Japanese Journal of Political Science

http://journals.cambridge.org/JJP

Additional services for *Japanese Journal of Political Science:*

Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here

The AsiaBarometer: Its Aim, Its Scope, Its Strength

TAKASHI INOGUCHI

How to cite this article:
TAKASHI INOGUCHI (2004). The AsiaBarometer: Its Aim, Its Scope, Its Strength. Japanese
Journal of Political Science, 5, pp 179-196 doi:10.1017/S1468109904001392

Request Permissions : Click here

RESEARCH NOTES

The AsiaBarometer: Its Aim, Its Scope, Its Strength

TAKASHI INOGUCHI
University of Tokyo

Abstract

The Asia Barometer was launched on 6 May 2003 with an international symposium held at the University of Tokyo. It was executed in ten Asian societies in summer 2003. With the first AsiaBarometer survey data in their hands, Asian social scientists got together at the University of Tokyo in January 2004 to present and discuss their papers and discuss the second AsiaBarometer survey to be conducted in summer 2004. In March 2004 discussion papers came out from the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. By the end of 2004 the AsiaBarometer Sourcebook will come out also. This research note summarizes the AsiaBarometer's aims, scope and strength.

1 Introduction

The AsiaBarometer represents the largest ever, comparative survey in Asia, covering East, Southeast, South and Central Asia. The AsiaBarometer is not the only survey done in Asia. The Social Weather Stations (Guerrero, 2003) in Manila have been conducting social surveys continuously for the last two decades. Then in the wake of third wave democratization (Huntington, 1991; Inoguchi and Ahn, forthcoming) in East and Southeast Asia a number of democracy barometers were born. The Korea Democracy Barometers (Shin, 2003), the East Asia Democracy Barometers (Chu, 2003) are the most well known along with various other democracy barometers (Diamond, 2003). Needless to say, the Global Democracy Barometers led by Richard Rose have been available since the end of the Cold War (Rose, 2003). The oldest, global World Values Surveys, led by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1997; Inglehart and Norris, 2003), have been in existence since the 1960s.

The AsiaBarometer distinguishes itself from many others in that it focuses on the daily lives of ordinary people; it is not primarily about values or democracy. It is primarily about how ordinary people live their life with their worries, angers, desires, and dreams. It focuses secondarily on their relationships with family, neighborhood, workplace, social and political institutions, and market place. In short, it is a survey based on the principle of bottom up rather than that of top down. Bottom up in the sense of adopting the down-to-earth perspective (Rose, 1989).

Most importantly, however, the AsiaBarometer is fundamentally different from other Asia barometers; the Social Weather Stations barometers, the Korea Democracy Barometers and the East Asia Democracy Barometers all originated from the Third Wave democratization of the last quarter of the last century, in such countries as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. In contrast, the AsiaBarometer originates from genuine academic interest in the daily lives, views, and sentiments of ordinary people in Asia, as registered in survey data. I was shocked to find its paucity when I was writing about the research infrastructure for social and behavioral sciences in Asia for the *International Encyclopaedia for Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Inoguchi, 2002b). The very dynamic and divergent nature of daily lives in Asia in an era of globalization needs to be registered and subjected to systemic empirical analysis. As someone who has studied a few Asian languages, including Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Indonesian (along with Japanese, my native tongue, English, French, German, and Russian), it was quite natural for me to come up with the idea of the AsiaBarometer. Furthermore, the AsiaBarometer idea has been successfully tested in another form as the Asia–Europe survey on globalization and the political cultures of democracy. This project conducted an 18 country survey, nine in Asia and nine in Europe in 2000 (Inoguchi, 2003a). This survey has reinforced the critical need to conduct surveys in a regular form.

The AsiaBarometer distinguishes itself from many others in that it makes utmost efforts to be sensitive to cultures and languages. First, focus groups are conducted where deemed necessary. Second, the English language questionnaire and the questionnaires in local languages are thoroughly compared and discussed, including those familiar with both. Third, local academics participate in questionnaire formulation and data analysis. In short, the AsiaBarometer tries to be culturally fluent as a whole.

More operationally, the AsiaBarometer is headquartered at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. It is funded by a number of sources: business firms, the University of Tokyo, the Ministry of Education and Science, and a few foundations. Its surveys are conducted by the Gallup International networks coordinated by the Nippon Research Center. Its predecessor, the Asia–Europe Survey, an 18-country survey, was conducted in 2000, covering nine Asian countries in East and Southeast Asia with focus on norms and values. The AsiaBarometer is a direct and extended successor to the Asia–Europe Survey with a shift in focus from norms and values in the Eurasian Continent to the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia. Some results of the Asia–Europe Survey have been published in English and in Japanese, although its definitive products are yet to be published in a couple of year's time (Blondel and Inoguchi, 2002; Blondel and Inoguchi, forthcoming; Blondel et al., forthcoming; Inoguchi, 2003a, 2004 Inoguchi, Tanaka and Dadabaev, forthcoming). The AsiaBarometer is to be conducted every year in 20 countries in East, Southeast, South and Central Asia at least for the next ten years. It is an ambitious project. It is also a project worth undertaking.

In what follows I will outline first the rationale and promises of the AsiaBarometer; second, I will discuss three principles of questionnaire formulation, which the

AsiaBarometer wants to observe as much as possible; third, I will summarize the questions by four clusters; fourth, I will touch briefly on the latest developments of the AsiaBarometer surveys for 2003 and 2004. Lastly, I will discuss briefly how the AsiaBarometer gauges three potentials of Asia: development, democratic and regionalizing.

