Non-Western International Relations Theory

Perspectives on and beyond Asia

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3 Why are there no non-Western theories of international relations?

The case of Japan[1]

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Are there any theories of international relations in Japan? My answer to the question is a qualified yes. I argue that international relations theories do exist in Japan. The 'flying geese pattern' regional integration theory is one example of a positivist middle-range theory. In the normative domain, one can cite a 'proto-constructivist' theory of identity formation, which I shall discuss later. Yet, my answer to the above question is a qualified yes because Japan has been an abortive regional hegemon in the past, even if it emerged from World War II to become the second largest economy in the world. Great powers often produce theories of international relations. But in the case of Japan, being a failed challenger to American hegemony in the past and having been embedded in the global governance system dominated by the United States today, has inhibited theoretical advance. This, combined with the relatively weak tradition of positivistic hypothesis testing in social science and the relatively strong tradition of descriptive work have tended to discourage the development of a Japanese theory of international relations.

What follows in this chapter consists of three sections. First, I summarize the development of the study of international relations in Japan for the period 1868–2005 (Inoguchi and Bacon 2000: 1–20; Inoguchi 2002: 111–26; 2003). There are four distinctive major intellectual currents – staatslehre, historicism, Marxism and positivism (Inoguchi in eds Easton, Gunnell and Stein 1994: 269–94). By staatslehre, I mean the study of how to rule the country from a state-centric perspective. Its influence can be seen in the first political science textbook in Japan by Kiheiji Onozuka at Tokyo Imperial University (Onozuka 2003). By historicism, I mean the methodology whereby everything must be studied historically on the basis of verifiable documents and materials. One of the best-sellers in this tradition is Tokutomi Soho's world history (Tokutomi 1991). By Marxism, I mean a political and intellectual tenet that sees and examines phenomena with a focus on dialectics of productive power and relations and their political manifestations. One of the best-known works in this tradition is Toyama Shigeki's work on the Meiji Restoration (Toyama 2000). By positivism, I mean the ideological tenet whereby everything must be empirically examined and tested. One of the best-sellers in this tradition is ironically Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Gakumon no Susume* (Fukuzawa 1978). This section is necessary to demonstrate that positivism in the American style has not been vigorously, or to put it more correctly, excessively implanted on Japanese

international relations soil despite the growth of the post-World War II academy of international relations in Japan (Inoguchi and Harada 2002).

Second, I focus on three authors during the pre-1945 periods, Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro and Hirano Yoshitaro, to argue that there were fledging theoretical developments on the Japanese soil. I suggest that, although constrained by circumstances of war and suppression, these authors did articulate quite a robust theory (in the broad sense articulated by Acharya and Buzan in their introduction to this volume).

Third, on the basis of the preceding empirical observations of Japan's international relations academy in terms of its approaches and orientations and the important contributions of Nishida, Tabata and Hirano, I argue that there developed vigorous theoretical works that can be legitimately characterized as a 'constructivist with Japanese characteristics' (Ong 2004: 35–58; see also Jones 2004), a normative international law theorist placing popular sovereignty, like Samuel von Pufendorf does, first before state sovereignty, as Hugo Grotius does (Sakai 2003: 95–106) and a social democratic internationalist (Sakai 2004: 79–95). The observation that the American style positivistic approach to international relations has not been developed as much as its international relations community's size suggests should be taken cautiously, because it does not automatically suggest there are no Japanese theories of international relations. Rather, even during the interwar and war periods there were theoretical developments that arguably constitute an important basis of the post-1945 development of Japanese international relations research.

1. The development of international relations in Japan

As in other societies, the field of international relations in Japan has been greatly influenced by the major currents of the social sciences. They may be described as follows: (Inoguchi in eds Dyer and Mangasarian 1989: 257–64; Inoguchi in eds Easton, Gunnell and Stein 1994; Inoguchi in eds Smelser and Baltes 2001) the first, in the staatslehre tradition, which greatly influenced military and colonial studies in the pre-war period and remained strong in a metamorphosed form even after 1945. The feature of this tradition is emphasis on rich, descriptive details elucidating complexities of all sorts. Top priority was given to supplying ample historical-institutional backgrounds and describing events and personalities in contexts and their consequences in minute detail. This approach was valued in analysing trends in international change that might affect Japan's foreign relations. Even after 1945, however, the bulk of area studies have continued in the staatslehre tradition, especially when conducted by government-related think tanks. In sharp contrast to the salience of this tradition in government-sponsored research, most area studies as practiced in academia are somewhat excessively humanistic, rather than relevant to social science or useful to government policy. The strong salience of area studies in Japan's international relations study is not unlike the Indian situation as characterized in Navnita (2009). This reflects in part the reaction of academics to the domination of the staatslehre tradition. One corollary of this strong staatslehre tradition is the emphasis on law and economics as opposed to

political science and sociology. Whereas schools of law and economy exist there are no departments of political science or sociology. They are most likely to be an appendage to the faculties of law or of letters for more than a century. Even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Japan is one of the very few countries in Asia that does not have an autonomous department of political science.

