


palgrave  
macmillan

# REINVENTING THE ALLIANCE

U.S.–JAPAN SECURITY PARTNERSHIP IN  
AN ERA OF CHANGE

---

Edited by  
G. John Ikenberry and  
Takashi Inoguchi



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

*G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi*

The U.S.–Japan alliance is the most important pillar of security and political order in the Asia Pacific but it is increasingly subject to strains between the two countries and from a rapidly transforming region. Japan is in the process of redefining its political and security identity in the region and the United States is showing ambivalence about regional leadership. Added to this, a wide assortment of new challenges to regional security—such as arms proliferation, regional missile defense, unstable financial flows, rogue states, terrorism, and the growing prominence of China—are forcing the U.S.–Japan alliance to rethink its goals. The U.S.–Japan security partnership is 50 years old. If the alliance is to remain relevant to regional security for another 50 years, it will need to be renewed, redefined, and reconciled with the wider region.

This project brings together American and Japanese specialists to examine the relationship between the U.S.–Japan alliance and the wider regional environment. We pose a variety of questions. Can the alliance be preserved in a way that will allow it to continue to play a stabilizing role in East Asia but also accommodate—and even foster—wider multilateral security cooperation? What are the constraints and opportunities on the alliance as it attempts to operate more fully within the Asia Pacific region? These constraints and opportunities might include historical legacies, technological innovations, constitutional prohibitions, and shifting domestic political opinion. Can the domestic support for the alliance in both Japan and the United States be sustained in this period of regional transition? Security relations in the region will increasingly be multitrack and multilevel. The central question is whether and how the bilateral alliance can evolve and remain at the core of the region's security order.

This group study advances a series of conclusions and recommendations for U.S. and Japanese leaders.

- 1 First, the bilateral alliance is the most critical element ensuring regional security and order in East Asia. There are no obvious alternatives to the alliance system on the horizon that are sufficiently credible and operable. Alternative models of regional security do exist and they should continue to be explored and debated. But the preconditions for a stable regional multilateral security order are not yet in place nor will they be so for several decades.
- 2 Second, the U.S.–Japan alliance has been poorly defined and defended in recent years. The alliance is more than simply a military pact aimed at protecting the two countries from an external threat. The alliance is also a political partnership that provides institutional mechanisms that support a stable relationship between the countries inside the alliance. We argue that even if all the external threats in the region were to disappear, the alliance would still be important for regulating relations between the United States and Japan—the two largest economies in the world. Alliances are important mechanisms for establishing restraints and commitments on the use of power. The alliance projects American power into Asia but it also makes that power more predictable and reliable. The alliance allows Japan to solve its security problems without becoming a militarized Great Power and this stabilizes regional relations. The multifaceted roles of the alliance must be acknowledged and invoked in the explanation of the grand strategic role and value of the alliance.
- 3 Third, the alliance will not survive unless it evolves. Both U.S. and Japanese elites realize that Japan will need to rethink its regional security presence—to play a more active role in ensuring regional peace and security. How it does this is both tricky and critical. It will need to redefine its security identity in a way that allows it to be a more active state but not do it in a way that triggers regional instabilities and arms races. The most important next step in evolving Japan's regional security involvement is in UN-sponsored regional peacekeeping operations. The expansion of Japan's security role take place within agreed upon regional multilateral arrangements.
- 4 Fourth, it is useful to have a model of the future U.S.–Japan partnership. The Armitage Report of autumn 2000 argued that the

- U.S.–British partnership was the best model for guiding the evolution of the U.S.–Japan relationship. We propose that the U.S.–German relationship is a better model. Germany is emerging from its World War II constraints to play a more active role in the region. The recent participation of Germany in the NATO bombing of Serbia, for example, allowed the world to glimpse the gradual expansion of Germany military responsibilities. But Germany has simultaneously signaled its willingness to work within regional multilateral frameworks, thereby providing stabilizing reassurances to neighboring countries. This is a model that the United States and Japan should look to in defining the direction of change.
- 5 Fifth, the rise of multilateral dialogues in the Asia Pacific are not a threat to but an opportunity for the alliance. These dialogues—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum—are an important supplement to the alliance. They provide institutional avenues for Japan to diversify its regional participation and strengthen its overall security identity. They provide opportunities for the United States to engage other regional players without throwing into question the core bilateral alliance partnerships.
  - 6 Sixth, a variety of new issues are emerging—theater missile defense, peace keeping, revolutions in military technology—that will test old security patterns in the region. The United States and Japan should get “out ahead of the curve” on these issues and find ways to make them work for—rather than against—desired security partnerships.

