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Clash of Values across Civilizations

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Abstract and Keywords

This article discusses the clash of values across civilizations and presents some illustrative examples of how key value dimensions compare across global regions. Seven substantive topics are discussed in this article, namely: happiness, the basic value configuration of the world, the role of government, globalization and confidence in democratic institutions, social capital, regional identity, and religiosity.

Keywords: clash of values, key value dimensions, global regions, basic value configuration, globalization and confidence, happiness, role of government, religiosity, social capital, regional identity

SHORTLY after the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama (1997) published his influential book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. He argued that the competition between capitalist democracy and socialist dictatorship ended with the victory of the former. Thus, history has ended in a single capitalist, democratic model. Supporting this point, the number of democracies has steadily increased since the 1970s. In December 2005, Freedom House (2005) reported that the number of democracies had grown to 122 with three new entrants, Burundi, Liberia, and Central Africa added to the list.

Similarly, economic development has continued. In 1992, O'Brien (1992) argued that financial services have been globally integrated due to the dramatic progress in computer technology that enables instantaneous financial transactions wherever one is located. Indeed, the amount of trade has been steadily rising for years. Especially noteworthy is the astronomical increase in currency trading since 1985 when the G5 countries (France, West Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom) concluded the Plaza Accord. Prior to 1985, the amount of trade in goods and services surpassed the amount of trade in currency. Since 1986, currency trading has become 50 to 100 times as large as the trade in goods and services.

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Worldwide democratization and financial integration illustrate the gigantic transformations of the past several decades (Held et al. 2003). Citizen values also reflect these societal changes. By values, I mean a set of preferred beliefs and norms, principles and practices deemed important by individual citizens. It is normal that the values held by citizens differ from one person to another. One thesis holds that these trends in democratization and economic development converge in a single model of the development of human values (see the chapters by Inglehart and Welzel, for example).

The counter position to the convergence argument is Samuel Huntington's (1996) provocative *Clash of Civilizations* thesis. When such factors as history, religion, language, and other cultural differences play a prominent role in value formation, they produce what Huntington calls the clash of civilizations. Huntington argues that some distinctive civilizations have developed sufficiently tightly knit and tenaciously held beliefs and norms that some of these sets are inherently incompatible with each other. Assuming the decomposability of those civilizational entities, he further argues that the Islamic and Chinese civilizations are more likely to pose difficult moments when the Atlantic civilization of the West finds it difficult to tolerate and accommodate.

Needless to say, I am not presupposing that there is a clash of civilizations as Huntington (1996) has argued. Instead, I present some illustrative examples of how key value dimensions compare across global regions, which seem to have civilizational colorings in appearance and by implications. By civilization, I mean a subset of the humankind that forms a long enduring set of similarly waving and synergistically vibrating brains and hearts. For the sake of simplicity, I do not use the term subcivilization to refer to entities, such as Islamic nations or Christian nations, but I use the term civilizations to refer to such groupings as well.

The substantive topics used in this chapter follow what Jean Blondel and Takashi Inoguchi (2006) state are the key dimensions of citizens' political culture: *identity, trust, and satisfaction*. "Political culture" refers to a set of beliefs and norms, principles, and practices that are political, that is, those pertaining to authority and coercion, and freedom. By identity, I mean something that one voluntarily uses to represent oneself symbolically. Trust involves the degree of confidence placed in and comfort attached to persons and institutions. By satisfaction, I mean the degree of gratification one gets from the state of affairs, be they income, life, health, marriage, the environment, politics, or neighborhood.

I conceptualize identity, trust, and satisfaction as integral to citizens' political culture. My point is perhaps understood more clearly once these three components are related to political regimes. Identity, trust, and satisfaction at the level of regimes are called identity, legitimacy, and efficacy, as exemplified in the democracy literature by authors such as Lipset (1981), Dahl (2000), and Pye (1988). Moreover, these dimensions overlap with many of the value factors that Huntington cited in his clash of civilizations hypothesis.

Because identity, trust, and satisfaction are integral parts of citizens' political culture and because political culture constitutes one of the core pillars of (p. 242) civilizations, I organize the substantive topics in this chapter accordingly. They are (a) the basic value config-

uration of the world, (b) religiosity, (c) regional identity, (d) social capital, (e) the role of government, (f) globalization and confidence in democratic institutions, and (g) happiness.