The second tradition is Marxism, which was very strong from the 1920s through to the 1960s. This tradition is associated with the conception of social science as *Oppositionswissenschaft*, or opposition science. As if to counter the staatslehre tradition, the vigorous Marxist school was clearly discernible from the 1920s through to the 1960s. Marxist categories of political analysis imparted a critical colouring to the observation of political events and the recognition of the ideological biases of the observer. In the 1920s, when the term *shakai kagaku* (social science) first came to be used in Japan, it often denoted Marxism, rendering social science virtually synonymous with Marxism. Japanese social science had been literally *Marxised* by the 1930s. Marxist influence became even more widespread without an internal security act of 1925, after 1945, and from the immediate post-war period through the 1960s the social sciences – economics, political science and sociology – were often led by Marxists or Marxist-leaning scholars. International relations was no exception. Marxism was so influential and pervasive that many other social science theories, especially those non-Marxist theories, were literally crowded out. Within the Marxist framework, such theories of international relations as 'the second image un-reversed' and 'the hegemonic destabilization' propositions were put forward. Given the strong staatslehre tradition and the almost continuous one-party dominance observed for nearly half a century since the mid-1950s, it was considered natural or desirable for academics and journalists alike to form a sort of countervailing force critical of government conduct. After the Cold War, while most Marxists have become post-Marxist, many have retained their critical view of government policy. Some have transformed themselves into postmodernists, radical feminists and non-communist radicals in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. Yet it is safe to say that Japanese academics were de facto *demarxised* by the 1970s.

The third tradition is the historicist tradition. This current has been very strong, and as a result the bulk of scholarship in international relations is akin to historical research, and therefore a branch of humanities rather than social sciences. In contrast to staatslehre, historicists do not pay much attention to policy relevance, and topics tend to involve events and personalities prior to 1945. The spirit that guides much of international relations is often similar to the Rankean concept of history, *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*, or broadly 'let the facts speak for themselves'. At the same time, this tradition brings some historians into the direction of quasi-constructivism in the sense that its thrust is to delve into the minds and impulses, hearts and passions, and memories and psycho-history of individuals and nations. Before Americans 'invented' constructivism, many Japanese historians of international relations felt they had been constructivists all the way through.

The fourth current of post-war international relations is informed by the recent introduction of perspectives and methodologies of American political science.

In the pre-war period the absorption of European social scientific thought – in the form of the works of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Leon Walras and Alfred Marshall – constituted the antidote to strong Marxist influence in the social sciences. After 1945, American social sciences played a similar role. American-style international relations has many components, of which two are most important: a proclivity for formulation of theories and for vigorous empirical testing. This intellectual tradition became stronger from the 1970s through to the 2000s.

It is important to note these four diverse currents are clearly evident in Japan's international relations studies even today and that they coexist fairly amicably without many efforts made toward integration. Most associational activities, like framing sessions of the annual conventions and of allocating journal pages, are determined by the more or less equal representation of four blocks, i.e. history, area studies, theories and substantive issues. Diversity without disciplinary integration – if not without organization integration – is one of the features of the academic community of Japan in part because of the strong legacy of the four diverse major social science traditions originating from the one-and-a-half-century experience of nation building, economic development, war and then peace.

The strong tenacity of the four traditions embedded in the Japanese international relations community sometimes makes it hard for some of more *bumi putra* (sons of the earth) Japanese academics to discuss matters with more heavily US-influenced (or arguably neocolonial) East Asian neighbours such as Korea, Taiwan and China (Inoguchi 2004). But various efforts to liberate Japanese academics from their slightly insulated academic community have been underway on the basis of their long accumulation of academic achievements. Most vigorous of these efforts is the launching of a new English-language journal, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (published twice a year by Oxford University Press). Its founding editor happens to be the author of this article. Referees are globally distributed depending on the expertise of a subject dealt with in a manuscript. Roughly 50 per cent of referees are from North America and about 30 per cent of referees are from Asia, including Japan and Australia. Also submissions exhibit a roughly similar pattern of geographical distribution. It is remarkable that the journal has been slowly but fundamentally transforming the Japanese international relations community into an entity that is far more intensely interested in the generation and transmission of ideas and insights on a global scale than before. Publications of their works in the English language by Japanese academics have been on the steady increase. Roughly 100 of its 2,000-odd members have published their books in English and more than 300 members have published their articles in English. Since the number of American PhDs is pitifully small, some 6 per cent of all the members of the Japan Association of International Relations, compared to East Asian neighbours, say, Korea (60 per cent of the Korean Association of International Studies have an American PhD.), their efforts at making inroads into the global community are laudable. In tandem with it, the perception of the Japanese international relations community held by the global international relations community seems to be changing slowly. To see how soon *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* starts to provide a venue for new schools of thought in

international relations, perhaps the period of five years since its first publication is too short.

