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Korea has been one of the crucial areas for Japan and a great source of civilization since ancient times; advanced culture from China, India, Persia and Korea itself came to Japan largely through the Korean peninsula. At the same time it has been an intermittent source of conflict especially in modern times. After all, during this century two major occasions upon which Japan's destiny was seriously affected are related to Korea.¹ In 1904 Japan fought against Russia over Korea and Manchuria, and Japanese victory in the war profoundly shaped its outlook of world politics. This arguably led to Japan's plunge into war against the United States because of its self-righteous assertion later in 1941 as well as its subsequent defeat due to an obsolete military strategy and shallow economic foundation.² In 1950 the Korean war significantly shaped the outlook of the Japanese, a policy line based on the Yoshida doctrine. Alarmed by the Korean War and abetted by the Americans, Japan developed its Self-Defense Forces and concluded the Japan-US

1 See, for instance, Moriyama Shigenori, *Nikkan heigo* [The Japanese Annexation of Korea] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1992).

2 Takashi Inoguchi, "Wars as International Learning," a paper prepared for presentation at the Peaceful Changes in World Politics Conference, Tuusula, Finland, April 1-2, 1993.

Security Treaty.³ And today the Korean peninsula poses a great challenge not only to the Korean nation but also to Japan as well. Korea's challenge is the prospect for reunification and its concomitant difficulties to attain and sustain it,⁴ and Japan's future will be deeply affected by developments on the Korean peninsula. Such importance of Korea to Japan reinforced by geographical proximity and the density of historical interactions compels Japan to base its Korea policy on a deep understanding of the forces underlying these two nations and to invent intricate devices to deal with them. It is thus useful to look at some major features of the recent global changes in international security, the world economy and domestic societies.

The Nature of Global Changes

In my view, three kinds of changes are taking place around the globe. They are dubbed for the sake of convenience the end of the Cold War, the end of geography and the end of history, each of which has to do with changes in the nature of international security, of the world economy and of domestic societies respectively.⁵ Although the latter two phrases are borrowed from authors Richard Atkins and Francis Fukuyama respectively, I use them rather freely from their original meanings.

The end of the Cold War refers both to the absolute military supremacy of the United States in strategic nuclear and conventional terms in the short and intermediate term and the gradually weaken-

3 Kosaka Masataka, *Saisho Yoshida Shigeru* [Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida], Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1968.

4 See, inter alia, Donald N. Clark, ed., *Korea Briefing* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Okonogi Masao, *Posuto Reisenki Chosen Hanto no Kokusai Kankei* [International Relations on the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War], (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, forthcoming in 1993); Okonogi Masao, *Nihon to Kita Chosen* [Japan and North Korea] (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1991); Okonogi Masao, ed., *Kiro ni tatsu Kita Chosen* [North Korea at Crossroads] (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

5 Richard Atkins, *The End of Geography* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

ing basis of US technology and economy to sustain such a supremacy in the longer term—at least as it is so perceived by the US government. The disappearance of bipolarity associated with the end of the Cold War means that non-Cold-War-related conflicts come to the forefront of world attention, and yet that people have found themselves unprepared to deal with them in so neat a fashion as before.⁶

The end of geography means both the globalization of economic activities and the increasing reality of a borderless world economy on one hand and, on the other hand, the increasing necessity to absorb global market disturbances and reduce the speed of structural adjustments by various measures sometimes called protectionism, regionalism, or subsidiarity.⁷

The end of history means that global ideological contradictions between the two opposing forces, capitalism and communism, have ended. It means that forces of liberalization, both in economic and political terms, are deepening throughout the globe and at the same time these liberalizing forces are very rapidly becoming forces of destabilization almost everywhere on the globe especially in the developing world and in the transitional (former socialist) world.

