relations are important, and of these, 13.1 percent believe that they are “extremely important.” The

proportion of students and teachers that believes that relations are “extremely important” is 46.3 percent; 60.1 percent of the general public believe that Sino-Japanese relations will remain important for China over the next 10 years, while of young students, more than 48.4 percent hold this view.

Even though China's gross domestic product (GDP) has surpassed that of Japan, its GDP per capita and qualitative economic indicators lag far behind those of Japan. Friendly cooperation between China and Japan supports the collective interests of the two countries. Historical problems between China and Japan, the issues of Taiwan, territorial disputes, and nationalist sentiment are intertwined and constitute structural contradictions. Failure to properly handle these issues could result in the United States and Japan constituting a military threat toward China. China, the United States, and Japan should all work hard to avoid this.

In the future, China will continue to follow the path toward peaceful development. Regardless of attempts to manufacture a “China threat theory” and to sabotage Sino-Japanese Relations, reality will continue to prove that China's development is an opportunity and not a threat for Japan. China's policy toward Japan was made very clear by the late Deng Xiaoping: “In sum, Sino-Japanese relations will be characterized by generation after generation of friendship between the two nations,” “this is our long term national strategy.”²⁵

Of course, China's ability to meet this objective also depends on whether Japan will adopt a similar long-term strategy in its China policy. At present, positive impressions and feelings of friendship of the Japanese public toward China are also on the decline. Japan has yet to adjust psychologically to China's rapid development and rise, and is particularly concerned with the increase in China's defense capabilities. Negative reports and commentary on China dominate the Japanese media. As Japan universalized access to the Internet and as its politics shifted toward the right, Japanese society began to exhibit “youth anger” toward China and a right-wing shift in the Internet. Some people have even consciously attempted to repeatedly antagonize China to exacerbate Chinese nationalist sentiment, seeing it as a double-edged sword that might be turned against the Chinese government.

As far as China is concerned, emotional or idealistic attitudes toward Japan are not helpful for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. China itself has areas in which it needs to make improvements. For example, criminal behavior by Chinese in Japan has seriously

undermined China's image in the country. In this area, the Chinese government needs to continue to enhance its cooperation with the Japanese police, and to increase education regarding observance of the law and friendship between Japan and China. More importantly, with the spread of information technology and development of democratization in China, public interest and participation in state politics and foreign relations have increased, which itself is a positive development. While this may be the case, the diverse information coming from China creates difficulties or even misunderstandings for the rest of the world in its understanding of Chinese policy. It should be admitted that the Chinese people are still limited in their understanding of Japan, and have yet to conduct comprehensive research on the country. At the same time, the spread of information technology and development of democracy in China has promoted freedom of speech with respect to Japan, explaining the so-called angry youth and Internet nationalism in China. As far as China is concerned, the liberalization of speech with respect to Japan is nothing to be afraid of—it is very normal for people to have different points of view—what is scary is when a lack of understanding of Japan results in subjective mistakes that undermine China's national interests.

Year 2012 is the fortieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Recently, former Chinese state councilor Tang Jiaxuan pointed out that in order to achieve long-term healthy and stable Sino-Japanese relations, the two states need to advance the following two major systematic projects:

One is building systematic political trust. Central to political security and trust is how one party recognizes and perceives another: are they opponents, enemies, or cooperative partners; do they represent a challenge or an opportunity? This is a fundamental issue. At present, the reason the two countries lack trust is that they are not able to objectively recognize one another's development. China has repeatedly affirmed that it will not stray from the path of peaceful development, that it will maintain a defensive national defense policy, that it will never seek hegemony, and that it will never expand outward. These are absolutely not empty words, as China does not make such statements to appease other countries. This represents China's basic national situation, and a strategic decision that China has made with respect to its development and fundamental interests.

Two is building systematic feelings among the people. Friendship between China and Japan has a deep foundation within the societies of the two countries. For this friendship to continue from generation to

generation is the collective will of the people of both countries. Because of history and practical reasons, sentiment between the people of the two countries continues to hover at low levels. Recent public opinion surveys reveal that more than 60 percent of Chinese people and nearly 80 percent of Japanese people lack feelings of friendship toward one another. This represents a low point in recent years. This state of affairs is concerning, and has provoked much thought. The reasons for this situation are many, including a lack of political security and trust between the two countries, the occasional exaggeration of sensitive issues between the two states, and the tendency for public opinion to lag behind the rapid pace of change in the two states. The two states should pay careful attention to the decline in public sentiment towards one another, increase the sense of urgency of improving ties, and increase targeted and multi-pronged efforts to quickly improve the situation.²⁶

On the whole, it follows from the collective national interests of Japan and China for the twenty-first century to see them support one another's development and avoid becoming enemies. Should China and Japan attempt to become enemies and constrain one another's peaceful development, this will damage the fundamental collective interests between the two countries. As the economy continues to globalize, the level of interdependence between states deepens. If China and Japan oppose one another, it will also strongly harm the interests of Japan's ally, the United States. For this reason, forward-looking strategists will opt for a long-term strategy to improve and develop relations between China, Japan, and the United States.

Notes

* Financial support from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Murata Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

1. *Primer of Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Diplomacy* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2000), 141.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Central CCP Archival Research Office, eds., *Selected Writings of Zhou Enlai on Foreign Diplomacy* (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenxian Chubanshe), 96.
3. *Primer of Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Diplomacy*, 143.
4. Note that while Deng Xiaoping was the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine; when Jiang Zemin was president, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made a visit to the shrine; and during Hu Jintao's time as president, Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni

- Shrine. China expressed its solemn opposition to all of these visits. In the future, the Chinese government and people will continue to protest visits by Japanese leadership to state religious sites designated by the Japanese military before the war such as the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Class A war criminals from the Sino-Japanese war.
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 19. Zhong Zhicheng, *For a More Beautiful World—The Travel Diary Notes of Jiang Zemin* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2006), 17.
 20. *Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Promotion of Strategic Cooperative Relations* signed between Chinese president Hu Jintao and Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda on May 7, 2008, in Tokyo.
 21. Speech by Xi Jinping in Tokyo, December 15, 2009; <http://news.0898.net/2009/12/15/511743.html>.
 22. Xinhua Net, China Daily Net, February 27, 2011; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/shizheng/2011-02/27/content_12083618.htm.

23. People Net, "Strong Country Forum," June 20, 2008; <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/33093/125024/> (Accessed June 21, 2008).
24. The five Chinese cities surveyed were Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Xian. A total of 1,540 residents were surveyed. In addition, 1,000 Master's students and young instructors from five major Universities, including Peking University, Tsinghua University, and China Renmin University were surveyed.
25. *Primer of Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Diplomacy.*
26. Keynote Speech of Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Chairman of the fifth Annual Committee for Friendship between China and Japan in the Twenty-First Century at the Opening Ceremony of the Committee's Third Conference held in Beijing on October 23, 2011.

Japan, China, Russia, and the American “Pivot”: A Triangular Analysis*

Lowell Dittmer

Japan, China, Russia, and the United States, four of the most powerful nations in the world, positioned cheek by jowl in Northeast Asia with some of the world's most extensive trade and mutually interlocking investments binding them together, have long had “complicated” political-strategic relations. They form two duos, each of which is or was formally bound by a mutual security alliance. In focus here is the Japan-US security alliance (JUSA). Though the JUSA is “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none” (according to former ambassador Mike Mansfield), forming the northern tier of the pentagonal US “hub-and-spokes” Asian-Pacific alliance network, it is a bilateral alliance from which China is excluded. The JUSA has never been explicitly directed against China but against the former Soviet Union, wherein it enjoyed full Chinese support. Since the end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet Union as a target of the alliance and both Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations began for a number of reasons to fray, China's view of the alliance has grown increasingly skeptical, however. This tension was dramatized by the events of September–October 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler in Japanese territorial waters being chased by Japanese coast guard patrol boats took evasive action and collided with its pursuers, leading to the arrest of the crew and captain. This in turn precipitated indignant Chinese diplomatic protests, unofficial trade sanctions, tit-for-tat personnel detentions, and mass demonstrations in the streets of both countries, ultimately resulting in the Chinese

captain's release and repatriation. Because the underlying cause of the dispute was conflicting territorial claims to areas involving rich subsurface hydrocarbon deposits currently under Japanese control, and because the terms of the alliance commit the United States to support Japan militarily if Japan comes under attack, the JUSA has suddenly acquired new strategic relevance. This was reinforced by the escalation of bilateral tension over the Diaoyu/Sankaku islets following their nationalization by Japan in August 2012.

This chapter provides an explication of the increasingly troubled Sino-Japanese relationship in terms of American pivotal involvement in an increasingly tense set of relationships—Russia also figures in the analysis, mainly as a basis for comparison. The strategic dynamic has become triangular. The first part of the chapter focuses on the role of divergent views of alliances in general and of the JUSA in particular. The second introduces the triangular framework, which brings the US “pivot” into the picture.

Asian Alliances

Though a staple of international politics since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, alliances are relatively new to East Asia, as indeed is the concept of the nation-state. But before delving into its distinctive Asian characteristics, we analyze what exactly the term alliance means. Ever an integral component of the Westphalian system, alliances are “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified.”¹ There are at least two different interpretations of the logic of alliance formation. The first is realist, rooted in balance-of-power theory: when a nation comes under a threat that it is unable to deter based solely on its own resources, it has two choices: either attempt to appease or to form an alliance with the source of the threat (“bandwagoning”), or try to resist the threat, either through self-strengthening (“internal balancing”), or by forming an alliance with another country (or countries) with a common interest in resisting the threat (“external balancing”).² “Power” and “threat” are conceived to be universal and the theory is thus readily applicable to any actor in the international system. The second is constructivist, according to which these and other relevant variables may be differently understood in different political cultural contexts, in that the perception of threat depends not only on the objective balance of forces but on the timeframe, ideological

perspective, domestic political culture, and other contextual variables.³ There may be an underlying affinity between constructivism and the older idealist tradition, according to which alliance construction (as well as the national interests on which it is based) depends not on threat perceptions alone but on culturally or ideologically embedded values, expectations/hopes, and national identities. We adopt here a hybrid definition: we begin with the general concept of the alliance and then proceed to show how it has been modified in the East Asian cultural context and what difference such modifications make in their practical political application—all based on the well-known premise that what is perceived as real is real in its consequences.⁴ An alliance is thus assumed to be two-dimensional, with both an explicit power-political logic and a subsurface of connotations that may shape how that logic is applied in a particular context.

The central political unit in premodern East Asia was the empire, not the nation-state, and the international community was conceived to be hierarchical, not an anarchic jungle, in which lower-ranking units professed deference to their superiors via symbolic tribute.⁵ This makes the Western concept of an alliance between sovereign equals somewhat problematic. And ever since the new concept of an international community of sovereign nation-states imposed itself in East Asia, alliances among these "new" nation-states have been formed with extraordinary parsimony, at least by Western standards. Whereas the United States has more than 50 security alliances, the People's Republic of China (PRC) in has had only 2: the 30-year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, which (albeit chronically troubled) lasted from 1951 until its scheduled expiration in 1981; and the strategic alliance with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, first formulated in 1961, renewed in 1981, and still formally binding. China's alliance with North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) extends from China's military intercession in the Korean conflict in 1950–1953, and although the two countries have since diverged ideologically and disagreed tactically, China remains North Korea's largest trade partner, foreign investor, and supplier of food and energy assistance. Both of these alliances are "fraternal," that is, they define relations among Marxist-Leninist or "communist" states, and are thus conceived to be ideologically privileged. China also signed a friendship treaty with Japan in 1978, its first with a noncommunist country, and another friendship treaty with Russia in 2001, but no mutual defense commitment was thereby entailed.

Japan has had only three formal alliances so far, all in the modern era: the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–1922), the so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis (1940–1945), and finally the JUSA (1952–present). The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in London in January 1902 and was based essentially on common opposition to Russian expansionism; it was renewed twice before being officially terminated, due to a number of dissatisfactions: Japanese disappointment with the lack of British support in their colonization of Korea following the Russo-Japanese War, perceived anti-Japanese discrimination in the Washington Naval Treaty,⁶ London's chagrin with Japan's miniscule contribution to World War I and its subsequent perceived encouragement of the Indian independence movement, and (perhaps most decisively) growing US opposition to Japan. Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany in 1936 and then the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 as a coalition of authoritarian “have-not” countries whose expansionist ambitions ran athwart (and were censured by) the League of Nations. Yet the Axis was a very loose alliance system (e.g., Japan was surprised by the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov pact with the Soviet Union and then again surprised when Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941; Hitler was in turn taken aback when Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor). The Axis, of course, ended in disaster, with the destruction and unconditional surrender of all three signatories. The alliance between Japan and the United States was signed as soon as Japan regained sovereignty at the end of the Allied occupation in 1951 and was renewed and expanded in spite of fierce domestic resistance in 1960. Despite basing squabbles it remains robust, anchoring the American defense commitment to the Northeast Asian region.

If we look more closely at these alliances, while the logic of alliance formation in Northeast Asia cannot really be said to deviate sharply from the realist model (in the sense that the alliance in each case confronts a perceived adversary posing a national security threat to both allies), there are at least three distinctive cultural nuances. First, in each instance, the alliance binds two sovereign but *unequal* partners, even when (as in the Sino-Soviet case) there is a strong ideological emphasis on fraternity and equality. In other words, these alliances conform to East Asian hierarchical patron-client patterns (*shang-xia guanxi*, or *oyabun-kobun* relations). Second, they tend to be exclusive: to China the Sino-Soviet alliance was central, and Japan as well has had only one alliance at a time. The implicit template for the alliance in these Confucian cultures is the *wu lun*, or five primary

kinship relations, particularly the most important father-son relationship. Third, these alliances are typically cross-cultural, in each case with leading Western nation-states. This may be attributed to the important subsidiary features of such alliances, specifically the teleological path-dependency in which "Western" was equated with a "modern" goal-culture.