1 The Basic Value Configuration of the World

Based on the World Value Surveys, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have put forward one of the boldest representations of the macro-pattern of human values (also see Inglehart chapter and Welzel chapter in this Handbook). They use the World Values Survey, which spans the last three decades, to identify two key dimensions of values: (1) survival versus self-expression and (2) traditionalism versus secularism. Survival means the preoccupation about physical, sociological, and psychological security in its structural and acute forms. Survival values are preferred primarily in nations with low per capita income or where economic developmental momentum has not yet dissipated. This survival preoccupation is sometimes called materialism. Self-expression means the preference to not suppress the desires of heart and mind, body and brain. The emphasis on self-expression is sometimes called postmaterialism. Self-expressive values are preferred largely in those nations with high per capita income.

Traditionalism means the adherence to principles and practices that are taken for granted and routinized in society. Secularism means the separation of the sacred from the sphere of public domain. It means both religious freedom to individuals and the non-contagion of religion within the public space of society. These two key dimensions are derived from analyses of a large set of questions about values taken from approximately sixty societies around the world. These two dimensions tell us that the basic configuration of values is the competition between survival values and self-expressive values and the competition between traditionalism and secularism.¹

In terms of crude geographical demarcation, Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, the Caribbean and South America, and central and eastern Europe are trying to develop beyond survival values, whereas western Europe, the developed nations of East Asia, and North America are pulled toward self-expressive values. The first key dimension of values approximately divides between the South and the North, the developing versus the developed world. Along the second dimension lies one group that consists of Africa, the Americas, and most of the rest of the world with the exception of western Europe and East Asia that constitute the other (p. 243) group in this dimension of values. In other words, west Europeans and maritime East Asians remain solidly secular and rational and increasingly self-expressive, whereas Americans remain more traditional in making religion more salient. Yet Americans are self-expressive. This does not vindicate the validity of the clash of civilizations thesis as Huntington (1996) claims. Rather west Europeans, maritime East Asians, and North Americans show a convergence of values on the first dimension.

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Another striking feature in the Inglehart and Welzel world map is that the United States is a mild outlier among the other advanced industrial democracies. The United States has a large percentage of population who possess a high level of religiosity and those who are preoccupied with daily survival in comparison to the other G8 countries. Western Europeans and East Asians are far less religious and increasingly are more concerned with lifestyle, a pursuit that goes beyond daily survival. One illustration of the schism between Americans and west Europeans is their divergence on how to conceive international law in terms of the use of force and universal norms such as human rights (Isernia 2001) in the lead up to the Iraq War of 2003.

American fundamentalism and unilateralism are the two phrases applied to these visibly outlying features of Americans in the developed world. Thus, what Huntington (1996) calls the Atlantic civilization reveals an Atlantic schism a decade after the *Clash of Civilizations* was published. The Atlantic schism remains essentially unresolved even after the Iraq War of 2003, leaving the Atlantic relations like a frosty marriage.

2 Multidimensional Religiosity

Since Karl Marx called religion the opium of the masses and Max Weber hailed the *Entzauberung* a step toward secularization and rationalization, two landmarks of modernity, most social scientists have played down the role of religion in discussions of the public space as distinguished from private space. Social scientists have long neglected the relationship of religion with politics, and this topic has been recently addressed by a number of important studies (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Varshney 2002; Lijphart 1979).

Steven Reed (2006) presented an iconoclastic study that tried to remedy what is called the western-centric and Christian-centric bias in this area of research. For instance, the World Values Survey asks: "How important is God in your life?" The survey also asks: "Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, how often do you attend religious services?" Reed (2006) instead uses the AsiaBarometer Survey that asks the following questions: "How often do you pray or meditate?" and "Which of the following activities do you think a religious person or group should be involved in?" Clearly, the latter questions attempt to be free from western and Christian biases often identified in many survey questions. Reed reaches two remarkable findings. First, traditions across religions are not so different from one another that they (p. 244) cannot be fruitfully compared. This makes these more neutral questions very attractive for cross-cultural comparisons. The AsiaBarometer Survey of 2005 studied fourteen countries in South and Central Asia, and many of these countries include a good number of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists (Mahayana and Hinayana), Christians (Catholic and other Christians), and a small number of believers from other religions. These religious groups are productively compared with remarkable eye-opening findings. Huber (2005) analyzed the link between beliefs and decisions to participate in religious services to see whether religious groups influence social policy in such areas as abortion.

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Second, religiosity is not a unidimensional phenomenon; Reed (2006) examined two dimensions of private piety and community participation. As soon as we view religiosity as multidimensional, the time-honored distinction between secularization and sacralization must be questioned. The (clashing) values across multiple civilizations appears precisely because Asia contains many major civilizations: Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian that have different expressions of their religious traditions.

