

The SAGE Handbook of
Asian Foreign Policy

2 Volume

Edited by
Takashi Inoguchi



The SAGE Handbook of
Asian Foreign Policy



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The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy

Volume 1

Edited by
Takashi Inoguchi

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2455 Teller Road
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B 1/1 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
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New Delhi 110 044

SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
3 Church Street
#10-04 Samsung Hub
Singapore 049483

Editor: John Nightingale
Editorial Assistant: Umeeka Raichura
Production Editor: Manmeet Kaur Tura
Copyeditor: Sunrise Setting Ltd
Proofreader: Sunrise Setting Ltd
Indexer: Sunrise Setting Ltd
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Notes on the Editor and Contributors

THE EDITOR

Takashi Inoguchi, who was awarded his PhD by MIT, is Emeritus Professor, University of Tokyo, former United Nations Assistant Secretary General, former President, University of Niigata Prefecture and currently Eminent Scholar-Professor at J.F. Oberlin University, Tokyo. He writes prolifically on Japan, Asia and international affairs. He has a working knowledge of Asian languages including Japanese (native), Chinese, Korean, Indonesian and Russian. Outside of Japan in Asia, he has taught in Beijing, Seoul, New Delhi, Singapore, Jogjakarta and Canberra. He has received many awards, including the Suntory Foundation's best-book award, the International Communication Fund's excellent-research award, the Japanese Public Policy Studies Association's best-book award, the Japanese Behaviormetric Society's best-book award, the International Society for Quality of Life Studies' Distinguished Fellow award. He is the founding editor of *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge University Press), *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* (Oxford University Press) and *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* (SAGE Publications). He is Director of the AsiaBarometer Survey, which focuses on quality of life in 32 Asian societies. The latest among his 150 book publications are *The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global* (2019), *Asian Societies: An Evidence-Based Typology on Daily Life Satisfaction* (forthcoming), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Asia* (Springer, 2017), *Trust with Asian Characteristics* (Springer, 2017), *The Quality of Life in Asia* (Springer, 2013), *Globalization, Public Opinion, and the State* (Routledge, 2008), *Citizens and the State* (Routledge, 2008), *The Uses of Institutions* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), *Political Cultures in Asia and Europe* (Routledge, 2006), *Values and Lifestyles in Urban Asia* (Siglo XXI Editores, 2005) and *American Democracy Promotion* (Oxford University Press, 2000).

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Imtiaz Ahmed is Professor of International Relations and Director, Centre for Genocide Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Professor Ahmed was educated at the University of Dhaka (Bangladesh), The Australian National University, Canberra (Australia), and Carlton University, Ottawa (Canada). He is

also currently Visiting Professor at the Sagesse University, Beirut (Lebanon). Professor Ahmed is the recipient of various awards and honours. He has authored, co-authored, or edited 22 books and 8 monographs. More than 100 research papers and scholarly articles have been published in leading journals and chapters in edited volumes. His recent publications are: *The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas: Responses of the State, Society & the International Community*, ed. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2010); *Human Rights in Bangladesh: Past, Present & Futures*, ed. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2014); *People of Many Rivers: Tales from the Riverbanks* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2015); and *South Asian Rivers: A Framework for Cooperation*, ed. (Berlin: Springer, 2018).

Tsuneo Akaha (Professor of International Policy and Management at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey) teaches courses on international migration and human security, multiculturalism, East Asia and Japan. He is the author of *Japan in Global Ocean Politics* (1985) and the editor/co-editor of: *Russia and East Asia: Informal and Gradual Integration* (2014); *The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia* (2010); *Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia* (2005); *The Future of North Korea* (2002); *Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention* (1999); *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific* (1997); and *Japan in the Posthegemonic World* (1993). He has also authored numerous journal articles and book chapters, most recently ‘International Migration and Human Security and Development in Mongolia’, *Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* (2018) and ‘From National Security to Human Security’, in *U.S.–Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion* (2017).

Chiyuki Aoi is Professor of International Security at the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo. Aoi was educated at Sophia University (BA), the University of Tokyo, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MS) and Columbia University (PhD). From 2008 to 2009, she was Visiting Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her research interests include military operations and strategy, the transformation of warfare and the use of force, strategic communications and international organisations, peace and security. Prior to her current position, she held faculty positions at Aoyama Gakuin University (Tokyo), and for five years she held professional positions at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations University (UNU).

Her main publications include *Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era* (2011), *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine towards the Post-Brahimi Era?: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats* (co-editor with Cedric de Coning and John Karlsrud, 2017) and ‘Japanese Strategic Communication: Its Significance as a Political Tool’, in

Defence Strategic Communications: The Official Journal of the NATO Strategic Centre of Excellence (Volume 3, Autumn 2017).

Jong-Yun Bae is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies and Director of the Center for Maritime Affairs at the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul. He received his PhD from Yonsei University in 2001. Before he began his career in the Politics Department at Yonsei University, he worked as a Research Professor at the Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum at Yonsei University and at Princeton University as a Research Associate of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies (PIIRS). His research interests include South Korea's foreign policy and its decision-making process, North Korean issues and inter-Korean relations and unification policies in the Korean peninsula.

Titli Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. Her research interests include great power politics in the Indo-Pacific and strategic affairs in East Asia. She was a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS, Tokyo) in 2017 and the Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo in 2010–11. Dr. Basu has widely published in national and international peer-reviewed journals including the *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, *Korean Journal of Defence Analysis*, and *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*. She has also shared her analyses in popular global platforms including *The Asan Forum*, *East Asia Forum*, *Global Asia*, *The Diplomat*, *Asia-Pacific Bulletin*, and *Asian Journal of Public Affairs*. Dr. Basu's recent work includes an edited book, *Major Powers and the Korean Peninsula: Politics, Policies and Perspectives* (KW Publishers, 2019) and a co-edited book, *China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific: Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure* (Pentagon Press, 2018). She completed her doctoral thesis from Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. She was a recipient of the Japan Foundation Fellowship in 2010. Previously, she interned with the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan.

Srinjoy Bose is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics and International Relations at the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Sydney). Previously, he was Marie Skłodowska-Curie Action Fellow at Durham University and a Prime Minister's Australia–Asia Endeavour Postgraduate Award scholar at The Australian National University.

Liu Bojian is a Research Assistant (Full-time) at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. His research interests cover international governance, law, cyberspace and China's transformation. He is also leading a research project on "Blockchain and International Public Policy" and doing comparative studies of regulatory policies toward cyberspace among major countries. He received his Bachelor of Laws from Xiamen University in China.

Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King's College, London and Associate Fellow on the Asia Pacific Programme at Chatham House. From 2012 to 2015, he was Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. He was Senior Fellow and then Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House from 2006 to 2012. Prior to this, he worked for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is the author of 20 books on China, the most recent of which is *China's Dreams: The Culture of the Communist Party and the Secret Source of its Power* (2018).

Alexander Bukh is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. Alexander has published extensively on international relations in Northeast Asia. His publications have appeared in academic journals such as the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Asian Survey*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* and *The Pacific Review*. Alexander is the author of *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's 'Other'* (2008). He is also a producer and co-director of a documentary on territorial-disputes-related activism in Japan and Korea titled *This Island is Ours* (2016). His second monograph, which explores the role of non-state actors in Northeast Asia's territorial disputes, is scheduled to be published in 2020. Alexander holds an LLM in International Law from the University of Tokyo and a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Pongphisoot Busbarat is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Chulalongkorn University. His research interests include Thai foreign policy, mainland Southeast Asia's relations with great powers and ideational approaches to International Relations. Before joining Chulalongkorn, Paul conducted research and taught at various institutions including ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Columbia University, Sydney University and The Australian National University (ANU). He is working on a manuscript examining Thailand's self-identification with China and the United States and its influence on Thai foreign policy postures towards both powers. Paul holds a PhD from ANU and Master's degrees from Columbia and Cambridge.

Barry Buzan is a Fellow of the British Academy, Emeritus Professor in the LSE Department of International Relations and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. He was formerly Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations, LSE. Among his books are, with Richard Little, *International Systems in World History* (2000); with Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers* (2003); *From International to World Society?* (2004); with Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (2009); *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations* (2014); and, with George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International*

Relations (2015). Among his articles is a trilogy of pieces in the *Chinese Journal of International Politics* exploring the possibilities for China's 'peaceful rise'.

Jennifer Chan is an Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. She graduated from Stanford University (PhD and MA), the University of Cologne (Community of European Schools), Hautes Etudes Commerciales in France (MBA) and the University of Hong Kong (B Soc Sc). Her research interests are human rights, global public health, social movements, gender, anti-racism, multiculturalism and film studies. Her publications include *Politics in the Corridor of Dying: AIDS Activism and Global Health Governance* (2015), *Another Japan is Possible: New Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education* (2008) and *Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan: Global Norms and Domestic Networks* (2004).

Sreeram Chaulia is Professor and Dean at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, in Sonapat, India. He is a leading opinion columnist for Indian newspapers- The Economic Times and The Asian Age- on world affairs and a commentator on international current issues on radio and television. He is a contributing editor for *People Who Influenced the World* (Murray Books, Adelaide, 2005), and has authored *International Organizations and Civilian Protection: Power, Ideas and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones* (I.B. Tauris, London, 2011), *Politics of the Global Economic Crisis: Regulation, Responsibility and Radicalism* (Routledge, New Delhi, London & New York, 2013) and *Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India's Prime Minister* (Bloomsbury, 2016). His latest book *Trumped: Emerging Powers in a Post-American World* was published by Bloomsbury in October.

Bruce Cumings is Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor of History and the College at the University of Chicago. His research and teaching focus on modern Korean history, twentieth century international history, US–East Asian relations, East Asian political economy, and American foreign relations. His first book, *The Origins of the Korean War*, won the John King Fairbank Book Award of the American Historical Association, and the second volume of this study won the Quincy Wright Book Award of the International Studies Association. He is the editor of the modern volume of the *Cambridge History of Korea* (forthcoming) and is a frequent contributor to the *London Review of Books*, *the Nation*, *Current History*, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and *Le Monde Diplomatique*. He was also the principal historical consultant for the Thames Television/PBS 6-hour documentary, *Korea: The Unknown War*. In 2003 he won the University of Chicago's award for Excellence in Graduate Teaching, and in 2007 he won the Kim Dae Jung Prize for Scholarly Contributions to Democracy, Human Rights and Peace.

Timur Dadabaev is a Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Special Program in Japanese and Eurasian Studies at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba. He has published in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *The Pacific Review*, *Nationalities Papers*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *Asian Survey*, *Inner Asia*, *Central Asian Survey*, *Asian Affairs*, *Strategic Analysis*, *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, *Cambridge Journal of Eurasian Studies* and others. His latest monographs are *Transcontinental Silk Road Strategies: Comparing China, Japan and South Korea in Uzbekistan* (2019), *Chinese, Japanese and Korean In-roads into Central Asia: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Cooperation Road Maps for Uzbekistan* (Policy Studies Series, Honolulu: East West Center (2019), *Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (2015) and *Japan in Central Asia* (2016). His edited volumes include *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan: Life and Politics during the Soviet Era* (co-edited with Hisao Komatsu, 2017) and *Social Capital Construction and Governance in Central Asia: Communities and NGOs in post-Soviet Uzbekistan* (co-edited with Yutaka Tsujinaka, 2017).

Sebastian von Einsiedel was appointed to the post of UN University's Vice-Rector in Europe in September 2018. He previously served as the founding Director of UN University's Centre for Policy Research, based in Tokyo, from 2014–18. Prior to joining UNU, Sebastian worked in and around the United Nations for close to 15 years, including with the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN Mission to Nepal and the International Peace Institute. He has published widely on the UN's role in peace and security.

Yong-Soo Eun is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Hanyang University and the Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge series *IR Theory and Practice in Asia*. Yong-Soo is broadly interested in IR theory, pluralism in social and international studies, Global IR, philosophy of social science and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. He is the author of *What Is at Stake in Building 'Non-Western' IR Theory?* (2018) and the co-editor of *Regionalizing Global Crises* (2014). His work has also been published in *Review of International Studies*, *Perspectives on Politics* and *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, among others.

Tony Fielding is a Research Professor at the University of Sussex, Brighton. He was awarded a PhD in Applied Geography from the London School of Economics, and spent most of his academic career teaching geography and the social sciences at the University of Sussex. He was appointed Visiting Professor in Japan on four occasions – three of them at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, and once at Kyoto University. While at Sussex, he held the posts of Head of

Department, Director of the Centre for Urban and Regional Research and Social Science Exam Board Chair. His main research interests are migration, urban and regional development, links between social and geographical mobility and the geopolitics of international migration in the UK, the EU and East Asia.

Peshan R. Gunaratne is a State Counsel at the Attorney General's Department of Sri Lanka and was an adviser to Professor G. L. Peiris, the former Minister of External Affairs. He is also a Visiting Lecturer in international relations at the Department of International Relations and the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Colombo. He has also conducted guest lectures at the Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute and the Army Staff College, Sri Lanka. His research interests include international security, foreign policy, international law and Asia-Pacific studies.

Peshan holds both a BA and MA in international relations from the University of Colombo, an LLB from the University of London and Attorneys-at-Law from the Sri Lanka Law College. Peshan is an alumnus of The Fund for American Studies and a life member of the Bar Association and the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka.

Ryan Hartley is a Lecturer in Tohoku University's Graduate School of Economics and Management. His research focuses on Japan's foreign policy, especially politico-economic foreign policy in the Mekong sub-region of Southeast Asia. He is especially interested in taking a critical approach to East Asia's political economy, seeking to discern the ways in which history, institutions and ideas underpin developing trends in the region. At present, he is focused on Myanmar. A number of recent publications on the topic are: 'The Evolution of Japan–Myanmar Relations since 1988', 'Japan's Rush to Rejuvenate Burma Relations: A Critical Reading of Post-2011 Efforts to Create "New Old Friends"' and 'Japan's Early Twentieth Century Entry into Burma and British Perceptions (and Misperceptions) of the Friend that Became a Foe, 1903–1943: A Case Study in the Global Blindspot'.

Yee-Kuang Heng is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo. Before joining UTokyo, he was Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, where he also served as Assistant Dean for Research. Heng graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) with a BSc (First Class Honours) and subsequently PhD in International Relations funded by a British government research scholarship. After completing his PhD, he held faculty positions lecturing at Trinity College Dublin (2004–7) and the University of St Andrews (2007–11). Heng's research interests range from the transformation of warfare and the use of force and the globalisation of risk and security studies to soft power in the Asia-Pacific. His work comprises peer-reviewed articles in

journals such as *Security Dialogue*, *Review of International Studies*, *Global Governance*, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* and *Journal of Strategic Studies*. His books include *Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Missions* (co-edited with Chiyuki Aoi, 2014) and, most recently, *Managing Global Risks in the Urban Age: Singapore and the Making of a Global City* (2016).

Carolina Hernandez is a Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of the Philippines (Diliman) and Founding President of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS Philippines). Awarded in 1979 of a PhD in Political Science at the State University of New York (Buffalo), she wrote a pioneering study in “Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines: 1945–1976”. Widely published in democratic civil-military relations, democracy, East Asian regionalism, Human Rights, security and security sector reform, her most recent co-edited work with Eun Mee Kim, Yoichi Mine and Ren Xiao is *Human Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in East Asia* (Palgrave Macmillan USA 2019). She served in the governing bodies of various regional and global institutions including the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Global Development Network, Global Center for Cooperative Security, Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She also served in the UN Secretary – General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters which she chaired in 2009.

Jonathan Holslag teaches international politics at the Free University Brussels as well as to various defence academies as a guest lecturer. His latest books are *Silk Road Trap* (Polity, 2019) and *A Political History of the World* (Penguin, 2018).

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao is currently Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Chair Professor of the College of Hakka Studies, National Central University and Chairman of the Taiwan–Asia Exchange Foundation. He is also serving as Senior Advisor to the President of Taiwan. Professor Hsiao’s research areas include the middle class, civil society and democratisation experiences in Asia, Taiwan’s environmental movements and transition to a low-carbon society and comparative studies of Hakka ethnic identity in Taiwan and Southeast Asia. His most recent books are *Middle Class, Civil Society, and Democracy in Asia* (editor, 2019), *China’s Footprints in Southeast Asia* (co-editor, 2018,) and *Comparing Hakka Ethnic Identity in Taiwan and Southeast Asia* (editor, 2017).

Liang-Chi Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, current Penn Kemble Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy and Adjunct Fellow at the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. He previously served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute and National Security

Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to those positions, he was the Editor of *China Brief* at The Jamestown Foundation from October 2007 to July 2011 and a Special Associate in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. While in law school, he clerked within the Office of the Chairman at the Federal Communications Commission and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center at the Office of the US Trade Representative. Mr. Hsiao received his JD and certificate from the Law and Technology Institute at the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, where he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the *Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology*.

Kaoru Ishiguro is a Professor at the Graduate School of Economics at Kobe University. His research area is the international political economy, on which he has published 'TPP Negotiations and Political Economy Reforms in Japan's Executive Policy Making: A Two-Level Game Analysis' in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (2017). He is co-author of *Games of International Conflict and Cooperation in Asia* (2017) and *Emerging Risks in a World of Heterogeneity: Interactions among Countries with Different Sizes, Politics and Societies* (2018). He is currently working on a book manuscript, *Trade Negotiations and Divided Government in Japan: A Two-Level Game Approach*, which presents a theoretical framework for international negotiations and a divided government in Japan and investigates the effect a divided government has on Japan's trade negotiations.

Purnendra Jain is a Professor and former Head of Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide. His main research focus has been on contemporary Japanese politics and foreign policy. He has also researched and written extensively on Japan–India relations, Australia–Asia relations, subnational governments, regionalism and regional institutions, energy and foreign aid issues and comparative studies of the politics and foreign policy of Japan, China and India. The editor and author of 15 books, his research results have also been published in such journals as *Asian Survey*, *Pacific Review*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, *Japan Forum*, *Japanese Studies*, *Leviathan*, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* and *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*. He is a former president of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia (2003–5), the Asian Studies Association of Australia (2010–12) and co-convenor of the 9th International Convention of Asian Scholars (ICAS9), Adelaide, 2015.

Ken Kotani is a Professor at the College of Risk Management at Nihon University. He obtained his MA from King's College London and PhD from Kyoto University. He served for 12 years as Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan and was a Visiting Research Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, 2008–9, and Visiting Lecturer of the National Defense Academy, Japan in 2011–17. His major field of study is

intelligence history in World War II and the Cold War. He is the author of *Japanese Intelligence in World War II* (2009) and co-author of *Intelligence Elsewhere* (2013) and *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* (2014).

Yuichi Kubota is Associate Professor at the Faculty of International Studies and Regional Development, University of Niigata Prefecture (PhD in Political Science, University at Albany, State University of New York, 2012). His research interests are in civil war, public opinion and political economy of development in the Asia-Pacific, and his recent publications include ‘Politicization Effect of Wartime Service Provision on Public Opinion in the FATA, Pakistan: Who Favors Democratic Reforms?’ (*Asian Survey*), ‘The Rebel Economy in Civil War: Informality, Civil Networks, and Regulation Strategies’ (*International Studies Review*), ‘Nonviolent Interference in Civic Life during Civil War: Rebel Service Provision and Postwar Norms of Interpersonal Trustworthiness in Sri Lanka’ (*Security Studies*) and ‘Imagined Statehood: Wartime Rebel Governance and Post-war Subnational Identity in Sri Lanka’ (*World Development*). He is the author of *Armed Groups in Cambodian Civil War: Territorial Control, Rivalry, and Recruitment* (2013).

Lien Thi Quynh Le is a Lecturer at the College of Economics, Hue University, Vietnam. She received her Master’s degree and PhD from Nagaoka University of Technology, Japan. She has published mainly on international regimes and global governance. Her most recent book is *The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global* (co-author, 2019). Her current research interests include the quantitative methods for the analysis and understanding of the structure and the effectiveness of the global governance regimes. Amongst these, the social network analysis perspective for the understanding of structure and relations between sovereign states, multilateral institutions or international organizations is particularly interested.

David M. Malone is a scholar and occasional practitioner in the fields of peace and security, development and law. He has served as Canadian ambassador to the UN, Nepal and Bhutan, as Canada’s High Commissioner to India and as President of the International Development Research Centre. Today, he serves as Rector of the UN University, headquartered in Tokyo, and as an Under-Secretary-General of the UN.

Ayako Masuhara is a Professor in the Faculty of International Relations at Asia University, Japan. In 2007, she submitted her Ph. D. dissertation to the University of Tokyo and published it under the title, *The End of Personal Rule in Indonesia: Golkar and the Transformation of the Suharto Regime* (Kyoto University Press, 2015). Recently, she has published papers on defense policy, civil-military relations, and social welfare in democratizing Indonesia.

Meron Medzini is a Jerusalem-born, Visiting Associate Professor (Emeritus) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He obtained his BA from City University of New York, his MA from Georgetown and his PhD from Harvard. He taught at the Hebrew University for almost half a century. He is the author of six books and over 70 articles in academic publications in Israel and abroad. He specialised in Israel's foreign policy with a focus on Israel's relations with Asian states. His biography of Golda Meir (2017) won the Israel Prime Minister's Prize. He also taught at Tel Aviv and Haifa Universities in Israel and lectured at many universities overseas.

Paul Midford is Director, NTNU Japan Program (since 2005). He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University (2001). He was a Monbusho scholar at Aoyama Gakuin University during 1992-1994 and has worked at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) and the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), all in Tokyo, Japan. He taught international and comparative politics at Japanese universities for more than seven years, including Kanazawa University, Hokuriku University and Kwansai Gakuin University. In total, he spent over ten years teaching and conducting research in Japan. His research focuses on East Asian regional international politics and security, Japanese foreign policy, and especially Japanese defense policy. Besides teaching Japanese politics, his recent research focuses on how Japanese public opinion and political parties are influencing Japan's evolving security strategy.

Satoru Miyamoto is a Professor at Seigakuin University. His expertise is North Korean studies, security in Northeast Asia, civil-military relations, and nuclear deterrence. He is the author of many research papers about North Korean politics, diplomacy, and military. He is a famous researcher in Japan in the politics and international relations of North Korea. He also attempts to establish empirical studies of North Korea in history and political science. He received a master's degree at Seoul National University and a doctorate at Kobe University. He is fluent in Japanese, Korean, and English.

Brittany L. Morreale is a PhD student at Adelaide University, conducting research as part of the Asian Studies department. She graduated with distinction from the US Air Force Academy in 2010 with a Bachelor's degree in physics and a minor in Japanese studies. She was subsequently awarded a Rhodes Scholarship, leading to her 2012 Master's degree in social and cultural anthropology from Oxford University. Her current research focuses on the paradigms of Asian development cooperation in Africa.

Mehdi Mozaffari is an Emeritus Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. He is Dr d'Etat en science politique from the University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne and has been a Lecturer at the same

university. He is diplômé de l'Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales, Paris (1967) and diplômé de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (1966). He has taught at different universities (Tehran, Paris 1, Grenoble, Catania and Aarhus) and has been a Visiting Scholar in Geneva and MGIMO/Moscow and a Senior Fellow at Harvard University. Mozaffari is the author, co-author and editor of a number of academic books and articles, including: *Pouvoir Shî'ite: Théorie et Evolution* (1998), 'The Role of Ideology in Iranian Foreign Policy', in *IRAN and the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century* (2013) and *Islamism: A New Totalitarianism* (2017).

Rohan Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, with a joint appointment by courtesy at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Previously, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program and a non-resident Visiting Fellow at the United Nations University in Tokyo. His research focuses on the grand strategies of rising powers and their impact on international security and order, with an empirical specialisation in South Asia and East Asia. He is the co-editor of *Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century* (2016). His research has been published in journals such as *International Affairs*, *Asian Security*, *Survival*, *Global Governance*, *India Review* and *International Journal*, as well as in edited volumes from academic presses such as Oxford, Cambridge, Stanford, University of North Carolina and Brookings.

Maung Aung Myoe is a Professor of International Relations at the International University of Japan (IUJ). Before his current position, he worked in the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He earned his PhD in Political Science and International Relations from The Australian National University. His research interests are civil–military relations, regional security in Southeast Asia and the government and politics in Myanmar. His publications include books, articles and chapters on Myanmar's foreign relations and military. He teaches foreign policy analysis, diplomacy and statecraft, security and strategy in international relations and international relations in Southeast Asia.

Edward Newman is Professor of International Security in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. Within the security-studies field, his interests lie in a number of areas: theoretical security studies, including critical approaches and 'human security'; intrastate armed conflict, intervention and political violence; international organisations and multilateralism; and peace-building and reconstruction in conflict-prone and post-conflict societies. He previously worked in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham and, before that, he spent over a decade in Japan,

mainly working at the United Nations University where he was Director of Studies on Conflict and Security in the Peace and Governance Programme. He is a founding executive editor of the journal *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* and a member of the editorial board of *Contemporary Politics*. His latest book is *Understanding Civil Wars: Continuity and Change in Intra-State Conflict*.

Ankit Panda is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists and a senior editor at *The Diplomat*. He is also an independent researcher.

Aparna Pande is Director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC. Her major field of interest is South Asia with a special focus on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Foreign and Security Policy. Born in India, Pande received her Bachelor's and Master's degrees in History from St. Stephens College at Delhi University before receiving an M. Phil in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She completed her Ph.D. in Political Science at Boston University in the United States. Aparna Pande's books include '*From Chanakya to Modi: The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy*' (Harper Collins, 2017), '*Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India*' (Routledge, 2010) and '*Contemporary Handbook on Pakistan*' (ed.) (Routledge, 2017).

Lam Peng Er is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained his Ph.D. from Columbia University. Lam has published in journals such as *Pacific Affairs*, *Asian Survey*, and *Japan Forum*. His single authored books are *Japan's Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role* (2009) and *Green Politics in Japan* (1999), both published by Routledge. Lam's latest edited volume is *China–Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Antagonism Despite Interdependency* (2017) published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Uddhab Prasad Pyakurel, a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, teaches political sociology at School of Arts, Kathmandu University. He often contributes articles to journals and local newspapers on poverty, people's participation, social inclusion/exclusion, state restructuring, micro-credit, gender, conflict, identity, democracy, election, Nepal's foreign relations and other socio-political issues. In addition, he is the author of the book *Maoist Movement in Nepal: A Sociological Perspective* (2007); co-author of the books *Nepal–India Open Border: Problems and Prospects* (2016), *Dalit Representation in National Politics of Nepal* (2012) and *State of Conflict and Democratic Movement in Nepal* (2013); editor of the monograph *Higher Education in Nepal: Inclusive Policy Guidelines* (2014); and one of the editors of the *Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies*.

Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He is also Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Previously, he has taught at Visva Bharati University at Santiniketan, West Bengal and also at Presidency College, Kolkata. He completed his PhD at the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He was also a Junior Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Studies at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. He is on the editorial board of Oxford Bibliographies (dealing with military history) and a member of Indian National Science Academy's Research Council. Roy specialises in Eurasian military history of the modern period. He has worked extensively on both conventional and unconventional wars of the pre-modern, early-modern and present eras. He has published many books and chapters in edited volumes published by Ashgate, Bloomsbury, Cambridge University Press, E.J. Brill, Oxford University Press, Pickering & Chatto, Routledge, etc. He has also published articles in various peer-reviewed journals. He is also one of the editors of Routledge's *War and Society in South Asia* and *Wars and Battles of the World* series.

Kosuke Shimizu is Professor of International Relations and the Director of the Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Kyoto. He is currently working on critical theories, non-Western IRT and the philosophy of the Kyoto School. His recent English publications include *Multiculturalism and Conflict Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific: Migration, Language and Politics* (co-edited with William S. Bradley, 2014), "Materialising the "Non-Western": Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-War Period", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2015).

Tomohito Shinoda is Professor of International Relations at the International University of Japan. He received his PhD from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. His research covers Japan's politics and foreign policy, international relations in East Asia and United States–Japan relations. His publication includes *Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shift* (2013), *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach in Foreign and Defense Affairs* (2007), *Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister* (2000) and *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia* (1998).

Oliver Stuenkel is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, a columnist for *El País* and *Americas Quarterly* and a commentator at GloboNews. His research focuses on rising powers, global order and Brazilian foreign policy. He is the author of the *IBSA: The Rise of the Global South?* (2014), *The BRICS and the*

Future of Global Order (2015) and *Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order* (2016).

Carlyle Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra and Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered in Australia that provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer was educated at Brown, holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale and a PhD in International Relations from The Australian National University. He is a Southeast Asia regional specialist with a research focus on Vietnamese domestic politics, the role of the military, foreign policy and maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Stein Tønneson is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), associate editor for Asia in the *Journal of Peace Research*, and member of the editorial board of *Global Asia*. His areas of research are peace in East Asia, nation-building in Southeast Asia, conflict in the South China Sea, revolution and war in Vietnam, and the role of social media in armed conflicts in Myanmar. During 2011–17 he led the East Asian Peace program at the University of Uppsala, and published his monograph *Explaining the East Asian Peace* (NIAS Press 2017) as well as the book chapter ‘Peace by Development’ in E. Bjarnegård & J. Kreutz, eds. *Debating the East Asian Peace* (NIAS Press, 2017).

Motohiro Tsuchiya is a Professor at the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University and has served as Dean at Keio University Faculty of Policy Management since 2019. He specialises in cybersecurity and other cyber issues. He joined the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace as Commissioner in January 2018. He is also Senior Adviser of the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. He authored *Intelligence and National Security* (2007, in Japanese), *Cyber Terror* (2012, in Japanese), *Cyber Security and International Relations* (2015, in Japanese) and co-authored *Cybersecurity: Public Sector Threats and Responses* (2012) and 30 other books. He earned his BA in political science, MA in international relations and PhD in media and governance from Keio University.

Takeshi Uemura is a Senior Assistant Professor at Meiji University, Japan. He specializes in cultural constructivism and is particularly interested in applying network theory in international relations. Relevant works include: “Understanding Chinese Foreign Relations – proposing a cultural constructivist approach”, *International Studies Perspectives* 16 (3): 345–365.

Michael Wesley is Deputy Vice-Chancellor (International) at the University of Melbourne. Previously he was Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University; Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy; Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University; and Assistant Director-General for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Assessments, the Australian government's peak intelligence agency. His research interests include Australian foreign policy, security dynamics in Asia and the Pacific, and the politics of statebuilding interventions. His 2011 book, *There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise of Asia* won the John Button Prize for the best writing on Australian politics and public policy. Professor Wesley holds a B.A. (Hons) from the University of Queensland and a PhD from the University of St. Andrews.

Alan Hao Yang is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University. He is also Executive Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) and Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF). Dr Yang is a specialist in Southeast Asia regionalism and Sino-Southeast Asian relations. His research interests cover soft power and foreign policy, security governance and disaster preparedness, the politics of resistance and border issues in Southeast Asia. He engages in track II diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and in Southeast Asia through CSCAP networks.

Anthony Yazaki is a Publications Editor at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He previously served as a Research Fellow at the UN University Centre for Policy Research and as a Producer for the Washington Bureau of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), where he covered US foreign policy.

Zheng Yongnian is a Professor of Political Science at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He is Editor of Series on *Contemporary China* (World Scientific Publishing) and Editor of *China Policy Series* (Routledge). He is also the Editor of *China: An International Journal* and the co-editor of *East Asian Policy*. He has studied both China's transformation and its external relations. His papers have appeared in journals such as *Comparative Political Studies*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Third World Quarterly* and *China Quarterly*. He is the author of numerous books, including *Market in State*, *The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor*, *Technological Empowerment*, *De Facto Federalism in China*, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China*, and *Globalization and State Transformation in China*, and coeditor of dozens of books on China's domestic development and international relations.

Ayşe Zarakol is Reader in International Relations in the POLIS Department and a Fellow at Emmanuel College. Dr. Zarakol's primary research interests are in

international security (with an emphasis on approaches rooted in social theory and historical sociology). More specifically, she works on the evolution of East and West relations in the international order, declining and rising powers, and politics of non-Western regional powers. She is the author of *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no.118, Cambridge University Press, 2011), published with a new introduction in Turkish as *Yenilgiden Sonra: Doğu Batı ile Yaşamayı Nasıl Öğrendi* (Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012). Her articles have appeared in journals such as *International Organization*, *International Theory*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *European Journal of International Relations*, *Review of International Studies*, among many others. Her research has been supported by a number of academic and government institutions in the UK, North America and Europe, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the European Research Council. Her most recent book is *Hierarchies in World Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no.144, Cambridge University Press, 2017), runner-up for the 2019 ISA Theory section prize. Dr. Zarakol is currently an Associate Editor at the *Journal of Global Security Studies*, a Series Editor for the Palgrave Studies in International Relations and the section chair for the Historical International Relations Section of the ISA.

