

The SAGE Handbook of
Asian Foreign Policy

2 Volume

Edited by
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Introduction

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When empires dominated the globe more or less in separation from each other, they could boast of their supremacy with ease. When King of England George III sent his emissary Lord McCartney to Qing Emperor Qianlong in Peking in 1793, Lord McCartney received the following response from Qianlong:

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufacturers. This is then my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute. Envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. Besides making gifts (of which I enclose an inventory) to each member of your Mission, I confer upon you, O King, valuable presents in excess of the number usually bestowed on such occasions. Do you reverently receive them and take note of my tender goodwill towards you! A special mandate. (quoted in MacNair, 1967)

More than 225 years ago, the picture of Asian foreign policy was entirely different. The imperial worldview did not know the concept of foreign policy and international relations among sovereign states in the Westphalian sense. The practice during those times was for the Qing Emperor to accept a neighboring country's chieftain and appoint him king of said country after the chieftain had

pledged ongoing tributes and unswerving loyalty. The mandate to rule the country came from the Emperor and was ruled on the Emperor's behalf.

In 2018, the foreign policy and international relations of sovereign states are largely based on membership of the United Nations, which consists of all the victorious states in World War II and newly independent colonial states. Those states that struggled through civil-cum-independence wars, such as the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, joined the United Nations later, whereas the defeated states of World War II, Germany, and Japan, joined the United Nations in the 1950s. Most Asian colonies gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union's former member states gained their independence in 1991 after their separation from the Russian Federation. Asia as a region refers to 29 states located in what is called East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong as China's Specially Administered Region), Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Brunei), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia). This *Handbook* also deals with Asia's adjacent states, such as the Russian Federation, Australia, and the United States as well as Iran, Turkey, and Israel. These countries are Asia's close neighbors.

With the geographical coverage of Asia in this *Handbook* made clear, I quote the United Nations Charter's Preamble and President Donald Trump's Remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly as comparisons with Emperor Qianlong's response to King George III. Both capture and reflect the atmosphere of their times.

The United Nations Charter Preamble, signed in 1945

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
- to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
- to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

- to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
- to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
- to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institutions of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
- to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP TO THE 73RD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2018

One year ago, I stood before you for the first time in this grand hall. I addressed the threats facing our world, and I presented a vision to achieve a brighter future for all of humanity.

Today, I stand before the United Nations General Assembly to share the extraordinary progress we've made.

In less than two years, my administration has accomplished more than almost any administration in the history of our country. ...

Each of us here today is the emissary of a distinct culture, a rich history, and a people bound together by ties of memory, tradition, and the values that make our homelands like nowhere else on Earth.

That is why America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination.

I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions. The United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship.

We only ask that you honor our sovereignty in return. ...

So together, let us choose a future of patriotism, prosperity, and pride. Let us choose peace and freedom over dominance and defeat. And let us come here to this place to stand for our people and their nations, forever strong, forever sovereign, forever just, and forever thankful for the grace and the goodness and the glory of God.

Thank you. God bless you, And God bless the nations of the world.

Thank you very much. Thank you.

Why do I juxtapose three quotes in this Introduction to *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*? Because Asian foreign policy in the first quarter of the 21st century contains some elements of what they tell readers about the arenas of international relations in the late 18th century, the mid-20th century, and the early 21st century. Qianlong distinctively conveys a relaxed imperial mode, giving the impression that Qing stands high above everyone else who comes to express submission and tribute from near and afar. The UN Charter impresses on

its readers the resolve of the UN to defend peace and human rights after the two calamitous wars fought in the first half of the 20th century. Trump is of a markedly American style of fighting to fundamentally redress what he regards as the foolhardy policy of his predecessors.

In order to understand Asian foreign policy, one needs both eyes and ears to distinguish the subtle signs and symbols from often blatant actions, and in order to analyze Asian foreign policy one needs to throw away some of the conventional knowledge and hearsay evidence. As we witness daily, Asian foreign policy is unfolding in diverse and often unconventional ways. Asia's terrain is rough and its memory and instincts die hard. Even though in many ways the last two centuries (from the late 18th century through the first quarter of the 21st century) were long and painful, the evolution of country actors occurred as if in twenty blinks of the eye.

