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# Foreseeing Perspective (Voir pour Prévoir)

Takashi Inoguchi

## INTRODUCTION

A foreseeing perspective is often shared by practitioners. Jesper Koll, a researcher and investor based in Tokyo, put forward his 10 outlier scenarios for 2019 on January 1, 2019. Here are some of them: (1) Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe convinces China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership; (2) the United States moves from a trade war to a currency war as the Federal Reserve is forced to cut US interest rates; (3) the Liberal Democratic Party establishes a ‘no more tax hikes’ policy; (4) Japan’s public and private pension funds commit 1 trillion yen to a joint incubator fund; (5) a peaceful invasion of Taiwan is launched with 100,000 Chinese arriving by boat to settle there; and (6) a ‘flying car’ shuttle service for the 2020 Olympic medal winners is announced by the Tokyo governor and Toyota (Koll, 2019). Instead of listing 10 events that are most likely to take place, he is smart to lead readers toward thinking about events that he thinks will be least likely, thus preparing readers to be consciously sensitized about them. His foreseeing perspective befits the era of complexity and unpredictability, which are widely said to be the two key features of international relations in the 21st century. This chapter, however, shows the more academic way of foreseeing international relations, with four variants: (1) statistics, (2) scenarios, (3) extrapolations, and (4) narratives. One may say that academic foreseeing exercises can be rigorous but also either boring or incomprehensible, or both, in comparison to those done by business- and political-risk consultants. Oftentimes, that may be true. But I may dare to say that academics have strengths; I am fond of citing two cases that I use in

my undergraduate-course lectures. First is the use of statistical models. In spring 1977 the Soviet–Japanese fishery-catch negotiations were under way. I presented my two models of predicting the agreed amount of salmon catch in 1977 to some 200 academic audiences in Tokyo. I used statistical models, a regression model, and a state space model. Two weeks after my presentation, government negotiations reached an agreement between the two countries of Japan and the Soviet Union. My two models turned out to be the best predictions of it. Some of the academic audiences expressed either uneasiness with model prediction or dislike of the negotiation adversary. Two articles on different prediction models were published in different academic journals called *International Organization* and *Behavioral Science* in 1978 and 1979, respectively. Newspaper reports were full of emotional sentiments about the negotiation results and estimates that were without rigorous logics. Second is the use of scenarios. In 1988, I published my article on four scenarios of the future of international affairs (London). It spelled out its logics in terms of the four scenarios' feasibility and probability: (1) Pax Americana, (2) Bigeminy (the United States and Japan), (3) Pax Consortis (scenario of many consortia where major actors forge coalitions to make policy adjustments and agreements among themselves), and (4) Pax Nipponica (when nuclear weapons arsenals are neutralized). The *Economist* magazine spent a few pages focusing on my *International Affairs* article.

Chapter 4 puts forward one of the intellectual traditions of international relations that has not been conventionally treated as a major-league member, sort of. This is in part because of different academic disciplinary origins such as history of medieval Italy, sociology of enlightenment in 19th-century France, and philosophy of policy science of 20th-century America, and in part also because it has been slightly misunderstood as methods rather than as an academic orientation across substantive academic disciplines.

I examine some conceptual and methodological issues in terms of how I have coped with difficulties of gauging and foreseeing international relations. There are four groups: (1) statistical methods, (2) multiple scenarios, (3) strategic orientation fixated and extrapolated, and (4) self-transformative evolutions. More specifically and narrowly, the 'statistical methods' used in this chapter are regression equation analysis and state space equation modelling. The multiple scenarios refer to brain simulations with key variables and parameters variantly specified as options. Strategic orientation fixated and extrapolated is the orientation by which to make the best use of human inertia and idleness and estimate what will happen. By self-transformative evolutions, I mean the context-highlighting evolutions of key variables and parameters with narratives in mind. In other words, (1) statistics, (2) scenarios, (3) extrapolations, and (4) narratives are used. Some concepts and methods deployed in international relations are more specific than some academics would like to see.

Lastly, I want to note that Chapter 4 is indispensable in examining and gauging Asian foreign policy, because in the first quarter of the 21st century we witness

that Asia and Asian foreign policy are changing fast and in a most dynamic way. Yet, much of the works on foreseeing perspective focus on the Western world. Oftentimes, those who are interested in what would be perceived as uncertain, unpredictable, or unfathomable in the non-Western world seem to base their judgment on pride and prejudice, as Westerners who possess few works with a foreseeing perspective about the non-Western world – especially Asia.

## STATISTICAL METHODS

Key components used in statistical models are concepts, variables, analytic methods, and, most importantly, the broadly correct relationships among them. Since their relationships are examined by statistical methods, caution is exercised about the interpretation of causality: a concept not-so-easy to establish.

### ***The Politics of Decrementalism (Inoguchi & Miyatake, 1978)***

In the latter half of the 20th century, a new ocean order emerged. Here, I examine the Soviet–Japanese fishery negotiations in the broader context of emerging ocean politics and the competition between many states to assert themselves by extending control over the sea to secure rights to maritime resources and consequently protect them. I examine the case of annual bilateral fishing negotiations between the then two largest fishing powers – Japan and the former Soviet Union – in the period 1956 to 1977, to provide insights into likely patterns of conflict and resolution. I attempt to construct a model by which the annual quota on salmon and ocean trout is sequentially predicted by state variables, or lagged endogenous variables, using the state space equations of modern control theory (Zadeh and Desoer, 1963).

The core feature of those negotiations was the politics of decrementalism. Incrementalism is when in organizational decision-making, such as budgeting, adding an increment to the budget of the previous year is the basis of the budget for the subsequent year; decrementalism is just the opposite of incrementalism (Wildavsky, 1964).

Potential conflict factors were more or less suppressed in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan and helped to create a structurally stable environment for negotiations; high politics were left out. Based on this insight, I propose that the dominant characteristics of the negotiations should be classified as the politics of decrementalism.

