

10 Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future

Takashi Inoguchi

Japan is in an era of transition. Behind a facade of confidence in their country's future, many Japanese feel adrift in the world of the late twentieth century.¹ The Japanese energy that is currently directed overseas is no longer based, as it was in the 1960s, on a nationally orchestrated strategy. Governments are no longer sure how to guide society, or with what goals. And Japanese society itself displays its loss of faith in the belief-system so dominant in the 1960s. Today the almost blind belief of that period in the loyalty to big business firms has lost its appeal. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the 1980s Japan had been improvising its responses to the unfamiliar challenges from within and without on an ad hoc basis, tenaciously adhering to time-honoured ways of doing things.

Bereft of a sense of direction, and uncertain about the future, Japan has been haunted by a vague angst about its future which has led it sometimes to hedge, and at least to limit, its commitment to the demands, requests and suggestions coming from overseas that Japan, now a global economic power, should take on more global responsibility.² As one observer aptly put it,

Japan, in fact, does not seem to be pursuing any reasoned search for a secure place in an uncertain world, much less a plan to dominate it, but rather an energetic, opportunistic drift reminiscent of the early 1930s, with freebooting individuals and companies out giving their country a bad name while native people back home believe, like the king of Spain, that hoarding gold will make them rich. Japan has had far too many eggs – defense, trade and technology – in one US basket, considering how uncertain the US seems to be about what to do next.³

One of the salient themes which emerged in the directionless Japanese society of the 1980s is an emphasis on traditional values: values such as perseverance, frugality, diligence, effort, family, community,

sacrifice, humility, the spirit of harmony and deference for the elderly. This fact is instructive. The problem is that these traditional values cannot be the basis for Japanese principles in guiding Japanese global policy. Former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's favourite saying, 'When you do something, sweat by yourself and give credit to others', may be the epitome of humility, generosity and altruism, but it cannot be the sole organising principle of Japanese diplomacy. The same can be said about economic efficiency and profitability. They cannot dominate other considerations when the dollar's volatility could shake down the world economy or when the United States makes it imperative for its allies to implement tighter measures on technological transfer to communist countries.

Apart from these traditional values and economic criteria, which are too vague to allow one to fathom how the Japanese would like to see the world evolve, what are Japan's conceptions of its global position and its global roles? In other words, how is the country shaping its scenarios of the future worlds in which Japan will occupy a not unimportant position? This chapter addresses these and related questions, especially in relation to burden sharing and power sharing with the United States in the management of the world economy and international relations.

I will present below four Japanese scenarios of the world system in 25–50 years' time, making a clear distinction between the economic and the political and security arrangements envisaged in each scenario. In each scenario, Japan's role and the degree of burden sharing/power sharing with the United States will also be indicated. Next, the feasibility of the four scenarios will be discussed in terms of three major conditions, assessing the relative feasibility and desirability of each scenario. The United States and Japan will be the primary focus, though other major actors, no less important to Japan than the United States, will be touched upon as much as possible. Lastly, I will reflect on my findings in the light of the dominant aspirations and apprehensions of the Japanese.

But before these four scenarios are introduced, more straightforward, if somewhat prosaic opinion poll results will be presented. To know what opinion polls reveal is important since the scenarios of the future that follow are inevitably those conjured up largely by educated elites and do not necessarily represent the prevailing moods and sentiments of ordinary Japanese people.

JAPAN'S EXTERNAL ROLE: OPINION POLL RESULTS

A 1987 opinion poll provides useful data on how the Japanese people see Japan's external role. The Public Relations Department of the Prime Minister's Office commissions annual polls on Japanese diplomacy. The poll conducted in October 1987⁴ contains one question relevant to our interest: 'What kind of roles do you think Japan should play in the community of nations? Choose up to two from the list below'. The list had five items:

1. Japan should make contributions in the area of international political affairs such as the improvement of East-West relations and the mediation of regional conflicts.
2. Japan should consolidate its defence capability as a member of the Western camp.
3. Japan should contribute to the healthy development of the world economy.
4. Japan should co-operate in the economic development of developing countries.
5. Japan should make contributions in scientific, technological and cultural exchanges.

Not surprisingly, the respondents overwhelmingly preferred roles outside the security and political realms. Item 3 registered 50.4 per cent; item 4, 34 per cent and item 5, 31 per cent, the three together adding up to 115.4 per cent out of a total of 162 per cent. By contrast, item 1 recorded 24.2 per cent, while item 2 registered only 7.8 per cent. It is very clear from these figures that the Japanese are disinclined to accept a major political or security role in the world.

