

THE USES OF INSTITUTIONS

The U.S., Japan,
and Governance
in East Asia

Edited by
G. John Ikenberry and
Takashi Inoguchi



CHAPTER 2

Japan: Bilateralism at Any Cost?

Takashi Inoguchi

War and Diplomacy in Modern Japan

When examining the Japanese tradition of the use of institutions in international relations, bilateralism stands out.¹ It is bilateralism that matters when the issue is who came to open the ports and the country. It is bilateralism that matters when the issue is where Japan had to dispatch troops to deal with the protection of compatriots abroad. It is bilateralism that matters when Japan had to negotiate the lack of tariff autonomy with major powers.

When Japan opened its ports and the country, the world was in the hands of the West. It was a world of competition among major powers. It was a world of colonialism and imperialism. To Japan it was furthermore a world of transition—a transition in the sense of adjustment from the Chinese-referenced world order to the Western-referenced world order in the mid-nineteenth century. In a transition the framework and the concept governing it are more likely to be fuzzy and murky in the first place.² Thus it was natural that Japanese leaders concluded that, before understanding the basic philosophy of international relations, the concrete pattern of behavior must be studied case by case bilaterally, that is, as Japan faced its adversary.³

Not only the Western powers but also the neighboring countries that had to be dealt with bilaterally. Japan's neighbors were not numerous. Most countries in Asia had been colonized. Japan's immediate neighbors were Korea and China. They must be studied closely and in depth and handled bilaterally.

It is not a coincidence that Japan was not so good at multilateralism. Multilateralism in the nineteenth century did exist then but only among

major states in the West. There were mechanisms whereby major Western powers competed with each other. There were a certain set of shared norms and rules that guided them because they were all Western powers.⁴ There was a modicum of international organizations in the Western world that detached key functions from violent use of force in settling international disputes. They included the Red Cross, international postal communication, international navigation, and so on.⁵ It is clear that, given the mid-nineteenth century non-Western context of Japan's war and diplomacy, the coerced opening of Japanese ports and country was the direct origin of Japanese preference for bilateralism.

After World War I a new world was on the horizon at least for the two major articulators of the day: Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin.⁶ They put forward their visions of the world in terms of new key norms and principles that they believed ought to permeate the world and prevail in the minds of people. It was natural after the unprecedented horror and calamity of World War I that Europeans started to envisage the elementary mode and level of global governance. They included no-war announcements and disarmament treaties of many kinds. It was not surprising to find that Japan was again an outlier. Earlier it was an outlier as the first non-Western power, and now it was an outlier as the state hesitant to bring itself to a multilateral treaty. Two major disarmament treaties that Japan grudgingly acceded, the Washington Treaty and the London Treaty, became later the symbol of multilateral constraints from which Japan wanted to depart, in order to carry out the self-claimed mission of achieving a greater East Asian peace and prosperity.⁷ To quote Prince Konoe,

In short, the principle of peace as propounded by Britain and the United States is the principle of peace at any price supported by those who favor the status quo and this [principle] has nothing to do with justice and humanity. . . . That is, those who will most benefit are Britain and the United States. Even if other countries, lured by the beautiful words of justice and humanity, join the League of Nations, it may not simply be that they will shrink economically [because of Anglo-American economic imperialism]. This being the case, it cannot be allowed [for this to take place] not only from the Japanese point of view but also from the viewpoint of justice and humanity. Therefore, the problems that have to be put forward at the forthcoming conference [at Versailles] prior to her joining the League of Nations are at least the rejection of [Anglo-American] economic imperialism and the equal treatment of the white and yellow races. After all, it is not just militarism alone that harms justice and humanity. Although the world was saved from the smoke of power and the hail of

bullets because of the German defeat, is it just the military force alone that threatens the equal right of the survival of nations?⁸

After World War II the Japanese preference for bilateralism was further consolidated. Japan was defeated and occupied by the Allied Powers led by the United States. At the time of a peace treaty with the Allied Powers, the cold war, then already deepening year by year, led Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty excluding the Soviet Union and its allies. Most Asian countries were not yet independent. Furthermore, East and Southeast Asian countries needed to get some things settled before normalizing diplomatic relationship, including war indemnities and related issues. Therefore in 1952 when it achieved independence again after seven years' occupation, Japan's space for its diplomacy was severely limited. Japan's diplomacy was virtually synonymous with its relations with the United States.⁹

The key arrangement with the United States made during the occupation was the combination of the new constitution and the Japan-United States Security Treaty. The new constitution, largely drafted in 1946, followed much of what was contained in the UN Charter, signed on June 26, 1945, as far as war and diplomacy are concerned. In other words, the preamble stipulating war renunciation and Article 9 on the use of force denied for the settlement of international disputes are those parts that have made Japan a country of pacifism of very special kind. As the impact of the cold war was world-wide and the time to grant independence to Japan was approaching, the other key arrangement was designed. The Japan-United States Security treaty came into force in 1952 when Japan gained independence. Through the Security treaty, Japan entrusts its national security to the United States. The United States takes care of Japan's deterrence and defense whereas Japan renders all the facilities and services (military bases, free sky, fuelling and repairing, hospitals and comfort) into the hands of the United States. This is equivalent to putting all the eggs in one basket: United States.¹⁰ And this is another origin of Japan's preference for bilateralism at any cost or bilateralism *über alles* in the post-1945 context. Without first settling major disputes or differences with the United States, Japan could not negotiate freely. In this context of bilateralism *über alles*, as applied Japan's relations with the United States, with the complications associated with the constitution and the Security treaty, it was quite natural to see the North American Bureau and the Treaties Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carry heavy weight.