These three ends have arguably been caused by the same factor, technological progress. Progress in military and especially nuclear technology has enabled both the US and Russia to build down large portions of strategic nuclear arsenals because of their enhanced power and precision. To put it simply, it has become unnecessary to retain as many nuclear missiles as needed to destroy military targets ten times when one delivery is more than sufficient to do the task. Progress in communications and transportation technology has broadened and deepened economic activity worldwide. Creating too many barriers against global market forces is increasingly unwise since, unless it be carried out in a most imaginative and effective manner, it will in the longer term place the barriers-cum-subsidies—

6 See, for instance, a special issue of *Survival* on "Ethnic Conflicts and International Security," Spring 1993.

7 See, for instance, Henry Aaron, et al., *Integrating the World Economy*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 1992).

protected sectors and commodities in a less competitive position. Failure to implement structural adjustments intermittently has come to mean less long-term competitiveness. Upward movements toward higher technology and more values-added products have become routine, if the task does sometimes verge on being Sisyphean. Similarly, progress in communications and transportation technology has made it virtually impossible to maintain political and economic systems tightly segregated and isolated from global political and economic forces. Even the most tightly segregated society receives news about world events directly or indirectly.

Three Manifestations on the Korean Peninsula and Japan's Korea Policy

These global changes are manifested in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula as well. First of all, the end of communism in Europe has been haunting North Korean leaders.⁸ They have seen the fate of Nicolae Ceaucescu of Romania with dismay and distress. National security, and more urgently regime security, are now at stake in North Korea. China's advice-cum-pressure toward reform and the openness offered to and placed upon North Korea makes its leaders angry and nervous. Kim Jong-il's cancellation of his planned visit to China in March 1993 may have been caused by such a sentiment of displeasure. The close relationship between democratic South Korea and the US as demonstrated by their Team Spirit military exercise must have seemed a great menace to North Korea. The mere thought of the US and South Korea's replaying a Gulf War on North Korea makes North Korean leaders tremble. The simple fact is that US reigns supreme militarily in Northeast Asia. Russia is in deep trouble with itself and in no mood to do anything for North Korea. Instead Russia is globally one of the best American allies.

8 See Kurata Hideya, Chosen mondai takoku kan kyongi ron non genzai "[Multilateralism on the Korean Question], *Gaiko jiho* [Revue Diplomatique], No. 1295 (February 1993), pp. 68–82; Sakata Noriyo, "Beikoku no reisen go no higasjo Ajia senryaku to Bei-Kan anzenhosho kankei, 1990–1992 [US East Asia Strategy and US-ROK Security Relationship, 1990–1992 after the Cold War], *Gaiko jiho* [Revue Diplomatique], No. 1295 (February 1993), pp. 50–67.

From North Korea's point of view China is no unconditionally reliable ally since it has come close to South Korea and meddles in North Korean internal affairs with its advice on reform and openness. Needless to say, however, there are two indicators of some friendship between the two countries. One is that portions of the North Korean energy supply seem to be contributed by China. The other is that in the National People's Congress of March 1993 in Beijing Premier Li Peng's speech mentioned North Korea, of all the countries, second to Japan.

Yet the apparent trend of US military downsizing (if I am to be politically correct, rightsizing) will continue, if it is to be done quite slowly, for some time to come due to an acute American awareness of its own need to enhance competitiveness—technological, economic and financial—and to focus its foremost attention towards its domestic agendas. This applies most drastically to Europe but in the long run Pacific Asia can be no exception.⁹ This poses a dilemma for South Korea. South Korea's existing security ties with the US must be enhanced to their logical extreme in the short and intermediate term in order to navigate correctly among the post-Cold War uncertainties and the increasingly explicit self-assertion on the part of South Korea's neighbors. But in the longer term South Korea is more likely to get itself prepared to meet the prospect for reunification, be it through absorption or confederation, by somewhat loosening the direct military ties with the US. The United States has been making it very clear that American forces in Pacific Asia will also be substantially shrunk or virtually withdrawn if US military access to some major bases in Pacific Asia can be secured in an emergency.