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Introduction

Takashi Inoguchi

When empires dominated the globe more or less in separation from each other, they could boast of their supremacy with ease. When King of England George III sent his emissary Lord McCartney to Qing Emperor Qianlong in Peking in 1793, Lord McCartney received the following response from Qianlong:

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufacturers. This is then my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute. Envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. Besides making gifts (of which I enclose an inventory) to each member of your Mission, I confer upon you, O King, valuable presents in excess of the number usually bestowed on such occasions. Do you reverently receive them and take note of my tender goodwill towards you! A special mandate. (quoted in MacNair, 1967)

More than 225 years ago, the picture of Asian foreign policy was entirely different. The imperial worldview did not know the concept of foreign policy and international relations among sovereign states in the Westphalian sense. The practice during those times was for the Qing Emperor to accept a neighboring country's chieftain and appoint him king of said country after the chieftain had

pledged ongoing tributes and unswerving loyalty. The mandate to rule the country came from the Emperor and was ruled on the Emperor's behalf.

In 2018, the foreign policy and international relations of sovereign states are largely based on membership of the United Nations, which consists of all the victorious states in World War II and newly independent colonial states. Those states that struggled through civil-cum-independence wars, such as the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, joined the United Nations later, whereas the defeated states of World War II, Germany, and Japan, joined the United Nations in the 1950s. Most Asian colonies gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union's former member states gained their independence in 1991 after their separation from the Russian Federation. Asia as a region refers to 29 states located in what is called East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong as China's Specially Administered Region), Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Brunei), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia). This *Handbook* also deals with Asia's adjacent states, such as the Russian Federation, Australia, and the United States as well as Iran, Turkey, and Israel. These countries are Asia's close neighbors.

With the geographical coverage of Asia in this *Handbook* made clear, I quote the United Nations Charter's Preamble and President Donald Trump's Remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly as comparisons with Emperor Qianlong's response to King George III. Both capture and reflect the atmosphere of their times.

The United Nations Charter Preamble, signed in 1945

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
- to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
- to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

- to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
- to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
- to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institutions of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
- to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP TO THE 73RD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2018

One year ago, I stood before you for the first time in this grand hall. I addressed the threats facing our world, and I presented a vision to achieve a brighter future for all of humanity.

Today, I stand before the United Nations General Assembly to share the extraordinary progress we've made.

In less than two years, my administration has accomplished more than almost any administration in the history of our country. ...

Each of us here today is the emissary of a distinct culture, a rich history, and a people bound together by ties of memory, tradition, and the values that make our homelands like nowhere else on Earth.

That is why America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination.

I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions. The United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship.

We only ask that you honor our sovereignty in return. ...

So together, let us choose a future of patriotism, prosperity, and pride. Let us choose peace and freedom over dominance and defeat. And let us come here to this place to stand for our people and their nations, forever strong, forever sovereign, forever just, and forever thankful for the grace and the goodness and the glory of God.

Thank you. God bless you, And God bless the nations of the world.

Thank you very much. Thank you.

Why do I juxtapose three quotes in this Introduction to *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*? Because Asian foreign policy in the first quarter of the 21st century contains some elements of what they tell readers about the arenas of international relations in the late 18th century, the mid-20th century, and the early 21st century. Qianlong distinctively conveys a relaxed imperial mode, giving the impression that Qing stands high above everyone else who comes to express submission and tribute from near and afar. The UN Charter impresses on

its readers the resolve of the UN to defend peace and human rights after the two calamitous wars fought in the first half of the 20th century. Trump is of a markedly American style of fighting to fundamentally redress what he regards as the foolhardy policy of his predecessors.

In order to understand Asian foreign policy, one needs both eyes and ears to distinguish the subtle signs and symbols from often blatant actions, and in order to analyze Asian foreign policy one needs to throw away some of the conventional knowledge and hearsay evidence. As we witness daily, Asian foreign policy is unfolding in diverse and often unconventional ways. Asia's terrain is rough and its memory and instincts die hard. Even though in many ways the last two centuries (from the late 18th century through the first quarter of the 21st century) were long and painful, the evolution of country actors occurred as if in twenty blinks of the eye.

From this angle, such works as Robert Cooper's *The Breaking of Nations* (2004) may not be the best guide to Asian foreign policy. Cooper argues that in discussing international relations one must start to distinguish three distinctive regions: 1) those which can be called post-modern, 2) those which can be called modern, and 3) those which can be called pre-modern. Cooper assigns Europe and the G7 to the post-modern, Asia and Latin America to modern, and Africa and the Middle East to pre-modern. I gather that his criteria of distinction for these three regions of the world are per capita income level, government stability, social harmony, peace with neighbors, volume of business transactions and communications, scientific discovery and technological innovations, and, no less important, the whole package of geography, history, and philosophy. My view is that it may shed light on how the pre-2008 world functioned and how the tripartite division gave comfort and consolation to each of the three groupings because they were interdependent but not too much. From the late 20th century through the early 21st century, each grouping has experienced a huge self-metamorphosis. What has driven this metamorphosis? My answer is globalization and digitalization in society. The tides of these two forces coming from within and without have led the world to become what some may feel is too closely connected and mutually vulnerable.

In a similar vein, this introduction must also include some ethical remarks about the late Samuel Huntington (1997) on civilizational clash, because Asia throughout the 20th century (and before and beyond) reverberated with strong anti-colonial and nationalist ideas and sentiments. It was not so long ago when Rabindranath Tagore, Sun Yat-sen, Ikki Kita, Ho Chi Minh, Mahendra Gandhi, Sukarno, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Mao Zedong, Subhas Chandra Bose, and many others crowded the headlines of newspapers as anti-colonial and nationalist ideologues and heroes in Asia. Huntington's thesis is that instead of might, wealth, and ideology (i.e., the Cold War set of three drivers), the post-Cold War world evolves with religion-centered civilizations that have become a new and key driver, dividing the world along new fault lines. Huntington's

core assumptions are: 1) the publics of member states will affiliate more strongly with the core states of their civilization than the public of other civilizations; 2) as the religiosity within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perception of out-civilization core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate; 3) as nationalism within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilizations core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate; and 4) as exposure to foreign cultures within given member-state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilizations core states, *ceteris paribus*, will deteriorate. Chris Collet and I empirically tested these hypotheses based on data gathered from the Asia-wide survey called the AsiaBarometer. The result was very weak (Collet and Inoguchi, 2012). Huntington's weakness is unveiled when one notices the difficulty of gauging religiosity and cultures in general among populations. The whole complexity of cultures defies measurement. Another, no less important, point is the same I raise with Cooper's analysis (2004) – that is, the tides of globalization and digitalization are key drivers. However, one merit of Huntington's focus is that the role of religion has been steadily increasing with the new millennium, according to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) and Robert Putnam and David Campbell (2012).

The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy is unique in that Volume I deals with theories and themes pertaining to politics within, among, and beyond nations. By theories I mean such intellectual traditions as realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical schools of thought – and the labeling of leading schools of thought has, over 15–25-year cycles, like business cycles, reflected experts' and pundits' thinking. By themes I mean key subjects that do not necessarily fit easily with theories but are pronounced in Asian realities. By 'within' I mean domestic politics, by 'among' international politics, and by 'beyond' transnational politics. This means that the *Handbook* not only examines foreign policy and international relations but also touches on domestic politics and transnational politics. Volume II deals with Asia's country-specific foreign policies, following the more traditional approach. Moreover, toward the end of Volume II, some key bilateral relations and comparisons are considered in an effort to make up for some blind spots.

In completing the editing of *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*, I have incurred a huge number of debts. Asian foreign policy is a new genre of study. As a matter of fact, this *Handbook* is the first of its kind to try and go beyond the concatenation of country-specific foreign policies in Asia. In order to acknowledge my debts properly, I have to briefly go back to my graduate student days. This will inform readers how many belts and roads I have trod in Asia. From my years as a graduate student, the late Shinkichi Eto, the late Hiroharu Seki, the late Lucian W. Pye, Gungwu Wang, and Alexander Woodside were among those encouraging me to study Asia and Asian languages.

Although I never claim to have become competent in any Asian languages, except for my mother tongue, I did study Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Thai, and Russian during periods teaching courses in universities in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Jogjakarta, Singapore, New Delhi, and Canberra and participating in conferences and joint projects in various places in Asia. One big research project on Japanese political economy concluded with the publication in the late 1980s and early 1990s of three books from Stanford University Press under the leadership of Yasusuke Murakami and Hugh Patrick, with Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, and Shumpei Kumon and Henry Rosovsky as co-editors. This encouraged and prompted me to study Asian countries other than Japan.

On the ever increasing number of schools of international relations, I fondly recall the late Hayward R. Alker, Robert Keohane, Peter Katzenstein, and Stephen Krasner and their characteristically forceful impact on my thinking. In the mid 1990s, I spent two productive years at the United Nations University, Tokyo Headquarters as Senior Vice Rector, appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. By 'productive' I mean that I was responsible for running the United Nations University Press and learnt how to produce books during my tenure there. Peter Katzenstein gave me another learning-by-doing opportunity at the US Social Science Research Council Committee on Peace and Security: it enabled me to hold a conference that led to the publication of *American Democracy Promotion* (Oxford University Press, 2000, co-edited with Michael Cox and G. John Ikenberry). For the conference and its subsequent publication I owe a debt also to Bruce Russett, Davis Bobrow, and, no less importantly, Steve Smith. In 2000, I was very fortunate to be given a scientific-research grant by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for the comparative study of democracy through opinion polls in Asia and Europe. The team, consisting of Jean Blondel, Ian Marsh, Richard Sinnott, Ikuo Kabashima, and myself, published four books on the subject from Routledge in the 2000s (e.g., Inoguchi/Marsh, 2008).

In the early 2000s, Chung-si Ahn and I established the Asian Consortium for Political Research (ACPR) as secretary general and president respectively. Its secretariat was located at the Japan Institute of Seoul National University. Meanwhile, a number of Asian universities joined the ACPR to hold annual academic conferences in Seoul, Tokyo, Fudan, and other places, and to publish annual newsletters from Seoul. Two books were published under the auspices of the ACPR, one co-edited by Baogang He, Brian Galligan, and myself, from Edward Elgar (He et al., 2007), while the other, edited by Chung-si Ahn, was published by Marshall Cavendish Academic. The Great Recession took place worldwide in 2008, and subsequently the ACPR secretariat relocated to Tokyo in 2009 with Keiichi Tsunekawa as secretary general.

In 2005, again thanks to a JSPS scientific grant, I started what became the 32-country polling study project on the quality of life (QOL) in Asia, still the

largest QOL study in Asia. Doh Chull Shin, Seiji Fujii, Yasuharu Tokuda, and myself have authored, co-authored, or co-edited books on the subject for Springer (e.g., Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013; Inoguchi, 2017). And in 2013, Lien T. Q. Le and I launched a project on multilateral treaties and global quasi-legislative behavior, including a book from Springer focusing on Asian states (Inoguchi and Le, 2019).

My contributions to encyclopedias, references, and handbooks have grown since the turn of the century. Examples include the *Oxford Handbook on Political Behavior*, edited by Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (2007), *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonaldo Morlino (2007), *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*, edited by Alex Michalos (2014), the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* from Elsevier, (second edition) edited by James Wright (2015), and the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations*, edited by William Thompson (2018). Aside from research and book publications, I am the founding editor of three journals: *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* (Oxford University Press, 2000–5), the *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (Cambridge University Press, 2000–18), and the *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* (Sage Publications, 2016–). All three journals focus on Asia from various angles and through different methods.

And now, most importantly, I have come to *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*. I express my heartfelt gratitude to Delia Alfonso and her colleagues at Sage Publications, including Umeeka Raichura, Colette Wilson, Chazelle Keeton and Manmeet Kaur Tura, who heroically saved the project from drowning. Purnendra Jain helped and advised me beyond the call of duty. Edward Newman and Aparna Pande undertook an eleventh-hour rescue review operation. In addition, Yongnian Zheng, Tsuneo Akaha, Purnendra Jain, Tomohito Shinoda, Peng Er Lam, Imtiaz Ahmad, and Ayse Zarakol all advised me on the review process. When, back in early 2016, I accepted Sage's offer to undertake this *Handbook*, I did so with great delight at the opportunity to know Asia better and, more importantly, to have the world know Asia better. Although on a couple of occasions my apprehension grew about how many chapters would reach my desk and how fast, my curiosity about Asia kept expanding and my positive voice ultimately overwhelmed my negative voice. It would not be inappropriate to say that, witnessing the incessant onslaught of aggressive words flying between capital cities and across oceans and continents in 2017–18, I secretly thought that I wouldn't regret spending so much time on this *Handbook*. The subjects of Asian foreign policy have continued to crowd TV news and newspaper headlines. At least what used to be unknown unknowns have gradually shifted, though only a little, to become known unknowns, and, with luck, they will become known knowns. Lastly, but most importantly, I acknowledge my greatest debt, to all the contributors to this *Handbook*.

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PART I

Theories



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The Dual Encounter: Parallels in the Rise of China (1978–) and Japan (1868–1945)

Barry Buzan

INTRODUCTION

Relations between China and Japan have been difficult at least since Hideyoshi's brutal invasions of Korea during the 1590s, when Japan aimed to overthrow the Ming dynasty. Since the 1980s, the focus of bad blood between them has been on Japan's imperialist abuse of China from 1894, specifically on its savage invasion and occupation of much of China from 1937–45. This 'history problem' is in some ways quite generally rooted in a long history of alienation, but its contemporary form focuses on a small number of highly symbolic issues: the Nanjing Massacre of 1937–8; the Yasukuni Shrine and visits to it by high-ranking Japanese politicians; the barbaric practices of Japan's unit 731, which conducted medical experiments on some 3,000 Chinese people; the content of school history textbooks, particularly Japanese ones; and a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands stemming from the 19th century, and a partly related but more recent one over maritime boundaries.¹

But although the history problem between China and Japan is in one sense long-standing and empirical, in another it is a political construction that can be heightened or lowered by the actions of opinion-formers. During the Maoist period, China–Japan relations were not dominated by history issues, and up until the 1970s China did not demand reparations or apologies from Japan and tried to seduce it away from the United States. For a time, Deng Xiaoping cultivated good relations with Japan as part of his pursuit of a stable environment for China's economic development (Kissinger, 2011: 356–67), but this broke down in the late 1980s.

Under Jiang Zemin, China turned towards the anti-Japan line that has prevailed ever since. Japan's full apology of 1995 made little impact on China and got lost in the turmoil of Jiang's disastrous visit to Japan in 1998 (Smith, 2015: 39–42, 47). As many authors argue, China's relations with Japan have been more consistently poor since then, with some brief warming fluctuations not disguising a trend of deterioration (Reilly, 2004; Gries, 2005; Foot, 2006; Shirk, 2007; Buzan, 2010: 26–9; Smith, 2015).

It was the cultivation of nationalism by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – to bolster its legitimacy at a time of reform and opening up – that led to the anti-Japanese turn (Vogel et al., 2002; Shirk, 2007: 140–80; Wang, 2008; Goh, 2013: 186–9; Yahuda, 2014: 297–319). From the early 1990s, the further promotion of patriotic education with a high anti-Japanese content was a response to the democracy movement that peaked at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Wang, 2008; 2012: 95–118; Schell and Delury, 2013: 307) – that is, it stemmed from the insecurity of the CCP in relation to the Chinese people. The Chinese leadership saw Japan as an easy, low-risk target against which to mobilize nationalist sentiment, which they could not do against the United States because that would threaten China's development (Shirk, 2007: 221). China's anti-Japanese politics have undermined those in Japan who want to move their country away from the United States, and in so doing have reduced the possibilities for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement (Yahuda, 2014: 1294). When a Japanese administration that favoured improved relations with China came to power in 2009, China did not take advantage of it but used the opportunity to try to weaken relations between Japan and the United States (Murphy, 2014: 352; Smith, 2015: 219–36).

This example sets up the key theme of this paper, which is that the historical 'facts', whether agreed or contested, matter less than the way in which they are either remembered, and played into current relations, or forgotten, and made subordinate to other memories. The contemporary framing of Sino-Japanese relations in terms of the history problem between them privileges a local, bilateral perspective that emphasizes the conflict and differences between the two countries and peoples within Northeast Asia (NEA). Without in any sense denying either the validity or the political force of this perspective, I want to offer an alternative view that privileges a global framing over a local one and emphasizes the shared fate and similarities between the two, rather than their conflicts and differences. The purpose of the exercise is therefore definitely not to revisit the controversies over the five symbolic issues listed above that represent the current history problem. Rather, it is to open a larger space for thinking about the world history that China and Japan have shared and how they might relate to each other in light of their common encounter with both the West and modernity.

The next section looks at three ways in which parallels might be drawn between China and Japan: by comparing deep cultural features, by comparing current political and economic behaviour, and by comparing the stories of their periods as rising great powers – Japan 1868–1945 and China from 1978 to the present.

Given limitations of space and the need to construct a global history counterpoint to the local perspective on China–Japan relations, the analysis focuses on this last approach, drawing out seven lines of structural similarity.² The conclusion argues that China and Japan have largely solved their global historic problem with the West and modernity, and that having a better appreciation of that shared experience and its impact on them might help them address their local history problem.

THE PARALLEL STORIES OF JAPAN AND CHINA

There are many ways of telling parallel stories about Japan and China. From a classical perspective, a comparison might focus on the old and deep cultural links between them. They share Buddhist and Confucian legacies, albeit filtered differently through their histories and their distinctive cultural elements (such as Shinto and the continuity of the Japanese imperial line in Japan, and Daoism, the century of humiliation, and the Communist revolution in China). They share imperial traditions, have comparable cultures of martial arts, and despite their significant differences are culturally linked at many points, from their written scripts to their use of chopsticks. A comparison of foreign policy would certainly focus on their deeply embedded sense of hierarchy and their concern with ‘face’ in social relations (Gries, 2004; Moore, 2010, 2014), both aspects of Confucian cultures. It might also look at their inward-looking traditions of national exceptionalism, seeing themselves as culturally superior and sometimes resorting to isolationism to avoid cultural and racial pollution.

A contemporary perspective on comparison might focus on similarities in military-defence policies (e.g. both have kept military spending low as a percentage of GDP, and both have featured contributions to UN peacekeeping operations) and politics (both can be seen as one-party states, and their ruling parties look alike in many ways, from factions to the propensity of their politicians to dye any sign of grey hair and to pave as much of the country as possible in concrete). Both have loud-voiced nationalists (who shout against much of the government’s foreign policy) and comparable economic policies and problems (from buying vast amounts of US treasuries, through managing the later stages of a developmental state, to coping with ageing populations and slowing growth).

Both the classical and the contemporary approaches to similarities between China and Japan keep the focus on the local, bilateral perspective. In this chapter, I want to focus on the structural, world historical parallels between the two during their respective periods as rising Asian great powers: Japan 1868–1945 and China 1978–present. The perspective in this chapter forces attention onto the global scale and the way in which the shared encounter of Japan and China with the West and modernity shaped not only the modern history of the two but also their relationship with each other. The general aim is to locate the history of NEA within a world-historical framing, looking not only at the relations of the

states and peoples of the region with each other but also at how they related to the Western powers both individually and collectively. The challenge of the West to NEA was both simultaneous and, to a considerable extent, shared in form and substance across the region. For all the states and societies concerned, the encounter was about the same set of issues: status and recognition, open trading and equal diplomatic rights, loans and financial standards, legal jurisdictions, and transfers of knowledge and technology (Gong, 1984, 1984b; Zhang, 1991, 1998; Suzuki, 2005, 2009).

Asia's history over the past two centuries has not just been its own. It has taken place under the extraordinary and extreme conditions of what Buzan and Lawson (2015) call 'the global transformation', in which a grand conjuncture of revolutions in politics, society, economy, law, knowledge, and technology have transformed the human condition. This conjuncture has unified humankind into a single global system/society/economy in an intense, intrusive, often violent, and rapid manner. It has redefined the foundations of wealth and power both within and between states and societies, and for a time it created an enormous wealth and power gap between those countries in command of these revolutions, mainly the West plus Japan, and those countries, mainly African and Asian, not in command of them. The revolutions of modernity have had huge consequences for all who encountered them. Those who embraced and adapted to them necessarily underwent massive social restructuring. Those who resisted such profound changes and turbulence nevertheless confronted a scale and form of power that made them vulnerable to penetration and occupation, and made the maintenance of the domestic social status quo impossible.

The encounter between NEA and the West was thus a shared experience in two profound senses. First, it was an encounter between the states and peoples of NEA and those of the West in a context where imperialism was the norm. This was mainly about power politics and economic penetration. Second, and more profoundly, it was an encounter between the traditional cultures of NEA and the revolutions of modernity. Modernity posed deeply unsettling ideational and structural challenges to the age-old hierarchical agrarian societies of NEA. In both cases, the distance of NEA from the Western core, and the robustness of its classical states and institutions, meant that, unlike in South Asia, the full force of these challenges arrived relatively late, giving Europeans a large and quite sudden power advantage. The rapidity of the transformation is indicated by the ease with which the Qing emperor dismissed Britain's McCartney diplomatic mission in 1793–4 (Kissinger, 2011: 33–56) and the ease with which, less than half a century later, Britain defeated the Qing, in 1839–42 (Lovell, 2011). These twin challenges took much the same form for China and Japan, and the starting positions from which they had to make their responses had many similarities.

But the general core–periphery story of a traditionalist, agrarian 'rest of world' encountering a force of modernity located mainly in some Western countries is inappropriate for NEA. Japan, uniquely among non-Western states, was,

alongside Italy and Russia, among the first round of modernizing states/societies (Koyama and Buzan, 2019). While maintaining many of its own cultural features, it quickly became part of the global great power club. This extraordinary achievement, a century before what Zakaria (2009) calls ‘the rise of the rest’, gave a sharp and distinctive regional twist to what elsewhere was the core–periphery story, largely a powerful, ‘developed’ and exploiting West imposing itself on a weak, ‘underdeveloped’ and exploited periphery. In NEA, there was a more complicated, three-sided story in which modernity was not only outside the region pushing in but also inside the region pushing both in and out.

A wider, more global, historical perspective along these lines not only links the regional and global levels into an integrated story but also suggests that in a sense NEA has faced two ‘history problems’, one global and one regional. The global problem from 1840 was a historic one: the massive material and cultural challenge from the West and how to restore the wealth, power, and status of the Asian states and people against it. This problem was ‘historic’ in the sense of being global in scale and of requiring deep and pervasive social changes in order to generate wealth, power and status under modern conditions. It has nevertheless largely been solved. Japan solved all three problems of wealth, power, and status before the First World War, though the racial issue lingered until after the Second World War, and the status issue resurfaced in its unequal alliance with the United States after 1945. China solved the diplomatic status issue during the Second World War, the power issue during the 1950s, and the wealth issue from the 1980s onwards, though its authoritarian government still makes it an outsider in international society. The regional problem arises from the disruptions caused within NEA by differential responses to the Western challenge, particularly the unique conditions created by Japan’s fast first-round modernization and the consequences of this within the region. Now that both China and Japan have acquired the revolutions of modernity, it is a ‘history problem’ rather than a ‘historic’ one, because it requires only a change in local historical perspective to remedy it, not a wholesale developmental transformation. This regional problem takes the form sketched in the introduction to this chapter. It continues to inspire deep emotions, and it remains intense and largely unresolved. Inoguchi (2010) makes the case that the global and regional levels of world order are in fact closely linked. My argument is about how to build on that factual linkage to create a more balanced perception of the regional history problem between Japan and China.

Comparing China and Japan in the context of their encounter with the West and modernity in the same time frame produces very different stories. Japan modernizes quickly and becomes both a strong state and an empire-building great power. China fails to modernize, suffers self-destructive internal dynamics that move it from being a weak state under the late Qing to being a failed state after 1911, and is penetrated and exploited by a variety of foreign powers. But if we compare the two in different time frames, selecting the periods in which they rose to global great-power standing, much more similar stories emerge.

Of course, the separation by a century does make a difference. Japan's rise took place in the world of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, where imperialism, racism, and great-power war were norms of international society. China's late 20th and early 21st century rise took place in a world where great-power war was no longer rational, a strong liberal order existed (Ikenberry, 2008), and imperialism and racism were no longer legitimate. Yet despite that big difference of circumstance, China and Japan have surprisingly parallel 'rise' stories within the regional–global nexus. Both followed the trajectory of late-developing non-Western powers in a Western-dominated world, and both were unable to de-link their search for primacy in Asia from entanglement in global power politics. What do the parallel 'rise' stories of these two NEA giants look like in detail?

STRUCTURAL HISTORICAL PARALLELS: JAPAN 1868–1945 AND CHINA 1978–PRESENT

The 'rise' stories of China and Japan show striking similarities in seven interconnected ways.

1. Acquiring Wealth and Power without Losing Cultural Identity

Japan's story from 1868 to 1945 is that of a rapidly rising power determined to integrate the revolutions of modernity into its own culture in such a way as to acquire the modern means to wealth and power while preserving key elements of its ethnic and cultural purity and distinctiveness. Japan quickly acquired a viable configuration of modernity that enabled it to generate the wealth and power necessary to acquire the dressings of empire and great-power status. By retaining the emperor and Shinto as key links to tradition, and by constructing a nationalist developmental state, it managed to stabilize its society during the period of stress caused by the rapid and massive social, economic, and political upheavals of modernization.

China's early reformers failed to make more than superficial changes in the face of both conservative, nativist opposition and the weakening of central governing power. China suffered a major break between its imperial and cultural past and its modernizing future. It was unable to acquire a stable configuration of modernity and fell into the mire of massive self-harm and sustained vulnerability to external intervention. The country only became coherent again after 1950 with the communist victory on the mainland. Unlike Japan, it suffered a false start by picking the ultimately dead-end approach to modernity of a command economy and a totalitarian polity. For three decades, it pursued power without much wealth in the context of a sharp confrontation with the West. From the 1960s, it also fomented ideological and military confrontations both with its erstwhile ally the Soviet Union and within the CCP itself in the form of Mao's Cultural Revolution

(Dikötter, 2016). But from the late 1970s, Deng's shift to reform and opening up put China on a rising trajectory similar in many ways to that of Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Deng's reforms, like those of the Meiji period, were precisely about generating wealth and power, while at the same time preserving 'Chinese characteristics' against the threat of modernization equating to Westernization. In many ways, Deng and the Chinese leaderships that followed him have emulated the form of the authoritarian Japanese developmental state, retaining close central control over the economy. Like the Meiji reformers, and indeed like Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists before them, the CCP now uses nationalism and links to China's classical past to try to stabilize the turbulence of the transition to modernity. They seek wealth and power partly to serve the people but mainly to strengthen the state.

2. Borrowing from the West

Meiji Japan and the China of 'reform and opening up' borrowed massively from the West in order to feed their transitions to modernity and jump-start their pursuit of wealth and power. Both sought Western knowledge and technique to develop their economies, education systems, and scientific and technological skills, and both sent large numbers of students abroad to learn (Jansen, 2000: 4886, 5407–8; *The Economist*, 2014: 65). In doing this, China had the additional advantage of being able to use Japan as a source of developmental knowledge and learning. Both acquired modern military weapons and organization from abroad. Both understood the need to become part of the global capitalist economy if their development was to succeed, while trying at the same time to retain as much national control as possible. Under the pressure of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Japan, like all the other great powers, abandoned this position and pursued the construction of a self-contained economic sphere of imperial preference. It is not clear that China will ever have this option, though its Belt and Road Initiative has some similarities to Japan's earlier continental strategy.

3. Assessing Their Position as Rising Powers

Like any rising power, Japan and China have had to assess their own *raison d'état* against the character of the prevailing international system/society. Both have had to confront the question of how they want to fit into the one constructed by the Western powers and still dominated by them. Japan confronted this question when Western power was at its peak, China when Western dominance was still extensive but appeared to be reaching the end of its run.

Japan's leadership correctly understood the international system/society as being highly competitive, capitalist, imperialist, racist, two-faced, and with great-power war as a legitimate and frequently used policy option (Suzuki, 2005), and they responded in like form. For better or worse, everyone knew where they stood

with post-Meiji Japan: it was a revisionist imperialist power in an imperialist international society. Imperial Japan was revisionist in both an orthodox way (it wanted to increase its status within international society) and a reformist way (it wanted to change by negotiation some of the rules, most notably those about racial inequality). It was not a revolutionary revisionist trying to replace the existing system with another. During Japan's rise the prevailing ethos among the great powers was social and racial Darwinism, and Japan was prepared to play this game of survival of the fittest as ruthlessly as necessary.

Like Japan, China has also been drawn into the still Western-dominated global political economy and is facing demands to act as a responsible great power. But unlike post-Meiji Japan, China has so far been unable to decide or articulate how its *raison d'état* fits into the prevailing character of the international system/society (Kerr, 2015). China wavers between seeing itself as besieged and encircled by hostile powers prepared to contain and go to war with it (as during the Maoist period, and increasingly now among nationalist opinion) and seeing itself as needing to integrate into an international system/society in which the threat of great-power war is low and the opportunity for co-development high (as was Deng's understanding, which led to the reform and opening-up policy of the late 1970s, and which is still perhaps the dominant line of thinking in China – Shambaugh, 2013: 18–20, 98–9 – though now giving way to 'striving for achievement' – Yan, 2014; Xu and Du, 2015). This indecision at the heart of China's thinking underpins the whole dilemma of its foreign policy.

With contemporary China, outsiders do not know what they are facing. That China has become quite wealthy and powerful, and is likely to become even more so, is widely accepted. This makes the various claims, both American and Chinese, that China is a status quo power (Johnston, 2003; Qin, 2003; Feng, 2008; Pan, 2008) sound implausible. At the very least, China is an orthodox revisionist, wanting to increase its status within the existing international society. China is not a revolutionary revisionist as it was under Mao, but whether it is, or will become, a reformist revisionist is difficult to tell (Buzan, 2018). China's current opposition to democracy and human rights might seem revisionist, but these norms are not yet consensually established as institutions of global international society. They are strongly held in the West and some other places but widely contested by others as well as China. How China will relate to international society in the future is vexed by the uncertainty over what kind of Chinese state will wield its increased power in 10, 20, or 30 years' time. Perhaps China will look something like it does now. Perhaps it will have lurched towards an extreme form of nationalist socialism and look quite threatening to its neighbours and more alienated from international society. Perhaps it will have become more open, pluralist, and reassuring to its neighbours, having achieved its aim of becoming a status quo power. Plausible cases can be made for all these scenarios, and constituencies for each of them can be found inside and outside China.

The inconsistency of China's foreign policy makes it difficult for others to build trust with it, and some in China find such reactions disturbing or antagonistic. From the 1950s to the 1970s, China was trying to foment revolution in many of its neighbours, and it went to war with some of them. From the 1980s through to 2007, it mostly wore a more benign and smiling face and built good relations with most of its neighbours, even, up to a point, Japan. After 2008, it adopted a more assertive turn (which may not even have been intentional: Shambaugh, 2013: 99) that undid the good work of the previous decade.

What are outsiders to think when strident Chinese voices complain about the United States containing China or constraining its rise, and when they call for the abandonment of Deng's policy of self-restraint, as Yan (2014) does? If China abandoned its peaceful rise/development, and the United States abandoned the region to China's power, what would China's behaviour look like? Would it just impose its primacy on East Asia and thereby restore historical 'normality'? Imperial Japan, of course, had a desire to dominate the Asian region (Jansen, 2000: 8642–54), and it is very easy to read a Chinese desire for regional pre-eminence into its current nationalist discourses (Fenby, 2013: 667; Yan, 2014: 168–9; Wang, 2014). China's diplomatic style does not help here. Its dismissal of genuine concerns among its neighbours, and in the United States, about its rising power and its assertive behaviour as mere anti-Chinese 'China threat theory' is increasingly driving a security dilemma. As Liff and Ikenberry (2014: 67–8, 90) argue: 'Beijing should understand that if its motives are in fact status quo-oriented, it does both itself and its neighbours a severe disservice by not being more transparent about the drivers and content of its military policies'. Because China is not only a major rising power but also has a decidedly mixed record in relation to its neighbours, it has to work particularly hard to see itself as others see it and to try to manage its international image in a more consistent, coherent, open, and honest way.