Bilateralism in Action before 1990

Immediately after Japan regained independence in 1952, extending and restoring normal diplomatic relationship to as many nations as possible was regarded as a very high priority. Since 1952, the three pillars of Japanese diplomacy are (1) alliance with the United States; (2) friendship with Asian countries; and (3) UN-centered diplomacy.¹¹ These three pillars were rather the wish than the reflection of diplomatic reality at that time, because Japan had virtually nothing other than the alliance with the United States. The other two were the wish of the Japanese people and government striving to attain the “honorable place in the community of nations.” The three pillars are required to be given equal emphasis because the first pillar, the alliance with the United States, was in fact overwhelming vis-à-vis the other two. To placate anti-Americanism and to appease nationalism in Japan, it was widely regarded that the three pillars must be of the same strength.

However, until Japan’s accession to the UN was achieved in 1956, not much got done.¹² Only after Japan’s entry into the UN did the possibility of Japan normalizing its diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union emerge. The center-right, which merged two parties into one to become the Liberal Democratic Party, was nearly split into two on the issue of negotiating with the Soviet Union. For nationalist reasons, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Agricultural Minister Ichiro Kono were most vigorous in establishing diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union.¹³ They were moderately anti-American and unhappy about being virtually dictated to about the scope and direction of Japan’s foreign policy. The negotiations with the Soviet Union ended with a pronouncement on diplomatic normalization without settling territorial or peace treaty issues. Tanzan Ishibashi who was elected prime minister after Hatoyama wanted to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China.¹⁴ The task was complicated and difficult because Japan concluded peace with the Republic of China in 1951. Ishibashi resigned because of illness one and a half month after he took office. Therefore nothing substantial happened in this front.

Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who succeeded Ishibashi, achieved two things that were meant to rectify what he regarded as the intolerable bias of the Security treaty and Japanese foreign policy.¹⁵ First, he sought to revise the Security treaty in the direction of reducing the asymmetrical nature of treaty obligations into more reciprocal nature, which was achieved in 1960. He resigned immediately after a high-ranking official’s visit to prepare for President Dwight Eisenhower’s trip to Japan was blocked by demonstrations. Second, he initiated talks with

Southeast Asian countries about war reparations and diplomatic relationship.¹⁶ He was ingenuous in linking reparations with trade exports and official developmental assistance. The point here is that even if bilateralism at any cost or bilateralism über alles was the basic principle of Japanese foreign policy, it did not necessarily prevent vigorous efforts to reduce asymmetrical dependence on the virtually overwhelming bilateral relationship with the United States from being undertaken. This is exactly what Prime Minister Kishi undertook toward revising what he regarded an excessively asymmetric alliance relationship with the United States. Also even the multilateralism that could be envisaged after Japan's accession into the United Nations did not go very far as long as Japan's foremost priority was the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even the most proalliance Prime Minister Kishi went so far to give priority to the following three issues at the UN: a proposal to oblige the registration of nuclear tests with the UN, an effort to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians, and a proposal to codify the principle of racial nondiscrimination.¹⁷

The issue of whether Japan maintained the alliance with the United States subsided at about the time when *The Economist* famously heralded the advent of Japan as an economic power in 1962.¹⁸ Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who succeeded Kishi, announced the income doubling plan shortly after taking office in 1960, according to which Japan's per capita income would be doubled by 1970 with an average annual growth rate of 7.2 percent for ten years. The target was achieved before 1970. At any rate bilateralism during the period between 1960 and 1975 was bilateralism extended. By that I mean that bilateralism was increasing as Japanese economic expansion brought Japan to every corner of the globe. This period was when President Charles de Gaulle of France ridiculed Prime Minister Ikeda as a transistor salesman. More fundamentally, it was the period when the Yoshida doctrine was brought into diplomatic practice, defined by overwhelming security dependence on the United States and aggressive pursuit for economic wealth.

The period between 1960 and 1975 was one expanding of bilateralism.¹⁹ At the basis lay bilateralism with the United States, which defined the parameters of most other bilateral relations. Alliance with the United States, trade, and other kinds of economic expansion overlapped considerably. When there was no formal alliance relationship with the United States, much slower expansion was observed. With respect to East and Southeast Asia until the end of the Vietnam War, this picture holds true more or less. Alliance, trade and investment, and all others went hand in hand most of the time during this time.

The three exceptions are Korea, China, and Russia/the Soviet Union. The Republic of Korea and Japan had no diplomatic relationship between 1952 and 1965.²⁰ Korea had an alliance with the United States, but no trade, or diplomatic relationship with Japan. Amid a wide array of issues stood their move toward normalization. Korea was a formal colony of Japan from 1911 to 1945. Any move in Korea in the direction of reconciliation with Japan was met with stiff resistance from the people. President Syngman Rhee, the founder, was a fierce anti-Japanese and anticommunist nationalist and exile experiences in Honolulu and Shanghai kept him in power through the Korean War of 1950–1953. His downfall was precipitated by democratic demonstrators in 1960 and a successful coup d'état by the military in 1961 that led Korea in a more consciously developmental authoritarian direction under the military leadership of President Park Chung Hee. It took four years before the two countries finally concluded the Basic Treaty formally ending the absence of diplomatic relationship between Japan and its geographically closest neighbor. The bilateral relationship since 1965 was no less hazardous. Yet it is very important to note that the quintessentially bilateral relationship was forged with Korea during the pre- and post-normalization periods. It was thick, dense, and provincial. The government and business firms eagerly nurtured Korea specialists. The scope of their attention and activities did not go beyond Korea, however.

