
Sovereignties: Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian

Takashi Inoguchi^a and Paul Bacon^b

^a*Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. Email: inoguchi@ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp*

^b*Faculty of Political Economy, Shumei University, 1-1 Daigaku-cho, Yachiyo-shi, Chiba 276-0003, Japan. Email: pbacon@hpo.net*

Abstract

Sovereignty remains the key concept and principle according to which the world is ordered. But sovereignty is also a disputed concept and a contested social practice; it has come under fierce assault from a number of diverse sources. Sovereignty is paradoxical in nature and hypocritically practised. States have different empirical degrees and qualitative types of sovereignty, ranging from the merely formal to the substantial to the popular. States also have different dispositions towards sovereignty, and are liable to project their own in different ways in pursuit of conflicting objectives. Different groups of states attempt to impose their understandings and beliefs on the international system. There are three ideal types which help us to understand the issue of sovereignty and the interactions of sovereign states. These are respectively Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian. The Westphalian paradigm has the maintenance and protection of state sovereignty as its key concept. The liberal paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of popular sovereignty and controversies over the extent to which this ideal should be promoted and exported. The anti-utopian paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of quasi-sovereignty or the loss of sovereignty, and in terms of resistance to attempts to impose globalization and liberal values on recalcitrant states and cultures.

1 Introduction

Sovereignty remains the key concept and principle according to which the world is ordered. But sovereignty is also a disputed concept and a contested

social practice; it has come under fierce assault from a number of diverse sources. The present system of sovereign states is conventionally understood to have had its origins in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The norms and practices of this European system were then applied to the non-Western world as international society expanded, and became ‘standards of civilization’ (Bull and Watson, 1984; Gong, 1984). The spread of the system of sovereign states is therefore closely related to the spread of European imperialism. This notwithstanding, many anti-colonial movements cast their claims to independence in terms of demands for their own sovereign state. The sovereign state, originally an agent of imperialist expansion, had become a political aspiration for those wishing to defend themselves against imperialism. Sovereign status is now jealously guarded by former colonies and non-Western states.

For much of this century, Western realist thought has also placed significant emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty. However, more recent critical scholarship has historicized the origins of the Westphalian system, and shown how the concept of sovereignty has itself changed and developed over time. It can be suggested that we are entering a late- or post-Westphalian phase in international relations in that the priority of state sovereignty is being subjected to increasing scrutiny. However, it has also been claimed that many purportedly sovereign states are in fact ‘quasi-sovereign’ and possessed only of negative and formal-judicial sovereign status (Jackson, 1990). Constructivists have suggested that a popular or liberal conception of sovereignty is replacing the legalist conception that has traditionally formed the basis of international law (Deudney, 1996; Onuf, 1998). It has also been suggested that the significance of the Westphalian system of rules has always been exaggerated, that international institutionalization is not strong, and that we live in a system organized according to principles of ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner, 1999). In this conclusion we survey these recent developments in the study of conceptual, empirical and historical aspects of state sovereignty. We also advance three ideal types which help to locate discussion of the motives and interactions of sovereign states.

2 The paradox of sovereignty

The idea of sovereignty is at root paradoxical. According to Hinsley’s (1986) classic definition, sovereignty entails the ‘idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community . . . and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’. Hinsley argues that sovereignty is a historical achievement, and that locating final authority within the community simultaneously challenges the validity of any external claims to authority. This idea

of domestic sovereignty also has clear implications for relations between sovereigns. According to the idea of internal sovereignty, final authority lies within the community. According to the idea of external authority, there is no final authority among states because each state is an authority independent of the others. On this conception states are existentially separate and ontologically antecedent to their social relations. This affirmation of sovereignty nevertheless serves to constitute other states as outsiders, albeit as sovereign others. The absence of supreme central political authority has led to a characterization of political relations between sovereign states as anarchical.

However, the claim that sovereign states are discrete actors and are somehow antecedent to their international relations is at odds with the fact that sovereignty also requires recognition; the act of recognition is necessary in order for states to function as sovereign entities. The claim of a sovereign state to exercise final authority within its own boundaries depends logically on the extension of this same right to all states, and states therefore constitute each other as sovereign (Hinsley, 1986). But the idea that one actor can constitute another as sovereign is at root contractictory. Mayall (1990) refers to this as the *paradox of state sovereignty*; the fact that two of the key ideas associated with sovereignty – power and recognition – exist in critical tension. This need for recognition also clearly indicates that purportedly sovereign states are actually actors embedded in a complex of structured social processes. Since the end of the Cold War, a great deal of reflectivist scholarship has attempted to demonstrate that we should conceive of state sovereignty in this way.

