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Looking Back to Look Forward: The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Paradigms

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1. Introduction

The paradox of looking back is that it can lead to looking forward. Once we notice that a rivulet has quietly bubbled forth at point of time $t - n$, it becomes much easier to see how the stream is likely to grow by point of time $t + n$ because by then you have seen how the stream has been flowing for the period between $t - n$ and t .

One good example is the history of state sovereignty. According to the conventional view of international law during the Cold War period, it was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that unleashed the modern period of state sovereignty, departing from the previous medieval pattern, in the case of Europe, of religious universality and political feudalism. Leaving aside the many other actors and entities that are best described as medieval, such as the Hanseatic League, the Italian city states, the empires of central Europe, and the Vatican and whole religious sects, this conventional view has painted the world ever since as if sovereign states were virtually the sole actors in global politics.

The fact is that before and after the Treaty of Westphalia, the landscape of Europe did not change dramatically, as Krasner (1993) astutely argues and Spruyt (1993) amply demonstrates. It is only in the mid-nineteenth century that sovereign states came to occupy the central place in global politics, with territorially based nation states born one after another within Europe (Germany and Italy) as well as in its periphery (the United States and Japan). Furthermore, the European sovereign states overflowed in colonialist empires worldwide during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was only during the Second World War and thereafter that colonialism began to relinquish its grip, unleashing a proliferation of sovereign states unprecedented in the history of humankind.

At the end of World War II, there were less than thirty sovereign states in the world, mostly European states and white-settled ex-colonies. When the United Nations headquarters building in New York was designed in 1945, the architect projected that the building would eventually have to accommodate a maximum of 100 member states. However, by the mid-1960s, there were far more than 100 and by the mid-1990s, the figure had reached 185. Given this dramatic increase in the number of sovereign states and the conventional views of international law, it was not unnatural that global politics was essentially inter-national politics, that is, politics among nations (Morgenthau, 1959). This is the Westphalian framework.

Yet while the number of sovereign states proliferated, at least two other streams of thought regarding global politics began to develop, inconspicuously until quite recently: the Philadelphian and the Anti-Utopian. The Philadelphian is the framework that governed the United States from its independence until the Civil War in the mid-nineteenth century and which has been in the process of reviving on a global scale toward the end of the twentieth century. It is manifested in the dramatic increase in the number of liberal democracies which subscribe to the norms and rules of the free market economy and democratic politics. One of the principles leading to this increase is that democracies rarely fight each other (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993). By Anti-Utopian, I refer to the framework that governs the failed and failing states and that has been structurally veiled by other frameworks. It refers to the revival of the mission to "civilize" but without ambitions for

territorial aggrandizement, under the banners of global governance, human security, and humanitarian assistance.

The growing Philadelphian influence is evidenced by the number of sovereign states that adopt in their constitutions adherence to such conventions and declarations on freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights as announced in such years as 1776, 1789, and 1945. Its reach now extends to about 150 states. The growing influence of the Anti-Utopian framework is evidenced by the number of humanitarian-assistance and peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations that are occasioned by large-scale famine and by intermittent civil strife. In other words, while state sovereignty has become the *Zeitgeist* in the twentieth century, it has also been accompanied by the steady erosion of state sovereignty in the wake of globalization as well as the growth of the civil society (Biersteker/Weber, 1996). These phenomena are behind the concomitant rise in the number of Philadelphian as well as Anti-Utopian actors. In other words, the three frameworks are growing in tandem.

Another good example of the rise of Philadelphian influence is the slow revival of what we might call "intermediate" organizations in Japanese society. According to conventional wisdom, in Japan there are only two categories of actors, governmental organizations (GOs) and non-governmental individuals (NGIs). This dichotomous image is primarily based on portrayals of state-led modernization starting in the mid-nineteenth century and continuing through the third quarter of the twentieth century. In the last quarter of this century, however, the vigor of intermediate organizations has been noted with increasing frequency (Inoguchi, 1998a).

