

DOES GLOBALIZATION REDUCE OR ENHANCE DEMOCRACY? A MICRO ANALYSIS BASED ON AN 18 COUNTRY CROSS-NATIONAL ASIA-EUROPE SURVEY

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Does globalization have a positive or negative impact on democracy? One reason this problem has gone unsolved is found in the fact that most studies to date have not made systematic use of empirical data to test propositions concerning the relationship between globalization and democracy. While there have been studies that have made a pioneering systematic contribution through the use of macroeconomic and other aggregate statistics, this article empirically examines whether globalization enhances or constrains democracy by using cross-national survey data collected in 17 countries (the Asia-Europe Survey). Our empirical testing has shown that globalization tends to be positively correlated to democratic activism at the individual level, suggesting the possibility that experiences of globalization strengthen democracy.

1. Introduction

Most democratization processes in history have been externally influenced. After examining 61 countries that were “free” as of 1991, Whitehead (1996) suggested that only Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom established democracy on their own, without outside interference. Recently, we have witnessed an increase in the volume of international transactions, which many analysts have labeled as globalization. It is widely believed that globalization has had a considerable impact on both domestic and international affairs. Consequently, social scientists have begun to consider more precisely the nature and extent of the impact that globalization has on democracy.

The burgeoning literature on the subject does not always characterize globalization as promoting democracy. Many analysts are concerned about the negative effects of globalization on democratic practices or acknowledge both the good and bad aspects of globalization. The scholarly divisions which exist on the matter may be due to the fact that both concepts here—globalization and democracy—can be defined and interpreted in a number of ways. Another reason for disagreement may be the lack of robust empirical testing of carefully formulated hypotheses. Many of these theoretical discussions have not been backed up with rigorous empirical research.

In this respect, Li and Reuveny (2003) made a pioneering systematic contribution, us-

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ing macro-economic and other statistical data. In contrast to their usage of aggregate data, this article makes use of cross-national data from an eighteen-country survey (the Asia-Europe Survey) to examine the impact of globalization on democracy.

2. Debates on the Impact of Globalization on Democracy

While history has its share of global activities, as exemplified by the Silk Road and transatlantic trade, it was only in the 1960s when people started to talk about such phenomena using the term “globalization.” Their topics vary from the expansion of financial markets to borderless terrorist networks. Even though some skeptics challenge the existence of a “truly global economy... dominated by uncontrollable market forces” (Hirst and Thompson 1999), few would deny that we are currently witnessing rapid changes toward a more integrated world in material, spatio-temporal, and cognitive aspects (Held and McGrew 2000).

Those who discuss globalization not only differ in their area of focus but also in their judgment of globalization (Sen 2002). Fueled by ideological backgrounds, debates on whether globalization is something to celebrate or to condemn seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. On the one hand, supporters of free-trade and capital market economy welcome the age of accelerating globalization (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000; Fukuyama 1992). Articles of this grain often appear in economic and financial magazines, emphasizing the benefits of globalization. On the other hand, those who oppose such neo-liberal arguments are those who insist that globalizing markets and multi-national companies are causing problems, including growing inequality and environmental destruction (Gill 1995; Gray 1999).

One of the important questions in the globalization debate asks whether globalization strengthens or weakens democracy (McGrew 1997; Held 1995; Goodhart 2001; Cerny 1999). Here, the debate is further entangled by different understandings of democracy. As will be discussed below, those who understand globalization to promote democracy are diverse in what they mean by “democratization,” their definitions ranging from institutional changes to enhanced citizenship. On the other hand, those who are skeptical about globalization tend to be more concerned about equality or economic gaps.

Those who believe globalization promotes democracy differ in how they consider democratization to be achieved. Some of them take elitist approaches: when economic globalization promotes a market economy via multinational business corporations or international institutions, authoritarian leaders are encouraged to make democratic concessions in order to promote greater business opportunities (Schmitter 1996). Others look at societal factors: global spread of the market economy leads to drastic changes in various aspects of society, including the emergence of a middle class that potentially supports democracy. In this school of thought, when the market economy reaches a certain stage in economic development, it is expected to trigger a democratization process (Lipset 1959, 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Muller 1995).

Although many discuss globalization in the area of economy or finance, there is another important aspect of globalization: communication and diffusion of information circulating

Table 1: Two Kinds of Globalization Impacting Two Levels of Society

		Kinds of Globalization	
		Economic	Communication
Level of Society: Elite and Mass	Elite/regime	Liberalization; Concessions	International pressures on regimes
	Mass/social	Rise of a middle class	Satellite TV; Advocacy groups

the globe. Highly-developed transportation technologies now allow us to travel around the world with ease. Online message exchange via the Internet has made international communications virtually costless. Globalizing media include fast-growing international news channels such as CNN, which is accessible around the world. Taking advantage of such developments in transportation and communication, pro-democratic international NGOs have emerged as important players in democratization processes (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Eased communications also facilitate the direct diffusion of democratic ideas (Huntington 1991; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi Neto 1996). These different views on how globalization promotes democracy are categorized in Table 1.

On the other hand, some also point to the negative impacts of globalization. Economic globalization is considered to have induced “job insecurity” or the fear of “being ‘swamped’ by” refugees and illegal immigrants, thus provoking the rise of right-wing populist parties (Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003; Swank and Betz 2002). Another argument stresses that cross-border economic activities of globalization have encouraged the erosion of state-based citizenship (Sassen 1996).

As these globalization debates suggest, different understandings of globalization and democracy have the potential to obstruct fruitful dialogues over the pros and cons of globalization. Empirical studies with falsifiable propositions and explicit operationalization could help in obtaining a clearer picture of the relationship between globalization and democracy.

Nonetheless, in contrast to massive amounts of theoretical literature on globalization and democracy, there are only a few empirical studies on the relationship between the two. For example, using the Polity III data and a set of economic indices, Li and Reuveny (2003) examine the impact of economic globalization on democratic and autocratic changes in 127 countries from 1970 to 1996. Their independent variables, which measure the degree of globalization, consist of four different national aggregate statistics—trade openness, foreign direct investment inflows, portfolio investment inflows, and the spread of democratic ideas. For their dependent variable, they use the Polity III dataset, which shows the level of democracy in each country, measured by the 10-point democracy index and the 10-point autocracy index. They find that while trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy, foreign direct investment inflows and the spread of democratic ideas positively affect democracy.

Starr and Lindborg (2003) address the impact of diffusion effects, using the Freedom

House data covering a total of 191 countries for the period between 1974 and 1996. The Freedom House survey evaluates countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties and then assigns them the status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Using Poisson analysis and hazard rate analysis, they find what they term “neighbor effects,” i.e., that countries whose neighbors are undergoing democratic transitions are more likely to experience democratic transitions.

Using the Asia-Europe Survey data, which we will also use for our analysis, Kabashima (2002) addresses the impact of exposure to globalization on political participation. His paper finds that people with a transborder personal connection or experience in foreign travel are more likely to participate in politics in a broad range of political activities. However, this study neglects the likelihood that the effect of globalization on democratic activism varies among societies. As it does not divide the dataset into national sub-samples the regression analyses is conducted as if all respondents were from a single population sample.