This subject of multidimensional religiosity is a new subject. New angles have been raised and new survey data based on such new angles await more in-depth analysis. Only with such new data and new in-depth analysis can one discuss the implications of the clash of civilization thesis. Yet with even a meager amount of the current data, one can get the impression that the clash of civilization thesis is overexaggerated.

3 Forging Regional Identity

Another way in which civilization lines might be defined is by identification with a region or a civilization. By identity, I mean something that respondents use to represent themselves symbolically. National identity is an identity based on nationality. Regional identity is derived from attachments to a larger region beyond the nation-state that might reflect an attachment to a civilization as "Asian," "European," or "Islamic." Even without value differences, identities can differentiate regions and their publics.

For instance, European integrationists have made the inculcation of a European identity a priority since 1945 (Sinnott and Niedermayer 1995). Similarly, researchers examining East Asian integration often think about Asian identity. In other words, how much do citizens value national identity versus transnational identities? In building a sense of regional community, one needs to develop a sufficiently strong sense of identity to a regional community that includes shared interests, common institutions, and a joint shouldering of risks and burdens.² Huntington's clash of (p. 245) civilization thesis makes conflicting statements about such geographic identities. At one point, the loss of national attachments is a cause of concern, at another point the development of cross-national regional identities is a source of concern.

Certainly, the clearest example of the development of regional identities has been Europe, and specifically the member states of the European Union. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) examined public support for regional integration in Europe in terms of economic performance, political salience, and role in international relations. Noteworthy is their use of pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis (also see Eichenberg in this volume; Gabel 1998). Sinnott and Niedermayer (1995) focused on policy, subsidiary, and legitimacy to measure regional identities that accommodate internationalized governance in Europe. Rosamond (1999) examined the impact of globalization on nurturing European identities. The consensus of this research is that new regional attachments are developing among west European publics because of the European integration process.

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With an eye to wider European integration, east Europeans focus on democratic identity. Instead of focusing on ethnic, religious, or some other identities, empirical research also focuses on democratic identity, which is a prerequisite for accession to the European Union (Klingemann and Hofferbert 1999; Berglund 2003). Richard Rose and his associates (New Democracies Barometer and New Europe Barometer) have shown that the question “reject all the non-democratic alternatives” most clearly reveals the support for regime principles (Berglund 2003). Klingemann and Hofferbert (1999) have shown that, to reveal democratic satisfaction, the estimate of the conditions of individual human rights is the best indicator. In Central Asia, the issue of identities is unsettling. While ethnic and clan-based identities are clearly strong and distrust among different groups pose formidable barriers, state-building efforts have not been proceeding smoothly in a democratic fashion. Thus, calls for unitary state-building efforts and democratizing efforts do not seem to go together in the same direction (Collins 2006; Kasenova 2006).

Surprisingly, the AsiaBarometer Surveys indicate that some regional identities also exist in Asia (Inoguchi et al. 2005, 2006). In most of the ASEAN Plus Three countries, “Asian” identities are not weak. Cambodia and the Philippines are the most regionalist, judging from the large percentage of the respondents who choose the “Asian” option to the identity question (see note 2) in both countries. This regional identity is dismally weak in China (5%), India (15%), and Japan (26%). In between are those areas heavily inhabited by Muslim and ethnic Chinese populations: Indonesia, India, and Malaysia. Ethnic Chinese populations are also in China and Taiwan (of course) and Singapore and Malaysia. If one thinks about the sixteen countries that participated in the East Asian Summit Declaration in December 2005, this picture does not change because India's regional identity is the weakest of the three big countries. In general, pan-Asian regional identities are modest among Asian publics.

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The three major countries in the region—India, China, and Japan—differ in their reasons for a weak regional identity. India tends to think that regional governance is India's task along with some regional organizations such as the South Asian Regional Cooperation forum. It is a bit like the United States thinking that global governance is the task of the United States and that the United States is the world's government (Mandelbaum 2006). China tends to think that the ASEAN Plus Three, with the exception of Japan, are more or less “respectful” to China and its rise. Thus, China seems to envisage its traditional tributary system as restored.³ In the case of Japan, it is ambivalent about Asia. It is a bit like Britain and its relationship to the European continent. Both view the continent as a source of troubles and headaches, and believe that some distance is the most healthy approach, although functional interactions and friendly relations are of the utmost importance. Thus, the Japanese tend to think first as an industrial democracy of the G8 and a good ally of the United States and only secondarily as a country of Asia in Asia. Reflective of the weak regional identity of the Japanese is their “don't know” response to the regional question that registers a high of 30 percent.