China is another exception to cold war related bilateralism. China has been ruled by the communist government since 1949. Japan did not conclude a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China until 1978.²¹ Instead, Japan joined the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which the Republic of China signed. After Prime Minister Ishibashi's frail and failed attempt at establishing diplomatic relationship with China foundered in two months in 1958, Prime Minister Ikeda encouraged nongovernmental relations with China to begin and grow during his tenure of 1960–1964. During this period, Tatsuo Takasaki and Liao Chengzhi concluded an annual agreement whereby a modicum of trade would be maintained between the two countries. China's political turmoil during the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four in the midst of the Vietnam War and of what China called the growing Soviet hegemony helped China to make rapprochement with the United States and Japan in 1971 and 1972, respectively. In 1972 diplomatic normalization between China and Japan was established, and in 1978 a peace treaty was concluded with China.²² It is not necessary to detail the events before and after 1978 as they are available elsewhere. The point here is that Japan's bilateral relationship with China resembles its relationship

with Korea, that is, thick, dense, and provincial. It is a self-contained and intensely path-dependent kind of bilateralism. Indeed in Northern Asia it is not rare to see Japan's bilateral relations thick, dense, and provincial.

Russia is an example of cold war related bilateralism. Unlike its relationships with Korea and China, Japan's bilateralism with Russia is thin, sparse, and provincial. However, as with Korea and China, Japan's bilateralism with Russia has been a self-contained and intensely path-dependent one. It may come as a small surprise to see Japan's bilateral relations with Russia often referring back to 1875, when the territorial issues were first resolved, to 1905, when Japan won victory over Russia, to 1945, when Russia won victory over Japan, or to 1956, when the diplomatic relationship was established with a peace treaty remaining to be concluded, let alone those complicated interactions in the post-cold war period. A diplomatic relationship was achieved in 1956. But since then nothing has happened, during both the Soviet and Russian periods, which would lead to a peace treaty being signed with Russia. All the big names notwithstanding, Hatoyama, Tanaka, Nakasone, and Hashimoto on Japan's side and Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin on Russia's side were not able to get a peace treaty signed.²³ There was modicum of interactions with Russia that existed for years that had to do with fisheries, salmon, and crab in the North Pacific. Territorial issues have been intensely negative on both sides until quite recently. Energy issues were occasionally explosive during the cold war period. More recently, however, energy issues are becoming seemingly more pragmatic. In both government and business firms Russian specialists have been nurtured and networked quite intensely, somewhat apart from the career patterns that are observed in those patterns discerned among those elite corps of generalists.

During the period of 1960–1975, multilateralism developed somewhat in tandem with Japan's accession to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964. Just like the UN spurred Japan's interest in multilateralism in the preceding period of 1945–1960, Japan's accession to the OECD accelerated Japan's affiliation with and activities in international economic and financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is noteworthy that Japan made a good distinction between these economic and financial institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the OECD on the one hand and the UN and other related institutions on the other precisely because the former is closely linked with the United States-led global economic governance. During

this period Japan was a member in good-standing, and Japan took its membership seriously. But its *modus operandi* was a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker, an agenda-taker rather than an agenda-setter. In other words, it worked quietly within the system with an eye at how the United States was thinking and taking action. To borrow Brian Job's characterization of Japanese multilateralism, it is the bilaterally networked multilateralism.²⁴ By that I mean Japan was bilaterally networked with the United States. Only on the basis of solid and sound bilateralism with the United States did Japan work in the framework of multilateralism. The scope of Japan's attention was confined to the economic, financial, monetary, technological, and energy-related aspects, never going into those security aspects. It must be noted that even a good rule-taker and agenda-taker Japan at times deviated from what it should be in terms of being a responsible stake-holder in the United States-led system. Japan's bilateralism with a focus on the United States has not been changed very much even after 1975. But the multilateral scope of its foreign policy was broadened considerably during the period. The oil crisis of 1973 shook the West fundamentally. The solidarity of the West floundered, especially when the United States was trying to disentangle itself from the Vietnam trauma and when the perennial Israeli-Palestinian conflict gave no hope for a possibility of a resolution. The Group of Five—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan—was born of a French initiative.²⁵ In the initial period of the Group of Five summits, Japan was so unaccustomed to the multilateral summit diplomacy that it developed the following *modus operandi*: a great deal of sherpa work prior to the summit meeting, a minimum amount of intervention, and a bilaterally managed highlighting of Japanese intervention by an annual chairperson. To cope with a large amount of uncertainty in the summit meeting, when linguistic difficulties of prime ministers cannot be underestimated and when the sociological aptitude of prime ministers in making its presence favorably felt cannot always be assured, Japanese bureaucrats helped accelerate the evolution of the summit in the direction of preparing well-scripted proceedings among the sherpas prior to a large degree. Japanese bureaucrats also helped accelerate the trend of ever more cabinet ministers' summit meetings prior to the summit meeting among presidents and prime ministers—hence the proliferation of summit meetings of foreign ministers, finance ministers/central bankers, defense ministers, and most recently internal ministers, etc. Since the number of actors was quite limited and an annually rotated chairperson is easily specified, Japan started to develop bilaterally networked multilateralism

in this context as well. Japan's bilaterally networked multilateralism has one of its direct origins here. However, it must be noted here that great variance exists across cases.

It is very important to emphasize that Japan's bilaterally networked multilateralism is best understood as a set of bilateral networks and joint works enveloped in a multilateral space. Only through working hard bilaterally could good multilateral outcomes be brought about. Emphasis is placed on bilateralism, not on multilateralism. It must be noted that the nature of a multilateral space in which bilaterally networked multilateralism seemingly works tend to be economic, financial, technological, legal and cultural, but never security-related. It has to do a lot with the way in which bureaucratic organizations are constituted in terms of prestige ranking. In the protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, multilateral institutions are not given as much weight and prestige as major powers, judging from the career patterns of bureaucrats assigned to departments dealing with major powers and from the career patterns of those assigned to deal with their counterparts from multilateral institutions. Things have been changing steadily, by conceptualizing multilateral institutions more in line with their increasing global importance in Japanese foreign policy. The point here is that Japanese multilateralism has its tenaciously held bilateralism *über alles* belief underneath.