There are three implications for conflict resolution in the context of bilateral negotiations in the emerging world ocean order. (1) The basic conflict management process is more bilateral than universal or multilateral, due to the prevalence of a unilateral approach in ocean rule-making. (2) Bilateral arrangements

vary as any UN Laws of the Sea are unable to provide specific and concrete guidelines for individual maritime conflicts, precisely due to the universality and comprehensiveness of international maritime laws. (3) In the sphere of fishery negotiations, accommodation of fishery states by coastal states will be made insofar as similar conditions for decremental politics are encountered in other bilateral fishing situations, leading to the politics of decrementalism accelerating.

The predictive performance from the Soviet–Japan fishery negotiations showed the potential for conflict resolution between the two countries to be fairly predictable and that largely pragmatic conflict management would basically prevail in the bilateral relationship. The security considerations of both countries may at times be a disturbing factor and a source of some uncertainty, especially given the US military’s commitment to the region.

The relevance of this research to general systems theory should be unambiguous. Decremental politics is played as an adjustment process among bilateral subsystems. When a certain number of conditions are encountered – such as the depletion of resources, the common commitment to the same principle, the asymmetrical relationship in commitment to and control over resources, and the institutionalized setting for decision – decremental politics is observed.

### ***Negotiation as Quasi-Budgeting (Inoguchi & Miyatake, 1979)***

The study of international negotiations has been one of the most elusive topics for an empirically testable formal analysis, in part because it is not always easy to obtain empirical data on the bargaining processes and outcomes in negotiations and on the internal motives that influence the decisions. It is often believed that only after those involved in the negotiations speak out and public documents are released can one understand the full scope of international negotiations. I argue that certain types of negotiations can be modeled on the basis of publicly available data, such as official publications and newspapers. I construct a simple model of negotiations, drawing some insights from the study of budgeting.

Again, our focus is on Soviet–Japanese salmon-catch negotiations (1955–1977). I propose that such bilateral interactions can be effectively conceptualized as a type of quasi-budgeting, with one state playing the role of a quasi-requester and the other state engaging as a quasi-appropriator. Similar to budgeting, negotiation outcomes contain a certain level of predictability; that is, outcomes feature small-scale changes. In these negotiations, Japan requests in the Soviet-dominated sea an amount of the salmon catch, and the Soviet Union in turn makes an ‘appropriation’ on it. Both states base their calculations mostly on previous experiences of quota determination.

I employ the Japanese–Soviet salmon-catch negotiations to demonstrate that a similar kind of analysis could be successfully applied to other types of issues

and thus could be methodologically generalizable. The 'request-appropriation' dynamics can be found in many bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The roles in the request-appropriation analogy are less sharp and more complicated than those of the fishery negotiations but still involve a repeated adjustment process comparable to the budgetary process.

From these examples, the potential to generalize from the proposed framework can be applied to other policy areas. To do so, three qualities are required for the application of the quasi-budgeting framework, as it enables researchers to identify the social interactions that can be conceived of as quasi-budgeting. First, the relationship between the actor making the request and the actor receiving the request (who has the power to appropriate) must take the demand seriously. Second, the interaction occurs in a (quasi-) institutional setting, and then a bilateral, or even multilateral, discussion and negotiation unfolds. Third, at least one aspect of the negotiation process and one aspect of the negotiation outcomes is quantifiable.

In the theory of budgeting, the process is conceived as an internal bureaucratic process. Negotiations must have five major features in this framework. (1) An asymmetry of commitment; that is, one actor/state mostly controls the area and resources and the other actor/state focuses on one segment, avoiding other more contentious issues. In the Soviet–Japan salmon-quota negotiations, the Soviet Union controlled the Northwest Pacific area and Japan was intent only on discussing fishery issues. (2) The organizational task is continued and repeated, similarly to budgeting. Every year, Japan and the Soviet Union engaged in reaching an annual definition of the maximum sustainable yield of salmon. (3) Technocrats, bureaucrats, and specialists are usually the most involved in the negotiations, as the work is generally about highly technical and practical matters. In budgeting, bureaucrats are also delegated the detailed work. (4) Relative independence in decision-making is a quality of both the Soviet–Japanese Fishery Commission and budgetary offices. These bodies in the Soviet Union and Japan enjoy a relative level of autonomy in making decisions, although parliament and congress, respectively, are given final appropriation. (5) The member composition of the Fishery Commission was relatively fixed and stable, leading to a similar sense of community that is experienced by national-budget offices.

To use Etzioni's (1964) concept, the Japanese–Soviet fishery negotiations became an 'encapsulated conflict'. The then two largest fishery powers found a mutual interest in the regional fishery regime. Political conflicts were internalized, and the negotiations mostly took on a tone of a routine ritual.

The intent of this analysis is to show that various negotiations can be submitted to an empirically testable formal analysis. Cognizant that more than one approach may explain the same issue, the quasi-budgeting framework is but one method. What is critical is the ability of the framework to competently explain and/or predict, depending on the intent of study.

### ***US Foreign Policy and Global Opinion (Goldsmith, Horiuchi & Inoguchi, 2005)***

International opinion is significant in the success or failure of a power's foreign policy. I present a theoretical framework and an empirical analysis of factors that affect global public opinion toward US foreign policy in the U-led war in Afghanistan (Goldsmith et al., 2005). The source of public opinion analysis was a cross-national survey of 63 countries with 60,000 respondents, conducted by the Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001, as the war unfolded in Afghanistan. In analyzing the data, the emphasis is on collective public opinion over individual public opinion of a single country (Page and Shapiro, 1992).

For the general theoretical framework, I propose three models of global public opinion: interests, socialization, and influence. The interest model, which is most consistent with realist theories of international relations and the pursuit of power by states, assumes that publics are cognizant of 'material' interest at the state level. Perceptions are also critical; to evaluate perceptions of mass publics, the second model of socialization is needed. Here, the focus is on beliefs, values, and expectations of politics. Socialization occurs through shared historical experiences and social factors, such as democracy, religion, and economic development. These factors fall under the umbrellas of political culture, which some argue is the most critical framework for appreciating the impact of cultural factors on foreign policy (Duffield, 1999). The third model is the model of influence. The underlying assumption of the model is that states seek to influence foreign public opinion to their advantage. The interest model is based on existing theoretical frameworks, particularly second-image reversed (Gourevitch, 1978) and two-level games (Putnam, 1988).