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The other two Oceanic countries, Australia and New Zealand, do not place much emphasis on an Asian identity. Even though their populations of Asian origins are on the slow increase, these nations do not discuss their multicultural heritages. In the previous Keating-led Labour administration, Australia was viewed as part of Asia, but in the current Howard-led Conservative administration, the dominant view is that Australia is not part of Asia in terms of civilization, although functionally it is in terms of mining, services, and other Australian niches. New Zealand more or less concurs with Australia, although its niches in Asia are different.

Regional identities in other parts of the world have not been examined as closely as they have in Europe. However, the Latinobarometer found that, shortly after their launching in 1995, all the regional groups for economic integration—the NAFTA, the Andean Pact, and Mercosur—had a good degree of awareness among the population of Latin America (Latinobarometer 1997). The presupposition underlying the survey on regional economic integration does not have much to do with identity. Yet a decade-long deepening of globalization has ironically prompted many Latin American countries to the identity issue through populist agitations and protectionist temptations like Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile.

In summary, Huntington was worried about the development of strong regional/civilizational blocs that would structure world politics in this century. He was especially concerned about the emergence of such regional blocs in the developing world. Ironically, the strongest evidence of such regional identities occurs within the European Union. The existence of such regional identities outside of the European (p. 247) Union is still limited, and the long and extensive process that was required to develop such transnational identities in Europe suggests that such regional identities will be slow to develop in other global regions.

4 Civilizational Divides in Social Capital

Another possible civilization variable is the concept of social capital. Dietlind Stolle (in this volume) examines three major definitions of social capital: Coleman's (1990) "structure of relations between persons and among persons," Nan Lin's (2001) definition as "an investment in social relations with an expected return in the marketplace," and Robert Putnam's (1993, 2000a) "norms of generalized reciprocity, trust and networks of civic engagement" horizontally organized. Central to all three definitions is the concept of trust in others as a key element of social relations.

Francis Fukuyama (1997) foresaw that the primary divide in the contemporary world would be between high-trust and low-trust societies. Because capitalist democracy has become the increasingly universal and global way to organize human activities, attention would focus on how to conduct global economic and political management in a capitalist democratic fashion. In capitalist business transactions as well as democratic political games, high trust makes an enormous difference. If trust is high, business transactions are more certain, faster, and less costly. If trust is low, business transactions are more uncertain, slower, and more costly. Similarly, if trust is high in democratic politics, the

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games of politics are more calmly deliberated, more pragmatically conducted, and more rationally managed. If trust is low in democratic politics, politics are less calmly deliberated, more confrontationally conducted, and less rationally managed. The divide grows as global capitalist integration deepens. Moreover, the divide expands as democratic diffusion prevails over the globe.

Fukuyama predicted that high-trust societies would produce more wealth and sustain deeper democracy over the longer term. In his scheme of things, the United States, Britain, and Japan belong to the former type, whereas China, France, and Russia belong to the latter type. The former produces capitalism of a higher order, whereas the latter produces capitalism of a lower order. To illustrate why Japan is of high trust and China is of low trust, Fukuyama looked at the way that sons are adopted in Japanese and Chinese families. What would people do if their children were all female and they owned a business? The Japanese are more inclined to choose an adopted son from those they employ in their business, whereas Chinese business families are more inclined to stick to the bloodline. Fukuyama's reasoning is that the Japanese are of less narrow trust, whereas Chinese companies are of more narrow trust. Japanese families are less tightly organized but more pragmatically extendable by placing confidence in those chosen employees from one's own business company.

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Global data from the World Values Survey paints a different picture of social trust. Newton (in this volume) shows that a simple East/West or North/South divide does not fully describe cross-national patterns of social trust. For instance, in contrast to Fukuyama's claim, social trust is high in China and Vietnam, and lower in some west European nations. Social trust is also noticeably lower in most east European nations or less developed African nations. In global terms, however, a clear positive relationship exists between levels of social trust and political or economic development.

Yamagishi (1998) put forward another divide in terms of bonding and bridging social capital. His cross-cultural experimental scheme contrasted how Americans and Japanese interact in the context of the prisoner's dilemma in order to see how players trust or distrust their respective adversary. By bonding social capital, he meant that social capital cements trust already there in terms of sociological and other attributes such as a common school tie or a shared lineage link. By bridging social capital, he meant that social capital forges trust and builds confidence among those who encounter each other for the first time. Yamagishi found that Americans tend to be social capital bridgers, whereas the Japanese tend to be social capital bonders. In other words, Americans use initial encounters with strangers to bring them into their expanding networks, whereas Japanese use initial encounters with strangers to determine whether they belong to a similar social circle and to consolidate the bond. Putnam (1997) also contrasted Americans and Japanese by characterizing the key features of their social capital. American social capital is generally non-discriminately friendly at the first stage with the potential for deeper ties developing after a face-to-face meeting. In a good contrast, Japanese social capital tends to be

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generally discriminately friendly at the first stage, followed by attempts to cement deeper trust if social attributes converge. Putnam describes American social capital as general and broad, whereas Japanese social capital is particularistic and narrow.