What is reason for their rise? The first reason is that the aura and authority that the state enjoyed in the past has been fading. State-led mobilization for war and state-led rapid industrialization became things of the past by the fourth quarter of the century (Murakami, 1997). This is a more or less universal phenomenon throughout the Northern Hemisphere.

The second reason is that instincts and institutions with roots in the feudal age die hard in Japan (Amino, 1997) and that in tandem with the steady erosion of state sovereignty they have begun to revive with almost atavistic vigor. Feudalism flourished in both Japan and Europe in medieval times, but absolutism arose in Europe in the early modern period, establishing the pattern of state sovereignty (Anderson, P., 1972). It further evolved into state sovereignty based on social liberalism infused with enlightenment thinking. In Japan, absolutism manifested itself briefly in the sixteenth century, only to be aborted before it could become well established (Inoguchi, 1997a, 1997b). What was born instead was the semi-feudalistic, centralized Tokugawa regime (1603-1868), which was in form an early modern nation in each of its 300-odd semi-autonomous governing units (domains). The modern state (1868-1945) nationalized and centralized power into itself for the goal of creating a rich nation and a strong army. It justified the concentration of power with the imperative of rapid industrialization and war mobilization.

Even after the defeat in World War II, the imperative to reconstruct the economy and achieve rapid growth in accordance with the U.S. policy of transforming Japan into a bulwark against communist further reinforced state power through most of the latter half of the century. Social liberalism made only slow progress under the Meiji state, and full-fledged liberalization only came about with the U.S.-led Allied Occupation. Yet state dominance continued, thereby giving the strong impression that the Japanese political system is that of a strong state.

However, once these two imperatives were fulfilled, which seems to be the case now, atavistic instincts seem to have revived, like long-buried seeds rising up to grow and flower again after an interregnum of one and a half centuries. What we now observe is the relative decline of state power, the resurgence of intermediate organizations, and the self-assertion of the individual (late, slow, and modest as it may seem by comparison with the United States or Western Europe; Inoguchi, 1998a). Still, without an adequate appreciation of the historical evolution of Japanese society, we will not be able to see clearly what lies in the not-so-near future.

Below, I would like to compare the three frameworks, Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian, in terms of geo-politics, geo-economics, and geo-culture.

2. Comparison of the Three Frameworks

All three are geopolitical to begin with. Let me explain them further in terms of their key actors, basic premises, and behavioral modalities (Inoguchi, 1998b).

Table 1

Outline of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Frameworks

	Westphalian	Philadelphian	Anti-Utopian
Geo-political framework			
Principal author	Kissinger	Russett	Huntington
Key concept	state sovereignty	popular sovereignty	loss of sovereignty
Institutional unit	nation state	liberal democracy	failed/failing state
Behavioral principle	balancing/bandwagoning	binding/hiding	hollowing out/collapsing
Geo-economic foundations			
Principal author	Gerschenkron	Reich	Wallerstein
Key concept	national economy	global market	world system
Driving force	state-led industrialization	market-driven mega-competition	global empowerment and marginalization
Critical variable	large input of capital and labor	critical input of technology	survival/competition strategy
Geo-cultural networks			
Principal author	Anderson	Barber	Barber
Key media	state-run radio/TV	cable TV network	underground network
Key purpose communication	nation building	global penetration	dissident
Key effect	ideo-legitimization	video-globalization	subversive operations

In the Westphalian framework, the actors are "normal states" and the basic premise is state sovereignty. In the Philadelphian framework, the actors are liberal democracies as politico-economic systems, and the basic premise is the ideology of liberal democracy (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1997; Ikenberry, 1996; Keane, 1998). In the anti-Utopian framework, the actors are failed and failing states and the basic premise is loss of sovereignty. Normal states are characterized as having strong state sovereignty and by a clear distinction of order within versus anarchy without. They are especially sensitive to infringements of sovereignty and territoriality. They abhor interference in internal affairs. Liberal democracies are characterized by firmly entrenched popular sovereignty and broad acceptance of universal norms and values such as the free market and democratic politics. They seek to downplay emphasis on protectionism and state sovereignty and the potentially volatile politics of marginalized segments of the globe. Failed and failing states are those that have suffered from "hollowing-out" in terms of sovereignty and have become economically marginalized. They are vulnerable in the face of global economic changes and instability in security, and prone to suffer from internal disorder and civil strife. They tend to be ripe for intervention from outside, whether it comes in the form of colonialism, humanitarian relief, or armed aggression.