If it is seeking a form of primacy in East Asia, China might be taking a parallel course to Japan's earlier one. Its foreign-policy behaviour is too ambiguous, changeable, and contradictory to know for sure that this is its goal, but there is easily enough evidence to have prompted its neighbours and the United States to hedge against the possibility.

4. Dealing with Being Outsiders

Because both China and Japan have had to rise into a Western-dominated international system/society, and because both have given high priority to defending their Asian cultural distinctiveness, both have faced the problem of being outsiders. As Japan quickly discovered, its racial and cultural characteristics marked it as an outsider to the West, even while its rising power and wealth made it part of both the great-power club and the modern Western-dominated system of international political economy. Japan had to face the problem of racist 'yellow peril'

reactions in the West during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and responded with the Kyoto School's philosophy of 'post-white power'. Yellow perilism played against both Japanese emigration to the Americas and against its reception as a new member of the great-power club (Shimazu, 1998).

China is also a cultural outlier to the Western mainstream, though, unlike Meiji Japan, it flourishes its differences rather than trying to hide them behind a veneer of Western-ness. China has been lucky here: Japan faced a very strict Western 'standard of civilization', while China faces a much more open and tolerant international society that, even while still being dominated by Western norms, accepts multiculturalism and at least officially rejects racism. In this context, China marks itself out in its own diplomatic rhetoric with its mantra of 'Chinese characteristics', aimed at asserting and preserving its cultural and political distinctiveness. China's outlier position, though similar in cultural terms to Japan's, is much less based on racism than was the case with Japan, and more based on the politics/ideology of being authoritarian within an international society dominated by democracies. Where Japan faced yellow-peril reactions, China increasingly has to deal with the 'China threat' theory arising from the combination of its increasing capabilities, its authoritarian party/state, and its assertive behaviour.

During their periods of rise, both Japan and China felt hemmed in by the Western powers and had strong bodies of opinion thinking that the West was trying to encircle them and constrain or prevent their rise. Ward (2013) makes this case about Japan, framing it as a 'status inconsistency' that pushed Japan into alienation from, and resistance to, the West. In contemporary China, nationalist opinion frequently asserts that the West is trying to encircle China and prevent its rise (Shirk, 2007: 212–28; Shambaugh, 2013: 72–8; Harris, 2014: 1740–1853). There are striking similarities between the position in Japan during the 1920s that participation in the League of Nations would entangle Japan in an Anglo-American order (Jansen, 2000: 7821–58), and contemporary Chinese worries that US pressure on them to be a 'responsible great power' is a way of containing China's rise by burdening it with responsibilities before it has sufficient wealth and power to carry them without compromising its own development (Shambaugh, 2013: 125–32).

In part these are just conspiracy theories that serve the interests of authoritarian governments. The conspiracy theory is undermined by the fact that the West, driven by the liberal/capitalist logic of joint gains and economic globalization, provided substantial help to the economic rise of both Japan and China. But the theory is supported by the periodic attempts of the West to contain both Japan and China militarily. Even this, however, has hardly been consistent. The United States had a quasi-alliance with Mao's China against the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 80s (Kissinger, 2011), and Britain had a serious two-decade alliance with Japan against Russia from 1902 to 1923. It cannot be said that the leading Western powers have refused to ally with the rising Asian powers when there was

strategic pressure to do so. But when the Western powers felt threatened by the rising Asian ones, they certainly moved to contain them.

Closely related to their concern about status inconsistency is the way in which both China and Japan have had specific reasons to feel insecure about their status as great powers. In Japan's case, this insecurity was focused around the racial-inequality issue. Japan failed to get this resolved at the 1919 Versailles Conference, and the humiliation was rubbed in by anti-Japanese and anti-Asian immigration policies in the United States, Canada, and Australia (Shimazu, 1998). Without recognition of their equality as people, how could Japan avoid being seen as a second-class great power? As Shimazu (1998: 138) argues, the consequence of this was that Japan was 'an arrogant, yet insecure power, dismissive of, yet sensitive to international opinion'. This quote could easily be applied to contemporary China. In China's case, as we have seen, the issue is not racism but its non-compliance with – indeed, rejection of – contemporary Western 'standards of civilization' in respect of human rights and democracy. This is used, like the race issue was used against Japan, to signal China as inferior. Japan is part of this problem, having shifted the grounds of its feeling of civilizational superiority over China from development (where China is catching up) to democracy (where the CCP remains committed to authoritarianism) (Wirth, 2015). Like Japan, China feels that it is rising into an international society dominated by Western powers and which it had no part in making. Both were the odd man out in the great-power club, feeling easily slighted and insulted, and prickly about their status.

5. Attraction to Strategies of Deception

One worrying parallel in the rise stories of China and Japan emerges from their shared culture: both seem attracted to grand strategies based on the art of deception. One of the most widely read Chinese classics in the West is Sun Tze's *Art of War*, and the clearest lesson in that book is that in classical Chinese culture, strategies of deception are much admired if they save the trouble of fighting costly wars. Kissinger (2011) also makes much of the link between China's grand strategy and its national game of *weiqi*, and how different Chinese strategic thinking is from Western, with its link to chess. He fails to note that Japan's national game is also *weiqi* (*go* in Japan, but it is the same game).

China's rhetoric of peaceful rise/development, win-win, and harmonious relations on the one hand and its military expansion and aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas on the other suggest that this way of thinking is still current in China. Peaceful rise was, then, a short-term cover for a period in which China was weak and needed engagement with the global economy in order to develop rapidly (Buzan, 2014). Japan's deception in attacking the Russian Far Eastern Fleet in Port Arthur in 1904 and, more famously, Pearl Harbor in 1941 suggests that it thought similarly during the period of its rise. When great-power war is a regular feature of international relations, strategies of deception may reap

short-term gains, as they did for Japan, and as China's fait accompli in rapidly building artificial islands in the South China Sea did in 2015. Yet as Luttwak (2012: 72–88) rightly points out, in current international society, strategies of deception risk triggering extreme negative reactions. Today, far more hangs on building sufficient trust to enable the great powers to manage shared problems, from the global economy, through climate change, to migration and terrorism (Cui and Buzan, 2016). Strategies of deception are directly corrosive of trust-building, making it difficult or impossible. It is a common view in contemporary China that outsiders misunderstand it (Shih and Yin, 2013; Zeng, et al., 2015). But this argument also works the other way around: China fails to see that others do not think in the same way that it does. Murphy (2014: 91) notes that one of imperial Japan's main weaknesses was that it misunderstood 'the motives and resolve of their enemies'. There is strong evidence that China's contemporary leadership suffers the same kind of misunderstanding, rooted in deep cultural differences, and does not see that it is living in a world mainly of friends and rivals and not the one from the past of enemies and rivals.

6. *Opposing Western Hegemony*

Despite their extensive borrowings from the West, and their dependence on the Western-dominated global economy, both Meiji Japan and contemporary China took strong stands against Western arrogance and hegemony. In part this related to their concerns about status inconsistency and being outsiders, as discussed above, but in addition to anti-Western rhetoric it took two specific forms: opposing Western imperialism/hegemony and mounting naval challenges to the West.

Both China and Japan took a broadly anti-Western political position, challenging US (and in Japan's case also British) hegemony, promoting a more multipolar world order, and contesting some Western values, such as democracy. As discussed, Japan simply pursued the version of direct-control empire then current in the West. Its anti-imperialism/hegemony was not a matter of principle but simply one of who the dominant power would be. Under Mao, China's anti-imperialism was not all that different from Imperial Japan's position. In its revolutionary phase, China supported those in Asia opposing Western imperialism, but it did so only by trying to replace Western, and also Soviet, imperialism with its own sphere of ideological influence. China's revolutionism was located in post-colonial times, and, as demonstrated by its attack-and-withdraw strategies against both India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), its imperialism was not about invasion and occupation. It was instead about the subversion or, if possible, replacement of foreign governments by regimes sympathetic to Maoist ideology. Since 1978, then, if contemporary China has been trying to assert primacy in East Asia, there is, of course, continuity of aim with both Mao's policy and that of Imperial Japan. Even then, however, there have been differences of style and method. China's current method is not much, if at all, about conquest or subversive

regime change; rather, it is about the use of economic carrots and sticks, backed by the weight of China's rising wealth and power, and the plausibility of its claim to own the future, at least in East Asia. But if China is not interested in primacy in East Asia, then the shape of its challenge is less clear. Its calls for multipolarity are transparently hypocritical, given its vetoing of Japan and India as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and it remains unclear whether China is an orthodox or a reformist revisionist and therefore how big and/or deep is its challenge to the system/society.

In this vein, it is interesting to note that during their periods of rise, Japan and China shared a significant ambiguity about whether their goal was to gain equality with the leading powers or to overtake and outdo them. There were certainly voices in Japan that advocated surpassing the West, both during the interwar years (Williams, 2004; Shimizu, 2015: 7–11) and in a different way during Japan's astonishing economic rise in the 1970s and 80s (Ishihara, 1991). In China, the main official rhetoric is about sovereign equality, non-intervention, and China's rightful place in international society, but there are also voices advocating that China play a long game to replace the United States as the global superpower. China's attempt to construct narrow East Asian intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), its uncompromising pursuit of expansive territorial claims, and some of its (un)diplomatic rhetoric both official and from nationalist netizens all point in this direction, as does Jiang Zemin's catchword 'rejuvenation', understood as restoring China's former position and glory. This idea has fed into Xi's 'Chinese Dream', which has roots in thinking that he wants to restore China as a/the world leader (Yan, 2001: 34–5; 2014: 165; Kissinger, 2011: 503–7; Sørensen, 2015: 53–7).

The other specific form that Japan's and China's opposition to the West has taken is the mounting of a naval challenge. Because Japan is an island nation, and because the threats to it during the 19th century came mainly from the sea, the desire for a strong navy was a perfectly understandable priority in its military modernization. This defensive naval policy was also a feature of Qing China's attempted reforms, though Japan succeeded where China did not. For Japan, a strong navy was also the key to being an imperial power, because its army could not project power without it. Japan's naval project destroyed China's navy in 1894–5 and Russia's in 1904–5. It achieved third place after the United States and Britain at the Washington Naval Conference, and its modern, well-trained, and technologically impressive navy won major victories over both the United States and Britain in the opening rounds of the Pacific War. For Japan, a strong navy was essential to both its status claims as a great power and its opposition to Western hegemony.

China's naval challenge is mainly directed against the United States, though it is also relevant to its relationships with India and Japan. It is still in its early stage, but already there is clear intent to graduate from being a defensive, 'brown water' force, largely confined within the first island chain, to being a 'blue water' force,

able to project power out to, and beyond, the second island chain. In part, China's naval aspirations, like post-Meiji Japan's, are an adornment to its great-power-status claims. But its aircraft-carrier plans are more about local swaggering and status. China remains a long way from being able to challenge the US navy in any general way, though it is rapidly increasing its ability to exercise denial, or at least firm resistance, to the US navy in the East and South China Seas. A direct challenge to US naval dominance like that attempted by Japan seems highly unlikely within the near or medium term, but a challenge sufficient to underwrite a Chinese bid for primacy in East Asia, and thus with echoes of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS), is much more plausible.

7. Seeking Primacy in East Asia and Its Repercussions among the Great Powers

In seeking to carve out a defensive bastion for itself in a Western-dominated world, Japan coercively asserted its right to political and economic hegemony over East Asia. It did this under an Asianist banner, constructing itself as the regional leader to liberate Asia from Western imperialism by building GEACPS. In pursuit of its national security and power, Japan attempted the conquest and colonization of East Asia, ensnaring itself in a fatal web that connected its role and claims in East Asia with its relations with the other great powers. This project was brought to an end by its defeat in the China and Pacific Wars from 1937–45, though a shadow of it remains in Japan's economic leadership in Asian development since the 1950s and up to a point still in the higher end of the economic spectrum. What Japan demonstrated was that any Asian power attempting to rise by consolidating its primacy in East Asia could not do so without triggering major counter responses from other great powers at the global level, especially the United States.

Early 20th-century Japan is increasingly echoed by how contemporary China balances its relationship with its region on the one hand and its relationship with the rest of the great powers, particularly the United States, on the other. In the conditions of the early 21st century, any repetition of Japan's crude 19th- and 20th-century imperialism in East Asia is out of the question. Nevertheless, there is a clear sense that China sees primacy in East Asia as its right, and that, as it was for Japan, this is partly about creating a political and economic Asian regional bastion against the West. But, like Japan, China cannot attempt primacy in its region, let alone the world, without this move playing strongly into its relations with the other great powers. For China, the United States–Japan alliance is a much stronger symbol of America's engagement in East Asia than US support for the Kuomintang against Japan. Shimizu (2015) argues that there are some dangerous parallels between Japan's interwar Kyoto School and contemporary Chinese thinking about international relations, with both drawing on many of the same historical and philosophical resources.

To make this structural parallel is not in any way to suggest that China, like Japan, is somehow fated to end up in a war with the West. But it is to suggest that both countries are fated to be in a similar historical/structural position. This position is defined by being late developers, finding a successful path to modernity, and then, as their power rises, having to work out the consequences of this for their interlinked relations with the East Asian regional level on the one hand and the rest of the great powers at the global level on the other. Japan had the advantage – albeit a fatal one – of facing mainly weak and underdeveloped neighbours, many still colonized by European powers that were themselves weakened by the First World War. And it did so at a time when war and empire were still normal and legitimate means of conducting foreign relations.

China cannot rationally resort to war and empire-building, and at least in this limited sense its rhetoric about peaceful rise/development is credible. As I have argued elsewhere, its main choice is between *cold* or *warm* peaceful rise, not between *peaceful* or *warlike* rise (Buzan, 2014). China's economy, and therefore the fate of its pursuit of wealth and power, is deeply tied to continuing engagement with the global economy. So too is the legitimacy of the CCP, which depends on its ability to deliver prosperity and progress to the Chinese people. Unlike Japan, China faces a region in which all of its neighbours are independent, several are more developed than it is, and many are finding their own paths to modernity. Like Japan, however, China does not have the luxury of sorting out its regional relations in isolation from its relations with the United States. Japan had the option of war against the United States and took it, even though many of its leaders knew that the huge power difference between them made defeat a likely outcome (Jansen, 2000: 9506–657). For China, war is not a rational option even as a long shot, notwithstanding that it has a better economic power ratio with the United States than Japan did. How the rising power in NEA relates to the United States remains an enduring issue both for the NEA region and for world politics. The strong lesson of history is that rising powers in NEA simply cannot escape from playing a two-level game in which the regional and global arenas are closely tied.

CONCLUSION

One conclusion that could be drawn from these seven points is that modern global structural conditions are powerful enough to create striking similarities in the developmental pathways of rising Asian great powers. During the 19th century, China and Japan shared a common crisis defined by a dual encounter, not only with an overwhelmingly powerful West but also with the deeply disruptive idea set of modernity. This dual encounter profoundly threatened the traditional forms of society and politics both within and between states and societies in NEA. That the local responses to this were fraught, highly differentiated, and

conflictual is hardly surprising. What is perhaps more surprising is how similar their responses to the Western challenge have become now that China also has a 'rise' story. Japan led the way, but China has caught up, and in the global historic perspective there is more that unites than divides these countries in the Asian tragedy of the 19th and early to mid 20th centuries and the new Asia emerging over the last several decades. China can make its own choices, but many of the questions it has to answer parallel those faced by Japan a century earlier.

A second conclusion has a more normative twist and concerns the relationship between the global historic problem and the regional history one. The global historic problem posed by the encounter with the West and modernity has largely been solved. NEA is more or less rid of Western imperialism, if not yet of US hegemony, and has largely restored its relative wealth and power in relation to the leading edge of developed states. It has also mainly restored the rightful place of its states and peoples in international society, though Japan still strives to be a fully normal country, and China has status grievances about its membership of, or standing in, various IGOs. For the most part, issues of sovereign and racial equality in international society have been pushed to the margins, but this is neither much celebrated nor remembered as a shared and parallel experience. China makes a big point of remembering it through the rhetoric of the 'century of humiliation' but focuses that mainly on the regional relationship with Japan.

In contrast, the regional history problem is actively remembered and still poisons contemporary relations between China and Japan. What remains unresolved is the lack of understanding and respect in relation to the difficult period of transition between the middle of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th, and especially the period 1931–45. This regional history problem obstructs the development of a regional international society in Asia (Buzan and Zhang, 2014) and thereby impedes the full realization of NEA's place in the world. The regional history problem means that a cycle of action–overreaction prevails, and building trust is difficult or even impossible. Because the history problem dominates perspectives, everyone sees only their own interests, concerns, and 'rightness', and is blind to the interests, concerns, and 'rightness' of others.

Although there is much that reinforces it, the regional history problem in NEA is not about some immutable structure. It is about political choices and a certain understanding of history that emphasizes selective local parts while largely forgetting the global whole. This can be changed. History is continuously reinterpreted to serve the present. That reinterpretation is not about distorting the facts but about seeing them in a different light, and the rewards in NEA for moving towards a more collective, and globally situated, interpretation of their history would be large. I do not underestimate the difficulty of solving the local history problem in NEA. In both Japan and China (and Korea), it has become deeply rooted in public understanding, and it serves the interests of some political elites to cultivate this. The regional history problem has become detached from its global historic context and taken on a powerful life of its own.

How best to address this now embedded social construction is a difficult question well beyond the scope of this chapter. But it seems to me that a necessary and useful step towards this task is to raise awareness of the shared global historic problem, both in itself and as the context that generated the regional history problem. The solution of the global historic problem should be a collective source of pride and celebration in NEA. And when that global problem is understood as the context for the regional one, it might make it easier to open doorways towards more balanced and less zero-sum understandings of NEA's shared history.

Notes

- 1 Controversy over the 'comfort women' used by the Japanese military during the Second World War is mainly between Japan and Korea.
- 2 All three comparisons are explored in Barry Buzan and Evelyn Goh (2020) *Rethinking Sino-Japanese Alienation: History Problems and Historical Opportunities*, Oxford University Press, from which this paper is drawn.

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Constructivism: National Identity and Foreign Policy

Yong-Soo Eun

INTRODUCTION

Most scholars agree that socially constructed attributes, such as national identity, nationalism and history, matter a great deal in East Asian international relations. The fields of International Relations (IR) and area studies both contain a wealth of literature on the subject of East Asian identity and its implications for regional politics. Kingston (2015: 1), for example, notes that ‘nationalism appears to be rising in a renascent Asia, stoking tensions, aspirations, pride, and identity politics’. Similarly, Shin (2015: 189) observes that ‘historical memories and national identity’ shape Northeast Asian IR. As evidence, experts often cite the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea, two democracies with close economic ties that, nevertheless, frequently fall into dispute over the ‘history issue’, i.e. Japan’s colonisation of Korea in the early 20th century (Glosserman and Snyder, 2017: 14). Going a step further, Wang (2013: 16) claims that ‘different interpretations of history and differences in identity... must be seen as a cause for conflict’ between China and Japan. Based on these observations, concerned scholars suggest that East Asia narrow ‘the gaps in the perceptions of identity’ through ‘historical reconciliation’ so as to improve regional cooperation (Kwak and Nobles 2013: 4; Kim, 2015: 1). Many insist that scholars need to pay great attention to national identity and historical memory to make sense of the relationships between East Asian states (Rozman, 2012; Arai et al., 2013; Hagström and Gustafsson, 2015).

Despite an extensive body of literature on the importance of socially constructed attributes, such as national identity or nationalism, in East Asian

international relations, the question of *how*, specifically, these attributes matter to foreign policy remains unclear or underexplored. An answer to this question requires both theoretical and empirical knowledge. That is, it requires both theoretical knowledge of the causal mechanisms of national identity vis-à-vis a state's foreign policy *and* empirical observations of how specific aspects of this identity actually 'cause' certain foreign policies of East Asian countries. Unfortunately, Asian area studies often neglect the former (i.e. a theoretical and methodological commitment to understanding causal mechanisms), while IR often neglects the latter (i.e. empirical local knowledge of the foreign policymaking of individual countries in East Asia). In this way, the two disciplines remain disparate. This chapter aims to bridge that gap by addressing both the theoretical and empirical considerations.

First, this chapter undertakes a theoretical review of how a state develops a national identity and how that identity comes to exercise a causal effect on that state's foreign policy. In doing so, the chapter maintains that national identity can work as a causal factor on various cognitive and political levels. In addition, this chapter, building on the metatheoretical insights of Parsons (2007) and Kurki (2008), rethinks the traditional Humean conception of causation, according to which causes are seen as 'pushing and pulling' forces, to show that national identity, which seems to be a 'constitutive' construct, can be situated in a 'causal' relationship.

Based on the theoretical, conceptual and methodological discussion of the causal mechanism of national identity, the chapter carries out an empirical analysis of South Korea's foreign policy regarding Japan and North Korea. This case study explores the roots of South Korean national identity and looks at how it 'causes' the state's actual foreign policies. A concluding section discusses what the empirical findings imply for mainstream (Western-centric) IR theories, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. The chapter ends by enumerating the positive effects that 'broadening' the field of IR by weaving IR theory with indigenous experience (in Asia) can have on our understanding of both IR and East Asian foreign policy.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CAUSATION

How History Shapes National Identity

Policymakers do not make decisions in a vacuum but in a predetermined social and historical context. Like the people they represent, policymakers are humans coloured by the prevailing values, beliefs and prejudices of their societies. It is obvious, then, that socially constructed national identity influences foreign policymaking in some way. Though some sort of connection is, perhaps, obvious, the aim of this chapter is to address the specific questions of 'how?'

For example, through which mechanisms does national identity influence a state's foreign policy? Can scholars treat national identity as a causal factor? If so, how significant a causal factor is identity in foreign policymaking? Understanding how a state forms a national identity is the first step to answering these questions.

While scholars may define the term in slightly different ways, national identity is, generally, a collective belief, shared by individuals belonging to the same nation, that they are historically, ethnically, culturally and politically related. These individuals often feel a sense of solidarity with other individuals, past and present, who are members of the same nation. More specifically, Anthony Smith (1991: 11) defines national identity as 'a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland'. Similarly, William Bloom (1993: 2–8) understands national identity as 'a particular set of cultural mores and political norms... passed down from generation to generation' that form the 'collective self' for 'a particular ethnos'. Since national identity, in Guibernau's words (2004: 135), 'reflects the sentiment of belonging to the nation' over generations, it is intrinsic in the socialisation of individuals. That is, national identity is transmitted 'across generational lines by processes of education and acculturation' (Friedberg 2005: 34). 'Acculturation', of course, refers to the process by which individuals internalise cultural, social and political norms (Bloom, 1993: 52). This process forms and consolidates a 'collective identification' (Wendt, 1994: 386).

The process of 'collective identification' necessitates a corresponding process of differentiation or dissociation from individuals who are not members of the nation. To preserve the social coherence, solidarity and uniqueness of the nation group, it is necessary to cast non-members as 'others'. One of the two key elements that defines any national identity is the concept of 'difference' from others (Campbell, 1992: 2–8). A nation's myths or traditions are often 'powerful differentiators and reminders of the unique culture and fate of the ethnic community' (Smith, 1998; Guibernau, 2004: 126). As Duncan Bell (2003: 67) sums up neatly, 'representation and recognition of us and them act as the mutually supporting scaffolds upon which national identity is constructed'. All national identities must answer both the question 'who are we?' and the question 'who are they?' to provide a coherent worldview.

There are several attributes, including territory, language, religion, cultural values and traditions, that give the members of a nation a sense of solidarity (see, for example, Smith, 1986: 1991; Campbell, 1992; Poole, 1999; Bell, 2003). Shared historical memories and myths are, perhaps, the most potent tools with which to define 'us' and 'them'. This is so because 'basically, a nation is a group of people who feel that they are *ancestrally* related' (Guibernau, 2004: 145) and because 'nation-building' is a 'historical' process (Smith, 1991: 13). Scholars commonly acknowledge that, instead of some predetermined entity, the

nation is a 'social construction, fluid in content, whose meaning is determined by historical contexts' (Weiner, 1997: xii). Historical context and meaningful group experiences can alter the collective values that make up national identity. Bloom (1993: 52) argues that 'a shared group identification can be triggered only by meaningful and real historical experience'. Recent studies in the field of social psychology confirm that a nation's collective experiences and memories engender national coherence as well as contribute to national perceptions of the 'self' and 'other' (Vertzberger, 2005; Pennebaker et al., 2013).

Understanding the historical experience of a particular nation is, then, key to understanding the identity of that nation. Jenny Edkins (2003: 45) explores the different ways groups remember the historical experiences of their societies, particularly the ways they remember traumatic experiences like war, famine, genocide and terrorism. In survivors of the First World War and the Vietnam War, for example, Edkins found a distinction between personal memories and the 'act of remembering'. The former, memory, is a personal record of direct experience. The latter, the 'act of remembering', is a 'social' experience that is 'intensely political'. Likewise, Dyson and Preston (2006) find that individuals consistently express themselves with analogies not from past personal events but from past events with broad societal significance. For example, the idea that the United States is exceptional, a 'shining city upon a hill', is based on the state's unique political history. Many Americans *feel* that, because their history is exceptional, the United States has 'special rights, responsibilities, and obligations toward others' (McCormick, 1992: 55–78).

The 'social' act of remembering is 'political' because it triggers a collective response from the nation, building an emotional bond between members. Indeed, collective emotions and the formation and preservation of national identity are closely related. Gellner (1983: 37) and Guibernau (2004: 136) argue that to identify with a specific nation an individual must develop 'a strong emotional investment' because national identity 'arises from the consciousness of forming a group based on the "felt" closeness uniting those who belong to the nation'. More recent studies point to the interrelated, even co-constitutive, relationship between collective emotion and identity, arguing that 'emotion makes identity consequential, and identity makes group-level emotion possible' (Mercer, 2014: 522). Hagström and Gustafsson (2015: 10) note that national identity is 'constructed through the forging of an emotional allegiance that makes us feel like we belong. ... Without emotional attachment, identities are difficult to construct'. In short, shared historical experiences are what generate 'collective affective experiences' (Hall and Ross, 2015: 859) and thus what build the bonds of national solidarity (Hutchison, 2010). This finding, again, supports the idea that historical experiences, especially such traumatic experiences as war, genocide, terrorism or colonialism, establish social coherence within the nation and sharpen the distinction between 'us' and 'them'.

How National Identity 'Causes' Foreign Policy

Constructivist IR theory generally tells us that national identity matters in international politics; yet, there is a gap in the constructivist understanding regarding *how* it matters, particularly in regard to both foreign policymaking and issues of causation. This chapter argues that national identity matters to foreign policymaking in three ways. First, since policymakers are themselves shaped by the prevailing collective beliefs in 'who they are', national identity motivates policymakers on a behavioural level. A fixed national identity narrows the range of possible actions policymakers might take to only those that are compatible with the longstanding values of the nation. Second, national identity affects the worldview of policymakers and thus the way they represent and react to other countries on the global stage. Third, politicians may appeal to national values in order to build public support for foreign policies or to justify these policies to the public after the fact. Let me clarify these points further.

National identity shapes policymakers' behavioural motivations and imperatives on a fundamental level. An individual is born with, essentially, a limitless potential for different behaviours, but through the processes of social interaction (i.e. socialisation and differentiation), the individual develops behavioural patterns confined to a narrower range, a range that is 'customary and acceptable' in the eyes of the society to which the individual belongs. National identity, the social and historical belief in a 'collective self', limits potential behaviour to a certain set of acceptable, compatible actions. A society's leaders are not immune to this effect; national identity places constraints on the range of foreign policy options available to policymakers. In Sanjoy Banerjee's terminology (1997), each state has a 'psychocultural structure' that contains fundamental rules for that state's action. As Rittberger (2002: 23) puts it, a certain course of action is 'adopted because it is in agreement with the intersubjectively shared, value-based expectation of appropriate behaviour emanating from the actor's social environment'. As such, decision-makers, particularly in democracies, may find it difficult or even politically suicidal to venture far from the collective belief system of their constituents. As Doty (1993: 301) comments, decision-makers are not 'merely making choices among various policy options. They are also performing according to a social script which is itself part of a larger social order'. Thus, decision-makers tend to make their political behavior conform to the shared ideas and values of their respective societies.

National identity affects not only how individuals behave within their society but also how they behave outside their society. Individuals, including decision-makers, appeal to national identity to make sense of world events and 'other' people and to decide what to do about them. Just as it rejects certain behaviours internally, national identity provides blinkers with which certain external, international events are denied or reinterpreted so as to be compatible with the prevailing belief system. In his seminal work on Israel's foreign policy,

Michael Brecher (1972) uses the 'prism' analogy to explain societal beliefs and identity. As with a prism, he explains, any light or information that comes into the society from outside tends to be refracted and distorted such that it is seen differently from how it actually is. World events are coloured and refracted as they pass through the 'prism' of socially shared belief, national identity. National identity, then, affects the cognitive process by which policymakers perceive an international event as either significant or benign (Bell, 2003). In Weber's words, national identity tells the group and the individual 'what to want, to prefer, to desire, and to value' (Weber, 2002, quoted in Hudson, 2007: 109). Several foreign policy studies have shown that national identity is a strong frame of reference for decision-makers' value judgements. For example, in the United States, economic liberalism is a mainstay of foreign policy (Cox et al., 2000; Mead 2002; Nau, 2002; Bell 2016). The principle exercises an enormous influence over US foreign policy because it is a 'mainstream belief' (Wittkopf et al., 2008: 243–4) that nearly all Americans share, regardless of their individual political affiliations. When policymakers in the United States and other places make foreign policy decisions, their views of other states are, inevitably, coloured by the normative constraints of national identity.

Third, policymakers use national identity to rationalise their foreign policy choices to other members of their nation. Foreign policy is 'sold to the public on the basis of certain shared values' (Jensen, 1982: 78; Browning, 2008) that make rationality subjective. Decision-makers can, then, use national identity to justify actions that would otherwise be difficult to explain. It is not uncommon, for example, for American decision-makers to cloak their actions in the rhetoric of the ideological precepts of American exceptionalism and liberalism to gain public support for actions abroad. In response to fierce criticism of the United States' pre-emptive military strikes against 'imminent threats' in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2007: 220), former president George W. Bush rationalised the response with the explanation: 'Our security will require all Americans to be ready for pre-emptive action. ... The United States has long maintained the option of the pre-emptive action. ... We are *bounded by ideals* that move us beyond our background' (quoted in Frum and Perle, 2003: 49, emphasis added). Samuel Huntington (2004) takes it a step further, stating that the nation's interests and foreign policy goals 'derive from national identity' themselves:

If American identity is defined as a set of universal principles of liberty and democracy, then presumably the promotion of those principles in other countries should be the primary goals of American foreign policy.... If the United States is primarily a collection of cultural and ethnic entities, its national interest is in the promotion of the goals of those entities and we should have a 'multicultural foreign policy'. If the United States is primarily defined by its European cultural heritage as a Western country, then it should direct its attention to strengthening its ties with Western Europe. (Huntington, 2004: 10–11)

Huntington concludes that ‘conflicts over what we should do abroad are rooted in conflicts over *who we are at home*’ (Huntington, 2004: 364, emphasis added). Similarly, Ringmar (1996: 13) argues that it is ‘only once we know who we *are* that we can know what we *want*’. In other words, national identity plays a decisive role in defining what the national interests and goals of a state should be. These national interests and goals, of course, are of key concern in foreign policymaking.

Taken as a whole, national identity has a substantial influence on the process of foreign policymaking. It shapes policymakers’ behavioural motivations, frames the normative context in which policymakers perceive and act in their world and rationalises specific, as well as overarching, foreign policy decisions.