In an Asian context, Inoguchi (2005a) used the AsiaBarometer Survey to demonstrate that social capital is conceptualized along the three dimensions of interpersonal relationship, merit-based utility, and system-linked harmony (cf. Pye 1988). It is interesting that Asia has generated and accommodated five of the eight civilizations that Huntington identified, that is, Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese, and Christian. By focusing on Asia alone, it is possible to fruitfully discuss the potential clash of values within and across civilizations. No less importantly, when social capital is linked with different sets of values, this can create instances of incongruence and disharmony when these societies have transactions and interactions. First, being sociable and trustful is an indispensable component of social capital. It concerns whether people are good-natured or bad-natured. Second, social capital is closely tied to how much benefit is expected when you trust someone with whom you share a certain amount of risk. It is based on merit. It is utilitarian. Third, social capital is broadly embedded with the social system. It needs to have a similar wavelength with the ideological, institutional, and cultural framework of the social system. Along these three dimensions, Asian civic cultures are clustered in terms of quasi-civilizational landmarks, namely, (a) Japan and Korea; (b) Sri Lanka, India, Uzbekistan, and Myanmar; (c) Malaysia and Singapore; (d) China and Vietnam; and (e) the (p. 249) Philippines and Thailand. The first cluster is Confucian developmental capitalist. The second cluster is former British colonialist-cum-Hinayana Buddhist-Hindu-Islamic. The third cluster is former British colonialist-cum-developmental authoritarianist. The fourth cluster is Confucian communist-cum-capitalist. The fifth is Third-Wave democracy capitalist. The three dimensions are derived from a set of questions on social capital incorporated in the 2003 AsiaBarometer Survey (Inoguchi et al. 2005).

In summary, there is a remarkable clustering of civic cultures based on social-capital-related questions in the AsiaBarometer Survey. On this level, at least, it appears that civilization patterns may be evident.

5 The Atlantic Schism in the Role of Government

Gosta Esping-Anderson (1990) has paradigmatically identified different worlds among advanced capitalist democracies in terms of the different values attached to the role of government. He identified three ideological camps: social democratic (Nordic), conservative (continental Europe and Japan), and liberal (Great Britain and the United States). Borre and Scarborough (1995) found similar patterns across west European democracies. Although these differences are not quite across civilizations, they have civilizational colorings. After all, capitalism has many civilizational origins even among what Huntington terms the Atlantic civilization.

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The role citizens assign to the government in the three public policy areas—old age pensions, health benefits, and unemployment insurance—roughly parallels the Atlantic schism as revealed by more recent opinions toward America's war against Iraq. Using three survey sources—the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer Survey, and the International Social Survey Program—Mehrtens (2005) confirmed the value foundations of the three capitalisms of Esping-Anderson. He concluded that the public opinion bases of the three capitalisms are mildly strong, particularly between the first two ideological camps of the social democrats and the conservatives (including Japan) and the third camp, the liberals (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States).

Broadening the scope of examination of welfare state attitudes, Staffan Kumlin (in this volume) identifies three areas that promise deeper analysis of welfare state attitudes, that is, general political values, specific policy preferences, and performance evaluations. An impressive list of findings about them has been presented with such factors as social class, self-interest, social justice, and policy feedback causally linked to welfare state attitudes as found mostly in western industrial democracies.

There is less evidence on public opinion toward the role of government outside the western democracies. In comparing nine countries in western Europe and nine (p. 250) countries in East and Southeast Asia, Inoguchi and Wilson (forthcoming) find that Asians expect the government to play strong roles in the provision of welfare and employment just like Europeans and that Asians are no less inclined to give priority to economic growth at the expense of the environment.

In sum, the question of whether there are clear regional/civilizational differences in these orientations toward government must be answered with the combination of strong empirical evidence and mild skepticism of some of the clichés such as Asian values.

6 Globalization and Confidence in Democracy

Democracy, in general, and confidence in democracy, in particular, have been discussed and examined primarily in the context of nation-states at the domestic level (Klingemann and Fuchs 1997; Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999, 2002; and Dalton 2004; see Shin in this volume). However, the momentous tide of globalization (Held et al. 2003) has introduced a new dimension to democracy research, and support for democracy represents a basic cultural divide in Huntington's model.