If North Korea goes nuclear even in the primitive form, it would trigger a vicious circle of arms race including a nuclear arms race. Not only South Korea but Japan and China will also be alarmed and start to take countermeasures. And more globally, that would encourage nuclear-capable states to go really nuclear, which would be

9 See James Schlesinger, "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1992/93), pp. 17–28; Robert A. Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future Prospects," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 19–40; Richard J. Ellings and Edward A. Olsen, "A New Pacific Profile," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1992–1993, pp. 116–36.

counter-productive to South Korea. But North Korea's announcement to pull out of the Nonproliferation Treaty in March 1993 is a serious action and North Korea needs to be encouraged to come back to the fold of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Leaving North Korea free from constructive international constraints would create an extremely bad precedent. South Korea's denunciation of its non-nuclear joint declaration made together with North Korea in late 1991 would create a suspicion that it might be planning to go nuclear once North Korea were absorbed by or confederated with South Korea. In a similar vein, if Japan fails to pledge its infinite membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty when the Treaty's first 25-year term is to expire it would be a most serious mistake.¹⁰ It is in the interest of South Korea, Japan, the US and probably Pyongyang itself that North Korea be discouraged from departing from the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. How to go about doing it is a difficult question to answer. Either bombing Yongbyon as the Israelis did Iraq or an application of tight and prolonged UN economic sanctions could precipitate a regime collapse or trigger a North Korean attack against the South. Since neither seeing North Korea suddenly collapse nor receiving a surprise attack are very attractive to South Korea, it is in Seoul's interest to make utmost efforts to encourage North Korea to return to the NPT. Furthermore, it will be in the interest of the entire peninsula to construct and consolidate a Northeast Asian security regime with the membership of both Koreas, the US, China, Russia and Japan.

Second, the South Korean economy has been placed in a dilemma. Together with increasing cost of R & D in technological innovation, early starters such as the US have become increasingly protective of their technology. High technology has become increasingly difficult for the developing world to get.¹¹ The movement toward

10 See Donowaki Mitsuro, "Kita chosen dattai donaru kakufukakusan joyaku [North Korea's Pull Out: What Will Happen to the Nonproliferation Treaty]," *Chuo koron*, May 1993, pp. 88–101.

11 I benefited from Ambassador Kim Kyungwon's interventions on the Korean economy and technology in the Williamsburg Conference, Zhongshang, Guangdong, China, March 22–24, 1993. See Also Alice H. Amsden, "The South Korean Economy: Is Business-Led Growth Working?" in Donald N. Clark, ed.,

more standardization and commonization of rules and regulations over economic activities across national borders has become apparent for some time already, especially regarding codification efforts in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These rules tend to be shaped by those who have the greatest stake in high technology—the early starters—and shaped largely without awaiting the successful conclusion of the Round. The rules are tailored by daily business. They are further spread through bilateral and regional trade and economic interactions among and with the early starters.

Unable to make a great leap forward in technological innovation and yet unable to get it transferred cheaply, South Korea has been locked into a difficult triangular economic relationship. Many capital goods are still imported from Japan, while finished products are still exported in substantial amounts to the US. Accordingly South Korea registers chronic trade deficits to Japan and chronic trade surpluses to United States. For the last fifteen years or so Japan's direct investment in the developing world has been directed toward ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia rather than Asian Newly Industrializing Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan—and most recently toward China, India and Latin America albeit at much lower levels.¹² On top of the less-than-active direct Japanese investment in South Korea, technology transfer also turns out to be less than Seoul would like to get from Japan. Furthermore, Japan itself has become increasingly more like the US: for example, Japanese steel makers have sued South Korean steel makers over patent violations. In short, Japan has also become more protective as it has moved up the high technology ladder. Although the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry and big business associations such as the Keidanren have been trying to increase imports of Korean products, progress has not been encouraging enough to South Korea.

Korea Briefing, pp. 71–96.

12 Japan External Trade Organization, ed., *Nihon no kaigai toshi* [Japan's External Direct Investment] (Tokyo: JETRO, 1992).

As it has become increasingly aware of being caught up with competitors in many sectors, the US has been withholding its technology from everyone else. Furthermore, taking advantage in many cases of its still-remaining security hegemony, it is trying to enshrine its policy philosophy in the universal package of global economic activities in the GATT and in bilateral and regional economic and trade agreements. Such US negotiations or agreements with countries such as Canada, Mexico, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea normally consist of two major agendas: one of further market liberalization and the other the codification of new economic rules such as intellectual property law, product liabilities and environmental concerns. No less important is the apparent direction toward protectionism in the US market as it focuses upon renewal and competitiveness as the economy continues to drag. Since most South Korean exports are directed toward the US, any major economic downturn combined with an upsurge of protectionism will spell dire consequences for Korea. Even if South Korean exports stagnate somewhat to the US, it would not matter so much if access to the Japanese market were to broaden enough to offset it. But unfortunately it is not the case, at least from the South Korean viewpoint. Progress is "too slow, too little." Even if South Korea does seek new markets such as China, Latin America, and India, the Japanese do so much more vigorously, whether in trade or in direct investment.