The dependent variable of real interest in the survey data is global public opinion about US foreign policy, but one single variable or factor cannot measure this concept. Instead, I look to the responses to four different survey questions during the US-led Afghan war, to serve as indicators of either explicit support for the targeted foreign policy or general levels of trust in the United States during the crisis. The four questions ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with US action in Afghanistan, whether their country should support US action in Afghanistan, which is the most concerning aspect of the war (seven choices given with civilian bombing as one), and whether respondents are concerned that the war against terrorism, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden will develop into a more general war against Islam. For the first two questions and the last question, 'don't know' was also a possible answer.

Using hypotheses derived from the three models of interest, socialization, and influence, and then testing them with the results of regressions and summary statistics of all independent variables that came from the survey data, we arrive at the following conclusion: shared military interests and economic interests between a country and the United States do not necessarily indicate support of

that public toward US foreign policy. Security cooperation among non-NATO allies can also prompt a backlash. This result stands in contrast to the versions of realism that assume that national leaders can easily manipulate foreign policy. Yet, it re-affirms the theories that view public opinion as independent of foreign policy issues. These theories include the rational-public approach (Page and Shapiro, 1992) and the liberal peace literature (Hobson, 2018).

Socialized factors are critical – that is, one’s experience with terrorism and the present size of the Muslim population in a community. The socialized values, beliefs, and perceptions do not always indicate public opinion but are context dependent and vary according to the policy. This points to a complex and context-dependent relationship between global opinion and international relations.

In terms of influence, while economic aid bears little impact on public opinion, the United States’ ability to transmit its ‘message’ carries mild indicators of impact. The ability of US media to penetrate foreign spheres of public information dispersal through airwaves and written media does positively increase support for its role in the Afghan war. The opportunity for transnational influence on public opinion supports the theoretical frameworks advanced by two-level games and second-image reversed.

Transnational factors impact the dynamics of international relations. In a complex world, a dominant state can gain support internationally but not always in line with state-level interests or the parameters of political culture. An examination of global opinion toward US foreign policy and its war in Afghanistan fit Keohane and Nye’s (1977) concept of ‘complex interdependence’ in describing the international relations of the world. Although Keohane and Nye’s (1977) analysis does not deal specifically with the international dynamics of public opinion, global public opinion and how it might be incorporated into their framework is a future research priority.

## **MULTIPLE SCENARIOS**

The keys to multiple scenarios are focused variables and competing evolution. Multiple scenarios are contrasted with each other, with the same but also different initial conditions and the same but also different parameters influencing evolutions. The beauty of multiple scenarios enables readers to understand contrasting evolutions with given initial conditions.

### ***Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future (Inoguchi, 1988/89)***

In this investigation, I present four Japanese scenarios of a future world system based over the next 25–50 years. These Japanese ‘visions of the future’ (Inoguchi, 1987) represent differing views on the future of global development,



the distribution of economic and military power, and institutions for peace and development.

The first scenario is *Pax Americana*, Phase II. The United States would retain its leading position and would continue to forge a 'balanced' or globalist view of the Western alliance. It would lead the regimes (rules and practices in international interest adjustment) and control the direction of world development (Krasner, 1983). Japan's role in this setting is relatively unchanged; Japan would focus on its economic role and the United States would shoulder the bulk of global security.

The second scenario is termed *Bigemony*. The term, coined by C. Fred Bergsten (1976), denotes the primordial importance of the United States and Japan in managing the world economy. The Japanese image of this future focuses almost exclusively on US–Japan relations, leaving Europeans, Asians, and others in the Third World outside of the power dynamic. Japan's role in this *Bigemony* scenario is similar to that proposed in *Pax Americana*, Phase II, with the strong acknowledgment that economic power will inevitably become military power. How Japan's economic power is to transform into military power needs close attention.

The third scenario is *Pax Consortis*. In this future world, no single actor dominates the others. The world is composed of many consortia in which the major actors forge coalitions to make policy adjustments and agreements among themselves. This scenario resembles *Pax Americana* with its regimes and 'cooperation under anarchy'. The difference between the first and third scenarios is in the pluralistic nature of the policy adjustments among the major actors in *Pax Consortis*. In this third scenario, Japan's role is two-fold: (1) forging coalitions and shaping policy adjustments among peers, in which no one is dominant through primarily quiet economic diplomacy; (2) helping to create a world free from military solutions, through massive economic-aid packages tied to ceasefires or peace agreements and a possible diffusion of anti-nuclear defense systems.

The fourth scenario is *Pax Nipponica*. In this world, Japanese economic power reigns supreme. The steady rise of Japanese nationalism, in tandem with what the Japanese term the internationalization of Japan, contributes to the strength of this scenario, because the intrusion of external economic and social forces in Japanese society stimulates nationalistic reactions against internationalization. Just as for *Pax Consortis* in its fullest version, a prerequisite for the advent of *Pax Nipponica* is either the removal of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals or the development of an anti-nuclear defense system. Without the neutralization of nuclear weapons, Japan's role in the security arena would be minimized.

Three major factors distinguish these scenarios from each other: neutralization of strategic nuclear arsenals, scientific and technological dynamism, and the debt of history. The nuclear arsenal of the United States is key in its ability to retain its superpower status and global influence. Until a revolutionary weapons system is developed that neutralizes nuclear weapons, the third and fourth scenarios will

have difficulty emerging because superpower status is currently based on ownership of such weapons. Even if nuclear weapons and military power are becoming less important in international politics, with the deepening of economic interdependence, the pace of the 'Europeanization of superpowers', as termed by Christoph Bertram, is incredibly slow.

The second factor of scientific and technological dynamism involves the innovative and inventive capacity of nations to translate scientific achievement into economic development. By all accounts, the United States appears to dominate in this category as well, with Japan not far behind in innovative capacity. The domination further supports the first scenario.

Factor three relates to the memory of nations who were occupied in the Second World War and suffered primarily at the hands of the Germans and the Japanese. The wartime memories are another barrier to the emergence of Pax Nipponica.