2   Rationale and promises of the AsiaBarometer

Intra-regional interactions in Asia have been deepening and broadening much faster than anticipated (Inoguchi 2002a). Interdependence has progressed considerably in the economic sphere, especially in manufacturing. Reciprocal market entry has become quite active in the service sector as well. Japanese *anime* now dominate the Asian animated film market, and in 2003 *Spirited Away*, an animation film, earned an Oscar award. Korean kimchi has emerged as the top-selling type of pickled food in many Japanese supermarkets.

A similar trend can be seen in the world of politics. Two decades ago, summit talks between Japanese and other Asian leaders occurred only once or twice a year. But by 2000 such meetings had increased 20-fold. There has been a dramatic increase in the level of interaction among Asian political leaders. Representatives of countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations now gather for as many as 300 meetings a year at various levels.

There is no denying that this broadening and tightening of regional interdependence in Asia has benefited both individual countries and the region as a whole. This is corroborated by the region's economic development and relative stability in recent years. To promote further regional growth and engender greater mutual benefits, however, there must also be closer contact in the field of scholarship. Unfortunately, Asia suffers from a decisive lack of a strategy to build a common academic infrastructure (Inoguchi, 2002b). What sort of an intellectual framework would be useful?

A handy model is the Eurobarometer, an ongoing series of large-scale surveys of public opinion within the European Union. I advocate establishing the Asian equivalent – the AsiaBarometer. It is important, however, to stress one major difference between them. The AsiaBarometer is run not by an inter-governmental organization such as the European Union, but by non-governmental academics. This, I am convinced, would not only result in huge advances in scholarly research in Asia, but also make some contributions to indirectly helping to bring about economic prosperity and political stability.

2.1   Knowledge begets prosperity

First let us consider how a regional survey of public opinion would benefit businesses. Opinion polls generally gather information, albeit limited, about the socioeconomic background of respondents, including such items as age, gender, occupation, education, income, and family. And it is possible to use them anonymously to collect information about people's values and norms, along with their outlook on

a variety of basic subjects, such as life and death, work, the family, society, politics, science and technology, gender and international affairs. Knowing better under certain conditions begets trust and social capital, which in turn became a foundation of wealth accumulation (Fukuyama, 1997; Inoguchi, 2002c).

A system of regional surveys covering topics like these would make it possible for companies to assemble basic data on income levels, consumer preferences, and lifestyles with which to formulate strategies for product development, manufacturing, and marketing and to identify the scale and location of target markets. Such an informational infrastructure would surely be a boon to business companies in East and Southeast Asia, many of which have been frustrated by the sluggish domestic economy and yet remain stuck in it because they do not have a good grasp of markets elsewhere in Asia.

The results could be used for analyses that go beyond country-by-country breakdowns to consider region-wide patterns, based on income level, city size, occupation, generation, age group, lifestyle, level of awareness about environmental and human rights issues, and so forth. Eventually such surveys would enable companies to look at the entire region as a single large market.

One potential stumbling block could be the difficulty of accessing the data. Opinion polls are already conducted in many Asian countries, but the ideas, facilities, and services for sharing the results have yet to be developed more fully.

When we consider Asia's increasingly high-income levels and mostly robust economic growth, it is remarkable how few social data are available concerning the entire Asian region as a whole. Needless to say, there have been similar attempts but sparingly more limited including Yun-han Chu's *East Asia Barometer* and Doh Chull Shin's *Korean Barometer*, both focusing on democracy and democratization. Much the same applies to Japan where the results of costly opinion surveys are generally used just once and then discarded. There has, to be sure, been a sharp rise in the number of surveys that are administered periodically in Japan and whole results are publicly disclosed, such as the Japanese General Social Surveys (Osaka University of Commerce and University of Tokyo, 2002), but even these are marred by the fact that virtually all of them are terminated before very long and that the facilities and services to enable shared use of the results remain to be vigorously consolidated.

A foundation for enduring regional prosperity could be built if such shortcomings in the availability of social data could be overcome in Asia as a whole. North America and Western Europe have gone ahead in this regard. The strength of many Western corporate brands is testimony to the merits of having a vast storehouse of data. An accurate grasp of consumer preferences and lifestyles in Asia as a whole will enable the accurate targeting of potential markets. And this should turn Japanese and other Asian firms into even more dynamic, enterprising, and creative entities. The merits of having access to reliable, annually updated facts about a vast market are immeasurable.

Suppose a manufacturer wants to develop a product integrating the functions of a mobile phone, calculator, television set, camera, voice recorder, security device, and car

navigator. What sort of potential customers should it target in terms of income bracket, occupational category, and age group? And how large a market should it anticipate? These questions can be hard to answer accurately, but with the AsiaBarometer, a set of common region-wide questions could be formulated to obtain the required information.

The weather forecasts aired on NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) still tend to focus entirely or largely on Japan. Will it rain in Beijing this afternoon? How hot will it be in Bangkok tomorrow? The Japanese network apparently thinks that its viewers have little interest in knowing the answers to such question. This is in sharp contrast to the weather reports on CNN, for instance, which provide forecasts for major cities all around the world. This US-based cable news network is sensitive to the changing needs of its business audience. For example, in 1996, when sources indicated that the US government was on the verge of announcing a partial lifting of its embargo on Cuba, CNN responded the next day by adding Havana to its worldwide weather forecasts.

In an age of globalization, with the pace of business activities accelerating all around the world, the merits of conducting region-wide social surveys regularly every year should not be underestimated.