3 Westphalian international society?

Theorists of international society take this to mean that sovereign states are constituted by, and together constitute, a society of states. Hedley Bull (1995) famously defines a society of states as existing where ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and certain common values, form a society in that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’. What are the rules by which sovereign states consider themselves to be bound in international society? Jackson (2000) defines these rules as follows (i) sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; (ii) refraining from the threat or the use of force; (iii) inviolability of frontiers; (iv) territorial integrity of states; (v) peaceful settlement of disputes; (vi) non-intervention in internal affairs; (vii) respect for human rights; (viii) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (ix) co-operation among states; (x) fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. The six most important norms on this list refer to the sanctity and preservation of state sovereignty.

Jackson refers to state sovereignty as the most important norm – or *Grundnorm* – of international relations.

3.1 Organized hypocrisy

However, it has been suggested that the term ‘state sovereignty’ is doing too much work, and that the term ‘sovereignty’ refers to a cluster of concepts and attributes that need to be disaggregated. Drawing on the work of Krasner (1999) and Litfin (1997), one might suggest that sovereignty possesses five properties: territory, recognition, autonomy against external interference, control of borders, and legitimacy. Legitimacy can refer, in Weberian terms, to the possession of a *legitimate* monopoly on the internal use of force. It can also refer to constitutive recognition in international society. Jackson (1990) has noted that many of Africa’s weak states exist because of the status conferred on them by international recognition, and not by virtue of substantial empirical statehood, such as the ability of a centralized sovereign power to control borders and exercise internal rule. Other states such as Taiwan have many of the positive attributes that would conventionally be associated with the possession of substantial sovereign statehood, and yet do not enjoy international legal recognition (Krasner, 1999). These two examples hopefully serve to illustrate the basic point that when we refer to state sovereignty, we can be referring to a number of different attributes.

Only a very few states have possessed all of these attributes. It is perhaps more helpful to identify four different types of sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). As we have seen above, theorists of international society place a great deal of emphasis on international legal sovereignty and the related norms of sovereignty and non-intervention that comprise Westphalian sovereignty. But domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty are also important. Domestic sovereignty relates to the organization of public authority within the state. Is it legitimate and/or effective? Is the state able to maintain order, collect taxes, regulate pornography, repress drug use, prevent abortion, minimize corruption and control crime? All states experience difficulties protecting their borders and controlling the flow of drugs, disease, information, capital, crime and humans. This aspect of sovereignty is referred to as interdependence sovereignty.

Krasner argues that

none of the best-developed approaches to international relations adequately conceptualize how international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty have actually functioned. Both are examples of organized hypocrisy. Their defining rules have endured and been widely recognized and endorsed but, at the same time, sometimes compromised – in the case of Westphalian sovereignty frequently compromised. (1999, p. 72)

He claims that constructivists and theorists of international society have understated the importance of power and self-interest in global politics, and have overemphasized the significance of international as opposed to domestic roles and norms. For Krasner it is wrong to suggest that Westphalian sovereignty is the operative principle in international relations, but it is equally mistaken to believe that Westphalian logic is being supplanted by the emergence of institutional norms and global governance. Instead, the Westphalian system is honoured in the breach, and we live in a system in which Westphalian standards are used as resources in a system of organized hypocrisy.

3.2 Historicizing Westphalia

According to the conventional view of international law during the Cold War period, it was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that ushered in the modern period of the nation-state and state sovereignty, departing from the previous medieval pattern, in the case of Europe, of religious universality and political feudalism. However, the fact is that before and after the Treaty of Westphalia, the landscape of Europe did not change dramatically, as Spruyt (1993) amply demonstrates. One of the key features of the Treaty of Westphalia is the emphasis on territoriality. Whereas feudalism defined authority in terms of a hierarchy of personal relationships, after Westphalia borders became the critical factor determining the legitimate extent of the exercise of sovereign authority. It is clear that Westphalia codified the sovereignty of the territorial state.

However, Bueno de Mesquita (2000) suggests that it is most accurate to conceive of Westphalia as an important event in a process which began some 500 years earlier. If we define sovereignty as an exclusive property right exercised over a specified territorial space, then sovereignty came into existence as the result of the Concordat of Worms in 1122. The Concordat of Worms and the associated agreements established a property right which related to the king as a head of state rather than as an individual. This new source of revenue represented an early element in the establishment of state sovereignty, including the right to raise taxes within a defined territory, which is often regarded as one of the central elements of sovereignty enunciated at Westphalia. This fiduciary role of the monarch was new, and created competition between the pope and kings over political control. Bueno De Mesquita argues that the competition which was institutionalized at Worms provided the catalyst for the construction of new executive, judicial, taxing and legislative apparatus which eventually emerged as the state as we know it. On this view, and contrary to the myth of origin which has emerged around 1648, Westphalia does not enjoy dramatically different qualitative status from

what went before. It is one of many important staging posts on the journey to the modern society of states.