Through the review of these three factors and their impact on the four scenarios, the most feasible world order in the short term is one that is led by Pax Americana, Phase II. The free spirit, open competition, and dynamic character of US society will be essential for the United States to reinvigorate its innovative and inventive capacity. Two other policies are also essential: first, close Japan-US macroeconomic policy cooperation, and second, full-scale interlinking of the US economy with the Asian Pacific economies under US leadership.

Certainly, US leadership entails fewer risks, but the overall stresses may outweigh the benefits. Another possibility is that the future may evolve toward a mixture of Pax Americana II and Pax Consortis. However, in the longer term, a soft landing on Pax Consortis seems the most desirable.

### ***Peering into the Future by Looking Back (Inoguchi, 1999)***

The best way to understand the future of global politics and the theoretical underpinnings of the involved issues is to appreciate the historical paths that have been taken to the present. I examine the three main paradigms that frame our knowledge of global politics and then attempt to portray the future around 2025 as a mixture of these three paradigms.

Global politics can be viewed through the prism of three paradigms: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian. Each paradigm in its conception of global politics is associated with one key concept: state sovereignty in the Westphalian framework, popular sovereignty in the Philadelphian framework, and loss of sovereignty in the Anti-Utopian framework. The Westphalian system is based on the nation-state, national economy, and national culture. The Philadelphian framework revolves around popular sovereignty, built on the trinity of liberal democracy, the global market, and global governance. The Anti-Utopian framework revolves around the loss of sovereignty and the resulting three factors of the failed state, the marginalized economy, and localized anarchy.

History shows that only in the mid-19th century did sovereign states come to occupy the central place in global politics, with territorially based nation-states emerging one after another within Europe (Germany and Italy) and in the periphery (the United States and Japan). In the 19th and 20th centuries, European sovereign states expanded their territorial reach in colonialist empires. Only during and after the Second World War, as colonialism drew to an end, did the world experience an unprecedented proliferation of sovereign states. Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1990s, the number of sovereign states grew from 51 to 185. Given the dramatic growth in the number of sovereign states and the conventional views of international law, it was not unusual that global politics was essentially ‘inter-national’ politics – that is, politics among nations (Morgenthau, 1978).

As the number of sovereign states multiplied, the Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian paradigms began to develop. The Philadelphian framework, with the United States as its leader, is manifested in the dramatic increase of liberal democracies that subscribe to the norms and rules of the free-market economy and democratic politics. A common principle among its proponents is the belief that democracies rarely fight each other (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). By Anti-Utopian, I refer to the framework that governs the failed and failing states, and this has been structurally veiled by other frameworks. ‘Anti-Utopian’ derives from the colonialist legacy. At the end of the 20th century, the universalist forces that sought to ‘civilize’ the world in the colonial age shifted to international efforts aimed at global governance, human security, and humanitarian assistance. However noble these utopian objectives, the results have been mainly prolonged strife, exploitative regimes shored up by international aid, and failed states.

Geopolitics, geo-economics, and geo-culture all impact the three paradigms, which are vying with each other to frame global human activity. However, it is the geo-economic challenge of globalization that will determine whether peace and prosperity will ensue. If everything is subject to market forces, then two obstacles may emerge. First, market turbulence causes instability; it can create the conditions in which market forces cannot function well. Second, the pursuit of market efficiency accelerates the marginalization of noncompetitive segments; the growing disparities that result from globalization and marginalization could easily bring about the conditions in which market forces fail to function properly. The critical question then becomes how deep will globalization go in the next 25 to 50 years. To answer this question, the following three variables, which are likely to play major roles in determining the vicissitudes of the three geopolitical frameworks, must be identified. They are technological innovations, deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions, and resilience of nation-states. These three variables will play a leading role in shaping the Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian outcomes.

Global market forces will make definite advances because of technological innovation, but their durable permeation will not be ensured because, when

it goes to the extreme, counterbalancing forces may offset the Philadelphian direction. Yet, in an enlarged North of higher income, the Philadelphian framework will prevail, more or less. In an exploding and imploding South, the Anti-Utopian direction and the Westphalian direction will be further enhanced. The Anti-Utopian direction will include further emphasis on global governance that is more likely to work with the mixture of idealistic individual-centered humanism, the vigorous pursuit of global market integrity, and the consolidation of those globalists and those cynical ‘civilizationists’ who extend assistance to fend off the negative contamination of alien ‘civilizations’. The Westphalian direction will focus more on the symbolic and cultural aspects of state sovereignty than the conventional Westphalian conception allows, thus creating a condition in which states will be more like ‘imagined communities’, not in stages of nation building, but stages of nation fragmenting or weakening under the growing forces of global markets and the threat of demographic and environmental deterioration.

### ***Three Japanese Scenarios for the Third Millennium (Inoguchi, 2002)***

The three Japanese scenarios for the future share the same conceptual basis as the three paradigms of global politics – Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian – but with Japanese characteristics; I use these names to emphasize the underlying links with global scenarios for the future (Inoguchi, 1999).

The Japanese Westphalian scenario is articulated by history professor Shinichi Kitaoka (1995), vice-minister of international affairs Eisuke Sakakibara (1994), and art and theater professor, composer, and director Masakazu Yamazaki (1997). The Westphalian scenario seems to be the one that appears most likely to many Japanese. The trinity of nation-state, national economy, and national culture seems to be the scenario with which they are most comfortable. Each of these three authors, in their subtle but distinctive way, stress nation-ness and national pride.

Kitaoka (1995) believes that globalization does not necessarily lead to a reduced nation-state role. He argues that since the world essentially adheres to the Westphalian model in matters of state sovereignty, Japan will not win the respect of the international community until it revises the constitution on the use of force to resolve disputes with other nations.

Sakakibara (1994) advocates the Japanese economic model and criticizes what he calls market fundamentalism and American fundamentalism. He argues that unrestrained globalized financial capitalism can destroy an economy; enhanced economic national autonomy and improved global welfare will benefit all economies.

Yamazaki (1997) argues for a better meshing of national and international cultures. Yamazaki envisages national culture diffusing into the rest of the world through appeals to common human themes. The appeal must be subtle,

sophisticated forms and characteristics of the Japanese arts that are embedded in human civilization.