2.2 Knowledge engenders stability

The benefits of a regular series of public opinion surveys would go beyond the promotion of economic prosperity. The knowledge obtained from such surveys would also serve as the foundation for greater regional stability. A shared regional perception of how the world is changing would facilitate adaptation to such changes, and this could minimize social upheaval and disintegration. A common perception could also gradually spawn a sense of Asian identity, promoting sentiments of belonging, of ownership, and of attachment toward the region. Furthermore, an increasingly common perception may in the long run foster minimally shared norms and values, such as of democracy and human rights (Putnam, 1993; Inoguchi, 2002c). Such a shared perception can play an important role in the context of globalization, which is sowing pockets of instability in countries around the world.

While globalization has the effect of raising overall income levels, it also tends to leave certain individuals, groups, communities, nations, and regions outside the circle of prosperity and push them to the brink of collapse. The concept of global governance has been created as a way of containing these negative consequences of globalization. This refers to efforts aimed at building a global framework – in the absence of a world government – to ensure a certain degree of rule of law, transparency, and accountability, so as to enable individuals to pursue their own safety, happiness, and fulfillment (Inoguchi and Bacon, 2003).

In order for global governance to function properly, there must be healthy arrangements for the disclosure of information. The AsiaBarometer would, up to a point, serve as a tool for gathering and disclosing information on key topics in this connection, such as the extent to which the rule of law is working to prevent crime and

corruption and the objectives and policies according to which businesses, governments, and other socially significant organizations are operating. An accumulation of data gathered regularly every year on a common set of questions throughout Asia would be extremely significant.

Even governments have a hard time accurately ascertaining what citizens think of their policies both because of and despite their policies. The AsiaBarometer operated by an academic, third-party organization could be of great help to them. Some governments might be disinclined to accept the results of opinion polls conducted by a third-party organization, but in most cases it should be possible to overcome their objections by adjusting wordings of questions and other aspects of the survey methodology. Regularly gathered survey results could, moreover, help eliminate the suspicions that states are liable to harbor about other countries; in other words, the AsiaBarometer could serve as a disarming instrument. This is another advantage of having the surveys conducted by a third-party, academic organization.

2.3 Contribution to scholarship

Finally, and most importantly, there are two major ways in which the AsiaBarometer would have significant consequences for academic research. The first would be to dramatically increase the use of data from Asia in the social sciences. There has been an overwhelming tendency to use data originating from Western countries because of the wealth and ease of use of such information; the AsiaBarometer would help correct this imbalance.

The second would be to raise the standards of social scientific research in Asia to levels comparable with those in the United States and Western Europe, since opinion polls constitute a powerful tool of empirical social science. There are four conditions that must be met for the results of such surveys to be of value to researchers (Inoguchi, 1995, 2002d). These are (1) a reasonable level of political freedom and democracy; (2) a sizable corps of researchers espousing shared academic values; (3) adequate infrastructure to support academic research, including specialist staff and the necessary physical facilities and equipment at universities and research institutes; and (4) a widely accepted system of evaluating academic performance that affects researcher's conduct. These conditions are in the process of being met in increasingly many Asian countries.

How, specifically, could the AsiaBarometer contribute to scholarship? Two positive consequences should emerge from periodically asking the same set of questions throughout Asia and turning the results into a database of essential information widely available to empirical researchers.

The first is that a vast range of Asian social phenomena would become objects of comparative research. Such research up to now has focused on Western countries because of the ready availability of a large pool of data necessary for empirical research in the social sciences – including basic statistics like those for population, occupation, and income; the results of public opinion surveys; and the findings of experiments in

social psychology. These countries are way ahead in the scope of their databases in these areas; furthermore, the data are accessible to researchers all around the world.

Sadly, little progress has been achieved toward creating such databases in Japan and other Asian countries, and both the idea of and mechanisms for disseminating data to foreign researchers have been lacking with some notable exceptions. This represents a failure to meet our responsibilities as global citizens. It shows that our gaze has been focused just till recently on our own countries; we have been paying too little attention to trends in other societies and other regions and among humankind in general. This is why we have not developed mechanisms for sharing our data with the rest of the world. An Asian polling institution would greatly broaden the region's intellectual horizons.

The second anticipated consequence is an increase in scholarly research based on a shared awareness of issues (as expressed in the shared list of questions), resulting in a fuller body of scientific knowledge. Surveys targeted just at Japan tend to zero in redundantly often on the complexity or distinctiveness of our country's social structure, political behavior, economic system, or whatever, diminishing the possibility of coming up with propositions that can be generalized beyond just Japan. It is comparative surveys – with such countries as China, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Singapore, Pakistan, South Korea, India, Tajikistan, and Thailand – that are likely to produce propositions that can be generalized across the entire region. Many such findings have been generated for the United States and Western Europe. The polling organization could contribute by triggering a quest for a similar body of knowledge in Asia.

Japan's social scientists would benefit greatly by working together with their Asian colleagues, rather than keeping to themselves. For one thing, they would see their works being cited with far greater frequency in the Social Sciences Citation Index. As a forerunner, the Ministry of Education in South Korea has instructed that the Social Science Citation Index be a most important criterion for decisions on hiring and promotion. Observations of social phenomena in Asia could beget new hypotheses and enrich the world's body of scientific knowledge. Findings from an isolated Far Eastern island nation, however remarkable they may be, are unlikely to attract much international attention as long as they are seen as emanating from a peculiar 'outlier.'