The cultural context of this type of asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship has at least two psycho-sociological implications: (1) The client state expects much more of the patron than support in the case of military attack, just as the patron expects less from the client than full reciprocal support. These expectations are rarely spelled out, of course, in the formal documents, but they are important: the "senior" partner is expected to provide not only aid and support, but also to function as a model for the client's future development. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance it seems clear why England, not only the world's first modernizer but at the time the world's leading naval power, also an island just off the coast of a powerful continent, would be an attractive role model for Japan. China's choice of the Soviet Union, the world's premier revolutionary communist country and successful embodiment of the socialist ideals that also inspired the Chinese revolution, is equally self-evident. (2) The intrinsically asymmetrical nature of the relationship and the culturally implicit role model expectations inculcate a sense of arrogant entitlement in the patron and a corresponding sense of dependency and resentment in the client. In the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as in the Sino-Soviet alliance, the inflated early expectations of the client are soon dashed. The patron, on the other hand, often expresses bewilderment at the client's resentment, given the client's relatively minor contribution to the alliance. The Confucian subtext of these relationships helps explain some of these discontents: in the kinship model, the ultimate payoff for the son's filial subordination to the father is that the father eventually passes away and the son takes his place. But although the notions of national development or modernization are somewhat analogous in that they do offer an upside to the client they are by no means a reliable model for an international alliance (e.g., nation-states cannot be expected to pass away).

Whereas the alliances of China and Japan have both been asymmetrical and culturally freighted, the two have responded quite differently.⁷ While both have been aggrieved about the asymmetry, China has been much more impatient, even indignant than Japan. The Western imperialist powers imposed harsh punitive treaties on

Japan and Korea as well as China, after all, usually at the conclusion of victorious imperial wars, which all three countries resented and eventually succeeded in overturning. But it was China that coined the term “unequal treaty,” and only here did it become a cause célèbre and target of competitive nationalist mobilization by both the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To be sure, Chinese relative outrage is a matter of quantity rather than quality: the JUSA, too, aroused fierce anti-American demonstrations at the time of its revision in 1960 as well as smoldering nationalist discontent since then (“Japan Can Say No,” etc.) demanding a more equal, “normal nation-state” relationship, which has evolved over time into contentious negotiations over the location of American bases and periodic discussion of repealing Article 9. But there are two qualifications in the Japanese case. First, discontent has been reciprocal: beginning in the 1980s, the United States too has complained about Japan’s inability to contribute in kind to the “mutual defense” commitment, inducing the latter to pay the most generous host nation support costs in the world and gradually to agree to expand its ambit of responsibility for self-defense (much to Beijing’s chagrin). Second, despite its complaints and occasional protests Japan has never abandoned the alliance—the previous Anglo-Japanese alliance, too, was abrogated not by Tokyo but by London. Japan seems to attach greatest significance not to equality but to alliance loyalty, expressing, for example, bitter resentment at the Soviet Union’s “betrayal” in annulling the 1941 Neutrality Pact to invade Manchuria in April 1945 (after Japan had already decided to surrender in the wake of the Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). For China, in contrast, the foremost issue has always been one of equality. China complained bitterly and constantly about the Sino-Soviet alliance within its first decade, which escalated to violent border skirmishes by 1969–1970, culminating in both internal and external balancing behavior by Beijing before ultimately abrogating the alliance in 1981.⁸ At the core of the Sino-Soviet dispute, according to Deng Xiaoping’s retrospective analysis, was always the issue of “equality.” Yet from a more objective perspective, “ambivalent” might be a better characterization, for the two countries were never equal during the entire tenure of the alliance, and indeed the alliance never functioned more smoothly and amicably than during the early period when it was most unequal.⁹ This inequality was accepted at the outset, but after Stalin’s replacement by Khrushchev Mao, for a mixture of personal and ideological reasons, soon found it intolerable.

Why the disruptive sense of outrage in the Chinese case but the (albeit reluctant) tolerance on the part of Japan? This can be explained by both structural and cultural factors. Structurally, the asymmetry was proportionally greater in the case of Japan's alliances, and in highly asymmetrical alliances the client typically gives the patron greater discretion, for it is obviously more dangerous for the client to withdraw.¹⁰ Britain was far more advanced and powerful than Japan during the latter's post-Meiji restoration industrial takeoff (though that ranking has since been upended) and the United States has since Japan's defeat also remained predominant, particularly in its immediate aftermath. Though initially less advanced than the USSR in both developmental and ideological terms, the Chinese always viewed their relatively backward status as a humiliating but temporary anomaly, so indelible was the sense of historical cultural superiority. And even objectively considered, China's size and population were consistently more nearly comparable to those of the Soviet Union, particularly after World War II from which the USSR suffered more devastation than any other country. The political cultural context is that whereas China was a revolutionary state throughout the first half of the twentieth century and hence more imbued with the principle of sovereign equality, Japan was a modernizing economy grafted onto a neotraditional political cultural base, in which State Shintoism elevated the emperor to quasi-divine status and the state hierarchy was sanctified via the educational and media apparatus (cf. the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education). The intramural context was also somewhat different: whereas the Soviet Union provided the ideological blueprint for Chinese political-economic development but proved a somewhat unreliable supporter of particular CCP policies thereafter (sc., the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution), Japan unconditionally surrendered to an America that had bombed its cities to rubble and then proceeded to occupy the country and even write its constitution (ironically including the famous "Article 9" that has since limited its alliance contribution). Thus while in both cases we find ambivalence about an asymmetrical alliance, only in the Chinese case did this result in an outright break. And these different experiences have had a lasting impact on the subsequent attitudes of both sides not only about their alliances but also about bilateral relations and foreign policy more generally.

Without undertaking a detailed historical recapitulation, let us consider in brief and bold outline the essential practical differences as they arose in the course of implementing the two alliances. Although

the Sino-Soviet alliance was initially formed in an atmosphere of suspicion, the early period after collaboration in the Korean conflict was one of apparently whole-hearted cooperation, in which China adopted the Soviet Union root and branch as a path-dependent model for its development and accepted Soviet leadership of the international communist movement, a large Soviet-subsidized loan at a time when Moscow's fiscal plight could ill afford it and the advice of some 10,000 visiting Soviet technical experts. This alliance disintegrated soon after the death of Stalin, for both surface and subsurface reasons. On the surface the most recent research indicates that the problem was largely ideological: after all, ideology was fundamental in the formation of the alliance and formed the basis for both domestic and foreign policy, so all policy choices had to be not only correct for one country but for both (and for the world communist revolution) and if one country took a separate path this was taken to be an implicit rebuke of the other.¹¹ In the words of Chinese historian Yang Kueisong, "what irritated Mao the most was Soviet unwillingness to carry on revolution. For Mao, revolution, whether it was the class struggle or the anti-imperialist variety, was not only the focal point of his life experience but also the key to the success of the Chinese revolution. In his mind the negation of revolution, particularly violent revolution, meant the negation of the universal applicability of the Chinese revolutionary model and the rejection of the 'unique contribution' that he had made to Marxism-Leninism."¹² With ideology the *ultima ratio*, the two stood equal before the Truth whatever the distribution of gross domestic product (GDP) growth or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) (or rather, more than equal—Mao was right and Khrushchev wrong). Yet aside from ideology, if the pivotal crises that contributed to the alliance's disintegration are considered, it seems that the underlying reason was that Moscow was failing in Mao's eyes to conform to the proper role of the senior partner, that is, to protect and nurture the junior partner to enable it to mature and stand on an equal footing. To Mao, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union had rashly promised to provide in the early 1950s, was not only a useful deterrent against the ability of the United States to check his revolutionary ambitions but also the ultimate symbol of the national coming of age. But Khrushchev, at what seemed to Mao the cusp of world power and demonstrable superiority to the capitalist states with the launching of Sputnik I and the world's first ICBM in 1957, then abandoned the world revolution to make peace with the leadership of the bourgeois world at Camp David (forgetting for

the moment that the CCP had also enshrined the same guidelines, as the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," in its 1956 state constitution and in every constitution thereafter). So when Khrushchev reneged on his commitment to provide China with nuclear weapons after Mao provoked the United States into a pointless nuclear confrontation over the Taiwan Strait in 1958 Mao may have publicly dismissed the bomb as a "paper tiger" but also launched a crash program for China to build its own. He also took advantage of the Cuban Missile Crisis by timing a border attack on India to coincide with the crisis, later mocking Khrushchev's compromise with Kennedy as first adventurous and then craven. After public polemics in the early 1960s culminated by the end of the decade in violent border clashes with dangerous escalatory potential between two nuclear weapon states, Mao embraced the implicit American promise of extended deterrence to forestall a threatened Soviet preemptive attack. The alliance was terminated upon its scheduled expiry in 1981 even though Mao, its most adamant critic, had already expired.

In view of its bitter disappointment with the Sino-Soviet alliance it is perhaps not surprising that the PRC has not entered into another new alliance since. While the formal alliance with the DPRK has been sustained, at times amid complaints, even occasional sanctions, the CCP has frequently reiterated its refusal to extend nuclear deterrence (i.e., a "nuclear umbrella") to any state, ally or not. Yet China, like any other nation, sometimes needs alliances (or their functional equivalent). Beijing has responded to this need with a number of tentative expedients:

1. With regard to the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, the Chinese entered into protracted "normalization" talks, resulting in the normalization of party-to-party relations in 1989 and in border demarcation and demilitarization agreements in the late 1990s. In 2001, reportedly at Chinese behest, the PRC and the Russia Federation signed a 20-year "Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation," which both sides stress is not an alliance (no promise of mutual strategic support and no explicit target). In addition to its continuing alliance with the DPRK, China has also maintained since the early 1960s an informal "all-weather friendship" with Pakistan, which included a border settlement, military advice, weapon sales, and technology transfer but no dispatch of troops or commitment of support in the event of hostilities.
2. One partial substitute for alliances that China has adopted is the "partnership." The first and still the strongest partnership is with the

Russian Federation, but China has since undertaken partnership agreements with many different states and even with international governmental organizations. According to Ning Sao there are four different types of partnerships, each with its own attributes: the simple strategic partnership (*zhanlue huoban guanxi*), as with the United States, which may contain competition as well as cooperation, but has three main elements: the two are partners rather than rivals, based on strategic considerations, and “constructive” rather than aiming to counter other countries or seek hegemony. Second is the “strategic consultative partnership” (*zhanlue xiezuo huoban guanxi*), such as that established with Russia in April 1996, which is the most comprehensive. Third is the “good neighborly partnership” (*mulin huoban guanxi*), which china established with ASEAN in 1997. The final type is a “basic partnership,” used to describe relations between China and developing countries, such as that between China and Mexico in 1997.¹³ Su Hao ranks these partnerships on three levels: the lowest rank is “constructive” strategic partnerships, such as between China and the United States, Japan, or India, which still contain serious disagreement. Next step-up is the “consultative” partnership, based on friendly cooperation between countries interested in deepening the relationship, such as between China and Britain, Germany, ASEAN, or the European Union (EU). While these partners have many common interests, the level of mutual trust remains to be improved. Highest is the “strategic” partnership, such as that with the Soviet Union, between countries sharing strategic aims and common interests and no fundamental differences between them.¹⁴

3. Since the late 1990s China has shifted from its earlier endorsement of “multipolarity,” often envisaging a world consisting of five “poles” (China, the United States, EU, Russia, and Japan), to one of “multilateralism.” This was a basic policy departure for Beijing, previously limited to bilateral relations and suspicious of multilateral associations as a tool of the great powers (perhaps a hangover from post-Tiananmen United Nations (UN) sanctions, or from their earlier unhappy membership in the International Communist Movement).¹⁵ Thus China joined the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1991, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the ASEAN plus 3 (including Japan and Korea) in 1999. In 2001, Beijing initiated the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia and four former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), later joined by four observers (Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia). This is a formally anarchic “multilateral mutual security organization” (*hezuo zuzhi*)—not a military alliance—whose chief target has been the “three evils” of “terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” but which has permitted China

to make economic inroads into Central Asia without infringing on residual Russian regional interests. In 2003, fearful that G. W. Bush would intervene forcibly in North Korea as he had in Iraq to forestall the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), China organized and convened the Six-Party talks, which successfully managed the proliferation issue without, however, resolving it. China has also become increasingly active in bilateral and multilateral preferential trade agreements, or FTAs, the largest of which is the ten-nation ASEAN plus one agreement (CAFTA), which came into full effect in January 2010. None of these is a multilateral alliance with any binding commitment to collective security.

4. None of these arrangements fits conventional definitions of an alliance. But then China has now come to disdain the concept of alliances and blocs as an outmoded "cold war mentality" that focuses too narrowly on the military dimension, too much on possible conflict, and too little on peaceful cooperation.¹⁶ In its place Beijing advocates the "new security concept" (*xin anquanguan*), based on "comprehensive security," first announced by Jiang Zemin in a UN address in October 1995 and further elaborated in an ASEAN meeting the following year and in a good deal of subsequent promotional literature. This new concept, as in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, emphasizes "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation," "dialogue, consultations and negotiations on an equal footing," and a "win-win" "positive-sum" formula with no conceptual room for security threats or even conflicts of interest.¹⁷ Similar is the concept of "harmonious world" (*hexie shijie*), coined by Hu Jintao in Jakarta in April 2005 and further elaborated in a UN address that September.¹⁸ These are obviously normative models that conceptualize away the need for a conventional security alliance against mutual threat.