For the Philadelphian scenario, I chose novelist and activist Makoto Oda (1998), economics author Kenichi Ohmae (1995), and social psychology professor Toshio Yamagishi (1998) to represent the main points. Oda (1998) argues for non-violence at the national and international levels. He favors Japan's pacifist constitution and advocates for Japan's role as a force in conscientious objection to war. In international relations, Oda focuses on networking and collaboration among non-governmental individuals and groups in pursuit of peaceful goals.

Ohmae (1995) states that the future lies in a borderless economy, concluding that national borders have ceased to be of primary significance. He strongly believes in freedom, the strength of technology, and the reform of business, education, leisure, and politics.

Yamagishi's (1998) message is that Japanese trust is primarily directed at socially known others, whereas US trust is more generalized. Japanese do not necessarily trust those who are not well known and well connected with their own networks, but they give full trust to socially recognized others. Yamagishi argues for more generalized trust because it fosters reciprocity in cooperation and nurtures a spirit of risk assessment in social relations.

For the group of authors that I place in the Anti-Utopian scenario, they stress the economic and civilizational discrepancy between parts of the South and most parts of the North, and they underline the post-post-colonial disruption of the so-called failed states. Most Japanese Anti-Utopian scenario authors are concerned about the disruptive potential of the United States and China. The third set of authors includes international relations professor Terumasa Nakanishi (1997), economics professor Tsuneo Iida (1997), and East Asian history professor, Hidehiro Okada (1997).

Nakanishi (1997) warns Japan about the inevitability of decline and cautions against falling into a less-than-medium-power status and not being prepared. He views China as a source of instability and disruption. Iida (1997), the second author in this grouping, distrusts the United States' hegemonic structure and its attitudes toward management of global markets. He views the US-style market fundamentalism as disruptive and destabilizing to the world economy. Okada (1997) views China as having high potential for the disintegration and destabilization of the entire region; he fears that the Chinese empire will disintegrate in the not too distant future.

In all, it seems that the synthesized Japanese scenario of the future (2000–2050) is best described as a Westphalian-Philadelphian-Anti-Utopian mix with the following elaborations. First, the basic framework will remain Westphalian, at least, on the surface. Second, the Philadelphian influence seems irreversible: the tide of globalization (economics), unipolarization (security), and democratization (governance) that accelerated in the last quarter of the 20th century points to the Philadelphian scenario (Inoguchi, 1994). Yet, the excessiveness

of these is bound to create backlashes in the form of peripheralization of many parts of the South, anti-hegemonic movements, and democratizing rhetoric and ritual that obfuscates the often-less-than-sufficient democratic realities, both in the South and North. Third, these outcomes of the excessive Philadelphian practice point to the possible salience of the Anti-Utopian scenario. Thus, the Japanese grand strategy seems to envision the Westphalian framework as basically continuing to prevail, if only on the surface, while the increasing influence of the Philadelphian spreads throughout the world, including to Japan. Whether, in order to cope with this global problematique, Japan's grand strategy would envisage global democracy, remains uncertain; Japan would most likely use its own Westphalian-cum-Philadelphian policy instruments to save and contain the 'marginalized South'.

## STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS FIXATED

Fixated strategies' non-adaptive evolutions are a most often deployed methodology of thinking broadly about the future. It is one of the ways to cope with uncertainty about the future, by making a fixed strategy and see a focused parameter evolve with time.

### ***Speculating on Asian Security, 2013–2033 (Inoguchi, 2014b)***

The two decades between 2013 and 2033 are full of uncertainty. In this speculative exercise on power competition in Asia, I focus on the difficulties encountered by China, the United States, and Japan in the pursuit of their respective goal of 'equality', 'primacy', and 'peace'. In the pursuit of these goals, each state is trapped by the means that are supposed to serve to help them achieve their respective goals: extractive institutions for China, R&D investment in weapons for the United States, and self-extending decisions for Japan.

Uncertainty is seen in China's demographic trend and its institutions. China's one-child policy has resulted in a drastic decrease in the productive population. The Dengist economics and politics of the last three decades have reached a certain degree of deadlock. Income and status gaps have grown: gaps between coastal and inland regions, between normal residents and houkou residents (city residents not officially admitted and thus protected), between high- and low-skilled workers, and between state and non-state firms. In 2012 alone, 100,000 collective protests with 1,000 or more participants occurred. Unrest has also triggered fractures in viewpoints and policy among the communist elites (Ong, 2015, pp. 345–359).

The United States also faces uncertainty: prolonged economic pain after the 2008 Lehmann shock, apparently unattainable peace in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

the rise of the 1%-versus-99% movement, the constant push and pull between the right who advocate small government and the left who advocate 'no entanglement abroad', and security. The rise of China has persuaded the US government to enhance the structure of regional security in the Asia Pacific and rein in the conflicting parties between China and other regional states in the Asia-Pacific. The US promise to rebalance the region will depend on its ability to fund R&D spending on weapons. When small government ideologues are strong in congress, R&D budgets tend to be cut.

Japanese politics has been fractious and fragmented at least since the end of the Cold War (Inoguchi, 2013). Low economic growth since the 1990s has caused the cohesiveness and traditional structure of relationships between state and society to fracture. The net result is the inability of organizations to make decisions that articulate, integrate, and implement policy directions. Key policies areas affected by indecision include nuclear energy, tax increases to sustain social policy, cooperative schemes to sustain US bilateral alliance, and strategies to remain competitive.

In 2033, what will the power configuration among these three countries be like? The basis of our speculation is demography. This factor and its development will be complicated by other determinants and sometimes twisted to produce unpredictable power configurations.

China's dialectic is an example of what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) call extractive political and economic institutions, by which they mean those institutionalized schemes and practices that have the effect of siphoning power and wealth to a privileged few – that is, the communist-party elites. The problem is that extractive institutions are not conducive to sustained economic development. Hence, the question is how long will these extractive institutions remain in place? Will they still exist in 2033?