The need for a common Asian polling organization is also evident if we consider the historical development of the social sciences in the United States and Europe. The first step in the process by which US social sciences achieved their current position of overwhelming dominance dates back to World War II, when Samuel Stouffer *et al.* (1945) surveyed morale among US soldiers. The second step was the creation of the Institute of Social Research (Featherman, 2003) and of a consortium led by the University of Michigan to enable the sharing of survey results. With these, empirical social scientific research took root in the United States. The third step was the establishment and development of scholarly journals (like the *American Political Science Review* and many other reputed journals) to serve as vehicles or the publication of researchers' finding

and these based on a strict system of anonymous peer review (Farr and Seidelman, 1993; Oren, 2003). Developing the social sciences in Asia will require a similar three-stage process.

Europe followed a pattern like that of the United States starting in the 1970s. First, the European Community launched the Eurobarometer surveys with Jean-Jacques Rubier's creative leadership. Second, the European Consortium for Political Research was set up under the leadership of University of Essex Professor Jean Blondel (now a professor emeritus at the European University Institute) (Blondel, 2003). And third, the *British Journal of Political Science* was launched – edited by another University of Essex professor, Anthony King – and developed into a leading voice of political research in Europe. Slightly later, the European Consortium for Political Research started to publish its own journal, *European Journal of Political Research*, and more lately another journal, *European Journal of International Relations*.

2.4   Building on existing foundations in Japan

Where does Japan stand? Opinion polls have existed for around four decades, and there is a vast accumulation of data (Kojima, 1977). Political research is already at a rather high level (Inoguchi, 2002d). There is, moreover increasing awareness of the need for data sharing with other researchers, although the mechanisms to enable such sharing remain to be vigorously consolidated. Some attempts have been made to manage the survey data, and joint-use services remain to be dramatically improved. A large bulk of data amassed over the past 40 years has been left to pile up in an *ad hoc* fashion without being fully used by other researchers.

One bright spot is the start in 2000 of the *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (of which I am the editor), published in English twice a year by Cambridge University Press, followed by the *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (of which I am the editor), published in English twice a year by Oxford University Press. And various other scholarly periodicals are being created or expanded in Asia. In addition to the above journals, whose editorial offices are located at the University of Tokyo, there is also the *Journal of East Asia Studies* (launched in 2001, with Kim Byung-Kook as the editor, published by Lynne Rienner). And in 2003 the Asian Political and International Studies Association was established; it is to publish a journal of its own from editorial offices in the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore with Amitav Acharya as editor.

The time is ripening. Having been engaged in empirical political science for the past 30 years, I have often been struck by the unnaturally large disparity between the accumulated wealth of empirical research in Japanese political science and Japan's woefully minimal international presence in the discipline. This has been a source of personal vexation as a political scientist working in Japan. The establishment of an Asian polling organization would not only make a major contribution to the Asian region as a whole but also help rectify the unnatural position Japanese political science finds itself in today (Inoguchi, 2002a).

3   Principles of questionnaire formulation

Having provided the rationale and the promise of the AsiaBarometer, I now turn to its principles of questionnaire formation. They are summarized by the following three points:

Principle 1: opinion polls cannot penetrate people's minds by being excessively obtrusive.

Principle 2: opinion polls cannot focus too much on the peripheral concerns of ordinary people.

Principle 3: opinion polls can be most illuminating when they are re-casted and examined with deft use of Przeworsky and Teune's (1972) two contrasting research designs.

3.1   Minimum unobtrusiveness

When opinion polls are so often used for marketing, journalistic, academic and policy purposes, one tends to forget one important thing: that they are intrinsically obtrusive to potential interviewees (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). A number of adaptations have been observed to cope with the need to reduce obtrusiveness and to enhance sensitivity while not compromising too much on capturing with as much precision as possible what interviewees have in mind. Here clearly, the need for cultural fluency cannot be overstressed, especially in attempts like the AsiaBarometer. Five examples are mentioned briefly to illustrate this point.

(1)   When you are asked how rich or poor you are, some tend to portray themselves as poorer than they really are. If you say you are rich and if that becomes known to others, you are bound to attract jealousy or even to attract tax authorities to tax you more, or, in worst cases, to attract burglars. Hence you tend to say that you are somewhere in the middle. Yanjie Bian's work (1994) on Chinese response proclivity seems to point to the basic correctness of this concern.

(2)   When you are asked how happy or unhappy you are, some tend to portray themselves as happier than they really are. If you say you are unhappy, you feel bad because you have been socialized to say happy in the United States. Hirschmann (1970) registers the subtle yet substantial difference between different linguistic cultures. Two Jews, one American, and the other German, ran into each other at New York after a long separation. The former asked the latter, 'How are you?' The latter replied, 'I am happy, aber bin ich nicht so gluecklich.' In the United States, you have been socialized to say happy since, after all, America is a free country with abundant opportunities.

(3)   When you are asked how strongly you are favorably disposed to the view that men are born unequal, you tend to hide yourself in the middle category, since you do not want to let your view of this kind of proposition be known even to your interviewee. The exceedingly high percentage of Japanese respondents to shoot at the middle response is the case in point. In contrast, I surmise that the majority

of interviewers in the United States and Western Europe, being politically correct, respond unfavorably to this question.

(4) When you are asked what is your primary identity, the majority point to their national identity. For instance, 96–98% of Koreans or Thais point to their respective national identity as their primary identity (Inoguchi, 2002e). But some 30% of Japanese replied that they have never thought about it, that they do not bother thinking about it, or that they do not care to answer the question. It may be that Japanese feel more reluctant to answer a context-free question like that than many other peoples (Inoguchi, 2002c).