2. Key framing questions of Japan's international relations since 1945

In order to see more closely the substance of international relations research in Japan, I now turn to the past half a century of the development of international relations in Japan in terms of the key framing questions that have driven intellectual agendas in the field (Inoguchi 2004). It is very important to note at the outset that in Japan the four great debates as conducted in the US were not reproduced. Japanese international relations academics have been much more deeply rooted in their own historical soils than East Asian neighbours. Furthermore, these four traditions and their influences on Japanese international relations have been self-sustaining in a more or less mutually segmented fashion. But the question is not to Japanize international relations theories, but to historicize and contextualize some of those American international relations theories and to generate insights and propositions much more sensitive to historical and cultural complexities. Other social science disciplines, such as economics and sociology, had been pursued in Japan since well before World War II, but international relations was relatively new, introduced as in many places, only after the war. Three key questions that may be identified in the development of the discipline of international relations since 1945 are as follows:

1. What went wrong with Japan's international relations?
2. What kind of international arrangements best secure peace?
3. Why is it that so much remains to be desired in our diplomacy?

These three questions are interrelated with each other. But it is very important to note that as time goes on, the shift has been taking place from question one via question two through question three. The first question, which goes back to the days when Japan's international relations led to war, then to defeat, and to the occupation of the country, is still one of the key framing questions in the study of international relations. It has drawn international relations students to study history-diplomatic history as well as other aspects of modern Japanese history in the related areas of economics, sociology and political science. It is as if all the questions originate from this key question. The economics perspective focuses on the productive capacity and production relationships of the Japanese economy whose alleged distortions drove the country into a wrong, long war. The sociology perspective focuses on the study of alleged feudalistic social relations and state-led social mobilization that were eventually manipulated and mobilized by the state to support and sustain that war. Political science devoted time to the study of the alleged pitifully insufficient democratic arrangements and institutions – the Imperial Diet, political parties, the bureaucracy, elections, the armed forces etc. Most of the foremost post-war scholarship of the third quarter of the twentieth

century has revolved around this first key question. Masao Maruyama is the foremost scholar addressing the question in his *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japan* (Maruyama 1963). If one has to choose only one key framing question in the Japanese social science communities in the latter half of the twentieth century, 'What went wrong?' is everyone's choice. In this sense Japan's social science community has been living under the long shadow of World War II irrespective of the oft-heard chorus of 'do not forget the past'.

In the study of international relations, the key framing question that attracted students was Japan's diplomatic interactions with foreign powers. The then newly founded Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) compiled and edited the multivolume work on Japan's 'Road to the Pacific War' (*Taiheiyo senso e no michi*), mobilizing virtually all the scholars and diplomatic historians, of which some were Marxists, active in the field in the 1950s and 1960s (ed. 20 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 1962–3). The approach it employed was predominantly descriptive, rather than analytical or theoretical, in sharp contrast to the other disciplines that adopted interesting mixtures of Marxism and culturalism in attempting to address similar issues.

This landmark Pacific War study asks the big what-went-wrong question and devotes chapter after chapter to tracing and examining absorbing details of the diplomatic and political dynamics of Japan's external relations. As the work is based primarily on studies of the recently released public documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the volumes are full of newly revealed details that led to the disaster. Most actors were portrayed as having done the right thing in executing their duties at places they were assigned to. The problem was that collectively their dutifulness and diligence did nothing to avert war with the rest of the world. Rather each individual actor's dutifulness and diligence led to collective disasters of a gigantic proportion. The past presidents of the JAIR include many who were involved in this massive study and remained leaders in the field long after the work was completed and published. In that sense as well, the key framing question had a very strong impact on the entire discipline. Diplomatic history has been a strong presence in the JAIR throughout the last half a century.

In tandem with the JAIR Pacific War project, newspapers and magazines played an important role in framing the academic agendas of international relations. For the press, the key framing question was the second: What are the best arrangements to secure peace? Debate unfolded on the subject of peace with the allied powers – should the San Francisco Peace Treaty have been signed? In the context of the Cold War, what was the right choice: a partial peace with the Western powers or a total one including all the Allied powers? Nambara Shigeru, a political philosopher and President of the University of Tokyo, took the latter position in the collectively signed appeal to total peace (Nambara 1950; see also Tsuchiyama 2005).