Another poll (1986) conducted by an academic team permits us to compare the priorities attached by respondents to the domestic and international roles the government should play.⁵ It allowed for multiple choices from among a list of priorities:

1. Preventing crime and securing people's safety (law and order).
2. Promoting technological innovation and raising productivity and production efficiency of the economy as a whole (economic power).
3. Increasing defence capability and consolidating national security.
4. Building roads, schools and hospitals and making life comfortable (standard of living).

5. Enhancing patriotism and strengthening the solidarity of the nation (national solidarity).
6. Promoting adjustment with foreign countries in economic fields and improving the world economy as a whole (global economic welfare).
7. Increasing taxes for those who can afford it and taking care of the poor and needy (social welfare).
8. Managing the economy to prevent inflation and unemployment (domestic economic management).

Instead of asking, 'To which task do you want to see the government attach its first priority?', the poll stated: 'There are many kinds of government policies nowadays. What do you think about the emphasis which government puts on each of them? Choose one of the following answers: (1) much more emphasis, (2) a little more emphasis, (3) keep as it is, (4) a little less emphasis, (5) no emphasis, (6) don't know and (7) no answer.

To make comparison simple, we will look only at responses for the first answer – much more emphasis. The following order of priorities emerges:

1. Domestic economic management (55.7 per cent).
2. Law and order (55.7 per cent).
3. Social welfare (45.2 per cent).
4. Standard of living (44.5 per cent).
5. Economic power (29.7 per cent).
6. Global economic welfare (27.8 per cent).
7. National solidarity (18.8 per cent).
8. National security (11.3 per cent).

In order to make comparison across different polls possible, I must make an admittedly crude assumption. If global economic welfare is said to correspond roughly to Japan's contribution in the economic field, and national security is said to correspond roughly to Japan's contribution in the security field, then two things are immediately clear: first, the overwhelming primacy of domestic priorities and, secondly, the overwhelming weight given to economic contributions compared to security contributions in Japan's desired role in the world. All this is not surprising. However, it is very important to keep in mind that, given the preoccupation with internal affairs and the avoidance of a commitment to security matters, public acceptance of the kind of world

role for Japan that is envisaged by the Japanese government and expected by foreign countries can come only slowly.

It is true that overall public acceptance of Japan's greater role in the world, whether of an economic nature or otherwise, has been steadily increasing for the last few years, especially during the tenure of the Nakasone Cabinet (1982-7). But this has been largely a grudging acceptance, coming only after the government had made a series of carefully calculated incremental moves without arousing too much opposition.⁶ We can recall the recent breakthrough in 1987 when the defence budget exceeded the limit of 1 per cent of GNP,⁷ and also various measures enabling enhanced security co-operation with the United States, including the Japanese decision to allow participation in the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme. But what is seen by the Japanese government as the barrier of public acceptance is still very much in evidence when it comes to Japan's security role in the world.

One recent event reinforces the impression gained from these polls. When the United States and many other NATO countries were sending naval boats to the Persian Gulf in 1987 under the US flag, the suggestion to send the Maritime Safety Agency's boats, put forward by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry, was defeated in Cabinet discussions because of opposition from the Ministry of Transport (which has the Maritime Safety Agency under its jurisdiction). The Cabinet Secretary played a crucial role in siding with the Minister of Transport and with public opinion.⁸ It is only against such a background that we can accurately assess Japan's conceptions of global roles, to which I now turn.

THE FOUR SCENARIOS

The following four scenarios of the world in the next 25-50 years are seen by the Japanese as 'visions of the future'.⁹ Although in some respects they overlap, they represent differing views on the future of global development, the distribution of economic and military power, and institutions for peace and development. It should also be mentioned that these scenarios have not been sketched out by the Japanese alone; both Japanese and non-Japanese have articulated their preferences, given a future in which Japan will play an enhanced role.

Pax Americana, Phase II

This image of the future was first articulated by the Americans. It is the image of an America retaining its leading position in the world and making full use of its advantage in having created the institutions of post-Second World War order and security. This scenario depicts an America experienced in forging the 'balanced' or globalist view of the Western Alliance and deftly prodding and cajoling its allies into enlightened joint action. The outline of this scenario was first made during the latter half of the 1970s, when the post-Vietnam trauma was still strong and when Soviet global influence was somewhat exaggeratedly felt in the United States. In the parlance of American political scientists, the key word was 'regimes' – rules and practices in international interest adjustment – whereby the United States would retain its enlightened hegemony and control the direction of world development. Such phrases as 'after hegemony' and 'cooperation under anarchy' – both used as book titles – epitomise the primary thrust of policy and academic interest in articulating this model of the future.¹⁰