Japan's experience with JUSA, after a stormy revision and renewal marred by street protests in 1960, has been generally more positive. Like the Sino-Soviet alliance during its heyday, it was initially comprehensive, a vehicle to sustain of the postwar reconstruction of Japan following the departure of allied occupation forces in 1951 (e.g., land reform, education reform, *zaibatsu* breakup, democratic constitutional structures). Since then JUSA has become strictly strategic, serving as the insurance policy underpinning the Yoshida doctrine, which allowed Japan to focus on economic reconstruction while relying on US extended deterrence for national security. While its East Asian neighbors were spending 2–6 percent of GDP for military armaments Japan could keep its military budget below 1 percent and never impose conscription. This was not only efficient

budgetary policy but reassuring to neighboring countries like China and Korea sensitive to the prospect of Japan's rearmament. The United States accepted its hegemonic stabilizer role throughout the period of Japan's rapid recovery, but when Japan became the world's second largest economy and a keen competitor in American markets while keeping its own market impenetrable, the United States came to view JUSA as enabling Japan to "free ride" economically (particularly after Japan declined to participate in the first Gulf War in 2001, preferring "checkbook diplomacy" of a US\$13 billion support payment). At this point alliance obligations were readjusted at US insistence in order to enhance Japan's defense capabilities and download some of the US defense burden. Inasmuch as much of this burden displacement occurred after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was no longer a target of the alliance and international communism seemed an endangered species, Beijing began to suspect that the strengthened alliance was now aimed at China. When in 1996 and 1997 Nakasone raised the defense budget above the tacit 1 percent limit immediately after the Taiwan Strait crisis, Deng Xiaoping criticized this as a sign of Japanese militarism. But more than the size of the budget (which has remained below 1 percent since, in contrast to the Chinese defense budget¹⁹) was the expanded geographic range of the JUSA. This Tokyo justified to permit the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and later to participate in the US-led "Global War on Terror."²⁰ Why did Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro welcome these added responsibilities? Because (from the Chinese perspective), he aspired to a more prominent regional and global role for Japan, including permanent membership in a reorganized UN Security Council, using the security partnership with the United States in the War on Terror as a legitimating pretext.²¹ China has not yet expressly opposed the JUSA per se, no doubt bearing in mind that the logical alternative would require Japan to assume full responsibility for its own defense, possibly including nuclear arms. But there is no question that the Chinese are chary of what they view as Japan's growing ambitions to play an international role under cover of the JUSA. This they decry with the support of a public nationalism whipped up since Tiananmen in a nation-wide "patriotic education campaign" that positions Japan as its most prominent *bête noir*, using not only the education system but also memoir literature, popular culture, a translation of Iris Chang's bestseller on the Nanjing massacre, and a proliferation of war memorials and museums.²²

So what do these parallel but diverging alliance experiences have to do with current Sino-Japanese relations? The post-Cold War period has been one in which China's economic development has gone into overdrive while Japan's economy has plateaued. China's 2010 passing of Japan in GDP seems to have inspired more assertive Chinese claims regarding territorial disputes, aggravating relations with India and several Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan. Thus the *Realpolitik* becomes one of "power transition."²³ The relevance of different alliance conceptions in this context is that while the JUSA has been institutionalized and remains fully operational, China has divested itself of the Sino-Soviet alliance and adopted a medley of interesting substitutes, none of which is, however, entirely equivalent. This helps fuel Sino-Japanese tension by fostering the sense in China that two of the strongest countries in the world are combining forces to keep China down. And since China has no allies it can trust to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in case of hostilities (over, say, Taiwan); it faces a "Malacca dilemma" that it is strengthening the PLA navy to solve, inadvertently fostering a security dilemma among other Asian countries likewise dependent on the SLOCs. Meanwhile, Japan, the United States, and other trade partners are rattled by trade imbalances and the sudden momentum of China's growth. While these concerns bolster JUSA, Tokyo is not immune to anxiety about possible American abandonment in favor of Beijing. Thus, stunned in February 1972 by the "Nixon shock" visit to China, Tokyo abruptly reversed course, dropping Taipei to recognize Beijing the same year; the 1998 Clinton visit to China occasioned similar anxiety because he did not (at Beijing's specific behest) make a Tokyo stopover ("Japan passing"). While the relationship among the three has many points in its favor—Japan and the United States have huge trade flows with China, China and Japan are geographical neighbors and share a Confucian cultural legacy—whenever tensions arise for whatever reasons, these tensions tend to reinforce JUSA solidarity and this in turn evokes China's abiding nightmare of being encircled by hostile forces (*baoweiquan*).

This brings us to the role of the United States in this tense relationship. The introduction of the United States, as *tertius gaudens*, makes the Sino-Japanese relationship triangular, as in the previous case of the Great Strategic Triangle between China, the United States, and the USSR. The United States has played a structurally analogous (albeit not equally successful) role in both alliances. We first turn to a brief discursus on the logic of the strategic triangle before applying the framework to the three principals.

The Sino-Japanese-American Triangle

A strategic triangle, as an analytic construct, may be said to exist if three conditions are met: (1) All three participants are sovereign (i.e., free to decide their foreign policies based on perceived national interests, rational (i.e., not overly inhibited from expedient maneuver by ideological dogmatism) actors; (2) each bilateral relationship is contingent upon the two participants' relationship with a third; and (3) each participant is essential to the game at least insofar as its "defection" would critically shift the strategic balance. The most frequent previous application of the triangular logic has been to the relationship between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States during the final two decades of the Cold War, when the Nixon administration succeeded in taking advantage of the growing alienation of China from the Sino-Soviet alliance to form a triangular relationship in which Washington's relationship to Beijing and Moscow was better than these two had with each other. This created a "romantic" triangle permitting Washington as "pivot" to forestall ongoing hostilities and possible further escalation and to extract more concessions from each "wing" than might have been feasible without the "jealousy" factor.²⁴

But a romantic triangle is only one of four possible configurations. If we assume that relations among players may be classified as either "positive" or "negative" (a simplification, but a necessary one routinely made by national security planners, international risk insurance agencies, budget chiefs, banks, etc.), there are only four logically possible configurations of three players. These are the unit veto, consisting of mutually antagonistic relationships between all three actors; "stable marriage," consisting of a positive relationship between the two spouses, each of whom has negative relationships with a third *pariah*; the "romantic triangle," consisting of positive relationships between one "pivot" player and two "wing" players, who in turn have better relations with the pivot than they have with each other; and finally the *menage a trois*, consisting of positive relationships among all three players. Within this triangular context, an alliance is a stable marriage, consecrated via a formal document that will be more or less honored by the two "spouses" (from a realist perspective, probably less) depending on their values, strategic ambitions, interests, and fears (figure 8.1).

The rules of the game are to maximize one's national interest by having as many positive and as few negative relationships as possible.




Figure 8.1 The Logic of the Strategic Triangle.

The implication is that, first, each player will prefer to have positive relations with both the other players; second, failing that, each player will wish to have positive relations with at least one other player; and, third, that in any event each player will try to avoid incurring negative relations with both of the other players. This would imply a simple rank order in triangular configurations, with a *ménage* being the optimal configuration, followed by a romantic triangle, followed by a marriage, with unit veto least preferable. Yet the rank order of options for individual actors is not the same: the most advantageous role is that of *pivot* in a romantic triangle, second *spouse* in a marriage, the third *partner* in a *ménage*, and fourth *pariah* excluded from a marriage. The two preference rankings differ because an actor's level of security is enhanced in part by the mutual alienation of the two other actors. Some configurations (and some roles) are more stable than others: a *ménage* is typically a relatively unstable and transient configuration. Given that the outcomes for each player vary based on one's position within the triangle, it is logical to assume that any nation finding itself in a triangular game will seek to "elevate" its role in the game, thus raising its payoff.²⁵ But the attractiveness of the actors will vary not only based on positional advantage but according to such conventional indices of national power as GDP growth and

military force projection capability. In either case positive relations with a strong nation will be worth more than positive relations with a weak nation. Given the fact that the “best” position in the triangle is that of pivot in a romantic triangle, the actor best qualified to play that role is the strongest of the three (i.e., with the greatest capabilities), provided that it can fulfill the pivot’s role requirements of mediating between the two “wings.”

Given the game’s grounding assumptions that international relations are not anarchic but hierarchical, that the game is competitive and some positions are better than others, differential change in the capabilities of the actors is one of the factors apt to change the configuration of the triangle. If one actor’s capabilities grow faster than those of the other two it becomes both a more attractive partner and a more formidable foe. Each of the other two actors will hence be tempted, provided their interests are reconcilable, to realign with the pivot while preventing the other from doing so, in order to bandwagon with the stronger power and avoid the budgetary burden (not to mention the security risk) of balancing against it. Thus the political implications of the triangular model differ from those of either classical realism or power transition theory. According to classical realism, if a weaker actor can overtake a stronger actor in capabilities, that would constitute a balance of power. Such a balance is considered to be a relatively stable configuration. According to power transition theory, on the other hand, for a weaker power to overtake or surpass a stronger one excites great anxiety and an enhanced possibility of war. In the triangular model, a “catch-up” scenario would simply lead to a realignment of the triangle as one or both of the other actors realigns with the “natural” pivot (or, if this proves nonnegotiable, forms a defensive coalition with the weaker power). Although the implications of the triangular model thus differ from those of either classical realism or power transition theory, there is an elective affinity with Kindleberger’s theory of hegemonic stability. The original conception of the role of “hegemonic stabilizer” was primarily economic—serving as lender of last resort, ensuring stable exchange rates, and so forth.²⁶ But the role of the pivot, though strategic rather than economic, analogously provides a “public good” by reconciling an otherwise dangerously polarizing antagonism. To be sure, the pivot’s intervention is not necessarily eleemosynary—it may indeed be quite self-interested, for by definition the pivot gains more from a romantic triangle than any other actor. But the premise that it provides a valued public good is supported by the fact that both

wings are willing to sustain such a relationship as being preferable to any other.

As hegemonic stabilizer or pivot, the United States inserted itself into both the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Japanese rivalries. Chronologically, the first US intervention was in the Sino-Soviet dispute, symbolized by Richard M. Nixon's famous February 1972 visit to Beijing, the "week that changed the world." The reasons for the long deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as noted above, are still a matter of scholarly debate, but seem to have had little to do with power transition, except perhaps as a future nightmare in the mind's eye of the Soviet leadership. In any event the alliance had by 1969 escalated to violent border clashes, and although these were suspended following a meeting at the Beijing airport between Zhou Enlai and Aleksei Kosygin on November 17, 1970, Moscow was sufficiently concerned about the looming Chinese threat that it seriously considered a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear weapons facilities and even solicited American active or passive collaboration. The chief US motivation for a deal with Beijing rather than Moscow was the apprehension that the United States was losing the strategic arms race with the USSR.²⁷ The conceptual innovation in the American response was that rather than simply supporting the weaker side against the stronger (as prescribed by classic balance-of-power realism), the Nixon administration opted to open relations with China while continuing to cultivate détente with the USSR, maintaining better relations with USSR and PRC than the latter had with each other,

The resulting "romantic triangular" configuration provided advantages to all three participants, putting a lid on the escalating bilateral dispute while enabling the United States to extract concessions from both sides, based on the "jealousy" each experienced lest its rival negotiate a better deal with Washington than it had. At the same time it facilitated an earlier end to the Cold War in Asia than in Europe, as the anticommunist animus against the PRC (and the anti-American animus in China) was sublimated by joint concern with the greater Soviet threat. The US assessment of the relative growth of threatening capabilities at the time eventually led it to share the Chinese obsession with the "Polar Bear" threat, giving rise to an increasingly unbalanced pivot tilting toward Beijing, particularly after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even so, Washington remained sufficiently even-handed to conduct SALT I (culminating in the 1972 ABM treaty and the interim agreement on strategic weapons [INF]) and SALT II (left unsigned because of Afghanistan but mutually honored until

1986) with the Soviet Union, to sign a START treaty in 1991 and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. The opening to China was more modest in terms of bilateral arms control agreements but even more impressive if measured against the status quo ante. China's capabilities were less advanced than the Soviet Union's at the time but Chinese foreign policy was far more radical and uncompromising, and its support of "wars of national liberation" leading to world revolution from the developing countries to overthrow the developed West was taken quite seriously at the time by American strategic planners and by many in the Third World. The immediate impact of the opening was to facilitate US withdrawal from Vietnam, as China reduced its subsidization of the national liberation war there (thereby earning Hanoi's future enmity), by extension also making possible the "Guam Doctrine" of drawing down American forces in East Asia. It also laid the groundwork for the later "China rise" by facilitating PRC entry to the Security Council of the UN, removing US obstacles to widespread diplomatic recognition and opening Western markets to Chinese exports. All of these developments coincided with American interests. But in triangular terms perhaps the most important result was to stabilize relations between the two actors whose antagonism had first facilitated the creation of the triangle. No longer intimidated by a Soviet strategic threat they could not deter, Beijing regained confidence under the American nuclear umbrella to enter first into border talks with Moscow in 1973–1976 and then into semiannual normalization talks in 1982, resulting in eventual elimination of "three fundamental obstacles" and full normalization of party-to-party relations in May 1989. Thus the American pivot seminally contributed to one of both countries' signal diplomatic achievements, the resolution of a 30-year bilateral antagonism and formation of a robust "strategic partnership"—whose utility as a counterbalance to American unipolarity is (unconvincingly) denied by both partners.

During the Cold War, the Sino-Japanese-American triangle was, of course, formally a marriage, consisting of the JUSA on the one side and facing an opposing Sino-Soviet alliance on the other. Yet even after the Korean War the level of Sino-Japanese tension was lower than one might have anticipated. There were crises in Korea, Vietnam, and the Taiwan Strait, but in response to these Beijing turned its ire on the United States and spared Japan. China was relatively well treated by Japan—relations were better, that is, than either Japan-Soviet or Sino-US relations—and Japan was also relatively well treated by Beijing—Beijing lambasted "American imperialism" while

viewing Japan as hapless puppet of the hegemon. This was partly because of relative power: to China, Japan was not yet a serious threat (digging out of the ruins of American nuclear and fire bombings and constrained by Article 9 of a superimposed constitution) while the United States clearly was. To Japan as well, China was less threatening than the USSR (which attacked Manchukuo despite their neutrality pact in the waning weeks of the war and then proceeded to annex Sakhalin and the Kuriles, repatriating all Japanese residents) and a complementary trade partner to a recovering trading nation. Beijing tolerated the JUSA as preferable to Japanese rearmament, and after the Sino-Soviet split it was a useful deterrent to the USSR, which displaced the United States as China's main security threat.