3. Measurement and Method

As discussed above, the literature suggests that there are different agencies (e.g. elite, mass) and different aspects (e.g. economic, communicative) of globalization as well as different meanings of democracy. Therefore, it is important to clarify and explain what level of analysis we are conducting and what we mean by “globalization” and “democracy” when we investigate the impact of globalization on democracy in this paper.

In examining the effect of globalization on democracy, at least two types of approaches can be employed. The first approach uses an aggregate dataset, the unit of which is the nation. The second approach, a micro-level approach, uses a survey data set that consists of individuals. The above-mentioned studies conducted by Li and Reuveny (2003) and Starr and Lindborg (2003) exemplify the first type of approach.

Although the first, macro-level approach has made a breakthrough in empirically tackling the impact of globalization on democracy, there are limitations to this approach. Aggregate datasets such as those collected by Polity or Freedom House are not always good measurements of democracy. These indices focus mainly on institutional aspects of democracy and depreciate how it works in reality, especially at the citizen’s level (Berg-Schlusser 2004). Additionally, as Li and Reuveny (2003, p.39) themselves admit, national-level analyses covering a period since 1970s cannot explain the effect of globalization on developed countries, because the institutional/aggregate level of democracy in these countries has changed so little during this period.

The limitations of the first approach suggests the importance of the second approach—micro-level analysis. Using the survey data, we can investigate democratic practices and people’s attitudes at the micro level, discerning differences within developed countries as well as developing countries. Having each individual respondent as a unit of analysis, rather than each country, enables us to tap into more differentiated impacts of globalization.

The micro-level approach to the impact of globalization on democracy has another advantage. Electorates have become more fragmented and individualistic than those in the

last quarter of the 20th century. As globalization deepens, the once-cohesive national economy has become fragmented and sectoral interest groups have been enfeebled (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). That is why authors of corporatist persuasions such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have seemingly abandoned their argument by saying that class categories such as the landowners, the rentier class, the military, the farmers, and the working class have ceased to be effective reference points in determining the electorates' voting behavior.

In order to conduct the micro-level analysis, we need to measure the level of globalization and democracy at the individual level. The survey data we used is the Asia-Europe Survey (ASES), which was conducted by Takashi Inoguchi and his team in nine Asian societies—Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines and nine European societies—the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece—in the fall of 2000, with nationally representative samples of approximately one thousand respondents in each society. Our analysis does not include China since questions regarding democracy were forbidden there. More details about the survey, including the questionnaire and the survey method, can be found in Blondel and Inoguchi (2006, Appendix I) and on the ASES website (www.asiaeuropesurvey.org).

The ASES measures the respondents' level of globalization by asking them about their experiences of globalization, such as having friends abroad or watching foreign TV programs (the exact wordings of the questions are shown on www.asiaeuropesurvey.org). Economic measurements of globalization, such as the growth in trade relationships, is typically measured by aggregate data and thus not included in this survey.

For our measurement of democracy, we use the questions that ask respondents about their experience of political participation, such as voting or campaign activities. This measurement of democracy may need more explanation. Although the level of democracy has often been measured by such indicators as electoral systems and civil rights (Dahl 1971; Bollen 1980; Coppedge and Reinicke 1991; Gastil 1991; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; Jagers and Gurr 1996; Przeworski et al 2000), these are only valid in measuring the democratic-ness of a country. Therefore, variance in democratic-ness among individuals needs to be measured by other means, such as one's tendency for political participation. Once most countries have achieved the status of liberal democracy, the individual variance in democratic-ness *within* a country should take on more importance than the variance *among* countries. In addition, political participation has been acknowledged as an important element of democratic practices (Pateman 1970; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Norris 2002). One important caveat here is that participation may include oft-criticized populist movements. Even if they exemplify negative aspects of democracy, they do constitute democratic practices. Since normative evaluations of such practices are important, we will address this point in the conclusion of this paper.

In summary, the ASES questions on individual involvement in globalization and democracy enable us to examine the relationship between communicative globalization and participatory democracy at the mass level seen in Table 1 (the shaded cell in the table). Even though this is merely one aspect of the relationship between globalization and democracy,

we believe that this is a combination of very important and relevant aspects and that it can offer a solid empirical proof in the globalization debates. In the following data analyses, we start by looking at globalization and political participation separately. Then the relationship between the two will be examined, first at the societal level and then at the individual level.

4. Analysis

4.1 Globalization and Political Participation in Asia and Europe

Before examining the relationship between globalization and democracy, we will present the survey results for globalization and political participation in eight Asian countries and nine European countries. This overview of the levels of globalization and democracy in each country serves as a background for the subsequent analyses.

Table 2 demonstrates the degree of globalization in seventeen countries in terms of information and communication. From the nine types of global communication referred to in the survey questions, we chose three common experiences, 1) using the Internet 2) international friendship and 3) watching foreign news programs, as variables for our analysis. These variables were also chosen because they are not highly correlated. The table shows the percentages of the respondents who answered that they 1) use the Internet at home or school/work 2) have friends from other countries and 3) often watch foreign news

Table 2: Experiences of Globalization in 17 Societies

Internet Use		International Friendship		Foreign TV News	
Sweden	60.6%	Sweden	75.5%	Ireland	70.8%
South Korea	51.2	Singapore	70.4	Singapore	68.7
Singapore	43.0	Ireland	69.4	Malaysia	63.8
United Kingdom	39.0	France	68.0	Thailand	57.8
Ireland	38.1	United Kingdom	59.5	South Korea	44.2
Japan	33.1	Germany	52.4	Portugal	42.7
Germany	31.9	Greece	40.0	Greece	41.4
Spain	28.3	Italy	36.3	Philippines	40.7
France	27.9	Portugal	34.6	Taiwan	37.8
Taiwan	27.6	Spain	33.2	United Kingdom	34.8
Malaysia	23.6	Malaysia	30.6	Japan	32.1
Portugal	23.6	Philippines	26.4	Sweden	29.7
Italy	19.9	Taiwan	21.9	Spain	29.3
Thailand	14.8	Japan	18.7	Indonesia	22.7
Greece	12.9	Thailand	17.1	Germany	22.5
Philippines	6.4	South Korea	9.6	France	14.7
Indonesia	2.6	Indonesia	8.4	Italy	9.7
Average	28.4	Average	38.1	Average	38.9

Note: Countries/societies are ranked in descending order of percentages.
Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2000.

programs on TV, respectively.

On the whole, Singapore and Ireland rank high and Indonesia ranks low in all of the three types of global communication. Sweden ranks high in internet use and having foreign friends. Language obviously plays an important role in this context. In these three countries, most people have a good command of English: 99.7% (Ireland), 69.2% (Sweden), and 61.4% (Singapore) of the respondents are at least able to “understand the general meaning of what is written.” Yet there are also countries like South Korea where the degree of internet use and watching foreign TV news is high, but the degree of having foreign friends is relatively low.