(5) When you are asked how much confidence you have in the government leader, whether he/she is prime minister or president, some tend to reply very positively. American and British tended to reply to the question very positively till sometime in the 1960s. The standard answer was that their political culture is a truly democratic civic culture a la Almond and Verba (1962). I have a less sanguine view of the American and British political cultures in that they contained those cultural streaks that are best characterized as more authoritarian, more conformist, more strongly socialized to be patriotic at least before the 1970s than Almond and Verba wanted to make us believe. This characterization may be more consistent with Huntington's characterization of America's polity as an essentially Tudor polity (Huntington, 1981).

3.2   Minimum oddness

It is too easily forgotten to social scientists who play with high sounding norms and abstract concepts that the daily lives of ordinary people are central to them and that politics and economics, let alone international affairs, are peripheral. Bombarding interviewees with barrages of questions, the vocabulary of which tends to be odd, strange, abstract, alien, incomprehensible, eerie, or weird at least to bumi putra, the sons of the soil, does not help survey designers to obtain the information they want to tap. This type of concern is terribly important when interviewees are not necessarily exposed to social science-related questions, which is the case by 99%. This concern has led the AsiaBarometer to focus more on the daily lives and concerns of ordinary people and then from these to shift to ask more peripheral questions like democracy and government performance. No less important is the way in which interviewing is undertaken. Whereas in the United States it is common for interviewers to ask interviewees by telephone, it is not common in the rest of the world. Face-to-face interviews are essential. In Russia, it is normal for interviewees to answer their responses at a place where interviewees assemble, probably because, to be interviewed at home, an interviewer has to be brought inside the apartment, an act that is often regarded as potentially inviting a criminal into the home. In Malaysia, it is common to respond to questions outside the door of the house but inside the outer door over which there is no roof. Under this circumstance it is simply odd to respond to questions one after another for more than an hour, the meaning of which is too remote to the daily lives

of ordinary people. The need to be sensitive to differences in survey culture cannot be over stressed.

3.3   Most similar/most dissimilar systems comparisons

By posing most similar/most dissimilar systems comparisons, I do not mean that the AsiaBarometer has adopted this or that design along the line of the methodological advice of Przeworsky and Teune (1972). The AsiaBarometer is designed to cover the entire region of Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. It is a huge region of diversity. It covers a vast area from Tokyo to Tashkent, from Jakarta to Islamabad, from Beijing to Colombo. As a regional barometer, the AsiaBarometer will be the largest in geographical coverage and least homogeneous in terms of key regional features, such as lingua franca, colonial heritage, per capita income level, regime characteristics, or social capital. Within each of the four sub-regions, many sub-regional characteristics might be more similar, while retaining a huge diversity within one society such as China or India. The point I am trying to make is that being conscious of similarity/dissimilarity at or across national, sub-regional or regional levels, one can tap more interesting features, such as the growing regionalism within each sub-region (Acharya, 2002; Ravenhill, 2001; Solingen, 1998) or globalization's fragmenting effects within each national unit (Held *et al.*, 2002) in terms of per capita income level or lifestyle or something else.

To sum it all, the AsiaBarometer tries to be as interviewee friendly and culturally sensitive as possible and to give analysts more scope and space for cross-level and cross-national examinations.

4   Four distinctive clusters of questions

4.1   Daily lives of ordinary people

Recording daily lives of ordinary people is placed centrally in the questionnaire (Rose, 1989). The idea behind this is that without trying hard to comprehend even a modicum of their daily lives, it would be less productive than otherwise to register the array of social scientists' concerns about their norms, values, identities, their relationship to society and political action, and beliefs tend to be treated rather superficially. Therefore it would be much more rewarding and productive to base social scientists' interest on daily lives of ordinary people. It is not that daily lives determine the norms, beliefs, and actions of ordinary people. To ordinary people, the society and public policy, the economy and politics are things normally far far away from their central concerns. True, their daily lives are overshadowed by economic conditions, social configurations, political institutions, and public policy, but they do not constitute the core of their life. Asking questions one after another about their peripheral concerns, that is those affairs they are not much interested in, is not the best way to understand them. Daily lives of ordinary people must be understood as they are first. This point must be stressed in Asia for two reasons: first, Asia is full

of diversity; second, Asia changes fast. There is no other region in the world that is more diverse and fast changing. Asking about daily lives of ordinary people first plays another role. These questions would make it presumably easier for them to answer than those questions about matters more peripheral to them. Daily lives of ordinary people are important furthermore, to be asked and answered in comparative settings. Even where social surveys are conducted frequently in a national setting, they tend to have no comparative scope. In many Asian societies, social surveys have been conducted rather frequently for the last quarter of a century. But survey research infrastructure within and across countries has been unabashedly underdeveloped in much of Asia. Despite the mushrooming surveys in Asia, such as the Social Weather Stations headquartered in the Philippines (Guerrero, 2003), the Korea Barometers headquartered in South Korea (Shin, 2003), the East Asia Barometers headquartered in Taiwan (Chu, 2003), and this AsiaBarometer headquartered in Japan, covering various parts of Asia, archiving and consortium building across and beyond Asia has not been well-developed. Registering periodically the daily lives of ordinary people in Asia over years, I hope, would trigger the development of social survey and more broadly empirically oriented social science infrastructure in Asia (Featherman, 2003; Inoguchi, 2002b).