National Identity as a ‘Causal’ Factor: The Concept and the Method

Even if one accepts that a state’s national identity and foreign policy are linked, the methodological question of causation remains: is it plausible to treat national identity as a separate explanatory factor that has a causal effect on a state’s foreign policy actions? Or does national identity have a co-constitutive relationship with the state that is inseparable and therefore not causal? Constitutive thinkers often point to the relationship between the politico-historically constructed norm of sovereignty and the existence of the state as an example. Because the norm of sovereignty constitutes the state, one may be tempted to argue that the norm of sovereignty causes the existence of the state. Yet, critics note that the state and the norm of sovereignty actually ‘coexist inseparably’ (Parsons, 2007: 39). There is no sovereignty without a state; the very minute people accepted norms of sovereignty, they looked around and saw states. Sovereignty and state are not, then, separable, nor are they temporally sequential. Therefore, there cannot be a causal-explanatory relationship between them. In his well-known discussion on constructivist theory, Alexander Wendt states:

If we want to explain how a master can sell his slave then we need to invoke the structure of shared understandings existing between master and slave, and in the wider society, that make this ability to sell people possible. This social structure does not merely describe the rights of the master; it explains them, since without it those rights by definition could not exist. By way of contrast, even if a parent in the antebellum American South had the physical capability and desire to sell their child, they could not do so because the structure of that culture did not recognize such a right. *These explanations are not causal*. It’s not as if the social structure of slavery exists independently of the master’s right to sell his slave and causes that right to come into being. Rather, the master’s right is conceptually or logically dependent on the structure of slavery, such that when the latter comes into being so does the former by definition. (Wendt, 1998: 113)

For Wendt and other constitutive thinkers, even though the ‘structure of shared understandings’ accounts for the slave trade, it does not cause it, since one cannot

separate the cause (a 'shared understanding' of the slave trade) from the effect (the act of selling a slave). In this vein, constitutive scholarship is interested in understanding the socio-historical 'background setting' for individual actions, rather than attempting to explain the actions in disjuncture. Wendt, however, cannot separate cause from effect, partly because he is not interested in 'specific' effects or outcomes (for a useful critique of Wendt in this respect, see Parsons, 2007: 108–9). If Wendt rephrased his questions to address specific actions – that, for example, *some* man sold 'his' slave at *some* point in the past – inseparability would not be so severe a problem. Specifics such as these can separate the socio-historically constructed meanings of society (e.g. national identity) from their effect on state action (e.g. foreign policy). It is true that certain actions make no sense without an associated belief. Yet it is also true that these same actions would not have occurred had it not been for the historical mechanism that put these meanings (as opposed to other meanings) in place.

The state and norms of sovereignty may coexist inseparably, but at some point in the past some mechanism brought about the first state-sovereignty system. If one asks a *concrete* question (e.g. why did James sell 'his' slave in 1899, as opposed to why men in general sold slaves in the past), one can piece together preceding actions to ultimately identify the cause of the final action. Constitutive scholars are correct to underscore the fact that certain actions make no sense without associated meanings or ideas, but they are wrong when they imply that these meanings or ideas cannot be built into causal explanations of actions. Using this logic, national identity is, indeed, separable from its effect on specific foreign policy actions.

More generally, the concept of cause must be liberated from 'the deterministic and mechanistic connotations that it has in much of... International Relations scholarship' (Kurki, 2008: xi, 11). Many IR scholars, relying on the positivist, Humean notion of causation, maintain that cause acts only in a 'when A, then B' manner, i.e. when event 'A' takes place, then consequences 'B' follow. In other words, cause is a 'pushing and pulling' force that regulates predictable patterns of events. Ideas or beliefs, like national identity, that do not work in a mechanistic manner and which one cannot observe directly, are not causal in the positivist 'when A, then B' sense. Yet, such a mechanistic understanding of causation unnecessarily limits its applicability to the study of the social world. Our social world is a complex, open system. We cannot truly understand it with simplified empiricist logic, since many *actual* events never become *empirical* events (Stones, 1996). Given that 'the social world is open not closed' (Patomäki and Wight, 2000: 228), social causes are often unobservable, and causal analysis should therefore not depend on the positivist and deterministic approach. 'Pushing and pulling' forces are not the only causes. Others, such as 'constraining and enabling' forces, also have a causal effect (Sayer, 1992; Patomäki, 1996). In this sense, critical realism broadens the conceptualisation of causation to refer to 'a variety of things' (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979; Kurki, 2007, 2008). These scholars

consider any process that is ‘responsible for directing outcomes’ a cause (Kurki, 2008: 16). To them, causes work not only in ‘pushing and pulling’ ways, but also in producing, generating, creating, constraining, enabling, influencing and conditioning ways. National identity, then, could certainly be ‘a constraining and enabling’ cause in foreign policymaking. As discussed, national identity acts as a ‘prism’ through which decision-makers interpret situations to be compatible with the prevailing societal norms. Also, national identity contains normative regularities that make policymakers self-regulate their actions. Furthermore, foreign policy may be based on certain ‘national goals’ that are part of the national identity. In these ways, national identity affects policymakers’ perceptions, behaviour and rationales, rendering some foreign policy actions possible and others impossible.

ILLUSTRATIONS: SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

South Korean National Identity: Formation and Evolution¹

Having addressed theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues with respect to national identity, this section offers an empirical study of South Korean identity and foreign policy. This case study illustrates how national identity works in practice as a ‘constraining and enabling’ cause of foreign policy action. It begins with an excavation, if you will, of South Korean national identity and ends with an examination of specific foreign policies that are either constrained or promoted by the South Korean national identity.

In the 19th century, a national identity unified decentralised ethnic groups in places like Germany and Italy into distinct political and territorial states. In Europe, national identity was a way to unify ethnic groups and draw borders between them. In Korea, scholars also refer to a ‘collective notion of national identity’ based on a belief in ‘ethnic homogeneity’ and a ‘prehistoric origin’ (Shin and Chang, 2004: 118–24; Choe, 2006: 93). This is a textbook definition of ethnically centred national identity that could, just as correctly, apply to European nationalism. Unlike Europe, however, a millennium of political, linguistic and geographic ‘continuity’ left little need for ethnic unification in 19th-century Korea (Shin and Chang, 2004: 121). The gravest threat to Korean national integrity in the 19th century was Western imperialism. To confront imperialist power, Korean nationalists felt a strong need to assert the distinctiveness and effectiveness of their nation and, by doing so, mitigate foreign influence and aggression. Politicians used Korean national identity, then, mainly as ‘an anti-imperialist ideology, opposing foreign challenge or aggression’ (Shin et al., 1999: 470; Olsen, 2008).

When, in the early 20th century, Korea entered the international order as a modern nation-state, a national identity based on ethnicity prevailed. The Japanese

annexation of Korea from 1910 until 1943 only strengthened the idea of a distinct, ethnically Korean national identity. A state-centred national identity based on statehood alone – if it had ever existed² – completely lost its basis among the Korean people when they lost their sovereignty. Without a state, Koreans relied on ‘ethnic homogeneity’ and common ancestry to maintain a national identity that drew a sharp distinction between themselves and the Japanese aggressor. Against this backdrop, Koreans stopped using the word *gukmin*, which means ‘citizen of the state’ and, instead, used *minjok*, which means ‘a common ethnic group’ (Choe, 2006: 95). The Korean nation was ‘racialized through belief in a common prehistoric origin, responding to Western imperialism, especially Japanese imperialism’ (Shin et al., 1999: 469). Under colonialism, ethnicity or ‘race’ served as a powerful differentiator and solidifier for Koreans.

Specific colonial policies, such as forced assimilation, encouraged the growth of ethnically centred nationalist sentiment in Korea, including the growth of an understanding of nation and identity that were inseparable from race. The Japanese adopted aggressive policies to assimilate Koreans into Imperial Japan and used the argument of Japanese racial and cultural superiority to justify their annexation of Korea. In response, Korean thought began to privilege the distinctiveness, purity and superiority of the *Korean* ethnicity (Allen, 1990; Koh, 1994; Shin et al., 1999). Koreans, in particular teachers and journalists, ‘zealously’ advocated for Korean ‘ethnic nationalism’. To rationalise their beliefs, they built narratives around common ancestry, ‘ethnic homogeneity’ and a long and glorious Korean history (Allen, 1990: 792). While ethnicity (a cultural construct based on common ancestry, language and history) is typically distinct from race (an immutable phenotypic and genotypic group), Koreans viewed the two as inseparable. In Korean discourse about identity, for example, the terms ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ are used interchangeably (Shin and Chang, 2004: 121). During this period, the notion of ‘a nation of one clan’ (or *danil minjok* in Korean) came to occupy a hegemonic position in the Korean discourse on national identity. Korean identity became all but inseparable from ethnicity and race.

Another traumatic historical experience, the Korean War of 1950–3, added a second layer of complexity to Korean national identity that was not at all congruent with the notion of ‘ethnic homogeneity’. During the war, the South and North adopted political identities that were not only distinct from but also in stark opposition to each other. In South Korea, for example, politicians portrayed the communist political system in Pyongyang as threatening and antagonistic. After the war, South Koreans internalised liberal market values and democracy as another way to identify the ‘self’ against the ‘other’ in the North (Shin et al., 1999: 472; Bleiker, 2001: 121; Olsen, 2008: 10). These post-war values were, and are, somewhat at odds with the primary sources of Korean national identity: ethnicity and race.

Despite the territorial division, ethnicity remains today a reminder in both South and North Korea of ‘who they are’ despite the border between them.

Neither territorial partition nor political separation completely erased the belief in a Korean identity based on a shared past, common ancestry and ethnic homogeneity. The view that all Koreans are ‘members of an extended family’ is a resilient one. In explaining this phenomenon, Choe (2006) notes that the territorial division of Korea was initially *externally* driven by the Cold War system. The governments of both South and North Korea, in this respect, continue to regard the reunification of Korea as the key to the ‘completion’ of the nation-state. Both consider the division of Korea after the Second World War a ‘temporary’ circumstance (Shin et al., 1999: 476). The leitmotif of ethnically based national identity is a critical component of policy discourses on the reunification of Korea.

After the territorial division, the more or less unitary system of ethnic national identity in South Korea gave way to an identity affected by multiple variables with asymmetrical degrees of rigidity. Nonetheless, ethnic identity remains the most fundamental and rigid of these variables. In South Korea, the powerful idea of a mythic, historical Korean nation persists. A unique racial and ethnic heritage is believed to be the thing that most clearly distinguishes this nation from others, particularly Japan. Whether true or constructed, this difference binds South and North Koreans together despite their contrasting political regimes. Political ideology is another identity influencer, however. Political identity operates on a less rigid and more contextual level, but there are political (democratic) and economic (open-market) aspects to South Korean identity. Because the values of democracy and market capitalism are not uniquely Korean, they are less ‘essential’ than ethnicity and therefore more fluid. Indeed, as codified in historical myth, the nation-state of Korea existed for a millennium without these political values.

South Korea’s layered national identity means that its people have a complex, even contradictory perception of their neighbour to the north. South Koreans who fully embrace their ethnic identity often empathise with North Korea, or at least its people. South Koreans who identify strongly with the political identity of the nation, in contrast, are very critical of North Korea, or at least its regime in Pyongyang. They oppose, for example, sending economic aid from South to North Korea, lest that aid bolster the prosperity of the communist regime. Still, operating within the belief of a common Korean ethnic identity, even many critical South Koreans believe that it is their state’s ‘duty’ to liberate their ‘brothers and sisters’ in the North from the communist regime (Koh, 1994; Choe, 2006). Although wary of potential military provocations from Pyongyang, those critical of the communist regime maintain that disputes between North and South Korea are ‘internal’ matters of one people, rather than ‘international’ disputes (Lee and Jeong, 2010; Kim, 2011).

In contrast, South Koreans have a set perception of Japan as the immutable ‘other’. Most Koreans support the notion that all Koreans are ethnically similar and members of an extended family. In postcolonial Korean society, however,

Japan is still a powerful differentiator that reminds Koreans of who they are and who they are not. Since the colonial occupation of the early 20th century, the idea of the Japanese ‘other’, a foil to Korean ethnicity, has built bonds of national solidarity and social coherence among South Koreans. South Korean sentiment and, to an extent, even its history curricula support the idea that the Korean nation is not only distinct from Japan but ethnically superior as well. The image of Japan in South Korea, then, is somewhat more consistent – and more consistently negative – than the image of North Korea.

South Korean Foreign Policy Actions towards North Korea and Japan

The multifaceted ethnic and political identity of South Korea is reflected in the state’s foreign policies towards North Korea and Japan. South Korea’s conflicting perception of North Korea – as both an ethnic identical and a communist ‘other’ – have led to somewhat contradictory policies towards the state. In contrast, South Korea maintains a determinedly cold relationship with its former coloniser, Japan, even though the two countries are thriving democracies with close economic ties.

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, South Korean governments have debated which foreign policy strategy the state should adopt with regards to North Korea. Generally speaking, the government has been split between those preferring containment and strict reciprocity and those endorsing sympathetic engagement and dialogue. The administrations of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8), for example, pursued dialogue, engagement and reconciliation – the so-called ‘Sunshine Policy’ – towards North Korea. South Korea kept up its Sunshine Policy even when Pyongyang revealed its ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in effect, destabilised Asian regional security. The Kim and Roh administrations continued to send North Korea economic aid and engage in military dialogues with the state. In this respect, analysts have portrayed the Sunshine Policy as ‘underbalancing’ (Kim, 2011). From a realist security-theory perspective, the Sunshine Policy is puzzling. Yet when one takes into account the in-group perception of South Korean policymakers towards a racial and ethnic Korean nation, the policy is more logical, or at least more understandable. In the discourse around the Sunshine Policy, the governments often evoked the Korean terms *danil minjok* and *han minjok*, which literally mean ‘a nation of one clan’ (Roh, 2006a). Despite North Korea’s military adventurism, South Korea pursued cooperative and sympathetic policies towards the neighbouring state based on, or caused by, a rigid sense of shared ethnic identity.

The foreign policy of the Lee Myung-bak government (2008–12) is perhaps a richer example of how complicated national identity ‘causes’ a state’s specific policies. Unlike his two predecessors, Lee took a hard-line approach to the

regime in Pyongyang. He justified this approach by pointing to the increasingly bellicose actions of North Korea (at the time, the state was conducting nuclear-weapons tests and long-range-missile launches). Lee evoked the political, state-centred identity of South Korea to drum up opposition to these actions. The administration often described the regime in Pyongyang as brutal and irrational and drew a stark distinction between it and the morally superior and economically advanced system in South Korea. The Lee administration called its hard-line strategy a 'grand bargain' aimed at pressuring the North Korean political and economic system towards democracy and liberalism. South Korea, positioning itself as the more advanced state, differentiated and infantilised the communist political identity of North Korea (Eun, 2016). The state abandoned sympathetic aid and adopted a policy of strict reciprocity towards North Korea in the realm of trade (Klinger, 2008).

As had been the case with previous administrations, however, the Lee administration also considered the peaceful reunification of Korea a national goal. Policymakers still frequently used the term *danil minjok* in their policy discourses on North Korea (Lee, 2010a, 2010b, 2012) and, even as Pyongyang continued to militarise, South Korea consistently pursued peaceful reunification. In 2010, for example, the South Korean battleship *Cheonan* sank in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 South Koreans. The findings of the international investigation pointed to North Korea being behind the attack (UNSCR, 2010), but, despite it being a clear violation of international law and justification for a declaration of war, the Lee administration did not pursue a military response. Instead, it imposed economic sanctions against Pyongyang. Although Lee blamed North Korea officially for sinking *Cheonan*, he also stated that the North 'must stop committing reckless military provocations, and embark on the path towards common prosperity for all 70 million Koreans. By doing so, we must restore peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and find the road to common prosperity for the Korean people. *Our ultimate goal is not military confrontation but peaceful unification*' (Lee, 2010a, emphasis added).

Lee's statement reveals that, despite his emphasis on a South Korean political identity distinct from that of the North, ethnic (*minjok*) identity was also a *constraining* influence on the foreign policy of his administration. For much of his career, Lee spoke of South Korean identity as inseparable from democracy and the market economy. Even so, a deep ethnic identity shared across North and South restricted the range of 'acceptable' policies towards North Korea. After the *Cheonan* went down, policymakers did not put forward resolutions that involved severing all relations with the North, let alone declaring war (Lee, 2013). Several public-opinion polls taken *after* the *Cheonan* incident indicated that 55.2% of South Koreans favoured 'reconciliation and cooperation' while fewer, 42.7%, favoured taking a hard-line stance against the North (Lee and Jeong, 2010). It is clear that, while the Lee government took a harder line against North Korea than its predecessors, a feeling of residual ethnic solidarity with the North limited

the range of acceptable foreign policy actions to, mostly, those that promoted 'reconciliation and cooperation'. These empirical findings show that socially constructed national identity works as a 'constraining and enabling' cause in foreign policy. Furthermore, the extent of national identity's causal influence varies depending on the type of national identity – political or ethnic, for example – and how rigid it is.

While South Korea's foreign policy towards North Korea varies based on ethnic and political identity, all South Korean governments, regardless of their political ideologies, have taken an almost unitarily vigilant course of action towards Japan. Although South Korean presidents emphasise, rhetorically, the need for reconciliation and cooperation with Japan when they come into office, most of their foreign policies in office are not consistent with this rhetoric. Both the left-wing administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun and the right-wing Lee Myung-Bak administration emphasised a 'future-oriented relationship between Seoul and Tokyo based on a spirit of reconciliation and friendship'. Yet, all three administrations were bogged down in disputes with Japan. South Korea took offense, for example, at Japanese history textbooks that whitewash the state's colonial wrongdoings. Japanese officials also continue to make official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, despite the fact that the shrine honours war criminals responsible for atrocities, suppressive colonial policies and forced conscription in Korea. The two states also butt heads over the islands known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan. The islands were annexed by Japan in 1905 ahead of its colonisation of the Korean peninsula and are currently under South Korean control.

These disputes with Japan elicit a 'collective' emotional response – mostly anger and fear – from South Koreans. In such an environment, achieving inter-state cooperation, let alone political friendship, is a tall order. In disputes with Japan, South Korean presidents take a – sometimes disproportionate – hard-line stance against Japan, making comments like: 'they [the Japanese] need to face the truth about their past, reflect on it and make a genuine apology' (Roh, 2006a). For Koreans, the territorial dispute over the Dokdo Islands is also a dispute over the history, dignity and sovereignty of Korea (Roh, 2006b; Lee, 2013). The reasoning behind this belief was revealed in the statement made by the former South Korean foreign minister Kim Sung-hwan to the Associated Press: 'We are victims of Japanese colonial rule. ... When the Japanese government claims that Dokdo is their territory, Korean people see it as another attempt to invade our country' (Kim, 2012). Indeed, according to a 2014 survey, South Koreans saw Japan as their second-largest military threat (EAI, 2014: 24). Even though North Korea is objectively the bigger threat, South Korea and Japan have trouble cooperating. The Lee administration, for example, refused to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement, an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan that would have consolidated information on North Korea's military and nuclear threats. Many South Koreans opposed the agreement, insisting that, before they began cooperating with the Japanese, Tokyo should offer a sincere apology for colonialism.

South Korea often eyes Japan's ambitions in East Asia with suspicion. For some, any attempt by Japan to reclaim the role of regional hegemon brings back the ghosts of imperialism. For many Koreans, instead of taking on regional leadership, Japan should be atoning quietly for its colonialist past. The collective memory of colonialism – part of the Korean identity – continues to cause conflict between South Korea and Japan on the international stage. The ethnicity-centred Korean identity is a coloured lens, or 'prism', that defines the view of Japan that South Koreans, including decision-makers, use to interpret Japanese policies. Suspicion about Japan's regional intentions reproduces and reinforces the image of Japan as a coloniser. Ethnicity-centred identity also provides 'normative' guidelines for South Korea's overarching approach to foreign policy with Japan that endure from administration to administration.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to explain how national identity works as a 'causal' factor in foreign policy. While both IR and area studies indicate that national identity matters in international politics, neither can specifically explain *how* and *to what extent* it matters. This chapter has taken this task on. Constructivist IR scholars regard national identity as a 'constitutive' construct, but the chapter has argued that it can actually *cause* foreign policy in particular ways. Building on the metatheoretical insights of critical realism, this chapter maintains that causes work not only in a 'pushing and pulling' (Humean) way but also in a producing, generating, creating, constraining, enabling, influencing or conditioning way. National identity, it concludes, is a 'constraining and enabling' cause that can shape foreign policymakers' behavioural motivations, frame the normative context of their perceptions, rationalise a particular course of foreign policy behaviour or define a state's foreign policy goals.

To overcome the methodological issue of the inseparability of cause and effect, as pinpointed by constructivist scholars, this chapter has confirmed the causal power of national identity by examining 'specific' foreign policy decisions. Using South Korea as a case study, this chapter has examined the state's foreign policies with regards to North Korea and Japan. In South Korea, national identity contains multiple variables – ethnicity, history, political ideology – that interact with *asymmetric* rigidity. These different variables of national identity 'constrain and enable' South Korea's foreign policy actions. For example, South Korea took a harder line against Japan's history textbooks than against North Korea's nuclear weapons. As Table 2.1 shows, these findings conflict with the conventional expectations of mainstream IR (e.g. realist and liberal) theory and thus have significant implications for the ongoing 'broadening IR' debate (Tickner and Waever, 2009; Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Hobson, 2012; Acharya, 2014, 2016; Ling, 2014; Eun, 2016; Qin, 2016). Let me clarify these points further.

Table 2.1 Mainstream theoretical perspectives in IR

	<i>Neorealism</i>	<i>Neoliberalism</i>	<i>Constructivism</i>
Analytical orientation	Seeks systemic and generalisable accounts	Seeks systemic and generalisable accounts	Seeks systemic and generalisable accounts
Key premise and assumption	States as rational actors constantly struggle for survival and power in the anarchic international system	States as rational actors cooperate and can order anarchy. Institutions or trade help states reduce uncertainty embedded in anarchy	States as social actors act differently depending on intersubjective understandings of the anarchic international system
Key concepts and variables	Balance of power, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity, threat intentions	Institutions, economic interdependence, democratisation	Identity, norms, intersubjective meanings
Theoretically inferred predictions about South Korean foreign policy behaviour	South Korea would pursue hard balancing against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats while seeking strategic or ad hoc cooperation with Japan in order to address these immediate threats	South Korea would pursue comprehensive cooperation with Japan, while its motivation to cooperate with North Korea would remain low	South Korean behaviour would vary depending on whether the concerned countries share common identities or norms, and on what identities or norms they share

South Korean foreign policy actions regarding North Korea and Japan might seem 'irrational' from the perspective of realist and liberal IR theory. Consider, for example, the regional security of East Asia. South Korea faces a direct threat from North Korea's nuclear programme. To curtail the North's nuclear ambitions, pursuing security cooperation with other regional states, including Japan, appears to be a 'rational' choice. Furthermore, both South Korea and Japan are strong democracies with close economic ties; several economic and cultural institutions have been established to promote bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Given these facts, realist and liberal theory – specifically balance of power theory, balance of threat theory, neo-liberal institutionalism, economic liberalism and democratic peace theory – would all expect South Korea to pursue comprehensive cooperation with Japan. In reality, it does not do so.

Although South Korean foreign policy behaviour does not follow the expectations of realism and liberalism, it seems to confirm the utility of constructivism, which holds that what matters in international politics is socially constructed ideas. However, the situation is more complex, since states like South Korea have rich, layered national identities based on multiple factors with varying degrees of 'causal' impact on foreign policy. Despite a political identity very similar to Japan's, South Korea has a strong ethnic identity that 'contains and enables' more rigidity than political ideology does. The socio-historical and socio-emotional aspects of this ethnicity-based national identity colour South Korean foreign policy in East Asia through a perceptual filter, or 'prism'. This 'prism' narrows the range of acceptable or unacceptable foreign policy decisions down to those that, ultimately, preserve the hegemony of South Korean, Japanese and North Korean relations. This effect is not merely a local one. One can apply this understanding to inter-state relationships in similar postcolonial regions.

While national identity 'causes' foreign policy, where the national identity of the state is complex it may be difficult to understand the effect identity will have on a given policy decision. As discussed earlier, national identity is not a unitary construct. Rather it is a multifaceted construct created by multiple variables – ethnicity, history and political ideology – with *asymmetrical* degrees of rigidity. As such, it is crucial to understand *which* aspect of identity is most rigid and thus most causal. In this sense, analysts should be attentive to local, indigenous knowledge because, after all, the historical myth or experiences around which people have built emotional bonds for generations are the most powerful sources for the rigid identity. In South Korea, the most substantive elements of national identity are drawn from the nation's collective historical experiences, especially 'traumatic' experiences, such as colonialism or war. In these situations, the distinction between 'self' and 'other' is clearest. This clarity forges national solidarity and emotional bonds that translate naturally into foreign policy later on. Indeed, the more fundamental and rigid the aspect of identity is, the more it 'causes' the state's foreign policy. Furthermore, the most rigid aspects of identity will overwhelm other national values, leaving them without substantial effect. Therefore, analysts should not only examine the various aspects of a state's identity but also evaluate the rigidity of these aspects to correctly understand their effect. To this end, IR theory, including constructivism, needs indigenous knowledge, and vice versa. Indeed, these can and should be interweaved. This suggestion resonates with the recent calls for a more inclusive and broader IR, namely 'Global IR'.

The 'Global IR' project urges current West-centric IR scholarship to properly reflect the histories, knowledge and theoretical perspectives outside of the West; yet, more importantly, it does not 'seek to displace existing (or future) theories of IR that may substantially originate from Western ideas and experiences' (Acharya, 2014: 620). Instead, the ultimate objective of 'Global IR' is to recognise multiple foundations of thought and encourage dialogue across the theoretical and spatial divides in the study of global politics. In Acharya's words,

IR ‘should acknowledge and encourage dialogue within as well as between cultures and locations, East, West, North, South’ in order to achieve ‘a truly global’ discipline (Acharya, 2014: 647; 2016: 2). This chapter – drawing from both Western theory and local history – has contributed to the objective of the ‘Global IR’ project, showing that, without local context, realist and liberal IR theories fall short of answering why South Korea behaved as it did in relation to North Korea or Japan. Indigenous knowledge can also add depth and sophistication to constructivist IR theory by specifying its boundary and scope conditions. Knowledge about local historical experiences, for example, makes constructivism a more effective approach to understanding the dynamics and extent of national identity’s causal effect on foreign policy. Such knowledge is indeed necessary to determine which aspects of national identity are more rigid and thus exercise a more powerful influence on foreign policy, and to understand why.

To bridge the gap between area studies (oriented towards local knowledge of the foreign policymaking of individual countries) and IR theory (committed to general understandings of causal mechanisms or constitutive processes of the state behaviour) is thus essential. Debates over Western versus non-Western IR or the superiority of one theoretical approach over another are pernicious to this bridging endeavour. Instead, we need to have a vigorous debate about how to develop productive interaction between disparate theories, fields or experiences. Instead of either applying (Western-centric) IR theories unquestioningly or rejecting them completely, we need to weave IR theories with history-sensitive knowledge and indigenous experiences in the non-West, not just to test the theories but also to create inclusive and complementary understandings of our world (Eun, 2018, 2019). I hope that the complementary approach to an understanding of national identity and foreign policy presented in this chapter will be a useful starting point for traversing the bridges and the junctions that connect the insights of IR theory (e.g. constructivism) to the empirical evidence necessary to make claims about the real world at any one moment.

Notes

- 1 Parts of the following sections appear in Eun (2018, 2019).
- 2 Some scholars argue that there was little, if any, ‘feeling of loyalty’ towards the abstract concept of Korea as ‘a nation-state’ prior to the late 19th century (Eckert, 1991: 226).

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Non-Western Realism

Zheng Yongnian and Liu Bojian

INTRODUCTION

The development of realist theory in international relations (IR) has, since Thucydides and Machiavelli, long been buttressed by the interactions of Great Powers in politics and intellectual debates in the West, while East Asia¹ could mostly be treated less as intellectual fountainhead, than as a data pool for an empirical test. Nevertheless, in the contemporary era, with the trend of the East Asian renaissance restoring the region's past prosperity as a world center, with frequent inter-state tensions known to be 'ripe for rivalry', a number of prominent Western realists have been shifting away from Western-centric scholarship toward formulating new sub-theories exploited from Asia's exceptional IR practices and traditional thoughts. Similarly, their endeavors have also encouraged East Asian scholars to contribute their indigenous perspectives toward rectifying Western understandings of IR theory.

Challenging the universality of the theories deduced from the experiences of the Western and Great Powers, scholars such as David Kang (2003) have underscored that the studies of East Asian international politics should require novel analytical frameworks. Indeed, as this chapter indicates, especially for the pre-modern practices where the Westphalian system was not accepted in adjusting the regional order, it could be problematic to apply Western realism when explaining East Asian IR practices. Also, while the progress of purer theory building is somewhat tardy and a non-Western IR theory has yet to be genuinely formed, this chapter will demonstrate how East Asian scholars are delving into non-Western experiences and values where they can rebuild their

theories of realism. Moreover, among IR academic communities in Japan, China, and southeast Asia, it will be shown how the progression of theoretical studies has been unbalanced. Above all, as we will find in this chapter, in terms of their prospects of encouraging cooperation-building between states, the new thoughts contributed by East Asian scholars of realism are more inclined to fit within defensive realism – although their views are largely divided over the geopolitical implications of China's rise and the nature of an East Asian regional order.

This chapter aims to provide a detour of the efforts by scholars focusing on East Asia in developing concepts and theories of non-Western realism. It consists of three parts. First, recognizing the significance of international practices per se as a crucial origin of intellectual traditions – several key historical and contemporary IR practices in East Asia that fundamentally determine the distinctiveness of East Asian realism will be identified and discussed. The second part will shed light on how non-Western realism was developed by elucidating: (1) how Western realism may be defective when interpreting East Asian IR, and (2) how do those emerging non-Western theories of realism improve the conventional arguments of the Western realists? The third part will critically review three major issue areas that are triggering theoretical debates among non-Western realists in East Asia.

REALISM AND PRACTICES IN EAST ASIAN IR

In his *Politics Among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau has identified the main principles of realism as the foundation for the realist school of IR, including emphasizing the conflictual nature of international politics, states' unitary rationality, and struggling for power while downplaying the role of moral laws in the anarchical world². Our discussion on IR practices in this section will also focus on these principles.³ The contents of two prominent camps of realism – i.e., offensive realism and defensive realism, such as debates about relative gains, alliance politics, security dilemma and the possibility of cooperation-building – will also be referred to in selecting our key East Asian IR practices.

A primary reason why we need to scrutinize major IR practices in East Asia is that the practices fundamentally embody shared intersubjective knowledge (Adler and Pouliot, 2011) including various forms of realism different to those of the West. Notably, perhaps because of the long tradition of meritocracy in East Asia, practices and shared intersubjective knowledge are so inherently connected because the boundary between realistic intellectuals and realistic policy practitioners is vague. For example, key strategists such as Fukuzawa Yukichi⁴, Mao Zedong, Shigeru Yoshida, and Lee Kuan Yew have exerted quite profound impacts on both their home country's foreign policy and scholarly debates among intellectuals.

As for this research, the scholarly merit of the so-called 'non-Western realism' actually hinges on the saliently exceptional IR practices in East Asia which

involve objective social facts shaping various indigenous thoughts of non-Western realism. In other words, it is the features of IR practices in East Asia that enable East Asian realists to be distinguishable from Western realists. Indeed, as discussed in the third section, almost all new theories of realism formed in East Asia are constructed based on reinterpretations of the region's IR practices. However, as a caveat, by exploring East Asian IR practices of realism, we do not mean that they are dominated by realism. In fact, as the third part will show, liberalism, institutionism, and constructivism are more significant in explaining Japanese and southeast Asian policy practices and they also exert quite some influence in China⁵.

Accordingly, we suggest two pathways in order to generally define non-Western East Asian realists. The first is to narrowly define them as a group of ethnically non-Western scholars based in East Asia who are not strictly Western-educated.⁶ In particular, by this definition, the scholars who are paying more attention to pure theory-building than policy studies still belong to this category since their research is influential and generally accepted by East Asian academia, and they do reflect a non-Western voice from a Westerner's perspective even though their theorizations are still fully based on Western literature, referring very little to featured East Asian IR practices.

The second group is more broadly defined in order to include those who contribute and enriching theory of realism drawn from non-Western IR practices. This certainly includes some Western-educated, or even Western-born, realists, even though they may not be non-Westerners in ethnic or geographic terms. In general, the non-Western theories of realism referred to in this chapter do not strictly exclude the thoughts developed by some Western-based scholars, such as Alastair Iain Johnston, given their exclusive treatment of East Asian values and experiences.