The high tide of Sino-Japanese relations was reached in the 1970s and 1980s, prompted by the US opening to China and by strategic triangular collaboration against the USSR, in which Japan participated. Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship has deteriorated. The argument here is that the key reason for this deterioration has been US inadequacy in its role as the hegemonic stabilizer, or "pivot." Japan's opening to China was implicitly contingent on US approval and has remained so. Whenever Sino-US relations deteriorated, Japanese suspicions of China increased; when Sino-US relations improved Tokyo set about improving relations with both Beijing and Washington for fear of being frozen out of a Sino-US marriage. But whereas the United States facilitated resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute by maintaining a stance of pivotal neutrality on the territorial issue, since the 2010 fishing boat incident Washington has allowed itself to be drawn into an implicit defense of Japan's territorial claims. Of course, Washington has its interests and alliance commitments, but going beyond these to "tilt" to one side is not conducive to compromise. There are other issues as well. The 1994 reform of Japan's electoral system from SNTV to a MMC in effect wiped out the socialist and communist parties that had previously been most committed to close Sino-Japanese relations, and in the wake of the Japanese economic malaise its contribution of official developmental aid (ODA) to China declined.²⁸ The end of the Cold War did not change the triangular balance as much as one might expect. Although the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 sovereign republics, removing the main target of the JUSA, Tokyo and Moscow failed to resolve their impasse over the Northern Islands, and Russo-Japanese relations remained cool. Sino-Japanese trade became the fastest growing bilateral trade nexus in Asia after Deng Xiaoping's 1992 "southern voyage"; by 2004 China

had replaced the United States as Japan's leading trade partner and host of foreign direct investment (FDI). But political relations have not kept pace. There was a perceptible drop in favorable Japanese public attitudes about China after Tiananmen and again after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mirroring the simultaneous fall in favorable American views of China. But increasingly, the most intractable issues have been bilateral. The rise in Chinese perceptions of Japanese war guilt, stimulated by the CCP's revival of Chinese nationalism in the wake of the collapse of international communism, by "patriotic" Ministry of Education textbook selections in 1982, 1984, 1986, 1995, and 2005; by Koizumi's six visits to the Yasakuni Shrine in the early 2000s; by the "comfort women" issue—the whole politics of historical amnesia are all highly sensitive to Sino-Japanese relations. More specific is the maritime territorial dispute. While Japan has altogether three territorial disputes in Asia,²⁹ the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is the only one in which Japan is the current stakeholder, and it is the most sensitive and hotly contested of the three. There are at least four reasons for this: first, the Senkakus form part of the "first island chain," a maritime glacis that inhibits the blue-water strategic ambitions of the PLA navy; second, the circumstances surrounding Japan's claim are controvertible, on historical if not legal grounds; third, the islands lie athwart vast subsurface hydrocarbon deposits that both countries need, as second and third largest oil importers in the world; and fourth, this dispute pits Japan against China, its strongest rival for leadership of the region. Japan staked legal claim to the islets in 1895 and occupied them until World War II and the United States returned them along with Okinawa in 1972. China (and Taiwan) began seriously to contest the claim only after the UN economic commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) reported the prospect of sizable subsurface hydrocarbon deposits in 1969, and it has since served as a pretext for repeated Chinese intrusions into Japanese territorial waters, which Japan has invariably protested.

While the United States played its pivotal role skillfully in moderating the Sino-Soviet dispute, its role in the increasingly volatile Sino-Japanese dispute has been less successful. This is certainly not to say that Washington is somehow responsible for all of the issues that have arisen since 1989 to plague the relationship. Yet all these issues—including the territorial dispute, the current flashpoint—were already extant during the heyday of Sino-Japanese amity in the 1970s and 1980s, then more successfully contained.³⁰ What has changed is that the Sino-US relationship has become more wary and "hedged"

as China's GDP and strategic capabilities have grown, leading to a mutual strengthening of the JUSA since the 1980s, partly (from the American perspective) to download part of the East Asian defense burden to an alliance free rider, partly because Japan hungered for greater global responsibility as a "normal nation." Japan's self-strengthening has not been reflected in arms spending (which has remained below 1 percent) or in troop strength, but in greater flexibility in international SDF troop deployments. From a Chinese perspective this looks like strategic encirclement. The War on Terror, from this perspective, was utilized for the same purpose, establishing bases in South and Central Asia and blithely waiving aside India's violation of the nonproliferation treaty while excoriating the DPRK's analogous violation.³¹ China was particularly critical of the 1996–1997 revision of the JUSA guidelines that authorized the use of SDF forces to maintain peace in the "region surrounding Japan," accusing Japan of including Taiwan within its defense perimeter—an allegation Japanese spokespersons disputed but did not categorically deny. These suspicions were heightened by the issuance of a joint security statement in February 2005 that included Taiwan as a shared security concern.³² At this time some 25 million Chinese signed an online petition against Japan's inclusion as a permanent member of a reorganized UN Security Council, while others took to the streets in a brief but intense anti-Japanese protest movement. The Chinese government took no immediate action to curb these protests, nor were the "ringleaders" ever called to account (in contrast to other such protests). Japan's support for UN Security Council reorganization was perceived in China as part of a Japanese-American plot to grasp regional leadership. Leadership rivalry also emerged in disputes over membership in the East Asian summit (EAS) and other multinational regional organizations. China criticized the cooperative development of high-tech weaponry in Theater Missile Defense (TMD), lest this neutralize their small nuclear deterrent and perhaps even be extended to the defense of Taiwan. This historically rooted Chinese fear of strategic encirclement proved in a sense to be self-fulfilling in 2010, when controversy over a fishing boat clash with Japanese coast guard patrol boats (after a series of such Chinese intrusions)³³ elicited an explicit American commitment to defend Japan's territorial claims under the terms of the JUSA.

To many American strategists, the Chinese have overplayed their hand since 2010 and are hence directly responsible for the consequent strengthening of the JUSA partnership.³⁴ This may be so. But to the United States, as self-appointed regional hegemon assuming

responsibility for the regional commons, a more polarized East Asian triangle will complicate its pivotal role, making a negotiated solution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, moderation of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma and nascent arms race, North Korean nuclear disarmament—indeed any collaborative regional endeavor—more difficult to achieve.

Conclusion

This chapter has had two interconnected foci: the culturally distinctive character of the Asian alliance system, and the logic of the alliance in a strategic triangular context. In contradistinction to the Western multilateral alliance propensity, Asian alliance behavior tends to stake everything on a single security alliance, which is then freighted not only with national security requirements but informal expectations having to do with patron-client ties and path-dependent political-economic development. There is also, however, national variation in this shared cultural pattern. The Chinese revolution brought a charismatic leadership to power that clashed with this (and many other) traditional cultural patterns. Thus the early multifunctional alliance with the Soviet Union soon gave way to a bilateral antipathy that had destabilizing repercussions throughout the communist world and well beyond it. In the process of winding down the Cold War, American diplomatic intervention succeeded in “triangulating” and eventually neutralizing that antipathy, paving the way for the reintegration of revolutionary China into the international community. But the American pivot has been less successful in resolving the Sino-Japanese political security rivalry that has arisen since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, US diplomacy might even be said to have (perhaps inadvertently) contributed to its polarization.

How can we account for such divergent outcomes to a shared structural dilemma? In both alliance triangles, the United States perceived itself to be threatened, and responded in a strategically innovative way to mitigate the threat. But in the “great” strategic triangle between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union it was China that was most seriously and immediately threatened, and it was thus China that made concessions (opening to the United States, the abandonment of world revolution, concessions to Taiwan, *inter alia*). The opening to the United States was designed to resolve a dangerous antagonism that neither side wished to see escalate. Moscow provided the first opportunity to serve as *tertius gaudens*, then Beijing, and the United States

ultimately interceded on behalf of the latter. The threat prompting US intervention, in retrospect considerably exaggerated, was the risk of losing the ongoing strategic arms race to the USSR. Most seriously threatened, however, was Beijing, which Moscow had come to view as a serious threat to its eastern flank. As the least threatened of the three, Washington could take a somewhat more disinterested, "pivotal" stance. In the Sino-Japanese polarization, on the other hand, it is Japan that feels itself most seriously and immediately threatened, and Japan solicited US intervention. US intervention, though subtle and limited, for the time being has checked further escalation. From the Chinese perspective US intervention on behalf of Japan "overbalances," creating a dangerous asymmetry. The imbalance can be attributed in part to the alliance itself, but also to the pentagonal American alliance network in Asia of which it is a part. Having decided in the wake of the Chinese Olympics and its triumphant survival of the global financial crisis to shift from a policy of strategic reassurance to one of greater emphasis on national sovereignty, Beijing feels itself threatened by the concerted regional reaction this shift has inspired. Washington has exacerbated rather than dampened that reaction, thereby jeopardizing its role as an impartial hegemonic balancer. The likely reason is that China's rise is conceived to pose a threat to American hegemony in the region as well. As for China, John Ikenberry notes, Beijing's post-Cold War strategy under Deng Xiaoping (to some extent emulating Japan's Yoshida doctrine) has been one of "macroeconomic absorption," with a predominant emphasis on positive incentives (trade, investment) and a general avoidance of negative incentives—hence Beijing's opposition to sanctions on Burma, North Korea, or Iran. The application of an informal boycott of rare earth elements against Japan in the aftermath of the fishing boat incident marks a rare resort to negative incentives. Whether this departure from Deng's strategic reassurance policy is only a temporary nationalist aberration or a strategic course correction based on a reassessment of China's relative weight after overtaking Japan in aggregate GDP growth remains to be seen. For the time being the bilateral relationship seems to have returned to a very uneasy status quo.

For a combination of three reasons, then, the Sino-Japanese-American triangle has not become "romantic," with the United States in a pivotal balancing position between Beijing and Tokyo, as in the structurally analogous "Great" triangle of the early 1970s, remaining essentially a "marriage." First, despite its troubles over the years, the JUSA is a far more robust alliance than the Sino-Soviet alliance,

which entails greater resistance to abandonment and realignment. Second, in the latter case it is China that is perceived to be challenging the territorial status quo of Japan, posing an asymmetric threat to the other two actors and tending to mute intramural basing disputes and reinforce alliance solidarity. Third, the United States perceives its hegemonic position to be challenged by China's swift economic and strategic "rise." Statistical extrapolations abound, projecting China to overtake the United States in aggregate GDP by 2020, perhaps earlier, and though China's military capabilities are likely to lag GDP growth, the PLA military budget has been growing along with GDP and cannot be too far behind. Thus the United States, haunted by the prospect of "power transition," finds it hard to serve simultaneously as pivotal balancer and stakeholder and has tended to shift from the former role to the latter.

Notes

* Financial support from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Murata Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring–Summer 1990): 103–124.
2. See Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009): 86–120.
3. For example, see Takashi Inoguchi, "The Triangle of Japan, South Korea and the United States in Northeast Asia: A Japanese Quasi-Constructivist Perspective," *Japan Spotlight*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (September–October 2005): 32–33; and Brian Frederking, "Constructing Post–Cold War Collective Security," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003): 363–378.
4. Thomas, Wm. I. and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 Volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918–1920).
5. See David Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
6. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 limited Japan's naval armament plans to three-fifths of the capital ships permitted to Great Britain and the United States.
7. Zhang Jingquan, "Zhan hou Zhong Ri jie meng guan bijiao yanjiu: yi Zhong Su tong meng, Ri Mei tong meng wei li" [A comparative study of the Chinese and Japanese concepts of alliance formation, taking the Sino-Soviet and Japanese-US alliances as examples], unpublished paper, Jinan University, Changchun, China, 2010.

8. Internal balancing consisted of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the external balance was the informal alliance with the United States beginning with the 1972 Nixon visit.
9. On this early period, see, for example, Hua-yu Li, *Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Thomas J. Christensen (*Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) views the Sino-Soviet alliance as fractious from the outset. *Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
10. See Snyder, “Alliance Theory,” also Walt, “Alliances.”
11. See Jian Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); and Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
12. Yang Kueisong, “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 34 (February 2002), as quoted in Christensen, *Worse than a Monolith*, 157.
13. Ning Sao, “Xuanze huoban zhanlue, yingzao huoban guanxi” [Choosing partnership strategy, shaping partnership relations], *Xinshiye* [New horizon], No. 4: 10–13. Reprinted in *Zhongguo waijiao* [China’s diplomacy], No. 6: 2–7.
14. Su Hao, “*Zhongguo waijiao de ‘huoban guanxi’ kuangjia*” [A framework for China’s diplomatic “partnerships”], *Shijie zhishi* [World knowledge], No. 5 (2000): 11–12.
15. The CCP stopped attending meetings of the International Communist Movement in the early 1960s and exited other transsocialist institutions as well. It withdrew from its observer role in the Warsaw Pact in 1961 and stopped responding to invitations from the COMECON in 1966, viewing Soviet-backed organizations as little better than Western ones. See Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 68–69.
16. Cf. Gilbert Rozman, “Post-Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 66 (September 2010): 605–620.
17. Kong Fanhe and Mao Qian, “Feichuantong anquan shijiaoxia de anquan limian” [Security conceptions from a non-traditional security perspective], *Taipingyang xuebao*, Vol. 57, No. 12 (2005): 72–79.
18. Wang Yi and Zhang Linhong, “Hexie shijie de goujian” (Constructing a Harmonious World), *Heping yu fazhan* [Peace and development], No. 2 (2007): 27–30.
19. According to the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spends 2.2 percent of its GDP on defense. By 2010 China had the world’s second largest defense budget, while Japan had the sixth largest.