This image has been intermittently put forward in different forms. Confident in the retention of America's cultural hegemony in the Gramscian sense, Bruce Russett, a Yale political scientist, criticised the declaration of America's decline and imminent demise by likening it to the premature report of the death of Mark Twain. More directly and bluntly, Susan Strange of the London School of Economics has asserted that US hegemony has not yet gone; the lament on 'after hegemony' is the favourite habit of American self-indulgence, she says. More recently, Paul Kennedy of Yale has described the revival of American composure and confidence, combined with the sombre recognition of the inevitability of national decline in the longer term.¹¹

In Japan, this image of America's future has been a consistent favourite. Naohiro Amaya, a former vice-minister in MITI was fond of talking about '*Go-Bei*' ('later United States'), as if the United States prior to Vietnam was called '*Zen-Bei*' ('earlier United States'). This is an analogy with the later Han dynasty of China, which was restored after 17 years of disappearance and survived for another two centuries. Similarly, Yasusuke Murakami, a well-known economist, has argued that the hegemonic cycle that has been observed for the last few centuries has ceased to repeat itself largely because the world economy has been transformed from something based on individual national economies to a much more integrated structure. His scenario delineates

an America which is an enlightened and experienced *primus inter pares* in an increasingly multipolar world.¹²

This image has been a favourite one, not least because it encourages the basic retention of Japan's traditional concentration on an economic role with no drastic increase in its security role, which is largely delegated to the United States. Although Japan's profile in the world has changed a great deal in the 1980s, the Japanese preference for limiting the country's commitment to military matters, many of which are generally deemed to have dubious utility, has not been altered.

Japan's roles in Pax Americana Phase II are not significantly different from its present ones. Essentially, these are primarily of an economic nature, with the bulk of global security shouldered by the United States. Even if Japan-US security co-operation is accelerated, this basic division of labour is unlikely to change. Even if Japan were to enhance its out-of-area security co-operation by sending warships to the Persian Gulf to shoulder the cost of oil imports, it would be bolstering the US-dominated world rather than becoming a main security-provider in the region. Even if Japan were to increase its security-related assistance to some Third World countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Papua New Guinea and Honduras, the security leadership of the United States would remain strong. Needless to say, there are those who argue that Japan will start in due course to exert influence by accumulating credit in the United States and other countries. But in this scenario Japanese self-assertiveness will be restrained by various domestic and international factors.

Japan's regional roles in this scenario will be heavily economic. More concretely, Japan will become the vital core of the Pacific growth crescent, encompassing three areas: (1) northern Mexico, the Pacific United States and Canada; (2) Japan and (3) the Pacific – the Asian NICs, coastal China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and Oceania.¹³ The incorporation of the second and the third economic groups into the extended US economic zone will be a vital factor in a US revival. In short, Japan's role in this scenario will be to link the US economy with the Asian Pacific economies in a more balanced manner than today. In this scenario, the current US efforts to liberalise the Pacific Asian markets, revalue local currency-dollar exchange rates and promote burden sharing in development aid, finance and international security will be given further momentum. At the same time, Pacific Asian nationalistic anti-Americanism will be considerably restrained. Perhaps it is important to note that Pax Americana Phase II will need a no less vigorous Western

Europe. An enlarged and enhanced European Community (EC) will remain a pillar of this scenario. But if it degenerates into regional protectionism of the sort that can be glimpsed in the tougher EC anti-dumping policy on printing machines, through arrogance derived from an expected enlarged size and power, then it will elicit a negative reaction from the United States and Japan.

'Bigemony'

This second scenario for the future has been propagated by economists and businessmen, fascinated by the rapid development and integration of what Robert Gilpin, a Princeton political scientist, calls the '*nichibei* [Japan-US] economy'. That is to say, the economies of Japan and the United States have become one integrated economy of a sort. C. Fred Bergsten, an economist who worked as a senior bureaucrat in the Carter administration and is now Director of the Institute for International Economics, coined the word 'bigemony', which denotes the primordial importance of the United States and Japan in managing the world economy. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, coined the expression 'Amerippon' to describe the close integration of the American and Japanese manufacturing, financial and commercial sectors, and indeed the two economies as a whole. This image of the future has been enhanced by the steady rise in the yen's value compared to the US dollar, and the concomitant rise in Japanese GNP, now registering 20 per cent of world GNP.¹⁴

In Japan this image has been put forward most forcefully by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In one of his meetings with President Reagan, he suggested that the two countries should forge a single community of the same destiny, although what he envisaged focused on security rather than on economic aspects of the bilateral relationship.¹⁵ It must be noted that Japanese images of the future have tended to focus on Japan-US relations, to the dismay of Europeans and Asians, let alone other Third World countries. This tendency itself shows the strength of this second scenario.