In this introduction we expand on the problems and opportunities that confront the U.S.–Japan alliance in the decade ahead. We begin by looking at the current regional situation and the new challenges that are emerging. We turn next to the ideas and strategies that inform U.S. and Japanese foreign policy—toward each other and the region. After that, we turn to a discussion of the chapters in this volume and relate them to the broad themes and recommendations that we have just introduced.

One set of chapters looks at the problem from conceptual and historical angles. Chapters 2 and 3 look at the broad historical/conceptual possibilities for regional security (Mastanduno and Tsuchiyama). Chapter 4 looks at the historical legacies—regionally and within Japan itself—that shape and constrain Japan’s role in the region (Berger). A second set of chapters looks more directly at the relations between security bilateralism and security multilateralism. Chapters 5 and 6 look

at the U.S.–Japan alliance and explore how alliance reform can be made complimentary with regional multilateral security cooperation (Kamiya and Smith). Two additional chapters look at the same question from the perspective of the region—again asking the question about the constraints and opportunities for the bilateral alliance to mesh with regional security cooperation (see chapter 7 by Cha). A third set of chapters looks at regional function issues and they ask the question: how can Japan and the United States find ways to expand and deepen their cooperation in these new areas? Chapter 8 looks at the revolution in military affairs and the implications for alliance cooperation (O’Hanlon) and Chapter 9 looks at theater missile defense (Umemoto). Chapters 10 and 11 look at regional peacemaking and peacekeeping and how Japan and the United States might expand their cooperation with the framework of UN functional duties (Stedman and Fukushima).

### Regional Security and Alliance Cooperation

The Asia-Pacific is one of the most dynamic and potentially unstable regions in the world today. The region encompasses a diverse mixture of rival Great Powers, thorny territorial disputes, unresolved historical memories, competing political ideologies, painful economic transitions, and shifting military balances. The unfolding relations between Japan, the United States, China, Russia, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia would be a challenge to manage even if the region had well-established governance institutions. But these new and unsettling developments confront the U.S.–Japan alliance at a time when the alliance itself is under strain. To reinvigorate the alliance and at the same time respond to the rising demand for greater security governance in the region is a major challenge.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S.–Japan alliance grew out of postwar and Cold War circumstances, but even in the midst of dramatic global and regional change the alliance remains the most stable and coherent mechanism for the management of regional security order.<sup>2</sup> It is not surprising that in a recent discussion of the Asian financial crisis, Yoichi Funabashi argued that the most important source of stability in the region is the bilateral security pact.<sup>3</sup> But a stable status quo is not likely. The region is becoming increasingly unsettled by shifting economic, political, and technological developments. Arms proliferation, controversies over humanitarian intervention, the roller coaster ride of capital and trade flows, and the rising power of China are critical elements in the transformation of the region and make the tackling of regional security problems more difficult.

These new demands for regional security governance are emerging precisely at a time when the U.S.–Japan alliance is entering a new era of reconsideration. Japan is undergoing a national process of rethinking about its security, its reliance on the United States, and the specifics of the American military presence in Okinawa. Japan has slowly diversified its security contacts in the region and is involved in an array of annual and ad hoc ministerial talks.<sup>4</sup>

The United States is also starting to think more broadly about regional security. The United States and China have recently resumed high-level talks between their military establishments and various security experts, and political leaders have called for more formal trilateral talks between China, the United States, and Japan. The United States is currently exploring ways of establishing a G-8 dialogue—modeled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—between the wider set of states in the region. Ideas about new multilateral institutions are in the air.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the United States has shown less willingness to maintain its far-flung regional and global security and political commitments. It has not embarked on a dramatic return to isolationism but it is also less consistent and dependable in its exercise of leadership.