Regarding the level of political participation, respondents were asked how often they have participated in the following eleven types of political activities: signing a petition, making donations at election, discussing national problems, discussing international problems, contacting officials about personal or local problems, attending a demonstration, discussing party politics, contacting officials about national issues, actively helping at election, gathering for problems in community, and joining a political party. For their answers, a four-point scale ranging from “would never do” to “have often done” was used (see the ASES website mentioned above for the exact wording of the questions). The results are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Political Activism in 17 Societies (%)

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR	Ave.
Voting	94.7	96.7	98.5	90.2	89.6	98.9	96.7	95.1	90.4	90.9	88.5	95.8	93.8	96.8	94.4	93.6	94.2	93.0
Discussion (national)	51.1	56.0	60.2	57.2	56.8	67.5	64.0	55.1	71.4	73.5	85.5	77.2	65.1	80.9	62.6	80.0	91.5	68.2
Discussion (international)	46.8	47.5	57.4	55.7	51.9	51.4	50.8	52.9	68.5	71.6	85.9	75.8	64.5	77.0	59.3	77.9	85.8	63.9
Discussion (party politics)	54.7	42.0	52.0	36.7	45.3	56.2	62.4	36.5	59.8	66.9	72.9	71.6	59.6	71.5	54.6	74.9	89.5	59.4
Petition	61.0	44.0	11.3	4.2	11.8	2.0	6.1	16.7	74.8	53.6	71.8	26.5	69.6	39.8	46.8	36.3	26.9	35.9
Gathering	10.2	10.0	18.0	4.7	13.0	13.4	31.5	23.9	23.1	43.1	33.1	25.7	8.5	26.8	34.0	14.9	30.7	21.7
Demonstration	17.1	16.2	6.0	0.7	4.7	3.7	7.1	10.3	17.6	26.0	48.0	27.9	25.9	33.6	40.2	28.0	40.0	20.9
Contact (personal/local)	15.8	9.9	15.6	6.4	12.0	1.9	19.2	17.5	25.6	44.0	36.4	18.6	16.2	16.9	17.4	10.8	29.5	18.7
Campaign activities	22.9	9.9	14.9	1.7	16.3	6.0	11.9	23.7	7.9	16.0	10.0	10.1	6.7	14.5	11.4	9.1	23.1	12.8
Contact (national)	5.7	4.2	8.9	3.7	13.4	3.1	9.9	12.6	10.3	29.1	10.9	14.1	8.4	7.4	12.3	5.1	11.7	10.1
Party membership	6.5	9.0	9.6	1.3	22.1	6.8	5.1	11.7	8.5	8.9	8.9	8.4	13.4	15.4	11.2	7.6	13.3	9.8
Donation	8.3	2.6	8.2	1.3	10.7	5.1	3.4	6.1	6.7	17.7	6.9	5.8	6.0	7.7	8.6	4.1	11.7	7.1

Note: Figures in each cell indicate the percentage of respondents who have ever participated in each political activity; Activities are listed in descending order of average percentage; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Source: Asia-Europe Survey 2000.

As is expected, the most common and conventional type of political participation, the act of voting, ranks the highest among the twelve kinds of participation in the ASES survey. In most countries, more than 90% of the respondents have voted in national-level elections. Following the act of voting are political conversations. The majority of the people in most countries have discussed national issues, international issues, or party politics with their family and friends. People in Europe tend to have participated more in discussions, with the highest being 91.5% of respondents in Greece having discussed national issues.

Whether or not one has signed a petition varies from country to country. In some European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden, around 70% of the respondents have signed a petition. In Asian countries, excepting Japan and Korea, significantly fewer people have signed a petition. Demonstration is another activity that varies across countries. Whereas only 0.7% of the respondents in Singapore have ever attended demonstrations, almost a half in France answered that they have participated in demonstrations. In general, regarding these two elite-challenging activities, European people are more inclined to participate.


There is no obvious contrast found between Asia and Europe regarding more conventional activities, such as contacting politicians and joining a party. Some countries generally rank high in political participation, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Ireland and Greece, while others generally rank low, such as Singapore and Portugal.

4.2 Explaining Political Activism at Societal Level

So far, we have taken a look at the levels of communicative globalization and the levels of democratic activism in 17 countries in Asia and Europe. Using these indices, we will now examine the relationship between globalization and democracy at the societal level. That is, we will investigate whether those societies with higher levels of globalization are marked by higher levels of political participation.

For the measurement of globalization, we use the same three indices of internet use, international friendship, and foreign TV news viewership. As for the levels of democracy, six categories of political participation were created out of the twelve types of participation discussed in the previous section. Partly following the categorization by Verba, Nye, and Kim (1978), highly correlated types of participation were combined into new variables and named “communal activities” (created from “contact (personal/local),” “contact (national)” and “gathering”), “campaign activities” (created from “donation,” “campaign activities” and “party membership”), and “discussion” (created from “discussion (national),” “discussion (international)” and “discussion (party politics)”). The values of Cronbach’s alpha for these three variables are .76, .76, and .83, respectively. Other variables that were found to be less correlated (demonstration, petition, and voting) are left as they are.

Figures 1 through 3 plot seventeen societies, with each dimension representing the levels of globalization and political participation. The vertical axes indicate national scores of political activism, which is the mean of individual scores based on their responses




Note: Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Figure 1: Internet Use and Political Activism

to questions on political activism ranging from 0 (“would never do”) to 3 (“have often done”). Scores of communal activities, campaign activities, and discussions are composites of responses to three questions, and range from 0 to 9 accordingly. Asian countries are represented as circles, and European countries are represented as diamonds. Country names are abbreviated as in Table 3.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the use of the Internet and political activities. First of all, it is necessary to note the possibility that correlations between political activities and the Internet use are spurious. The existence of the digital divide suggests that those who have access to the Internet tend to be affluent and educated (Norris 2001); affluence and education are oftentimes behind political participation (Verba, Nye and Kim 1978).

As is evident from the plot, Singapore, where many people use the Internet but participate less frequently in politics, can be regarded as an outlier. Signing a petition is correlated with the use of the Internet ($r=.527$; $r=.668$ without Singapore), presumably because the online petition is widely used today. When we turn our eyes to 1) communal activities and 2) demonstration, we find that these are weakly correlated with the Internet use if we exclude Singapore ($r=.272$ and $.330$ respectively). Discussion and the Internet use are negatively correlated among European countries ($r = -.660$). Voting and



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
Figure 2: International Friendship and Political Activism

campaign activities seem to be independent of Internet access.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between international friendship and political activities. Singapore, where most people have friends from other countries but rarely get involved in political activities, seems to be an outlier again. If Singapore is excluded, international friendship is positively correlated with 1) communal activities, 2) signing a petition, 3) attending demonstrations, and 4) discussion ($r=.793$, $.681$, $.650$, and $.608$ respectively), whereas friendship is negatively correlated with voting. Campaign activities seems to be independent of international friendship.

Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between watching foreign TV news and political activities. In contrast to the aforementioned two analyses, we do not observe any positive correlation between watching foreign TV and each political activity. These are more or less negatively correlated. Ireland is located on the upper right corner of each plot except for in voting, presumably because of its strong ties to Britain.

These societal-level analyses show correlations between international friendship and certain political activities (communal activities, discussion, petition, and demonstration) as well as between internet use and signing a petition. However, levels of both globalization and political activities are influenced by many other factors, including the level of economic development and cultural and institutional backgrounds. The number of cases (countries/societies) is too small to control for the effects of these factors. As was discussed



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Figure 3: Foreign TV News and Political Activism

above, micro-level analyses using survey data enable us to overcome the shortcomings of macro-level analyses, including the problem of control variables.

4.3 Explaining Democratic Activism at the Individual Level

In this section, the relationship between globalization and political activism in each society will be examined at the individual level. In other words, we will see whether individuals with higher degrees of globalization experience are more engaged in political activities. For each of the seventeen countries, we conduct ordered-logit regression analysis. Here, the dependent variables are the six modes of political participation. The independent variables consist of the three types of global communication, as well as other socio-economic factors as control variables—gender, age groups, education, income, and city size (urban or rural).

The results of the regression analyses are shown in Tables 5 through 10. Before looking at each of them, a summary of the results may assist in understanding the greater picture. Table 4 shows the abbreviated names of the countries where experiences of globalization exhibit a statistically significant relationship with political activities in our regression analyses. In each cell, Asian countries are written on the upper level and European countries are written on the lower level.

Table 4: Experiences of Globalization and Political Participation

	Voting	Campaign activities	Communal activities
Internet use	DE	TW, SG, <i>MY</i> IE, ES	JP, SG, <i>MY</i> GB, IE, DE, IT
International Friendship	<i>PH</i> IE	JP, TW, MY, TH GB, FR, SE, IT	JP, TW, MY, TH, PH GB, IE, FR, DE, SE, IT, PT
Foreign TV news	TW, SG, MY, TH <i>FR</i> , PT	SG, ID GB, DE, ES, PT	KR, SG, ID, TH GB, DE, SE, PT
	Discussion	Petition	Demonstration
Internet use	JP, KR, TW, SG GB, DE, SE, IT	JP, KR, TW, SG, TH GB, IE, FR, DE, IT, ES, PT	JP, KR, SG IE, IT
International Friendship	JP, KR, SG, MY, TH GB, IE, FR, DE, SE, IT, PT	JP, PH GB, FR, DE, IT	JP, TH, PH IE, FR, DE, SE, IT, GR
Foreign TV news	TW, SG, MY, ID, TH, PH IT	KR, <i>MY</i> , ID IE, ES	<i>MY</i> , ID PT

Note: Significant at .05 level; those with negative coefficients are shown in italic font; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Compared with other political activities, the most common form of political participation, the act of voting, does not have a statistically significant relationship to globalization in many countries. In contrast, more communication-based activities, such as communal activities and discussion, exhibit a positive relationship in many countries both in Asia and Europe. The combinations of 1) international friendship and communal activities, 2) international friendship and discussion, and 3) Internet and petition show statistically significant relationships in many countries. Following are detailed discussions about each type of political activity and the overall tendencies suggested in the results of our regression analyses.

Voting

Table 5 shows the relationship between globalization experiences and the act of voting. As mentioned above, only a few statistically significant relationships are found in this case. In the Philippines and France, negative relationships are actually exhibited between experience with globalization and voting. In contrast to the other two types of globalization experiences (internet use and international friendship), watching foreign TV news is positively related in Taiwan and some Southeast Asian countries. Among the control factors, age groups often show statistically significant relationships to the act of voting, especially in Asia. In most countries, the coefficient of each age cohort increases as the age category becomes older, meaning that older people tend to vote. Education shows a positive effect, especially in the northern part of Europe, but the relationship is weak in other parts of Asia and Europe.

Campaign Activities

Regarding campaign activities such as contributing money to election campaigns or actively helping a political party/candidates at election, the relationship between global-

Table 5: Regression Results for the Determinants of Voting

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	-0.30*	-0.32*	0.02	0.02	-0.15	-0.12	-0.05	0.02	-0.20	0.12	-0.01	0.06	0.43*	-0.31	-0.24	-0.29	-0.40
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.29)
Age 25-34	0.23	1.12**	0.74*	2.80**	2.16**	0.63**	0.77**	-0.44	0.96**	1.07**	2.39**	0.79**	1.32**	1.25**	-0.04	0.94**	2.10**
	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.40)
Age 35-44	1.11**	1.68**	0.91**	4.01**	2.94**	0.67**	1.09**	0.19	1.89**	1.94**	2.79**	1.36**	1.47**	1.73**	0.49	1.22**	2.64**
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.46)
Age 45-54	1.48**	2.55**	1.46**	4.12**	3.55**	1.04**	2.16**	0.42	2.26**	2.52**	3.87**	1.77**	2.16**	2.05**	1.14**	2.16**	2.75**
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.42)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.49)
Age 55-64	2.55**	2.55**	1.85**	4.26**	3.66**	1.72**	1.93**	0.56	2.38**	3.10**	4.91**	2.35**	3.32**	1.69**	0.93*	1.97**	3.44**
	(0.35)	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.43)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.33)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.61)
Age 65-	2.85**	2.10**	1.84**	4.34**	2.87**	2.31**	1.51**	-0.16	3.82**	3.27**	5.25**	2.61**	3.62**	1.83**	0.92*	1.67**	3.30**
	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.39)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.38)	(0.49)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.59)
Education	0.06	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.05*	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.10**	0.10**	0.18**	0.19**	0.02	-0.01	0.09**	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Income (log)	0.65**	0.00	0.63**	0.58**	-0.47*	-0.18	-0.13	0.19	0.32**	0.39	0.47**	0.05	0.44*	0.85**	0.80**	0.36	0.25
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.37)
City size	0.09	0.23**	0.22**		0.18*	0.07	-0.21*	0.01	-0.18	0.37**	-0.21**	-0.08*	0.36*	-0.06	0.17	-0.09	-0.24**
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Internet	0.23	0.26	-0.13	-0.41	-0.44	0.58	0.46	-0.32	0.09	-0.29	0.14	0.63**	0.29	0.41	0.02	-0.35	0.51
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.47)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.44)
Int'l Friend	0.15	0.46	-0.03	-0.34	0.07	0.42	-0.36	-0.57**	0.24	0.64**	-0.01	0.20	-0.09	-0.09	-0.03	-0.15	-0.24
	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Foreign News	0.14	-0.09	0.52*	0.44*	0.41*	-0.03	0.44*	0.27	-0.21	0.31	-0.49*	0.28	-0.21	0.04	-0.28	0.52**	-0.20
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.37)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.30)
N	1022	871	799	759	780	921	930	888	653	627	873	971	820	1006	478	716	679

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18-25' as a base category; City size is a ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Table 6: Regression Results for the Determinants of Campaign Activities