From this angle, such works as Robert Cooper's *The Breaking of Nations* (2004) may not be the best guide to Asian foreign policy. Cooper argues that in discussing international relations one must start to distinguish three distinctive regions: 1) those which can be called post-modern, 2) those which can be called modern, and 3) those which can be called pre-modern. Cooper assigns Europe and the G7 to the post-modern, Asia and Latin America to modern, and Africa and the Middle East to pre-modern. I gather that his criteria of distinction for these three regions of the world are per capita income level, government stability, social harmony, peace with neighbors, volume of business transactions and communications, scientific discovery and technological innovations, and, no less important, the whole package of geography, history, and philosophy. My view is that it may shed light on how the pre-2008 world functioned and how the tripartite division gave comfort and consolation to each of the three groupings because they were interdependent but not too much. From the late 20th century through the early 21st century, each grouping has experienced a huge self-metamorphosis. What has driven this metamorphosis? My answer is globalization and digitalization in society. The tides of these two forces coming from within and without have led the world to become what some may feel is too closely connected and mutually vulnerable.

In a similar vein, this introduction must also include some ethical remarks about the late Samuel Huntington (1997) on civilizational clash, because Asia throughout the 20th century (and before and beyond) reverberated with strong anti-colonial and nationalist ideas and sentiments. It was not so long ago when Rabindranath Tagore, Sun Yat-sen, Ikki Kita, Ho Chi Minh, Mahendra Gandhi, Sukarno, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Mao Zedong, Subhas Chandra Bose, and many others crowded the headlines of newspapers as anti-colonial and nationalist ideologues and heroes in Asia. Huntington's thesis is that instead of might, wealth, and ideology (i.e., the Cold War set of three drivers), the post-Cold War world evolves with religion-centered civilizations that have become a new and key driver, dividing the world along new fault lines. Huntington's

core assumptions are: 1) the publics of member states will affiliate more strongly with the core states of their civilization than the public of other civilizations; 2) as the religiosity within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perception of out-civilization core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate; 3) as nationalism within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilizations core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate; and 4) as exposure to foreign cultures within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilizations core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate. Chris Collet and I empirically tested these hypotheses based on data gathered from the Asia-wide survey called the AsiaBarometer. The result was very weak (Collet and Inoguchi, 2012). Huntington's weakness is unveiled when one notices the difficulty of gauging religiosity and cultures in general among populations. The whole complexity of cultures defies measurement. Another, no less important, point is the same I raise with Cooper's analysis (2004) – that is, the tides of globalization and digitalization are key drivers. However, one merit of Huntington's focus is that the role of religion has been steadily increasing with the new millennium, according to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) and Robert Putnam and David Campbell (2012).

The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy is unique in that Volume I deals with theories and themes pertaining to politics within, among, and beyond nations. By theories I mean such intellectual traditions as realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical schools of thought – and the labeling of leading schools of thought has, over 15–25-year cycles, like business cycles, reflected experts' and pundits' thinking. By themes I mean key subjects that do not necessarily fit easily with theories but are pronounced in Asian realities. By 'within' I mean domestic politics, by 'among' international politics, and by 'beyond' transnational politics. This means that the *Handbook* not only examines foreign policy and international relations but also touches on domestic politics and transnational politics. Volume II deals with Asia's country-specific foreign policies, following the more traditional approach. Moreover, toward the end of Volume II, some key bilateral relations and comparisons are considered in an effort to make up for some blind spots.

In completing the editing of *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*, I have incurred a huge number of debts. Asian foreign policy is a new genre of study. As a matter of fact, this *Handbook* is the first of its kind to try and go beyond the concatenation of country-specific foreign policies in Asia. In order to acknowledge my debts properly, I have to briefly go back to my graduate student days. This will inform readers how many belts and roads I have trod in Asia. From my years as a graduate student, the late Shinkichi Eto, the late Hiroharu Seki, the late Lucian W. Pye, Gungwu Wang, and Alexander Woodside were among those encouraging me to study Asia and Asian languages.

Although I never claim to have become competent in any Asian languages, except for my mother tongue, I did study Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Thai, and Russian during periods teaching courses in universities in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Jogjakarta, Singapore, New Delhi, and Canberra and participating in conferences and joint projects in various places in Asia. One big research project on Japanese political economy concluded with the publication in the late 1980s and early 1990s of three books from Stanford University Press under the leadership of Yasusuke Murakami and Hugh Patrick, with Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, and Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky as co-editors. This encouraged and prompted me to study Asian countries other than Japan.