20. Japan responded whole-heartedly to the appeal of the G. W. Bush administration for greater security support in the “Global War on Terror” following the World Trade Center bombing. To wit, it joined the “coalition of the willing” to deal with terrorist groups through increased international police and intelligence cooperation, border movements, and domestic security enhancement. Following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, Japan deployed aircraft and destroyers to support refueling operations in the Indian Ocean region for the invasion of Afghanistan. In September 2003, Japan (along with 11 other countries) joined the Proliferation Security Initiative to detect and interdict the movement of illegal or suspect weapons and missile technologies, and in December dispatched 600 heavily armed ground troops to the south of Iraq to support US occupation and reconstruction activities after the invasion. Japan also joined the Six-Party talks, generally supporting US demands that Pyongyang completely dismantle its nuclear program. Richard Tanter, “With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei militarization, and the Bush Doctrine,” in Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness, *Confronting the Bush Doctrine* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 153–180.
21. Zhang, “Zhan Hou.”
22. Iris Chang [張純如], *Nanjing hao jie : bei yi wang de da tu sha* [The Nanjing massacre] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1998).
23. Power transition theory views the point at which a growing power approaches and surpasses a hegemonic power as relatively likely to result in war, in contradistinction to classic balance-of-power theory, which views a balance of power as relatively stable. See A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958; and Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efirid, and A. F. K. Organski, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
24. See Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992).
25. I owe this insight to Prof. Yu-Shan Wu; see his “Power Transition, Strategic Triangle, and Alliance Shift,” unpublished paper presented at the thirty-ninth Taiwan-American Conference on Contemporary China, December 9–10, 2010, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.
26. See Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
27. For a classic example, see Albert Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1958), Rand report number P-1472.
28. China has been the biggest single recipient of Japanese official developmental aid (ODA) since 1982, representing more than 50 percent of the total assistance China received from both bilateral and multilateral sources. Since 2000 Japan has publicly announced several times its intention to suspend ODA in the light of China’s rapid development, its own foreign aid to Africa and Southeast Asia, and its public ingratitude about Japanese aid, yet ODA continues to date at the rate of about US\$1.2 billion per year (indeed Japan remains the largest source of foreign aid to China). Overseas Economic

- Cooperation Fund, *kaigai keizai kyoroku binran*, 1987, 251; as cited in Sadako Ogata, "Regional and Political Security Issues: Sino-Japanese-United States Triangle," unpublished paper, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley; also see Joshua Keating, "China Sends Japan \$1.2 Billion in Aid Every Year," *Foreign Policy*, December 2, 2010; http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/28/japan_sends_china_12_billion_in_aid_every_year (Accessed December 12, 2010).
29. To wit, (1) Japan contests Korean occupation of the tiny uninhabited island TokDo/Dokto (Takeshima); (2) it claims the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles occupied since 1945 by Russia (Etorofu, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais islets); (3) and it claims the Senkakus/Diaoyu (S/D) islets, southernmost in the Ryukyu chain, which China and Taiwan contest.
 30. The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue first came up during normalization talks in 1972, with the powerful conservative antinormalization group arguing that Japan should not agree to formal diplomatic relations until China conceded ownership of the islands. Zhou Enlai agreed to shelve the issue. It came up again in 1978 when the Chinese were pressing Japan to sign a Peace and Friendship Treaty with an antihegemony clause implicitly directed against the USSR. But Japan was at the time hoping for the return of the Northern Territories from the USSR and also negotiating various trade agreements with Moscow. Again Japanese conservatives argued that the Senkaku issue had to be settled before signing a treaty. In April, an armada of Chinese fishing boats suddenly appeared near the islands, arousing great uproar in Japan. The boats withdrew, with Beijing explaining that they had been pursuing a school of fish and gone off course. China agreed to insert a clause in the treaty stating that it was not directed against a third party, the Senkaku issue was shelved (but not conceded), and the treaty was signed.
 31. See Rex Li, *A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 215.
 32. See Xinbo Wu, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japan Alliance," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 119–130.
 33. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force scrambled 83 times in the first half of 2011 to check out military aircraft from China buzzing Japan's air space, according to the Defense Ministry's Joint Staff Council, more than triple the amount compared to the same six-month period in 2010. Yoree Koh, "Japan Jet Scrambles Related to China Planes Tripled," *Wall Street Journal*; <http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/10/14/japan-jet-scrambles-related-to-china-planes-tripled/> (Accessed October 14, 2011).
 34. Brad Glosserman, "Beating Up on Tokyo: Good Fun, Bad Policy," *PacNet*, No. 50 (August 7, 2012); <http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1250.pdf> (Accessed August 28, 2012).

Japanese Policy toward China*

Emi Mifune

Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of Japanese policy toward China and its background to illustrate how Japan has grappled with a troubled triangle structurally, with economic-security duality.

Although Japan had been gradually recovering from the Lehman Shock of 2008, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the resultant Fukushima Nuclear Power Station accident have affected Japan's society and industry strongly and negatively. Regarding the foreign exchange rate, the Japanese yen is becoming stronger more rapidly than anticipated by exporting firms. Through overseas business expansion, corporations are earning lower revenues in the United States and European Union (EU) countries, but are earning higher revenues in markets in Asia. Asian emerging economies, including that of China, have risen remarkably since the global economic and financial crises and have been pulling the world economy. With the expansion of its relative economic importance, the political influence of China is rising and the global balance of power is shifting from a structure centered on the United States and other industrialized countries to a multipolar structure that China has insisted upon.¹ The Asian region is becoming increasingly important for Japan both economically and politically.

During the past decade, the United States has allocated vast resources to the Middle East and Central Asia. At a time when eastern Asia is

building a new security and economic architecture, the presence of the United States in Asia has declined gradually. Simultaneously, the status of Japan as the core economy in Asia has been assumed by China instead.

To make matters worse, Japan has had ten prime ministers since 1996. Japan's frequent changes of prime minister are dizzying and increasingly counterproductive. Perhaps this situation has left Japanese leaders with barely sufficient time to introduce effective policies. Japan needs prime ministers who can offer principled leadership during their respective terms of office, and who can pose appropriate economic and security policies with a vision for the future of Japan.

The area of Asia surrounding Japan poses persistent threats. In 2010, the security environment in eastern Asia was severe and insecure. Although China emphasizes its peaceful development and although it has come to play important roles in the world and the Asian region, China's increasing military strength without transparency and its assertive maritime activities are of severe concern regionally and internationally.

China's rise has engendered changes in international relations in Asia not only economically but also militarily.² China, while expanding its outreach to the world rapidly in terms of its economy, diplomacy, and military affairs, also seeks to increase its influence abroad. Contemporary China is recognized as a great power with global aspirations. That recognition and those aspirations have colored the relations between Japan and China.³ Economic relations between Japan and China have been developing. Is China's rise as a commercial and military power an opportunity, challenge, or threat to Japan? No single answer to this question has ever existed, but the Japan-China relationship has never been merely a zero-sum game. The impact of China's rise presents an opportunity, a challenge, and a threat for Japan. The Japan-China relationship is moving to a new stage as China raises its international status and integrates its national power.

The United States and China are strategic countries. Nevertheless, Japan is criticized as having no diplomatic strategy. Criticism persists that Japan's foreign policy is opaque not only for foreigners but also to Japanese themselves. Very few prime ministers of contemporary Japan have composed and presented a clear vision of a concrete national image. A marked tendency among Japan's ministers and bureaucrats is to speak with incomprehensible phrasing. Then,

what is the purpose of Japan's foreign policy line? According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, it is to secure national interests: the prosperity and safety of Japan's nation and people.⁴

In that context, this study is an examination of Japan's China policy during 1996—mid-2012. This chapter comprises the following three sections. First, the changing economic structure and power shift in Asia are described. The status quo is that, in the configuration among the trio, China has replaced Japan as a core economy and has pushed aside US influence in Asia. Next, the perceptions, expectations, and anxieties related to Japan's own foreign policy are considered by themselves and *vis-à-vis* the two other countries. Subsequently Japanese policy related to China and its background since 1996 are examined. The salient observations present an illustration of a troubled triangle that Japan is confronting now.

Japan's Adaptation to the Looming Power Shift in Asia

Changing Structure in Asia

The recent Great Recession has wielded a strong influence over the world economy and politics. Recently, economic power has been shifting gradually to eastern Asia. China has shown itself to be more resilient to impacts of this crisis and has shown its ability to overcome the crisis sooner. Economic changes and shifts that have occurred in eastern Asia should be understood as a process of changing global implications. The most important among these processes are the relative declines of the United States as a unipolar power and Japan as a major economic power.

The trade structure in 1990 was pulled by economically developed countries. However, the presence of Japan in trade has decreased markedly. The changing network of eastern Asian trade is apparent: the core of trade has shifted from Japan to China over the past two decades.

The share of China and the United States in Japanese trade exhibits the structural changes of Japanese trade: the American share has declined while the Chinese share has risen rapidly. This changing economic configuration among the trio poses a dilemma for Japan. The changing share of China and the United States in Japanese trade underscores that an economic power shift in Japan occurred after Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Changing Views of ASEAN and the United States

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan conducted an opinion poll of people in Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (ASEAN 6 countries) during February and March 2008.⁵ Respondents were asked to choose the country that is and will be the most important partner for ASEAN countries at present and in the future. Overall, 30 percent of respondents chose China, 28 percent of respondents chose Japan, and 23 percent chose the United States as the important partner for the present. Regarding the future, 33 percent of respondents chose China, 23 percent of respondents chose Japan, and 13 percent of respondents chose the United States.

China's rise has also altered American consciousness. According to an opinion poll administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in the United States,⁶ to the question of which country is the most important for the United States, the answer by the majority of the US general public until 2009 was Japan. In 2010, Japan and China were chosen at approximately equal rates, but in 2011, China was regarded as more important: 31 percent of the respondents chose Japan, but 39 percent of the respondents chose China. This change in perception was reflected even earlier by the opinion leaders. In 2008, the answers of most opinion leaders were Japan. In fact, China and Japan were regarded almost equally in 2010, but in 2011, 46 percent of the opinion leaders chose China, whereas only 28 percent of respondents chose Japan.

Japanese Perceptions, Expectations, and Anxieties about China

Disgust with Chinese Antagonism and Aggression

How do Japanese people regard Japan's foreign policy and diplomacy? Regarding research related to Japanese social consciousness as surveyed by the Cabinet Office during January 19–February 12, 2012,⁷ the survey asked what fields were expected to worsen in Japan.

The top five responses were business conditions (58.7 percent), national finance (54.9 percent), employment and labor conditions (49.3 percent), economic power (40.6 percent), and diplomacy (37.9 percent). The percentage of those who described diplomacy (28.3 percent in 2010; 46.3 percent in 2011; 37.9 percent in 2012) wavered starkly. Probably, this resulted from faltering Japanese government policy toward China.

The Japan-China relationship was tested when a Chinese ship collided with two Japanese Coast Guard's patrol vessels in Japanese territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands on September 7, 2010. The Japanese showed wide dissatisfaction and anxiety related to the deportment and handling of the incident by the Japanese government.

The Cabinet Office of the Japanese government conducted a public opinion poll about Japan-China relations.⁸ Years 2004 and 2010 were turning points in the Japanese view of China. According to the survey, almost half of the respondents felt friendly toward China in 1995. However, their feelings toward China deteriorated rapidly after 2004. After the Abe administration, intergovernmental relations between Japan and China improved. Nevertheless, the Japanese general public's feelings toward China have not improved.

In the 2010 investigation, the people who felt friendly to China were 20.0 percent (with 4.6 percent of respondents feeling friendly and 15.48 percent of them feeling somewhat friendly); 77.8 percent of them did not feel friendly to China (with 47.3 percent of them not feeling friendly and 30.5 percent of them not feeling very friendly). The category "friendliness is felt" decreased from 46.9 percent in 2003 to 20.0 percent in 2010 but increased to 26.3 percent in 2011, and "familiarity is not felt" rose from 42.9 percent in 2003 to 77.8 percent in 2010 but fell to 71.4 percent in 2011.

Comparing answers to the question of whether the present relations between Japan and China was good overall among results obtained in 2003, 2010, and 2011 shows that 47 percent of respondents felt it was good in 2003 (with 41.4 percent answering that it was probably good and 5.6 percent answering it was good), but in 2010 only 8.3 percent of respondents felt that the relations were good (with 7.2 percent of respondents answering it was probably good and 1.1 percent answering it was good). In 2011, 18.8 percent of respondents felt that the relations were good (with 17.2 percent of respondents answering it was probably good and 1.6 percent answering it was good). However, 88.6 percent of respondents felt that Japan-China relations were not good in 2010 (with 32.4 percent of respondents answering that the Japan-China relations were probably not good, and 56.2 percent answering that they were not good), but only 42.9 percent of respondents had felt that it was not good in 2003 (with 34.2 percent answering they were probably not good and 8.7 percent answering that they were not good), 76.3 percent of respondents had felt that it was not good in 2011 (with 45.3 percent answering they were probably not good and 31.0 percent answering that they were not good).

A few factors have contributed to the deterioration of the Japanese view toward China since 2004: first, Japanese people are reacting to China's strong anti-Japanese sentiment and their heightened nationalism. Anti-Japanese booing was severe in soccer's Asian Cup of 2004, and anti-Japanese riots occurred in various parts of China in 2005, greatly upsetting the feelings of Japanese people. Many Japanese believe that the Chinese government has based their policies and strategies related to Japan, such as Japan's entry into the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, on historical issues. Although some Japanese people believe that visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is a disgrace, it makes others wonder why China continues to demand apologies endlessly. It has given rise to anti-Chinese sentiment but not to atonement. Second, many Japanese people's distrust of China has arisen because of problems related to food safety, the Chinese navy's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, and the problem of resources in the East China Sea, despite deepening economic relations between the two countries.

Japanese Dilemma Posed by Chinese Threats and Reliance on the United States

Chinese aggression against Japan presented a paradox to Japan when global trends changed in the post-Cold War era. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japanese government,⁹ Japanese people who believed that the US-Japan alliance was useful were 63.5 percent in 1991, but increased to 76.4 percent in 2009, and 81.2 percent in 2012. Exactly 82.3 percent of respondents chose the Japan-US alliance and Japanese Self-Defense Forces to protect Japanese security in 2012 (62.4 percent in 1991). Moreover, 72.3 percent of respondents saw a risk of Japan being engulfed in war in 2012 (versus 22.3 percent in 1991). In addition, 12.6 percent of those foreseeing such a risk chose the US-Japan alliance as the reason; 81.4 percent of them chose international strains and antagonism. Showing some similarity, 18.7 percent chose the US-Japan alliance as the reason but 68.6 percent of them chose international strains and antagonism in 1991. However, people who believed that the US-Japan alliance was worthless were 18.2 percent in 1991, which decreased to 16.2 percent in 2009, and 10.8 percent in 2012. Also, 22.0 percent reported no possible risk of Japan being engulfed in war in 2012 (33.1 percent in 1991); 52.5 percent chose the US-Japan alliance as

the reason (35.7 percent in 1991). To the question of what is of interest in the field of security and peace of Japan, 46.6 percent of respondents chose Chinese military modernization and naval activities in 2012 (30.4 percent in 2009; 36.3 percent in 2006), and 45.5 percent of respondents chose the US-China relations (13.3 percent in 1997).

When the apparent trend to global war declined in the post-Cold War era, Japan needed the Japan-US alliance and remained concerned about US-China relations and Chinese military expansion.

From “Threat” to “Opportunity” in the Economic Arena

Since China entered the WTO in 2001, the economic relationship between Japan and China has continued to improve. In 2010, trade between Japan and China in 2011 reached its highest ever level with a total of 345 billion dollars (increase of 14.3 percent compared with the prior year: economic data for Hong Kong and Macao are excluded). Recently, both exports and imports have increased dramatically.

