



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THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

Regional Multilateralism

**Edited by
Takashi Inoguchi,
G. John Ikenberry,
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Alliance Constrained: Japan, the United States, and Regional Security

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Both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton hailed Japan as “the cornerstone of United States global security.”¹ Both Prime Minister Taro Aso and Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone reaffirmed the alliance with the United States as key to peace and prosperity in Japan and the region.² Even just judging from their words, it is crystal clear that the United States is intensely global, whereas Japan is intensely inward looking and essentially preoccupied with Japan and its vicinity. Besides the paraphernalia of the leaders about the alliance, subtle differences and divergences in their priorities seem to manifest themselves between the two governments. They should not be exaggerated. Rather, they should be overcome. Nevertheless these divergent priorities could grow as remedies are ignored.

Japan’s prime minister Yukio Hatoyama proclaimed that Japan should pursue an “equal partnership” with the United States and announced a series of initiatives that aimed at altering policies under the previous governments of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Such initiatives as investigating the secret U.S.-Japan agreement about the “transit” of nuclear weapons through the Japanese territorial space, revising the status of forces agreement (SOFA) and the host-nation support payment for the cost of U.S. troops in Japan, and the relocation plan for the Futenma Marines Corps Airbase were all part of Japan’s renewed assertion of equality.

These proposed Japanese initiatives were incremental and had mostly only tactical implications for the United States. Japan under the Hatoyama government continues to emphasize the U.S.-Japan alliance as the most important bilateral relationship Japan has. Japan has selectively continued its contributions to security cooperation with the United States in distant areas, such as the Sea of Aden and Nepal. Furthermore, there are signs that not all of the DPJ proposals

found in its preelection manifesto may be pursued. As revision of the Futenma relocation issue—Hatoyama’s pick of the fights—quickly deadlocked between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan’s local politics, revision of SOFA became a nonstarter. Even on the Futenma issue, any negotiated settlement seems to fall within minor modifications to the original agreement.

The fact that Japan and the United States are quarrelling over mainly tactical issues is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the two countries are still emphasizing the importance of the alliance for their strategic objectives. On the other hand, discussions on the tactical issues are taking up all the time from the key officials and delaying badly needed discussions to iron out common strategic objectives for the two allies under the changing regional security environment. The current situation is similar to the state of the alliance following the fall of the LDP government in 1993, when a coalition of former opposition parties elected Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. Hosokawa announced a “mature partnership” between Japan and the United States without discussions of Japan’s contributions to global and regional security. The next two years under the coalition government of the LDP and the Socialists barely had the Socialists accept the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The Japanese procrastination during the rapidly changing post-Cold War international security environment resulted in what Yoichi Funabashi called “Alliance Adrift.”³

The volume addresses the issue of subtle divergences between the allies of the two largest economies. To make divergences clear, let us focus on how Japan perceives the alliance from three predominant angles.

Isn’t Japan More Equal Than Others?

Perhaps it is not far-fetched to say that no other alliance can claim the higher degree of utility, malleability, and longevity than the Japan-United States alliance.⁴ It has survived all the vicissitudes since 1945: the Korean War, 1950–53, the Quemoy crisis, 1958, the Vietnam War, 1965–73, the Sino-Indian War, 1962, the Sino-Soviet War, 1969, the Indo-Pakistani War, 1971, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 1978–91, the Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979, the fall of Berlin Wall, 1989, the Tiananmen crisis, 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991, the Cambodia War, 1979–90, the Gulf War, 1991, the Kosovo crisis, 1996–99, the Rwanda massacre, 1996, the 9/11 terrorism, 2001, the Afghan War of 2001–present, the Iraqi War of 2003–present, the Somali piracy, 2002–present. Rather, the scope and intensity of alliance-related action have grown by leaps and bounds. During the Korean War, the U.S. military bases in Japan were the key to the success of the United Nations forces to prevent North Korea from forcibly uniting both Koreas. During the Vietnam War, U.S. military bases in Okinawa then (and until 1972) under U.S. control were the key to the country’s military vigor. The robustness of the alliance between Japan and the United States led to the schism among communist alliance as manifested in their fraternal wars between China and the Soviet Union, between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between China and Vietnam, but also the de facto suspension of the alliances between China and

North Korea and between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union when the alliance was meant primarily against communism which ceased to exist as far as Europe was concerned.