The American view toward multilateral military cooperation has fluctuated over the decade but it has generally been supportive of initiatives—as long as they do not undermine the core bilateral security order. The 1995 Pentagon report on East Asia spent more time discussing the positive contribution of these multilateral cooperative initiatives than the 1998 report. But overall, the United States has warmed up to soft security multilateralism. In 1991, when Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama proposed at an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference that a forum be created to discuss regional security, American officials responded coolly. The American attitude warmed up in later years. The Clinton administration signaled its interest in multilateral security dialogues in April 1993 during the confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, who identified such initiatives as one of the major policy goals of the new administration for Asia. President Clinton himself gave voice to the multilateral vision in a speech before the Korean National Assembly in July 1993, when he called for the creation of a new Pacific community, built on “shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic values.” He identified four aspects to this vision of community: continued U.S. military presence and commitment, stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

support for democracy and open societies, and the promotion of new multilateral regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges.

In the following years, the United States has signaled its interest in organizing "coalitions of the willing" to address various regional security problems and to cautiously foster closer ties between its partners. It has given support to the ASEAN Regional Forum as a mechanism for dialogue. But the United States has also backed unilateral initiatives among its allies, including the U.S.–Japan–ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), the U.S.–Japan, ROK Trilateral Defense Talks, the Pacific Command's (PACOM) dialogue with Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and Singapore on establishing great interoperability for future collective humanitarian operations, and PACOM's Asia Pacific Security Center, where Asian militaries study the conceptual and operational aspects of confidence-building measures and cooperative security. These cooperative security undertakings reflect the general American government view that the bilateral alliances should be strengthened and coordinated as much as possible. "Foremost," argues the 1998 Pentagon strategic statement of East Asia, "the U.S. will continue to strengthen its strategic partnerships with allies, which serve as important pillars from which to address regional political and military challenges. All of our alliance relationships promise to expand both in scope and degree in coming years to encompass more comprehensive concepts of security cooperation."<sup>6</sup>

The security order in Asia is premised on unwavering American security participation and if this role becomes less certain the region begins to respond with unsettling arms races, security dilemmas, and renewed political tensions. In short, the U.S.–Japan alliance is simultaneously caught between an increasing array of thorny regional security challenges and shifting domestic political environments in both Japan and the United States. It is useful to look more closely at the logic of American and Japanese thinking about the bilateral alliance and wider regional strategies.

### American Policy Toward Asia

American policy toward East Asia is built around hard bilateral security ties and soft multilateral economic relations. Embedded in these policies are a set of political bargains between the United States and the countries within the region. The U.S.–Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the security order. The hub-and-spoke defense system has its roots in the

early Cold War and the failure of more multilateral security arrangements that were intended to mirror the Atlantic security pact.<sup>7</sup> The U.S.–Japan alliance was established to deter the expansion of Soviet power and Communism more generally in the Asia-Pacific. This Cold War anti-Communist goal led the United States to use its occupation of Japan and military victory in the Pacific to actively shape the region—doing so more successfully in Northeast Asia than Southeast Asia. The United States offered Japan—and the region more generally—a postwar political bargain. The United States would provide Japan and other countries security protection and access to American markets, technology, and supplies within an open world economy. In return, Japan and other countries in the region would become stable partners who would provide diplomatic, economic, and logistical support for the United States as it led the wider American-center postwar order.

From the beginning, this bilateral security order has been intertwined with the evolution of regional economic relations. The United States facilitated Japanese economic reconstruction after the war and actively sought to create markets for Japanese exports, particularly after the closing of China in 1949.<sup>8</sup> The United States actively sought the import of Japanese goods into the United States during the 1950s so as to encourage Japanese postwar economic growth and political stability.<sup>9</sup> The American military guarantee to partners in East Asia (and Western Europe) provided a national security rationale for Japan and the Western democracies to open their markets. Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes. In Asia, the export-oriented development strategies of Japan and the smaller Asian tigers depended on America's willingness to accept their imports and live with huge trade deficits; alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries made this politically tolerable.<sup>10</sup>