Bilateralism itself was becoming more multilateral during the period of 1975–1990. The reason is quite simple. Economic globalization accelerated. Market is inherently universal and global. The Plaza summit of 1985 was a big accelerator of financial and economic globalization. It is important to note that in 1985–1986 the amount of currency trade surpassed the amount of trade of goods and services for the first time in history. The former became some 50–100 times larger than the latter by 1986. To help the United States mitigate its twin deficits (government and trade) and become more competitive, the United States government called for an intervention by Group of Five countries, to purchase huge amounts of government bonds in New York. Japanese and German money poured into New York. Since Germany was already contemplating a single European currency, the amount of its currency flowing into New York was somewhat restrained. Japan purchased a massive amount of government bonds in New York and fueled its bubble economy at home. The speed and ease with which money flew accelerated financial integration. The Asia-Pacific region could not be an exception. Regional and global arrangements became increasingly necessary and desirable. Not only global rearrangements like the WTO but regional arrangements like the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum were results of such trends. It is widely known that East Asia is arguably one of the least institutionalized regions in the world. The debate has been going on as to why the absence of such institutionalized cooperation is observed between realism and constructivism. Realism attributes this absence to conflicting interests whereas constructivism attributes this absence to lack of shaped ideas. Here it is suffice to note that Japan's robust bilateralism with regard to such issues as regional security, human rights, and agriculture may be a factor aside from realism or constructivism explains the degree of institutionalized cooperation on a regional scale.

In these multilateral organizations, multilaterally inspired bilateral consultations and coordination prospered. The number of summit meetings of Japanese prime ministers in 1960s and 2000s increased almost 100-fold. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (1964–1972), for instance, did not go abroad at all in only one year of his eight years in power. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–present) meets 12 heads of state in one set of ASEAN Plus Three (refers to the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Nations and three Northeast Asian States, i.e., Japan, South Korea, and China) meetings, which is necessary and efficient. The same applies to the Group of Eight summit meetings. The period of 1975–1990 was one that of a transition, thus registering figures of an intermediate nature in this regard. Bilaterally networked and inspired multilateralism is accentuated by Japanese habit and preference. Japanese leaders find it more difficult to call for action through appeal of speeches, which is the normal practice in many multilateral meetings, and speech drafting and delivery is not one of the strengths Japanese are most proud of. Rather they prefer to court the support of each country individually. For instance, suppose that Japan presents a draft resolution at a UN General Assembly meeting, each and every ambassador of Japan has to report its estimate of the support patterns of the government she/he is assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Logrolling matters here. Logrolling works more effectively bilaterally than multilaterally: you support me on this matter while I support you on that matter. It is simple and effective if both find the combination of the individual issues sufficiently attractive. Possible issues include: a vote for Japan as nonpermanent membership of the UN Security Council; a different item on the same agenda in the same meeting; and an item of official development assistance the government needs from Japan via a Japanese ambassador. Bilaterally inspired and networked multilateralism worked in 1975–1990 in perhaps the most classical fashion.

Bilateralism in Action: 1990–2005

Bilateralism has undergone a metamorphosis during the period after the cold war and especially after the 9/11 terror attacks. American predominance and the proliferation of regionalisms came to the fore. The Japanese strategy to live with American predominance and unilateralism has taken the following scheme. Bilateralism has been further enhanced through their special relationship.²⁶ The personal friendship nurtured between Ronald Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone became political and was elevated to the status of a special relationship. Ronald Reagan delivered a speech in the National Diet of Japan in 1983 saying, “there is nothing that our two countries cannot do.” United States Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield went so far as to say that the United States and Japan had “the most important bilateral relations in the world—bar none.” The personal relationship has been further emphasized between George W. Bush and Junichiro Koizumi. Though not particularly eloquent in their speeches or conversations, they have established a very good relationship. When Koizumi met Bush in Crawford, Texas in June 2003 after the United States declared victory in the Iraq War, Koizumi’s “High Noon” was reciprocated by Bush’s heartfelt embrace. The Japanese strategy is best characterized as the voice-via-loyalty option in Albert Hirschman’s three categories: loyalty, voice and exit, for those facing difficulties in organizations.²⁷ By the voice-via-loyalty option I mean that only thoroughly demonstrating loyalty to the United States can Japan enlarge its freedom to speak its preference. Two examples will suffice to prove this.

First, Japan and Iran concluded an agreement to explore and exploit petroleum in Azadegan, southwestern Iran in 2004. In response, the United States government initially made two mutually contradictory statements about the deal, one mildly positive, the other plainly negative. In Congressional testimonies, it is now clear that two factors mattered to the United States government in giving the Japanese government freedom on this matter.²⁸ First, the Japanese ambassador in Vienna in charge of international organizations (including the International Atomic Energy Agency) delivered a strong speech fiercely opposing the Iranian government’s possible intention to produce nuclear weapons. Second, the Japanese government has sent and kept its 500 strong Self Defense Forces troops in Samawa, southwestern Iraq. When Spain, Norway, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and some other countries withdrew or were about to withdraw their troops from Iraq, Japan has shown its loyalty to the United States by keeping troops in the

country. Even though half the number of Americans are against President George W. Bush, 68 percent of Americans believe that Japan is reliable, the highest figure in the opinion polls the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts every year.²⁹

Second, Japan and North Korea have been getting closer since September 2002 when Koizumi made a surprise visit to Pyongyang in his efforts to bring back Japanese abductees to Japan.³⁰ Five abductees came back, though children were left in Pyongyang having been told that their parents would be back soon. In July 2004 Koizumi made another visit to Pyongyang to bring the remaining members of Ms. Hitomi Soga's family to a reunion in Jakarta, Indonesia. Her American husband and two daughters made for a dramatic family reunification in Jakarta. Her husband, who underwent a surgery this spring in Pyongyang, did go through a more solid examination in Tokyo. To this news, the United States government expressed that the extradition agreement between the two countries was valid and effective, that he would be brought into the custody of one of the United States military bases in Japan to go through the military court, but that he would not be brought into custody in which he received medical treatment in Tokyo. In September 2004 he finally went to the military base in which he sought a legal deal that admitted his guilt.