The deepening of globalization seems to affect how researchers conceptualize democracy. Globalization fragments the national economy throughout the world. Those units with competitive niches rise whereas those units without such niches decline. All the former unite. Globalization reintegrates those units with competitive niches (Rosenau 2003). The fragmenting effects on democratic governance have led some, such as Guehennot (1999), to argue that globalization undermines the foundation of democracy by fragmenting the national electorates and bringing external global market forces to bear on how territorially bounded democracy functions. Guehennot has gone so far as to declare that democracy

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will end, hence his title, *La Fin de la democratie*. Comparing the democratic choice leaders made out of authoritarianism in Latin America in earlier times and more recently, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argued that the sound assessment and judgment of leaders of democratization make a difference.

This mode of explanation sounds very much like that of rational choice theory. Its key words are uncertainty, choice, and key individual actors. O'Donnell and Schmitter claimed that instead of focusing on plantation landlords, the military, foreign capital, and the working class, the focus should be on the calculus of leaders placed under extraordinary uncertainty in judging the prospects for democracy. Their mode of explanation has been altered dramatically. In the past, they argued that certain socioeconomically distinguished classes represented themselves in choosing the course of the nation whether they were the military, the working class, the fledgling national middle class, foreign capital, or the plantation owners. In trying to explain (p. 251) the transition to democracy and the subsequent return to authoritarianism and dictatorship, O'Donnell and Schmitter had adopted the sociological class explanation. Now, their explanation is the individualistic rational choice explanation.

In contrast, my suspicion focuses on the deepening of globalization, which has made it more difficult for authors such as O'Donnell and Schmitter to adhere to Moore's (1966) model that sees socioeconomic development leading to democratization. This new scholarly approach is more at ease with the individualistic explanations of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) presumably because the electorates are more atomized into less cohesive groups, which weakens and sometimes eliminates traditional class distinctions. In other words, one attaches increasingly less value to sociologically defined classes like industrial capitalists, plantation owners, workers, or rentiers.

As long as globalization undermines or sustains democracy and those values democracy embodies and enriches, it matters greatly. An empirical question arises: Does globalization promote democratic consolidation? Alternatively, does globalization reduce the effectiveness of democracy? The former argues that with globalization, especially with its increased capital mobility, democracy will be consolidated because it reduces the threat of the elites. The latter argues, as Guehennot does, that the greater capital mobility reduces the scope of collective choice in a democracy.

I formulate (2004) the relationship between globalization and confidence in democratic institutions as follows: the primary independent variables affecting the confidence in domestic institutions are (1) satisfaction with life and politics; (2) beliefs in civic duties, political apathy, antipathy toward politics and beliefs in free competition, government intervention, and government inefficiency; and (3) globalization as experienced in daily life in the contexts of the workplace, family and friends, TV news and entertainment, and other life experiences. The analyses demonstrated that satisfaction with life and with politics and beliefs in politics and the market both affect popular confidence in institutions. Globalization as experienced in daily life situations also exerts a significant negative influence on popular confidence in institutions. Especially noteworthy is the result that globaliza-

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tion tends to undermine the popular confidence in the civil service and the military, the two institutions that serve the state. Those who experience the impact of globalization through the workplace and the internet have greater confidence in domestic institutions such as parliament, law enforcement and the court, and big business. That is, those who experience globalization through their workplace and the internet are adapters to globalization, and are comfortable doing business and appreciate the order and stability maintained by law enforcement and the courts. In contrast, those who experience globalization through family and friends, through TV news and entertainment, and through employment tend to look down on the values of domestic institutions.

In general these findings imply that globalization has diverse effects on nations and individuals, depending on how they are linked to the international system. Sometimes globalization may reinforce trust in national institutions, and, at other times, it will have a negative effect.

(p. 252) 7 In Pursuit of Happiness

John Stuart Mill wrote, “Those only are happy, who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way” (Mill 1989, 117–18). This was a traditional way of looking at happiness before the Enlightenment according to McMahan (2006). The important thing was “being good” rather than “feeling good,” but this changed with the Enlightenment. Influenced by the Enlightenment, the American Founding Fathers made the pursuit of happiness man's “unalienable right.” Perhaps partially because of this legacy, Americans are compelled to think in terms of happiness. Hirschmann (1970) wrote about two Jewish friends who met each other in New York after a long period of not meeting: The one from Germany asked the other living in New York, “How are you?” The New Yorker responded, “I am happy; aber bin ich nicht so glücklich.” Needless to say, not only the Enlightenment, but also the American exceptionalism factor has crept in here (Lipset 1997).