The behavior modalities of normal states are balancing and bandwagoning (Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1998). The aim of balancing is to contain the potentially explosive assertiveness of other normal states. Capability to fight must nevertheless be maintained in case it is necessary. In the case of an overwhelmingly powerful normal state (or coalition thereof), a state may resort to bandwagoning. If you cannot beat them, join them. The behavior modalities of liberal

democracies are binding and hiding (Deudney, 1996). Like-minded actors band together in order to achieve a wider and stronger union. When faced with forces that might jeopardize liberal democratic norms at their foundation, however, concealment may be expedient. The behavioral modalities of failed and failing states are "hollowing-out" and collapse. They are actors that are no longer autonomous actors. They are associated with anarchy within and intervention from without, yet they are so amorphous that their strength is not much affected by such outside intervention.

To illustrate this more concretely, we may examine the three frameworks as expounded upon in Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy* (1995), Bruce Russett's *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (1993), and Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1994). Kissinger's central concern is with peace achieved by finessing balance-of-power politics among major powers. Russett's key thesis concerns the predominantly non-violent mode of conflict resolution among those actors who share a common set of norms and values such as those of democracy and liberalism. And Huntington's primary perception is of the essential incompatibility of civilizations and of some sets of religion, race, language, geography, and history.

Why is it that these works were all published at about the same time in the United States? I might suggest that it is because the United States lives with the three frameworks. It is because the United States needs a grand strategy guiding it in its relation to the rest of the world when it is a self-acknowledged world leader with a long-term concern about its sustainability and ambivalence over questions of isolationism and interventionism. One must acknowledge that the United States is the primary actor in global politics. It is the only normal state on the globe in the Westphalian sense, if Kenneth Waltz's category or "normal" state means possessing massive strategic nuclear forces and thus being able to determine its own destiny. It is the founding father of Philadelphian actors, spearheading the economic liberalization and political democratization of the late twentieth century. It is the virtually only global actor equipped with the physical apparatus and mind-set for armed intervention. The primary responsibility for overseeing global developments on three fronts falls on the shoulders of the United States. When the distribution of military power is characterized by the salience of a very powerful actor with the rest trailing far behind, it is natural that the United States has to assume maintenance of strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, low-intensity warfare, and satellite intelligence. When economic globalization accelerates and political and social liberalization gain momentum, someone must see to it that shared norms and values drive the global community to take concerted action to sustain peace and prosperity. It must be the United States that takes the lead on this. When the marginalized segments of the global market become volatile and when the peripheral areas of the world become unstable, someone must do something to alleviate the negative consequences that intermittently unfold in the failed and failing states. "Someone" ends up being the United States a little too often.

Not only the superpower, but also international organizations live under the three frameworks. Let me take the United Nations as an example (Inoguchi, 1998c). The United Nations is embedded in the Westphalian framework in which member states reign supreme. The United Nations has neither the authority nor power to levy taxes or to conscript armies, two major features of state sovereignty. A carbon dioxide tax, or a taxation scheme that would secure an autonomous revenue source for the United Nations by taxing currency trading, has a long way to go. And a standby scheme for recruitment and dispatch for the United Nations peacekeeping

operations has encountered difficulties. Nevertheless, the United Nations is increasingly Philadelphian in the sense that some 70-120 member states are characterized as liberal democracies, depending on the definition. The recently concluded treaty banning land mines was ratified by some 150-odd states primarily because non-governmental organizations are most effective in disseminating information on an issue and persuading key member states to join in, including the country that hosted the conference, Canada. The three U. N. agencies that expanded their budgets, personnel, and overall activities in the 1990s were the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). They are most skillful and effective in appealing to world public opinion and mobilizing volunteers, funds, and other forms of support. They had good causes (refugees, famine, and children) and excellent leaders, who all happen to be women: Sadako Ogata, Catherine Bertini, and Carol Bellami.