The alliance system and the U.S.–Japan security pact in particular has also played a wider stabilizing role in the region. The American alliance with Japan has solved Japan's security problems, allowing it to forego building up its military capability, and thereby making itself less threatening to its neighbors. This has served to solve or reduce the security dilemmas that would otherwise surface within the region if Japan were to rearm and become a more autonomous and unrestrained Great Power. At the same time, the alliance makes American power more predictable and connected to the region. This too reduces the instabilities and "risk premiums" that countries in the region would need to incur if they were to operate in a more traditional balance-of-power order. Even China has seen the virtues of the U.S.–Japan alliance.



During the Cold War it was at least partially welcome as a tool to balance Soviet power—an objective that China shared with the United States. But even today, as long as the alliance does not impinge on China's other regional goals—most importantly the reunification with Taiwan—the alliance does reduce the threat of a resurgent Japan.

In the late 1940s, in an echo of today's situation, the United States was the world's dominant state with 45 percent of world GNP, leadership in military power, technology, finance, and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But the United States nonetheless found itself building world order around stable regional partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter Soviet threats. As the historian Geir Lundstadt has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation."<sup>11</sup> The remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of European and Asian governments to harness American power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships.

The political bargain behind the East Asian regional hegemonic order was also aimed at making American power more predictable and user-friendly. If the United States worried about finding partners to help wage the Cold War and build an American-centered world order, these partners worried about American power—both domination and abandonment. Thus the East Asian regional bargain was also about the restraint and commitment of American power. The United States would agree to operate within bilateral and multilateral institutional frameworks and the junior partners would agree to operate within and support the American order. American hegemony would become more open, predictable, reciprocal, and institutionalized and therefore more benign and tolerable. But the United States would be able to lock other countries into operating within a legitimate and American-centered order.

The end of the Cold War and the shifting economic and political environment in East Asia has altered the region and presented challenges to this postwar regional hegemonic order. The geopolitical landscape has changed. The Soviet Union has collapsed and now Russia is a weakened Great Power—too weak to play a dominant role in the region. The peace negotiations between the Koreas also is likely to lead to the reassessment of relationships and bargains. The end of the Cold War

makes it more difficult for some Americans to understand why the United States continues to provide security protection to Japan and the wider region. But in other ways, the relations and bargains remain critical to regional order—and they remain largely intact. The United States is even more powerful today than it was in the past, particularly with the ongoing economic malaise in Japan and the growth of America's new economy during the 1990s. The United States is still the world's leading military power. Fifty percent of world military spending takes place in the United States and it accounts for 80 percent of world military research and development. The United States also remains the leading destination for East Asian exports. There is a wide array of regional vested interests—on both sides of the Pacific—in favor of open trade and investment. This creates ongoing incentives for the countries of the region to engage the United States and attempt to establish credible restraints and commitments on American power.

The United States government clearly is convinced that its security and political presence in the region is as important as in the past, despite the end of the Cold War. The Nye Commission in the mid-1990s provides a critical intellectual and policy rationale for the continuation of the extended American leadership role in the region. As a result, the asymmetries of power and prevailing strategic interests make the basic bargain between the United States and its partners as relevant and valued as ever before. The alliance may have lost its Cold War function but it remains critical in forestalling security dilemma-driven conflict and arms races in the region and it makes the United States a more predictable and institutionalized superpower. The bargains behind the regional security order are evolving but they are also being recreated.

### Japan's Ambivalent Multilateralism

Japan tends to prefer to operate bilaterally within the Asia Pacific region although it has begun to pursue a variety of multilateral diplomatic initiatives in recent years. The reasons why Japanese tend to see international relations in terms of bilateralism are several. First, there are historical and geopolitical reasons. The multilateral security system in Europe emerged out of centuries of balance-of-power politics that socialized the states of Europe into a common framework and created conditions for multilateral security cooperation. By contrast, there never has been a true balance-of-power system in Asia. China was too strong politically by the time of the Opium War. Likewise, Japan has been too strong economically after it became the first modernized power in Asia from

the late nineteenth century onward and so there has never been a comfortable balance between the two. All other Asian powers have been too weak to balance against the big two. The absence of a working balance-of-power system has meant that one of the critical forces that fostered a tradition of regionalism and multilateral order in Europe did not take root in Asia. This situation has also contributed to the absence of a strong sense of shared identity and culture in Asia.