The Japanese strategy of riding on the era of regionalisms is roughly as follows. As technology advances, the scale of the unit shifts from the state to the region and beyond. The strength of the European Union in shaping the norms and rules of the WTO because of its total trade volume and size of members has made a strong impression on the Japanese. Similarly, the negative experience Japan has gone through in its direct investment in Mexico, for instance, because of Japan's nonmembership in the North American Free Trade Agreement, is something Japan cannot forget. Therefore the regions are at least partially becoming the unit for its strategic planning. But the regional diversity in East and Southeast Asia has kept the area in open, loose regionalism and it is understood that the region is not really ready for any comprehensive regional free trade agreements in any near future.³¹ The awareness that East and Southeast Asia has remained a region that is institutionalized and whose regional identity is yet to be nurtured has become very, very clear to many Japanese leaders. The Japanese sense of regional competition with China has made Japan move strongly to achieve agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the region Japan and Singapore made the first bilateral free trade agreement. It triggered, however, the bilateral agreement between China and ASEAN

concluded soon after. It agreed that both parties would work out the details in ten year's time. It is against the backdrop of this agreement that Japan has started to woo unusually vigorously ASEAN with a comprehensive free trade agreement called an economic partnership agreement. But as China has realized that any comprehensive regional bilateral free trade agreement with ASEAN is not really feasible in the near future, Japan is coming to its original skepticism that region-wide multilateral free trade agreement might also not really be feasible in the near future. Both China and Japan are returning to their original belief in the time-tested bilateralism or, more correctly, bilaterally networked multilateralism.

The tenacious adherence to bilateralism in the Japanese conduct of diplomacy since the opening of the ports and the country in mid-nineteenth century notwithstanding, multilateralism has become a no less salient feature of Japanese diplomacy during this post-cold war and post-9/11 period. In several areas of multilateral diplomacy, not only the sociological aspect of largely bilaterally focused networking but also the ideational aspect of policy package focused appeals have become another focal point of multilateral diplomacy. The areas of policy appeal-focused multilateralism include human rights, disarmament, and human security. Let me take each of the three to illustrate the point that Japan may be using multilateral institutions not only from the predominantly sociological point of view but also from the ideational appeals of policy packages Japan wants to get adopted by institutions.

Japan has been widely regarded as shy about human rights issues. Yet Japan's basic position, as contrasted to the United States position, has been that the historical and institutional legacies cannot be underestimated in dealing with human rights violations and that some cultural sensitivity and fluency in multiculturalism may be exercised in handling human rights issues.³² More operationally, Japan's approach is what is called quiet suasion. It is an antidote to the adversarial approach of showing carrots and sticks. It is the reconciliational approach of inducing voluntary action when carrots are offered. Economic sanctions are not an oft-used weapons in Japanese diplomacy. Even when such action is taken, Japan tends to lift economic sanctions to come sooner than other major powers. That was the case with Japan lifting economic sanctions in 1991 on China with regard to the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. Arms embargo is not an option to Japan as it is prohibited by the National Diet resolution. Japan's view does not lean, however, to the position that a universal definition of human rights does not exist. Rather Japan's position is to encourage the creation of an environment more conducive to the solid observance of human rights. A good example is the prelude to the

Cambodian peace talks. Among the three parties fighting each other, Japan proposed that when reconciliation was made and a peace accord reached by the three parties, official developmental assistance would be offered to aid economic reconstruction in the postconflict period.³³

Disarmament is an issue area in which Japan has made a great initiative with regard to the eradication of small arms and light weapons, using a community-based strategy that uses the ownership concept quite cunningly.³⁴ Earlier, the individualistic approach prevailed in this area: if you surrender a gun, you are given, say, 10 U.S. dollars. The problem with this individualistic approach is that people tend to collect guns from everywhere and that individual efforts do not lead to any positive benefits to a village or a town as a whole where such an effort is undertaken. Instead, Japan proposed to adopt the following formula: if a village or a town collects guns on a communal basis, then that village or town is given a hospital or a school or some other public facilities for communal use. Based on the ownership concept, this approach encourages voluntary action on a communal basis. In other words, since this village is ours, we must work out how the guns will be collected and surrendered and how the collectively owned public facilities will be constructed and maintained. This formula has been moderately successful in Cambodia and Afghanistan, and increasingly in some parts of Africa. Needless to say, keeping such facilities function on a daily basis costs a huge amount of costs and organizational attention.

Human development is a new policy area in which Japan has found a new niche wherein its strengths can be applied. It is a concept articulated by Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate in economics.³⁵ It argues that economic development can only be fully achieved when each and every individual enjoys freedom to identify and develop her/his potential. When India was subjected to British colonialism, large-scale famine took place quite often, because Britain did not care very much about the imminent famine and thus such information did not reach the relevant government offices. Since India's independence, India has not seen any large-scale famine even during the very difficult transition period of partition. Rather than envisaging economic development in poverty-stricken societies as if the task were for engineers to build dams and power stations, one must envisage how individual citizens may be able to drink good water, to study language, to learn about hygiene, to acquire computer skills, to become self-sustaining farmers, to learn to teach, etc. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has spearheaded the area of human development by publishing Human Development Report every year.³⁶