No less important is the fact that the belief that the United Nations should be made available to the less privileged and more marginalized on the globe. It does extend a helping hand to those forced to live in the Anti-Utopian framework because member states are all supposed to be normal states, more or less, and to be committed, more or less, to a number of charters, including the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, that enshrine freedom, human rights, equality, and democracy. It is not coincidental that some 150 states have constitutions that contain some segments of these charters as well as some segments of the declarations issued in 1776 and 1789.

To illustrate further, using the case of Japan (Inoguchi, 1997c), one might note that Japan wants to be viewed as a liberal democracy and that most people, except for a few vehement nationalists, do not much mind the state of semi-sovereignty as far as national security is concerned. It is not so unhappy to be a civilian power as long as it is assured peace and prosperity. Japan is often criticized as shirking its responsibilities as far as human rights and disarmament are concerned, which is to say, essentially, that it is not sufficiently Philadelphian yet. But Japan is like most others, not fully Philadelphian. And even a good Philadelphian actor often hides. Japan is also frequently criticized for not being a normal state, that is brought to task for neither having the will nor the capacity to resort to force even for the good cause of the peaceful settlement of a dispute, and that its political process is plagued with either too many heads or no head at all to assume ultimate political responsibility. In short, it is accused of not being quite Westphalian. But Japan has been trying after all to become less Westphalian in a number of respects in tandem with its growing economic interdependence and as its inseparability from global security.

3. Geoeconomic Foundations of the Three Frameworks/p>

The above three frameworks must be grounded in geoeconomic bases as well as geocultural networks. The geoeconomic bases of the three frameworks are described, respectively, in Alexander Gerschenkron's *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (1965), Robert Reich's *Work of Nations* (1991), and Immanuel Wallerstein's *Modern World System* (1974). Gerschenkron's unit is the national economy and the key actor is the sovereign state driven by its own late-coming status and economic backwardness. His protagonists are Russia and Germany. In the late twentieth-century context, however, he could have included the following three groups of states: First, the East Asian states (à la World Bank, 1993 or Robert Wade, 1991) in much the same way as he treated Germany and Russia in the earlier periods of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Second, the Nordic States (à la Esping-Anderson, 1985) with their social-

democratic policy package. Third, the Napoleonic states (à la Robert Boyer, 1995) with regard to regulation. The commonality of these groups is that they more or less uniformly stress the positive role of the state in bringing about economic prosperity and social stability. Some argue that globalization brings about weak and unstable nations incapable of responding to the demands of their citizens or of managing their exposure to the hostile, volatile, and irrational international economy, and that the weakness and instability of these latter states will undermine even their economic efficiency (Bienefeld, 1997).

Reich's unit is the global market and the key actor is an anonymous and amorphous set of all the speculators in the world, watchful eyes on the lookout for opportunities to be exploited to the full. To summarize Bienefeld's succinct critique of Reich's argument, leaving out his negative tone, it is roughly as follows: The scenario of the future is the unilateral and inevitable movement toward further globalization. Reich's future is to be sustained by the fortunate few who can adapt to and excel in global mega-competition. His premise is that further liberalization will lead to the global cornucopia. Regarding the declining majority, he argues that it can be rescued through massive training schemes financed by the privileged minority. Government intervention, especially if it takes the form of protectionism, will necessarily reduce the general standard of living. The Reich world is the modernization theory writ large with the United States as the model for liberalization and globalization.

Wallerstein's unit is the world system of empowerment and marginalization, and the key variable is how business and state leaders are able to harmonize their survival/competitiveness strategies with global market forces and major power competition. His heart lies with those who are exploited and marginalized in the peripheries around the world. Since globalization exposes the weak to the torrent of global competition without much help from the state, the future is inevitably dark. The prescription of international economic agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tends to further marginalize many weak states before they benefit from market liberalization.