Referring to the fundamental principles of classical realism identified by Morgenthau, this section will evaluate five major clusters of IR practices in East Asia that most frequently appear in debates among realists about East Asian international affairs and thereby unravel several key puzzles from them that draw the interests of both Western and non-Western realists.

The earliest cluster is the IR practices during pre-Qin China, particularly the Warring States period, where there were two major thematic categories embodying the principles of realism. The first category is the practice of the balancing of power ('Hezong Lianheng' in Chinese) with fast-changing alliances and counter-alliances, and the other is the philosophy of raising the national power of a state in order to survive, i.e., statecraft. Both of these categories had been quite profoundly reviewed by ancient strategists and thinkers such as Sun Tzu and Xunzi. In general, when investigating IR practices during the pre-Qin period, the key puzzle is how to evaluate the role of alliances, diplomatic protocol, economic autarky, military power, and other mechanisms that regulate peace and war.

The second cluster is the running and collapse of the 'Tianxia' (all-under-heaven) order in East Asia. It is highly competitive among constructivists, liberal

institutionalists, and realists in interpreting and applying the practices of the 'Tianxia' order. In fact, Edward Hallett Carr (1946: 85), a founding father of modern realism, when criticizing liberal internationalism, had mentioned China's traditional idealistic aspirations of becoming a sovereign lord of the earth under the heaven.

By definition, the 'Tianxia' is a hierarchical tributary system – an extension of China's domestic order, where the Chinese empire and the emperor oversaw relations between non-Chinese states in East Asia – which had maintained regional order for a long time and was based on the Chinese suzerainty (Fairbank and Ch'en, 1968). However, paying tribute to the Chinese emperor, states' deference to the hierarchy of 'Tianxia' was still largely nominal and only instrumental where China did not actually have substantial control over those states. As the most essential part of establishing and operationalizing the system (Zheng, 2010: 293–321), the incentives of pursuing power for material primacy also prevailed among the small states surrounding mainland China, which is why some peripheral regimes such as Khitan, Mongol, and Jurchens succeeded by concurring with mainland China and subsequently dominating the 'Tianxia' system.

In fact, practices of the balance of power within the tributary system are also frequently salient, but the difference is that there is always a superpower sustained in the Middle Kingdom far mightier than any surrounding actors to the extent that it leaves very little chance for peripheral states to balance against the Middle Kingdom itself. As the third section indicates, debates over the long history of the East Asian tributary regional order focus primarily on issues such as: what are the particular mechanisms between the Middle Kingdom and other actors contributing to long peace in the region?, and, how do these mechanisms have beneficial implications for contemporary order building in East Asia?

The third cluster of primary IR practices in East Asia, after the collapse of the 'Tianxia' system and China's 'Century of Humiliation', was generated during the emerging Westphalian system in East Asia. After the collapse of the tributary order, Western powers and, after the Meiji Restoration, a modernized Japan were competing fiercely in rebuilding regional order. In sum, there are three major sources of IR practices during this period that should be noted: (1) the power transition from China to Japan accompanied with an order change in East Asia, (2) strategic confrontations between Japan and the United States, and (3) international movements toward modern nation-building along with anti-colonialism across East Asia.

As what Thucydides' trap hints, Japan's victory during the first Sino-Japanese war underpinned its rise to primacy in East Asia following the practice of radical Pan-Asianism. Japan's expansion in East Asia at the end of both the 19th century and the 1930s had necessitated a major powers' balance against Japan – as demonstrated by the triple intervention and the US Open Door Policy. In the meantime, the formation of a multi-polar world system was plagued by the newly rising powers' abomination of the existing world order, and the transformation

within the East Asian power structure was largely internalized in Japan's domestic political configurations. Demonstrated by the triumph of the realistic view held by Matsuoka and the disgraced non-interventionistic doctrine of Shidehara⁷, Japan's ambition of breaking the status quo became stronger after the Manchurian Incident (Iriye, 1974: 265).

During this period, most thoughts within modern realism took the form of national strategies seeking survival in Hobbesian world politics, represented by influential strategists such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Yamagata Aritomo⁸ in Japan, Shin Chae-Ho in Korea, Mao Zedong in China, and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. For example, endorsing the value of 'the strong eat up the weak'⁹ and pan-Asianist ideology¹⁰, Fukuzawa Yukichi was a leading intellectual who had guided Japan to achieve wider national greatness in the region since the early-1880s, and his thoughts greatly influenced Yamagata Aritomo who developed more radical and realistic theories of Japan's statecraft and regional strategy.

The fourth cluster of East Asian IR practices is the area that Western realists have paid most attention to and essentially covers the process from the formation to the collapse of the Cold-War bipolar system. In general, there are six subareas noteworthy for more scholarly investigations: (1) the non-alignment movement following soaraway modern state-building in East Asia; (2) the establishment and evolution of the Association of southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); (3) Japan's post-war pacifist foreign policy under the Yoshida Doctrine; (4) the cross-strait crisis and proxy wars in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina; (5) the Sino-Soviet split and China's rapprochement with the United States; and (6) Japan's struggling reconciliations with the Republic of Korea and the Peoples' Republic of China.

In general, as Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh (1993) observed, the Asian security environment was less structured than the European NATO-Warsaw Pact environment. For instance, as reflected in the quasi-alliance between Mao's China and the United States, the Cold War in East Asia was quite different from that in Europe to the extent that common strategic ends outweighed ideological discrepancies and China even got acquiescence from the United States in armed interventions in the Third Indochina War. Besides, during the Cold War and in contrast to the situation in Britain and France, Japan and South Korea were not ultimately able to attain nuclear weapons.

In fact, another significant feature of East Asian realistic practices is that the strategic thoughts developed by the charismatic leaders arising after the end of World War II have been well respected and inherited in major states' foreign policies. For example, as one of the most frequently used terms depicting modern China's military strategy, 'active defense' was conceptualized by Mao Zedong during the period of the Civil War. Moreover, Shigeru Yoshida set up an economically centric and militarily self-restrained approach for post-war Japanese foreign policy, while Lee Kuan Yew designed flexible survival strategies for Singapore when faced with dire geopolitical circumstances.

The fifth cluster of IR practice in East Asia is the contemporary power competitions after the Cold War and against the emerging backdrop of China's rise, in which three practices are particularly scholarly valuable. They include: (1) cross-regional power and status competitions between Japan and China accompanied by disruptive bilateral distrust; (2) vacillations of southeast Asian countries' strategic choices between balancing and bandwagoning when facing China's rise; (3) debates, either among scholars and policy practitioners, over whether the rising China will be a benign status quo power – in particular, the most spiritedly debated topic is whether the Sino-US power transition will fall into the Thucydides trap, as classical realism believes, under which context China's relations with either Japan or South Korea, as two key allies of the United States, are deemed to be unstable and occasionally marked by rivalry.

EAST ASIA IN WESTERN REALISM

Not surprisingly, as the third section will discuss, among scholars who aim to build non-western theories, the majority focus on the former three sources of East Asian practices – largely due to the fact that the period of the former three practices was set before the Westphalian system of modern nation-states appeared in East Asia, which made IR practices in East Asia more distinguishable from those in the West. Nevertheless, East Asian IR practices after World War II have been increasingly visible in the conventional literature of realism, while the solid trend of economic integration in Western Europe has significantly weakened realists' explanatory power. In other words, in the sense of Western classical realists, the modern IR practices in East Asia are arguably not exceptional compared to those of the West.

For example, as a founding father of classical realism in IR, Hans Morgenthau (1950: 835–836) noted that the principle of the balance of power in Asia, originating from the idea of the 'open door' policy in China, is one of the key national interests of the United States who assumed that the domination of the Asian mainland by another nation would threaten the security of the United States. For neoclassical realists such as Aaron Friedberg and Thomas Christensen, power politics in East Asia are the same as those in Europe where shifts of relative power distribution largely shape changes of foreign policy in a particular state (Rose, 1998).

For offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer, the nature of East Asian international politics is by no means exceptional and the rise of China will almost certainly force its neighbors and the United States to form a balancing coalition to contain it. Peculiarly, by explaining how imperial Japan was prevented from gaining regional supremacy between 1895 and 1945, Mearsheimer clarified how the US global strategy of offshore balancing worked, which is the core concept of his theory.

Table 3.1 Featured divisions of Western realism applied in modern East Asia

<i>Types of realism</i>	<i>(neo) Classical realism</i>	<i>Structural realism</i>	<i>Offensive realism</i>
Generally shared views	1) Anarchy in international relations 2) Conflictual nature of world politics 3) The state is rational and unitary 4) The moral law is far less important than power		
Views about cooperation	States' penchant for relative power and defections usually sabotages cooperation as prisoners dilemma predicts	Achievable through reassurance, but security dilemma is still risky when fear and distrust aggravate	No genuine cooperation because of the revisionist nature of states
Key cases in East Asia	Open Door policy in East Asia; balancing against the Empire of Japan; free-riders in alliance politics	The arms race in East Asia after the Cold War; difficult development of nonproliferation regime	The U.S. offshore balancing in East Asia; rising assertiveness of China.

Besides, for offensive realists, cooperation could be reluctantly achievable through alliances when there are common threats to contain, but the alliance is extremely friable because each state, calculating relative gains, will inevitably adopt the strategy of buck-passing by shifting the burden of containing the threat to their partners. For example, as Jennifer Lind (2004) argues, the pacifist foreign policy during the post-war period that Japan takes can be depicted as buck-passing given the fact that, within the alliance with the United States, Japan has long been too self-restrained to contribute as much as other allies of the United States¹¹.

Unlike offensive realists focusing on power and conflicts, defensive realists use structural rivalries and states' preference of security as two themes framing their arguments, and the most crucial concept they apply in explaining contemporary East Asian power dynamics is security dilemmas. They believe that cooperation-building between states in the rivalry is possible through costly reassurance showing benign intentions. For example, by integrating neoclassical realism and neorealism, Thomas Christensen (1999) emphasized the risks of security dilemmas in contemporary East Asia while also holding that the US cautious and non-offensive military presence did ameliorate the security dilemma in the region.

Overall, regarding the explanatory power of Western realism in East Asian international politics, there are generally three weaknesses attracting non-Western scholars to improve by contributing new thoughts. First, for the existing Western realism, the dichotomy of revisionist and status-quo power largely limits the discussion of relatively complicated relations between the East Asian regional order

and the world order. Second, Western realism in East Asia focuses narrowly on the region's modern East Asian IR practices which appeared only after the region was incorporated into the Westphalian system, while the pre-modern practices were given far less theoretical investigations. Third, as more realists attempt to develop mid-level theories, the classical realists' assumption of setting states as unitary has been increasingly challenged.

As the following paragraphs will reveal in detail, a caveat is that most of the so-called, non-Western realism on East Asia does not overthrow existing Western realism but rather supplements its explanatory power. In particular, regarding the first weakness, for realists who are interested in East Asia, the focus of scholarly debates have shifted from the nature of rising powers to more concrete questions such as the evolution of regional security architecture and the strategic patterns of major states. In the second weakness, upsurges of exploring pre-modern IR history in East Asia have considerably enriched literature of East Asian realism. As for the third point, delving into domestic layers such as public opinion and decision-makers, there are growing interests of psychological and cultural variables in IR that have been investigated as auxiliary factors explaining peace and conflicts.

NON-WESTERN REALISTIC THEORIES BY MAJOR ISSUE AREAS

Echoing some of the featured East Asian IR practices, we list in the first section, for the convenience of discussion, the following review of the emerging thoughts of East Asian realists will be phrased by East Asian sub-regional issue areas or states, instead of proceeding by each practice, as most realists in East Asia are specialized and interested more in certain subfields of IR.

Foreign Relations of a Rising China

In general, the development of IR theory on China can be seen as a process of dialogue between Western-based China watchers and China-based scholars. Since the 1980s, after almost three decades of the dominance of Marxism-Leninism, and with several Western theoretical classics of IR being translated into Chinese, there has been a growing number of Chinese scholars accepting the paradigm of Western IR theories of realism, whereas, during the early period, the liberalists and constructivists essentially dominated Chinese IR literature (Ni and Xu, 1997). In fact, the Chinese scholars' passion for reformulating Western IR theories originated from their efforts to justify China's peaceful rise, particularly when Western realists were debating whether China should be contained.

In a broad sense, after the incipient period of introducing Western realist literature in the 1980s, in the process of localizing and further developing realism

within Chinese IR academia, there are two stages, beginning during the late 1990s, that are notable.

The first is decades' long debate on Western realists and Sinologists' arguments on the motivations behind China's strategic behavior. To a large extent, the debate was initiated by two famous hard-core realistic articles – 'The Coming Conflict with America' and 'Beijing as a Conservative Power' – both published by *Foreign Affairs* in 1997, in which the second held that China currently does not have the ability to fulfill its revisionist motivations. In contrast, another prominent expert on China, Alastair Iain Johnston, regards China as a non-revisionist power that is compatible with conditions of defensive realism even though his research showed that China has historically exhibited a strategic culture of classical realism where it had no fundamental difference with Western realpolitik (Johnston, 1996).

In response to Western suspicions of China's strategic motivation, Xuetong Yan (1997) redefined China's national interest and provided an alternative lens for foreigners to understand the motivations of China's foreign policy. Yan's view is regarded as a realistic approach to clarify China's concerns over international order. In fact, since Hu Jintao's administration came into power, the Chinese government has sent clearer official signals indicating China's non-revisionist motivation, and one famous case that interested Western scholars and media was Bijian Zheng's quasi-official speech in 2003 where he raised the term of China's 'peaceful rise' (Zheng, 2006). As Acharya and Buzan argued in 2009, China's strategy of peaceful rise, by eschewing highly risky confrontations with the United States, can actually fit well within realists' logic (Acharya and Buzan, 2009).

During the first half of the 2000s, less pessimistic assessments of China's rise were made by influential realists such as Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross and constructivists such as David Kang. For example, in 2003, Kang (2003) argued that China's rise presents more of an opportunity than a threat to states in East Asia where there is a cultural predisposition toward hierarchy which encourages region-wide accommodation with China. Notably, Robert Ross revised Kang's argument in 2006 and holds that, affected by variations in China's military and economic impacts on the region rather than cultural factors, secondary states in East Asia tend to align toward accommodating, instead of balancing against, the rising of China, which Ross (2006) believes is in accordance with the principles of realism.

In general, in the first stage, from the 1980s to 1990s, scholars in China were relatively passive but somehow patriotic in response to the Western discourse. Moreover, most studies done by Chinese scholars were case studies applying Western theories in explaining benign Chinese foreign policies. As Yaqin Qin (2009) put, China's contributions to IR theories in this stage were largely limited by the lack of awareness of 'international-ness' and the absence of a theoretical hardcore.

Giving less attention to the myths of whether China is a status quo or revisionist state, the second stage of developing realist theory about China is demonstrated in the debates occurring since the beginning of the 2000s on the implications of China's rise in the post-Cold War world-order. In addition, the stage has also been processed in the scholarly efforts of building a Chinese school of IR theory where reformulating the Western paradigm of realism has undergone considerable progress in comparison to the first stage.

Stimulated by the waves of debates since the 1990s on the implications of the 'Tianxia' system and Johnston's evaluation of Chinese ancient strategic culture, Chinese realists have been drawing more on China's IR practices beginning with the pre-Qin period. They have had productive dialogues with scholars from the English School such as Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang (2012). For example, Yan and his colleagues at Tsinghua University initiated a research project of building IR theories of the harmonious world through drawing on IR thoughts and practices in the pre-Qin China.

In particular, by reinterpreting China's traditional political thoughts in the pre-Qin period, Yan formulated a theory of moral realism explaining the global power transition and the implications of China's rise. He emphasized that political leadership is the key to national power and morality constitutes an essential component of political leadership, while economic and military power is less determinate than political leadership in fitting in with moral norms (Yan et al., 2011).

Regarding the ancient East Asian order, Fangyin Zhou's equilibrium analysis of the tributary system is regarded as a realist explanation in which he underscores the nature of conflictual interactions that lead to a mutual accommodation between China and relatively weaker neighbors (Womack, 2012). Moreover, Feng Zhang (2015) described how the tributary system worked and gave a bit of a more realistic interpretation than others, which was vividly demonstrated by what Zhang categorized as four strategic choices adopted by actors in tributary diplomacy: expressive hierarchy for Confucian propriety and instrumental hierarchy for self-interest maximization on the part of China, and identification with Chinese values and deference to Chinese power on the part of other actors.

Regarding topics such as ancient China's suzerainty, the hierarchical order in the long history of East Asia, and implications of the ancient IR practices to contemporary China's peaceful rise, conclusions made by non-Western realists have been increasingly divided, particularly since 2010. In general, their views can be categorized as conditionally pessimistic or conditionally optimistic.

Unsurprisingly, notwithstanding their highlighting of national interests and power, most realists based in China give conditionally optimistic conclusions on China's peaceful rise, which were quite innovatively developed from their decades-long endeavors in theorizing China's ancient IR practices. In particular, several key concepts such as moral realism, 'Tianxia,' 'harmonious world', and the tributary system have been further defined and applied in evaluating

contemporary China's behavioral patterns in world politics. As mentioned above, moral realism and other mid-level theories drawing on Chinese ancient IR practices were typical non-Western realism theories synthesizing China's traditional thoughts and classical realism, and they essentially attempted to explain how international political leadership and strategic reputation can ensure a rising state successfully replaces the existing great power with moral legitimacy in a peaceful way.

Notably, some scholars outside mainland China also shared a conditionally optimistic view on China's rise. For example, Xiaoyu Pu argued that China might succeed in molding a new world order which would successfully delegitimize unipole's authority and order (Schweller and Pu, 2011). Investigating the process where Chinese civilization evolves into the Chinese nation-state, Chih-yu Shih considered the practices of Chinese foreign policy since imperial times as 'harmonious realism' where the Confucius idea of 'harmonious world' has been synthesized with the modern thought of realistically calculating national interests (Shih, 2013). Also, Yuen Foong Khong (2014) agreed with Yan's conditionally optimistic views and argued that time would allow both China and the United States to find solutions to their disputes before completing a risky power transition.

According to Chinese realists' conditionally optimistic views on China's peaceful rise, two necessary conditions must be met simultaneously to ensure China's peaceful rise within the framework of realism. First, China's rise should be accompanied by China's stronger motivations to take more moral responsibilities for international cooperation tackling global issues. Second, China's core national interest during its rise shall not be fundamentally challenged by the United States and its allies.

However, some other non-Western realists, particularly those who are based outside of China, hold different views on the nature and implications of China's rise. For example, Suisheng Zhao (2015) raised doubt that, as what Chinese mainstream scholars have believed, the Chinese world order would be uniquely benevolent. Zhao held that China's rise was a process of reconstructing regional hierarchy and maximizing China's security by expanding influence and control over its neighbors. In addition, by investigating European experiences of war, Ja Ian Chong and Todd H. Hall (2014) used an analogy on German-British power relations before WWI and the contemporary China-US relations, arguing that China may not achieve a peaceful rise unless both China and the United States were able to manage conflicts between their regional security commitments as well as their domestic nationalistic pressures and, occasionally, regional crises.

Regarding research methodologies and approaches, there are also some new ideas contributed by purer theorists with a non-Western background. For example, Victoria Tin-bor Hui and Ja Ian Chong utilized comparative approaches in China-related IR studies. Enriching the Western realism that has overlooked mechanisms that facilitate the great power's success of domination, and by comparing

distinctive historical IR practices between Europe and ancient China, Hui (2005) argued that strategies adopted by domination-seekers in ancient China proved that universal domination ought to be as scholarly significant as the balance of power. Shedding more lights on modern IR practices, Ja Ian Chong (2012) argued that external intervention largely shaped the formation of sovereign statehood and thereby nationalist movement. Chong's argument was set under quite realistic assumptions that foreign interventions rationally preferred relative gains and the imperialist powers' interests were mutually conflicting in quite realpolitik ways. In particular, Chong bridges the scholarly gap between IR and domestic politics and thereby challenges the classical realists' assumption that states are unitary.

Demonstrating domestic and individual levels of analysis¹², some psychological variables such as perception, national image, and fears have also been investigated by Chinese realists. For instance, Dong Wang (2010) applied the theory of misperception to explain Sino-US rivalry in the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, Shiping Tang (2010b) further interpreted fears and uncertainties as causal linkages of security dilemmas, and Jianwei Wang (2000) and Biwu Zhang (2012) explained how images of the United States held by China could explain the evolving Sino-US relations as well as non-revisionist motivation behind Chinese foreign policy regarding the United States. Tang's social evolutionary approach is noteworthy as well. In his theory, Tang (2010a) underscored the mechanism of social evolution in IR from a world of offensive realism to a world of defensive realism which has particularly accelerated since World War II.

Japan's Post-war Foreign Policy and Northeast Asian Security

Realism has long been considered as unproductive in the scholarship of post-war Japanese foreign policy. According to Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels (1998: 171), 'students of Japan frequently focus on a single policy area or on Japan's bilateral relations with specific states and have generally failed to test Japan's larger strategic calculus against IR theory.' Takashi Inoguchi (2007) also found that, although significant efforts in building IR theories had appeared in Japan since the 1920s and 1930s, they focused more on constructivism and normative international law theory than on realism, and producing big theories was still discouraging and less attractive for Japanese scholars studying social sciences.

Particularly, after World War II, given the domestic constraints such as the prevailing culture of antimilitarism and Article 9 of Japan's pacifist constitution, Japan only exerted its techno-economic power to the region through foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance (ODA). As the most modernized country in East Asia, it has been following a very restrained security policy, tagged as the Yoshida Doctrine. In this sense, Japan's case seems to be largely applicable to arguments endorsing liberalism and constructivism, and Japan's foreign and

defense policies have long been depicted as, for example, a 'reactive state' (Calder, 1988), struggling in an 'extreme reputational predicament' (Midford, 2002), and being 'mired in immobilism' (Singh, 2013). Similarly, Japanese indigenous IR scholars, probably due to the dominant political faith of pacifism, are generally loath to apply realism to theorize Japan's post-war foreign policy.¹³

However, no matter how exceptional Japan's pacifist post-war foreign policy is, several prominent scholars outside Japan hold that realism can still be feasible in explaining the IR practices of Japan. Although constitutionally constrained for a long time, Japan has far mightier military power than most analyses have suggested. For example, Japan is one of the leading countries regarding total military spending (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2016), and Japan owns a globally leading capability for offensive or defensive air superiority or sea control operations (Lind, 2004). Moreover, since the early 1990s when Ichiro Ozawa (1994) raised the debate on Japan's normalization, perceiving the transforming strategic environment such as China's rise, the nuclearization of North Korea, and the oil crisis in the Middle East, Japan has been undergoing a slow but tremendous shift in its grand strategy in order to make its global political power commensurate to its international economic status.

In particular, after comprehensively investigating Japan's post-war foreign policy from the lens of political economy, Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) emphasized Japan's culturally embedded strategic feature of mercantile realism and argued that 'economic balancing' will be adopted by economically competitive states to the extent that geoeconomic interests might outweigh traditional political and security objectives. Moreover, regarding the alliance between Japan and the United States during the Cold War, Jennifer Lind found that although Japan had more security concerns than the United States in East Asia, Japan was too cautious to agree to contribute more to the US global strategic layout. Lind (2004) argued that Japan's security strategy during the Cold War fitted in with the strategy of 'passing the buck' in offensive realism.

Regarding the myth of Japan's evolving security strategy, Michael Green (2003) regarded Japan as a reluctant realistic state, and his research concluded that Japan's foreign policy after the Cold War generally reflected a strong continuity when compared to what had been insisted on since the end of World War II – although he admitted that growing realism, indicated by greater focus on balance of power and higher sensitivity to security, has been practiced in Japan's foreign policy (Green and Self, 1996). However, since the end of the 1990s, leading Japan experts such as Kenneth B. Pyle (2007) and Richard Samuels (2007) have more or less witnessed and admitted Japanese foreign policy's realistic transformation from the pacifist Yoshida Doctrine.

Since the 2000s, Japan's distance from its post-war pacifist posture has been further advanced, which has been demonstrated by the growing power of nationalistic conservatives in Japan's foreign policy making (Takahashi, 2010). Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister of Japan who visited the Yasukuni Shrine

annually from 2001 to 2006, had called for a national debate on the issue of amending Article 9 in 2003. After 9/11, Koizumi agreed to support the US-led 'war on terror'. Succeeding Koizumi in 2006, Shinzo Abe, another nationalist prime minister, also pushed through some laws allowing Japan to play a greater security role in the region.

Overall, since the rise of Koizumi, there has been emerging pessimistic predictions on further Sino-Japanese reconciliation. For example, when considering Japanese security concerns with China since 1989, Reinhard Drifte augured that the most likely forthcoming Japanese policy toward China was to further integrate into the US-Japan military alliance against China rather than keeping a skillful engagement or gradually bandwagoning with rising China (Drifte, 2003). Besides, Eugene A. Matthews (2003) presented strong evidence of a new Japanese nationalism and believed that the nationalistic trend in Japanese politics could have alarming consequences, although it may just serve as a tool to rally public support to tardy but urgently needed economic reforms.

Since 2012, when the Sino-Japanese relationship had dramatically deteriorated, and after his re-election as prime minister, Abe has achieved quite significant progress by establishing the National Security Council, lifting bans of arms export, reinterpreting Article 9 – thereby essentially recollecting the right of collective self-defense. Also, in response to the rising threat perceptions from China and North Korea, Abe has pledged to exert active pacifist foreign policy, which is demonstrated by the new guidelines for US-Japanese defense cooperation issued in 2015 and upgraded security collaborations with southeast Asia, Australia, and India. As Michael Auslin observed in 2016, practicing Japan's new realism, Shinzo Abe's radical reforms have reshaped Japan's national security posture and unveiled more realistic policy practices (Auslin, 2016). Nevertheless, because Japan's direct and indirect contributions to its alliance with the United States has been steadily growing, Japan's case might have been less salient to test the offensive realists' pessimistic theory of buck-passing when evaluating the bilateral alliance.

As Japan became more suspicious of China's strategic intention, especially since 2010, Christopher Hughes (2016) revised Green's point, and argued that Japan's security strategy may be moving from 'reluctant realism' toward a form of 'resentful realism' which is more destabilizing and risky for the status quo of the regional security order. However, while most Japanese scholars were less prone to link Japan's foreign policy up with hardcore realism, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001) emphasized that Japan's overall strategic goal was to reduce the intensity of the security dilemma in northeast Asia by maintaining an alliance with the United States and its defensive military capabilities, and he thereby contended that postclassical realism, a kind of realism with a more optimistic assumption of the state's benign intention, was better than either defensive realism or mercantile realism in explaining Japan's post-war security posture.

Largely because Japan's post-war reconciliations with countries in southeast Asia were more successful than those in northeast Asia, most Japan specialists

based in southeast Asia, such as Bhubhinder Singh and Lam Peng Er, tend to be less inclined to realism when evaluating Japan's regional policies. By contrast, conclusions made by experts based in China and South Korea are more realistic. In other words, it seems that we could tentatively deem that Japan's most realistic IR practices originate mainly from its foreign policies toward northeast Asia, i.e., China and the Korea Peninsular, while its policies to southeast Asia are relatively closer to liberal pacifism.

For instance, as well-known scholars from China and South Korea respectively, Jiangyong Liu and Victor D. Cha endorse neorealism in interpreting Japan's foreign policy. Liu (2012) found that aggressive words such as 'national interest' and 'strategy' have become less sensitive in Japanese political language since the 1990s while its foreign policy has been slightly more realistic after 2000. Following the structural pressure of neorealism, Victor D. Cha (2000) considered Japan-ROK relations as quasi-alliance relations that are largely determined by their perceptions of the level of US patron commitments to their security concerns, and both Japan and South Korea were fearful of a US abandonment of its commitment in northeast Asia.

Table 3.2 Major divisions of realism specialized in Japan's foreign policy

<i>Realist Theories</i>		
<i>on Japan</i>	<i>On peace/cooperation building</i>	<i>On strategic rivalry and war</i>
Mercantile Realism	Cooperation is instrumental and mainly designed for strengthening economic might	Involvement into military conflicts are too costly and destructive for Japanese mercantile interests
Resentful Realism	Japan's cooperation with the US and small powers around China will be enhanced to balancing against China	With rising nationalism and accelerated agenda of normalization, Japan's foreign policy will be more proactive toward the perceived threat
Reluctant Realism	Pacifism in Japanese foreign policy will be reduced, and Japan will be less idealistic in regional cooperation	Albeit its higher sensitivity to security and balance of power, Japan's military program is still constrained by pacifist norms
Buck-passing (Offensive realism)	Japan is usually stingy to contribute more to the collaborations with security partners, and the cooperation is instrumental and tactic	Japan tends to not actively balance against rising threats, while it prefers to introduce more powerful US to deter rising threats
Neoclassical Realism (Victor D. Cha)	Cooperation is determined by a common threat and patron commitment of allied great power	Security dilemmas shall be prevalent and risky in Northeast Asia, but the US military presence may help placate

Regarding Japan's post-war reconciliations in East Asia, the balance of threat theory is one of the very few theories of realism that are well accepted as being scholarly significant. According to the theory, Japan's rapprochement with South Korea and China since the end of 1960s resulted from the existence of their common threats – i.e., the Soviet Union for China and Japan, and the North Korea for South Korea and Japan – while the disappearance of common threats between China and Japan at the end of the Cold War greatly sabotaged the foundation of their reconciliation process. Victor D. Cha's (2000) study provided an alternative realist theory, showing how effects from a common patron may outweigh common threats in explaining the evolutions of Japan-ROK relations.

To sum up, in a strict sense, it seems that theories of realism specialized in the foreign relations of Japan are less 'non-Western', not only because realism was long regarded as less correct than constructivism or liberalism, but also because pacifist culture in Japan is too strong to provide enough realistic IR practices inspiring indigenous intellectuals. Therefore, in this section, as Inoguchi suggested, admitting that there were realistic thoughts and practices in pre-war Japan, by non-western realisms on Japan, we generally mean most of those theories are specialized in explaining Japan's post-war IR practices rather than that they are proposed by Japanese or non-Western theorists.

POSTWAR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND REALISM

Before the end of the Cold War, realism was nearly mainstream in southeast Asian IR studies, and three major wars in Indo-China and the US support of authoritarian regimes in an attempt to contain communism were widely referred as salient cases supporting classical realists' arguments. For example, after the fall of Saigon in 1975, Seni Pramoj, the leader of Thailand's Democrat Party, gave a hardcore realistic reflection on the US presence in southeast Asia: 'We have cockfights in Thailand, but sometimes we put a sheet of glass between the fighting cocks. They can peck at each other without hurting each other. In the cold war between Moscow and Peking, the glass between the antagonists can be Washington' (Shambaugh et al., 2014: 64).

Ironically, since the 1990s, in contrast with northeast Asia and constituted by mostly small states with diversified political, religious and ethnic identities, southeast Asia has become far more integrated than any other regions of Asia. Entering the 21st century, when the further integration led by ASEAN in East Asia has been plagued by increasing rivalries in northeast Asia, replacing the domination of realism, constructivism has been regarded as a compelling intellectual competitor of realism in explaining the IR practices of southeast Asia countries in which the relationship between the durability of ASEAN's internal unity and its surrounding strategic environment influenced by great powers' competitions has become the primary topic of contemporary IR scholarship.

In contrast to the European Union, where economic incentive plays a fundamental driving force for integration, ASEAN was not established by a treaty for alliances, though it was considerably reinforced with overlaps of security interests among members and partners, especially under strategic concerns of anti-communism during the Cold War (Leifer, 1989). In this sense, theories of realism have been applied in this area of studies. As Acharya put, distinctive to the situation in northeast Asia, southeast Asia is 'constructing a security community' (Acharya, 2014). Sorpong Peou (2002) even contended that constructivism has been more likely to conform to the balance-of-threat theory.