Japan's roles in the 'bigemony' scenario may appear to some to be very similar to those envisaged in Pax Americana Phase II. However, economic power becomes military power almost inevitably, and Japan does not constitute the historic exception to this rule.¹⁶ But the form in which Japan's economic power will be translated into military power needs close attention. Under 'bigemony' the technical, economic and

strategic co-operation/integration between the United States and Japan will become formidable, and of the largest scale in history. It is therefore not difficult to foresee, for instance, advanced fighter aircraft being developed jointly and manufactured primarily for Japanese use, with Japanese finance, though with American know-how, and also sold to third countries under the label, 'Made in the United States'. The large-scale strategic integration between these two countries as developed in the Pacific in the 1980s will come to be seen as a good testimony of the bigemonic roles Japan can play in security areas.

Japan's regional role in 'bigemony' is an acceleration of the features presented in Pax Americana Phase II. A gigantic Pacific economic community will be forged, with Japan's role reminiscent of the role played by the corridor stretching from northern Italy through north-eastern France, the Rhineland and the Low Countries to southern Britain in modern European economic development. Under this scenario, the potentially heated contest between the United States and Japan over the structural framework of Pacific Asia's economic relationship with the United States will be largely dissipated. Currently, Pacific Asia faces increasingly clear alternatives as to its economic framework: either a US-led free-trade regime established through a bilateral agreement with the United States, or a regional community with de facto Japanese initiatives, which would try to retain a free-trade zone even if North America and Western Europe fell into the temptation of protectionism and regionalism of a malign kind.¹⁷ Furthermore, the strategic integration of many countries in the region may make it hard to accommodate the Soviet Union within an invigorated bigemonic structure, thus relegating it to a far less important status than it currently occupies, unless some other countervailing moves are continuously taken. In this scenario Western Europe, though large in size and high in income level, will be increasingly localised within Europe and its immediate vicinity. This picture reminds one of Immanuel Wallerstein's scenario of the future predicting the formation of two de facto blocs, one comprising the United States, Japan and China, and the other both Western and Eastern Europe.¹⁸

Pax Consortis

Japan's third scenario portrays a world of many consortia in which the major actors proceed by busily forging coalitions to make policy adjustments and agreements among themselves – a world in which no

single actor can dominate the rest. This scenario resembles Pax Americana Phase II in its crude skeleton with its 'regimes' and 'co-operation under anarchy'. However, the major difference is that the thrust of the third scenario rests on the pluralistic nature of policy adjustment among the major actors, whereas that of the first conveys the desirability or necessity (or even the hoped-for inevitability) of 'administrative guidance' or 'moral leadership' by the state that is *primus inter pares* – the United States. This third image is favoured by many Japanese, not least because Japan is averse to shouldering large security burdens. It is also favoured because Japan is not completely happy about America ordering everyone around, especially when it only grudgingly admits its relative decline.

Kuniko Inoguchi, a Sophia University political scientist, articulates this scenario most eloquently and forcefully in the context of the American debate on post-hegemonic stability of the international system.¹⁹ The image has also been put forward by former Vice-Minister Shinji Fukukawa of MITI, which favours minimising the role of military power. Recently, MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conscious of the increasing intrusion by other ministries into foreign affairs, have been trying to use national security and the Western Alliance as a stick to discipline other ministries which might otherwise move in an 'irresponsible' direction (as in the Toshiba case, when it came to light in 1987 that the Toshiba company had sold equipment to the Soviet Union which the United States claimed was in breach of the COCOM agreement on technology transfer). The image of Pax Consortis accords on the whole with the pacifist sentiments of most Japanese.

Japan's role in the Pax Consortis scenario is two-fold. First, with the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals increasingly neutralised either by the de facto US-Soviet detente process or by technological breakthroughs, Japan's primary role is that of quiet economic diplomacy in forging coalitions and shaping policy adjustments among peers, no one of which is predominant. Secondly, Japan's role is that of helping to create a world free from military solutions. That would include, if possible, the diffusion of anti-nuclear defensive systems to all countries and the extension of massive economic aid tied to ceasefire or peace agreements between belligerent parties. Japan's primary regional role in this scenario would be that of co-ordinator or promoter of the interests of the Asian Pacific countries which have not been fully represented either in the UN system or in the economic institutions of the industrialised countries, such as the OECD. Japan's secondary

regional role is that of moderator, especially in security areas.²⁰ This might include acting as an intermediary and attempting to achieve reconciliation between North and South Korea, or the provision of neutral peacekeeping forces in Cambodia and/or Afghanistan in order to facilitate reconstruction through massive aid flows from such multilateral institutions as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Western Europe will loom larger in this scenario than in the other three. In line with its role is such forums as the Western seven-power summits, Western Europe will continue to play an even larger role, having been traditionally quite adept in those situations where multiple actors adjust conflicting interests. The increasing economic ties between Western Europe and Pacific Asia will also encourage thinking along the lines of this scenario.²¹