Gerschenkron's transformative mechanism is the large input of capital and labor. The system of stockholding to collect capital, state-led industrialization to guide entrepreneurs, and long working hours in exchange for permanent employment status or high wages. As Paul Krugman (1993) correctly points out, a good deal of the East Asian miracle can be explained by the massive input of capital and labor.

The transformative mechanism of the Reich world is the straightforward input of technological innovation. As Paul Roemer cogently argues, technology itself is endogenized in the market here, in contrast to that of the Gerschenkron view, where technology tends to be treated as exogenous. The global market began to flourish after telecommunications devices became available to all speculators and after opportunities for currency trading were dramatically amplified by the Plaza Accord of 1985. It will further flourish at some future time when telemanufacturing and teledistribution devices are invented and utilized globally.

Wallerstein's transformative mechanism is a little more sociological, as well as political, involving international class struggle, surrounding regional market consolidation and expansion.

These three bases coexist in the late twentieth century. The Gerschenkron world still flourishes in East Asia despite the slight erosion of self-confidence due to the recent financial crisis. The Reich

world is rapidly on the rise almost everywhere. The dramatic global spread of telecommunications technology and the instantaneous global financial services associated with it is the basis of this expansion. The Wallerstein world dies hard because of the accelerated empowerment and marginalization mechanisms embedded in the era of mega-competition. If you cannot compete, merge with others or marginalize yourself further by protectionism.

The Gerschenkron scheme corresponds roughly to the Kissinger world. The Reich scheme corresponds roughly to the Russett world. The Wallerstein scheme corresponds roughly to the Huntington world. Geopolitics has its geoeconomic basis in each of the three frameworks.

4. Geocultural Networks of the Three Frameworks

The three frameworks, Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian, have their own geocultural networks. These are depicted in the works of Benedict Anderson (1991) and Benjamin Barber (1993). Benedict Anderson portrays the state radio network of Indonesia in its primary role fixated on nation-building. Benjamin Barber describes the starkly different networking technology and strategy of the Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian worlds. They are symbolized by MacWorld and Jihad, respectively. CNN and Samizdat (Samoizdatel'stvo) symbolize another aspect of the contrast between these two different networks.

Networks are important in nurturing and cementing sharing and solidarity, and hence they are self-strengthening. The rise or decline of the three frameworks depends in part on how these three networks flourish, compete, or degenerate. In the Anderson network, the state and state-owned radio and television play the key networking roles.

As an example of how such networks are forged, I might note the example of Indonesia. Indonesia consists of some 13,000 islands and is a country where countless, mutually incomprehensible native languages are spoken. When Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands, the new leaders chose for the new nation's standard language a somewhat artificial and very local language spoken mostly in the Malay peninsula coastal areas and the surrounding area for commercial purposes. It is a sort of Creole or pidgin form of Indonesian, a sort of Malayo-Polynesian Esperanto and called Bahasa Indonesia. But the leaders chose this deliberately instead of Javanese, the predominant language of the island of Java where most of the Indonesian founding fathers originated. For the sake of the unity and solidarity of the Republic of Indonesia, it was decided not to impose a dominant language of the dominant population on all the rest. The national language is diffused on all possible occasions through the public network Radio Indonesia. Bahasa Indonesia is the symbol and device for nation building. Children begin to learn Bahasa Indonesia formally after they start primary school. I vividly remember an experience in Jyogdjakarta, Java, where I was teaching Japanese politics at the University of Gadjah Mada for two months in 1990. With two other Japanese colleagues, I was eating lunch on the rocks of a small river where a group of young children were swimming mid-stream. I asked one of them in my elementary Bahasa Indonesia whether they spoke Bahasa Indonesia. He said "Tidak" (No.). An interview by the public broadcaster Televisi Indonesia, when President Suharto visited Tokyo at the time of the Group of Seven summit in 1993 for the apparent purpose of presenting Indonesia's appeal to join the Group, was also a telling experience. They asked straightforwardly and gave the impression that they really wanted to raise the status and prestige of Indonesia by joining the Group of Seven. What surprised me further was that Televisi Indonesia identified me as someone who could be interviewed on the

subject and that the interviewer was one of my former students at Jyogdjakarta in 1990. Their assumption seems to have been that my presumably deeper "understanding" of Indonesia's nation-building efforts drawn from my experience in Indonesia would "soften" an otherwise much harsher view thereof, and that I was "networked" to "video-legitimize" their cause.