The former position was called realism, the latter idealism. The great debate on realism versus idealism unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s. At a glance it resembles the first great idealism-realism debate in the US. But in Japan, unlike in the US, realism's victory over idealism was somewhat incomplete. (Parenthetically, the second great debate between traditionalism and the scientific school did not take

place either.) The behavioural revolution did not take place in Japanese international relations. The third great debate between neorealism and neoliberalism did not take place in Japan either. Nor is the fourth great debate between rationalism and reflectivism taking place. Many Japanese academics feel that they have been practicing reflectivism, rather, long before it was preached by Americans, although they were less articulate and sophisticated about methodology. The salience of this debate in the most widely read newspapers and popular magazines was such that the main arena of discussion was journalism, not academia, and the individuals who were involved in the journalistic debates became the best-known names in the field.

There is nothing wrong with the debate itself. Intellectuals who speak out in the media have played immensely important roles throughout the last 60 years. The problem was that the professionals in the academic community of international relations itself ended up becoming less rigorous in their scholarship than their colleagues in other fields of the social sciences. The second framing question was basically a policy question, but given the way in which Japanese society is organized, there is little likelihood that members of academia can develop careers as experts on policy or become well versed in policy affairs and well connected in policy-making circuits. Intersectoral labour mobility is so limited that even scholars active in the journalistic debates over policy could not realistically aspire to active involvement in policy making as part of their careers. What looked like policy debates, therefore, was in fact mostly illusory. Ultimately, the 'journalist academics' came to constitute a special species within academia. The situation in Japan forms a strong contrast to the case in the US where professionalization has made great advances for the last half a century and academics have established themselves by an autonomous/autocentric dynamism.

The third framing question is a more recent one. Although in a sense it is similar to the second, it has led to empirical rather than theoretical investigations of what should be done. In this sense, the third framing question encouraged scholars to carry out empirical studies of an often fastidious nature. This thrust became dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. Kusano Atsushi published meticulously researched books on Japan-United States policy discussions on the market and trade liberalization of agriculture and large retailing shops (Kusano 1991). Kusano has been quite active in commenting on policy and politics in TV programmes since then. Also, Tadokoro Masayuki published a well conceptualized work on the international political economy of US dollars and Japanese yen (Tadokoro 2001). Tadokoro has been quite active as a co-editor of a monthly magazine in which he regularly contributes a policy column. However, unlike empirical studies in the US, those of Japan do not necessarily feel driven to place their research in grandiose and occasionally almost Procrustean theoretical schemes. This tendency reflects, in part, the growing professionalization of Japanese international relations academics, despite the adversities. Competition among international relations academics has somewhat increased in tandem with growth of the membership of JAIR. As of January 2005, the number is slightly more than 2,000.

The above portrayal may give the impression that the field of international relations has been directly affected by Japan's own development. Diplomatic history, quasi-policy debates and empirical analyses are depicted as the shifting salient genres predominant in each period of post-war Japanese development. As the key framing questions changed from the 1940s through to the 2000s, empirical analyses of various aspects of Japan's foreign relations have become a dominant genre.

A natural question to ask here is whether dynamic debates have been taking place among Japan's four traditions. Over the years since 1945, the first two traditions, staatslehre and Marxist, seem to be waning in their influence. The latter two, historically oriented studies and American social science-influenced studies have been on the ascendant. But the basic tenacity of these four traditions over many years has much to do with the lack of political science and international relations departments on campus, which are autonomous in appointment and budget – and in terms of academic discipline. Parenthetically, the absence of an institutionalized political science department has a lot to do with the nineteenth century origin of nurturing bureaucratic elite candidates in legal training and with the fear of producing a bundle of unemployed young elites trained in 'political science', which could be subversive to the 'system'. Therefore, the waning and waxing of these four traditions have much to do with the development of Japanese society, i.e. rapid industrialization, the achievement of a high income society and the relative decline of the state's influence rather than with the dynamic debates amongst them. 1) 'idealism' in the third quarter of the twentieth century was to be replaced by 'realism' in the post-Vietnam war years; 2) 'realism' in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century was to be replaced by the proliferation of other streams of thought, constructivism, institutionalism, feminism and so forth. By idealism, I mean the tendency to place pacifism at the helm according to article nine of the Constitution and to play down the role assigned to Japan by the Japan-US Security Treaty. By realism, I mean the tendency to place alliance with the US as the highest priority and to play down the role envisioned by the Constitution at the time of its drafting process. Having examined, albeit briefly, Japan's international relations during the interwar, war and post-war (and within it, post-Vietnam, post-Cold War and post-9/11) periods, I now take a closer look at these authors who were active in theorizing of Japan's international relations.