3.3 The expansion of Westphalian and international legal sovereignty

The society of states evolved in the context of the breakdown of medieval Christendom and was initially a European institution. It is rooted in the political culture of the European peoples. It became a transatlantic institution following the American revolution of the late eighteenth century. The beginning of the universalization of international society began with the accession of the Ottoman Empire to the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The extension of international society beyond Europe (including Turkey) and America was first generally recognized by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, where most states of the Americas and several non-Western states, including Japan, were represented (Jackson, 2000). Further expansions of international society took place with the founding of the League of Nations in 1919 and later the United Nations in 1945.

Since that time there have been two further surges in membership of international society. These can be attributed to the wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia, which reflected the post-war diminution of European power, and the rash of new states created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. At the end of World War Two, there were only fifty-one sovereign states in the world, mostly European states and white-settled ex-colonies. When the UN headquarters building in New York was designed in 1945, the architect projected that the building would eventually have to accommodate a maximum of 100 member-states. However, by the mid-1960s, there were far more than 100 and the figure is now approaching 200. Only in the last forty or fifty years has international society become a truly inclusive global association. As Spruyt (2000) has noted, there are ironic elements to the creation of the modern state system at the second millennium's end. Initially the European inventors of the principle of sovereign territorial rule denied that same principle to the non-European subject territories. These former subjects, however, turned the principle against their masters to obtain their independence. But in so doing they also participated in the final completion (and perhaps the high-water mark) of the West European project: the full expansion of the Westphalian order across the globe.

3.4 Nationalism and self-determination

It is, of course, possible to suggest that international society is not yet inclusive, and that there remain many frustrated would-be member nations with

strong cases for political independence. After Westphalia there remained many actors and entities that are best described as medieval, such as the Hanseatic League, the Italian city-states, the empires of Central Europe, and the Vatican. It is only from the nineteenth century onwards that sovereign states came to occupy a central place in global politics, with territorially based nation states born one after another within Europe (Germany and Italy) as well as in its periphery (the United States and Japan). Also, according to Caporoso (2000), nationalism was a phenomenon that only took off during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although we regard nationalism as a central feature of the modern political landscape, the political system of the seventeenth century did not rest on anything like the cultural groups which developed much later. Even apparently homogenous nation-states are often recent amalgamations of different ethnic and racial groups.

What is the precise nature of the relationship between states and nations? Deutsch *et al.* (1957) characterize this as a demand-side phenomenon, where communities of identity formed and then chose their own sovereign institutions. Tilly (1992), on the contrary, suggests that as part of the project of consolidating state power, state leaders create loyal subjects and citizens by cultivating a myth of origin, teaching civic pride, and inculcating numerous national symbols in the minds of their subjects. There are thus contrasting views on whether nations make states, or states make nations. How exactly are we to evaluate the existing degree of congruence between state and national boundaries? It has become conventional to bemoan the lack of congruence, and to identify it as one of the primary sources of conflict in contemporary international society. But Caporoso (2000) suggests that, given the recentness of the phenomenon of nationalism, the congruence between state and national boundaries is actually far closer than we might reasonably expect.

This further raises the question of whether self-determination is or is not a feature of the contemporary society of states. It is commonly held to be so, and is often mentioned in the same breath as state sovereignty and non-intervention as if it were a complementary aspect of the sovereignty compact. But, of course, if the principle of self-determination for peoples were to be applied literally, then the implications for the contemporary society of states would be nothing short of subversive. As Spruyt (2000) notes, self-determination is untenable in practice unless one argues that the roughly 3000–5000 ethnic groups that exist today should all be allowed to constitute independent states. Jackson (2000) argues that self-determination is *not* part of the contemporary Westphalian compact. It is clear that the principle of self-determination has been applied selectively and inconsistently during the twentieth century.

3.5 *Legitimacy*

There is a further problem with the issue of legitimacy. The Concordat of Worms and the Treaty of Westphalia both contributed to the establishment of the territorially sovereign state, but they did not establish the modern sovereign state as we know it. As Litfin (2000) suggests, a central feature of modernity is that state authority has been conceived as resting on the consent of the governed. Worms fomented and Westphalia legitimated the power of monarchs within territorially delineated jurisdictions, but this concept of the state was based far more in terms of divine right than in any notion of consent. Thomson (1994) also argues that the state's oft-touted monopoly of legitimate violence did not arrive until the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the formal juridical elements of sovereignty existed centuries earlier, the substantial distinction between the legitimately sovereign inside and the anarchical outside did not emerge until much later. Onuf and Klink (1989) further note that the validity of the distinction between inside and outside did not emerge until the consolidation of substantial democracy. The term sovereignty contains numerous elements and embodies too many imprecise terms which need to be unpacked. One of the major problems is the conflation of the ideas of legitimacy and authority. It is common, but not at all necessarily accurate, to associate the term sovereignty with the popularly sovereign modern nation-state.