Dating back to China’s accession to the WTO, the economic relationship between Japan and China has been developing apace. China’s share of Japan’s exports increased from 6.3 percent in 2000 to 19.7 percent in 2011. For Japan, China ranked fourth place in 2000 and first place in 2009. Japan’s imports from China ranked first place in 2011 (20.0 percent), an increase from second place in 2000 (14.5 percent).

The Japanese stance in relation to the Chinese economy has changed from “threat” to “opportunity” as the economic relationship between the two countries expanded. Since the 1990s, low-priced Chinese products have flowed into the Japanese market, and many Japanese firms have opened manufacturing operations in China. Relocation of Japanese manufacturers to China is another aspect of the Chinese economic threat.

Reduction of manufacturing costs is regarded as an advantage for Japanese companies when establishing a production foothold in China. However, not only is low-cost labor of China in demand by Japanese manufacturing firms now; the adoption of capable Chinese workers is also demanded.

It is time for Japanese companies to expand functions from labor-intensive operations in manufacturing firms to the sale of goods in the Chinese domestic market. Moreover, labor disputes have increased recently because of social unrest. The Labor Contract Law, which was enforced in China in January of 2008, obligates manufacturers to

continue employing workers who have worked for more than 10 years until retirement age (60 years old). In addition to the enforcement of the Labor Contract Law, China has consistently increased the average rate of workers' wages by more than 10 percent after 1999, and the minimum wage has increased in many provinces. It is predicted that China's labor costs will be higher in the near future, but that the global competitiveness of labor-intensive industries will be decreased. Dissatisfaction related to the payment and the promotion of Chinese workers is deterring Japanese companies from conducting business in China. The salaries given by Japanese firms in China are lower than of those given by European and American enterprises.¹⁰

Adopting capable Chinese workers is an important challenge for Japanese firms, especially because the current global economic crisis poses a dilemma of China's economy being a threat as well as an opportunity to the Japanese economy. The purpose of Japanese companies embarking on ventures in China is to change "reduction of labor costs" to "sales in a Chinese market." According to an investigation of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan, Japanese sales to Chinese customers in China have increased.¹¹

Figure 9.1 portrays the transition of the distribution classified by Japanese companies' overseas subsidiary activities by region:¹²




Figure 9.1 Expanding of China's Presence in Japanese Companies' Overseas Activities while Reducing the American Share.

Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

61.8 percent of the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies were located in Asia in 2010. Particularly, 29.9 percent of them were in China in 2010. The ratio of activities in the United States has continued to decrease annually.

Expanding Personal Interactions between Japan and China

Expanding personal interactions is one factor that has supported change in contemporary Japan-China relations.

The number of Japanese people who visited China increased from 27,828 in 1978 to 1,305,190 in 1995, to 2,385,700 people in 2001, and to 3,658,200 people in 2011. According to data from the Japan National Tourism Organization,¹³ the number of Chinese people who visited Japan increased from 7,220 people in 1978 to 220,715 people in 1995, to 391,384 people in 2001, and to 1,043,500 people in 2011. The ratio of Chinese among foreigners who visited Japan increased from 6 percent in 1995 to 16.8 percent in 2011.

Japan's travel industry, ceremony businesses, and department stores expect high purchasing power from affluent Chinese people and strive to invite consumers. Affluent Chinese people are anticipated as consumers in the Japanese market. Affiliated Stores, where the Chinese Yi-Lian credit card is useful, are gaining popularity in many places.

According to data from the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau,¹⁴ 272,230 registered Chinese aliens were living in Japan in 1998 (18.0 percent of all registered aliens) and 674,871 (32.5 percent of all registered aliens). Both the number and ratio of legal aliens have expanded greatly. It can also be said that Chinese people who specialize in technology and who have other specialized knowledge increasingly contribute to Japanese economic activities.

According to data from the consul of the MOFA Bureau Planning Division,¹⁵ Japanese residents in China have increased as well. The 64,090 Japanese people living in China in 2002 became 77,184 in 2003, 99,179 in 2004, 114,899 in 2005, 125,417 in 2006, 127,905 in 2007, and 131,534 in 2010 (second most numerous to 388,457 in the United States). The number of Japanese staying in China for extended periods of time also increased. In 2002, 63,098 Japanese residents of China rose to 76,168 in 2003, to 98,172 in 2004, to 114,170 in 2005, to 126,627 in 2006, and to 129,805 in 2010 (second most numerous to 240,305 in the United States).

Shifting Japan's Policy to Address a Rising China

Friendship Diplomacy during 1972–1995

After the 1972 normalization, Japan pursued friendship diplomacy toward China. The basic thrust of Japan's China policy was established in the context of normalization in 1972. Japan continued its friendship diplomacy toward China even after the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989. Although the United States and EU countries continued to impose sanctions on China in response to the massacre, Japan was the first country to lift sanctions toward China. It restarted Japanese yen loans to China in the autumn of 1990. The historical trip of Japan's emperor was completed in the autumn of 1992.

Japan's China policy line has been based on three elements. First, Japanese fundamental policy for China has been influenced by the United States' policy for China since World War II. Second, Japan has keen interests in economic relations with China, as described above. Third, the Japanese have assumed a reconciliatory posture toward China because of their historical expiation. In the 1972 normalization communiqué, Japan acknowledged its responsibility for the severe damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and stated its deep reflection on the fact. Although many Japanese have felt they were defeated by the United States in the Pacific War, they felt no sense of defeat in the Japan-China War. Moreover, it is rare for Japanese to have an inferiority complex to Chinese. Rather, many Japanese people felt grateful to the Chinese people until September 7, 2010, because China had abandoned war compensation in the 1972 normalization communiqué.

To maintain and strengthen the security and prosperity of Japan, the preservation of a peaceful international environment is important, and the stability and prosperity in the eastern Asian region is indispensable. It is desirable from Japan's perspective to have a more open and stable society in China that is friendly toward Japan.

Engagement and Balancing Policies While Strengthening the US-Japan Alliance since 1996

Japan's policy toward China shifted away from a friendship and engagement policy to an engagement and balancing policy with the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance. On April 17, 1996, Japan's prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and US president William Clinton

agreed to promote bilateral security cooperation and announced the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the twenty-first century. The reliable alliance between Japan and the United States has helped to ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China rose as a prominent regional threat. In the 1990s, China's offensive postures have induced Japanese politicians to reconsider shifting Japan's policy toward China from friendship diplomacy to engagement and balancing diplomacy.

The Japan-US Joint Declaration emphasized the importance of a peaceful resolution of problems in this region. The two leaders emphasized that it was extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. However, Hashimoto and Clinton agreed that the two governments would jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized the need for the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the Japan-US security relationship.

China's foreign policy in 1990 was known as Deng Xiaoping's "24 character strategy": "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership." Later, a phrase, "make some contribution," was added. Certain aspects of this strategy have been emphasized, such as "never claim leadership" and "make some contribution." Deng's strategy has been summarized as downplaying China's capabilities and avoiding confrontation while building up China's power for the future.

However, China has been regarded as an unstable element in Asia.

On February 25, 1992, China adopted the Territorial Sea Law and the Contiguous Zone that supported its asserted claim over Japan's Senkaku Island. This China Territorial Sea Law and the Contiguous Zone Article 2 described that People's Republic of China's (PRC) territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore island, Taiwan, and its various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of China. However, the PRC's Law on the Territorial Sea of September 4, 1958, declared in Article 1: this regulation is applied to all territory that belong to the PRC including the mainland and its offshore island,

Taiwan, and the various affiliated islands, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands, and other islands. Then China's Territorial Sea Law of 1992 was the first law that included Diaoyu Island, which is Japan's Senkaku Island, as Chinese territory. Moreover, it is widely known in Japan that the official newspaper of China's Communist Party *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) on January 8, 1953, insisted that "Ryukyu archipelagos are on the northeast in our Taiwan, and on the southwest of Japan's Kyushu scattered, which includes seven sets of islands: The Senkaku Islands, Sakishima Islands, Daito Islands, Okinawa Islands, Oshima Islands, Tokara Islands and Okuma Islands." With this article, China strongly recommended that the United States return the Okinawa Islands to Japan.

In 1993, China made a "New Guideline" that expanded China's defense area from "its homeland" to "air, sea and space."¹⁶ In the early 1990s, China stimulated the Southeast Asian countries through its military expansion and building of military facilities in the Mischief Reef. Under that theoretical rise of a Chinese threat, the new defense policy with the United States was important for Asian countries including Japan. The Japan-US alliance focused on China's growing military activities instead of former Cold War adversary Russia as a regional security threat.

China's series of nuclear tests in 1995 raised questions in Japan with respect to its aid policy toward China. Negative domestic public opinion compelled the Japanese government to consider suspending its grant assistance after the initial test in May. When China continued nuclear testing in August 1995, Japan's government decided to suspend large-scale yen loans for China.

Moreover, Chinese military exercises near the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 during Taiwan's first presidential election alerted Japan's government and general populace. Chinese assertive military performances against Taiwan caused Japanese to shift away from Japan's China policy from friendship diplomacy to engagement policy. Once the Taiwan Strait contingency breaks out, US bases in Japan might be attacked by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Therefore, Japan started to consider acquisition of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Japan's National Diet began to discuss the defense guideline legislation.

In 1996, the percentage of Japanese negative views of China became dominant for the first time since Japan's government began annual surveys of Japan-China relations in 1978.

*Historical Issues from Japan's Expiation to
China's Political Tool in the 1990s*

In the 1990s, the impact on Japan-China relations of historical issues changed in the course of Japan's approval of historical textbooks, China's Patriot education promoted by Jiang Zemin, and establishment of a regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Jiang Zemin, famous for hating Japan, has indicated increasing emphasis of historical issues against Japan permanently. Jiang initiated the use of historical issues as a political instrument toward Japan. Japan and the United States have been good partners to disarmament. On China for the CWC, however, interests of Japan and the United States have differed.

China is, if anything, a country that does not enthusiastically support the control of weapons of massive destruction (WMD). However, it forced the addition of the Verification Annex Part IV (B) 15¹⁷ as soon as China joined in establishing the CWC.

At the disarmament conference of Geneva in 1990, the Chinese government made its initial informal request to the Japan's Kaifu administration to assist in resolving the problem of chemical weapons left over in China by the former Japanese army at the end of World War II. First government-to-government consultation on Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China (ACWs) took place when the first Japan-China Governmental Meeting at the director-general level was held in January 1991. However, it was after the Japan-China Joint Working Group Meeting at the director's level was set up by the fourth Japan-China Governmental Meeting in December 1996, shortly before the CWC entered into force, when consultations between Japan and China intensified.¹⁸ At the disarmament conference in Geneva on February 27, 1992, the Chinese delegation described the Chinese government disposal of 300,000 chemical weapons that "some foreign country" left. However, more than 2 million weapons were still not disposed of. Furthermore, 20 tons of mustard gas weapons were disposed of, but more than 100 tons of mustard gas weapons remained. China did not criticize Japan openly, but it was evident that China indicated Japan's ACWs. From that time, China insisted on adding Article I-3.¹⁹ No other country could have left chemical weapons in China. The CWC Article I-3 Verification Annex Part IV (B) 15 and Article I-3 are laws intended exclusively for Japan.

The chief cabinet secretary of Miyazawa administration Yohei Kohno promoted the ACW project because Japan had no official

papers proving the ACWs as delivered weapons after dismantlement. Primarily, the governments of the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai Shek, the Moscow and Taiwan governments, have had the responsibility of managing the disarmament of those weapons. Despite Yohei Kohno's insistence that Japan has no official papers to prove those chemical weapons as disarmed weapons, there are actually some official documents in the Siberia Historical Document House in Yamagata Prefecture of Japan and in the National Institute for Defense Studies in the Defense Agency (Current Ministry of Defense).²⁰

Later, Japan and China respectively ratified the CWC on September 19, 1995, and April 25, 1997. When the convention entered into force on April 29, 1997, Japan assumed the obligation to destroy the ACWs in China, and China undertook to provide appropriate cooperation.

On July 30, 1999, the Japanese and Chinese governments signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Destruction of Japanese ACWs. Japan must pay all necessary costs to dispose of the ACWs and compensate further accidents.²¹

Some Japanese companies that contracted with Japan's government were investigated by the Tokyo Prosecutor for illegal expenditures.²² The vice minister of foreign affairs, Tetsuo Yano, a councillor of the Liberal Democratic Party, intervened in the tender for this project.²³

China also behaves outrageously. Regarding ACWs, China demanded that Japan construct a large-scale substation and heliport. The planned building sites are geopolitically important points because they were near Russia and North Korea. China might, therefore, eventually divert resources from the project to depositories or hangars for missile and weapons. Generally, a 1,000 kW substation is sufficient to dispose of 300,000–400,000 chemical weapons. However, China demanded a 50,000–70,000 kW substation. Roads around the facilities are sufficiently solid for several ten-ton tanks and armored cars to pass.²⁴

China also forced unreasonable demands on this project. Regarding the cutting of trees for development of building lots, China demanded US\$100 per white birch tree, despite its international market price of US\$2–3. Housing for workers was a luxurious 2LDK with swimming pool and sport gym. When Japanese staff needed just one bandaid, they were obligated to buy medical sets constituting three cardboard boxes. Moreover, the Chinese government dispatched medical staff including obstetricians and gynaecologists from Beijing. Japan was compelled to allay all of those costs.²⁵

China asserted the probable reserves of 2 million rounds of ACWs initially. Japan's government estimated 700,000 rounds. Magnetic investigations by Japanese officers revealed 300,000–400,000 rounds. Nevertheless, not all of those were ACWs. Conventional arms were likely included. At Japan's lower house standing committee on cabinet on October 19, the Japanese government revised probable reserves downward to 300,000–400,000 rounds. Japanese have atoned for the conflict between Japan and China. However, Japan's government cannot and must not believe or accept all of what the Chinese government asserts.