Rather, the alliance was consolidated in terms of its scope and intensity throughout the immediate post-Cold War years. First of all, the alliance has expanded its scope to various trouble spots of the developing world, enabling Japan's peace keeping troops to Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique, Iraq, and the Indian Ocean.⁵ More importantly, during the 1990s, expectations on Japan within the bilateral alliance started to shift to extended naval and air force capabilities beyond Japan's territorial defense, substantially departing from the traditional force posture of conventional land force-focused anti-Soviet warfare on Hokkaido.⁶ In the 2000s, the trend was accelerated by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the U.S. Armed Forces. The spirit of RMA was to slim the armed forces and to minimize U.S. military bases abroad in size and cost, while at the same time enhancing mobility of the U.S. troops including those stationed abroad.⁷ A most spectacular manifestation of the idea was the execution of the two wars, the Iraq War and the Afghan War, by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.⁸ Riding on this renewed emphasis in the U.S. government on air and naval forces and jointness of operations with the allies, the Japanese emphasis on long-range air and naval forces capabilities was widely accepted and encouraged by the United States.

Yet as the first decade of the new century is nearing its end, it has become very clear that the alliance faces new serious challenges. First, the United States' number one priority, the global terrorism led by al Qaeda, needs to have a massive number of land forces and special forces globally deployed.⁹ To end the Iraq War and to bring the Afghan War to a victory, a daunting level of endeavor is widely deemed necessary. The renewed emphasis on land and special forces since the "Surge" strategy in Iraq in 2007 under Defense Secretary Robert Gates is now being applied to the ongoing Afghan operation. The NATO Commander in Afghanistan General McKiernan was fired on May 11, 2009. Head of the Central Command, General David Petraeus found McKiernan not in harmony with the surge starting as applied in Afghanistan. The comeback of the U.S. Army is indicated by the cabinet-level appointment of a retired army general Shinseki, known as vocal opponent of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's downsizing of the Army as well as the Secretary of State Clinton's strong ties with the Senate Armed Service Committee during her years as New York Senator. Second, the United States needs to engage allies and friends as well as potential foes much more vigorously and persistently. President Obama's multilateralism means that allies and friends are not necessarily "more equal than others," as seen from their side, which after all used to see things by "leaning to one side," Bush's America. Third, the United States needs to militarily keep ever expanding China at bay. Without doing so, the United States might jeopardize its vaunted global military preeminence. The economic sufferance originating from subprime housing loans has been negatively affecting all the budget items, most seriously the federal government budget items on air and naval capability. The decision not

to deliver F-22s, super-powerful fighter aircrafts, to any outstanding purchase requests is one possible indicator of the budgetary erosion of the military expansion. The decision to scale down the missile defense program is another. The slow implementation of the pending plan to add one more aircraft carrier to the Pacific fleet at the expense of the Atlantic fleet is another possible indicator of the budgetary erosion of the military expansion. Fourth, President Obama's nuclear disarmament initiative may have negative implications to some allies and friends who rely on the United States in terms of defense since disarmament might mean lessening of the U.S. defense commitment and deterrence against potential threats. Most importantly, possible announcement by the United States of no first use of nuclear weapons is worrisome to security experts in Japan. Foreign Minister Okada of the new Hatoyama government in October 2009 called for such announcement by the United States. Both U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates and chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen opposed Okada's proposal as it reduces flexibility in U.S. responses in the region where tension over the North Korean nuclear development is high.¹⁰ Security experts in Japan share this American concern. Japan's small island territory and high population density will not survive the first strike, and hence preemptive capabilities of the American nuclear weapons are just as important as their deterrence capabilities. Furthermore, Japan faces a multitude of nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical and biological weapons) of its neighbors. Bilateral nuclear weapons reductions between the United States and Russia, China, and even possibly North Korea would reinforce Japan's apprehension because of the huge uncertainties of managing the disarmament process without upsetting strategic stability and of the likelihood that Japan as a nonnuclear weapons state will not be a direct participant of the process.

Isn't the Alliance Meant to Primarily Deal With Neighbors?

The U.S.-Japan alliance has been intensely bilateral in its origins and operations. Yet Japan has long been trying to get more global in terms of its own self-appointed role as a supporter of the U.S. -led system. The United States has been looking forward to seeing Japan go global for years without being seen too pushy or too imposing. Curiously enough, the alliance has long been regarded as primarily bilateral and secondarily increasingly global. Its regional scope has been played down partly because of the constitutional and political self-restraint against the geographical scope of the alliance and contingency of alliance operations. Constitutionally, it is often interpreted that Japan forbids use of force for the settlement of international disputes. The SDF were justified for defensive defense only, and the bilateral alliance was permitted to the extent that it did not allow use of the SDF for operations other than defending the Japanese territorial spaces. Politically, Japan's use of its military forces has been gradually accepted as long as it is approved at the United Nations. Sending SDF troops has been steadily accepted provided that there are no battles being waged. Two major impeti that Japan rethink the scope and contingency of the alliance in action were the end