In addition to promoting concepts and ideas to institutions, Japan has started to supply their professionals to multilateral institutions. Since institutions are composed of ideas, personnel and finance, how these components are generated and supplied should not be underestimated. The premise is that Japan must man organizations at a higher level in order to lead organizations. Japan has been a rare member in that the amount of money Japan contributes to such institutions is counter-proportional to the number of professionals working there. This is very clear at the UN, for instance. No less serious is the large number of Japanese nationals working at lower levels in international organizations. No less disturbing is the extreme imbalance of female Japanese nationals compared to male nationals working in such institutions. The ratio of female nationals over male nationals is 8:2, reflecting the relatively closed job market for female professionals in Japanese society. To pay more attention to multilateral institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed those divisions immediately under the Minister's Cabinet starting in July 2004 rather than the Bureau of Foreign Policy Planning, which was the case between 1993 and 2004.³⁷

A serious problem in enhancing Japan's influence in multilateral institutions is that the bureaucrats who are regarded as slightly less competent fill the highest positions in each bureaucratic agency, and they nearly monopolize the high-level positions in multilateral institutions, and these bureaucrats rotate their positions among themselves. Given the generally high-level income level compared to multilateral institutions and the generally domestic orientation in career design, it is not very easy to appoint the very high-level heads of multilateral institutions from among domestic-oriented elite bureaucrats. Much needs to be improved if Japan's use of multilateral institutions is upgraded in terms of effectiveness to materialize its ideas and interests.

Bilateralism in the Future as Seen from Organizational Reform

So far I have stressed that bilateralism has been the primordial mode of handling Japan's international relations. That is why I turn this idea of bilateralism at any cost or bilateralism *über alles*. That is why I borrow the concept of bilaterally networked multilateralism from Brian Job. In this section I speculate how Japan might use multilateral institutions on the basis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' career patterns in the past and from now on. Which career paths are most salient among the occupiers of the top position of the diplomatic corps? Who are sociologically

well-situated in terms of reaching number one position in the diplomatic corps?

In order to answer the question I pose, it is first necessary to describe briefly what composes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁸ The diplomatic corps consist of some few hundred, each year employing about two dozen new cadre candidates. Departments include the Minister's Cabinet and a dozen or so bureaus.

Of all the bureaus two are outstanding: the Treaties Bureau and the North American Bureau. This fact is borne out by the fact that virtually all the Deputy Administrative Foreign Ministers, Japan's number one diplomats, have come to the top position primarily through Treaties Bureau and secondarily through North American Bureau. All the Deputy Administrative Foreign Ministers from 1952 until today came through the Treaties Bureau. The Treaties Bureau plays two indispensable roles: (1) providing drafts of pertinent answers to questions regarding the constitution and the Japan-United States Security Treaty for Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the National Diet, thus playing the sensitive role of the guardian of the constitution and the friendship between Japan and the United States; (2) dealing with all sorts of demands, requests, and suggestions and combining accommodation, rejection, and prolongment, thus confronting issues with well-thought-out and well-prepared arguments in a very legalistic fashion. The North American Bureau plays the key role in dealing with the United States government in all areas and making suggestions to other bureaus and as a matter of fact to other bureaucratic agencies as well about other agendas that might be of conflict with the estimated preference of the U.S. government, thus paving the way to the continuous U.S.-centered bilateralism in Japanese diplomacy. It is not an exaggeration to say that cadre candidates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be strong at legalistic argumentation on any matter to sustain the delicate relationship between the constitution and the Japan-United States Security Treaty to legislators in the National Diet and to public opinion leaders and adept at reading minds of the United States government and maintaining friendship irrespective of the difficulty of issues dealt with. It is very clear that defensive legalism and U.S.-centered bilateralism dominate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Below these two areas of primordial importance are the bilateral bureaus dealing with various regions. Then come the functional areas like Economics, Economic Cooperation, Information and Research, and Cultural Exchange (known as Public Diplomacy since 2004). It is curious to know that other bureaus such as the UN and Information and Research have been subject to occasional organizational mergers and eclipses.

But in 2004 a few organizational changes inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that would enable one to make a glimpse at the future of the Japanese use of multilateral institutions took place. First, the Treaties Bureau has been renamed the International Legal Bureau, whose main task now is to assign internal law experts to major negotiations that other bureaus deal with. Its emphasis has shifted from being a legal guardian at home to being a legal expert abroad. This change may herald the end of dominance of the Treaties/International Legal Bureau. Second, a few International Information/Policy Coordinators have been set up. They are assigned to the task of coordination and aggregation of positions on a certain set of issues, which are to be identified and tackled each time issues come up with a flexibly organized team. This organizational change is expected to mitigate one of the perennial weaknesses of Japanese organizations, that is, its segmented and disaggregated nature. Largely bilaterally oriented bureaus are thought of as slightly lower-prestige units dealing with routine and mundane matters. In light of steadily growing power of the Prime Minister's Office, this change may as well mean one step forward toward the "quasi-colonization" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Prime Minister's Office. This feature was salient especially when Junichiro Koizumi was prime minister (2001–2006) but whether this is a trend is a moot question. Third, the Disarmament Division has been graded upward. It signifies a growing awareness that disarmament questions are big multilateral issues that Japan must deal with a little more effectively. It is curious to note that of all the English school diplomats (those cadre candidates who are assigned for early training at English-speaking universities in the United States or the United Kingdom) the Treaties Bureau and the North American Bureau were most coveted bureaus to be assigned whereas Disarmament Division's predecessor was not a particularly popular place, its rank being slightly lower than a dozen or so bureaus.

These changes do not seem to suggest that a revolutionary change is in the offing in Japan's use of institutions in a multilateral setting. Although Japan has apparently recognized that multilateralism is the wave for the future, it has not been well-prepared to be an agenda-setter and rule-maker in many areas of multilateral diplomacy. Rather it still remained largely an agenda-taker and rule-taker. In a number of areas like international trade, finance, and money, where Japan has at times been a fairly solid agenda-setter and rule-maker, much remains to be done if Japan is to be a proactive agenda-setter and rule-maker in other areas of multilateral diplomacy. What form of institutionalization (global versus regional, for instance) is "ideal" is a subjective matter.