Pax Nipponica

A fourth image of the future, 'Pax Nipponica', was first put forward by Ezra Vogel, a Harvard sociologist, who in 1979 published a book entitled *Japan as Number One*. It is a world in which Japanese economic power reigns supreme. This scenario has been propagated by those Americans who are concerned about the visible contrast between the United States' relative loss of technological and manufacturing competitiveness and Japan's concomitant gain. Ronald Morse of the US Library of Congress, for example, published an article entitled 'Japan's Drive to Pre-eminence'.²² This view has also been gaining power in Japan, reflecting both the noticeable rise in the value of the Japanese yen compared to the US dollar and other currencies and Japan's leading position as a creditor country. The steady rise of Japanese nationalism, in tandem with what the Japanese call the internationalisation of Japan, is contributing to the strength of this scenario, because the intrusion of external economic and social forces into Japanese society stimulated nationalistic reactions against internationalisation.

Japan's role in this scenario is best compared to that of Britain during the nineteenth century, when it played the role of balancer among the continental powers, its global commercial interests presumably helping it to fulfil this role. As for Pax Consortis in its fullest version, a prerequisite for the advent of Pax Nipponica is either the removal of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals or the development of an anti-nuclear defence system. Without the neutralisation of nuclear weapons, Japan's leading role in the security area would be

minimised, and Pax Nipponica in its fullest form would not be realised. In this scenario, Japan's regional role will coincide with its global role, as its pre-eminent position will enable it to play the leading role in the Asian Pacific region as well.

These scenarios offer substantially different visions of Japan's future. I will now consider what conditions must prevail if they are to be realised.

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FOUR SCENARIOS

To what extent are these scenarios feasible? Under what conditions will the scenarios come into being? In attempting to answer these questions, I will first identify three factors which seem to distinguish these scenarios from each other, and secondly, speculate on the feasibility of each scenario in the next 50 years.

There appear to be three major factors which are crucial in distinguishing these scenarios from each other – (1) the effective neutralisation of strategic nuclear arsenals, (2) scientific and technological dynamism and (3) the debt of history.

Neutralising the Nuclear Arsenals

It is the arsenals of strategic nuclear forces that have allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to retain their superpower status and global influence. Whether these weapons will become obsolete – in other words, whether they cease to be a crucial factor determining global development – remains to be seen. Whether the United States or the Soviet Union or any other country will be able to arm itself with a defensive weapons system which makes it immune to nuclear attack is another question which needs to be answered, and the American SDI and its Soviet counterpart are directly related to this factor. The Conventional Defense Initiative, in which the United States has recently proposed that Japan be jointly involved, may be included as a miniature version of a less ambitious yet more solid kind of effort. Ronald Reagan's fascination with the SDI and Japan's quiet effort to build the CDI may simply reflect what might be called a 'Maginot line' complex surfacing again years after its failure.²³

If such a revolutionary weapons system is realised, strategic nuclear arsenals will be neutralised. Unless this happens, the fourth scenario,

Pax Nipponica, will have difficulty in emerging because while super-power status is based on ownership of strategic nuclear weapons, both the United States and the Soviet Union will remain superpowers despite all their economic difficulties. In a similar vein, the third scenario, Pax Consortis, will not materialise into a system comprising both economic and security regimes without a similar neutralisation of strategic forces. With the disarmament process between the United States and the Soviet Union slowly making progress, strategic nuclear forces may not make much difference in determining global developments. There are those who, arguing in favour of Pax Consortis, maintain that nuclear weapons and even military power in general have already ceased to be a major factor in international politics and that economic interdependence has deepened sufficiently to make war an obsolete instrument for resolving conflicts of interests, at least among OECD countries and in direct East–West relations. Even granting that military power has become less important, I would argue that what is sometimes called the ‘Europeanisation of superpowers’, in Christoph Bertram’s phrase, will progress so slowly as to make it hard to envisage the fully fledged scenarios of Pax Consortis or Pax Nipponica inside the twentieth century. Needless to say, those who argue for Pax Consortis talk about it in a somewhat nebulous future most of the time.