3.6 *Quasi-sovereignty*

The concept of failed states is important here. Jackson defines such states as having self-destructed from within as a result of armed anarchy. Such countries are political failures and their condition is self-inflicted. Failed states cannot or will not safeguard the minimal civil conditions of life for their citizens, such as domestic peace, law and order, and good governance (Jackson, 2000). They subvert the logic that is conventionally held to govern the assignation of sovereign statehood. Instead, failed states have a juridical existence and are internationally recognized as such, but they have little if any substantive empirical existence. The fact of international recognition as member-states of the United Nations makes it difficult for intervention to occur in what may be illegitimate and highly dangerous domestic political circumstances.

States have this legal independence largely as a result of the emergence of a postcolonial international society that regarded political and legal emancipation as an imperative which was not dependent on the substantive domestic social and economic conditions of would-be states. One of the new norms of postcolonial international society has been that societies were granted independence even if they were in no position to exercise it in ways

conventionally associated with sovereign statehood. These include, as we saw above, active control of a territory and its borders, and so on. What Jackson refers to as the ‘international guarantee’ of juridical statehood brought into existence a number of insubstantial states which he suggests we should refer to as ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson 1990, 2000). Many of these entities are the successor states of defunct colonial empires or Communist federations that have failed to consolidate internally with the advent of independence. Jackson (2000) is prepared to identify the following states as having been failed states during the 1990s: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Columbia, Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia.

According to Article 4 of the UN Charter, there is a substantive requirement for membership which stipulates that member-states are ‘able and willing to carry out’ their Charter requirements. However in the emerging postcolonial international political climate it became untenable to make political independence conditional upon a capacity for self-government, as defined by Western states. Self-government had become a categorical right. This was reflected in UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. According to this Declaration, ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination’ and ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’ (Jackson, 2000). From this point onwards, self-determination became the basic criterion for admission into international society, and eclipsed the idea that states had to be empirically plausible. *De jure* recognition replaced *de facto* recognition. As Litfin (2000) points out, the whole meaning of democracy in the modern era, and especially in the second half of the twentieth century, is that state authority is grounded upon the consent of the governed and institutionalized through open and fair elections. A further irony, then, is that just as state sovereignty was being linked to democratic legitimacy, the political climate in international society created an imperative for the unconditional dispensation of insubstantial and merely juridical sovereignty.

3.7 Change and continuity

Since 1648 sovereign states have evolved in the context of the destruction of medieval society, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, the Enlightenment and the political revolutions of the eighteenth century, nationalism and the spread of the nation-state, the Industrial Revolution, urbanization, mechanization, democracy, Nazism, Communism, and the advent of the nuclear age (Jackson, 2000). International society and the

relations of sovereign states have changed and evolved over time. Several norms that were present in the international societies of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries disappeared in the twentieth century. These include an expansive set of discretionary sovereign state rights regarding the international use of armed force, such as the right to intervene, the right to initiate aggressive war, the right of conquest, and the right to control foreign territories as colonial dependencies (Jackson, 2000). What is more, the society of states will continue to evolve in response to new developments. For example, the Westphalian compact is currently being challenged by the emergence of some new norms or proto-norms, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, international aid, environmentalism and humanitarian intervention.

While the *Grundnorm* of state sovereignty has remained intact, the constellation of supporting norms has adapted and changed in character over time. Much has changed and much has remained the same in Westphalian society. Pluralist advocates of international society such as Jackson like to stress the basic continuity which they see as having been inherent in the adherence to a core of settled rules over time. Constructivists like to historicize and relativize international society, and demonstrate the fact that new norms and institutions are emerging. Krasner stresses the continuity of certain structural elements in the international system, such as power asymmetries, and the lack of authoritative, universal decision-making structures. He argues that Westphalian rules are frequently violated but also that the international system is highly complex and weakly institutionalized. Instead, organized hypocrisy is the norm.

4 The Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian paradigms

States have different empirical degrees and qualitative types of sovereignty, ranging from the merely formal to the substantial to the popular. States have different dispositions towards sovereignty, and are liable to project their own in different ways in pursuit of conflicting objectives. Different groups of states attempt to impose their understandings and beliefs on the international system. We identify three ideal types which help us to understand the issue of sovereignty and the interactions of sovereign states (Inoguchi, 1999). These are respectively Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian. The Westphalian complex has the maintenance and protection of state sovereignty as its key concept. The liberal paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of popular sovereignty, and controversies over the extent to which this ideal should be promoted and exported. Liberal states enjoy substantial degrees of popular sovereignty; they enjoy relations of complex interdependence with other republican states; and they increasingly conceive of these interrelationships in

late- or post-Westphalian terms (Linklater, 1998). As well as being more prepared to conceive their relationships with fellow liberals in co-operative terms, they are also less likely to take claims to sovereign statehood as seriously as their Westphalian counterparts. This is evident in recent justifications for NATO activity in Kosovo, and in the content of Blair's 'Doctrine of the International Community' (Roberts, 1999). Perhaps the key difference between Westphalian and liberal groups of states is the different views they have about the acceptability of action with regard to failed states. The anti-utopian paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of quasi-sovereignty or the loss of sovereignty, and in terms of resistance to attempts to impose globalization and liberal values on recalcitrant states and cultures. In this second section of this paper we articulate these three political paradigms, and also sketch the three economic foundations that sustain and reinforce these paradigms.