In short, South Korea is in trouble. When regionalization seems to be in progress in Western Europe and North America in the form of the Maastricht Treaty and NAFTA, South Korea cannot resort to letting Pacific Asia form its own economic grouping. It would be suicidal because its largest export market lies in the US. Yet if South Korea allows the US to engage in its multilateral "bottom-up" strategy in creating and cementing economic rules,¹³ then it will draw South Korea one notch closer to NAFTA than would be the case without its bilateral free trade negotiations with the US. Unlike ASEAN countries, which can act as part of an economic grouping, or unlike

13 Peter Cowhey and Jonathan Aronson, "A New Trade Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1992/93), pp. 183-95.

Japan which is already an economic superpower, South Korea is in trouble as universal economic rules are reshaped across borders.

North Korea is one of the countries hardest hit by the globalization of economic activities and it has started to stagnate and shrink since Russia has stopped allowing barter and supplying petroleum; the quasi-autarkic North Korea economy has nothing to sell abroad on a competitive basis. With the gradual deterioration of supply of food, energy and medicine North Korea can only exhort its people by heightening the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. North Korean mass media has already gone to the extreme of referring to Kim Il Sung as God.¹⁴ The already tight social control has been tightened even further, and the announced withdrawal from the NPT and concomitant national war emergency decree is seen in part as an excuse for this and for further political mobilization. With the economy stagnating further and further, North Korea is likely to be hit even harder once UN-led economic sanctions are applied. Especially it would be a disaster once sanctions are deepened so as to scrutinize every item of economic assistance from Chongyon, the organization of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan. It is sometimes said to be five billion yen larger than North Korea's government budget itself (60 billion yen).¹⁵ Precipitating North Korea's collapse does not seem to be the goal of any neighboring countries including South Korea. Once that were to take place, the money necessary to keep the North Korean population staying and working where they now live would be formidable to the South Korean and Japanese governments.

Third, with the end of European communism and with the revisionist thought of reform and openness permeating China, Vietnam and Cuba, North Korea cannot help but feel very bad about its lack of solidarity with even a single country. What North Korea can do is to reinforce the Kim personality cult to its extreme of elevating them to

14 Suzuki Masayuki, "Shinkiki Surogan no ki to Chosen no kamisama (Ideomancy: Sloganeered Wood and Korea's God)," *University Press*, No. 245 (March 1993), pp. 10–14.

15 *Shukan Posuto*, March 23, 1993.

the level of God in the good tradition of Northeast Asian animism.¹⁶ Yet the personality cult cannot last indefinitely. The octogenarian Kim Il Sung's departure from this world cannot be too far away and on that occasion pent-up emotions might be unleashed so dramatically as to precipitate the regime's collapse. Besides intensifying the personality cult, they also try to mobilize external kin such as Japan's Chongyon, Chinese Koreans in China's Northeast, and South Koreans. Japan's Chongyon cannot but help North Korea in part because its members relatives live in good numbers under hardship in North Korea. Chinese Koreans cannot be useful unless North Korea loosens its border control significantly. South Koreans cannot be mobilized merely by exaggerating the common indignation of South Korea's and North Korea's plight in the NPT regime.

In South Korea the transition to democracy has been achieved successfully. It is a success story in many respects; from developmental authoritarianism-cum-military dictatorship of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan to the democratic transition by the military-turned-civilian Roh Tae Woo, and further to Kim Young Sam, an opposition party politician who became head of the predominant governing party. Yet despite the apparent triumph of democracy and market capitalism South Koreans cannot help but feel a less-than-perfect harmony with US-originated democracy and market capitalism. The sentiment cannot be called anti-Americanism but it tends to extoll some nativistic cultural and social values, often in an idealized fashion. The sentiment has not come out in a very pronounced way in South Korea. But we saw similar sentiments rising in Japan in the 1980s when the economy was flourishing to its extreme and Japanese economic super-performance was used as an excuse for the US government to push Japan toward further market liberalization and policy coordination.¹⁷

16 Suzuki Masayuki, *Kita Chosen: Shakaishugi to dento no kyomei* [North Korea: Concurrence of Socialism and Tradition], (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992).