Second, Asia has existed as a so-called intrusive system—that is, the operation of security relations within Asia have been conducted as part of a wider Pacific and global system of Great Power relations.<sup>12</sup> Politically significant external states have helped shape relations within the Asian subsystem. Without the involvements of these states—European and American Great Powers—the Asian system would not have maintained regional order by itself. The leading states in this intrusive system—Japan and China—could gain greater leverage in seeking their interest in Asia by bringing Euro-American influence to bear on their regional policy objectives. The outside states that have been allied to either Japan or China have tended to play a relatively indirect and benign role in the region, allowing their regional partners to operate as they wished as long as larger global interests were not put at risk.

There are also cultural reasons for Japan's reluctant multilateralism. Japanese views of international relations has tended to be hierarchic, reflecting Japan's long experience with premodern Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese also tend to see international relations as giving expression externally to the same cultural patterns that are manifested internally within Japanese society. As is often noted, Japanese society is characterized by the prevalence of vertically organized structures. Hierarchy is evident throughout its society. One of the most well-known relationships in Japanese business society is *keiretsu* (systematization). For example, besides the oligopolistic alignments controlled by financial groups, there are manufacturing *keiretsu* in such industries as chemicals and steel, and partial *keiretsu* in automobiles and electronics industries. In the *keiretsu*, a few hundred small plants and firms, called offspring companies, are aligned under a parent company in order to secure continuous order and technological and financial support.<sup>13</sup> If the images of international relations reflect the domestic power structure in a society, Japanese intellectual orientation in its foreign relations may be characterized as hierarchical. When the Japanese try to locate Japan in international society, their domestic model offers itself as an analogy. To the extent this is so, Japan's diplomatic behavior is biased toward vertically organized bilateral relations.

Japanese diplomatic experience also reinforces bilateralism at the expense of multilateral relations. When Japan has entered into a specific international order through geopolitical alignments, Japan's strategy is somewhat similar to the logic of *keiretsu*. Japanese thinkers situate Japan not only in the horizontally arranged international system (i.e., in terms of unipolar or multipolar order) but also in the stratified international system (i.e., patron–client relations). When Japan joins such an international system, alliance policy should come into play. At the turn of the century, Japan was considering two different states as a possible ally—England and Russia. In the end, Japan decided to go with Great Britain for a variety of reasons including its naval and economic power and the fact that Britain did not participate in the Triple Intervention by which Japan had to give up the Liaotung Peninsula.<sup>14</sup> In the case of the U.S.–Japan security treaty of 1951, the rationale was similar to the earlier Anglo-Japanese alliance. The United States could guarantee Japan's safety as well as economic growth. Hence, it was bandwagoning for profit once again. Even in the case of the Axis Pact of 1940, one may find the same logic in Japanese thinking. Though many of the mid-European powers turned to Nazi Germany out of fear, Japan did it to obtain expected military and economic gain. The Axis Pact had disastrous outcomes in Japan, while the alliances with England and the United States have been regarded as great successes.

This leads us to the current Japanese view of multilateral approaches to security. In spite of the fact that Japanese tend to deal with security issues by managing the bilateral relations of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the Japanese have come to have a more positive view of multilateral diplomacy in the years since the end of the Cold War. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the Japanese expected a decline of American hegemony in the early 1990s and this made foreign policy officials think more seriously of alternatives to the American-led security order. For example, the Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (the Higuchi Report) made public in August 1994 stated, “the United States no longer holds an overwhelming advantage in terms of overall national strength.” Then, it said, “[t]he question is whether the United States will be able to demonstrate leadership in multilateral cooperation.” As the most distinguished institution of multilateral cooperation, the Report mentioned the United Nations, and indicated that “it is essential that multilateral cooperation be maintained under U.S. leadership.” The report said Japan should “play an active role in shaping a new order” instead of playing a “passive role.”<sup>15</sup> Partly because of this thinking, Japan has been very supportive to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