Liberalism has enjoyed a revival at the end of the twentieth century. This is manifest in the dramatic increase in the number of liberal democracies that subscribe to the norms and rules of the free market economy and democratic politics. One of the principles leading to this increase is that democracies rarely fight each other (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). By anti-utopian, we refer to failed and failing states and the competition to decide what will happen to them. Will they become subsumed within the globalizing Liberal project, or will they become pockets of resistance to this phenomenon by falling back on indigenous resources to defend their economic integrity and cultural identity? The term anti-utopian derives from the colonialist legacy. At the end of the twentieth century, the universalist forces that sought to 'civilize' the world through territorial expansion in the colonial age shifted to international efforts aimed at global governance, human security and humanitarian assistance. However noble these utopian objectives, they have mainly resulted in prolonged strife, exploitative regimes shored up by international aid and failed states.

The growing liberal influence is evidenced by the number of sovereign states that adopt in their domestic constitutions rhetorical adherence to the conventions and declarations on freedom, democracy, equality and human rights of 1776 (United States), 1789 (France) and 1945 (United Nations). The growing influence of the anti-utopian framework is evidenced by the number of humanitarian-assistance and peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations that are occasioned by large-scale famine and by intermittent civil strife. In other words, while Westphalian society has retained its significance in the twentieth century, there has also been a steady erosion of state sovereignty in the wake of globalization and the growth of global civil society (Biersteker and Weber 1996). These phenomena are behind the concomitant rise in the number of liberal as well as anti-utopian actors. In other

words, evidence for all three paradigms can be discerned in contemporary international relations.

Indicative of this coexistence of the three paradigms is the publication of three books, each of which frames post-Cold War US foreign policy in relation to the three paradigms (Inoguchi, 2000): Henry Kissinger (1993), Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Samuel Huntington (1996). Kissinger identifies balancing and bandwagoning as the key dicta of Westphalian international relations. State sovereignty and the primacy of foreign policy are the two key themes. All other things are judged according to whether they facilitate the realization of adroit exercises in the balance of power. Kissinger's argument is that as the United States's hegemony going back to 1945 is bound to decline slowly, its international leadership must be augmented by intermittent acts of balancing. His central concern is with peace achieved by the finessing of balance-of-power politics among the major powers.

Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War also marked the end of history and the triumph of liberal democratic capitalism. In the long run, all societies will be organized in this way, because this model has proved itself to be superior to all other forms of government. He also argues that such 'post-historical states' are peaceful in their interrelationships because they share a common set of norms and values such as democracy and liberalism. Advocates of this theory argue that by promoting democracy, the United States can lessen the likelihood of the outbreak of war. At the same time, the passive version of this idea advises that the United States limit its interaction with other states to liberal democracies. Contact with non-democracies, which for the time being remain mired in the historical world, may be dangerous and deplete resources. It is therefore to be avoided.

Huntington also focuses on regions of the world that are potentially resource-draining: the Islamic world and China. He argues that many civilizations are incompatible and the world is rife with situations for their potential clash. While he argues that international primacy matters, he does not state that Western values are universal. Rather than universal, he argues, the West is unique (Huntington, 1993, 1996). Huntington's primary perception is of the essential incompatibility of civilizations and of some religions and races, as a result of differences in language, geography and history. For Kissinger, Westphalian norms and strategies remain fundamental to the practice of diplomacy between sovereign states. Fukuyama believes that the Cold War ultimately presages a decisive victory for liberal values. The conceptual struggle is over and it is now matter of waiting until history plays itself out to produce a liberal world. Huntington believes that international relations will be reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines.

The tensions between these three paradigms are reflected in contradictions in US foreign policy. The United States is one of the most frugal of countries when it comes to limiting the transfer of state sovereignty to international organizations. In this regard and especially with regard to its relationship with the United Nations, the United States can be a bigot Westphalian. At the same time, the United States proselytizes about and occasionally crusades for the principles of freedom, democracy and human rights, in the process prioritizing these principles over the norms of Westphalian society. The United States is an innate if hypocritical liberal. Furthermore, the United States relentlessly advances the notion and practice of the global market and global governance on the basis of the no-nonsense recognition of unbridgeable gaps between different religions, races, languages and histories in terms of its own national interests. The United States can often be a cool-headed anti-utopian state. It is important not to overestimate the determining power of the United States, but equally it is important to acknowledge that if America decisively selects one of these identities, then this will have substantial implications for the future development of global politics.