MacWorld is the symbol of global penetration. CNN is its television networking counterpart. CNN is characterized by prompt global reporting on the spot with dramatic, well-calculated visual effects. Again, to draw from my own experience, I recall when I appeared on CNN with Diet member Wakako Hironaka at the time the Liberal Democratic Party was trounced in the June 1993 general elections. Everything was live, no script, no rehearsal. CNN Tokyo's Eileen O'Conner appeared shortly before broadcasting time and said that she would ask us certain questions. The setting was also deliberately chosen: vote counting was still going on in the building of one of the Japanese television stations where CNN Tokyo has its offices. Against the background noise of the busy vote-counting room, we sat and discussed the general election and its impact on Japanese politics. Certainly it was calculated to give the strong visual impression that Japan was experiencing a dramatic change and that TV viewers were witness to it. This is perhaps what the United States government wanted to see in the context of the ongoing trade negotiations and in view of Japan's limited participation in the Gulf War.

Samizdat is the symbol of dissident communication from the old days of the Soviet regime. Today, fax and e-mail are the latest devices for dissident communication. They are used for underground or subversive operations or for clandestine intelligence activities. Again, to draw on my own experience. I received a fax message some weeks after June 4, 1989 (the day of the Tiananmen massacre), when anti-Chinese government demonstrations and meetings were taking place in Tokyo. The message was a call for solidarity from Chinese students at the University of Tokyo. I knew the name of one of the students, who had come to me a couple of years earlier with a letter of recommendation from Yan Jiaji, then director of the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I had known Yan through correspondence regarding the publication in Chinese of a book series in political science put out by the University of Tokyo Press, of which I was editor. In my introduction to the Chinese edition, I acknowledged the efforts of a number of colleagues including Professor Yan Jiaji. The massacre took place before the Chinese translation started to come out, and when it appeared, in late 1990, my reference to Yan Jiaji had been deleted. I was abroad on that particular day, but had been in intermittent correspondence with the former student. He now has a tenured teaching job at a university in Tokyo and lives there with his Japanese wife and child.

The above perhaps somewhat-too-personal account of the implications of the three different styles of networking correspond to the three different networks. How these different geocultural networks will evolve, along with the three geoeconomic bases and three geopolitical frameworks, into the twenty-first century is our next subject.

Future Directions

Geoeconomically speaking, it is not entirely clear that globalization in its extreme will bring about peace and prosperity. If everything is subject to market forces, two obstacles may rise up. First, market turbulence creates instability. Second, the pursuit of market efficiency accelerates the marginalization of non-competitive segments. Therefore, globalization and integration are not likely to reinforce the Philadelphian trend in a unilateral direction. There are likely to be swings

both ways, forward and backward. Atrophy of the Philadelphian framework may take place if the geoeconomic foundations are not assured at an optimal level. Once globalization and liberalization reach the extreme, internal disparities may develop into something that cannot be easily contained. The Anti-Utopian framework flourishes under such circumstances. In a similar vein, globalization and integration taken to the extreme may bring about a revival of state sovereignty because it is counted on as the last resort against the relentless tide of market forces.

Then the question will be, how far globalization will deepen in the next quarter or two. In order to get a clearer view of this situation, it will be necessary to identify at least the following three variables, which are likely to play major roles in determining the vicissitudes of the three geopolitical frameworks. They are: key technological innovations, deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions, and resilience of nation states. Each of these three variables will play a leading role in shaping the Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian outcomes. It is my task here to see how these three factors play out their role in determining global politics.