4.2   Perceptions and assessments of their lives

How ordinary people perceive their own lives is very important in itself and in terms of its ramifications to public policy, the role of central government, confidence in institutions etc. How they place their standard of living on the rich–poor continuum, how happy they are with their life, how satisfied they are with their life, what is their life style (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), what are their daily worries, what are their desires and ambitions, what are their deprivations and frustrations – these questions are central to ordinary people as well as others. Their answers to these questions constitute the core of their lives. From building on the daily lives of ordinary people comes the perception and assessment of ordinary people's concerns and the relations to the larger social entities, such as patriotism and confidence in government performance (Inoguchi, 2003b, 2003d). Since social surveys have been developed mostly in the United States and Western Europe in the latter half of the last century (Featherman, 2001), these perceptions and assessments of ordinary people about their lives and their relationships to the larger social entities have tended to be examined in relation to conducting democratic politics, such as voting and elections (Miller *et al.*, 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1976; Watanuki and Miyake, 1997; Miyake, 1985; Kabashima, 1998). But democratic or otherwise, this cluster of questions is primordial in seeing how they relate to the larger society. These are not just to explain the types of voting behavior and election outcomes.

4.3   Relationships of their lives to the larger social entities

How do ordinary people relate themselves to the larger society? This is what political scientists and sociologists are most eager to ask questions about. After all, it is

not sufficient to relate, for instance, individual economic satisfaction with government support. At least their confidence in government must be placed in the equation linking individual economic satisfaction with government support (Hibbs, 1993). The crux of the matter is how they relate to the larger society. In a similar vein, it is not sufficient to relate individual economic deprivation to anti-Americanism. One needs to bring in how national, ethnic and religious identity is configured in the equation linking economic deprivation and anti-Americanism. In another similar vein, it is not sufficient to relate individual religiosity to preference for non-democracy. One needs to take into account economic deprivation and psychological apprehension at least in the equation linking religiosity and non-democratic preference.

4.4   Norms, beliefs, value preferences, and actions

Norms, beliefs, value preferences, and actions are those pet concerns of political scientists and sociologists. Social surveys are a most convenient research instrument to use to examine these concerns. Hence the accumulation of extensive work on these, examined in the context of democratic politics (Katznelson and Miller, 2002). These concerns are easiest to investigate in a democratic society, but not necessarily in a non-democratic society. Asking about confidence in government is tricky in many societies. In Malaysia and Singapore, for instance, confidence in government is the highest, whereas in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, confidence in government is the lowest in East and Southeast Asia according to the Asia-Europe Survey conducted in 2000 (Inoguchi, 2003d). In the former societies, it is not easy for interviewees to respond to a question negatively, as they have been socialized for so long not to express views and preferences on politics. They might be suspicious that their responses might be relayed to the security apparati of a society. Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese exhibit symptoms of disaffected democracies, and are most grumpy about democracy of all the democracies in the world (Inoguchi, 2003b, 2004; Pharr and Putnam, 1999). Even in a democratic society like the United States and the United Kingdom, what seems to be occasionally extreme conformism and patriotism has been registered in surveys conducted in the 1950s and 1960s (Almond and Verba, 1962). By conformism I mean conformism to the belief that the United States is a great established democracy, as contrasted to a democracy in the making (Burnham, 1986). By patriotism I mean the swift and solid rally around the flag once war looms large. Having a continuum of democracy in Asia from non-democracy to established democracies, caution cannot be overstressed in comparing responses across societies.

5   Harvesting the AsiaBarometer 2003 Survey and Planting the AsiaBarometer 2004 Survey

The AsiaBarometer was first conducted in summer 2003 in 10 countries, Uzbekistan, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, China, Korea and

Japan. The AsiaBarometer sourcebook will be published containing the descriptions of its aims and scope, fieldwork report, questionnaire, all the basic figures (tabulated and cross-tabulated) on all the questions surveyed, links, and references. It will be published in 2004 as a sister volume to the sourcebook of the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys combined and co-edited by Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basanez and their associates by Siglo XXI editors for distribution, with Quality Global Research editing, formatting and undertaking all other preparation (Inoguchi, Basanez and Dadabaev and Hotta, forthcoming; Inglehart, Basanez et al., 2003). The survey was a nationwide survey in principle. But for some countries like China and India only some big cities were surveyed. For countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the Java island and the peninsular Malaysia were surveyed excluding the non-Java Indonesia and the eastern Malaysia. Each sample size was 800 and the sampling method was a multi-stage random sampling in principle with some notable exceptions. Also it was done by a face-to-face interviewing except in Japan. All the expenditures were covered by business donations to the University of Tokyo for this purpose. The AsiaBarometer 2003 Survey was carried out by the Gallup International coalition led by the Nippon Research Center.

After cleaning-up and integrating the assembled data from the ten countries, the AsiaBarometer 2003 data set was sent to prospective authors of country profile and comparative papers drawn from academics of the ten countries, to examine and analyze the data set for presentation and discussion at the AsiaBarometer conference. The AsiaBarometer conference was held on January 14–15, 2004 at the University of Tokyo with academics bringing their papers. Their revised papers came out subsequently as Discussion Papers of the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo in March 2004. These papers are to be included in the afore-mentioned volume (Inoguchi, Basanez et al., forthcoming). In conjunction with the AsiaBarometer conference, an open symposium was held also. It drew wide attention region-wide. Not only Japanese, but also Korean, Sri Lankan and Malaysian newspapers and TVs reported about the AsiaBarometer. It must be noted that for access to the data set, open access will be made possible when it is accepted by two data consortiums, the Social Science Data Archives of the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

On the basis of the success of the AsiaBarometer 2003 Survey, its 2004 survey has decided to focus on Southeast Asia, receiving the basic funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other countries will be added for its 2004 survey once such funding is secured. Like its 2003 survey, it will hold the AsiaBarometer conference and symposium early in 2005. After the cleaning-up and integration of the data assembled from surveyed countries, country profile and comparative papers will be drafted, presented and discussed in its annual conference and symposium. A similar annual source book will be published like the preceding volume for 2003. A similar donation of the data set will be done similarly as in for the 2003 data set.