3. Three theorists as an illustration of Japanese theories of international relations

The following three thinkers are chosen to illustrate that something akin to fledging theoretical development was seen in the 1930s or at a critical juncture of deepening democracy and run-away fascism: 1) They represented one of the then most noted scholars in philosophy, international law and economics; 2) They vigorously articulated their thoughts, which are resonant with Japanese international relations thoughts and practices after World War II as well.

3.1 Nishida as an innate constructivist

Identity is one of the key concepts in international relations study. Yet it is a key concept that is not easy to 'grasp adequately by Anglo-American positivist methods alone' (Williams 1996; Ong 2004). Nishida attempted to fix this thorny issue of Japanese identity in international relations when Japan was considering its place betwixt East and West. The question is: How to resurrect the historical consciousness of Japanese in an environment where 'what is perceived as a normative inferiority induced by a Western civilization that views itself as intellectually culturally and morally superior' (Ong 2004). To summarize, this is the thrust of his philosophy of identity.

Nishida rejects Cartesian logic and adopts dialectic. Yet his dialectic is more Hegelian. In his dialectic a thesis and an antithesis coexists without forming a synthesis. Contradictions manifest themselves in concrete forms. Contradictions do not necessarily move in the direction of a new synthesis without an innate self-contradiction. 'Rather it rejects decontextulized things; it seeks to see things in their appropriate contexts' (Nisbett 2003 cited in Ong 2004). He argued that Japanese identity emerges through a coexistence of opposites, Eastern and Western. In his own words,

> Simply put, if every real thing is concrete and determined it is because it is the expression of a greater reality taking shape, and this greater reality is the universal. The identity of an individual, its self-determination, is at the same time the manifestation of the self-identity of the universal determining itself through the individual.
>
> (Heisig 2001)

What is striking about Nishida's philosophy is that he is envisaging to make Japanese identity construction, not parochial but universally understood. Nishida's orientation is qualitatively very different from those works of Nihonjinron in the 1980s and 1990s, which argue that Japanese culture is unique, exceptional and thus parochial. In his own words, 'The distinctiveness of the Japanese is only of local value; it is enhanced when its core can be extracted and translated into something of world scope.' (Heisig 2001).

Many American constructionists swim in the vocabulary of rationalism. But Nishida lives in the philosophy of nothingness (1958). I argue that Japanese theories in this area are very profound. Once articulated by such authors as Ralph Pettman and Christopher Goto-Jones, Nishida's innate construction becomes clearly comprehensible by readers of all persuasions.

3.2 Tabata as an international law theorist presupposing the natural freedom of individuals

State sovereignty is one of the key concepts of international relations study. Tabata Shigejiro, well versed in the long tradition of international law, state sovereignty

and democracy, put forward his theory of international law, remarkably presaging the advent of a democratic, anti-western and anti-hegemonic international law.

How to treat state sovereignty is a key question in international law. Discussing the equality of states, Tabata (Tabata 1946), in his works written before 1945 but published in a book form thereafter, emphasizes that the concept of equality of states presupposes both the recognition of the natural freedom of individuals and duties that arise from natural law (Sakai 2003, 2004). Tabata takes the popular sovereignty theory as developed by Emmerich de Vattel and Samuel von Pufendorf in contrast to the state sovereignty theory as developed by Hugo Grotius. The Grotian theory of state sovereignty was more widely and strongly accepted during the interwar period as a universalist position. Yet the Grotian theory of state sovereignty tends to accommodate what existed in his early modern times, and presupposed the Hobbesian concept of self-preservation in a constant struggle in the international community. In contrast, Pufendorf, for one, developed the argument that only on the basis of equality of individuals can one envisage the equality of states in which such normative duties as 'thou shalt not hurt others' prevails.

Tabata's theory took dramatic applications both in 1944 and in 1950 (Sakai 2003, 2004). In 1944 he argued against the negation of equality of states under the scheme of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and for the immediate independence to be accorded to Western colonies in Asia with the equality of states materialized under the scheme. During the Allied powers' occupation, he argued in 1950 against a peace treaty only with the non-communist Allied powers. He argued that concluding a peace treaty with some of the Allies, but not with others, is tantamount to the negation of the concept of equality of states. The bearers of sovereignty are citizens and democratic principle ought to be observed in concluding a peace treaty as the government proposed to do. Since public opinion was arguably against it by more than slight margins, Tabata was riding upon public sentiment. He argued for the transcendence of state sovereignty on the basis that equality of states and popular sovereignty which he thought would lead to peace.