*Jiang's Unsuccessful Visit to Japan and
Communiqué in 1998*

Jiang's visit to Japan as a state guest was originally scheduled for September 1998. He had to put off that visit until November because of the deluge in Changchiang. Then, President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Kim Dae Jung paid an official visit to Japan as a state guest in October 7–10, 1998, earlier than Jiang Zemin's visit. During his stay in Japan, Kim Dae Jung held a meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan. The two leaders conducted an overall review of past relations between Japan and the ROK, reaffirmed the current friendly and cooperative relations, and exchanged views on how the relations between the two countries should be in the future. The Joint Declaration described:

President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea and Mrs. Kim paid an official visit to Japan as State Guests from 7 October 1998 to 10 October 1998. During his stay in Japan, President Kim Dae Jung held a meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan. The two leaders conducted an overall review of past relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, reaffirmed the current friendly and cooperative relations, and exchanged views on how the relations between the two countries should be in the future. As a result of the meeting, the two leaders declared their common determination to raise to a higher dimension the close, friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea which have been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century.

Looking back on the relations between Japan and the ROK during this century, Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the

past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.²⁶

After Japan's apology to Korea, China apparently expected a Japanese apology to China. Jiang's visit to Japan in 1998 failed diplomatically with respect to apology and partnership. After China's declaration of strategic partnership with Russia and the United States, Jiang offered to Japan that they would form a strategic partnership with Japan. However, Japan refused because Japan's strategic relationship might impinge upon the US-Japan alliance. Moreover, Japan refused to use "new words" on historical issues because the Obuchi administration and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not suggest Chinese intention. Obuchi is regarded as a pro-China politician. Nevertheless, Japan's government could not interpret the true intentions of China. Kim Dae Jung, as the president of ROK, promised NOT to bring up historical talk any longer. Japan's government wondered if China was prepared not to bring historical issues up anymore. Unless China parts with a history card, there will be no showdown. Because many voices rose in the Liberal Democratic Party to say that an "apology toward China has already been made," if Obuchi had made a concession toward China on the "apology," he might have lost his position in the Liberal Democratic Party.

Finally, no "apology" was specified in Japan-China Joint Declaration. Neither leader signed. Later, the unsigned communiqué was made public. The future of bilateral relations between Japan and China is full of difficulties. It might be symbolic that the creation of 1998 communiqué had troubles to the very last.

Yasukuni and Koizumi

Under the Koizumi administration, diplomatic relations between Japan and China foundered partly because of Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which hindered political bargaining and goodwill.²⁷ Koizumi had not missed his visit to Yasukuni Shrine every year since his first victory in an election of the House of Representatives in 1972.

The original structure now known as Yasukuni Shrine was established in Tokyo in 1869 by the Emperor Meiji. In 1879, it was renamed Yasukuni Shrine. Currently, about 2.4 million divinities are enshrined at Yasukuni. These divinities are souls of people who

have made ultimate sacrifice for Japan since 1853. Almost 5 million people visit Yasukuni Shrine every year since it is known as an institution for commemorating those who died in wars for the nation. Some Japanese people believe that their respect to and awe of the deceased is best expressed when appreciating that current peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the ultimate sacrifices they made. Therefore, at Yasukuni Shrine, rituals to dedicate appreciation to the deceased are repeated. Visiting Yasukuni in contemporary Japan is not praising a symbol of militarism.²⁸ Twice every year—in the spring and autumn—major rituals are conducted, on which occasion offerings from His Majesty the Emperor are dedicated to them,²⁹ although some Japanese people regard visitation of Yasukuni by the prime minister as unconstitutional in terms of Article 20.

Koizumi's prayer at Yasukuni was triggered by the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party. Koizumi made a promise to executives of the Military Pension League and Bereaved Family Association in April 2000 to offer a prayer at Yasukuni. However, Koizumi is likely to have considered the feelings of Korea and China on the matter. During the Koizumi administration, Koizumi visited Yasukuni, and he visited the shrine on August 13, 2001, on April 21 during the Annual Spring Festival Day (21–23) in 2002, New Year's Day in 2003 and 2004, October 17 during the Annual Autumn Festival (17–20) in 2005. His sole exception was August 15, 2006, in Koizumi's final term. Koizumi avoided visiting Yasukuni on August 15, the anniversary of the end of the World War II, considering the neighboring countries, including China, during 2001–2005. China remained critical even though Koizumi avoided visiting Yasukuni. Then, Koizumi judged that there was no difference whenever he might visit to Yasukuni. He visited Yasukuni on August 15 in his final year as prime minister. It was his severe criticism of China and Korea that they would not hold the summit meeting if he were to visit Yasukuni.

Yasukuni's visitation persists as a controversial issue for many Japanese as a matter of life and death by national wars. Not only war criminals but also war victims, who died for their nation, are enshrined there. Koizumi continued saying "they are a matter of soul and mental freedom"; "I cannot understand why visiting Yasukuni Shrine is criticized"; "what is wrong if the Prime Minister worships at the victims who passed away for the country."³⁰ He continued to explain that his visitation of Yasukuni Shrine was for the vow for

peace. Visiting Yasukuni Shrine implies neither following the right wing nor the revival of militarism. It is his feeling as a Japanese, beyond ideas or ideology.

Koizumi's feelings were expressed during the discourse of the fifty-sixth annual commemoration of the end of World War II. Koizumi held a press conference at Yasukuni on August 13, 2001.

I believe that Japan must never again proceed a path to war. Every year, before the souls of those who lost their lives in the battlefield while believing in the future of Japan in those difficult days, I have recalled that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the ultimate sacrifices they made, and renewed my vow for peace. I had thought that people of Japan and those of the neighbor countries would understand my belief if it was fully explained, and thus, after my assumption of office as prime minister, I expressed my wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15.

However, as the anniversary of the end of the war came closer, vocal debates have started at home and abroad as to whether I should visit Yasukuni Shrine. In the course of these debates, opinions requesting the cancellation of my visit to Yasukuni Shrine were voiced not only within Japan but also from other countries. It would be totally contrary to my wish, under these circumstances, if my visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 could, against my intention, lead people of neighboring countries to cast doubts on the fundamental policy of Japan of denying war and desiring peace. Taking seriously such situations both in and outside of Japan, I have made my own decision not to visit Yasukuni Shrine on that day, and I would like to choose another day for a visit.

As prime minister, I deeply regret withdrawing what I have once said. However, even if I have my own views on a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, I am now in a position to devote myself to my duty as prime minister, and to deal with various challenges, taking broad national interests into consideration.³¹

Koizumi offered his feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning not only to the Japanese but also the Chinese victims of the war. When Koizumi visited China by one day's trip on October 8, 2001, he visited the anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall at LUGOU Bridge in the Beijing suburbs. LUGOU Bridge was the ignition point of Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937.

For Koizumi, visiting Yasukuni was not a simple matter of just praying for the Japanese soul. It was also a matter of his reliability as

a politician. Koizumi could not avoid visiting Yasukuni merely based on China's pressure or pertinacity.³² As another means of worship, aggravation of Japan-China relations became much worse, making it impossible for Koizumi to retract.³³ Chinese aggressive pressure forced Koizumi to be stubborn.

The arrogant utterance of Chinese sounded humiliating to Japanese people, and greatly stimulated public opinion in Japan. After the foreign minister's talk on July 24 in Hanoi, the Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan severely told journalists in Japanese language that he "GENMEI," which means "assert" or "order strictly" "Japanese foreign minister Tanaka to stop Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine." Japanese media argued about his meaning of "GENMEI": whether it meant "assert" or "order strictly." When the commanding tone of the Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan was broadcast on television, public opinion of Japan was stimulated.

In addition, during election, Japanese electors had been repeatedly shown a television commercial that states that "Koizumi does not make promises that he cannot keep." Generally politicians are regarded as "persons who tell lies insensitively". However, one reason for Koizumi's enduring popularity was that he was expected not to tell lies, unlike old-type politicians. If he did not go to Yasukuni, Japanese electors might think Koizumi could not enforce structural reforms and overthrow of vested rights and interests in Japan.

Furthermore, it was a matter of interference in domestic affairs.³⁴ If Koizumi stopped worshipping, he would have been criticized for yielding to Chinese pressure.³⁵ Quoting a Chinese scholar's words, *Sankei Shimbun* pointed out the reason behind Koizumi having changed worship of the end of the war anniversary, which showed Chinese influence although it could not be hailed as "the huge victory of Chinese diplomacy."³⁶

Many Japanese knew that the fundamental factors aggravating Japan-China relations were not only historical matters but also other political issues, such as Taiwan, reform of the UN Security Council, and arms embargo on China by the EU.³⁷

It can be said that Koizumi manipulated the political performance skillfully. According to the NHK TV program "Japan in Asia" aired on August 15, 2006, the question about the shrine visits was posed to the public. The percentage of approval was 72 and the percentage of disapproval was 28 among respondents in their twenties and thirties. However, the percentages of approval and disapproval were almost equal for people in their fifties and sixties. Koizumi might have had

to sacrifice domestic support if he had submitted to China's demand to forego his visit to Yasukuni.

Regarding political bargaining, Koizumi is inferred to have had two intentions. One was a strategy toward China, the other was a domestic tactic. Regarding the strategy related to China, perhaps Koizumi sought to send a message to China through many visitations to Yasukuni Shrine that historical issues could not be used further as Chinese political instruments. In addition to his foreign aims, he had a domestic aim of becoming the president of the Liberal Democratic Party and carrying out privatization of the postal service. Koizumi had an experience of election defeat in 1969 after his father's sudden death. The special post offices had supported his grandfather and father. However, in the 1969 election, the special post offices started to support Seiichi Tagawa, who had served as the New Liberal Club representative later. At the time, Koizumi hated the special post offices. The local volunteers had offered the special offices in private since Japan's postal system began. About three-fourth of all post offices were special ones that existed before the postal service privatization.

At the time of the 2001 election, Ryutaro Hashimoto was an extremely influential lawmaker in the postal department. The largest institution of supporters for the Liberal Democratic Party was *TAIJU*, which was a Special Post Office Chief Association. The *TAIJU* members were 239,651. The construction industry, the second largest institution, had 182,526 members. The third largest, the Military Pension League (*GUNONREN*), had 154,592 members, 124,056 in the Nurse league, 115,189 in the Medical Association among the total 2,369,252 members of the Liberal Democratic Party. Koizumi, therefore, had to keep his promises related to Yasukuni simply to gain the Yasukuni-related votes to become prime minister.

None of the prime ministers has visited Yasukuni since Koizumi's retirement. Yet, the reason is not only for reconstructing Japan-China relations but also for fearing an impact on Japan-US relations. In the final year of the Koizumi administration, several Japanese opinion leaders advised caution because the Yasukuni issue was a controversial one not only with Asian countries but also with the United States, producing anxiety about an anti-American historical view of Yasukuni by American leaders such as Henry John Hyde, Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr., and Kurt M. Campbell, and newspapers such as the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*.³⁸

Discontinuance of Yen Loans to China

Under the Koizumi administration, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was reexamined. Eventually, Japan's government decided to change the ODA policy toward China and stop yen loans.

China embarked on its Open and Reform Policy in December 1978, and requested the provision of yen loans in 1979. In response, Prime Minister Ohira committed during his visit to China in December 1979 that Japan would provide ODA to China. This decision was based on the idea that support for China's Open and Reform Policy would benefit not only the stability and prosperity of China and Japan, but also that of the entire Asian region. Japanese ODA to China as a whole, mainly through yen loans, has contributed to the extraordinary development that China has achieved.

ODA toward China has been one pillar of Japan-China relations. Yen loans to China changed the Chinese hardlined diplomatic posture against the United States. According to US ambassador James Lily at the time, Fang Lizhi and his wife were protected by the US Embassy in Beijing immediately after the Tiananmen Square Massacre and left for Britain.³⁹ That protection and conveyance were negotiated by Japan's government using the yen loan program as a political tool.

Regarding yen loans, which occupied a great share of Japan's ODA, in March 2005, the Japanese government made a decision to halt new loan supply by the fiscal year 2008. By 2007, the total amount of the yen loans amounted to 3,208 billion yen, and came to account for 91.5 percent of all ODA.

Two clearly different points from the ODA criticism arose in the 1990s. First, the criticism on ODA to China increased in Japan when examining long-term plans not like temporary stops for Tiananmen Square Massacre or nuclear tests. Second, the US element was huge. Anxiety persisted about China's progress to military expansion further against Missile Defense (MD), which the United States promoted. After the US Congress showed their concern publicly that Japan's ODA supported Chinese resources and technology of military activities, Japan's Diet immediately began to reconsider ODA to China.

The ODA Charter generally stipulates the principles of Japan's ODA as considering each recipient country's request, its socio-economic conditions, and Japan's bilateral relations with the recipient country comprehensively. Japan's ODA will be provided in

accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the following principles.

1. Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
2. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.
3. Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missiles, their export and import of arms, and so on.
4. Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.

Chinese military assistance for Iraq triggered Japan's ODA reduction to China. On February 16, 2001, the US-Britain Air Force bombed the construction of optical fiber cable that connected an underground control center to five commanders and communication institutions as air defense bases in Baghdad.⁴⁰ Then, the Foreign Relations Committee of US Senate announced the start of investigation of the strong possibility that China had violated an export ban for Iraq instituted by the UN, and that China had provided Iraq with materials and technology, and that Japan's ODA had been used for the technology and funding of the optical fiber by China.

Consequently, questions arose from all sides as to whether Japan had the necessity of continuing ODA toward China. In the Investigation Committee on International Problems of the House of Councillors on April 8, 2002, a committee submitted that China was going to provide loans to Pakistan for constructing harbor facilities in Gwadar.⁴¹ At the Upper House's Diplomacy & Defense Committee on May 11, 2003, a committee pointed out that most of Japan's ODA to China was turned to Chinese military expenditures, and that China had given economic aid to Asian neighbors and African countries. After China succeeded in launching its manned spacecraft "*Shenzhou 5*" on October 15, 2003, voices rose increasingly in favor of halting ODA to China.

In March 2008 governments of Japan and China reached an outline of an agreement to stop supplying new yen loans to China in the 2008 fiscal year. At a press conference after a National People's Congress in March 2008, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao emphasized

that he wanted Japan also to promote China-Japan friendship. Then he presented three principles underlying China's policy to Japan: (1) to promote mutual exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries; (2) to start jointly the strategic research for friendship by both countries' diplomatic authorities; (3) to settle historical issues suitably. "To settle historical issues suitably" does not mean merely to halt visits to Yasukuni by a premier. It is said that many Chinese have the view that Japan's ODA to China is postwar compensation.