6   Gauging developmental, democratic and regionalizing potentials

It would be most appropriate to give thoughts on the future of Asia, as the AsiaBarometer is to measure many things in people's minds and hearts. It is my conviction that conducting the AsiaBarometer every year in all parts of Asia would enable us to gauge Asia's potential of economic development, democratization, and regional integration. In this last section I will give my thoughts to each on the three potentials of Asia in the next half a century.

Economic development in Asia has a vast future. Only in various parts of Asia, most importantly in the coastal East, Southeast, and South Asia has economic development achieved self-sustained momentum. Tangible fruits of self-sustained economic development affect merely some 10 percent of the total population of Asia. Two giants, China and India, have a long way to go before they can declare that they have reached their self-sustained and mature developmental stage. Vast population and vast space pose a formidable challenge to any engineer of economic development of China and India. Even what looks more manageable, as in continental Southeast Asia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, huge investments are needed before one can talk about self-sustained and mature economic development. Some optimists like Andre Gunder Frank (1998) optimistically talk about the coming historic shift of global economic weight to the Orient notwithstanding, Asia's economic developmental potential is huge and thus challenging. What is a more visible turning point in terms of an economic developmental take-off stage? In my view, one's desire to purchase a refrigerator in the near future and one's recent acquisition of a refrigerator seem to be a most accurate and convenient indicator of things to come. Food purchasing tends to take a lot of time. No less tangible changes can be detected by the steady increase in the sale of disposable diapers. Use of cloth diapers takes away too much precious time from a mother, a second and indispensable household earner.

Democratization in Asia has a long way to go. Two largest and longest non-Western democracies, Japan and India aside, many remain to be more deeply democratized even in the democratic corridor of coastal East and Southeast Asia. Continental East and Southeast Asia and most of South and Central Asia need far more time before they are democratized. Take China as an example. One can wait patiently believing that once per capita national income goes beyond a certain threshold, democracy is bound to come. Alternatively the Gorbachev syndrome may work. During a transition period the failure to make its policy transparent and accountable to the public like in the case of SARS disease in 2003 would make this process faster. A likely collapse of an accumulating bubble of the Chinese economy in the aftermath of the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 would make it much faster. At any rate, in my view, one tangible indicator of democratization in the initial stage is the reverse of two contrasting options to the question, 'Generally, do you think people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can't be too careful in dealing with people.' More operationally clear is whether a certain

question is approved or not to be asked to interviewees by the government. Even before formal democratization takes place, *de facto* democratization will start creeping in once the government approves the question on confidence in institutions, for instance.

Regionalizing potentials are more difficult to grasp with the questionnaire. Questions on identities, primary and secondary and tertiary, would enable one to be more precise on such potentials once questions about sub-regional identities, such as East Asian, are to be included. Take a look at Japan, Korea, and China. Japan has a long way to go before they forge regional identity. Those Japanese who think their Asianness is next important to national identity are some 60% in contrast to the case of Koreans, 96%. Chinese secondary identity seems to go more parochial, such as Fukienese and Siquanese rather than going more regional such as Asian. They seem to stick to the formula of Chinese versus the rest at each level. But if free trade agreements are to be concluded among the three, the picture might as well change fast. Koreans and Chinese are audacious in this regard, while Japanese remain cautions in moving in that direction. No less complex pictures may be drawn as to Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia.

References

Acharya, Amitav (2002), *Regionalism and Multilateralism*, Singapore: International Specialized Book Service.

Almond, Gabriel and Sydney Verba (1962), *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bian, Yanjie (1994), *Work and Inequality in Urban China*, Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Blondel, Jean (2003), 'European Consortium for Political Research', paper for presentation at the AsiaBarometer Symposium, Tokyo, May 6–7 2003.

Blondel, Jean and Takashi Inoguchi (2002), 'Political Cultures Matter', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 3(2), November, pp. 151–171.

Blondel, Jean and Takashi Inoguchi, *Political Cultures: Citizens, States and Societal Values in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia*, forthcoming.

Blondel, Jean et al., *Parties, Political Leadership, and Economic Bureaucracy in East and Southeast Asia a Comparative Study*, forthcoming.

Bulmer, M. (2002), 'History of Social Survey', in N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 21, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 14469–14473.

Burnham, Walter D. (1986), *Democracy in the Making: American Government and Politics*, New York: Prentice Hall.

Butler, Robert and Donald Stokes (1976), *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice*, London: Palgrave-Macmilliam.

Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley (1966), *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Chu, Yun-han (2003), 'The East Asian Democracy Barometers', paper for presentation at the AsiaBarometer Symposium, Tokyo, 6–7 May 2003.

Diamond, Larry (1999), *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation*, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry (2003) *Journal of Democracy*, http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/jod.htm

Farr, James and Raymond Seidelman (eds) (1993), *Discipline and History: Political Science in the United States*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Featherman, David (2002), 'Infrastructure of Social and Behavioral Research in the United States', in N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 11, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 7503–7511.

Featherman, David (2003), 'Reflections on the Evolution of a "Social Hubble": Survey Research as a Telescope on Societies around the Globe', paper for presentation at the AsiaBarometer Symposium, Tokyo, 6–7 May 2003.

Frank, Andre Gunder (1998), *Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (1997), *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Guerrero, Linda Luz (2003), 'Social Weather Stations: Asia's Oldest Barometer', paper for presentation at the AsiaBarometer Symposium, Tokyo, 6–7 May 2003.