Of the uncertainties faced by the United States, the uncertainty of R&D investment in weapons stands out. In 2012, President Barack Obama announced a 10-year defense-budget plan with budgetary cuts. It is hard to see how R&D can avoid cuts, but two trends may block budgetary cuts in this area: (1) the United States is a strong proponent in the ever-advancing technology of weapons; (2) over the last 20 years, China has focused on a two-digit defense build-up. It has also been clearly explicit in its intention to deny the United States access to the Chinese coast where industrial and military facilities are concentrated. To deter China from such a policy, the United States must engage in an equally aggressive policy of weaponry R&D.

The Japanese decision-making practice of seeking consensus from below has meant that politics is fragmented, slow, and occurs in instalments. The problem is serious for structural reasons. First, technology allows everyone to participate in politics. Second, the traditional mediating organizations – political parties and interest groups – have lost much of their ability to influence society. Third, technology has allowed voices from other places to easily traverse national borders.

John Keane (2009) calls it the end of representative democracy and the emergence of ‘monitory democracy’.

In speculating on Asian security among the three regional powers, we have focused on what each power yearns for most and with what means each power seeks to achieve its goal. The United States seek primacy, yet R&D investment in weapons is prohibitive. China seeks equality at home and abroad, alleviating extractive institutions at home and equal sovereignty abroad, yet China’s military modernizations depends on these extractive institutions. Japan yearns for peace and may have to pursue armed neutrality to achieve this peace, yet in the end may require a stronger capacity to deter potential adversaries and defend itself. In an era of deep globalization, the battle appears to be more at home.

### ***A Call for a New Japanese Foreign Policy (Inoguchi, 2014a)***

I offer a portrait of Japanese foreign policy through the great traditions of international relations, depicting it as a combination of three forms of ‘-ism’: classical realism, transformative pragmatism, and liberal internationalism. Each of these traditions helps capture an aspect of Japanese foreign policy. These three ‘-isms’ are defined in relation to, particularly, US leadership, globalization, East Asian community formation, and the concept of an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’. I propose a new synthesis and direction for Japanese foreign policy that combines classical realism, transformative pragmatism, and liberal internationalism in new ways.

Classical realism refers to an elite-focused statecraft of survival and a striving to preserve the status quo. In a crisis situation, aggressive military and diplomatic moves need to be counterbalanced and hedged with astute judgment, deft articulation, and agile action. Transformative pragmatism refers to a revisionist line of self-rejuvenation and self-repositioning. This approach attempts to rejuvenate and reposition the economy and country. Liberal internationalism refers to working through and enhancing global norms and institutions, strengthening Japan’s ability to advance itself and work with other states under conditions of deep globalization (Ikenberry, 2011; Keohane et al., 2009).

A mix of three foreign policy lines best serves Japan. Classical realism focuses on defense build-up and alliance consolidation. With China actively pursuing a ‘restoration’ that reflects the power dynamics of 200–400 years ago, a period during which the Manchus subjugated the Han Chinese, its immediate neighbors must enhance their defenses and alliances. Although the Shinzo Abe administration’s emphasis on patriotism, the national anthem, and allegiance to the flag falls within the realm of domestic politics, it is somewhat out of line with classical realism, which regards the preservation of the status quo as the highest priority. We argue that this element of classical realism is best seen within the context of domestic political competition rather than as an externally directed expression of intent by government and civil society.



Transformative pragmatism focuses on Abenomics, in which sound economic growth is activated through quantitative easing of the money supply, fiscal austerity, a consumption tax hike, and a two-pronged pro-growth policy of accelerating research and development and liberalizing often stifling government regulations. Transformative pragmatism also concentrates on helping global neighborhoods: this is based on the assumption that in an era of deep globalization, global citizens are all neighbors working together to build needed infrastructure, improve the quality of life, and create work opportunities. By raising the national income of countries, Japan is helping to expand free markets and trade in terms of technical/expert advice and financial investment. With free markets spreading to encompass emerging economies as well as OECD member states, Japan's economic growth is bound to increase.

Liberal internationalism focuses on international ideas and institutions that foster freedom, peace, and prosperity in Japan's global neighborhood. Japan naturally wishes to help other countries achieve the same prosperity and peace that it achieved through international organizations and transnational groups, as well as through Japanese government and non-government organizations. Japan's commitment to various transnational policy regimes, through international treaties and agreements registered at the UN, is arguably the greatest of any nation. My argument is that the maturity of Japan's liberal internationalism that is helping to sustain transnational policy regimes befits a world in which US leadership is less dominant and in which functionally multipolar regimes could survive and, at times, govern in order to prevent destruction and destitution.

In sum, Japanese foreign policy should combine classical realism for hedging and counterbalancing, transformative pragmatism for increasing internal vigor, efficiency, and democracy, and also liberal internationalism, for contributing to the enhanced capability of multilateral institutions. This combination should be put into practice with keen observation, sound judgment, and flexible action.

## **SELF-TRANSFORMATIVE EVOLUTIONS**

Unlike many other methodologies, self-transformative evolutions make actors, goals, and strategies change over time, as well as their outcomes.

### ***Political Security: Toward a Broader Conceptualization (Inoguchi, 2003)***

Political security policy can be defined as the reasonable freedom of action that enables one to pursue and achieve the objectives that national actors deem essential to defend, even in the potential and/or actual presence of primarily external threats to national actors in world politics (Nye, 1974). I emphasize two dimensions of political security policy (Holsti, 1967; Morse, 1971). The first is the

focus of attention. Political security policy is usually either outward-looking or inward-looking; I argue instead that internal and external security are closely interrelated. It is the policy target – by the changes through which one tries to enhance national security – that makes an important difference. The second dimension is the level of activity – that is, is it active or passive? Not to be confused with extrovert and introvert orientations: extrovert implies outward-looking and active, and introvert implies inward-looking and passive. A policy can be outward-looking and passive, or alternatively inward-looking and active. Internal self-restructuring is one mode of augmenting political security and should be incorporated into the wider framework of security studies. Along with the two dimensions just outlined, I propose a taxonomy of political security policy. Each type of security policy has major difficulties that may cause national actors to modify their policy choice.