Fitting in well with situations in southeast Asia, Western classical realism assumes that two of the common responses of smaller states in the shadow of a potentially dominant or threatening power are balancing and bandwagoning. However, after the end of the 1990s, when China became the largest trading partner of most countries in southeast Asia and with latent territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it seems that the dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning could be too simplistic to describe regional states' strategic choices in regard to Beijing. Similarly, when threat perception of China is offset by China's generous reassurance, according to the balance of threat theory, China's rise may not necessarily entail strategic containments adopted by southeast Asian countries, and ASEAN's role as security community in southeast Asia may be weakened, while its role of an economic commonwealth may be strengthened.

Since the end of the Cold War, due to China's rapidly rising economic and political might, states in southeast Asia have had to engage with China rather than actively isolate it as most of them did before the 1980s. Indeed, in 1996, Lee Kuan Yew suggested that southeast Asian states should pragmatically 'engage, not contain, China, but ... also quietly ... set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play in accordance with the rules as a good global citizen' (Ciorciari and NetLibrary, 2010: 102).

In theory, as defensive realists conceptualized, the strategy of engagement not only includes reassuring China of its goodwill in cooperation but usually also incorporates elements of hedging¹⁴ against a probable more assertive China by simultaneously maintaining cooperative relations with other major powers such as the United States, Japan, and India, even though the presence of those external powers usually collide with China's regional interests. In fact, as Denny Roy (2005) and Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008) put, facing a rapidly rising China with extremely asymmetric relative power, along with reassuring China by actively managing disputes on the South China Sea, small states in ASEAN are more inclined to choose the strategy of hedging.

However, for southeast Asian countries, the most serious challenge is that the degree and detailed approaches of their strategic hedging against the possibility of a security crisis arising from China's rise has been growingly contentious. In theory, as classical realists and neorealists believe, preferences of secondary states are situationally determined, and their strategic behaviors are contingent

Table 3.3 Major divisions of realism on Southeast Asian regional strategy

<i>Realist theories on Southeast Asia</i>	<i>On peace/cooperation building</i>	<i>On strategic rivalry and war</i>
Classical realism	Secondary states focusing on relative gains are extremely pragmatic; deceptions are highly probable in cooperation	Small states tend to balance against or bandwagon with certain great power so that rivalry may be prevailing, and proxy wars are highly probable
Balance of threat	Peace and cooperation are more likely to be achieved when states perceive common threats	The military alliance will be formed to contain common threats
Defensive realism	Cooperation is strategically taken in the form of engagement (reassurance + hedging)	Security dilemma; ASEAN could be split by radical Sino-US strategic competition
Institutional realism/ Soft balancing	Peace and cooperation are achievable by institutionalization, but the conflicts of interests are inevitable	States are rational, and the nature of their interactions are conflictual, but revisionist power can be checked within institutions

on each state's immediate and changing environment (Ross, 2009: 87) which entails significant risks of internal disputes among members states of ASEAN. Besides, for ASEAN, constituted by small states and hit by the balance of power theory and the concept of a hedging strategy, its security apparently hinges much on its balanced relations with external powers. So, as Kishore Mahbubani alerted with an example of the contest between China and the United States, once competitions among external powers deteriorate, ASEAN split and even crumbled (Grant et al., 2012).

In sum, from the lens of realism on southeast Asia, there are essentially three themes of discussion among realists on southeast Asia: (1) on relations with a rising China; (2) on multiple relations with competing big extra-regional powers such as the United States, China, and Japan; and (3) on how the two former types of relations affect the internal cohesion of ASEAN. Scholars based in southeast Asia have contributed theoretical thoughts to the three themes under discussion.

For example, regarding the security of southeast Asia, Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan (2005) criticized traditional realists' overstatement of the US-led balance of power and argued that regional multilateral security dialogue and security management should be at least as crucial as the US role as a balancer. S. R. Joey Long (2010) held similar views on the importance of a multilateral dialogue in molding southeast Asian security. In addition, Evelyn Goh (2007)

agreed with ASEAN's strategy of omni-enmeshment by binding major competing powers while not taking sides between any of them. She also emphasized ASEAN's complex balancing skills that well-utilized institutionalization and diplomacy to indirectly balance potential Chinese power (Goh, 2007).

On power relations in southeast Asia, another noteworthy new theory of realism is institutional realism. In essence, institutional realism is one part of the soft balancing theory which contends that balancing could be achieved through non-military and efficient means. For instance, when highlighting the power of multi-lateral institutions where small states can deter great powers, Kai He (2008) argued that the overarching strategy for ASEAN with regards to extra-regional powers could be depicted as 'institutional balancing', which he explained that inclusive institutional balancing through ASEAN Regional Forum had constrained China's assertiveness, as well as how the United States has been penalized by ASEAN Plus Three's exclusive institutional balancing. Institutional realism is different from institutional liberalism, and the foremost difference between them is that the latter recognizes the anarchy in world politics and states' preference of security, while the former contends that institutional building is a result of the Kantian culture in IR.

DISCUSSION

Four points are worthwhile to be noted in our discussion of the development of non-Western realism in East Asia. First, although consciously drawing more on their East Asian IR practices, non-western realists' scholarships are largely developed from concepts and methodologies of the West. The development of non-western realism is still an ongoing endeavor instead of a widely acknowledged achievement. Second, except for the three typical signs of progress of theory-building as mentioned in the last section, most non-Western theoretical thoughts explaining East Asia focus on a foreign-policy analysis of a certain state or sub-region in quite microcosmic manners.

Third, and most of all, regarding particular issue areas that East Asian non-Western realisms have shed a light on, scholarly attentions are currently too partial on theorizing China's rise. Especially amongst scholars based in China, it seems that while there are latent tendencies of being China-centric, realisms developed on China have been relatively more sophisticated than others in terms of the scope of IR practices in Chinese history that have been explored, and the degree to which indigenous scholars have been involved in building their own theories of realism. Besides, for the featured approach overwhelmingly drawing on pre-modern East Asian regional order, overstating regional hegemon's role might be less relevant today in the era of globalization featured with far more frequent interactions between extra-regional great powers. For example, the sole hierarchical order coordinated by the most powerful empire is the necessary condition in stabilizing

the Chinese tributary system. However, when the East Asian hegemon is not a global hegemon, the regional order may be under severe challenge, which has actually always been the most practical problems in post-war East Asia.

For realisms on southeast Asia, while a few typical IR practices have been investigated for contributing non-Western theories, they rely heavily on Western-based and -educated scholars and further theoretical progress requires more investigations into the pre-modern IR practices of this sub-region. In general, although affected by the anti-realism culture derived from pacifism in Japan, given several types of realism particularly designed for Japan's case, realisms specialized in Japan are more fruitful than that in southeast Asia.

Fourth, particularly in terms of their prospect of cooperation building, most major theories of realism developed based on East Asian IR practices are closer to defensive realism than offensive realism, in which they tend to be less pessimistic on the difficulty of conflict resolutions between states, and some even accept the merit of some mechanisms derived in neoliberalism and constructivism such as institutions and norms.

Last but not least, beyond merely localizations of Western realism, building non-Western realism is far from being accomplished. It is not only a process of critically synthesizing non-Western IR practices with Western establishments but also an attempt to advertise non-Western values back to the West and wider academies; otherwise, it is still a close-door remaking of indigenous IR knowledge and practice. In other words, by reviewing the progress of non-Western theories in East Asia, we have actually presupposed that historical practices of IR from different parts of the world are somehow heterogeneous, but we also deem that if well abstracted and conceptualized, the non-Western values could become as useful as Western counterparts.

Notes

- 1 In this chapter, 'East Asia' refers to the geographic areas of northeast Asia and southeast Asia because the culture and scholarship in other parts of greater East Asia are too divergent and distinctive to be well analyzed in the chapter.
- 2 See Morgenthau (2016).
- 3 Social practice includes both factual interactions and intellectual reflections.
- 4 Fukuzawa Yukichi is regarded as the pioneer in enlightening Japanese to progress into a more advanced civilization and thereby in founding the modern Japanese understanding of Social Darwinism and pursuit of dominant power in East Asia.
- 5 Put by Inoguchi (2015), it seems that China is playing a bigger role in facilitating globalization, multilateralism, and peace building.
- 6 Most of them, however, received graduate-level or relevant training from Western universities.
- 7 Respectively as an expansionist and a pacifist, Yōsuke Matsuoka and Kijūrō Shidehara were opponents representing extremely splitting thoughts on Japan's foreign policy roughly from the 1930s to the 1940s.
- 8 Influenced by Yukichi's thoughts on a crisis of Japanese civilization and Western imperialism in Asia, Yamagata Aritomo, as a founding father of modern Japan's military tradition, strongly recommended that Japan should adopt Prussian political ideas and strategically expand its sovereignty over Asia.

- 9 For example, vividly reflecting modern realists' core argument, Fukuzawa Yukichi had written: 'The English export opium, a poisonous drug, to China. The Chinese lose money, injure their health, and year by year their national strength is sapped', and 'this depends solely on the fact that one country is stronger and one weaker' (Samuels, 2007).
- 10 As a vision prominently proposed by Fukuzawa Yukichi, Pan-Asianism has profound influence on modern Japan's foreign policy, which was not only used to justify the wartime militarists' ambition of 'the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere' but also underpinning post-war Japan's pacifist prospect of laying out its foreign policy in East Asia.
- 11 But this offensive realistic view of buck-passing has been facing a more acute challenge in terms of its feasibility of explaining recent progress in Japan's willingness to share more responsibility since 2012. For relevant discussion in detail please see 'Japan's Post-war Foreign Policy and Northeast Asian Security' in the third part of this chapter.
- 12 Also called the first and the second images of international relations.
- 13 Therefore, most realist scholars contributing so-called non-Western realism specialized on Japan fall into the second category as mentioned in the first section, which included both non-Western or Western based Japan watchers who dedicatedly draw on the IR practices of Japan. However, we are not ruling out that there are still some prominent realist literatures contributed by Japanese scholars studying issues such as methodologies (Inoguchi, 2010), the general international security environment (Kawasaki, 2001; Sasaki, 2012), and China's rise (Sasaki, 2010), etc.
- 14 Hedging means keeping open for more than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security threat, and it is not equal to balance, although it does provide necessary policy preparations for possible balancing behavior in the future.

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Foreseeing Perspective (Voir pour Prévoir)

Takashi Inoguchi

INTRODUCTION

A foreseeing perspective is often shared by practitioners. Jesper Koll, a researcher and investor based in Tokyo, put forward his 10 outlier scenarios for 2019 on January 1, 2019. Here are some of them: (1) Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe convinces China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership; (2) the United States moves from a trade war to a currency war as the Federal Reserve is forced to cut US interest rates; (3) the Liberal Democratic Party establishes a ‘no more tax hikes’ policy; (4) Japan’s public and private pension funds commit 1 trillion yen to a joint incubator fund; (5) a peaceful invasion of Taiwan is launched with 100,000 Chinese arriving by boat to settle there; and (6) a ‘flying car’ shuttle service for the 2020 Olympic medal winners is announced by the Tokyo governor and Toyota (Koll, 2019). Instead of listing 10 events that are most likely to take place, he is smart to lead readers toward thinking about events that he thinks will be least likely, thus preparing readers to be consciously sensitized about them. His foreseeing perspective befits the era of complexity and unpredictability, which are widely said to be the two key features of international relations in the 21st century. This chapter, however, shows the more academic way of foreseeing international relations, with four variants: (1) statistics, (2) scenarios, (3) extrapolations, and (4) narratives. One may say that academic foreseeing exercises can be rigorous but also either boring or incomprehensible, or both, in comparison to those done by business- and political-risk consultants. Oftentimes, that may be true. But I may dare to say that academics have strengths; I am fond of citing two cases that I use in

my undergraduate-course lectures. First is the use of statistical models. In spring 1977 the Soviet–Japanese fishery-catch negotiations were under way. I presented my two models of predicting the agreed amount of salmon catch in 1977 to some 200 academic audiences in Tokyo. I used statistical models, a regression model, and a state space model. Two weeks after my presentation, government negotiations reached an agreement between the two countries of Japan and the Soviet Union. My two models turned out to be the best predictions of it. Some of the academic audiences expressed either uneasiness with model prediction or dislike of the negotiation adversary. Two articles on different prediction models were published in different academic journals called *International Organization* and *Behavioral Science* in 1978 and 1979, respectively. Newspaper reports were full of emotional sentiments about the negotiation results and estimates that were without rigorous logics. Second is the use of scenarios. In 1988, I published my article on four scenarios of the future of international affairs (London). It spelled out its logics in terms of the four scenarios' feasibility and probability: (1) Pax Americana, (2) Bigeminy (the United States and Japan), (3) Pax Consortis (scenario of many consortia where major actors forge coalitions to make policy adjustments and agreements among themselves), and (4) Pax Nipponica (when nuclear weapons arsenals are neutralized). The *Economist* magazine spent a few pages focusing on my *International Affairs* article.

Chapter 4 puts forward one of the intellectual traditions of international relations that has not been conventionally treated as a major-league member, sort of. This is in part because of different academic disciplinary origins such as history of medieval Italy, sociology of enlightenment in 19th-century France, and philosophy of policy science of 20th-century America, and in part also because it has been slightly misunderstood as methods rather than as an academic orientation across substantive academic disciplines.

I examine some conceptual and methodological issues in terms of how I have coped with difficulties of gauging and foreseeing international relations. There are four groups: (1) statistical methods, (2) multiple scenarios, (3) strategic orientation fixated and extrapolated, and (4) self-transformative evolutions. More specifically and narrowly, the 'statistical methods' used in this chapter are regression equation analysis and state space equation modelling. The multiple scenarios refer to brain simulations with key variables and parameters variably specified as options. Strategic orientation fixated and extrapolated is the orientation by which to make the best use of human inertia and idleness and estimate what will happen. By self-transformative evolutions, I mean the context-highlighting evolutions of key variables and parameters with narratives in mind. In other words, (1) statistics, (2) scenarios, (3) extrapolations, and (4) narratives are used. Some concepts and methods deployed in international relations are more specific than some academics would like to see.

Lastly, I want to note that Chapter 4 is indispensable in examining and gauging Asian foreign policy, because in the first quarter of the 21st century we witness

that Asia and Asian foreign policy are changing fast and in a most dynamic way. Yet, much of the works on foreseeing perspective focus on the Western world. Oftentimes, those who are interested in what would be perceived as uncertain, unpredictable, or unfathomable in the non-Western world seem to base their judgment on pride and prejudice, as Westerners who possess few works with a foreseeing perspective about the non-Western world – especially Asia.

STATISTICAL METHODS

Key components used in statistical models are concepts, variables, analytic methods, and, most importantly, the broadly correct relationships among them. Since their relationships are examined by statistical methods, caution is exercised about the interpretation of causality: a concept not-so-easy to establish.

The Politics of Decrementalism (Inoguchi & Miyatake, 1978)

In the latter half of the 20th century, a new ocean order emerged. Here, I examine the Soviet–Japanese fishery negotiations in the broader context of emerging ocean politics and the competition between many states to assert themselves by extending control over the sea to secure rights to maritime resources and consequently protect them. I examine the case of annual bilateral fishing negotiations between the then two largest fishing powers – Japan and the former Soviet Union – in the period 1956 to 1977, to provide insights into likely patterns of conflict and resolution. I attempt to construct a model by which the annual quota on salmon and ocean trout is sequentially predicted by state variables, or lagged endogenous variables, using the state space equations of modern control theory (Zadeh and Desoer, 1963).

The core feature of those negotiations was the politics of decrementalism. Incrementalism is when in organizational decision-making, such as budgeting, adding an increment to the budget of the previous year is the basis of the budget for the subsequent year; decrementalism is just the opposite of incrementalism (Wildavsky, 1964).

Potential conflict factors were more or less suppressed in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan and helped to create a structurally stable environment for negotiations; high politics were left out. Based on this insight, I propose that the dominant characteristics of the negotiations should be classified as the politics of decrementalism.

There are three implications for conflict resolution in the context of bilateral negotiations in the emerging world ocean order. (1) The basic conflict management process is more bilateral than universal or multilateral, due to the prevalence of a unilateral approach in ocean rule-making. (2) Bilateral arrangements

vary as any UN Laws of the Sea are unable to provide specific and concrete guidelines for individual maritime conflicts, precisely due to the universality and comprehensiveness of international maritime laws. (3) In the sphere of fishery negotiations, accommodation of fishery states by coastal states will be made insofar as similar conditions for decremental politics are encountered in other bilateral fishing situations, leading to the politics of decrementalism accelerating.

The predictive performance from the Soviet–Japan fishery negotiations showed the potential for conflict resolution between the two countries to be fairly predictable and that largely pragmatic conflict management would basically prevail in the bilateral relationship. The security considerations of both countries may at times be a disturbing factor and a source of some uncertainty, especially given the US military’s commitment to the region.

The relevance of this research to general systems theory should be unambiguous. Decremental politics is played as an adjustment process among bilateral subsystems. When a certain number of conditions are encountered – such as the depletion of resources, the common commitment to the same principle, the asymmetrical relationship in commitment to and control over resources, and the institutionalized setting for decision – decremental politics is observed.

Negotiation as Quasi-Budgeting (Inoguchi & Miyatake, 1979)

The study of international negotiations has been one of the most elusive topics for an empirically testable formal analysis, in part because it is not always easy to obtain empirical data on the bargaining processes and outcomes in negotiations and on the internal motives that influence the decisions. It is often believed that only after those involved in the negotiations speak out and public documents are released can one understand the full scope of international negotiations. I argue that certain types of negotiations can be modeled on the basis of publicly available data, such as official publications and newspapers. I construct a simple model of negotiations, drawing some insights from the study of budgeting.

Again, our focus is on Soviet–Japanese salmon-catch negotiations (1955–1977). I propose that such bilateral interactions can be effectively conceptualized as a type of quasi-budgeting, with one state playing the role of a quasi-requester and the other state engaging as a quasi-appropriator. Similar to budgeting, negotiation outcomes contain a certain level of predictability; that is, outcomes feature small-scale changes. In these negotiations, Japan requests in the Soviet-dominated sea an amount of the salmon catch, and the Soviet Union in turn makes an ‘appropriation’ on it. Both states base their calculations mostly on previous experiences of quota determination.

I employ the Japanese–Soviet salmon-catch negotiations to demonstrate that a similar kind of analysis could be successfully applied to other types of issues

and thus could be methodologically generalizable. The 'request-appropriation' dynamics can be found in many bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The roles in the request-appropriation analogy are less sharp and more complicated than those of the fishery negotiations but still involve a repeated adjustment process comparable to the budgetary process.

From these examples, the potential to generalize from the proposed framework can be applied to other policy areas. To do so, three qualities are required for the application of the quasi-budgeting framework, as it enables researchers to identify the social interactions that can be conceived of as quasi-budgeting. First, the relationship between the actor making the request and the actor receiving the request (who has the power to appropriate) must take the demand seriously. Second, the interaction occurs in a (quasi-) institutional setting, and then a bilateral, or even multilateral, discussion and negotiation unfolds. Third, at least one aspect of the negotiation process and one aspect of the negotiation outcomes is quantifiable.

In the theory of budgeting, the process is conceived as an internal bureaucratic process. Negotiations must have five major features in this framework. (1) An asymmetry of commitment; that is, one actor/state mostly controls the area and resources and the other actor/state focuses on one segment, avoiding other more contentious issues. In the Soviet–Japan salmon-quota negotiations, the Soviet Union controlled the Northwest Pacific area and Japan was intent only on discussing fishery issues. (2) The organizational task is continued and repeated, similarly to budgeting. Every year, Japan and the Soviet Union engaged in reaching an annual definition of the maximum sustainable yield of salmon. (3) Technocrats, bureaucrats, and specialists are usually the most involved in the negotiations, as the work is generally about highly technical and practical matters. In budgeting, bureaucrats are also delegated the detailed work. (4) Relative independence in decision-making is a quality of both the Soviet–Japanese Fishery Commission and budgetary offices. These bodies in the Soviet Union and Japan enjoy a relative level of autonomy in making decisions, although parliament and congress, respectively, are given final appropriation. (5) The member composition of the Fishery Commission was relatively fixed and stable, leading to a similar sense of community that is experienced by national-budget offices.

To use Etzioni's (1964) concept, the Japanese–Soviet fishery negotiations became an 'encapsulated conflict'. The then two largest fishery powers found a mutual interest in the regional fishery regime. Political conflicts were internalized, and the negotiations mostly took on a tone of a routine ritual.

The intent of this analysis is to show that various negotiations can be submitted to an empirically testable formal analysis. Cognizant that more than one approach may explain the same issue, the quasi-budgeting framework is but one method. What is critical is the ability of the framework to competently explain and/or predict, depending on the intent of study.

US Foreign Policy and Global Opinion (Goldsmith, Horiuchi & Inoguchi, 2005)

International opinion is significant in the success or failure of a power's foreign policy. I present a theoretical framework and an empirical analysis of factors that affect global public opinion toward US foreign policy in the U-led war in Afghanistan (Goldsmith et al., 2005). The source of public opinion analysis was a cross-national survey of 63 countries with 60,000 respondents, conducted by the Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001, as the war unfolded in Afghanistan. In analyzing the data, the emphasis is on collective public opinion over individual public opinion of a single country (Page and Shapiro, 1992).

For the general theoretical framework, I propose three models of global public opinion: interests, socialization, and influence. The interest model, which is most consistent with realist theories of international relations and the pursuit of power by states, assumes that publics are cognizant of 'material' interest at the state level. Perceptions are also critical; to evaluate perceptions of mass publics, the second model of socialization is needed. Here, the focus is on beliefs, values, and expectations of politics. Socialization occurs through shared historical experiences and social factors, such as democracy, religion, and economic development. These factors fall under the umbrellas of political culture, which some argue is the most critical framework for appreciating the impact of cultural factors on foreign policy (Duffield, 1999). The third model is the model of influence. The underlying assumption of the model is that states seek to influence foreign public opinion to their advantage. The interest model is based on existing theoretical frameworks, particularly second-image reversed (Gourevitch, 1978) and two-level games (Putnam, 1988).

The dependent variable of real interest in the survey data is global public opinion about US foreign policy, but one single variable or factor cannot measure this concept. Instead, I look to the responses to four different survey questions during the US-led Afghan war, to serve as indicators of either explicit support for the targeted foreign policy or general levels of trust in the United States during the crisis. The four questions ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with US action in Afghanistan, whether their country should support US action in Afghanistan, which is the most concerning aspect of the war (seven choices given with civilian bombing as one), and whether respondents are concerned that the war against terrorism, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden will develop into a more general war against Islam. For the first two questions and the last question, 'don't know' was also a possible answer.

Using hypotheses derived from the three models of interest, socialization, and influence, and then testing them with the results of regressions and summary statistics of all independent variables that came from the survey data, we arrive at the following conclusion: shared military interests and economic interests between a country and the United States do not necessarily indicate support of

that public toward US foreign policy. Security cooperation among non-NATO allies can also prompt a backlash. This result stands in contrast to the versions of realism that assume that national leaders can easily manipulate foreign policy. Yet, it re-affirms the theories that view public opinion as independent of foreign policy issues. These theories include the rational-public approach (Page and Shapiro, 1992) and the liberal peace literature (Hobson, 2018).

Socialized factors are critical – that is, one’s experience with terrorism and the present size of the Muslim population in a community. The socialized values, beliefs, and perceptions do not always indicate public opinion but are context dependent and vary according to the policy. This points to a complex and context-dependent relationship between global opinion and international relations.

In terms of influence, while economic aid bears little impact on public opinion, the United States’ ability to transmit its ‘message’ carries mild indicators of impact. The ability of US media to penetrate foreign spheres of public information dispersal through airwaves and written media does positively increase support for its role in the Afghan war. The opportunity for transnational influence on public opinion supports the theoretical frameworks advanced by two-level games and second-image reversed.

Transnational factors impact the dynamics of international relations. In a complex world, a dominant state can gain support internationally but not always in line with state-level interests or the parameters of political culture. An examination of global opinion toward US foreign policy and its war in Afghanistan fit Keohane and Nye’s (1977) concept of ‘complex interdependence’ in describing the international relations of the world. Although Keohane and Nye’s (1977) analysis does not deal specifically with the international dynamics of public opinion, global public opinion and how it might be incorporated into their framework is a future research priority.

MULTIPLE SCENARIOS

The keys to multiple scenarios are focused variables and competing evolution. Multiple scenarios are contrasted with each other, with the same but also different initial conditions and the same but also different parameters influencing evolutions. The beauty of multiple scenarios enables readers to understand contrasting evolutions with given initial conditions.

Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future (Inoguchi, 1988/89)

In this investigation, I present four Japanese scenarios of a future world system based over the next 25–50 years. These Japanese ‘visions of the future’ (Inoguchi, 1987) represent differing views on the future of global development,

the distribution of economic and military power, and institutions for peace and development.

The first scenario is *Pax Americana*, Phase II. The United States would retain its leading position and would continue to forge a 'balanced' or globalist view of the Western alliance. It would lead the regimes (rules and practices in international interest adjustment) and control the direction of world development (Krasner, 1983). Japan's role in this setting is relatively unchanged; Japan would focus on its economic role and the United States would shoulder the bulk of global security.

The second scenario is termed *Bigemony*. The term, coined by C. Fred Bergsten (1976), denotes the primordial importance of the United States and Japan in managing the world economy. The Japanese image of this future focuses almost exclusively on US–Japan relations, leaving Europeans, Asians, and others in the Third World outside of the power dynamic. Japan's role in this *Bigemony* scenario is similar to that proposed in *Pax Americana*, Phase II, with the strong acknowledgment that economic power will inevitably become military power. How Japan's economic power is to transform into military power needs close attention.

The third scenario is *Pax Consortis*. In this future world, no single actor dominates the others. The world is composed of many consortia in which the major actors forge coalitions to make policy adjustments and agreements among themselves. This scenario resembles *Pax Americana* with its regimes and 'cooperation under anarchy'. The difference between the first and third scenarios is in the pluralistic nature of the policy adjustments among the major actors in *Pax Consortis*. In this third scenario, Japan's role is two-fold: (1) forging coalitions and shaping policy adjustments among peers, in which no one is dominant through primarily quiet economic diplomacy; (2) helping to create a world free from military solutions, through massive economic-aid packages tied to ceasefires or peace agreements and a possible diffusion of anti-nuclear defense systems.

The fourth scenario is *Pax Nipponica*. In this world, Japanese economic power reigns supreme. The steady rise of Japanese nationalism, in tandem with what the Japanese term the internationalization of Japan, contributes to the strength of this scenario, because the intrusion of external economic and social forces in Japanese society stimulates nationalistic reactions against internationalization. Just as for *Pax Consortis* in its fullest version, a prerequisite for the advent of *Pax Nipponica* is either the removal of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals or the development of an anti-nuclear defense system. Without the neutralization of nuclear weapons, Japan's role in the security arena would be minimized.

Three major factors distinguish these scenarios from each other: neutralization of strategic nuclear arsenals, scientific and technological dynamism, and the debt of history. The nuclear arsenal of the United States is key in its ability to retain its superpower status and global influence. Until a revolutionary weapons system is developed that neutralizes nuclear weapons, the third and fourth scenarios will

have difficulty emerging because superpower status is currently based on ownership of such weapons. Even if nuclear weapons and military power are becoming less important in international politics, with the deepening of economic interdependence, the pace of the 'Europeanization of superpowers', as termed by Christoph Bertram, is incredibly slow.

The second factor of scientific and technological dynamism involves the innovative and inventive capacity of nations to translate scientific achievement into economic development. By all accounts, the United States appears to dominate in this category as well, with Japan not far behind in innovative capacity. The domination further supports the first scenario.

Factor three relates to the memory of nations who were occupied in the Second World War and suffered primarily at the hands of the Germans and the Japanese. The wartime memories are another barrier to the emergence of Pax Nipponica.

Through the review of these three factors and their impact on the four scenarios, the most feasible world order in the short term is one that is led by Pax Americana, Phase II. The free spirit, open competition, and dynamic character of US society will be essential for the United States to reinvigorate its innovative and inventive capacity. Two other policies are also essential: first, close Japan-US macroeconomic policy cooperation, and second, full-scale interlinking of the US economy with the Asian Pacific economies under US leadership.

Certainly, US leadership entails fewer risks, but the overall stresses may outweigh the benefits. Another possibility is that the future may evolve toward a mixture of Pax Americana II and Pax Consortis. However, in the longer term, a soft landing on Pax Consortis seems the most desirable.

Peering into the Future by Looking Back (Inoguchi, 1999)

The best way to understand the future of global politics and the theoretical underpinnings of the involved issues is to appreciate the historical paths that have been taken to the present. I examine the three main paradigms that frame our knowledge of global politics and then attempt to portray the future around 2025 as a mixture of these three paradigms.

Global politics can be viewed through the prism of three paradigms: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian. Each paradigm in its conception of global politics is associated with one key concept: state sovereignty in the Westphalian framework, popular sovereignty in the Philadelphian framework, and loss of sovereignty in the Anti-Utopian framework. The Westphalian system is based on the nation-state, national economy, and national culture. The Philadelphian framework revolves around popular sovereignty, built on the trinity of liberal democracy, the global market, and global governance. The Anti-Utopian framework revolves around the loss of sovereignty and the resulting three factors of the failed state, the marginalized economy, and localized anarchy.

History shows that only in the mid-19th century did sovereign states come to occupy the central place in global politics, with territorially based nation-states emerging one after another within Europe (Germany and Italy) and in the periphery (the United States and Japan). In the 19th and 20th centuries, European sovereign states expanded their territorial reach in colonialist empires. Only during and after the Second World War, as colonialism drew to an end, did the world experience an unprecedented proliferation of sovereign states. Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1990s, the number of sovereign states grew from 51 to 185. Given the dramatic growth in the number of sovereign states and the conventional views of international law, it was not unusual that global politics was essentially ‘inter-national’ politics – that is, politics among nations (Morgenthau, 1978).

As the number of sovereign states multiplied, the Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian paradigms began to develop. The Philadelphian framework, with the United States as its leader, is manifested in the dramatic increase of liberal democracies that subscribe to the norms and rules of the free-market economy and democratic politics. A common principle among its proponents is the belief that democracies rarely fight each other (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). By Anti-Utopian, I refer to the framework that governs the failed and failing states, and this has been structurally veiled by other frameworks. ‘Anti-Utopian’ derives from the colonialist legacy. At the end of the 20th century, the universalist forces that sought to ‘civilize’ the world in the colonial age shifted to international efforts aimed at global governance, human security, and humanitarian assistance. However noble these utopian objectives, the results have been mainly prolonged strife, exploitative regimes shored up by international aid, and failed states.

Geopolitics, geo-economics, and geo-culture all impact the three paradigms, which are vying with each other to frame global human activity. However, it is the geo-economic challenge of globalization that will determine whether peace and prosperity will ensue. If everything is subject to market forces, then two obstacles may emerge. First, market turbulence causes instability; it can create the conditions in which market forces cannot function well. Second, the pursuit of market efficiency accelerates the marginalization of noncompetitive segments; the growing disparities that result from globalization and marginalization could easily bring about the conditions in which market forces fail to function properly. The critical question then becomes how deep will globalization go in the next 25 to 50 years. To answer this question, the following three variables, which are likely to play major roles in determining the vicissitudes of the three geopolitical frameworks, must be identified. They are technological innovations, deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions, and resilience of nation-states. These three variables will play a leading role in shaping the Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian outcomes.

Global market forces will make definite advances because of technological innovation, but their durable permeation will not be ensured because, when

it goes to the extreme, counterbalancing forces may offset the Philadelphian direction. Yet, in an enlarged North of higher income, the Philadelphian framework will prevail, more or less. In an exploding and imploding South, the Anti-Utopian direction and the Westphalian direction will be further enhanced. The Anti-Utopian direction will include further emphasis on global governance that is more likely to work with the mixture of idealistic individual-centered humanism, the vigorous pursuit of global market integrity, and the consolidation of those globalists and those cynical ‘civilizationists’ who extend assistance to fend off the negative contamination of alien ‘civilizations’. The Westphalian direction will focus more on the symbolic and cultural aspects of state sovereignty than the conventional Westphalian conception allows, thus creating a condition in which states will be more like ‘imagined communities’, not in stages of nation building, but stages of nation fragmenting or weakening under the growing forces of global markets and the threat of demographic and environmental deterioration.

Three Japanese Scenarios for the Third Millennium (Inoguchi, 2002)

The three Japanese scenarios for the future share the same conceptual basis as the three paradigms of global politics – Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian – but with Japanese characteristics; I use these names to emphasize the underlying links with global scenarios for the future (Inoguchi, 1999).