As the leading global power, the United States needs a grand guiding strategy. The United States remains at present the most significant of the liberal actors, and has spearheaded the economic liberalization and political democratization of the late twentieth century. It is virtually the only global actor equipped with both the physical apparatus and the potential mind-set for armed intervention. The primary responsibility for overseeing global developments on the geopolitical, economic and cultural fronts falls on its shoulders. When the distribution of military power is characterized by the salience of a very powerful actor with the rest trailing behind, it is natural that the United States should assume responsibility for the maintenance of strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, low-intensity warfare and satellite intelligence. When economic globalization accelerates and political and social liberalization gain momentum, there must be leadership to see to it that shared norms and values drive the global community to take concerted action to sustain peace and prosperity. When the marginalized segments of the global market become volatile and when the peripheral areas of the world become unstable, there needs to be leadership to address the problems that intermittently arise in failed and failing states. That leadership tends to end up being provided by the United States, depending on the paradigmatic predisposition of critics, a little too often, not often enough, or not quickly enough. In order to characterize the three paradigms in more detail we will sketch their constituent political frameworks and economic foundations.

5 Politics and economics in the three paradigms

5.1 *Political frameworks of the three paradigms*

In the Westphalian paradigm, the actors are ‘normal states’ and the basic premise of relationships is state sovereignty (Inoguchi, 1999). In the liberal paradigm, the actors are liberal democracies as politico-economic systems, and the basic premise is the promotion and defense of liberal politics and economics. In the anti-utopian framework, the actors are failed and failing states, and the basic premise is loss of sovereignty and how to respond to this. Normal states are characterized as having substantial, if not always necessarily legitimate, state sovereignty and by a clear distinction of order within versus anarchy without. They are especially sensitive to infringements of sovereignty and territoriality. They abhor interference in internal affairs (Biersteker and Weber, 1996). Liberal democracies are characterized by firmly entrenched popular sovereignty and broad acceptance of universal norms and values such as the free market and democratic politics, however incompatible these two norms may at times be. They assume a strong link between popular sovereignty and legitimacy. They seek to downplay emphasis on protectionism and state sovereignty and the potentially volatile politics of the marginalized segments of the globe. Failed or quasi-states have either ‘hollowed-out’ or simply never enjoyed a substantial sovereign empirical reality at any stage. They have become economically marginalized. They are vulnerable in the face of global economic changes and prone to suffer from internal disorder and civil strife. They tend to be ripe for intervention from outside, whether it comes in the form of colonialism, humanitarian relief, armed aggression, or economic penetration and exploitation.

The behavior modalities of Westphalian states are balancing, bandwagoning and non-interference (Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1998). The aim of balancing is to contain the assertiveness of other normal states. Capability to fight must be maintained in case it is necessary. In the case of an overwhelmingly powerful normal state (or coalition thereof), a state may resort to bandwagoning. The behavior modalities of liberal democracies are binding, and isolationism or crusading (Deudney, 1996; Keane, 1998; Onuf, 1998). Like-minded actors band together in order to achieve a larger and stronger union. When faced with forces that might jeopardize liberal democratic norms at their foundation, however, isolationism or indifference may be expedient if hypocritical. The behavioral modalities of failed and failing states are ‘hollowing-out’ and collapse. These are actors that are no longer autonomous. Aside from their legal status, they enjoy no substantial empirical personality in international society. They are associated with anarchy within and intervention from without, yet they are so amorphous that their

strength is not much affected by such outside intervention (IFRCRCS, 1998; UNHCR, 1998).

5.2 Economic foundations of the three paradigms

The three political dispositions and frameworks entail related economic bases. The Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian economic bases of the three frameworks can be discerned, respectively, in the work of Gerschenkron (1965), Reich (1991) and Landes (1998). Gerschenkron's key concept is national economy, and the key actor is the sovereign state which is attempting to mediate its late industrialization and comparative economic backwardness. His protagonists are Russia and Germany, but in the late twentieth-century context we can apply his arguments to the following three groups of states: (i) the East Asian states with their developmentalist strategies, which share commonalities with Germany and Russia in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; (ii) the Nordic states with their social-democratic policy packages; (iii) the post-Napoleonic states with regard to regulation. These actors more or less uniformly stress the positive role of the state in bringing about economic prosperity and social stability. It is commonly argued that globalization creates weak and unstable states that are incapable of responding to the demands of their citizens or of managing their exposure to a hostile and volatile international economy. It is claimed that the weakness and instability of such states will eventually undermine their economic efficiency (Esping-Anderson, 1985; Boyer, 1990; Wade, 1991; Bienefeld, 1996).