Japan's Policy for EU Plans to Lift Weapons Embargoes on China

Most European and American Japanologists and Sinologists tend to discuss the major factor of the anti-Japan demonstration of China in 2005 as Koizumi's visitation of Yasukuni. However, such views are too rash. Economic policy, US policy, and security policy are always latent in the politicization of the historical issues between Japan and China. The Koizumi administration's cooperative policy to the US policy in the EU's planning to lift military embargo to China was a crucial element.

During Chinese anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005, the Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing did not respond to the apology and insisted that the Chinese government had never done anything to apologize to the Japanese, and that the Japanese were using current important issues of Taiwan, human rights, and history to hurt Chinese.

"Japanese were hurting Chinese by human rights issues" was a reference to the Japanese government's cooperation with the US government's appeal for European governments not to lift weapons embargo after the Tiananmen Massacre.⁴² At a press conference on March 31, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized both the United States and Japan because the EU did not lift the arms embargo to China easily because of pressure from the United States and Japan. This statement was read on the Japanese language version of Renmin Ribao's website, not in its English version. The Bush administration continued warning the EU that lifting the arms embargo for China by the EU would send the wrong signal to China. Modernization and arms build-up of the Chinese military might be accelerated at an early pace if the arms embargo for China by the EU were lifted. It would influence the security environment in Asia.

“Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”

President Hu Jintao of the PRC made an official visit to Japan as a state guest during in May 6–10, 2008. During his visit to Japan, President Hu and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda reached a common understanding on various points related to the comprehensive promotion of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” and issued a joint statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.

The two sides recognized that the Japan-China relationship is an important bilateral relationship for the two countries and that Japan and China have great influence on and bear a solemn responsibility for peace, stability, and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. They also recognized that the two countries’ sole option is to cooperate to enhance peace and friendship over the long term. The two sides resolved to promote a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests comprehensively and to achieve the noble objectives of peaceful coexistence, friendship for generations, mutually beneficial cooperation, and common development for their two nations.

The Japanese side expressed its positive evaluation of China’s development since the start of reform and open policy, saying that China’s development has offered great opportunities for international community including Japan. The Japanese side stated its support of China’s resolve to contribute to the building of a world that fosters lasting peace and common prosperity. The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan’s consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan’s contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than nearly 70 years since the end of World War II. The two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue and communication on the issue of UN reform and to work toward mutually enhancing the common understanding on this matter. The Chinese side assigns importance to Japan’s position and role in the UN and desires that Japan play an even greater constructive role in the international community. Both sides stated that they would resolve bilateral issues through consultations and negotiations. Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communiqué of the government of Japan and the government of the PRC.

Both sides resolved to cooperate together while building frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and to cooperate together based on the following five pillars: (1) enhancement of mutual trust in the political area; (2) promotion of people-to-people and cultural exchange as well as sentiments of friendship between the people of Japan and China; (3) enhancement of mutually beneficial cooperation; (4) contribution to the Asia-Pacific region; and (5) contribution to the resolution of global issues.

Democratic Party's Drifting China policy: 2009–mid-2012

The Democratic Party is a hodgepodge group of politicians from the left wing to the right wing of Japan's political spectrum. Therefore, its foreign policies are based on no particular principle and no agreement in the Cabinet. It is said that Japan's Democratic Party comprises several clusters that are diplomatic amateurs' groups. It published the following basic policy on diplomacy and national security in the website.

We seek to establish Japan as a world leader in diplomacy which realizes security and independence in harmony with the common good of the international community. While continuing the defense policy in accordance with the Constitution's pacifism, we shall develop independence and dynamism in Japanese diplomacy with a realistic and flexible consciousness and strategy.⁴³

From this basic policy, one discerns that the Democratic Party pursued Japan's independence from the United States initially when the Democratic Party came to power.

The Hatoyama administration had no concrete regional or global strategy. Hatoyama might not have realized Japan's position in the trio configuration of the United States, China, and Japan. Hatoyama often described that Japan would act "as a mediator between the United States and Asia." On September 28, 2009, Okada told the Chinese foreign minister that Japan wanted to be "a coordinator between the US and Asia." However, neither the United States nor China regards Japan's political capability as that of a mediator.

Hatoyama set Japan-China relations as a priority matter of Japan's foreign policy. Hatoyama proposed that China make a "sea of friendship (*yuai no umi*)" of the East China Sea. However, he never took appropriate measures to resolve the controversial Senkaku issue, situated in that "sea of friendship."

The prime minister and the foreign minister had been extolling different views of the world. Both their designs of East Asia Community (EAC) were unsubstantial. The feature of Hatoyama's concept was establishing the system of common economic and social cooperation and the system of collective security in Asia. A great discrepancy arose between Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada with respect to the EAC. Hatoyama presented the EAC structure as including the United States, but Okada did so without the United States. The EAC that Hatoyama draws was premised on changing the Japan-US relations and the role of a Japan-US alliance while commitment by the United States was indispensable. Hatoyama explained to the ROK that the core countries were ROK and Japan, which jointly possessed equivalent values of democracy. However, he emphasized to China that it was important to accumulate common points while considering mutual differences. Hatoyama's conception of the EAC had been based on the integrative model of EU. However, Asian countries have never held the same philosophy, values, religion, lifestyles, or security interests. Hatoyama has never had an idea of which country enjoys estrangement between Japan and the United States: it must be China.

The Japanese general public was unable to realize what on earth Hatoyama wanted to do. Diplomacy by the Hatoyama administration made the US-Japan alliance fragile. Hatoyama wielded great influence by Ichiro Ozawa, who used to insist on a "theory of trigonometric functions" involving the United States, China, and Japan, namely equidistance diplomacy among the trio. Hatoyama never presented how he considered Japan's security issue after Japan and the United States became estranged by "equidistance diplomacy."

Regarding the Kan administration, Naoto Kan had always assigned priority to domestic political situations rather than diplomacy. The incident on September 7, 2010, the Chinese ship collision incident, strongly compelled Japanese to change their view toward China. Japan's principal policy line toward China had been based on liberalist engagement policy up to that point. Yet, it broke Japanese confidence not only with respect to China but also Japan's government. Many Japanese finally realized that liberalist engagement is ineffective in light of China's offensive posture against Japan.

However, Kan commanded the release of the Chinese captain because Kan worried that Hu Jintao might not come to Yokohama APEC if Japan continued to detain the Chinese captain. At the Japan Upper House Standing Committee on Audit on October 18, 2010,

Kazuya Maruyama, a councillor of the Liberal Democratic Party and lawyer, clarified the contents of telephone conversations with the chief cabinet secretary Yoshito Sengoku. Immediately after Japan released the Chinese captain with disposal suspension, Maruyama raised the objection that Japan should deport him after induction and judgment. Then Sengoku said the Yokohama APEC would vanish if Japan's government did not do so. Maruyama immediately replied that releasing him was a national loss. Subsequently, Maruyama talked about his anxiety that Japan would be a dependency of China in the future. Sengoku refuted Maruyama's anxiety and stated that Japan was already subject to China. Sengoku answered that the talk of Maruyama was a lie in a committee.⁴⁴ However, according to *Sankei's* scoop, the Chinese captain was released with disposal suspension because of the political judgment by Prime Minister Kan and the Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku.⁴⁵

The Noda administration parted from the concept of Hatoyama's EAC. Noda's power base was vulnerable. Therefore, political power stability was expected to be the core purpose for Noda. Noda was often described as a puppet of the United States or bulldog of the Ministry of Finance. The Noda administration had no diplomatic ideals. Noda had sought to remain in the prime minister's position by satisfying demands by the United States and the Ministry of Finance to the greatest extent possible after he came to office. Then, his foreign policy toward China was restraining China under the United States' "Pivot."

While the Japanese presence in the Asia-Pacific region declined, the Japanese government groped for the vision that attains strengthening of ties with the Asia-Pacific region. In January 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda tried to produce a policy that advocates the new diplomatic maneuver "Pacific Ocean Charter."⁴⁶ "Pacific Ocean charter" builds comprehensive rule, such as continuous economic development of the Asia-Pacific region to break away from the "East Asian Community" concept by the Yukio Hatoyama administration. This concept, which uses the APEC framework, is designed to attain strengthening of ties of the whole Asia-Pacific region with both wheels of economy and a security.

To give a concrete example in the economic milieu, this concept expanded the framework of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and develops it into the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) until 2020. In the security milieu, it was a concept that tries to build a comprehensive framework based on international law related to freedom

of navigation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and so on, and to draw China and Russia in the multilateral framework based on Japan-US alliance. Prime Minister Noda was going to call out at the APEC summit meeting held in Vladivostok in Russia in September 2012. However, he didn't call out. The Pacific Ocean Charter must be difficult to carry out. Japan has no diplomatic capability by which it can enjoy leadership in regional security. Moreover, no economic framework of the Pacific Ocean Charter exists that makes TPP the economic architecture in which neighboring countries cannot cooperate with Japan.

Noda looked only at the United States, as Koizumi once did.

Democratic Party Misunderstanding of Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests

After September 2010, senior officials of the Kan administration repeated a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests. Tragically, the Democratic Party has never realized the concept and meaning of mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.

Ex-Premier Shinzo Abe asserted that the Democratic Party had never realized the meaning of mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.⁴⁷ Later, this concept was posed at the Summit between Abe and Hu Jintao on October 8, 2006, to improve the Japan-China relationship, which had deteriorated during the Koizumi administration. Then, a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests was based on the Japan-China Joint Press Statement issued when Premier Wen Jiabao of the PRC made an official visit to Japan from April 2007. China and Japan agreed to a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests between Yasuo Fukuda and Hu Jintao on May 7, 2008. While proposing a “win-win policy”—mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, the key word in Japan-China relations changed from friendship to mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests. Under friendship diplomacy, Japan must strive for friendship despite its surrendering of national interests. However, China considers the China-Japan relationship as based on its strategy and national interests. Then, Abe proposed his new ideas for the purpose that the Japan-China relationship contributes to mutual interests, stability, and development

in the world. A mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests means a political philosophy “to restart” the Japan-China relationship, which had become quite complicated during the Koizumi administration.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The first section of this chapter presented two main points. The first point, the most important among the processes of power shift in Asia, is the relative decline of the United States as a unipolar power and that of Japan as a major economic power while China's rising. The second is that the United States' and Japan's decline and China's rise have also altered the consciousness of ASEAN countries' people and Americans. China has become the most indispensable for Japanese economic growth in the status quo. In this context, the importance of China for the Japanese economy has increased dramatically and extremely. Although many troubling issues persist between China and Japan, Japan has neither the option of quarrelling nor that of deteriorating in relations with China.

The second section of this chapter described Japanese perceptions, expectations, and anxieties related to China in the changing architecture of trilateralism. This reflects the duality between the threat posed by Chinese aggression and expectations of economic opportunities. Although most Japanese people feel anxiety about Chinese antagonism against Japanese, economic interactions between Japan and China have multiplied dramatically. As a countermeasure against Chinese ambition, Japan must recognize its role as a supporter of a US-led system to restrict Chinese ambitious expansion. However, Japan must grope for and grasp economic opportunities with rising China. Under such a duality between security and economy, Japan is facing difficulties within a complicated triangle. Japanese supporters' roles of the US-led system and the United States' dominant role in Asia have been modified in the context of rising China. Regarding China, which is an important economic partner, it has annoyed Japan by its strong antagonism and a controversial territorial dispute. Regarding the United States, which is an important ally, Japan has controversial issues related to Okinawa and the unequal Status of Forces Agreement that has violated Japanese human rights. Japan has serious troubles with both strong countries, but it can oppose neither of them.

Japanese difficulties arise not only because of duality between security and economy but also because of duality of the United States'

hedge strategy between a policy of containing China and a policy of cooperating with China: the United States' pivot strategy. That is, the United States enhances its cooperative relationship with China while the United States uses Japan as a political instrument to contain China. Japan is placed in a quandary, wondering whether the United States protects Japan from the Chinese threat by the US-Japan alliance or whether the United States, which is now reducing defense expenditures, only receives immense finance help from Japan and does not protect Japan. Indeed, the Security Consultative Committee Document US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" on October 29, 2005, described that "Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as invasion of remote islands."⁴⁹ It is too optimistic to trust the Japan-US alliance unequivocally.

The third section of this chapter examined Japanese policy toward China. Chinese economic development has supported its military expansion. China's rise, both economically and militarily, has altered international relations in Asia. Then, the changing configuration of relations between China and the United States has strongly influenced the Japanese policy direction toward China. Japan has shifted policy related to China from a liberalist view to a realist view: from friendship diplomacy to engagement and a balancing policy since the United States turned its strategic line toward China. Japan changed the core policy direction of the Japan-US alliance from Japan's security and Far Eastern emergency to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region to adapt to the changing regional security environment. The United States also affects Japanese economic policy, and even Japanese ODA. Since China used historical issues as political tools in the 1990s, they have become not only bilateral issues of Japanese expiation but also have come to constitute compound problems with Chinese military expansion, Chinese economic and military assistance toward the third world including Iraq and Pakistan, and its inconspicuous purposes which have impacted US global military strategies.

Between rising China, which is a latent threat with strong antagonism against Japan but which carries immense economic opportunity, and the economically acquisitive United States, which is an indispensable foundation of Japan's security but which is insufficiently reliable to protect Japan from Chinese aggression, Japan is facing a troubled triangle with worrisome situations posed by China and with fear of abandonment by the United States.

Notes

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 28. When a silent prayer for the dead is offered at noon of August 15, the anniversary of the end of the World War II, worshippers respect the dead and offer their silent prayers. However, at the speech of the emperor in Budohkan next to Yasukuni, some worshippers recently have begun to leave Yasukuni. They come to Yasukuni just for their prayer.
 29. Yasukuni Shrine; <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/index.html> (Accessed December 1, 2011).
 30. Koizumi repeatedly testified in parliament and mentioned the matter at press conferences.
 31. Prime Minister's official residence; <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0813danwa.html> (Accessed December 1, 2011).
 32. On August 2, 2006, a Japanese nonprofit institution *GENRON* NPO and Beijing University made an announcement about their cooperative opinion poll.

The majority of Chinese respondents answered that they could not admit Japanese politicians' visit to Yasukuni Shrine even if A-class war criminals were enshrined separately.

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