One is struck by his consistency and integrity in sticking to the equality of states and its popular democratic foundations when he argued with the world. He argued against retaliation prevalent in the interwar period and against the hegemonic unilateralism in the immediate post-war period. By 2005 Japan had become one of the major rule makers relinquishing the role of a rule taker in global governance in a number of policy areas (Inoguchi 2005: 112–17). In this area as well, Japan's international relations have laid down the basis of some niches that are more likely to grow in the near future. At the dawn of the 2000s, just to give a few examples, Japanese international law academics are busy theorizing about 'inter civilizational law' especially with regard to different conceptions of human rights, making rules and norms of transnational business transactions, formulating schemes of 'special drawing rights' for nuclear energy for peaceful use through neo-multinationalism (Onuma 1998; Hurrell 2004; Inoguchi 2005).

3.3 Hirano as an economist placing regional integration higher than state sovereignty

Regional economic integration has been one of the key concepts in international relations study. Having escaped the fate of being further marginalized in the world economy despite the lack of tariff autonomy for the long period between 1856 and 1911, many Japanese economists were eager to build a more robust economic strength on their own feet as well as with Japan's neighbours. In 1924 Hirano argued that modernity and its contractual social principle (read capitalism) could be replaced by constructing a communitarian social principle (read socialism) (Hirano 1924). When socialism, communism and anarchism were widely considered to be dangerous thoughts, Hirano used the concepts communitarian and contractual to denote socialism and capitalism. Hirano was the leader of one of the competing Marxist analyses of Japan, arguing that the Meiji Restoration represented the absolute monarchy and Japanese style, and the task of revolutionaries is to accelerate Japan's capitalist development further, thus precipitating a socialist revolution. In 1944 he argued for a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by noting that instead of the struggle among imperialist sovereign powers, his cherished goal of upholding a communitarian principle might be materialized at long last. Whether his dramatic turn to the support of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was a real or disguised *tenko* (relinquishing an anti-government position and transforming oneself into a pro-government position due to suppression and inducement) is a moot question. The following year Japan was defeated and the Communist Party welcomed the US-led Allies as a liberating force (Johnson 1990).

Seeing the pre-1945 and post-1945 Japanese thoughts a little more continuously, one can see a striking co-working of extraordinarily divergent thinkers pouring their thoughts into the idea of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area. Saburo Okita, a young bureaucrat with an engineering degree and Hotsumi Ozaki, a young journalist, worked together for Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who was Prime Minister during the critical years of 1939–41. Hotsumi Ozaki received capital punishment for treason against the state as a member of a spy ring of Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy. Saburo Okita climbed the ladder in bureaucracy and articulated the idea and policy of regional integration together with John Crawford from the Australian National University. The Japanese theory of regional integration in the form of the flying geese pattern of development grew out of their thinking of the 1930s and 1940s (see Korhonen 1994: 93–108). The theory was revived in the 1970s, hence demonstrating persistence.

4. Provisional answer to the question, 'Why are there no Japanese theories of international relations?'

In order to answer the question, we have examined the four major currents of Japan's international relations to see that the staatslehre was interested in policy rather than theory; that historicism wanted to have detailed and meticulous descriptions of events and personalities on the basis of verifiable documents,

in part for its own sake, in part to disguise political positions due to the limited degree of freedom before 1945 and in part to construct norms and logics of actors à la proto-constructivism; that Marxism did represent very theoretical analyses until 1970s by when academics and non-academics alike were largely demarxised in Japan; and that positivism, American style, did not become hegemonic in Japanese international relations. If we define theories of international relations as narrowly defined positivistic theories of American-style international relations, Japanese international relations can be characterized as not producing theories of international relations. Neither hegemonic stability theory nor democratic peace theory is born. Positivism is not a major current in Japan's international relations. Needless to say, there is not a shortage of theory-conscious empirical studies without grandiose pretension.[2]

Yet, in part to give a qualified answer to the question, we have illustrated the three proto-theoretical arguments as revealed by Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro and Hirano Yoshitaro. They all demonstrated quite robust theoretical arguments and are characterized as an innate constructivist, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law and a Marxist theorist of regional integration respectively. Indeed, they generated theories of sorts that would have universal audiences if their work was translated into English and published in an appropriate forum.

The beauty of these three theorists is that they have resonance to the kinds of issues that confront Japan's international relations in the 2000s. First, as Japan's difficulties with regard to the Yasukuni shrine, to the East Asian summit in Kuala Lumpur and to the US military bases in Japan illustrate, Japan's identity between the West and the East has not been well sorted out. Second, the flying geese pattern of integration suggests the market-conforming and yet developmental hierarchy-conscious, bilateral liberalization strategies, which is slightly at odds with the multilateral regional integration agreement strategy. Third, the border-transcending, people-based pacifism is not fading away. Rather, in the process of revising the Constitution's article nine, the Liberal Democratic Party's draft retains the basic pacific posture intact whereas the existence of armed forces called the Self Defense Forces is explicitly acknowledged.