Scientific and Technological Dynamism

The second factor concerns the innovative and inventive capacity of nations – how vigorous they are in making scientific and technological progress and in translating it to economic development. Needless to say, forecasting technological development is not easy. However, even a cursory examination of the social propensity to innovate seems to tell us that the Americans have been the most innovative nation, with the Japanese following on steadily behind. Such conditions as open competition, abundant opportunities, a strong spirit of individualism and freedom and high social mobility, which are observed in the United States, compare very favourably to conditions in Japan.

There is another argument, however, which completely opposes this: that is to say, that Japanese technological innovation has been making steady progress. The following evidence is adduced for the argument:

1. The number of licences obtained by Japanese companies and individuals in the United States has come very close to that of the

United States itself. In 1987, the top three companies were all Japanese firms – Canon, Hitachi and Toshiba (in that order).²⁴

2. More articles by Japan-based authors have appeared in *Chemical Abstracts* than by authors from any other country for several years.
3. The United States in the first 30 years of this century produced as few as five Nobel Prize winners, which is about on a level with Japan's seven winners for the 40-year period since 1945.²⁵

Yet as far as general innovativeness is concerned, the United States seems likely to enjoy its dominant position at least until the end of the twentieth century. If this argument is sufficiently strong, then the first scenario gains force.

The Legacy of History

The third factor is related to the memory of the peoples of the nations occupied in the Second World War of their treatment, primarily at the hands of the Germans and the Japanese. As the former Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, once said to Toyoko Yamazaki, a Japanese novelist, the memory of people who have suffered from war disappears only 80 years after the event. His evidence for this is the Boxer intervention in China in 1900, which has virtually been forgotten, whereas he argues that the memory of the second Sino-Japanese war of 1937–45 will not disappear from the memory of the Chinese for another 40 years. With the question of their wartime atrocities still a politically controversial issue, as shown by international reaction to Japanese official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo (which contained the remains of Japanese war criminals) and President Reagan's 1985 conciliatory visit to the Bitburg cemetery (which contained the graves of Waffe-SS men), Japan or West Germany cannot play a leading role without facing many barriers.²⁶ Pax Nipponica is inherently difficult because of this factor.

THE FOUR SCENARIOS RECONSIDERED

Let me now examine the four scenarios in the light of the three factors discussed above.

Pax Americana, Phase II

Whether Pax Americana Phase II is realised or not will critically depend on factor 2 – scientific and technological dynamism. The argument for this scenario tends to be based on the free spirit, open competition and dynamic character of American society, which it is thought will help the United States to reinvigorate its innovative and inventive capacity.

In my view, this scenario has a fairly high feasibility if the present predicament is managed well. For that purpose two policies are essential: first, close Japan–US macroeconomic policy co-operation and, secondly, the full-scale interlinking of the US economy with the Asian Pacific economies under US leadership. Whether the United States can achieve this without igniting Asian nationalism against it remains to be seen.

‘Bigemony’

The feasibility of ‘bigemony’ depends critically on factor 3 – the debt of history. In other words, it is still an open question whether Japanese pacifist feeling can be overcome and whether the East Asian neighbours can be at ease with Japanese leadership in regional and global security matters, even a leadership based on co-operation with the Americans. To be feasible, therefore, this scenario requires very close friendship between the United States and Japan as a precondition for overcoming the debt-of-history problem. The argument against this scenario is that the steady progress of Japan–US economic integration and defence co-operation has been accompanied by recurrent and at times almost explosive friction between the two countries, which augurs ill for the future.

In my view, the ‘bigemony’ scenario can progress only slowly and steadily, in a moderate manner, as technological progress and economic dynamism push Japan and the United States closer together.

Pax Consortis

The feasibility of Pax Consortis depends critically on factor 1 – nuclear neutralisation. This is conceivable in the distant future, but certainly not in the foreseeable future. For the two superpowers to relinquish

superpower status and revert to less important roles will take time, even assuming that their decline has already begun. One may recall Edward Gibbon's remark that it took another 300 years for the Roman empire to disappear after its inevitable decline and demise were declared by Tacitus. It is utterly beyond speculation whether and how an unknown perfect anti-nuclear defensive weapon system might be developed and deployed. The weaker form of Pax Consortis, one could argue, is more feasible. One may cite the inability of the superpowers to have much influence on the course of events in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, for example; the increasing importance of monetary and economic policy co-ordination and consultation among the major powers; increasing international collaboration in research and development; and the very frequent formation of consortia in manufacturing and financial activities. Needless to say, conventional forces will become more important when nuclear weapons are neutralised. Thus arms control – a kind of consortium – in conventional forces will become an important focus under Pax Consortis.