Reich's key concept is the global market and the key actor is an anonymous and amorphous set of all the speculators in the world, who are on the lookout for opportunities to be exploited. According to this argument, the scenario of the future is unilateral and inevitable movement towards further globalization. Reich's future is to be sustained by the fortunate few who can adapt to and excel in global mega-competition. Government intervention, especially if it takes the form of protectionism, will necessarily reduce the general standard of living. Reich's liberal worldview is modernization theory writ large, with the United States as the model for this liberalization and globalization.

Landes's key concept is economic development, and the key actors are groups of entrepreneurs with the propensity to make the best use of technological breakthroughs. The driving force is a supportive entrepreneurial and cultural disposition towards innovation and enterprise. The critical variable is therefore the cultural predisposition to promote invention and know-how in the context of economic development. Both Reich and Landes make much of the importance of the existence of a culture of trust and solidarity. Yet Reich's conception of trust is far more generalized (Putnam, 1993;

Yamagishi, 1998) than Landes's conception. Landes's conception is historically, geographically and culturally far more nuanced and differentiated.

Gerschenkron's transformative mechanism is the large input of capital and labor: a system of stockholding to collect capital, state-led industrialization to guide entrepreneurs, and long working hours in exchange for permanent employment status or high wages. As Paul Krugman (1993) correctly points out, a good deal of the East Asian miracle can be explained by the massive input of capital and labor. The transformative mechanism of the Reich world is the straightforward input of technological innovation. As Paul Romer (1990) cogently argues, technology itself is endogenized in the market here, in contrast to the Gerschenkron view, where technology tends to be treated as exogenous. The global market began to flourish after telecommunications devices became available to all speculators and after opportunities for currency trading were dramatically amplified by the Plaza Accord of 1985. The volume of currency trade surpassed that of goods and services in 1986 for the first time in human history, rising to about eighty times that of the latter in 1996. It will further flourish at some future time when telemanufacturing and teledistribution devices are invented and utilized globally. Landes's transformative mechanism is Weberian. The inner values and attitudes that guide a population are depicted as fundamental to initiating, advancing and sustaining economic development. Certain kinds of values and attitudes cherished by a population are more conducive to invention and innovation and to enterprise and development.

These three economic paradigms coexist in the early twenty-first century. The processes that Gerschenkron identifies persist in East Asia despite the erosion of confidence engendered by the Asian financial crisis. Evidence for Reich's globalization thesis can be found almost everywhere. The dramatic global spread of telecommunications technology and the instantaneous global financial services associated with that spread are the basis of this expansion. Lastly, the potential for the development of Landes's ideas lies in the fundamental differences in the inner values and attitudes which are inculcated and inherited among cultures. These are more durable than the technologically driven cultural convergence thesis allows. The Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian political paradigms have their economic foundations in each of these three frameworks.

5.3 The three paradigms and the future: a sketch

It is by no means clear that comprehensive globalization would be conducive to peace and prosperity. If everything becomes subject to market forces, two problems may emerge. First, market turbulence creates instability. Second, the pursuit of market efficiency accelerates the marginalization of non-

competitive segments of economies. The growing disparities that result from globalization and marginalization could easily create the conditions in which market forces cannot function well. Therefore, globalization and integration do not at all necessarily engender the unilateral establishment of liberal values and practices. The liberal framework may atrophy if its economic foundations are not assured at an optimal level. George Soros's metaphor of a huge iron ball destroying a number of economies one by one as it swings is very apt in this respect (Soros, 1998). As the momentum behind globalization and liberalization intensifies, disparities within and between states may create social and political tensions which cannot easily be contained. It is obvious that globalization threatens the traditional principle of Westphalian state sovereignty. But there is also a point at which globalization undermines the economic and political liberalism that are crucial to the advancement of the liberal paradigm. Anti-utopian developments seem more likely under such circumstances. Similarly, globalization and integration taken to the extreme may bring about a revival of state sovereignty because this is regarded as the last bastion against the relentless tide of market forces. Under such circumstances governments could easily stress the symbolic and cultural aspects of state sovereignty rather than the more conventionally Westphalian aspects, such as territorial integrity, military might and economic wealth.