Researchers often raise the question on happiness and its “causes:” Why do some rich people tend to be unhappy despite their high income level, whereas some poor people are happy in spite of their low income level? Does not a high income make one happy? In examining various surveys on happiness and sometimes a little less elusively satisfaction, one often encounters this puzzling question.

In examining the satisfaction level of some Asian countries, Inoguchi and Hotta (2006) discovered that the higher the level of religiosity the higher satisfaction, *ceteris paribus*. Those countries with high percentages of religious Muslim, Hindu, or Hinayana Buddhist populations tend to select the “happy” response, such as India, Uzbekistan, and Myanmar, somewhat irrespective of other seemingly important factors such as income level. Similarly, Inoguchi and Hotta (2006) showed that the higher the per capita income level, the lower the level of satisfaction. High-income countries in Asia—like Japan, South Ko-

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rea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—tend to select the “not very happy” response for whatever reasons.

This pattern is broadly congruent with the global relationship between GNP per capita and survival and well-being (Inglehart and Welzel 2005 468–9; Veenhoven 2006). It appears that the impact of income on happiness declines as gross national product per capita goes up. Beyond a certain threshold of economic development, lifestyle seems to determine the degree of happiness. In learning from the history of happiness as recounted by McMahan (2006), one can only speculate whether religion might not be an opium for the masses, as Karl Marx argued some 150 years ago and as Max Weber argued about the *Entzauberung* a century ago. How much this-worldly value one accords to religion has changed the popular conception of happiness dramatically. In tandem with the diminishing space of other-worldly happiness, the popular conception of happiness has become more vulnerable to the turbulence of this-worldly life (cf. Lane 2000).

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One must hasten to note, however, that asking about happiness or satisfaction in an authoritarian regime is slightly tricky. When internal security is strict and effective, then respondents tend to answer with their personal safety in mind. If the question about happiness or satisfaction is taken as an indicator of respondents' satisfaction with the regime, then they must play safe. In other words, they tend to express more happiness or satisfaction than they truly feel.⁴ Although this scenario is obvious, it is very important to be reminded that the response of happiness and satisfaction has a lot to do with the degree of freedom the regime accords to a society. The AsiaBarometer Survey serves as an ample reminder of the need to be alert to this methodological and interpretive pitfall of survey data in societies that are not quite liberal nor democratic.⁵

8 Conclusion

Values held by citizens are inherently diverse. The clash of values is ubiquitous and observed across civilizations. The clash of values also results in adaptation through times. This chapter has surveyed such a clash of values across civilizations highlighting topics such as the cultural map of the world, religiosity, regional identity, social capital, conceptions on the role of government, globalization and confidence in democratic institutions, and happiness, as revealed mostly in survey data.

The above discussion seems to give empirical and conceptual credence to the title of this chapter (and its key argument), the clash of values across civilizations—not the clash of civilizations. What we have is the human civilization, under which there are subcivilizations such as those identified by Huntington (1996). Furthermore, such subcivilizations do not necessarily clash with each other. The clash takes place at the individual level. When not properly combined nor serendipitously contextualized, some values give rise to the enormous degree of incongruence and disharmony. They give the semblance of civilizational clashes. However, certain structural conditions (p. 254) and contingencies need to

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be identified and examined before we can rush to conclusions about the clash of civilizations.

Nevertheless, a clash of values is empirically identified through survey data. The mildly outlying position of the United States among the G8 countries in the Inglehart and Welzel cultural map of the world seems to give some credence to the Russian argument that the United States is the Neo-Bolsheviks of the twenty-first century, exporting democracy and free market ideologies to the rest of the world. The links between global forces and westernization is a complex topic.

Although the clash-of-civilizations literature has focused on religiosity, we have questioned even the existence of these differences. The AsiaBarometer Survey reveals that different religions can be effectively compared when questions are correctly formulated, and that more comparable patterns across regions appear. Differences exist, but perhaps not as dramatic as prior research has suggested.

The evidence on regional identities also tends to weaken the evidence of broad civilization differences. Regional identities have developed within the European Union. However, the potential drivers of community formation in Asia—China, India, and Japan—have citizens who tend to be the least regionally oriented in terms of their identities. Regional identities are also weak in other parts of the developing world.

A set of social capital questions as asked in the AsiaBarometer Survey has revealed the striking divergence of religious, cultural, and different colonial-historically inculcated conceptions of social capital in ten Asian societies. How people accord similar and dissimilar roles to the government, especially on social welfare, has some ideological and cultural origin among advanced individual democracies, that is, social democratic, conservative, and liberal. How the tide of globalization may alter the map of ideology and policy remains to be empirically and vigorously explored. Of all the subjects examined here, research has devoted the least attention to how globalization affects citizens' confidence in institutions. Asia-Europe Survey data suggest that globalization slightly decreases the confidence in domestic democratic institutions.