To sum up, if theories of international relations are understood as narrowly positivistic theories, American style, my answer is that there are no Japanese theories of international relations. If theories of international relations include constructivists, normative theories, positive theories and legal theories as well as works representing less than rigorously formal theorizing effects, my answer is a qualified yes.

More indirectly but possibly more fundamentally, I might as well speculate that the following four factors are important to stress when we try to understand the nature of Japan's international relations in terms of theoretical continuity.

1. Japan's international relations research has been developing like a mosaic with different methodological traditions harmlessly co-existing with each other. Unlike international relations in the United States, where political science gives the crucial disciplinary framework, international relations in

Japan accommodates different disciplinary traditions like diplomatic history, international law, international economics, area studies and various political theories. This amalgamate nature of Japan's international relations community makes it more difficult to produce theories for international relations.

2. Japan's international relations research is a *bumi putra* (indigenous) variety, because Japan was not colonized by the West. Colonialism was an avenue to acquiring foreign language, which tends to facilitate international relations study. The US-led Allied occupation during the 1945–52 period was conducted by indirect rule. By which I mean that Americans stood at the top while Japanese bureaucrats were mostly kept intact except for some small percentage of those regarded to have been tainted by war crimes. Indirect rule is too shallow to change many things. This is most conspicuous when we compare international relations in Japan with those in Korea, Taiwan and China, let alone in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines.
3. Japan's international relations research operates in a slightly different framework from the King/Verb/Keohane positivistic methodology bible. It reflects the historical and cultural legacies, some of which may be most usefully glimpsed through the postmodern angle of Ralph Pettman's work (King, Keohane and Verba 2001; Pettman 2004).
4. More substantively, Japan's international relations evolved with three stages: a) its beginning as a small peripheral country whose ruler was 'legitimized' by Chinese rulers in the latter's fledging tributary system mostly during a period leading to and including the Qin and Han dynasties; b) its endogenizing period in which tributary missions and trades were suspended and then private trade flows with sporadic quasi-tributary trades dominated the scene during the one millennium of Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties; c) its maturing period of developing its own Japan-centric world order during a few centuries of early modern Japan in which the Tokugawa *bakufu* (military government) ruled the nation in almost exclusive control of Japan's external defence and commerce plus internal communications and security with some 300 domains keeping de facto autonomy (Inoguchi in Rozman *et al.* 2005; Inoguchi 2005: 362–403).
5. Three distinctive features of Japan's international relations as most clearly glimpsed from the fledging Japan-centric regional order in the early modern period are as follows: a) permeable insulation whereby Japan absorbs higher civilizations such as ideographs, religion, weapons and institutions – selectively and taking time – without letting them fully permeate and swamp the country (Schaede and Grimes 2003). It was the case not only with China and Korea in ancient times but also with Portugal and Spain in medieval times and also with the UK and the United States in modern times; b) friendship with and distance from China and the West: Japan's relationship with China and Korea resembles to that of the UK with Europe (Inoguchi 2005: 392–6). Japan is ambivalent to the continent like the UK is. In other words, Japan is part of Asia, but somewhat separate from Asia; c) Japan-centric world order whereby

external actors were largely left for a certain adjacent domain to handle, like the Satsuma domain vis-à-vis the Ryukyu kingdom, the Tsushima domain vis-à-vis the Chosun kingdom, the Matsumae domain vis-à-vis the Ainus and Russia whereas the Tokugawa *bakufu* monopolized external trade and conducted only at Deshima port of Nagasaki mostly with Dutch and Chinese (Fairbank 1968; Satoru 2005). In 1818 Chinese Emperor Jiaqing distinguished in Jiaqing huidian two groups of foreign countries: tributary states and mutually trading states. For example, tributary states were Korea, Vietnam and England, and mutually trading states were the Netherlands, France and Japan. To China, Japan was an economic animal without being respectful by sending tributary missions whereas to Japan, China was a non-state trading actor without formal relationship (Banno 1972).