Pax Nipponica

The feasibility of Pax Nipponica depends critically on factors 1 and 2 – neutralisation of nuclear weapons and scientific and technological dynamism. If both factors are realised together, the historical factor may become less important. But the difficulty of neutralising nuclear weapons has already been mentioned. It must also be emphasised that the obstacles to Japan taking security leadership will not be easy to surmount. First, it will not be easy to persuade the overwhelmingly pacifist Japanese public. Second, it is not easy to see Japan shouldering the burden of the level of overseas armed forces the United States currently possesses for a prolonged period of time. It could easily lead Japan to suffer the kind of inefficiency that the Soviet Union has been so painfully experiencing. Thus estimates of Japan's likely scientific and technological dynamism will also affect the likelihood of Pax Nipponica.

In my view, Japan's innovative and inventive capacity for the next 10–20 years should not be underestimated. But beyond that period, the expected fall in demographic dynamism and associated social malaises that are bound to arise, such as the overburdening of the small productive working population for extensive social welfare expenditure

and for Japan's increased contributions for international public goods, seem to augur ill for this scenario.

To sum up, it seems to me that scenarios one and two – Pax Americana, Phase II and bigemony – are more likely than scenarios three and four in the intermediate term of 25 years, while in the longer term of 50 years a mixture of Pax Americana, Phase II and Pax Consortis seems more feasible. Of the two scenarios feasible in the medium term, Pax Americana, Phase II is the more desirable because it entails fewer risks to the United States as well as to the rest of the world. The effort necessary to sustain the US hegemonic position in its fullest form, whether alone or jointly with Japan or other allies, may cause more stresses than benefits. In the longer term, a soft landing on a Pax Consortis seems desirable.

CONCLUSION

These four scenarios are, admittedly, incomplete. Yet their delineation is useful in order to know better what kind of futures the Japanese have in mind in their assiduous yet uncertain search for their place in the world. Some readers may be struck by the fact that these scenarios reflect peculiarly Japanese aspirations and apprehensions. The weight of the past not only lingers on, but fundamentally constrains the Japanese conception of the world. Any drastic restructuring of Japan's foreign relations away from the ties with the United States seems virtually impossible to the majority of Japanese. It is instructive to learn that in Japan only 7.2 per cent of the population are neutralists, who want to abrogate the country's security treaty with the United States, while in West Germany as many as 44 per cent are neutralists.²⁷

The same thing can be said of the three major factors. First, the debt of history to the Pacific Asian neighbours has been deeply felt as a major constraining factor in our scenarios. It is as if an anti-Japanese alliance in Pacific Asia were always ready to be forged, despite that near half-century since the war, just because Japan once crossed a certain threshold of misconduct. Secondly, the neutralisation of nuclear weapons has been the dream of most Japanese since 1945, when two nuclear bombs were dropped on two Japanese cities. Thirdly, the innovative and inventive capacity of nations is one of those things many Japanese have long felt lacking within themselves. Perhaps reflecting that, they waver between unnaturally timid and exceedingly bold estimates of their own scientific and technological capacity.

Some may argue that my overall scenario – a soft-landing scenario proceeding from Pax Americana, Phase II to the Pax Consortis – is more than mildly optimistic. This may be true. It is arguable that this optimism is somewhat unfounded when the United States, the architect of the post-war order, is beset by severe problems. The point is that a large majority of responsible Japanese leaders have found it virtually impossible to think beyond a world where the United States is of primary importance to Japan and where the Japan–US friendship is a major pillar of global stability. My delineation of four scenarios, including the Pax Nipponica and bigemony, should not be understood as a disclosure of non-existent plans for Japan to become a world supremo, or co-supremo. Rather, it should be interpreted as a manifestation of the kind of independent impulse long suppressed, yet only recently allowed to appear on a very small scale in tandem with Japan's rise as a global economic power. The Japanese are perplexed as they continue to rise in influence. Under what combination of the four scenarios Japan will stand up on the world stage remains a matter for our common interest.

Notes and References

Some of the material in this article is drawn from an earlier paper by the author, entitled 'Japan's global roles in a multipolar world' and presented to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, in 1988. Professor Inoguchi gratefully acknowledges the constructive comments on that article by Shafiqul Islam and Brian Woodall, as well as the contributions of members of the Council's study group on Japan's role in development finance.