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	-0.54** (0.15)	-0.44** (0.15)	-0.75** (0.15)	-0.70** (0.19)	-0.98** (0.14)	-0.94** (0.15)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.46** (0.12)	-0.35* (0.16)	-0.37* (0.16)	-0.65** (0.14)	-0.65** (0.15)	-0.40** (0.14)	-0.52** (0.13)	-0.29 (0.22)	-0.87** (0.16)	-0.35* (0.16)
Age 25-34	-0.48 (0.35)	0.33 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.38 (0.29)	0.31 (0.19)	-0.28 (0.22)	0.32 (0.30)	-0.36* (0.17)	0.17 (0.30)	0.21 (0.26)	0.06 (0.28)	0.86** (0.29)	0.04 (0.28)	0.21 (0.23)	0.42 (0.38)	-0.04 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.29)
Age 35-44	-0.06 (0.33)	0.75** (0.26)	0.12 (0.23)	-0.58* (0.29)	0.29 (0.20)	-0.44 (0.23)	0.84** (0.29)	-0.40* (0.18)	0.28 (0.30)	0.52 (0.28)	0.38 (0.28)	0.61* (0.30)	-0.10 (0.28)	0.26 (0.23)	0.04 (0.39)	0.19 (0.26)	0.57* (0.28)
Age 45-54	0.90** (0.33)	0.82** (0.29)	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.34)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.48 (0.26)	0.59 (0.34)	-0.29 (0.20)	0.24 (0.33)	0.70* (0.28)	0.98** (0.30)	0.47 (0.31)	0.26 (0.29)	0.16 (0.24)	0.50 (0.43)	0.45 (0.29)	0.74* (0.29)
Age 55-64	0.84* (0.33)	0.52 (0.34)	0.10 (0.33)	-1.23* (0.55)	-0.21 (0.29)	-0.91** (0.33)	0.62 (0.38)	-0.24 (0.28)	1.01** (0.34)	0.29 (0.32)	0.41 (0.32)	1.08** (0.31)	0.58 (0.31)	0.11 (0.26)	0.90* (0.46)	-0.19 (0.32)	0.40 (0.31)
Age 65-	0.67* (0.34)	0.62 (0.42)	0.12 (0.38)	-1.19 (0.67)	-0.11 (0.32)	-1.05* (0.43)	0.58 (0.44)	-0.54 (0.32)	0.65 (0.36)	0.43 (0.33)	0.47 (0.31)	0.76* (0.36)	0.71* (0.32)	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.14 (0.43)	0.07 (0.33)	0.57 (0.33)
Education	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.20** (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Income (log)	0.20 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.26 (0.17)	0.34* (0.15)	0.12 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.10 (0.19)	0.19 (0.15)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.13)	0.26 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.31)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.49* (0.21)
City size	0.11* (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)		0.31** (0.06)	0.37** (0.14)	0.03 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.14 (0.12)	0.24* (0.11)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.16 (0.11)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.27* (0.12)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.09** (0.02)
Internet	0.14 (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)	0.46* (0.18)	0.58* (0.24)	-0.47* (0.19)	-0.84 (0.47)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.18 (0.26)	0.26 (0.18)	0.57** (0.19)	0.13 (0.17)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.16)	0.26 (0.17)	0.72** (0.27)	-0.12 (0.24)	0.33 (0.26)
Int'l Friend	0.44* (0.19)	0.33 (0.25)	0.54** (0.17)	0.21 (0.24)	0.33* (0.16)	0.14 (0.25)	0.72** (0.22)	0.20 (0.15)	0.50** (0.18)	0.13 (0.18)	0.55** (0.16)	0.29 (0.16)	0.60** (0.17)	0.33* (0.14)	0.15 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.18)	0.11 (0.16)
Foreign News	0.24 (0.15)	0.20 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.16)	0.62** (0.24)	-0.24 (0.14)	0.55** (0.17)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.13)	0.76** (0.17)	0.03 (0.17)	0.34 (0.20)	0.43* (0.18)	0.13 (0.15)	0.19 (0.21)	0.51* (0.24)	0.47** (0.16)	0.15 (0.17)
N	739	754	749	811	812	790	945	949	623	577	846	775	761	930	374	614	650

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18-25' as a base category; City size is a ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

ization and political activism is significant in more countries than is the case with voting, but the relationship is not as significant in as many countries as is communal activities or discussion. In Malaysia, those who use the internet and those who have friends abroad differ in their stances to party politics; whereas the former are less committed to party politics, the latter are more inclined to participate in party politics. Among social-economic factors, gender shows a significant relationship in many countries. Males tend to participate more in campaign or partisan activities. In contrast to voting, factors such as age are not as significant in the case of campaign activities.

Communal Activities

More significant relationships are exhibited between globalization experiences and communal activities, such as getting together in the community or contacting elected officials. Among the three types of globalization experiences, international friendship exhibits a significant relationship in many countries. Its effect on communal activities is often stronger than the two other globalization experiences as suggested by the coefficients of each variable. As in the case of campaign activities, internet users in Malaysia tend to participate less in communal activities, while those who have friends abroad participate more. As for the other control variables, males and people with higher education often participate more in communal activities.

Discussion

Discussion is another activity that has a positive relationship to globalization experiences. Unlike other political activities, no countries show a negative relationship between globalization and discussion. Many countries that exhibit positive relationships vis-à-vis communal activities are also listed here; international friendship also shows significant relationships to discussion. One major difference between communal activities and discussion is seen in relation to foreign TV news. Foreign TV news programs matter in Taiwan and other many Southeast Asian countries, while among the European countries, the foreign news programs are significantly related only in Italy. Socio-economic factors also show an association with communal activities. Men and those with higher education are more inclined to talk on politics.

Petition

In addition to conventional modes of political participation, such as voting and campaign contribution, “elite-challenging” activities like signing petitions and demonstration have been also considered to be types of political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979). Among the three types of globalization experiences, the use of internet is significantly related to petition signing in many countries. The relationship between the internet and petitions may be explained by the fact that today people sign and send petitions online. In Malaysia, those who watch foreign news tend not to sign petitions. As to other socio-economic factors, there are no obvious patterns except for in education, which is positively related to petition-signing in many countries.