On the ever increasing number of schools of international relations, I fondly recall the late Hayward R. Alker, Robert Keohane, Peter Katzenstein, and Stephen Krasner and their characteristically forceful impact on my thinking. In the mid 1990s, I spent two productive years at the United Nations University, Tokyo Headquarters as Senior Vice Rector, appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. By 'productive' I mean that I was responsible for running the United Nations University Press and learnt how to produce books during my tenure there. Peter Katzenstein gave me another learning-by-doing opportunity at the US Social Science Research Council Committee on Peace and Security: it enabled me to hold a conference that led to the publication of *American Democracy Promotion* (Oxford University Press, 2000, co-edited with Michael Cox and G. John Ikenberry). For the conference and its subsequent publication I owe a debt also to Bruce Russett, Davis Bobrow, and, no less importantly, Steve Smith. In 2000, I was very fortunate to be given a scientific-research grant by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for the comparative study of democracy through opinion polls in Asia and Europe. The team, consisting of Jean Blondel, Ian Marsh, Richard Sinnott, Ikuro Kabashima, and myself, published four books on the subject from Routledge in the 2000s (e.g., Inoguchi/Marsh, 2008).

In the early 2000s, Chung-si Ahn and I established the Asian Consortium for Political Research (ACPR) as secretary general and president respectively. Its secretariat was located at the Japan Institute of Seoul National University. Meanwhile, a number of Asian universities joined the ACPR to hold annual academic conferences in Seoul, Tokyo, Fudan, and other places, and to publish annual newsletters from Seoul. Two books were published under the auspices of the ACPR, one co-edited by Baogang He, Brian Galligan, and myself, from Edward Elgar (He et al., 2007), while the other, edited by Chung-si Ahn, was published by Marshall Cavendish Academic. The Great Recession took place worldwide in 2008, and subsequently the ACPR secretariat relocated to Tokyo in 2009 with Keiichi Tsunekawa as secretary general.

In 2005, again thanks to a JSPS scientific grant, I started what became the 32-country polling study project on the quality of life (QOL) in Asia, still the

largest QOL study in Asia. Doh Chull Shin, Seiji Fujii, Yasuharu Tokuda, and myself have authored, co-authored, or co-edited books on the subject for Springer (e.g., Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013; Inoguchi, 2017). And in 2013, Lien T. Q. Le and I launched a project on multilateral treaties and global quasi-legislative behavior, including a book from Springer focusing on Asian states (Inoguchi and Le, 2019).

My contributions to encyclopedias, references, and handbooks have grown since the turn of the century. Examples include the *Oxford Handbook on Political Behavior*, edited by Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2007), *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonaldo Morlino (2007), *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*, edited by Alex Michalos (2014), the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* from Elsevier, (second edition) edited by James Wright (2015), and the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations*, edited by William Thompson (2018). Aside from research and book publications, I am the founding editor of three journals: *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* (Oxford University Press, 2000–5), the *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge University Press, 2000–18), and the *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* (Sage Publications, 2016–). All three journals focus on Asia from various angles and through different methods.

And now, most importantly, I have come to *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*. I express my heartfelt gratitude to Delia Alfonso and her colleagues at Sage Publications, including Umeeka Raichura, Colette Wilson, Chazelle Keeton and Manmeet Kaur Tura, who heroically saved the project from drowning. Purnendra Jain helped and advised me beyond the call of duty. Edward Newman and Aparna Pande undertook an eleventh-hour rescue review operation. In addition, Yongnian Zheng, Tsuneo Akaha, Purnendra Jain, Tomohito Shinoda, Peng Er Lam, Imtiaz Ahmad, and Ayse Zarakol all advised me on the review process. When, back in early 2016, I accepted Sage's offer to undertake this *Handbook*, I did so with great delight at the opportunity to know Asia better and, more importantly, to have the world know Asia better. Although on a couple of occasions my apprehension grew about how many chapters would reach my desk and how fast, my curiosity about Asia kept expanding and my positive voice ultimately overwhelmed my negative voice. It would not be inappropriate to say that, witnessing the incessant onslaught of aggressive words flying between capital cities and across oceans and continents in 2017–18, I secretly thought that I wouldn't regret spending so much time on this *Handbook*. The subjects of Asian foreign policy have continued to crowd TV news and newspaper headlines. At least what used to be unknown unknowns have gradually shifted, though only a little, to become known unknowns, and, with luck, they will become known knowns. Lastly, but most importantly, I acknowledge my greatest debt, to all the contributors to this *Handbook*.

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