security dialogue at the official level since its inception in 1994. Japan is also a member of the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) since it started in 1978. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that was organized in 1989 as a regional economic forum is expected to function as a confidence-building mechanism in this area.<sup>16</sup> At the private level, the Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP) was established in 1993, and is promoting dialogue with states that include Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. Japan's Self Defense Agency has also launched security dialogues with China and Russia. All of those efforts will increase transparency in the security area. Japan's ODA and its policy in the UN's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) activities are often regarded as part of Japan's multilateral commitments as well.

Taken together, one may be able to say that the Japanese are more positive toward multilateral diplomacy than they were in the past. Especially immediately after the Cold War ended, many pundits and political scientists in Japan predicted that multilateral security frameworks will take over the alliance networks in Asia. Today, however, no Japanese officials or researchers within the foreign policy establishment expect that multilateral arrangements can replace the bilateral security relations in the near future. It will continue to be a challenge to conduct both bilateral and multilateral relations at the same time without creating contradictions and thereby repeat the problems that Japan experienced in the first quarter of the twentieth century. To deal with North Korea and China, for example, the multilateral approach may function as a type of preventive diplomacy, at least to some extent. However, there is no great expectation that they will have a crisis management function. For example, there is some skepticism in Japan whether the Agreed Framework concluded among four governments including North Korea could produce the expected outcome.

Is the U.S.-Japan alliance and multilateral security dialogues compatible or contradictory? The multilateral security frameworks in Asia such as ARF is expected to work as a confidence-building measure and, as a result, they can decrease the chance of growing security dilemmas. However, they are not likely to have deterrence and defense functions in the near future. In other words, they do not have "teeth" yet. That is why those multilateral frameworks cannot do much once a crisis takes place—perhaps best seen in the case of East Timor in the summer of 1999. This is a more serious problem when long-range missiles and nuclear threats are involved. To deal with such problems, the U.S.-Japan

alliance is expected to function. Therefore, there is a sort of division of labor between them. Conversely, if and when ARF has “teeth” in the future, it might create contradictions with the U.S.–Japan alliance. Even more importantly, when China gains influence within multilateral frameworks and begins to be more democratic, Japan may face a dilemma even though no party in Asia wants a China-centered multilateral arrangement at this point. Likewise, the deployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in the area around Japan would make Sino-Japanese–U.S. relations more complicated.

On entering the new century three events took place, triggering some change in the nature and form of alliance with the United States. These three events took place a decade after the end of the Cold War. They are (1) the antiterrorist war, (2) China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and (3) Russia’s quasi accession to the NATO. All these events have started to affect profoundly the form and substance of the alliance with the United States from the Japanese and German points of view.

- 1 The antiterrorist war is a new war. It de-territorializes alliance; it needs to treat all except rogue states as a cooperative partner. Special relationship as has been entertained of the alliance between the United States and some of its allies until the recent past seems to have lost its meaning. For instance, no one talks about the U.S.–Japan alliance in terms of Mike Mansfield, who called it the most important alliance bar none. The U.S. government has ceased to use the phrase special relationship. Instead, the word, partner, has been more or less uniformly used to characterize all the cooperative states in the antiterrorist war.
- 2 China’s accession to the WTO has started to blur the erstwhile important distinction between security identity and commercial interests. The latter tends to acquire more importance. For instance, a spate of bilateral free trade agreement ideas has been flooding the Asia-Pacific, several involving China: China–ASEAN, China–Korea–Japan, Korea–Japan, Japan–ASEAN, ASEAN plus three, and the like. In some countries popular ranking of the United States have been recently reversed by those of China like in the ROK.
- 3 Russia’s quasi accession to the NATO has started to blur the security identity of West Europeans. If Russia ceases to be a potential adversary, then why NATO? If NATO incorporates Russia, is Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

redundant? If NATO incorporates Russia, is Western European Union (WEU) becoming more important. If the United States acts in an unipolar and unilateralist fashion, what would be the best way for West Europeans to maintain their alliance with the United States?