Table 7: Regression Results for the Determinants of Communal Activities

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	-0.86**	-0.62**	-0.70**	-0.51**	-0.75**	-0.65**	-0.47**	-0.47**	-0.16	-0.17	-0.47**	-0.39**	-0.17	-0.34**	-0.28	-0.79**	-0.32*
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Age 25-34	0.36	-0.05	0.25	0.34	0.20	0.22	0.31	-0.03	0.55*	0.69**	-0.07	0.52*	0.31	0.23	0.05	0.56*	0.43
	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Age 35-44	0.61	0.15	0.31	-0.02	0.27	-0.07	0.68**	0.09	1.10**	1.64**	0.61**	0.75**	0.52	0.58**	0.38	0.81**	0.70**
	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.26)
Age 45-54	1.42**	0.46	0.06	0.06	0.04	-0.23	0.83**	0.16	1.24**	1.71**	1.23**	0.84**	0.90**	0.69**	0.52	0.88**	0.85**
	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Age 55-64	1.62**	0.25	0.70*	-0.13	0.16	0.08	0.69*	0.25	1.39**	1.64**	1.04**	1.32**	1.41**	0.43	0.91*	0.34	0.67*
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.44)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Age 65-	1.31**	0.31	0.07	-0.61	0.59	-0.22	0.60	0.01	1.10**	1.77**	0.91**	0.95**	1.25**	0.26	0.10	0.02	0.38
	(0.34)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(0.32)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.30)
Education	0.06*	0.09**	0.05*	0.04	0.06*	0.02	0.03*	0.06**	0.06**	0.05	0.07**	0.18**	0.14**	0.01	0.05*	0.07**	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income (log)	0.33*	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.22	0.31*	0.04	0.21*	-0.17	-0.31	0.27*	0.09**	0.11	0.28*	0.03	0.01	0.37*
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.19)
City size	-0.01	0.12*	0.08		0.23**	0.12	-0.20**	0.01	0.07	0.31**	-0.11*	-0.13**	0.36**	-0.05*	-0.06	-0.10	-0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Internet	0.46**	0.17	0.24	0.42*	-0.55**	-0.18	0.06	0.19	0.52**	0.42*	0.15	0.39**	0.09	0.33*	0.42	0.25	0.26
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Int'l Friend	0.74**	0.39	0.74**	0.26	0.76**	0.10	0.50**	0.30*	0.71**	0.50**	0.62**	0.40**	0.62**	0.37**	0.40	0.47**	0.12
	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Foreign News	0.08	0.30*	0.25	0.59**	-0.19	0.41*	0.47**	0.02	0.53**	0.20	-0.00	0.40*	0.42**	0.16	0.24	0.49**	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.15)
N	625	729	767	819	807	753	950	956	621	591	845	819	778	934	377	639	642

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18-25' as a base category; City size is a ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Table 8: Regression Results for the Determinants of Discussion

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.13)	-0.28* (0.13)	-0.53** (0.13)	-0.34** (0.12)	-0.48** (0.13)	-0.24* (0.12)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.39** (0.12)	-0.47** (0.18)	-0.58** (0.14)	-0.43* (0.17)
Age 25-34	0.12 (0.29)	0.55* (0.21)	0.28 (0.19)	0.25 (0.22)	0.53** (0.18)	-0.10 (0.19)	0.40* (0.18)	-0.12 (0.16)	0.37 (0.27)	0.69** (0.25)	0.10 (0.24)	0.37 (0.23)	0.28 (0.25)	0.24 (0.21)	-0.07 (0.31)	0.19 (0.23)	0.60* (0.29)
Age 35-44	0.29 (0.29)	0.95** (0.22)	0.60** (0.20)	0.40 (0.21)	0.63** (0.18)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.59** (0.19)	-0.09 (0.17)	0.53 (0.27)	0.95** (0.27)	0.07 (0.24)	0.92** (0.24)	0.31 (0.25)	0.67** (0.21)	0.42 (0.32)	0.51* (0.24)	0.69* (0.30)
Age 45-54	0.75** (0.29)	1.06** (0.25)	0.58* (0.24)	0.63** (0.24)	0.67** (0.21)	-0.47* (0.23)	0.63** (0.22)	-0.06 (0.19)	0.69* (0.30)	1.19** (0.27)	0.39 (0.28)	1.05** (0.26)	0.48 (0.26)	0.82** (0.23)	0.68 (0.36)	0.73** (0.27)	1.48** (0.35)
Age 55-64	0.84** (0.29)	1.03** (0.30)	0.62* (0.28)	-0.33 (0.33)	0.87** (0.26)	-0.44 (0.28)	0.58* (0.25)	0.19 (0.28)	1.21** (0.31)	1.47** (0.31)	0.66* (0.29)	0.94** (0.25)	0.55* (0.27)	0.55* (0.24)	0.67 (0.38)	0.76** (0.28)	0.68* (0.32)
Age 65-	0.60* (0.30)	0.82* (0.38)	0.21 (0.33)	-0.41 (0.37)	0.29 (0.30)	-0.55 (0.38)	0.11 (0.29)	0.04 (0.32)	0.64* (0.32)	1.59** (0.31)	0.39 (0.27)	0.90** (0.28)	0.76** (0.28)	0.59* (0.25)	0.23 (0.35)	0.06 (0.31)	0.61 (0.33)
Education	0.15** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.11** (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	0.22** (0.04)	0.10** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.08** (0.02)	0.14** (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)
Income (log)	0.24 (0.14)	-0.30* (0.15)	0.17 (0.14)	0.32* (0.14)	0.03 (0.15)	0.17 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	0.36** (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.11 (0.18)	0.59** (0.13)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08 (0.12)	0.69** (0.13)	-0.15 (0.27)	0.38* (0.19)	0.66** (0.23)
City size	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)		0.19** (0.05)	-0.21 (0.13)	0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.02)	0.10 (0.10)	0.36** (0.10)	0.12* (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.30** (0.10)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.04 (0.03)
Internet	0.40** (0.15)	0.52** (0.15)	0.33* (0.16)	0.60** (0.17)	-0.03 (0.17)	0.66 (0.39)	0.02 (0.19)	0.27 (0.24)	0.57** (0.16)	0.26 (0.17)	0.33 (0.17)	0.41** (0.16)	0.52** (0.15)	0.36* (0.17)	0.08 (0.23)	0.07 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.29)
Int'l Friend	0.51** (0.16)	0.50* (0.23)	0.27 (0.15)	0.30* (0.15)	0.38** (0.15)	0.14 (0.22)	0.57** (0.17)	0.24 (0.14)	0.82** (0.16)	0.58** (0.16)	0.46** (0.15)	0.40** (0.14)	0.49** (0.15)	0.65** (0.13)	0.23 (0.20)	0.70** (0.16)	0.16 (0.18)
Foreign News	0.12 (0.14)	0.18 (0.13)	0.36** (0.13)	0.41** (0.14)	0.40** (0.13)	0.75** (0.15)	1.05** (0.12)	0.52** (0.12)	0.27 (0.15)	0.29 (0.16)	0.10 (0.21)	0.04 (0.16)	0.21 (0.14)	0.51* (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)	0.11 (0.14)	0.18 (0.19)
N	764	786	825	842	866	789	947	968	651	624	883	953	822	984	444	708	668

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18-25' as a base category; City size is a ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Table 9: Regression Results for the Determinants of Signing a Petition