When one is outward-looking and active, we can find the syndromes of conquest/hegemony. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the conquest syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it assumes the hegemony syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to extend internal values outside national boundaries, whether by direct or indirect rule. The major problem with conquest is the cost that actors have to pay to suppress/crush resistance and liberation movements in a conquered area. To reduce costs, a conquest policy may give way to a hegemonial policy. In the case of hegemony, the difficulty lies in the cost of keeping allies acquiescent to the hegemony. In times of decline, to retain its overwhelming position, the hegemony has to increasingly rely on inducements to maintain the loyalties of its allies. The cost of such inducements when a power is in decline can be prohibitive. Alternatively, the hegemony can reduce its commitments so as to minimize its problems.

When one is inward-looking and active, we find the syndromes of revolution/Finlandization. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the revolution syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it is called the Finlandization syndrome. Finlandization denotes the security policy of a state that attempts to maintain and/or augment its security by the partial restructuring of its internal and external policies for the sake of securing its survival. National actors with either of these syndromes question their internal values and institutions and attempt to alter, wholly or partially, internal arrangements to develop a better security position. The major problem for revolution is counter-revolution and foreign intervention. The major challenge with Finlandization is persuasion; the government must persuade a large section of its people to accept the policy. The outcome depends on whether the people can accept the unpleasant aspects associated with the policy and recognize the positive aspects of it.

When one is outward-looking and passive, we can find the syndromes of manipulation/maneuvering. When this perspective takes a strong form, it assumes the manipulation syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it becomes the maneuvering syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt

to cope with environments without questioning internal values and institutions. The major challenge to manipulation is possessing sufficient skill, especially in diplomacy. Since the essence of manipulation is to bring about small changes in one's favor within the environment, without great costs, even the most skillful manipulation probably cannot overcome the hegemonial determination of a great power. The major challenge with maneuvering is credibility: the main aim of maneuvering is to make gains without costs and without altering much, except one's own position.

When one is inward-looking and passive, we can find the syndromes of seclusion/submission. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the seclusion syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it is called the submission syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to confine the internal values and institutions within national boundaries and seek to minimize the extent to which they are undermined. Here, political security is more internal than external. The major challenge is the excessive control that the state must exercise over its inhabitants to prevent outside information or influences from filtering into the country. The major problem with submission is humiliation; a submission policy tries to alter the balance of dependence after submission, and therefore it is important to ensure that the feeling of humiliation among the people does not get in the way of bargaining the balance of dependence.

In sum, we advance the notion that political security policy should involve a broader conception of security that takes nothing for granted – internal or external. Our main purpose is to provide a more adequate framework for a comparative study of the sources and transformations of political security policy.

### ***World Order Debates in the 20th Century (Inoguchi 2010)***

I present a somewhat unconventional grand framework in which to understand world order: in particular, the dialectic framework of international relations. My aim is to contribute to international relations theories, particularly by extending the application of the two-level game, the second-image game and the second-image reversed to certain hitherto neglected areas.

My objective in applying the two-level game, the second-image game, and the second-image reversed to the state strategy of leading powers is to examine and analyze the long-term evolution of world order in the extended 20th-century period (1890–2025). By the state strategies of leading powers, we mean the balance of power, collective security, and primacy.

All three state strategies are associated with antithetical and synthetic concepts. The antithetical concepts are people's war, people power, and global terrorism, all of which are most often developed by the marginalized have-nots of the world. The three synthetic concepts are colonial aloofness, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention. These synthetic concepts developed through interactions within the world system between the haves and have-nots.

By referring to the world system, this section deals both with the struggle of international politics on the surface of inter-governmental relations and the structure of global politics at the grassroots.

My use of dialectics is somewhat unorthodox as it highlights the thesis posed by the haves. Synthesis is defined as the haves' response to the have-nots' challenge, or antithesis. The thesis posed by the haves is privileged in our treatment of dialectics. After all, the elites primarily shape political security by virtue of their strength. Strength, however, can easily degenerate into weakness. The haves use their strength, in one way or another, to accommodate, placate, or suppress the have-nots' challenge. It is the way in which they use it that determines their longevity. My use of dialectics is hence evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Leading powers must maintain and support their policy direction and commitments, despite the associated costs, until transition into a new regime of institutionalized political security occurs. Marginalized states develop certain antithetical strategies to make their voices heard: people's war, people power, and global terrorism. People's war, sometimes called guerilla warfare, is a strategy adopted by states that are humiliated and marginalized by the invading, occupying, and colonizing regular army. People's war takes place at the peripheries; leading powers' war takes place at the core.

People power uses non-violent action, according to the principle that the use of violence usually provokes governments into taking strongly suppressive measures and is, therefore, counter-productive. People power needs competent leaders – that is, leaders who are charismatic, able to translate words into outcomes, equanimous vis-a-vis difficult situations, and magnanimous toward failings of its followers.

Global terrorism takes the form of violent action instigated by transnational, nongovernmental terrorist groups (Freedman, 2002; Roberts, 2002). Terrorism is based on strong religious, political, environmental, or humanistic convictions. Global terrorism is born from the global structure characterized by what its perpetrators regard as oppressive suffocation that culturally neutralizes the capacity of other powers to counterbalance. The global embeddedness of the world economy makes it difficult for the marginalized have-nots to disentangle themselves from the ties, rules, and practices that have been largely shaped and shared by the privileged citizens of a hegemony. Dialectic moments occur when thesis directly confronts antithesis and their interaction produces a synthesis. It is important to note that the outcome of the haves' accommodation, appeasement, placation, or suppression of the have-nots' challenges is a synthesis different from that of systemic transformations triggered by the confrontation of thesis and antithesis; it rather represents the haves' response to this confrontation. Dialectical moments occur when the haves' response to the have-nots' challenges – the synthesis – drains the haves' power resources.

There have been two dialectic moments in the extended 20th century. The first occurred in two steps, in 1914 and in 1939, and saw the dialectic turn from

balance of power to collective security. The inter-war period of 1919–1939 was no more than a pause during which the same set of conditions replayed themselves, driving revisionists to push themselves to the fullest extent. The second, in 2001, saw the dialectic turn from collective security to primacy. Global terrorism presented this dialectic moment with the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Its synthesis is the United States' renewed search for primacy, which has changed from war deterrence to warfare capabilities.