Table 2

Directions of Change in Terms of Three Key Variables

1. Key technological innovations	Information technologies steadily combined with manufacturing technologies
Philadelphian direction	
2. Demographic-environmental deterioration	Short-term deterioration and long-term amelioration
Anti-Utopian direction	
3. Resilience of nation states	The state as the provider of identity, stability and fulfillment
Westphalian direction	

Kondratieff, Schumpeter, and other business-cycle economists (Goldstein, 1988; Saito, 1998) enumerate the key technological innovations that bring about total factor productivity. Starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these include canals (such as the Suez and Panama), railroads, electric power, automobiles, and information technologies. Each was the driving force in business prosperity roughly for the periods 1800-1848, 1848-1895, 1895-1941, 1941-1996, and 1996-, in this order. Canals and railways shortened distances dramatically between oceans and on continents. Electrical power provided the engines for industrialization. Automobiles are the symbol of manufacturing. Information technologies dramatically eased global communication and thus business transactions. What we observe now is the early explosion of technological innovation in the information technologies. Starting with telecommunications, computers, and financial services, innovation in this area has steadily begun to permeate the manufacturing and marketing sectors, bringing about new revolutions in business. It is not entirely clear whether these innovations will sustain the law of marginal increase of profit (Arthur Brian) in contrast to the law of marginal decline of profit, which is said to have been the case in the past with respect to the effects of new technologies. If that is the case, the claims for the advent of a new economy without business depressions might be credible (Weber, S., 1997). If these things evolve sufficiently, it may be possible to sustain the geoeconomic foundations of

the Philadelphian framework reasonably well. Similarly, the geocultural networks sustaining the Philadelphian framework will develop further.

The deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions is the old Malthusian problematique. Technological optimists argue that biochemical and biomedical technologies will make breakthroughs to cope with the expected scenario. Environmental pessimists argue that, in view of the prospect of further population expansion and deterioration of the environment, the basis of food production as well as the fundamental conditions for clean air and water will be undermined, placing human life in jeopardy. Demographically, the proportion of the aged on the globe is becoming alarmingly large in comparison to the productive population in the advanced industrial democracies.

My sense is that discovery and scientific breakthrough will take time to bear fruit, and that all the splendid innovations in information technology that may be made in the next half century will not be much use in dramatically ameliorating the deterioration that takes place. Parts of the world population, such as thousands of infants in civil-strife-torn areas, will be sacrificed. Yet the growing awareness of global citizenship and the increasing behest for global governance is likely to prevent miserable situations from further deterioration. Needless to say, all these are not likely to lead to any all-out Anti-Utopian scenario. But the lack of well-concerted action on this front will increase the likelihood of a doomsday scenario.

The resilience of nation states will be sustained for the next half century. A whole world awash in the tide of globalization and driven everywhere by market forces is unlikely to take permanent root. That would ultimately mean the obliteration of most organized units other than markets, and this is highly unlikely. The more plausible picture is that the more globalized and the more market-force-driven, the more likely developmental forces are likely to resort to the state to restore stability and security and the more reliance there will be on national identity and solidarity as sources of meaning and fulfillment. Yet the traditional prerogatives of sovereign states, i.e., the ability to raise tax revenues and conscript soldiers, are becoming more difficult. As market liberalization and globalization further expand, these globally competitive firms rely less and less on the state. They find ways to pay relatively less tax by expanding offshore and seeking tax havens. Conscription is increasingly out of favor and raising of military reserves is based on volunteers. Internationally, mobilizing soldiers for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations will tend to be based on standby agreements.

If the above speculations make the future seem to be very near, it is important also to remind ourselves that a half a century is not so far away. It is like the day after tomorrow. The most important message of the above exercise is that looking back helps us to peer into the future perhaps more clearly because we can trace the tenuous yet critical threads all the way back, thus better understanding the path that has been trodden for much longer periods of time than conventional wisdom allows.

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