of the Cold War and the onset of the Global War on Terrorism. The former has led Japan to send peace keeping, building, and other operations abroad in a self-assigned role of a global civilian power.¹¹ The latter has led Japan to send SDF to problem areas as a member of the coalition of the willing against global terrorism in a self-assigned role of a global ordinary power.¹² Distinction between global civilian power and global ordinary power cannot be made in terms of who were dispatched and in what missions they engaged. SDF went to both and ran non-combat missions. The only difference is the availability of clear UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) mandate, which is a controversial subject as the United States sees that there is no need for such a mandate. Not surprisingly, Japan's SDFs have been sent mostly far abroad, but not near abroad, meaning those Japan-colonized or -occupied areas in the twentieth century except for Cambodia and East Timor as part of the United Nations peace building teams.

But of late attention has been shifting to near abroad, meaning Japan's immediate neighbors, most importantly China and Korea in the geographical sense.¹³ First, China's economic rise has made it the factory of the world. China's military rise has made the United States to move to counterbalance with a planned addition of another aircraft carrier group to the Pacific fleet on top of the current two groups. China's rise attracted the largest number, 141, of presidents and prime ministers of the world to the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. Second, ascent of both North and South Korea into global actors (albeit in very different ways) resulted in a renewed Japanese focus on this historically important peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has gone nuclear whereas the Republic of Korea (ROK) has replaced Japan in terms of offering acute regional hubs (the Incheon airport and the Busan port). The DPRK has gone nuclear and is determined not to throw out nuclear weapons despite the agreed framework with the United States (1995) and agreements in the Six Party Talks (2003–8). The ROK has grown to a global trader and rule-maker although its somewhat exaggerated Korea-centered vision was put forth.

The key challenge for Japan is not that it has been overshadowed by its neighbors, but that the rise of its neighbors is testing Japan's alliance with the United States. The alliance, which initially focused on Japan's territorial defense and then started to be integrated into U.S. global strategy outside Japan's immediate vicinity, is now confronted to deal with Japan's neighbors. First, the oath of one China in the joint communiqués of Japan and the United States respectively complicates alliance contingency in an event of Chinese use of force or threat thereof vis-à-vis Taiwan.¹⁴ Can Japan rely on the United States when China forcibly intervenes in Taiwan? Can Japan sit idly by when China invades Taiwan and violates Japan's maritime sovereignty in conjunction? Second, the nuclear armed but nearly failed DPRK can explode into resorting to violent external actions to secure regime survival or implode into ungoverned chaos and internal disorder exacerbated by famines and natural disasters.¹⁵ Can Japan rely on the United States in its efforts to defend itself when the DPRK launches its missile attacks at Japan? Can Japan effectively deal with possible DPRK refugees reaching Japanese islands? Can Japan underwrite the recovery of North Korea after its collapse? These are the range of questions that must be answered by policyplanners and

placemakers. The Japanese perceptions of the alliance selectively shown above are simply meant to illustrate some of the subtle diverging priorities from those of the United States.

Has the Alliance Become Little More Than Hobson's Choice for the Rest including Japan?

Former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine coined a word, hyperpower, to characterize the United States. Indeed, as the only de facto "revisionist" superpower in the world (as symbolized by President Obama's phrase, "Yes, we can change the world"), the United States is often seen as having an impetuous temper and being impervious to other's sentiments. To most Japanese citizens, the U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage's call for "boots on the ground" sounded as such. The Gulf War (1991) shocked Japan by the tone of American urging that Japan take up arms shoulder to shoulder with the United States and the resultant frustration in the United States about Japan's nonaction. The same can be said about U.S. expectations of Japan's contributions to a possible maritime embargo against North Korea during the height of the first crisis over DPRK nuclear weapons development (1993–94), the Iraq War (2003–) and the Afghan War (2001–). When the Japanese Constitution is widely interpreted as prohibiting military troops from being deployed to battlefields abroad unless a set of conditions are met, why does the United States assume that these conditions are not difficult to change? Is the proclaimed U.S. lack of interest in meddling in internal affairs of Japan a mere diplomatic rhetoric when the Japanese government is given Hobson's choices about fully liberating its military from constraints of the postwar constitution? One illustrative episode to this theme is that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was appalled and disappointed when he was briefed prior to his imminent visit to East Asia in 2005 that the issue of relocating a U.S. military base in Futenma, Okinawa, had not been made an inch ahead since the 1995 Japan-U.S. agreement on that issue. He bypassed Tokyo for Seoul and Beijing in 2005, presumably to communicate his frustration with the Japanese government.