The year 2025 will be the year in which the primacy of the United States either coalesces into global governance or collapses. My speculation is that there will be a transition from primacy to global governance for two reasons. First, the interactions between humanitarian interventions by leading powers and global terrorism by dissidents might evolve in the direction of what I call mirrored humanitarian interventions and mirrored global terrorism, under the nuclear disarmament processes, or, in other words, in a less violence-prone direction. Second, the step-by-step, largely bilateral disarmament initiatives might lead to a situation in which only the United States maintains a minimum nuclear arsenal so as to be credible in ensuring world law and order, or, in other words, again in a less violence-prone direction.

### ***Global Leadership and International Regime (Le, Mikami, & Inoguchi, 2014)***

This study is an attempt to construct a quantitative link for international regimes with global leadership. By proposing a framework of global leadership analysis, I seek to provide an empirical testing of the transformation of global governance toward cooperation without hegemony paradigm.

Global leadership and international regimes are paired relatively close to each other. International regimes are 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner, 1983: 186). The state, as an institutional form, is centrally important in the formation of international regimes. From a theoretical standpoint, regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or an 'intervening variable', between the fundamental characteristics of world politics, such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behavior of states on the other (Keohane, 1984). An ever-more interconnected world demands more cooperation among states for trade, peace, security, and a host of other issues. When multilateral consensus in a given area of international relations takes the form of multilateral treaties, the leading role of a state can be more tangible and better recorded.

The most striking feature of current US global leadership is that in addition to possessing overwhelming military might, the United States has been, on the whole, successful in taking the initiative for inculcating global norms and establishing global institutions in a wide range of policy areas. The experience of the

United States reinforces the analysis that the basis of the extending US power and influence throughout the world is the junction between global leadership and international regimes.

In a contrasting perspective, other scholars have written on cooperation without hegemony. Robert Keohane (1984) argues that cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes are established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is possible; cooperation can emerge and a regime can be created without hegemonic leadership.

How to verify the shift toward cooperation without hegemony paradigm on an empirical basis? Of the several approaches available, I chose a schematic approach. My approach is to construct a quantitative link between international regimes and global leadership. My objective is to develop a system that can observe global leadership change over time and that is more systematic. World politics has changed from the era dominated by a single hegemon to a new way of global governance that is represented by diverse stakeholders. The expected rules of cooperation and state compliance with the rules are increasingly being materialized in the form of multilateral treaties. Regime theorists explain that when treaties are ratified, states signal their intentions by being a signatory and prioritizing the issue. The more initiative a nation takes in international treaties, the more it shows its intention to be a leader.

The country's willingness to lead in solving global issues as the first mover in the formation of an international regime is measured and characterized by analyzing their ratification behavior in multilateral conventions deposited to the UN, which shape the 'rules of the game' of the global community. For this purpose, I define a set of quantitative indicators, the Index of Global Leadership Willingness and the Global Support Index, and calculate for each country based on its actual ratification year data for 120 multilateral conventions, covering a range of global issues.

The resulting portrait shows a noticeable decrease in world leadership performance among countries and the convergence in states' position in world politics. The results are then used to analyze changes in the leadership willingness indices of selected country groups, such as G3, G7/8, and G20, over the century and find that the will to drive the international agenda of these groups of leaders is in decline. Although several countries show visible leadership in specific policy domains, such as environment and intellectual property, neither G7/8 nor G20 was playing a comparable role to those performed by the G3 100 years ago.

How to establish the link between global citizens' preference for values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other? The former consists of individual citizens whose voices are registered by almost recurrent and ubiquitous polls carried out across the planet, whereas the latter consists of about 120 multilateral treaties registered in the UN system since 1945. For the former, the World Values Survey led by Ronald Inglehart is chosen, whereas for the latter, the Multilateral Treaties Survey carried

out by Lien Thi Quynh Le is used. If some links are to be established empirically and statistically, one could claim that a global social contract does exist empirically and that classical social contract theory can be globally extended.

Factor-analyzing global citizens' preference and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties enables one to see separately how connected the former and the latter are in terms of key dimensions and locations of participant states. The former yields key dimensions of (1) emancipative-versus-protective orientation toward participation and (2) secular-versus-sacred orientation. The latter yields key dimensions of (1) agile-versus-cautious orientation toward participation, (2) global commons versus individual citizen's interests, and (3) aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. The former's emancipative-versus-protective orientation and the latter's agile-versus-cautious orientation results in fairly high correlation coefficient. The former's secular-versus-sacred orientation and the latter's aspirational-bonding-versus-mutual-binding orientation results in a fairly high correlation coefficient. No less important is the spatially similar locations of most of the 158 states on these dimensions.

Hence, one can claim that the global social contract hypothesis is validated *grosso modo* empirically.

The study has empirically tested and found support for the idea of cooperation without hegemony. This is the preposition about a new world order where no power or group of powers can sustainably set an international agenda. We have constructed a quantitative metric to measure states' actions in global regimes to evaluate their willingness to take a leadership position in international cooperation for solving shared global issues. The findings show the current political situation in the world is not led by G7, G8, or G20. This is a leaderless world. Moreover, the analysis results describe a striking perspective on world politics and provide evidence to argue that our current world is actually without consistent global leadership. By comparing the leadership score for key global players through different stages of world history and in different policy domains, we can identify the divergence in powers that are bound to shape 21st-century world politics.

## CONCLUSION

One of the intellectual traditions of international relations is the foreseeing perspective. Within this tradition, I have examined a number of works authored or coauthored by myself, all of which aim at gauging, analyzing, and foreseeing various aspects of international relations from the global perspective. By focusing on those four types of work – statistics, scenarios, extrapolations, and narratives – whose ultimate aim is the nowcasting/forecasting of international relations with deep understanding of inner workings of subjects, I have highlighted the saying, 'All politics is global'. Helped by the heightened

consciousness of how social phenomena are manifested in complex forms and figures, I have deliberately chosen those works in which angles, concepts, measurement' and modelling vary tremendously. The lesson of this exercise is that understanding cannot be obtained unless angles and perspectives are flexibly deployed and unless gauging and nowcasting/forecasting are carefully carried out.

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