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	0.01 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.13)	-0.53** (0.15)	-0.32 (0.18)	-0.78** (0.17)	-0.61** (0.22)	-0.28 (0.26)	-0.62** (0.13)	0.12 (0.15)	0.24 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	0.40** (0.13)	-0.22 (0.12)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.54** (0.16)	-0.13 (0.15)
Age 25-34	0.26 (0.29)	0.46* (0.22)	-0.23 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.27)	0.38 (0.22)	-0.28 (0.29)	0.86 (0.45)	-0.28 (0.18)	0.37 (0.28)	0.20 (0.25)	0.20 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.26)	0.36 (0.26)	0.26 (0.21)	-0.30 (0.33)	0.09 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.25)
Age 35-44	1.07** (0.29)	0.25 (0.22)	0.06 (0.24)	-0.24 (0.27)	0.00 (0.24)	-0.43 (0.31)	1.23** (0.46)	-0.078 (0.19)	0.49 (0.28)	0.38 (0.28)	0.72** (0.24)	0.43 (0.26)	0.70** (0.27)	0.56** (0.21)	0.06 (0.33)	0.54* (0.25)	0.05 (0.26)
Age 45-54	1.48** (0.29)	0.13 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.27)	-0.20 (0.33)	0.13 (0.27)	-0.48 (0.36)	1.22* (0.53)	-0.13 (0.21)	0.78* (0.31)	0.50 (0.27)	0.99** (0.27)	0.12 (0.28)	1.11** (0.28)	0.55* (0.22)	0.36 (0.38)	0.25 (0.29)	0.23 (0.27)
Age 55-64	1.34** (0.29)	-0.43 (0.30)	-0.21 (0.35)	-0.72 (0.52)	-0.21 (0.35)	-0.60 (0.48)	1.61** (0.59)	-0.20 (0.31)	0.59 (0.31)	0.70* (0.31)	0.75** (0.27)	0.34 (0.27)	0.37 (0.29)	0.21 (0.25)	0.48 (0.41)	0.55 (0.30)	-0.15 (0.28)
Age 65-	1.28** (0.30)	-0.52 (0.40)	-0.72 (0.43)	-0.89 (0.67)	0.46 (0.39)	-0.30 (0.61)	0.79 (0.85)	-0.09 (0.34)	0.76* (0.33)	0.51 (0.32)	0.28 (0.27)	0.28 (0.32)	0.43 (0.31)	-0.29 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.38)	0.26 (0.33)	-0.38 (0.30)
Education	0.04 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	0.09** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	0.28** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.08** (0.02)	0.16** (0.03)	0.13** (0.03)
Income (log)	0.47** (0.13)	0.08 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.20)	0.07 (0.20)	-0.24 (0.22)	0.02 (0.28)	0.10 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)	0.04 (0.19)	0.35** (0.13)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.13 (0.13)	0.42** (0.13)	-0.26 (0.26)	-0.06 (0.20)	0.10 (0.19)
City size	-0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)		0.11 (0.07)	0.15 (0.21)	-0.24 (0.14)	0.03 (0.02)	0.28** (0.11)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.13** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.11)	0.05* (0.02)	0.26** (0.10)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.02)
Internet	0.34* (0.15)	0.59** (0.15)	0.45* (0.18)	1.20** (0.23)	-0.04 (0.21)	0.12 (0.51)	0.73* (0.36)	0.34 (0.26)	0.48** (0.17)	0.53** (0.18)	0.38* (0.16)	0.47** (0.16)	0.20 (0.16)	0.65** (0.17)	0.68** (0.24)	0.49* (0.23)	0.30 (0.24)
Int'l Friend	0.35* (0.16)	0.21 (0.23)	0.34 (0.18)	0.27 (0.23)	0.25 (0.19)	0.13 (0.34)	0.44 (0.31)	0.51** (0.15)	0.41* (0.16)	0.28 (0.17)	0.44** (0.14)	0.42** (0.15)	0.11 (0.16)	0.56** (0.13)	0.38 (0.22)	0.03 (0.17)	0.09 (0.15)
Foreign News	-0.14 (0.14)	0.41** (0.14)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.83** (0.17)	0.80** (0.22)	0.30 (0.29)	-0.24 (0.13)	-0.31 (0.16)	0.36* (0.17)	0.10 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.16)	0.25 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.21)	0.84** (0.21)	-0.01 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.16)
N	861	851	814	813	821	783	949	962	653	616	888	869	838	954	419	639	674

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18-25' as a base category; City size is a ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Table 10: Regression Results for the Determinants of Demonstration

	JP	KR	TW	SG	MY	ID	TH	PH	GB	IE	FR	DE	SE	IT	ES	PT	GR
Female	-0.48** (0.14)	-0.42** (0.15)	-0.45* (0.19)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.73** (0.22)	-1.04** (0.23)	-0.52* (0.25)	-0.56** (0.14)	-0.59** (0.15)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.12)	0.27* (0.13)	-0.31* (0.12)	-0.21 (0.17)	-0.52** (0.15)	-0.52** (0.15)
Age 25–34	-0.50 (0.32)	0.15 (0.22)	0.20 (0.27)	-0.43 (0.41)	0.26 (0.28)	-1.08** (0.26)	0.29 (0.38)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.27)	0.09 (0.25)	-0.50* (0.22)	-0.23 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.26)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.10 (0.30)	-0.43 (0.22)	-0.22 (0.24)
Age 35–44	0.06 (0.30)	0.15 (0.23)	0.21 (0.29)	-0.21 (0.40)	0.15 (0.29)	-1.75** (0.32)	0.18 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.28)	0.53 (0.27)	-0.10 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.23)	0.14 (0.26)	-0.32 (0.21)	0.17 (0.31)	0.07 (0.24)	0.19 (0.26)
Age 45–54	0.78** (0.30)	0.04 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.35)	-0.59 (0.53)	-0.71 (0.40)	-1.18** (0.33)	0.72 (0.43)	-0.21 (0.23)	-0.23 (0.30)	0.50 (0.27)	0.25 (0.26)	-0.56* (0.24)	0.56* (0.27)	-0.51* (0.22)	-0.05 (0.35)	0.08 (0.27)	0.28 (0.26)
Age 55–64	0.80** (0.30)	-0.28 (0.33)	-0.19 (0.45)	-32.97 (6620911)	-0.61 (0.50)	-1.72** (0.49)	0.04 (0.56)	-0.69 (0.38)	-0.13 (0.32)	0.26 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.55* (0.24)	0.46 (0.29)	-0.96** (0.24)	0.29 (0.37)	-0.57* (0.29)	-0.05 (0.28)
Age 65–	0.74* (0.31)	-0.87 (0.49)	-0.54 (0.55)	-0.45 (0.84)	0.21 (0.51)	-33.16 (3868296)	-0.36 (0.81)	-1.08* (0.45)	-1.29** (0.35)	-0.33 (0.33)	-0.48 (0.27)	-1.18** (0.30)	-0.26 (0.30)	-1.42** (0.27)	-0.61 (0.35)	-0.86** (0.31)	-0.41 (0.40)
Education	0.06* (0.03)	0.14** (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	0.22** (0.04)	0.12** (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.11** (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)
Income (log)	0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.18 (0.20)	0.07 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.21)	0.47 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.02 (0.19)	0.32* (0.13)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.25 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	0.34 (0.25)	-0.34 (0.19)	0.02 (0.19)
City size	0.01 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.12 (0.08)		0.06 (0.09)	0.17 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)	0.14 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.12** (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.18 (0.11)	0.00 (0.02)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)
Internet	0.62** (0.16)	0.43** (0.16)	0.33 (0.22)	0.93* (0.38)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.00 (0.55)	0.11 (0.34)	0.26 (0.29)	0.18 (0.17)	0.58** (0.18)	0.25 (0.15)	0.18 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.43** (0.16)	0.39 (0.22)	0.27 (0.22)	0.34 (0.24)
Int'l Friend	0.38* (0.18)	0.46 (0.24)	0.31 (0.21)	-0.47 (0.35)	0.33 (0.24)	-0.19 (0.37)	0.70* (0.28)	0.53** (0.16)	0.22 (0.17)	0.42* (0.17)	0.46** (0.14)	0.53** (0.14)	0.61** (0.16)	0.47** (0.13)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.44** (0.15)
Foreign News	0.01 (0.15)	0.02 (0.14)	-0.28 (0.19)	0.52 (0.37)	-0.52* (0.21)	1.07** (0.22)	0.42 (0.27)	-0.07 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.02 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.18)	0.11 (0.15)	0.10 (0.15)	0.08 (0.21)	0.32 (0.19)	0.50** (0.15)	-0.18 (0.16)
N	830	827	823	839	856	890	949	961	647	615	882	936	826	987	467	697	668