Needless to say, as seen from the United States, pictures are entirely different. After all, alliance politics is the policy of different perspectives often shaped by different positions and circumstances placed in world politics. Since much has been conceptually analyzed elsewhere on balance of power and unipolarity or primacy,¹⁶ this volume focuses primarily on empirical manifestations of alliance politics between Japan and the United States. After all, this alliance has dramatically shifted from "the most important bilateral relations—bar none" to a component of "the (ad hoc) coalition of the (temporarily) willing" in the past two decades. The newly elected government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has reversed and revised most of Japan's military commitments to the United States and U.S.-led coalitions made under the incumbent government of the LDP. The maritime refueling operation in the Indian Ocean as part of the Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban

and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan was let expire in January 2010. The DPJ government refrained from upgrading the country's Ship Inspection Law to enable its Coast Guard ships to conduct involuntary high-seas inspections of vessels suspected of transporting cargos related to weapons of mass destructions (WMD)—a move that would have enhanced Japan's responses to the North Korean nuclear proliferation contingencies. At the same time, the DPJ has made some new financial, civilian, and military commitments to UN-authorized security operations. The Anti-Piracy Special Measures Law was passed by bipartisan efforts to send the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the civilian Coast Guard vessels and planes to the Sea of Aden and neighboring Djibouti, though with a strict code on use of weapons by the MSDF. The DPJ government also agreed to a massive financial contribution to reconstruction of Afghanistan with a small group of diplomatic contingents. A small dispatch of GSDF personnel to a UN peace-keeping operation in Nepal was also carried out by the DPJ government. The DPJ effort to recast UN centrism into Japan's security policy is clearly visible, but the small scale of personnel dispatches brings back the Gulf War trauma to the minds of the proponents of SDF activism. The Obama government of the United States has so far kept itself to appreciative comments on Japan's contributions to these distant-area security operations. Instead, the expressed discord between the two governments has centered squarely on the issue of relocating the Futenma Marine Corps Airbase functions. Whether the ongoing discord in the alliance is the only sore spot of the otherwise solid post-Cold War alliance, or whether it is the beginning of more discords to follow is yet to be seen.

The aim of the volume is to examine to what extent these and other diverging priorities are real and whether they are not remedied with political and diplomatic leadership and other processes in regard to America's and Japan's relations with the latter's regional neighbors. To make empirical examinations comparative and fair to both sides of assessment of the alliance, we have asked two scholars, one Japanese and one American, to examine the alliance from bilateral and global perspectives (Chapters 2 and 3). Also, we have asked two contributors, one Japanese and one American, to assess the alliance's impacts on each regional country or a group of countries, including Korea, China, Russia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Australia. It is our aim to collectively present a detached and detailed assessment of the alliance between Japan and the United States, as it unfolds toward its fiftieth anniversary since the treaty revision in 1960 in the direction of more symmetric nature in terms of alliance duties of both allies—enhancing both Japan's burden sharing and credibility of the U.S. commitment. We briefly anticipate what might follow.

In Chapter 2, Tomohito Shinoda outlines Japan's dilemma between abandonment by its ally (the United States) and entrapment into America's conflicts through Japan's overseas troop dispatches in the post-Cold War period. Shinoda argues that the balance in recent years has shifted more toward the fear of entrapment.

Sheila Smith in Chapter 3 concurs with Shinoda's view when she points out U.S. strategic flexibility as the new context of bilateral alliance management. The United States sees each of its bilateral alliances through its global strategy.

The global strategic posture review, which guides regional force presences, poses a challenge to the psychological aspect of the alliance management. Japan has dealt with the “entrapment” fear by confining its out-of-area troop dispatches into sunset legislations (special measures laws). Smith suggests that a broader definition of alliance be adopted to incorporate political and economic partnership between Japan and the United States.

As Akiko Fukushima in Chapter 4 points out, the border between bilateral defense cooperation (primarily for Japan’s territorial defense) and broader regional and global security cooperation has been a contested one. Japan’s reluctance to give precise geographical definitions to such phrases as “Far East” in the 1960 revised U.S.-Japan alliance treaty or the “adjacent areas” in the 1998 Regional Contingency Law illustrates a delicate balancing between the entrapment fear and the practical needs to cooperate with the United States on regional security matters.