The Japanese Westphalian scenario is articulated by history professor Shinichi Kitaoka (1995), vice-minister of international affairs Eisuke Sakakibara (1994), and art and theater professor, composer, and director Masakazu Yamazaki (1997). The Westphalian scenario seems to be the one that appears most likely to many Japanese. The trinity of nation-state, national economy, and national culture seems to be the scenario with which they are most comfortable. Each of these three authors, in their subtle but distinctive way, stress nation-ness and national pride.

Kitaoka (1995) believes that globalization does not necessarily lead to a reduced nation-state role. He argues that since the world essentially adheres to the Westphalian model in matters of state sovereignty, Japan will not win the respect of the international community until it revises the constitution on the use of force to resolve disputes with other nations.

Sakakibara (1994) advocates the Japanese economic model and criticizes what he calls market fundamentalism and American fundamentalism. He argues that unrestrained globalized financial capitalism can destroy an economy; enhanced economic national autonomy and improved global welfare will benefit all economies.

Yamazaki (1997) argues for a better meshing of national and international cultures. Yamazaki envisages national culture diffusing into the rest of the world through appeals to common human themes. The appeal must be subtle,

sophisticated forms and characteristics of the Japanese arts that are embedded in human civilization.

For the Philadelphian scenario, I chose novelist and activist Makoto Oda (1998), economics author Kenichi Ohmae (1995), and social psychology professor Toshio Yamagishi (1998) to represent the main points. Oda (1998) argues for non-violence at the national and international levels. He favors Japan's pacifist constitution and advocates for Japan's role as a force in conscientious objection to war. In international relations, Oda focuses on networking and collaboration among non-governmental individuals and groups in pursuit of peaceful goals.

Ohmae (1995) states that the future lies in a borderless economy, concluding that national borders have ceased to be of primary significance. He strongly believes in freedom, the strength of technology, and the reform of business, education, leisure, and politics.

Yamagishi's (1998) message is that Japanese trust is primarily directed at socially known others, whereas US trust is more generalized. Japanese do not necessarily trust those who are not well known and well connected with their own networks, but they give full trust to socially recognized others. Yamagishi argues for more generalized trust because it fosters reciprocity in cooperation and nurtures a spirit of risk assessment in social relations.

For the group of authors that I place in the Anti-Utopian scenario, they stress the economic and civilizational discrepancy between parts of the South and most parts of the North, and they underline the post-post-colonial disruption of the so-called failed states. Most Japanese Anti-Utopian scenario authors are concerned about the disruptive potential of the United States and China. The third set of authors includes international relations professor Terumasa Nakanishi (1997), economics professor Tsuneo Iida (1997), and East Asian history professor, Hidehiro Okada (1997).

Nakanishi (1997) warns Japan about the inevitability of decline and cautions against falling into a less-than-medium-power status and not being prepared. He views China as a source of instability and disruption. Iida (1997), the second author in this grouping, distrusts the United States' hegemonic structure and its attitudes toward management of global markets. He views the US-style market fundamentalism as disruptive and destabilizing to the world economy. Okada (1997) views China as having high potential for the disintegration and destabilization of the entire region; he fears that the Chinese empire will disintegrate in the not too distant future.

In all, it seems that the synthesized Japanese scenario of the future (2000–2050) is best described as a Westphalian-Philadelphian-Anti-Utopian mix with the following elaborations. First, the basic framework will remain Westphalian, at least, on the surface. Second, the Philadelphian influence seems irreversible: the tide of globalization (economics), unipolarization (security), and democratization (governance) that accelerated in the last quarter of the 20th century points to the Philadelphian scenario (Inoguchi, 1994). Yet, the excessiveness

of these is bound to create backlashes in the form of peripheralization of many parts of the South, anti-hegemonic movements, and democratizing rhetoric and ritual that obfuscates the often-less-than-sufficient democratic realities, both in the South and North. Third, these outcomes of the excessive Philadelphian practice point to the possible salience of the Anti-Utopian scenario. Thus, the Japanese grand strategy seems to envision the Westphalian framework as basically continuing to prevail, if only on the surface, while the increasing influence of the Philadelphian spreads throughout the world, including to Japan. Whether, in order to cope with this global problematique, Japan's grand strategy would envisage global democracy, remains uncertain; Japan would most likely use its own Westphalian-cum-Philadelphian policy instruments to save and contain the 'marginalized South'.

STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS FIXATED

Fixated strategies' non-adaptive evolutions are a most often deployed methodology of thinking broadly about the future. It is one of the ways to cope with uncertainty about the future, by making a fixed strategy and see a focused parameter evolve with time.

Speculating on Asian Security, 2013–2033 (Inoguchi, 2014b)

The two decades between 2013 and 2033 are full of uncertainty. In this speculative exercise on power competition in Asia, I focus on the difficulties encountered by China, the United States, and Japan in the pursuit of their respective goal of 'equality', 'primacy', and 'peace'. In the pursuit of these goals, each state is trapped by the means that are supposed to serve to help them achieve their respective goals: extractive institutions for China, R&D investment in weapons for the United States, and self-extending decisions for Japan.

Uncertainty is seen in China's demographic trend and its institutions. China's one-child policy has resulted in a drastic decrease in the productive population. The Dengist economics and politics of the last three decades have reached a certain degree of deadlock. Income and status gaps have grown: gaps between coastal and inland regions, between normal residents and houkou residents (city residents not officially admitted and thus protected), between high- and low-skilled workers, and between state and non-state firms. In 2012 alone, 100,000 collective protests with 1,000 or more participants occurred. Unrest has also triggered fractures in viewpoints and policy among the communist elites (Ong, 2015, pp. 345–359).

The United States also faces uncertainty: prolonged economic pain after the 2008 Lehmann shock, apparently unattainable peace in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

the rise of the 1%-versus-99% movement, the constant push and pull between the right who advocate small government and the left who advocate 'no entanglement abroad', and security. The rise of China has persuaded the US government to enhance the structure of regional security in the Asia Pacific and rein in the conflicting parties between China and other regional states in the Asia-Pacific. The US promise to rebalance the region will depend on its ability to fund R&D spending on weapons. When small government ideologues are strong in congress, R&D budgets tend to be cut.

Japanese politics has been fractious and fragmented at least since the end of the Cold War (Inoguchi, 2013). Low economic growth since the 1990s has caused the cohesiveness and traditional structure of relationships between state and society to fracture. The net result is the inability of organizations to make decisions that articulate, integrate, and implement policy directions. Key policies areas affected by indecision include nuclear energy, tax increases to sustain social policy, cooperative schemes to sustain US bilateral alliance, and strategies to remain competitive.

In 2033, what will the power configuration among these three countries be like? The basis of our speculation is demography. This factor and its development will be complicated by other determinants and sometimes twisted to produce unpredictable power configurations.

China's dialectic is an example of what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) call extractive political and economic institutions, by which they mean those institutionalized schemes and practices that have the effect of siphoning power and wealth to a privileged few – that is, the communist-party elites. The problem is that extractive institutions are not conducive to sustained economic development. Hence, the question is how long will these extractive institutions remain in place? Will they still exist in 2033?

Of the uncertainties faced by the United States, the uncertainty of R&D investment in weapons stands out. In 2012, President Barack Obama announced a 10-year defense-budget plan with budgetary cuts. It is hard to see how R&D can avoid cuts, but two trends may block budgetary cuts in this area: (1) the United States is a strong proponent in the ever-advancing technology of weapons; (2) over the last 20 years, China has focused on a two-digit defense build-up. It has also been clearly explicit in its intention to deny the United States access to the Chinese coast where industrial and military facilities are concentrated. To deter China from such a policy, the United States must engage in an equally aggressive policy of weaponry R&D.

The Japanese decision-making practice of seeking consensus from below has meant that politics is fragmented, slow, and occurs in instalments. The problem is serious for structural reasons. First, technology allows everyone to participate in politics. Second, the traditional mediating organizations – political parties and interest groups – have lost much of their ability to influence society. Third, technology has allowed voices from other places to easily traverse national borders.

John Keane (2009) calls it the end of representative democracy and the emergence of ‘monitory democracy’.

In speculating on Asian security among the three regional powers, we have focused on what each power yearns for most and with what means each power seeks to achieve its goal. The United States seek primacy, yet R&D investment in weapons is prohibitive. China seeks equality at home and abroad, alleviating extractive institutions at home and equal sovereignty abroad, yet China’s military modernizations depends on these extractive institutions. Japan yearns for peace and may have to pursue armed neutrality to achieve this peace, yet in the end may require a stronger capacity to deter potential adversaries and defend itself. In an era of deep globalization, the battle appears to be more at home.

A Call for a New Japanese Foreign Policy (Inoguchi, 2014a)

I offer a portrait of Japanese foreign policy through the great traditions of international relations, depicting it as a combination of three forms of ‘-ism’: classical realism, transformative pragmatism, and liberal internationalism. Each of these traditions helps capture an aspect of Japanese foreign policy. These three ‘-isms’ are defined in relation to, particularly, US leadership, globalization, East Asian community formation, and the concept of an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’. I propose a new synthesis and direction for Japanese foreign policy that combines classical realism, transformative pragmatism, and liberal internationalism in new ways.

Classical realism refers to an elite-focused statecraft of survival and a striving to preserve the status quo. In a crisis situation, aggressive military and diplomatic moves need to be counterbalanced and hedged with astute judgment, deft articulation, and agile action. Transformative pragmatism refers to a revisionist line of self-rejuvenation and self-repositioning. This approach attempts to rejuvenate and reposition the economy and country. Liberal internationalism refers to working through and enhancing global norms and institutions, strengthening Japan’s ability to advance itself and work with other states under conditions of deep globalization (Ikenberry, 2011; Keohane et al., 2009).

A mix of three foreign policy lines best serves Japan. Classical realism focuses on defense build-up and alliance consolidation. With China actively pursuing a ‘restoration’ that reflects the power dynamics of 200–400 years ago, a period during which the Manchus subjugated the Han Chinese, its immediate neighbors must enhance their defenses and alliances. Although the Shinzo Abe administration’s emphasis on patriotism, the national anthem, and allegiance to the flag falls within the realm of domestic politics, it is somewhat out of line with classical realism, which regards the preservation of the status quo as the highest priority. We argue that this element of classical realism is best seen within the context of domestic political competition rather than as an externally directed expression of intent by government and civil society.

Transformative pragmatism focuses on Abenomics, in which sound economic growth is activated through quantitative easing of the money supply, fiscal austerity, a consumption tax hike, and a two-pronged pro-growth policy of accelerating research and development and liberalizing often stifling government regulations. Transformative pragmatism also concentrates on helping global neighborhoods: this is based on the assumption that in an era of deep globalization, global citizens are all neighbors working together to build needed infrastructure, improve the quality of life, and create work opportunities. By raising the national income of countries, Japan is helping to expand free markets and trade in terms of technical/expert advice and financial investment. With free markets spreading to encompass emerging economies as well as OECD member states, Japan's economic growth is bound to increase.

Liberal internationalism focuses on international ideas and institutions that foster freedom, peace, and prosperity in Japan's global neighborhood. Japan naturally wishes to help other countries achieve the same prosperity and peace that it achieved through international organizations and transnational groups, as well as through Japanese government and non-government organizations. Japan's commitment to various transnational policy regimes, through international treaties and agreements registered at the UN, is arguably the greatest of any nation. My argument is that the maturity of Japan's liberal internationalism that is helping to sustain transnational policy regimes befits a world in which US leadership is less dominant and in which functionally multipolar regimes could survive and, at times, govern in order to prevent destruction and destitution.

In sum, Japanese foreign policy should combine classical realism for hedging and counterbalancing, transformative pragmatism for increasing internal vigor, efficiency, and democracy, and also liberal internationalism, for contributing to the enhanced capability of multilateral institutions. This combination should be put into practice with keen observation, sound judgment, and flexible action.

SELF-TRANSFORMATIVE EVOLUTIONS

Unlike many other methodologies, self-transformative evolutions make actors, goals, and strategies change over time, as well as their outcomes.

Political Security: Toward a Broader Conceptualization (Inoguchi, 2003)

Political security policy can be defined as the reasonable freedom of action that enables one to pursue and achieve the objectives that national actors deem essential to defend, even in the potential and/or actual presence of primarily external threats to national actors in world politics (Nye, 1974). I emphasize two dimensions of political security policy (Holsti, 1967; Morse, 1971). The first is the

focus of attention. Political security policy is usually either outward-looking or inward-looking; I argue instead that internal and external security are closely interrelated. It is the policy target – by the changes through which one tries to enhance national security – that makes an important difference. The second dimension is the level of activity – that is, is it active or passive? Not to be confused with extrovert and introvert orientations: extrovert implies outward-looking and active, and introvert implies inward-looking and passive. A policy can be outward-looking and passive, or alternatively inward-looking and active. Internal self-restructuring is one mode of augmenting political security and should be incorporated into the wider framework of security studies. Along with the two dimensions just outlined, I propose a taxonomy of political security policy. Each type of security policy has major difficulties that may cause national actors to modify their policy choice.

When one is outward-looking and active, we can find the syndromes of conquest/hegemony. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the conquest syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it assumes the hegemony syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to extend internal values outside national boundaries, whether by direct or indirect rule. The major problem with conquest is the cost that actors have to pay to suppress/crush resistance and liberation movements in a conquered area. To reduce costs, a conquest policy may give way to a hegemonial policy. In the case of hegemony, the difficulty lies in the cost of keeping allies acquiescent to the hegemony. In times of decline, to retain its overwhelming position, the hegemony has to increasingly rely on inducements to maintain the loyalties of its allies. The cost of such inducements when a power is in decline can be prohibitive. Alternatively, the hegemony can reduce its commitments so as to minimize its problems.

When one is inward-looking and active, we find the syndromes of revolution/Finlandization. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the revolution syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it is called the Finlandization syndrome. Finlandization denotes the security policy of a state that attempts to maintain and/or augment its security by the partial restructuring of its internal and external policies for the sake of securing its survival. National actors with either of these syndromes question their internal values and institutions and attempt to alter, wholly or partially, internal arrangements to develop a better security position. The major problem for revolution is counter-revolution and foreign intervention. The major challenge with Finlandization is persuasion; the government must persuade a large section of its people to accept the policy. The outcome depends on whether the people can accept the unpleasant aspects associated with the policy and recognize the positive aspects of it.

When one is outward-looking and passive, we can find the syndromes of manipulation/maneuvering. When this perspective takes a strong form, it assumes the manipulation syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it becomes the maneuvering syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt

to cope with environments without questioning internal values and institutions. The major challenge to manipulation is possessing sufficient skill, especially in diplomacy. Since the essence of manipulation is to bring about small changes in one's favor within the environment, without great costs, even the most skillful manipulation probably cannot overcome the hegemonial determination of a great power. The major challenge with maneuvering is credibility: the main aim of maneuvering is to make gains without costs and without altering much, except one's own position.

When one is inward-looking and passive, we can find the syndromes of seclusion/submission. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the seclusion syndrome, whereas in a weak form, it is called the submission syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to confine the internal values and institutions within national boundaries and seek to minimize the extent to which they are undermined. Here, political security is more internal than external. The major challenge is the excessive control that the state must exercise over its inhabitants to prevent outside information or influences from filtering into the country. The major problem with submission is humiliation; a submission policy tries to alter the balance of dependence after submission, and therefore it is important to ensure that the feeling of humiliation among the people does not get in the way of bargaining the balance of dependence.

In sum, we advance the notion that political security policy should involve a broader conception of security that takes nothing for granted – internal or external. Our main purpose is to provide a more adequate framework for a comparative study of the sources and transformations of political security policy.

World Order Debates in the 20th Century (Inoguchi 2010)

I present a somewhat unconventional grand framework in which to understand world order: in particular, the dialectic framework of international relations. My aim is to contribute to international relations theories, particularly by extending the application of the two-level game, the second-image game and the second-image reversed to certain hitherto neglected areas.

My objective in applying the two-level game, the second-image game, and the second-image reversed to the state strategy of leading powers is to examine and analyze the long-term evolution of world order in the extended 20th-century period (1890–2025). By the state strategies of leading powers, we mean the balance of power, collective security, and primacy.

All three state strategies are associated with antithetical and synthetic concepts. The antithetical concepts are people's war, people power, and global terrorism, all of which are most often developed by the marginalized have-nots of the world. The three synthetic concepts are colonial aloofness, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention. These synthetic concepts developed through interactions within the world system between the haves and have-nots.

By referring to the world system, this section deals both with the struggle of international politics on the surface of inter-governmental relations and the structure of global politics at the grassroots.

My use of dialectics is somewhat unorthodox as it highlights the thesis posed by the haves. Synthesis is defined as the haves' response to the have-nots' challenge, or antithesis. The thesis posed by the haves is privileged in our treatment of dialectics. After all, the elites primarily shape political security by virtue of their strength. Strength, however, can easily degenerate into weakness. The haves use their strength, in one way or another, to accommodate, placate, or suppress the have-nots' challenge. It is the way in which they use it that determines their longevity. My use of dialectics is hence evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Leading powers must maintain and support their policy direction and commitments, despite the associated costs, until transition into a new regime of institutionalized political security occurs. Marginalized states develop certain antithetical strategies to make their voices heard: people's war, people power, and global terrorism. People's war, sometimes called guerilla warfare, is a strategy adopted by states that are humiliated and marginalized by the invading, occupying, and colonizing regular army. People's war takes place at the peripheries; leading powers' war takes place at the core.

People power uses non-violent action, according to the principle that the use of violence usually provokes governments into taking strongly suppressive measures and is, therefore, counter-productive. People power needs competent leaders – that is, leaders who are charismatic, able to translate words into outcomes, equanimous vis-a-vis difficult situations, and magnanimous toward failings of its followers.

Global terrorism takes the form of violent action instigated by transnational, nongovernmental terrorist groups (Freedman, 2002; Roberts, 2002). Terrorism is based on strong religious, political, environmental, or humanistic convictions. Global terrorism is born from the global structure characterized by what its perpetrators regard as oppressive suffocation that culturally neutralizes the capacity of other powers to counterbalance. The global embeddedness of the world economy makes it difficult for the marginalized have-nots to disentangle themselves from the ties, rules, and practices that have been largely shaped and shared by the privileged citizens of a hegemony. Dialectic moments occur when thesis directly confronts antithesis and their interaction produces a synthesis. It is important to note that the outcome of the haves' accommodation, appeasement, placation, or suppression of the have-nots' challenges is a synthesis different from that of systemic transformations triggered by the confrontation of thesis and antithesis; it rather represents the haves' response to this confrontation. Dialectical moments occur when the haves' response to the have-nots' challenges – the synthesis – drains the haves' power resources.

There have been two dialectic moments in the extended 20th century. The first occurred in two steps, in 1914 and in 1939, and saw the dialectic turn from

balance of power to collective security. The inter-war period of 1919–1939 was no more than a pause during which the same set of conditions replayed themselves, driving revisionists to push themselves to the fullest extent. The second, in 2001, saw the dialectic turn from collective security to primacy. Global terrorism presented this dialectic moment with the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Its synthesis is the United States' renewed search for primacy, which has changed from war deterrence to warfare capabilities.

The year 2025 will be the year in which the primacy of the United States either coalesces into global governance or collapses. My speculation is that there will be a transition from primacy to global governance for two reasons. First, the interactions between humanitarian interventions by leading powers and global terrorism by dissidents might evolve in the direction of what I call mirrored humanitarian interventions and mirrored global terrorism, under the nuclear disarmament processes, or, in other words, in a less violence-prone direction. Second, the step-by-step, largely bilateral disarmament initiatives might lead to a situation in which only the United States maintains a minimum nuclear arsenal so as to be credible in ensuring world law and order, or, in other words, again in a less violence-prone direction.

Global Leadership and International Regime (Le, Mikami, & Inoguchi, 2014)

This study is an attempt to construct a quantitative link for international regimes with global leadership. By proposing a framework of global leadership analysis, I seek to provide an empirical testing of the transformation of global governance toward cooperation without hegemony paradigm.

Global leadership and international regimes are paired relatively close to each other. International regimes are 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner, 1983: 186). The state, as an institutional form, is centrally important in the formation of international regimes. From a theoretical standpoint, regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or an 'intervening variable', between the fundamental characteristics of world politics, such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behavior of states on the other (Keohane, 1984). An ever-more interconnected world demands more cooperation among states for trade, peace, security, and a host of other issues. When multilateral consensus in a given area of international relations takes the form of multilateral treaties, the leading role of a state can be more tangible and better recorded.

The most striking feature of current US global leadership is that in addition to possessing overwhelming military might, the United States has been, on the whole, successful in taking the initiative for inculcating global norms and establishing global institutions in a wide range of policy areas. The experience of the

United States reinforces the analysis that the basis of the extending US power and influence throughout the world is the junction between global leadership and international regimes.

In a contrasting perspective, other scholars have written on cooperation without hegemony. Robert Keohane (1984) argues that cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes are established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is possible; cooperation can emerge and a regime can be created without hegemonic leadership.

How to verify the shift toward cooperation without hegemony paradigm on an empirical basis? Of the several approaches available, I chose a schematic approach. My approach is to construct a quantitative link between international regimes and global leadership. My objective is to develop a system that can observe global leadership change over time and that is more systematic. World politics has changed from the era dominated by a single hegemon to a new way of global governance that is represented by diverse stakeholders. The expected rules of cooperation and state compliance with the rules are increasingly being materialized in the form of multilateral treaties. Regime theorists explain that when treaties are ratified, states signal their intentions by being a signatory and prioritizing the issue. The more initiative a nation takes in international treaties, the more it shows its intention to be a leader.

The country's willingness to lead in solving global issues as the first mover in the formation of an international regime is measured and characterized by analyzing their ratification behavior in multilateral conventions deposited to the UN, which shape the 'rules of the game' of the global community. For this purpose, I define a set of quantitative indicators, the Index of Global Leadership Willingness and the Global Support Index, and calculate for each country based on its actual ratification year data for 120 multilateral conventions, covering a range of global issues.

The resulting portrait shows a noticeable decrease in world leadership performance among countries and the convergence in states' position in world politics. The results are then used to analyze changes in the leadership willingness indices of selected country groups, such as G3, G7/8, and G20, over the century and find that the will to drive the international agenda of these groups of leaders is in decline. Although several countries show visible leadership in specific policy domains, such as environment and intellectual property, neither G7/8 nor G20 was playing a comparable role to those performed by the G3 100 years ago.

How to establish the link between global citizens' preference for values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other? The former consists of individual citizens whose voices are registered by almost recurrent and ubiquitous polls carried out across the planet, whereas the latter consists of about 120 multilateral treaties registered in the UN system since 1945. For the former, the World Values Survey led by Ronald Inglehart is chosen, whereas for the latter, the Multilateral Treaties Survey carried

out by Lien Thi Quynh Le is used. If some links are to be established empirically and statistically, one could claim that a global social contract does exist empirically and that classical social contract theory can be globally extended.

Factor-analyzing global citizens' preference and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties enables one to see separately how connected the former and the latter are in terms of key dimensions and locations of participant states. The former yields key dimensions of (1) emancipative-versus-protective orientation toward participation and (2) secular-versus-sacred orientation. The latter yields key dimensions of (1) agile-versus-cautious orientation toward participation, (2) global commons versus individual citizen's interests, and (3) aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. The former's emancipative-versus-protective orientation and the latter's agile-versus-cautious orientation results in fairly high correlation coefficient. The former's secular-versus-sacred orientation and the latter's aspirational-bonding-versus-mutual-binding orientation results in a fairly high correlation coefficient. No less important is the spatially similar locations of most of the 158 states on these dimensions.

Hence, one can claim that the global social contract hypothesis is validated *grosso modo* empirically.

The study has empirically tested and found support for the idea of cooperation without hegemony. This is the preposition about a new world order where no power or group of powers can sustainably set an international agenda. We have constructed a quantitative metric to measure states' actions in global regimes to evaluate their willingness to take a leadership position in international cooperation for solving shared global issues. The findings show the current political situation in the world is not led by G7, G8, or G20. This is a leaderless world. Moreover, the analysis results describe a striking perspective on world politics and provide evidence to argue that our current world is actually without consistent global leadership. By comparing the leadership score for key global players through different stages of world history and in different policy domains, we can identify the divergence in powers that are bound to shape 21st-century world politics.

CONCLUSION

One of the intellectual traditions of international relations is the foreseeing perspective. Within this tradition, I have examined a number of works authored or coauthored by myself, all of which aim at gauging, analyzing, and foreseeing various aspects of international relations from the global perspective. By focusing on those four types of work – statistics, scenarios, extrapolations, and narratives – whose ultimate aim is the nowcasting/forecasting of international relations with deep understanding of inner workings of subjects, I have highlighted the saying, 'All politics is global'. Helped by the heightened

consciousness of how social phenomena are manifested in complex forms and figures, I have deliberately chosen those works in which angles, concepts, measurement' and modelling vary tremendously. The lesson of this exercise is that understanding cannot be obtained unless angles and perspectives are flexibly deployed and unless gauging and nowcasting/forecasting are carefully carried out.

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A Rational Choice Analysis of Japan's Trade Policymaking

Kaoru Ishiguro

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains the ministry bureaucrat-led trade-policymaking regime in Japan using a rational choice analysis. I take up the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) negotiations of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in the latter half of the 1990s and examine what kind of influence the ministry bureaucrat-led trade-policymaking regime had on the negotiation results. In the analysis, I use a formal model of two-level game approach to examine the interdependence of international and domestic negotiations.

Many countries have concerns over the trade-liberalization negotiations between two countries and/or in regional areas, because multinational trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been difficult. Conflicts of interest between each country are difficult to adjust, the WTO Cabinet meeting in Geneva in December 2011 abandoned the whole of agreement, and the prospect of future negotiations is nowhere in sight. In light of this, other trade-liberalization agreements, such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) have been negotiated in Japan.

However, in these negotiations, the problem of domestic politics (domestic conflicts of interest), which was overshadowed by international conflicts of interest among countries in the WTO negotiations, becomes clearer. In the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) negotiations of APEC, there was a conflict between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which wanted to promote trade liberalization, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry

and Fisheries (MAFF), which was interested in preventing it. The EVSL negotiations finally failed to reach an agreement owing to protectionist resistance in the field of agriculture in Japan.

The reasons why I use a formal model of rational choice analysis to examine Japan's trade policymaking are as follows. First, the analysis has exactness and accuracy in explanation. The formal model must show the prerequisites and assumptions of an argument precisely to express a model in mathematical form. While it is not necessarily for descriptive arguments, the formal model can definitively explain the process by which a conclusion is arrived at by prerequisites and assumptions. Sometimes, a conclusion that has not been led by prerequisites and assumptions is insisted on in descriptive arguments. In the formal model, we can prevent such a leap and contradiction of logic.

Second, the formal model can lead to different conclusions precisely by adequately choosing parameters that consist of prerequisites and assumptions. In this study, I examine the influences that the political pressures of a domestic constituency and the power of the protectionist ministry bureaucrats have on the results of trade negotiations. I explain that the influences on the negotiation results are different depending on different preferences (parameters) of the ministry bureaucrats for trade liberalization.

Third, by devising various functions and parameters, the analysis can adopt the results of earlier studies. In this study, we adopt useful previous research results such as a 'bureau-pluralism' theory (Aoki, 1988) and a Zoku Diet discussion (Inoguchi and Iwai, 1987) to constitute our formal model. Moreover, our formal model can apply to study the Asian other countries – for example, Korea, which has a different trade policymaking from Japan and where the presidential leadership is strong.

The relation between trade-liberalization negotiations and domestic politics has been analyzed positively in the literature with the theory of two-level games. The two-level-games analysis was introduced by Putnam (1988) and was subsequently shown to apply to various domains in the international political economy by Evans et al. (1993). Regarding previous studies related to trade liberalization and domestic politics using such an approach, Grossman and Helpman (1995) analyze the relationship between political donations and trade negotiations in each industry, and Milner and Rosendorff (1997) examine the problem of the US government–Congress relation and trade negotiations.

These two-level-games analyses focus on domestic politics in the United States. Therefore, they have limited applicability to trade negotiations and domestic politics in Japan, and in particular, to trade negotiations under the ministry bureaucrat-led trade policymaking. Regarding the studies that focused on the relations between the trade negotiations and domestic politics in Japan, Rapkin and George (1993) took up the GATT Uruguay-round negotiations, Schoppa (1993, 1997) analyzed the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), and Okamoto (2004) and Ishiguro (2007) studied the EVSL negotiations.

Rapkin and George (1993) analyzed the problem of the opening of the Japanese rice market and domestic politics in the GATT Uruguay round (September 1986–December 1993). While a demand was made on Japan to open the rice market in the Uruguay round, domestic protectionist forces – MAFF, agricultural and forestry Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Zoku Diet members, and the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (JA-Zenchu) – refused it. It follows that the opening of the Japanese rice market was limited to minimum access. Rapkin and George (1993) pointed out the protectionist role played by agricultural and forestry Zoku Diet (Norin-zoku) members of LDP.

Schoppa (1993, 1997) examined the problem of US foreign pressures (*gaiatsu*) and the Japanese market opening in SII (May 1989–June 1990). As for the results of SII, there were contrasting negotiated fields. While the Japanese market opening advanced in the field of public investments and distributions, in land policies, market opening advanced partially, and in exclusive business customs (non-competitive firms' transaction), the market opening did not advance. Schoppa (1993, 1997) explained the difference in the negotiation results according to the relationship between US foreign pressures and domestic synergistic strategies in Japan. The market opening advanced in the fields where both were engaged; however, it did not advance in the fields without engagement.

Okamoto (2004) examined the EVSL negotiations of APEC. While the EVSL attempted to identify 15 sectors for the market opening and to promote liberalization on a priority basis, it failed due to objections raised by the protectionist ministry bureaucrats in Japan. Because agriculture and forestry marine products were included in the 15 selected sectors, MAFF cooperated with Norin-zoku members and interest groups and strongly objected to the liberalization. Okamoto (2004) points out that the use of veto by MAFF and Norin-zoku members limited the domestic win-set in Japan and played an important role in the failure of the EVSL negotiations.

Ishiguro (2007) was the first to analyze the EVSL negotiations by constructing a formal model of two-level games. (For the US government–Congress relations and trade negotiations, a formal model analysis using two-level games had been undertaken by Milner and Rosendorff (1997).) And while the relationship between the ministry bureaucrats and the trade negotiations had been analyzed in descriptive studies such as Rapkin and George (1993), Schoppa (1993, 1997), and Okamoto (2004), there was no formal model to explain the analysis. Ishiguro (2017) applied the formal model of two-level games to the TPP negotiations.

In this chapter, I examine the kind of influences the political pressures of a domestic constituency have on the ministry bureaucrats and how they affect the results of trade negotiations. We analyze the problem by using a formal model of two-level games. The domestic constituency, including consumers, firms, and agricultural producers, forms interest groups and politically pressures the ministry bureaucrats and the party politicians in the process of trade negotiations. Our main conclusion is as follows. The influences of the political pressures

from the constituency on the negotiation results differ depending on the object of bureaucracy (MITI or MAFF) and its trade-liberalization preferences. In addition, the influences that the protectionist MAFF has on the negotiation results differ depending on the preferences of its ministry bureaucrats.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the second section, we consider trade policymaking under the ministry bureaucrat-led regime and the EVSL trade negotiations of APEC. We clarify the characteristics of Japan's trade policymaking and examine the international and domestic conflicts in the EVSL negotiations. In the third section, we construct a formal model of trade negotiations under the ministry bureaucrat-led trade policymaking using the two-level games analysis, and in the fourth section, we examine the influences that the political pressures of the constituency have on the trade negotiations. Finally, we analyze the bargaining powers of MAFF and the EVSL negotiations, before summarizing our conclusions.

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER MINISTRY BUREAUCRAT-LED POLICYMAKING

The ministry bureaucrats have played an important role in the trade-policymaking process in Japan.¹ Arguments that attach considerable importance to the role of ministry bureaucrats in policymaking are called 'bureaucrat-led models of policy determination' (Pempel, 1974; Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1989). Each ministry bureaucrat has a jurisdictional domain and has a veto on the intervention of other ministry bureaucrats. If the policymaking extends to plural jurisdictional domains, a conflict of interest may occur among the ministry bureaucrats. In Japan, a political-economy system exists in which the demands and conflicts of various domestic constituencies are handled by the ministry bureaucrats. As mentioned, Japan's political-economy system has been helpfully termed 'bureau-pluralism' (Aoki, 1988).