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Respondents are categorized into six age groups with '18–25' as a base category; City size is an ordinal variable that measures city population except in Singapore; Country names are abbreviated as follows: JP: Japan, KR: South Korea, TW: Taiwan, SG: Singapore, MY: Malaysia, ID: Indonesia, TH: Thailand, PH: Philippines, GB: United Kingdom, IE: Ireland, FR: France, DE: Germany, SE: Sweden, IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, GR: Greece.

Demonstration

Another elite-challenging activity, demonstration, also tends to be positively related to globalization experiences. Yet in addition to this similarity, there is a contrast between petition and demonstration; petition is more related to the internet use whereas demonstration tends to be more related to having friends abroad. International friendship may encourage people to attend demonstrations, especially in Europe, where bus rides to demonstration sites in neighboring countries are occasionally arranged by NGOs. Foreign TV news matters in fewer countries. As in the case of petition, Malaysia is the only country where watching foreign TV news is negatively related to democratic activism. While there are no obvious patterns in relation to socio-economic factors, men and those with more education tend to be more inclined to attend demonstrations.

Looking at each country, Singapore exhibits significant positive relationships between globalization experiences (especially Internet use and foreign TV news) and democratic activism. In contrast, few significant relationships were found between globalization experiences and democratic activism in Greece (only displaying a relationship between friends abroad and demonstration). While Japan showed many significant relationships vis-à-vis the internet and international friendship, no significant relationships were found with foreign TV news. Malaysia is a country where those who have globalization experience were often found to participate less in political activities, and thus our hypothesis cannot be proven here.

Overall, having friends abroad is significantly related to certain political activities that require communication, such as political discussions. We are not incognizant of the fact that this relationship may be caused by another factor, such as communication skills, and that the relationship between globalization and democracy could be spurious. However, it is at least possible to say that those who are engaged in global communications also actively participate in democratic political life.

Another characteristic to be noted in our results is a contrast between countries at different stages of economic development. In countries with higher GDP per capita, international friendship is often related to political activities; in countries with less GDP per capita, watching foreign news tends to be more related to political activities. A typical case in this regard is the relationship between globalization experiences and discussion. This contrast suggests that there may be a particular type of relationship between globalization and democracy (or if we can assume causality, a particular democratization mechanism) that comes into effect at a particular stage of economic development. This idea of assuming different democratization mechanisms at different stages of economic development has resonates with modernization theories, which anticipate democratization taking off at a certain phase of economic development (Lipset 1959; 1994). In societies with a burgeoning economy, people may be obsessed with economic activities, and thus one-way communication such as watching foreign TV may be more related to political participation. As the economy achieves a certain level of development, people may begin to have more time for political communication, and having friends may become more tied to political participation.

4.4 Comparison between Societal and Individual Level Analyses

Using the ASES data enabled us to investigate the relationship between globalization and democracy at the individual level. Different aspects of globalization suggest both similar and dissimilar relationships with democratic activism at social and individual levels.

On the one hand, in relation to certain aspects of globalization and democracy, strong correlations between globalization and democracy were observed both at the societal and individual level. Specifically, these positive relationships include those between internet use and petition and between international friendship and communal activities. On the other hand, there were instances where differing patterns were observed at the societal level and the individual level. Namely, negative relationships between foreign TV news and protest and between foreign TV news and discussion observed at the societal level were rarely seen at the individual level. At the individual level, a positive relationship between foreign TV news and discussion was even identified in some countries.

5. Conclusion and Implications

The principal aim of this article was to offer an empirical perspective on the debates on whether globalization promotes or impairs democracy. Noting the limits of previous empirical studies that examine the relationship between globalization and democracy at the macro level, we introduced a micro-level approach. Focusing on globalization at the individual level, our question asks, “Does personal experience in globalization stimulate or suppress political participation?” We believe that political participation is a good indicator of how democracy is working at the individual level.

Using cross-national survey data of 17 countries in Asia and Europe, we have investigated whether globalization experiences such as using the Internet, having international friends, or watching foreign TV news programs are related to political activism such as voting, communal activities, or protests. Our results generally support a positive relationship between globalization experiences and political participation. In particular, having international friends is positively related to communicative political activities, while the use of internet is positively related to signing petitions in many countries in both Europe and Asia. Slightly different patterns were also suggested at different stages of economic development: while those countries where international friendship is related to political activism can be categorized as “developed” countries, watching foreign TV news is often related to political activism in developing countries.

Limitations of our analysis imply possibilities for further research. Firstly, the ASES data used for our study is taken solely from the year 2000, and thus our analyses do not actually cover the “process” of globalization. Instead, we compare different degrees of globalization among the respondents. Secondly, since statistical analyses only offer correlations or associations between variables without specifying causal relationships, our results also suggest that there is the possibility of democratic activism leading to globalization. Therefore, we consider it somewhat premature to draw the conclusion that communicative globalization leads to increased democratic activism. With the accumulation of more

surveys that cover the issues of globalization and democracy, it will be possible to address causal relationships between the processes of globalization and democracy.

Thirdly, the rise of right-wing populist movements, seemingly in response to globalization, suggests that there is a need to investigate what types of democratic activism are correlated with globalization. In our analysis, problematic populist movements constitute a small part of our data sample, and we thus consider the the positive relationship between globalization and democratic activism to be a basically praiseworthy phenomenon. However, more specification in measuring participation type may help clarify this relationship from a normative perspective.

Noting such limitations and the possibility of further investigations, we believe that this article empirically demonstrates that in both Asia and Europe, there is generally a positive relationship between globalization and democracy at the individual level. This suggests that experiences of globalization may strengthen democracy.

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