1. T. Inoguchi, *Tadanori to Ikkoku Hanei Shugi o Koete* (Beyond free-ride and prosperity-in-one-country-ism) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1987); T. Inoguchi, 'Tenkanki Nihon no Kadai' (Japan's Tasks at a Time of Transition), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (1, 8, 15, 22 and 29 November 1989).
2. T. Inoguchi, 'The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking ahead with Caution', in T. Inoguchi and D. I. Okimoto (eds), *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2: The Changing International Context* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988) pp. 23–63, 490–500; T. Inoguchi, 'Japan's Images and Options: Not a Challenger but a Supporter', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 12(1) (Winter 1986) pp. 95–119; T. Inoguchi, 'Japan's Foreign Policy Background', in H. J. Ellison (ed.), *Japan and the Pacific Quadrille* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987) pp. 81–105.
3. M. Sayle, 'The Powers that Might Be: Japan is no sure bet as the next global top dog', *Far Eastern Economic Review* (4 August 1988) pp. 38–43.

4. Department of Public Relations, Office of the Prime Minister, *Gaiko ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa* (Opinion Poll on Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, April 1988).
5. Joji Watanuki *et al.*, *Nihonjin no Senkyo Kodo* (Japanese Electoral Behaviour) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986).
6. T. Inoguchi, 'Trade, Technology and Security: Implications for East Asia and the West', *Adelphi Papers*, 218 (Spring 1987) pp. 39–55; T. Inoguchi, 'The Legacy of a Weathercock Prime Minister', *Japan Quarterly*, 34(4) (October–December 1987) pp. 363–70.
7. When the 1987 fiscal budget draft was revealed early in 1987, it surpassed the 1 per cent limit. But because in 1987 GNP increased much more vigorously, defence expenditure became less than 1 per cent of GNP at the end of the 1987 fiscal year. On the opinion polls, see Nisihira Sigeki, *Yoron ni Miru Dosedai Shi* (Contemporary History through Opinion Polls) (Tokyo: Brain Shuppan, 1987) p. 295.
8. *Asahi Shimbun* (30 October 1987); see also K. Chuma, 'Nihon no Yukue o Kangaeru' (Thinking about Japan's Future Direction), *Sekai* (December 1987) pp. 85–98.
9. T. Inoguchi, 'Tenkanki Nihon no Kadai', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (15 November 1987).
10. Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
11. B. Russett, 'The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?', *International Organization*, 39(2) (Spring 1985) pp. 207–31; S. Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', *International Organization*, 41(4) (Autumn 1987) pp. 551–74; P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
12. N. Amaya, *Nihon wa Doko e Ikunoka* (Whither Japan?) (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1987); Y. Murakami, 'After Hegemony', *Chuo Koron* (November 1985).
13. C. I. Bradford and W. H. Branson (eds), *Structural Change in Pacific Asia* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987); P. Drysdale, *International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1988).
14. R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
15. T. Inoguchi, 'The Legacy of a Weathercock Prime Minister'.
16. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.
17. T. Inoguchi, 'Shaping and Sharing the Pacific Dynamism', paper presented at a symposium on 'Japan's Growing External Assets: A medium for growth?', Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan College, Hong Kong (22–4 June 1988).
18. I. Wallerstein, 'Friends as Foes', *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1980) pp. 119–31.
19. K. Inoguchi, *Posuto Haken Sisutemu to Nihon no Sentaku* (An Emerging

- Post-hegemonic System: Choices for Japan) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1987).
20. T. Inoguchi, *Tadanori to Ikkoku Hanei Shugi o Koete*.
 21. T. Inoguchi, 'Shaping and Sharing the Pacific Dynamism'.
 22. E. Vogel, *Japan as Number One* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); E. Vogel, 'Pax Nipponica?', *Foreign Affairs*, 64(4) (Spring 1986) pp. 752-67; R. A. Morse, 'Japan's Drive to Pre-eminence', *Foreign Policy*, 69 (Winter 1987-88) pp. 3-21.
 23. On the CDI pushed by the US Congress see D. C. Morrison, 'Earth Wars', *National Journal* (1 August 1987) pp. 1972-5; R. L. Kerber and D. N. Frederiksen, 'The Conventional Defense Initiative/Balanced Technology Initiative', *Defense Issues*, 2(36) pp. 1-5. I am grateful to Jefferson Seabright for enabling me to read these and other related materials.
 24. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (26 March 1988).
 25. *Ashai Shimbun* (evening edn, 24 March 1988).
 26. P. Katzenstein, 'Supporter States in the International System: Japan and West Germany', paper prepared for the conference on 'Globalized Business Activities and the International Economy', Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo (23-4 June 1988).
 27. On the West German figure, see 'Disarmament is a Long Word and Takes a Long Time to Say', *The Economist* (30 July 1988); on the Japanese figure see Sayle, 'The Powers that Might Be'.