Held, David *et al.* (2003), *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, Oxford: Blackwell Publisher.

Hibbs, Douglas A. (1993), *Solidarity of Egoism? The Economics of Sociotropic and Egocentric Influences on Political Behavior*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

Hirschmann, Albert (1970), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, Samuel (1981), *American Politics: The Power of Disharmony*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, Samuel (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Inglehart, Ronald (1977), *The Silent Revolution*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald (1997), *Modernization and Post-Modernization*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris (2003), *Gender Equality*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basanez, et al. (eds.) (2004), *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys*, Delegacion Coyoacan, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

Inoguchi, Takashi (1995), 'Democracy and the Development of Political Science in Japan', in David Easton, John Gunnell and Michael Stein (eds), *Regime and Discipline*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 269–293.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2002a), 'AsiaBarometer no setsuritsu o mezase (Let Us Do an Asian-wide Opinion Poll Every Year)' *Chuo Koron*, July, pp. 150–155.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2002b), 'Infrastructure of Social and Behavioral Sciences: Japan and Korea', in N.J.Smelser and P.B.Baltes (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Oxford: Elsevier, Vol. 11, pp. 7489–7493.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2002c), 'Broadening the Basis of Social Capital in Japan', in Robert Putnam (ed.), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 358–392, 481–489.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2002d), 'Japanese Political Science Looks Toward 2006', *Participation*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 17–20.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2002e), 'Governance Across Borders in Northeast Asia: Shaping and Sharing Identities, Ideas, Interests and Institutions', paper presented at the EU-UNU symposium on Governance Across Borders, 14–15 January 2002.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2003a), *The Final Report of Project: Minshushugino kino fuzen no rironteki-jisshoteki kenkyu* (No. 11102001, April 1999–March 2003).

Inoguchi, Takashi (2003b), *Gendai Nihon Seiji: Fuhen to Tokui* (Contemporary Japanese Politics: the Universal and the Idiosyncratic), Tokyo: NTT shuppan.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2004c), *Seijibunka to Globalization* (Political Cultures and Globalization), Tokyo: NTT shuppan.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2003c), 'Political Science in Three (Non-) Democracies: Japan, Korea and China', paper prepared for presentation at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, 28 June–4 July 2003.

Inoguchi, Takashi (2003d), 'Globalization wa yoi governance wo motarasuka (Does Globalization Bring About Good Governance?)', *Nempo seijigaku* (Annals of Japanese Political Science Association), pp. 199–277.

Inoguchi, Takashi, Miguel Basanez, Timur Dadabaev and Lucian Hotta (eds.) (forthcoming), *Values and Lifestyle in Asia: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook of the AsiaBarometer 2003 Survey*, Delegacion Coyoacan, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

Inoguchi, Takashi and Chung-Si Ahn (forthcoming), 'Introduction: Changing Values and the Challenge of Democratic Governance in East and Southeast Asia', in Inoguchi and Ahn (eds), *Governance in Asia*.

Inoguchi, Takashi and Paul Bacon (2003), 'Governance, Democratic Consolidation and the "End of Transition"', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 3(2) November, pp. 169–190.

Inoguchi, Takashi, Akihiko Tanaka and Timur Dadabaev (eds.) (forthcoming), *Values and Lifestyles in Asia: A Cross-National Analysis and Sourcebook Based on the AsiaBarometer Survey of 2003*, Delegación Coyoacán, 04310, Mexico: D. F. Siglo XXI Editores.

Kabashima, Ikuo (1998), *Seiken Kotai to Yukensha no Taido Henyo* (Regina Change and Attitudinal Change of Electorates), Tokyo: Bokutakusha.

Katznelson, Ira and Helen Milner (eds) (2002), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, New York: Norton.

Kojima, Kazuto. (1977), 'Public Opinion Trends in Japan' *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 41, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 206–216.

Miller, Warren E. *et al.* (1960), *The American Voter*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Miyake, Ichiro (1985), *Seito Shiji no Bunseki* (An Analysis of Party Support), Tokyo: Sobunsha.

Norris, Pippa (ed.) (1999), *Critical Citizens*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Oren, Ido (2003), *Our Enemies and US: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Osaka University of Commerce and University of Tokyo (2002), *Nihonban General Social Surveys JGSS-2000 Kisoshukeihyo Codebook* (Japanese General Social Survey JGSS-2000 Sourcebook), Tokyo: University of Tokyo: Institute of Social Sciences.

Pharr, Susan and Robert Putnam (eds.) (1999), *Disaffected Democracies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Przeworsky, A. and H. Teune (1982), *Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, New York: Krieger Publishing Company.

Putnam, Robert (1993), *Bowling Alone*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, Robert (ed.) (2002), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, New York: Oxford University Press, Ravenhill, John (2001) *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism.*

Rose, Richard (1989), *Ordinary People in Public Policy*, London: Macmillan.

Rose, Richard (2003), *New Democracies Barometer*, http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/index.html?global.html

Shin, Doh Chull (1999), *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shin, Doh Chull (2003), 'The Korea Democracy Barometer Surveys', paper for presentation at the AsiaBarometer Symposium, Tokyo, 6–7 May 2003.

Solingen, Etel (1998), *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stouffer, Samuel *et al.* (1945), *American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life*, New York: Sunflower University Press.

Watanuki, Joji and Ichiro Miyake (1997), *Kankyo Hendo to Taido Hen'yo* (Attitudinal Changes under Environmental Change), Tokyo: Bokutakusha.