Westphalian society has survived many substantial upheavals and has proved itself to be a remarkably resilient institution. It is unlikely to be transcended but could transform, as it has in the past, to cope with new political, economic and cultural developments. The most plausible picture is that the more globalized and the more market-force-driven the world becomes, the more likely developmental forces are to resort to the state and other non-governmental actors to restore stability and security, and the more reliance there will be on national or cultural or other expressions of identity and solidarity as sources of meaning and fulfilment. These three frameworks seem to be developing in tandem. Globalization will make definite advances because of technological advances, but its endurance will not be ensured because in the final analysis counterbalancing forces may offset the liberal trajectory. In an enlarged North the liberal paradigm will prevail. Perhaps the most interesting question concerns outcomes in the quasi-sovereign world. Liberal and Westphalian actors have markedly different views about what should happen in these areas. Liberals will place more emphasis on global governance, standards of civilization and the vigorous pursuit of globalist consolidation and global market integrity. Westphalians will focus more on state sovereignty as a means of resisting these forces. Substantial resistance will serve to perpetuate anti-utopian enclaves or engender inter-

civilizational conflict. Insubstantial resistance will result in incorporation within the liberal paradigm.

References

- Arthur, B. (1994) *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bienefeld, M. (1996) 'Is a strong national economy a utopian goal at the end of the twentieth century?', in R. Boyer and D. Drache (eds), *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization*. London: Routledge, pp. 415–440.
- Biersteker, T. and Weber, C. (eds) (1996) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyer, R. (1990) *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2000) 'Popes, kings and endogenous institutions: the Concordat of Worms and the origins of sovereignty', in *International Studies Review* Special Issue 'Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order', pp. 93–118.
- Bull, H. (1995) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan.
- Bull, H. and Watson, A. (eds) (1984) *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Caporoso, J. (2000) 'Changes in the Westphalian Order: territory, public authority, and sovereignty', in *International Studies Review* Special Issue 'Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order', pp. 1–28.
- Dallmayr, F. (1998) *Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Deudney, D. (1996) 'Binding sovereigns: authorities, structures, and geopolitics in Philadelphian systems', in T. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 190–239.
- Deutsch, K. et al. (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Doyle, M. (1997) *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*. New York: Norton.
- Esping-Anderson, G. (1985) *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Galtung, J. (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gerschenkron, A. (1965) *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldstein, J. (1988) *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gong, G. (1984) *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hinsley, F.H. (1986) *Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Huntington, S. (1993) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- IFRCRCS (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cross Societies) (1998) *World Disasters Report 1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Inoguchi, T. (1999) 'Peering into the future by looking back: the Westphalian, Philadelphian and anti-utopian paradigms', *International Studies Review*, 1(2), 173–191.
- Inoguchi, T. (2001) 'Three frameworks of American foreign policy thinking and American democracy promotion in Pacific Asia', in M. Cox, G. John Ikenberry and T. Inoguchi (eds) *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 267–286.
- Jackson, R. (1990) *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, R. (2000) *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan, R. (1998) *The Ends of the Earth*. New York: Random House.
- Keane, J. (1998) 'The Philadelphian model', in T. Inoguchi, E. Newman and J. Keane (eds), *The Changing Nature of Democracy*. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 231–243.
- Kissinger, H. (1993) *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Krasner, S. (1999) *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Krugman, P. (1993) 'The myth of Asia's miracle', *Foreign Affairs*, 73(6), 62–78.
- Landes, D. (1998) *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*. New York: Norton.
- Linklater, A. (1998) *The Transformation of Political Community*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Litfin, K. (1997) 'Sovereignty in world ecopolitics', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(suppl. 2), 167–204.
- Litfin, K. (2000) 'Environment, wealth and authority: global climate change and emerging modes of legitimation', in *International Studies Review* Special Issue 'Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order', pp. 119–148.
- Mayall, J. (1990) *Nationalism and International Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Onuf, N.G. (1998) *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Onuf, N.G. and Klink, F. (1989) 'Anarchy, authority, rules', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(2), 149–173.
- Putnam, R. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reich, R. (1991) *The Work of Nations*. New York: Knopf.
- Roberts, A. (1999) 'NATO's "humanitarian" war over Kosovo', *Survival*, 41(3), 99–121.
- Romer, P. (1990) 'Endogenous technical change', *Journal of Political Economy*, 102, 71–102.
- Russett, B. (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Saito, S. (1998) *Junen defure* [A Decade of Deflation]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.
- Schweller, R. (1998) 'New realist research on alliances: refining, not refuting, Waltz's balancing proposition', *American Political Science Review*, 91(4), 927–935.
- Soros, G. (1998) *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. New York: Perseus Books.
- Spruyt, H. (1993) *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Spruyt, H. (2000) 'The end of empire and the extension of the Westphalian system: the normative basis of the modern state order', in *International Studies Review* Special Issue 'Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order', pp. 65–92.
- Thomson, J. (1994) *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1992) *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 900–1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) (1998) *The State of the World's Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wade, R. (1991) *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1991). *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, S. (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Walt, S. (1998) 'International relations: one world, many theories', *Foreign Policy*, 110(Spring), 29–46.
- Weber, S. (1997) 'The end of business cycles?', *Foreign Affairs*, 76(3), 65–82.
- Yamagishi, T. (1998) *Shinrai no kozo* [The Structure of Trust]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.