### Renewing The U.S.–Japan Alliance

The chapters that follow attempt to chart a course for the future of the security pact between Japan and the United States. Chapters 2 and 3 by Mastanduno and Tsuchiyama delineate the range of possibilities for future security organization in the region. Both provide arguments for why the bilateral alliance remains the most viable instrument of regional stability available in the decades ahead. But there are other conceptual possibilities. These include a more traditional balance-of-power system, a competitive Sino-American bipolar system, or a full-scale regional security committee. What Mastanduno and Tsuchiyama make clear is that security orders have specific political and power-related preconditions. It is not possible to simply agree to construct a security committee. Shared norms and convergent interests are also necessary. The critical issue in moving away from the bilateral alliance system toward something more multilateral is the role of China. Without movement toward compatible sociopolitical domestic systems and a resolution of lingering historical antagonisms, such a community-based security order will remain illusive. But chapters 2 and 3 also make it clear that without proper management of the bilateral arrangements it would be easy for the region to slip back into a more competitive and conflictual order. The alliance needs to be championed and renewed in order to sustain its position within the region.

Chapter 4 by Berger illuminates the diffuse antagonisms and lingering historical resentments that remain as obstacles to closer regional cooperation. Japan has not been able to put its history to rest. Symbolic gestures and concrete steps will need to be taken to overcome the resentments that remain in Japan's relations with China and Korea. Drawing stronger lessons from Germany's strategy of regional reconciliation would help. Berger makes clear that reconciliation in East Asia is possible. Some of the "history disputes" between Japan and China are created by elites for diplomatic advantage. But other aspects of these disagreements are rooted in issues such as textbooks and war memorials. In a very real sense, the level of conflict in the region hinges as much on these cultural and historical matters as the objective balance-of-power.

Deft diplomacy and enlightened leadership will be needed to heal wounds that linger and obstruct closer security cooperation in the region.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 by Kamiya, Smith, and Cha probe the relationship between bilateral and regional multilateral security cooperation. One of the most important findings of these chapters is that the choice between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements is a false one. Both Japan and the United States have been traditionally suspicious of multilateral security activities. This is partly because they do not want to create slipshod mechanisms that erode the primacy of the alliance and because of the loss of control that a more diffuse security organization would entail. But the more firmly anchored the bilateral alliance is, the more that these two countries can participate in regional dialogues and use them to strengthen the alliance and the wider regional environment. A zero-sum relationship does not exist between the two types of security approaches if smart diplomacy is pursued.

If one of the important steps that Japan needs to take in the next decade is to expand its regional security responsibilities, regional multilateral arrangements will be important to ensure that all countries in the region are comfortable with the evolving Japanese security posture. The example of Germany is again relevant. Germany made a strategic decision to move toward early unification of West and East Germany in 1990. In doing so, however, Chancellor Kohl engaged the other countries in the region and sought their approval. Germany agreed to intensify its commitments to European monetary and political integration as a way to reassure France, Britain, and even Russia that a larger Germany would not be a larger threat to its neighbors. Likewise, Japan should use the multilateral fora in the region to consult with and reassure neighbors about its changing security orientation. Anchoring these changes within the U.S.–Japan alliance is critical. But fostering a dialogue with other countries about their interests and worries is also important to reconcile change and stability.

The final set of chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11 by O'Hanlon, Umemoto, Stedman, and Fukushima explore new issues that are creating challenges and opportunities for the alliance. O'Hanlon looks at the implications of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) for alliance relations. It is possible that if the United States pushed the technological revolution sufficiently hard it could radically distance itself in terms of military capabilities and interoperable cooperation from its allies. O'Hanlon casts some doubt on whether a true revolution is in the offing. But he also argues that it is important to harness military innovation to alliance goals. Innovation is certainly a goal but it is not an end in itself.



Making sure that the United States and Japan are able to work together in training and operations is critical in the years ahead. The United States will continue to advance its high-technological capacities but it should make sure that its allies are not too far behind.