Happiness is elusive in the post-Enlightenment society in which the pursuit of happiness in this world is “legitimized” and exposed to the turbulence of this-worldly life. Those who focus on the pursuit of other-worldly happiness seem to respond to the happiness questions most affirmatively.

In conclusion, it may be appropriate to speculate here about the prospects for a culture clash in the future. The culture clash in regional identity may be rising. In tandem with the tide of globalization, the drive to regionalize economies has been on the steady rise in many parts of the world (Katzenstein 2005). Regional identities have been hampered by “big power chauvinism” in regions as well as by both narrower and broader identities. In addition, the culture clash in religiosity may be on the rise. As the physical movement of people has become more frequent and ubiquitous, the culture clash is increasing because people are intermixing more than in the past. At the same time, it seems people, more of-

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ten than not, discover some modus operandi about religion and an ensuing clash. The culture clash in social capital may be (p. 255) increasing also. Business transactions have increased dramatically, which brings more people into contact. Accordingly, culture clashes arise in terms of how business partners and adversaries conceptualize risks. The government's role in social policy is increasingly affected by the tide of globalization despite the tenacity of historically, culturally, and ideologically held beliefs on the role of government. Globalization accelerates the need to make a decision on whether to enhance social safety nets or not, which is bound to initiate culture clashes as well. The culture clash in confidence in democracy is also on the rise. After all, globalization fragments the electorates, organizations, and neighborhoods. Globalization seems to dilute the cohesion and efficacy of democracy as organized in the nation-states. It seems, therefore, at least in the shorter term to be on the rise. The culture clash in happiness is also growing in relation to how one conceptualizes this world and the one after death. As long as other-worldly happiness is retained in one's religious belief, which is often manifested in lower-income societies, one does not bother too much with the turbulence of this-worldly life. Hence the often seen paradox of finding that some low-income societies are full of happy people.

After all, public values are like the DNA of world citizens. Even when the clash of values is empirically observed, one cannot rush to the conclusion about the clash of civilizations. The diversity of values within civilizations is immense. Furthermore, the malleability of values cannot be underestimated as scientific research on the long-term malleability of the DNA has shown. In addition, perhaps most importantly, the clash of values across civilizations takes place only on the given structure and framework that citizens are placed at a certain point in history. Hence, the need is great to be empirically solid and culturally and contextually sensitive in carrying out research in the areas I have addressed in this chapter.

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(1) Researchers have identified a few other such dimensions as the primordial ones: individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede 2000), nationalism versus cosmopolitanism, humanism versus materialism (Lane 2000), and left versus right (see Mair in this volume).

(2) The identity question asked to respondents in some Asian countries is: “People often think about themselves in terms of nationality. If you are asked to think about yourself beyond such an identity, which would be your choice? (a) Asian, (b) Don't identify with any transnational group, (c) Other transnational identity (if yes, please state it), or (d) Don't know.”

(3) As early as 1818, Emperor Jiaqing of the Qing dynasty registered that China is associated with two types of countries. The first type called tributary countries included Vietnam, Korea, and England. The second type called mutually trading countries included the Netherlands, France, and Japan (Inoguchi 2005b). King George III of England sent emissaries laden with gifts to China's Emperor Qianlong in 1793, requesting him to open the ports and the country. As understood by the Chinese Emperor, England acknowledged its tributary status to China.

(4) The AsiaBarometer Surveys have not had problems conducting surveys in non-democratic regimes in Asia. Our strategy is simple: If national teams find an unaccommodatable question, they delete them but retain the rest. This principle does work. If you ask about confidence in institutions in some countries, you might be able to ask the question only when you delete a certain number of institutions. For example, in Myanmar the military regime is not interested in respondents being asked about their confidence in the military. Similarly, in Brunei the constitution stipulates that the King is the sole political actor, therefore, asking about respondents' confidence in institutions other than the monarch would be very awkward. What emerges from the AsiaBarometer Surveys is a clear picture of the relationship between freedom and confidence in government. In simple terms, the less freedom, the higher the confidence in government, *ceteris paribus*.

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(5) Gallup international's Ijaz Gilani (2006) seems to be liable to this pitfall in measuring democracy score by taking an average of percentages of respondents who were positive about the following two questions: (1) elections in my country are held freely and fairly and (2) the rule in my country is by the will of the people.

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