The rise of China and its integration with the regional economy also provides a new context for evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Recognizing closer political, economic, and military cooperation during the past decade, Michael Mastanduno (Chapter 5) sees that the United States has overcome its fears of Japan challenging U.S. hegemony (1980s) and Japan enhancing economic ties with China (1990s). Strategic interests of the United States and Japan are more convergent as both seek a new economic model in the ongoing global economic downturn, Japan balances U.S. financial debt reliance on China, and Japan serves as a window of openness to Asian regionalism. A combination of U.S. forward deployment in Japan and their strategic ambiguity about China may alter China’s perception of this alliance into an alarmist one, however.

Yasuyo Sakata (Chapter 6) outlines Japan’s interests in building trilateral cooperation that includes South Korea. Three objectives of (1) maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; (2) deterring and defending against the North Korean threat; and (3) maintaining a favorable strategic balance in Northeast Asia underlie Japan’s approach. As geostrategic temptation for South Korea to drift away from the alliance with the United States was demonstrated by the Roh Moo-Hyun-era flirtation with autonomous security policy in response to the U.S. strategic posture review, Japan saw that the U.S.-Japan alliance facilitates Japan’s approach to South Korea, according to Sakata.

South Korea has its own reasons to be cautious about closer security partnership that includes Japan, according to Scott Snyder (Chapter 7). South Korea’s deep-rooted mistrust of Japan leads to a desire to keep Japan out of the Korean Peninsula security issues, but to do so is not easy for South Korea. South Korea has to either match or overtake Japan as America’s most important regional and global security partner through its bilateral alliance, or accept increased Chinese influence on the peninsula, if Japan were to be excluded.

Chikako Ueki (Chapter 8) illustrates the alliance’s utility for Japan’s policy toward China. In addition to deterring military aggression by the latter, Japan identifies political benefits of the alliance in the form of moderating Sino-Japanese rivalry and engaging China as a “responsible stakeholder.” The latter

two are important as the Japanese economy increasingly depends on China's continued growth.

Victor Cha (Chapter 9) also counters the view that the bilateral alliances operate at odds with multilateralism. The presently evolving security architecture in Asia is inclusive of both the United States and China, he argues. The picture of the institutions that tie the United States, Japan, and China in the region is much more complex than "bilateral versus multilateral." This complexity is a useful tool in muting regional security dilemmas.

Reemergence of Russia as a significant actor in regional and global affairs introduces a complicating factor in the evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance. While Russia may serve as a possible counterbalance to the rising China, Akio Kawato (Chapter 10) lists Central and South Asia as areas of importance for Japan-Russia relations, Russian redevelopment of the Pacific fleet, and nuclear deterrence as three areas of possible conflicts between the U.S.-Japan alliance and Russia. On the other hand, economic development of the Russian Far East through resource and related service-sector development is of mutual benefits. Russia's skepticism against U.S.-Japan cohegemony can be eased by engaging Russia through multilateral security forums and summit meetings.

Joseph Ferguson (Chapter 11) sees that a weak Russia will lead to resource grab by China in Russia's peripheries and expose U.S. and Japanese interests to terrorism threats in Central Asia. While Japan missed an opportunity for closer cooperation with Russia during the first decade of the post-Cold War period, recent Russian assertion for more control in the Sakhalin resource development is turning foreign investors more cautious. As Russia seeks a more comprehensive development of Far Eastern provinces beyond oil and gas, a window of cooperation exists with the United States and Japan.

Takashi Terada (Chapter 12) sees strengthening of Japan-Australia security ties as catalyzed by their respective bilateral alliances with the United States. However, divergent perceptions about the rising China between Australia and Japan has prevented further upgrading of the emerging ties, and China's regional diplomacy to project a positive image has further reduced the need for such upgrading. The more likely arena of Australia-Japan-U.S. cooperation is outside Japan's neighborhood—like Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Sheldon Simon (Chapter 13) sees comfortable match among the U.S.-Japan alliance, Australia's maritime security interests in Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asia's desire to balance outside security partners through inclusion. The United States will continue to be the preferred primary partner of Southeast Asia over China, and Japan and Australia increasingly supplementing the U.S. role through the trilateral security dialogue is a welcome trend for Southeast Asia.

In Chapter 14, Hitoshi Suzuki brings in a perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the U.S. urging, Japan has increased its ties to the NATO and its global missions. In particular, numerous postconflict processes of democratization on the Eurasian continent are of common concerns of Japan and NATO. Japan views its out-of-area cooperation with NATO as

means to secure U.S. commitment to Japan's defense, and to that extent Japan's involvement poses no threats to the Europeans.

In Chapter 15, Inoguchi, Ikenberry, and Sato draw key insights from each chapter, assess divergent perspectives of Japan's regional bilateral relations between the Japanese and American authors, and discuss evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its limitations in the post-Cold War and post-Global War on Terrorism era.

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