Tetsuya argues that missile defense is a delicate regional issue and that it should be dealt with in a way that strengthens rather than weakens the U.S.–Japan alliance. The United States should make sure that it pursues technologies that do not threaten China's deterrent capacities. Boost phase defense is the most reasonable approach that addresses potential missile threats from North Korea but does not—or at least should not—destabilize the wider region. At the same time, missile defense should be an alliance arrangement. The United States should consult with Tokyo and Seoul on the specifics of their plan and seek a joint approach to its development and deployment.

Stedman and Fukushima look at the opportunities that are opening up for Japan to play a more active role in regional peacekeeping. The idea here is to seek ways for Japan to be a more active security player in the region without triggering unnecessary new conflicts and antagonisms. Connecting Japan's peacekeeping duties to a region-wide UNs-sponsored mechanism is one sensible way to find a way forward. Japan's recessed security presence in the region—made possible by the alliance—has been a stabilizing feature of the region for 50 years. The goal is to not lose these advantages while also facilitating a more active and constructive Japan presence in managing regional conflict and cooperation.

Stepping back from the specific issues, this volume suggests that the United States and Japan need to discover a new model for the alliance partnership. One model has been advanced by the Armitage Commission: the U.S.–British relationship. Some of the features of this relationship do make sense in the context of the U.S.–Japan relationship. It is a special relationship built on deeply embedded trust and cooperation. But the U.S.–German relationship is probably a better model. Both Germany and Japan have labored under the weight of history. Germany is today modernizing its international position in ways that allow it to play a more active role in its region while also reassuring its neighbors. It is normalizing its role with the outside world but also building deeper connections with its region. The two processes go hand-in-hand. So too should Japan look to its institutionalized connections—first and foremost with the United States but also with the other countries in the region—as useful relations that should be strengthened, as its foreign and security presence in the region evolves.

## Notes

1. For overviews of the changing security dynamics in the Asia Pacific region, see Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, "Asia's Insecurity," *Survival* (Autumn 1999); Mataka Kamiya, "Hopeful Uncertainty: Asia-Pacific Security in Transition," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1996); Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94); Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999); Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asia Security," *Survival* (Summer 1994); and Kent E. Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2001), pp. 106–122; and Takashi Inoguchi, ed., *Japan's Asian Policy: Revival and Response* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
2. For useful discussions of bilateralism and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region see William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific* (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
3. Funabashi, "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 26–36.
4. Multilateral security dialogues in which Japan is involved include the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region, the International Seminar on Defense Science, the Asia-Pacific Seminar, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium; for the latest developments in Japan's Asian policy, see Inoguchi, 2002.
5. For discussions of multilateral security arrangements in East Asia, see David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1994); Young Sun Song, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1993); Paul Evans, "Reinventing East Asia: Multilateral Security Cooperation and Regional Order," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Spring 1996); and Amitav Acharya, "A Concert for Asia?" *Survival* (Autumn 1999); Takashi Inoguchi, "Possibilities on Limits of Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Security and Economic Access," in Tainjoon Kwon and Dong-Sung Kim, eds., *World Order and Peace in the New Millennium* (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO and Korean Association of International Studies, 2000), pp. 291–301.
6. *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1998), p. 61.
7. On the idea floated by the United States of a multilateral security institution in Asia in the early 1940s and during 1950–51 that was to be a counterpart to NATO, see Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 45 (July 1993).

8. See Micheal Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford, 1997); and Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," in Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 34–63.
9. See Stuart Auerbach, "The Ironies that Built Japan Inc.," *Washington Post*, 18 (July 1993).
10. This argument is made in Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chapter 2.
11. See Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *The Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 23 (September 1986), pp. 263–277.
12. See Luise Cantori and Steven L. Smith, eds., *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 25.
13. Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society*, p. 96.
14. A comparison of Japanese security options in the early years of the twentieth and the twenty-first century can be seen in Takashi Inoguchi, "A Northeast Asian Perspective," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (July 2001), pp. 199–212.
15. Higuchi Report, Advisory Group on Defense Issues, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century* (Tokyo: Defense Agency, August 1994).
16. The ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) meeting since 1997 is also expected in the near future to become a new mechanism for resolving not only economic issues but also security.