With regard to professional training, it is widely recognized that many of freshman cadre candidates have not necessarily acquired solid proficiency of English and that their speech drafting ability is somewhat limited as speech drafting is normally done first in Japanese and then translated into English, without paying much attention to how to appeal to the audience in terms of agenda-setting and rule-making. And needless to say, their oratorical capacity remains to be significantly improved.

Although its use of institutions is still primarily bilateral, Japan has come to realize that multilateralism is the wave of the future if they started to signal this shift in a modest way with the latest organizational changes. It would signal the gradual shift from U.S.-centered bilateralism and defensive legalism to bilaterally networked multilateralism and in the direction of offensive-framing and agenda-setting approach.

Notes

1. Whether Japan's diplomacy places emphasis on bilateralism or multilateralism aroused wide attention when the Japanese government issued a blue-ribbon commission report on Japanese defense after the cold war in 1996, Akiko Fukushima, *Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). Portions of its report mentioned some merits of multilateralism in Japan's attempt to reduce its over-dependence on the alliance arrangement with the United States. The report aroused somewhat perplexed comments by the United States. In the 2000s, an economic dimension was added to the debate. As globalization deepens, the benefits accrued to free trade agreements, whether it is bilateral or multilateral, are openly sought after. Ironically Japan was not so eager at least initially in the late 1990s and early 2000s to conclude bilateral or regional free trade arrangements as it was more or less content with the arrangements with the WTO and with protectionism at home in such sectors as agriculture, banking, retailing, transport, communications, and education pose an enormous barrier to free trade agreements. However, as China rose up steadily and especially as China concluded in 2003 a free trade agreement with the ASEAN, Japan accelerated its moves toward free trade agreements, focusing on such agreement with ASEAN with the target agreement year being 2006. Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel, *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.- Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Kuniko Ashizawa, "Japan's Approach toward Asia-Pacific Regional Security: From 'Hub-and-Spoke' Bilateralism to 'Multi-Tiered,'" *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003): 361-382.
2. Takashi Inoguchi, "Korea: Japanese Visions of Regional Order: From Chinese-Referenced Regional Order to Western-Referenced Regional Order," in Charles Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, *Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, eds., *Korea at the Center*

(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006). This chapter focuses on the transition of the Japanese vision of regional order in East Asia from 1853 to 1894.

3. How the Japanese faced and reacted to Commodore Perry's visit to Japan is given rich and nuanced pictures in Mitani Hiroshi, *Perry no raiko* [Perry's Visit] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2003). The benign nature of the Perry visit is stressed in Kato Yuzo, *Bakumatsu gaiko to kaikoku* (Tokugawa Diplomacy and the Opening of the Country in Early and Mid-Nineteenth Century) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2004). The historical background of Perry's expedition is given in Inoguchi Takashi, "Perry teitoku Nihon enseiki o yomu (Understanding the Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China and Japan Performed in the Years 1852, 1853 and 1854)," in Inoguchi Takashi, ed., *Perry teitoku enseiki* (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 1999), pp. 257–283.
4. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977). Fukuzaka Yukichi, a well-respected thinker in the Meiji Period, reported that his first dream of the year in 1885 was that Japan joined the seven Western powers to take the public law among nations in their hands. Japan's assiduous learning of international law was facilitated by her acute awareness that Japan was an outlier among the major Western powers. The thought was that only by becoming a good pupil of the West would Japan be accepted by the West as a driving force.
5. Craig Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (New York: Oxford, 1994) and Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). The Japanese study of international relations was until recently one of the most stubborn in portraying world politics as essentially and nearly exclusively Westphalian style relationship among sovereign states. Takashi Inoguchi, "Political Science in Three Democracies, Disaffected (Japan) Third-Wave (Korea) Fledgling (China)," paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Montreal, March 17–21, 2004. How Japanese academics view international relations from what I call the Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian paradigms is examined in Takashi Inoguchi, "Three Japanese Scenarios for the Third Millennium," in Immanuel Wallerstein and Armand Clesse, eds., *The World We Are Entering, 2000–2050* (Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2002), pp. 189–202. For a general description of these three paradigms, see Takashi Inoguchi, "Peering into the Future by Looking Back: The Westphalian, Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian Paradigms," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1999): 173–191. Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of Wars : Occupation, Resistance and the Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6. Arno Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959). Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics; America's Response to War and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). Their ideological impacts on the Japanese

conception of international relations were essentially minimal. Hence the difficulty of Japan in acting “correctly” amidst the new *Zeitgeist* after the Versailles and Washington treaties. See Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). See also Sakai Tetsuya, “Sengo gaikoron niokeru risoshugi to genjitsushugi (Idealism and Realism in the Debates on the Postwar Diplomacy),” *Kokusai Mondai* [International Affairs], No. 432 (March 1996), pp. 24–38.

7. Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai, ed., *Taiheiyo senso eno michi* [The Road to the Pacific War] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1963). See also Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto eds., *Pearl Harbor as History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973) and Hosoya Chihiro, Irie Akira, and Oshiba Ryo, eds., *Kioku to shiteno Pearl Harbor* (Pearl Harbor as Memory) (Kyoto: Minerva shobo, 2004). Also, see James William Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940: Selected Translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no michi, kaisen gaiko shi* (The Road to the Pacific War: A History of the Process Leading to the War) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), *Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932: Selected Translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no michi, kaisen gaiko shi* (The Road to the Pacific War: The Process Leading to the War) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941: Selected Translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no michi, kaisen gaiko shi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Christopher G. Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933* (London: Hamilton, 1972), *Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
8. Prince Konoe, “We Reject the Peace Only Favorable to Anglo-American Powers,” in *Nihon to Nihonjin* [Japan and the Japanese], 1918, quoted in Miwa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yosuke* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1971), pp. 60–61.
9. John Dower, *Embraced by the Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999).
10. Katzenstein Peter, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism—National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Takashi Inoguchi, “Not a Challenger, but a Supporter,” *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1986): 95–115. More recently, however, the pacifism and antimilitarism of postwar Japan has been experiencing some metamorphosis for the last decade, triggered in part by the potentially destabilizing moves developing in North Korea and China and the increasingly proactive orientation of the United States as well as by more domestic factors in Japan.
11. Gaimusho, *Gaiko seisho* [Diplomatic Blue Book] (Tokyo: Okurasho, 1957). It was in 1957 when Kishi was prime minister.

12. See Akiko Fukushima's chapter on Japan and the United Nations in this volume.
13. Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). Other aspects of Japanese-Russian relations can be seen in John J. Stephan, *The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations* (Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1998); Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945: Difficult Peace* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2005).
14. Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Quansheng Zhao, *Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics: Informal Mechanisms and the Making of China Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 1993).
15. George Packard, *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
16. Nakamura Takafusa, *Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History: 1926–1994* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1994); Nakamura Takafusa and Miyazaki Masayasu, eds., *Kishi Nobusuke Seiken to Kodo Seicho* [Kishi Nobusuke, *Its High Economic Growth*] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2003); Hatano Sumio, ed., *Ikeda, Sato Seikenki no Nihon Gaiko* [The Foreign Policy of Japan during the Ikeda and Sato] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo, 2004).
17. Inoue Juichi, "Kichi Nobusuke," in Mikuriya Takashi, ed., *Rekidai Shusho Monogatari* [Stories of Prime Minister] (Tokyo: Shinshokan, 2003), pp. 176–183.
18. *The Economist*, September 1, 1962, p. 11.
19. Inoguchi Takashi, "NichiBei kankei kara mita Nihon gaiko ron [Japanese Diplomatic Policy Lines as Seen from Japan-United States Relations], *Kan*, Vol. 16 (January 2004): 14–22.
20. Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). Japanese-South Korean relations has been characterized by the manifold density and intensity of their legacies and interactions. See, for instance, Kimura Kan, *Chosen/Kankoku Nationalism to shokoku ishiki* [Korean Nationalism and Small Country Consciousness] (Kyoto: Minerva shobo, 2000).
21. Haruhiro Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking," in T.J. Pempel, ed. *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 69–70. Deng Xiaoping is known to have said that unless China and Japan do not get along with each other, one half of the heavens would fall down. The point is how to find a compatible and enduring solution.

22. Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*; Tanaka Akihiko, *Nitchu Kankei, 1945–1990* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991).
23. Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Japanese-Russian relations have been semi-frozen most of the post–1945 years irrespective of the cold war and post–cold war periods. Hence after World War II there has been neither peace treaty nor territorial settlement.
24. William Tow, Russell Trood, Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
25. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Payne, *Hanging Together* (London: Sage, 1997); Shiro Saito, *Japan at the Summit: Its Role in the Western Alliance and in Asian Pacific Co-Operation* (London: Routledge, 1990); Davis Bobrow and Mark Boyer, *Defensive Internationalism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
26. Takashi Inoguchi, “America and Japan: The Political Is Personal,” *Open Democracy*, June 17, 2004.
27. Albert Hirschman, *Voice, Exit and Loyalty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
28. United States Congress, *Testimony on Japan's Deal with Iran on Petroleum Exploitation at Azadegan, Iran*. TACREF (Tokyo American Center Reference), March 30, 2004. Raquel Shaoul “An Evaluation of Japan's Current Energy Policy in the Context of the Azadegen Oil Field Agreement Signed in 2004,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (December 2005): 411–437.
29. “Gaikusho NichiBei kankei yoron chosa” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Annual Opinion Polls on Japan-United States Relations in Japan and the United States], *Yomiuri shimbun*, July 16, 2004.
30. On Koizumi's surprise visit to Pyongyang, see, *Kokko seijoka kosho saikaie Kyo Nitcho Kaidan* [Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks Resume Today], *Asahi Shinbun*, September 17, 2002.
31. The China-ASEAN free trade agreement envisages its implementation by 2013. The ongoing negotiation between Japan and ASEAN on a comprehensive economic association targets at 2006 as the date of agreement. A comprehensive economic association agreement tries to link two free trade economies in a more multidimensional framework than merely a free trade agreement in the thinking of the Japanese government. The idea is not only to liberalize trade but also to liberalize the economy with an eye at the mode and timing necessary to carry out adjustments sector by sector and at the “self-sustainability” of the economy after such an agreement is enacted.
32. A detailed comparison between Japan and the United States approaching the issues of human rights and democracy in the Asia-Pacific is attempted in Takashi Inoguchi, “Human Rights and Democracy in Pacific Asia: Contention and Collaboration between the U.S. and Japan,” in Peter

- Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington, eds., *United States-Japan Relations after the Cold War* (La Jolla, CA: Graduate School of Pacific Studies and International Relations, 1994), pp. 115–153.
33. Kohno Masaharu, *Wabei kosaku—Tai Cambodia gaiko no shougen* (Peace Building Operations: Witnessing Japan's Diplomacy toward Cambodia) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1999); Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).
 34. Keith Krause, ed., *Small Arms Yearbook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 35. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
 36. United Nations Human Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 37. Gaimusho, *Korekara no Gaimusho* [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs from now on] (Tokyo: Gaimusho, 2004).
 38. *Gaimusho soshiki kaikaku* (Organizational Reforms at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/kai_genjo/>, August 22, 2002.