17 I am referring to a bulk of Japanese excessive arguments about Japan and Japanese on the basis of their renewed self-confidence.

It also came up in China and Singapore in the early 1990s as the Chinese economy has been registering some ten percent growth rate and the US is perceived to be using the post-Tiananmen massacre legacy instrumentally for its trade, defense or human-rights interests.¹⁸ Also in South Korea such sentiments are bound to deepen somewhat as the US government pushes South Korea so unilaterally and aggressively to further accelerate market liberalization. And they may even find some secret consolation in North Korea's obstinate tenacity to uphold things Korean after the end of European communism. These sentiments have after all been encouraged by the disappearance of communism as the totally opposing global ideological and military system; how they can help South and North Koreans to work out their difficulties cooperatively without alienating the four major neighboring powers, the US, China, Russia and Japan, will be a major task confronting both Koreas in the years ahead.

Common to Koreans on both sides is not solely their sentiments about Americans. The Korean suspicion of Japan and Japanese is to a certain extent natural given the past record of Japanese vis-à-vis Koreans. If the purpose is to discourage Japanese from repeating past misconduct and to encourage Koreans to make best use of mutually beneficial interactions with Japanese, however, then linking history with the present in such a way as to portray the present solely from the negative angle of the past will not serve the purpose of the portrayer. To rectify some excessive suspicion and mistrust on both sides, I believe a bilateral project should be established to write a history of Northeast Asia centered on Korea and Japan. Such a history could be used in both countries as a subtext of the history courses in junior high schools.¹⁹ It would be attempted for the purpose of raising consciousness about Korean-Japanese differences and similarities in interpreting their history from

18 I am referring to a bulk of Chinese excessive arguments about China and Chinese on the basis of their renewed self-confidence.

19 See as an example of Japanese-Korean cooperation Yamada Shoji, Takasaki Muneji, Chung Changyon, and Cho Kyongdal, *Kin-gendaishi nonakano Nihon to Chosen* [Japan and Korea in the Modern-Contemporary History], (Tokyo: Tokyo shoseki, 1991).

ancient to contemporary times. My idea is to commission ten historians from each country for five years to write a history, and then use it in schools in both languages.

This task of enhancing our understanding of our differences and similarities will be essential toward creating and sustaining a security community in Northeast Asia involving both Koreas and the four major powers including Japan.²⁰ When the North-South Agreement was concluded in late 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea was studying the possibility of an international regime that would help insure the inter-Korean non aggression agreement. In this study Japan was excluded as a party to such a regime ostensibly because, without other explanation, Japan could not possibly contribute to any guarantee of mutual nonaggression.²¹ This seems to represent something intermittently popping up in both Koreas, due to an insufficient understanding of Korean national interests regarding Japan's involvement in affairs on the Korean peninsula. Even barring the two extreme possibilities of a sudden North Korean collapse or a surprise attack against South Korea, Japan can be an important factor in moderating both Koreas' positions toward each other and in creating some conditions more conducive to greater mutual confidence on the Korean peninsula. This point is to be stressed especially when every possible party—except South Korea—to a Northeast Asian security arrangement *did* want Japan to get involved in such an arrangement in late 1991, if such a thing is ever to emerge. It seems to me that probably by 1993 South Korea as well will start to see Japan as a positive party in any efforts toward such a goal.

20 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).

21 Kurata Hideya, “[Multilateralism on the Korean Question].”

Conclusion

Japan's Korea policy is one of our major priorities. Japan's perception of Korea has been changing along with the three major global changes, each manifested in the areas of international security, the world economy and domestic societies. In this article I have portrayed the major changes on the Korean peninsula concomitant to the three global changes associated with the end of the Cold War, the end of geography and the end of history, or with their backlashes. In analyzing them I have tried to portray Japan's perception of Korean changes and of Japan's interest in Korea, especially in a stable transition to a Korean peninsula that not only both Koreas but also the four major neighbors can look to with mutual confidence backed by commitment and compassion.