6. Japanese style of integration has three distinctive features, which developed on a domestic, regional and global scale step by step: a) it focuses on transportation and the market (Rozman 1974). During the early modern period internal commerce was encouraged across 300-odd domains. The Tokugawa *bakufu* consolidated social infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports and storehouses. During the modern period ports, ships, coal, oil and tax autonomy were keys. During the post-World War II period, population, official development assistance, foreign trade, technological cooperation and foreign direct investment were keys; b) it makes use of evolutionary developmental maturation within Japan, in Asia and the world over. It is sometimes called the flying geese trade and development pattern whereby the leading goose is followed by lieutenant geese, and then by laggard geese. Just like the development of commercial routes linking Osaka and Edo (Tokyo) and other ports nationwide was crucial in forging the national domestic market in early modern Japan, the development of industry in Asia (light industry such as textiles, clothes, footwear and food, and heavy industry such as steel, petrochemicals, machinery and electronic and information industries) was pursued through official development assistance, trade and direct investment, in conjunction with the Japanese development of a certain stage (one step earlier). In an era of globalization, complex patterns are forged case by case to determine where Japanese-style functional integration can go. In the current discussion in Japan on East Asian community building, functional integration is a key word in the Japanese debate. In other words, economic, financial, technological and organizational linking is first sought after without paying too much attention to security, ideas, values, institutions and so on (Inoguchi 2005: 56–61); c) the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was conjured up by the Japanese Imperial Army when necessary weapons and energy resources were dried up at home and near abroad when the Japanese Imperial Navy lost the entire Western Pacific for its sphere of control. It contained the ideas of racial equality, anti-monopoly by the West and the equality and solidarity of East Asia. However, the idea was not backed up by either military might or economic resources let alone by political practice in 1944 or 1945. However, some authors like Nishida, Tabata and Hirano hoped in their own respective way that the Japanese destruction

> of Western colonialism, its idea and military might, would help pave the way eventually to the liberation of the colonized East by Japan, however awkward its implementation was and however self-contradictory its ideas were. Nishida thought of it as a way of helping Japan to establish its own identity; Tabata thought of it as a way of establishing international law less founded on state sovereignty; and Hirano thought of it as a way of equality-based regional integration. All the three dreamt implausible and impossible dreams because the idea ended in the mere imposition of coercion when Japan was totally at the mercy of US military attacks (Inoguchi 2005). If the military might of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy had been completely replaced by the United States Armed Forces, a greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere might have been triggered.

I would like to add a few words about American hegemony in international relations theory and research. A few reasons why American international relations have a much larger and stronger profile, other than those already noted, may be elaborated. In my view, in part because of multiple anonymous peer reviews, in part because of its sheer size, in part because of use of linga franca and in part because of the link between hiring/promotion and assessment of publication performance, the American academic community has developed a dynamic, competitive and auto-centric quality. Other international relations communities have not matched its vigour and strength. Perhaps West Europeans have built a community that has arguably developed strength in a number of niche areas on a par with Americans. Such European-based international relations journals as *Review of International Studies*, *European Journal of International Relations* and *Journal of Peace Research* have registered their respective niche and position in the world market and are a clear testimony to this assessment. Yet one might have to note the 'out flows' of American authors penetrating these and other 'outstanding' journals. To state in a reverse direction, there are other non-American outstanding journals here, 'outstanding' in part because of the 'outflows' of American-residing authors. West Pacific Asians have been trying to build strength on their own feet as much as possible. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* has spearheaded the publication in the region of a journal that is purported to set up a forum in which discussions from within and without not only bring up the academic level of articles but also trigger the fusion of ideas and the enrichment of insights to be brought to bear on the better and deeper understanding of international relations in the region (2000–). Compared to, say, the *Pacific Review*, a journal with a similar regional focus, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* has been less preoccupied with the rather stereotyped comparison between Western European and Pacific Asian regionalism (a highly institutionalized one and an open house one) and interested in a more historically and culturally contextualized analysis of regionalism. Yet its strength remains to be improved substantially before it can claim its position of one of the world-renowned academic focal points.

As a footnote, I might as well add that Japanese political scientists have moved forward to a world centre stage. Two articles in the June 2005 issue of *American*

Political Science Review are co-authored by political scientists with Japanese names and one of the articles in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, which was the most widely read article (of all the Sage journals) in June 2005, is co-authored similarly (Hill and Matsubayashi 1999: 215–24; Imai 2005; Richardson 1974; Goldsmith *et al.* 2005: 408–29). In other words, Japanese strength cannot be underestimated. All the three articles are very solid and positivistically spirited. In an era of deepening globalization, ideas diffuse and permeate fast and en masse. The fact that the latter article on anti-Americanism has been read most frequently seems to suggest that Japan's international relations research has started to enhance worldwide acceptance without so much playing down its *bumi putra* characteristics. In a similar vein, some non-Western theories of international relations have been made far more comprehensible thanks in part to Western authors like Ralph Pettman, who decipher and represent metaphysics such as Taoist strategies, Buddhist economics, Islamic civics, Confucian Marxism, Hindu constructivism, Pagan feminism and animist environmentalism (Pettman 2004).

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Notes

1 I draw for sections 2 and 3 of the paper from Takashi Inoguchi, 'The Sociology of a Not-So-Integrated Discipline: The Development of International Relations in Japan', *Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, February 2002, pp. 111–26; revised 12 December 2005.

2 Furthermore, such authors as Motoshi Suzuki, Keisuke Iida, Yusaku Horiuchi and Takashi Inoguchi are vigorous in this area of study.