In the pluralism theory of policy decisions, there is an argument that attaches importance to the increased influences of party politicians, as well as arguments emphasizing internal multidimensions and conflicts of interest within the governmental bureaucracy. Under the long-term governance of the LDP, the policy-formation ability of Zoku Diet members improved, and, as a result, their political interventions spread to various policy decisions. Arguments that attach importance to the role of the party politicians are called 'competitive models of politicians and bureaucrats' (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1984, 1987) or a 'politician-led model' (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993).

There are two regimes of trade policymaking under bureau-pluralism: one is the ministry bureaucrat-led regime and the other is the executive-led regime. Here, we examine the trade policymaking under the ministry bureaucrat-led regime that negotiated the EVSL.²

Ministry Bureaucrat-Led Policymaking

The policymaking body under the ministry bureaucrat-led regime is composed mainly of 1) ministry bureaucrats, 2) Zoku Diet members, and 3) interest groups (Figure 5.1). In the specific domain over which the ministry bureaucrat has jurisdiction, these three groups formed cooperative relations called the 'iron triangle (sub-government)' (Campbell, 1984: 301) to mutually support their interests. In resolving a policy problem, such as that related to trade policy, in which plural ministry bureaucrats are involved and participate in the field of industrial products, agriculture and forestry marine products, and services, conflicts of interest may occur among the ministry bureaucrats (Campbell, 1984: 308).³

The ministry bureaucrats play an important role in drafting and enforcing trade-policy processes: they set agendas, paying special attention to interest groups under the jurisdiction of their respective ministries, and draft the main policies. During the policy-enforcement stage, they influence the economic subjects through *gyousei-sidou* (administrative advice). This advice is in the form of an action, such as the guidance and direction that an administration carries out under voluntary cooperation with partners to accomplish administrative objectives. The advice does not have compelling legal force; however, it has practical compelling force in the use of subsidies, fiscal investments and loans, and the taxation system.

The decision-making style under the ministry bureaucrat-led regime is bottom-up (George-Mulgan, 2008: 173). Policy drafts are revised numerous times and their contents are accumulated through adjustments and consensus building (*nemawashi*) both inside and outside the ministries and government offices. Furthermore, the policy drafts are examined by the Policy Affairs Research Council (*Seimu-Chousa-Kai*) and the Executive Council (*Somu-Kai*) of the ruling LDP before being submitted to the Cabinet and the Diet. During the prior examination process, the Zoku Diet's ruling-party members influence the policy decisions. Given the existence of prior examinations, the system is called the 'two-pillar system between the government and the ruling party' for policymaking. In this




Figure 5.1 Ministry bureaucrat-led policymaking

system, Zoku Diet members cooperate closely with the ministry bureaucrats and have strong influence on policymaking.

Zoku Diet members act as an intermediary between interest groups and ministry bureaucrats (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 540). Party politicians represent interest groups, which support politicians during an election and influence the related ministry bureaucrat. In particular, Zoku Diet members use their strong influence in the specific policy fields in which the ministry bureaucrat has jurisdictional rights. In the GATT Uruguay round and the EVSL of APEC, Norin-zoku members played an important role in preventing the market opening for agriculture, forestry, and marine products in Japan (Rapkin and George 1993: 72; Okamoto 2004: 100). Although the ministry bureaucrats need the support of Zoku Diet members to secure the ministry's interests, Zoku Diet members demand a significant role in the policymaking and enforcement decisions of the ministry bureaucrats.

Domestic farmers, firms, and consumers do not directly participate in trade negotiations; however, they construct interest groups and exert political pressure on governmental representatives and the ministry bureaucrats and thereby influence trade negotiations (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 533). For example, in the EVSL trade negotiations, JA-Zenchu cooperated with MAFF and Norin-zoku members to apply political pressure to prevent the liberalization of agricultural products.

Under the ministry bureaucrat-led policymaking regime, the maintenance of small-scale part-time farmers was the prime focus of MAFF, Norin-zoku members, and JA-Zenchu. These organizations supported small-scale part-time farmers for the following reasons: MAFF used its role in maintaining farmers' interests as the justification for its budget; Norin-zoku members were supported by electoral voters in the farming villages; and JA-Zenchu was supported by members of the village association. Therefore, these bodies supported protectionist trade policies to protect domestic small-scale part-time farmers.

International and Domestic Conflicts in EVSL Negotiations

In November 1994, in the Bogor Declaration, APEC aimed at realizing 'free and open trade and investment' by 2020 for developing countries (by 2010 for developed countries). For this purpose, from 1995 to 1998, the EVSL negotiations were conducted to achieve trade liberalization more rapidly in 15 specific industrial, agricultural, forestry, and fishing products. However, the EVSL negotiations did not succeed, owing to the veto of MAFF in Japan. I now explain the international and domestic conflicts of the EVSL negotiated under the ministry bureaucrat-led regime (see also Okamoto, 2004).

1) International conflicts. The EVSL negotiations were divided into two stages: the first involved a negotiation to select which sectors will undergo trade liberalization (from November 1995 to November 1997), and the second

involved a negotiation to decide the enforcement method of trade liberalization (from November 1997 to November 1998).

First, there were negotiations among countries to select the sectors targeted for trade liberalization. The negotiations began in November 1995, when the APEC leaders' meeting adopted 'the Osaka Action Agenda' and continued until the leaders' meeting to specify the sectors, in Vancouver in November 1997, when the leaders announced a statement. Through the negotiations, 15 sectors (Front 9 sectors, Back 6 sectors) were specified as objects of trade liberalization to be debated according to the three pillars (trade and investment liberalization, trade facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation) of APEC activity. Assuming 'the APEC principle of voluntarism' for the enforcement of trade liberalization, Japan agreed that it would include in the negotiated sectors 1) fish and fish products, 2) forest products, 3) the food sector, and 4) oilseeds and oilseed products.

Second, regarding the enforcement method of trade liberalization, negotiations were conducted among APEC countries. The negotiations began just after the leaders' meeting in November 1997 and were continued until the ministerial and the leaders' meetings in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. It was in these ministerial and leaders' meetings that the final decisions were made on referring the trade liberalization of the Front 9 sectors to the WTO and the virtual cancellation of the EVSL negotiations.

In the negotiations on enforcement of trade liberalization, a voluntarism method, or a cafeteria approach, was opposed to a package approach (Okamoto, 2004: 45–50). The package approach demands trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation from each participating country in all sectors. On the other hand, under the cafeteria approach, each country can decide freely based on the APEC principle of voluntarism which actions to undertake and in which sectors. The United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong sought to promote trade liberalization in APEC and supported the package approach,⁴ while Japan supported the cafeteria approach.

The participants could not reach an agreement on the enforcement approach of trade liberalization and, in the end, the negotiations failed. The reason why Japan refused the package approach is it was unable to accept tariff reductions for 1) fish and fish products, 2) forest products, 3) the food sector, and 4) oilseeds and oilseed products. In particular, Japan completely refused the liberalization of fish and fish products.

2) Domestic conflicts. The Japanese ministries that participated in APEC trade-liberalization negotiations were MITI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), MAFF, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Okamoto, 2004: 84–8). The preference of the Japanese negotiator was affected by the preferences of these ministries. As mentioned, each ministry bureaucrat has authority for trade liberalization in the jurisdictional sectors and has a veto on the negotiations of the specific fields.

MITI was positive about the EVSL negotiations: it intended comprehensive trade liberalization and played an important role. The APEC issues were the joint jurisdiction of MITI and MOFA. MOFA sought to promote basic trade liberalization but did not have any role in the related jurisdictional industries. Therefore, it was only part of the formal adjustment in the EVSL negotiations. MAFF was protectionist and negative about the EVSL negotiations from beginning to end. Its basic viewpoint was ‘no more concessions beyond the Uruguay Round commitment’. The reason was that there would be demands for further liberalization in the next WTO round if it gave any concessions in the EVSL. MOF’s participation was based on its jurisdiction over customs and tariffs, and it did not act positively or negatively for trade liberalization.

MAFF cooperated with agriculture and forestry fisheries-related interest groups and Norin-zoku members, and it objected to the liberalization of agriculture and forestry marine products (Okamoto, 2004, 89–90). JA-Zenchu objected to the liberalization of the ‘food sector’ and ‘oilseeds and oilseed products’, and the National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations (Zengyoren) objected to the market opening of ‘fish and fish products’. In addition, the Japan Forestry Association and the Japan Plywood Manufacturers’ Association (JPMA) objected to the liberalization of ‘forest products’. Among party politicians, those supporting anti-liberalization were members of the Agricultural and Forestry Division, the Fisheries Division, and the Special Committee on Agricultural Trade, all of which were subject to the Policy Research Council of the LDP. The LDP was the only party that played a meaningful role in the EVSL negotiations. The Norin-zoku included some of the most influential Zoku Diet members at that time.

Trade negotiations are conducted not by a single body but by the divided management of ministry bureaucrats. A four-ministry co-chair of MOFA, MITI, MAFF, and MOF was appointed, and each ministry was assigned responsibility for a negotiation field. As a result, MAFF had strong influence on the trade liberalization of agricultural, forestry, and marine products. Therefore, the EVSL negotiations failed at the conclusion of the agreement. Such a failure was the result of the vertical sub-government among the ministry bureaucrats.

THE TRADE-NEGOTIATION MODEL UNDER MINISTRY BUREAUCRAT-LED POLICYMAKING

I construct a formal model of two-level games to analyze the trade negotiations under the ministry bureaucrat-led policymaking. The model follows Ishiguro (2007, 2017).

Framework of Trade Negotiations

1) Actors. We assume that trade liberalization is negotiated between two countries: the home country (Japan) i and the foreign country j . The model includes four

main actors: a representative negotiator (prime minister, G) for the home country; the home country's MITI bureaucrat (M) with a free-trade orientation; the home country's MAFF bureaucrat (A) with a protectionist orientation; and the foreign country's government (F). The representative negotiator must negotiate the contents of the agreement with MITI and MAFF, while negotiating tariff reductions with the foreign country's government.

Each actor negotiates tariff reductions for the home country and the foreign country to maximize the political support it receives from various domestic constituencies, such as consumers, firms, and farmers. Consumers want to increase the consumer surplus, whereas firms and farmers want to increase profits. A decreased tariff rate increases the consumer surplus but decreases profits and vice versa. Each actor negotiates trade liberalization and attempts to satisfy the demands of its home country's constituents, which apply political pressure on the actors to maximize their benefits.

2) The trade-negotiation game. The trade-negotiation game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the main actors reduce tariff rates, and in the second stage, the economic agents in each country maximize consumption and production. After the first stage, the tariff rates are agreed upon by the two countries; in the second stage, each country's consumers, firms, and farmers optimize their actions given the tariffs (for the economic model, see Appendix 1).

In the first stage, tariff negotiations occur on two levels. One level involves international negotiations (between the governments of the two countries); the other level involves domestic negotiations or politics (among the representative negotiator, MITI, and MAFF). In the negotiations, the home country's representative negotiator has the right of proposal and the foreign government and the MAFF bureaucrat have the right of veto. Initially, the representative negotiator makes a proposal to the foreign government. When the foreign government accepts the proposal, the proposal is sent to MAFF for approval. If MAFF ratifies the proposal, the tariff agreement between the countries is approved. We assume that if MAFF and the foreign government can obtain pay-offs that exceed the status quo, they will not refuse the representative negotiator's proposal. Furthermore, if MAFF or the foreign government refuses the proposal, the negotiations break down.

3) Information structure. The preferences of each actor and the rules of the game are common knowledge. In other words, the actors have perfect and complete information. The equilibrium of the tariff-reduction-negotiations game is assumed to be a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.

Objective Functions of the Actors

Each actor's true objective is to maximize its political approval rating; however, because the tariff rate corresponds to the political approval rating, we use the tariff rate as a proxy for the political approval rating. Therefore, in our model, each actor attempts to maximize its political support function by minimizing the

differences between its ideal and actual levels of domestic and foreign tariff rates. The objective functions for the home country's representative negotiator, MITI, MAFF, and the foreign government are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} U_{il}(t_i, t_j) &= -(t_i - t_{il})^2 - (t_j - t_{jl})^2, \quad l = M, A \\ U_{iG}(t_i, t_j) &= \gamma U_{iA}(t_i, t_j) + (1 - \gamma) U_{iM}(t_i, t_j) \\ U_{jF}(t_i, t_j) &= -(t_i - t_{iF})^2 - (t_j - t_{jF})^2 \end{aligned}$$

where t_i is Japan's tariff rate, t_j is the foreign country's tariff rate, t_{il} ($l = M, A, F$) is each actor's optimal tariff rate for Japan, and t_{jl} is each actor's optimal tariff rate for the foreign country (see Appendix 2 for the optimal tariff rate). Each actor wants to completely eliminate foreign tariffs; therefore, $t_{jM} = t_{jA} = t_{jG} = t_{iF} = 0$. The objective function of the home government (U_{iG}) is constructed as a weighted average of MAFF's function (γ) and MITI's function ($1 - \gamma$), in which γ represents MAFF's political influence. In the ministry bureaucrat-led trade-policymaking regime, the value of γ is large.

According to these objective functions, the indifference curves for each actor's objective function are concentric circles. Each actor can maximize its political support by combining $(t_{iG}, 0)$, $(t_{iM}, 0)$, $(t_{iA}, 0)$, and $(0, t_{jF})$ of its optimal tariff rates. The combinations of each actor's optimal tariff rate represent each actor's ideal point. An actor's political support increases as the actual tariff rates approach the ideal point. However, it decreases as the actual tariff levels move in either direction away from the ideal point.

POLITICAL PRESSURE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND NEGOTIATION RESULTS

I examine the influence that the increased political pressures from firms and farmers have on the equilibrium of trade negotiations (see Appendix 3 for the equilibrium of trade negotiations). We consider three cases. Case 1 ($t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG}$): Japan's representative negotiator is free-trade-oriented and the preferences of the ministry bureaucrats are sufficiently similar. Case 2 ($t_Z - t_{iG} < t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_{jF}$): MAFF supports protectionism and the preferences of the ministry bureaucrats are moderately different. Case 3 ($t_{jF} < t_{iA} - t_{iG}$): the preferences of the ministry bureaucrats are sufficiently different. The results of trade negotiations are different for all the three cases.

Result 1. In Case 1 ($t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG}$), the increased political pressure of the opposing interest groups on MITI increases the domestic and foreign tariff rates. However, the increased political pressures on MAFF increase the domestic tariff rate, while the effects on the foreign tariff rate are dependent on the influence power γ of MAFF (see Figure 5.2 for the proof).

Result 2. In Case 2 ($t_Z - t_{iG} < t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_{jF}$), the result of trade negotiations is determined by the ideal point $(t_G, 0)$ of Japan's representative negotiator. The negotiator's preference consists of the

preferences of MAFF and MITI and the influential power of MAFF. The political pressures that the opposing interest groups exert on MAFF and MITI increase the domestic tariff rate, while they do not change the foreign tariff rate (see Figure 5.3 for the proof).

Result 3. In Case 3 ($t_{jF} < t_{iA} - t_{iG}$), the result of the trade negotiations is determined by the preference ($t_{iA}, 0$) of MAFF. The political pressure on MITI does not affect the negotiation results. The political pressures that the opposing interest groups exert on MAFF increase the domestic tariff rate, while they do not change the foreign tariff rate (see Figure 5.3 for the proof).

Figure 5.2 expresses the effects that the increased political pressure of interest groups has on the results of the trade negotiations in Case 1 ($t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG}$). The horizontal axis represents the domestic tariff rate t_i , the vertical axis the foreign tariff t_j . The points $(t_{iG}, 0)$, $(t_{iM}, 0)$, $(t_{iA}, 0)$, and $(0, t_{jF})$ indicate the ideal points of the representative negotiator (G), MITI (M), MAFF (A), and the foreign government (F) respectively. $N(t_{iA}, t_{jF})$ is the Nash equilibrium. The set that expresses higher political support than the indifference curve I_A is Japan's domestic win-set, and the set that expresses higher political support than the indifference curve I_F is the foreign win-set (Putnam, 1988). Trade liberalization can be negotiated on the contract curve ($t_j = -(t_{jF}/t_{iG})t_i + t_{jF}$) between the two win-sets. Point a_0 indicates the initial equilibrium of the trade negotiations.

If the groups opposing trade liberalization increase political pressure, and, hence, MAFF (MITI) tends toward being protectionist ($t_{iA} \rightarrow t_{iA'}$), the result of the trade negotiations moves from point a_0 to point a_A (a_M). The protectionist tendency of the ministry bureaucrats makes the domestic tariff rate higher in comparison with point a_0 ; however, the effects that it has on the foreign tariff rate depend on the targeted ministry bureaucrats. The protectionist tendency of MITI lifts the foreign tariff rate, while the effects of MAFF depend upon its influence power γ (see *Result 1*). Even if MITI increases its protectionist tendency, the Nash equilibrium N (status quo) does not change. However, the Nash equilibrium




Figure 5.2 Effects of interest groups' political pressure on negotiation results

moves to the right ($N \rightarrow N'$) if MAFF increases its protectionist tendency. It widens the foreign win-set. The protectionist tendency of MAFF not only increases the domestic tariff rate but also decreases the foreign tariff rate if the influence power γ is sufficiently small ($\gamma < \gamma^*$) and increases it if the influence power γ is sufficiently large ($\gamma > \gamma^*$).

EVSL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE MINISTRY BUREAUCRAT-LED REGIME

What kind of impact will the protectionist tendency of MAFF, caused by political pressures of the domestic constituency and the increased influence power γ , have on the results of the trade negotiation? We examine this question in the context of the EVSL negotiations.

Preferences of Ministry Bureaucrats and Negotiation Results

In the EVSL negotiations, the changed preferences of MAFF and the increased influence power of MAFF were clear, and, hence, the preference of the Japanese representative negotiator inclined toward protectionism. When Japan agreed to the specification of the 15 sectors at the APEC ministerial meeting in November 1997, 'the APEC principle of voluntarism' was identified as the preferred method of enforcing trade liberalization. Japan conformed to this principle and promoted voluntarism as the enforcement method. Thereafter, when it became clear in the trade-ministerial meeting in Malaysia in June 1998 that the package approach would be selected, interest groups and Norin-zoku members applied political pressure on MAFF. In the end, both MAFF and the Japanese representative negotiator became more inclined toward protectionism.

When the preference of MAFF becomes more inclined toward protectionism, what kind of impact do the trade negotiations have on the negotiation results? Figure 5.3 shows the effects on the negotiation results of the increased difference in ministerial preferences owing to the increased optimal tariff rate t_{iA} of MAFF. The horizontal axis expresses the tariff rate t_i in Japan and the vertical axis the foreign tariff rate t_j .

Given the optimal tariff rate t_M of MITI, when the pressures of interest groups and Norin-zoku members are strengthened, and as a result, the optimal tariff rate t_{iA} of MAFF becomes more inclined toward protectionism, the distance between MITI's ideal point and MAFF's ideal point becomes larger. The increased optimal tariff rate t_{iA} of MAFF moves the Nash equilibrium to the right (from N to N') and narrows Japan's win-set (widens the foreign country's win-set). Additionally, the contract curve $t_{jF}t_{iG}$ moves counterclockwise around the foreign country's ideal point $(0, t_{jF})$ (for example, $t_{jF}t_{iG'}$).




Figure 5.3 MAFF's ideal point and negotiation results

In Case 1 ($t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG}$), because the distance between the ministry bureaucrats' ideal points is sufficiently small, the international negotiations are conducted on the contract curve (Figure 5.2). The negotiation results are restricted by the foreign win-set. When the optimal tariff rate of the MAFF is increased, the negotiation domain between the two win-sets moves to the right. In Case 2 ($t_Z - t_{iG} < t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_{jF}$), because there is an ideal point $(t_{iG}, 0)$ of Japan's representative negotiator in the negotiation domain, the negotiation result coincides with the ideal point $(t_{iG}, 0)$ (see *Result 2*).

When the preference of MAFF tends to shift toward increased protectionism, and the distance between the ministry bureaucrat's ideal points becomes sufficiently large, as in Case 3 ($t_{jF} < t_{iA} - t_{iG}$), the effective negotiation domain is on the straight line $t_d a_1$ and lies between the two win-sets. Then the negotiation result coincides with the point $(t_d, 0)$. Japan's tariff rate t_d is higher than the optimal level t_{iG} of Japan's representative negotiator. The negotiation results are limited by the preference of MAFF to use its veto (see *Result 3*).

Influences of Ministry Bureaucrats and Negotiation Results

When MAFF increases its influence power, what kind of effects will its increased influence power have on the negotiation results? When Japan agreed to the trade liberalization of specific sectors in the APEC ministerial meeting in November 1997, the influence of MAFF was not strong. Subsequently, however, the influence of MAFF was increased, when it became clear that the package approach of trade liberalization would be selected.

Given the optimal tariff rate t_{iM} of MITI and the sufficiently large distance between the ministry bureaucrats' ideal points, Figure 5.4 expresses the effects that the increased influence power γ of MAFF has on the negotiation results. The horizontal axis indicates the influence power γ of MAFF and the vertical axis indicates the tariff rate t_{io} in Japan. APEC₉₇ shows the agreement point at the time when the specific sectors of EVSL were determined, and APEC₉₈ shows the situation at the time of the breakdown of the EVSL negotiations. The tariff rate t_{FM} expresses a tariff rate that is acceptable to the foreign government. This critical tariff rate becomes high with the voluntarism method, while it becomes low with the package approach. γ_{FM} indicates the influence power of MAFF corresponding to the tariff rate t_{FM} . $\gamma = 1$ indicates a situation where MAFF exercises its veto.

In the case where the distance between the ministry bureaucrats' ideal points is sufficiently large, we have the following relationship between the influence power γ of MAFF and the tariff rate t_{io} in Japan. First, the relationship depends on a level of acceptable tariff rate t_{FM} for the foreign government. In the case where the acceptable tariff rate is sufficiently high ($t_{FM} \geq t_{iA}$), the relationship is expressed by the curve *ABCD*. As the influence power γ is increased, the tariff rate t_{io} in Japan rises. The tariff rate t_{io} is monotonic (but not strictly), increasing with the influence power γ . In the case where the acceptable tariff rate for the foreign government is sufficiently low ($t_{FM} < t_{iA}$), the relationship is expressed by the curve *ABC''₁C''₂D''*. When the influence power of MAFF is increased, the negotiation breaks down at the acceptable tariff rate t_{FM} and then the tariff rate t_{io} does not change from the status quo t_{iA} .

In the case where the acceptable tariff rate for the foreign government is sufficiently high ($t_{FM} \geq t_{iA}$), the relationship (expressed by the curve *ABCD*) between the influence power γ and the tariff rate t_{io} is as follows. Because of $t_{iG} = \gamma t_{iA} + (1 - \gamma) t_{iM}$ (see Appendix 2 for the equation), the increased influence γ of MAFF increases the optimal tariff rate t_{iG} of the Japanese government. Here, the contract curve moves counterclockwise around the foreign country's ideal point. In Case 3, where the influence power γ of MAFF is weak, the negotiation results are restricted by the win-set of MAFF. Even if the influence power is increased in Case 3, the tariff rate $t_{io} = t_d$ is not affected. When its influence power is increased and, hence, the negotiation domain moves to Case 2, the negotiation results reflect the optimal tariff rate t_{iG} of the representative negotiator. Furthermore, in Case 1, the tariff rate t_{io} rises while being constrained by the win-set of the foreign government.

When the EVSL negotiations began in November 1995, the influence of MAFF was not strong. Until the leaders' meeting in November 1997, the relationship between the influence power γ of MAFF and the tariff rate t_{io} would be indicated by the point APEC₉₇ in Case 3 in Figure 5.4, and the tariff rate t_{io} in Japan would be expected at the moderate level. On the other hand, as it became clear that the package approach would be selected, the influence of MAFF increased, and the relationship between the influence power γ and the tariff rate t_{io} moved to Case 2




Figure 5.4 MAFF's influence and negotiation results

and Case 3. The negotiation results were expected to be more inclined toward protectionism. In Figure 5.4, the APEC₉₈ expresses the relationship at the time of the EVSL's breakdown.

Second, the negotiation result t_{io} depends on the optimal tariff rate t_{iA} of MAFF. The optimal tariff rate t_{iA} affects the range of Case 3, which is restricted by the win-set of MAFF. If MAFF becomes more inclined toward protectionism ($t_{iA} < t_{iA}'$), the relationship between the influence power γ and the tariff rate t_{io} is expressed by the curve $A'B'C'D'$ in Figure 5.4. The range of Case 3 widens as a result of the narrowing of the win-set of MAFF ($AB \rightarrow A'B'$), and then the tariff rate t_d determined in this range rises to t_d' . On the other hand, because the foreign win-set spreads out, the range of Case 1, where the tariff rate t_{io} is restricted by the foreign win-set, and the range of Case 2, determined by the optimal tariff rate t_{iG} of the representative negotiator, moves to the right.

After December 1997, the preferences of MAFF and the Japanese representative negotiator moved in a more protectionist direction owing to political pressures of interest groups and Norin-zoku members (Okamoto, 2004: 98). They lobbied to influence policymaking in advance of the leaders' meeting in November 1998. As a result, it is assumed that the preference of MAFF and the Japanese representative negotiator became more inclined toward protectionism.

Third, the effects that the influence power γ of MAFF have on the negotiation results depend on the acceptable point $(t_{FM}, 0)$ for the foreign government. The possibility of agreement is large, so as for the acceptable tariff rate t_{FM} to be high. Conversely, it becomes very likely that the negotiations will break down, so as for it to be low. The package approach lowers the acceptable tariff rate and raises the possibility of breakdown of the negotiations.

In the case that the acceptable tariff rate t_{FM} is sufficiently high, as the influence power γ of MAFF is increased, Japan's representative negotiator can agree with the higher tariff rate t_{io} . However, in the case that the acceptable tariff rate t_{FM} is sufficiently low, the agreed tariff rate t_{io} is low. In Case 3, even if the influence power of MAFF is increased, the agreed tariff rate t_{io} does not change. If the influence power increases more than the acceptability point ($\gamma > \gamma_{FM}$), the negotiations break down.

In the EVSL negotiation, Japan attempted to increase the acceptable tariff rate of the foreign countries. In October 1998, the Agriculture State Secretary, Tadahiro Matsushita, and the Forestry Agency's Director General, Toru Yamamoto, visited Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Another State Secretary, Hiroaki Kameya, visited China and Korea with the Director General of the Fisheries Policy Planning Department and the Fisheries Agency. In November, the MAFF minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, visited the United States and held discussions with Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Gene Sparling, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman (Okamoto, 2004: 96–7). These visits and talks did not succeed in raising the acceptable tariff rate of the foreign governments. Thus, because the increased influence of MAFF exceeded the critical point (γ_{FM} related to t_{FM}) of the foreign government, the EVSL negotiations broke down.⁵

CONCLUSION

I examined the effects of the ministry bureaucrat-led policymaking regime in Japan on the trade-liberalization negotiations using the formal model of two-level games. My main conclusions are as follows.

First, in the case where Japan's representative negotiator is free-trade-oriented and the ministry bureaucrats' preferences are sufficiently similar (in Case 1), if interest groups opposing trade liberalization (such as firms and farmers) apply political pressures on MITI, the tariff rates in Japan and abroad are increased. However, if the political pressures are exerted on MAFF, the tariff rate is increased in Japan, while the effect on the foreign tariff rate depends on the influence power of MAFF.

Second, in the case where MAFF is more inclined toward protectionism and the ministry bureaucrats' preferences are moderately different (in Case 2), the negotiation results are determined by the ideal point of the representative negotiator in Japan. The political pressure that the opposing interest groups apply on MAFF and MITI and the increased influence power of MAFF increase the tariff rate in Japan; however, this scenario does not change the tariff rate in the foreign country.

Third, in the case where the ministry bureaucrats' preferences are sufficiently different (in Case 3), the negotiation results are determined by the preference of MAFF, and the negotiation results are not affected by the political pressure on MITI. The political pressure that the opposing groups exert on MAFF increases the tariff rate in Japan, while it does not change the tariff rate in the foreign country.

Notes

- 1 Johnson (1982) and Wolferen (1989) attach considerable importance to the role of the ministry bureaucrats in policymaking and the enforcement of Japanese industrial policies. Johnson (1982) describes Japan as a 'developmental state', and Wolferen (1989) defines Japan as 'bureau-authoritarianism'. These studies point out the importance of the ministry bureaucrats; however, they do not sufficiently analyze the relations between the ministry bureaucrats and party politicians and the conflicts of interest among the ministry bureaucrats.
- 2 See Ishiguro (2017) for the trade negotiations under executive-led policymaking.
- 3 The conflicts among ministry bureaucrats arise as a result of *tatewari-gyousei* (divided administration system), and the ability to coordinate the conflicts is limited within the ministry bureaucrat organizations. The conflicts give the party politicians room to play a role in the policymaking process (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 549).
- 4 In 1997, the APEC leaders' meeting announced: 'We find this package to be mutually beneficial and to represent a balance of interests'. According to Krauss (2004: 280), this announcement was a reason for the United States to insist on the package deal.
- 5 In the United States, the interest groups for liberalizing forestry products exerted political pressure on the US government, and, thus, the US government could not increase the acceptability tariff rate t_{FM} (Krauss, 2004: 277).

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APPENDICES

In these appendices, we describe the formal model closely. A reader who is not used to such a model can skip this part and still understand the main subject.

Appendix 1: The Economic Model

I set up an economic model based on the standard international trade theory (Rosendorff, 1996). I assume that there are two countries and two goods and that each market is divided. The consumer's utility function (u_i) in the home country (i) is $u_i = X_i - (1/2)X_i^2 + v$, in which X_i denotes the quantity of goods consumed domestically, which domestic and foreign firms produce in an imperfectly competitive manner. A competitively produced *numeraire* good, denoted by v , is sold in the two countries, and its price is standardized to 1 in both markets. A similar consumer utility function (u_j) is assumed for the foreign country. According to utility-maximization conditions, the inverse-demand functions of the goods X_i and X_j in the two countries are $p_i = 1 - X_i$ and $p_j = 1 - X_j$ respectively. The domestic price of good X_i is denoted by p_i , and the foreign price of good X_j is denoted by p_j . The consumer surpluses in the home country and the foreign country are $CS_i = (1/2)X_i^2$ and $CS_j = (1/2)X_j^2$ respectively.

There is one firm (the domestic firm) that produces X_i goods in the home country and another firm (the foreign firm) that does so in the foreign country. These firms supply the produced goods to the two markets. The total supply quantities (X_i and X_j) in the two markets are $X_i = x_{ii} + x_{ji}$ and $X_j = x_{ij} + x_{jj}$, in which x_{ii} denotes the quantity supplied to the domestic market by the domestic firm, x_{ij} denotes the quantity supplied to the foreign market by the domestic firm, x_{ji} denotes the domestic-market supply of the foreign firm, and x_{jj} denotes the foreign-market supply of the foreign firm.

The profits of both firms (π_i and π_j) are defined as the total revenue generated in the home country and the foreign country, less tariffs paid on exports. Here, we eliminate production and transportation costs for simplicity.

$$\pi_i = x_{ii} p_i(X_i) + x_{ij} p_j(X_j) - t_j x_{ij}, \quad \pi_j = x_{ji} p_i(X_i) + x_{jj} p_j(X_j) - t_i x_{ji}$$

Each profit-maximizing firm produces in a Cournot-competitive fashion given the tariff rates (t_i and t_j) in effect in each country. Then, if we assume interior solutions, the quantities supplied by each firm to each market in equilibrium can be expressed as follows:

$$x_{ii} = (1+t_i)/3, \quad x_{ji} = (1-2t_i)/3, \quad x_{ij} = (1-2t_j)/3, \quad x_{jj} = (1+t_j)/3$$

Appendix 2: Political Support Functions and Optimal Tariff Rates

1) Political support functions. The political support function (Baldwin, 1987; Milner and Rosendorff, 1997) for each actor is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} W_{il}(t_i, t_j) &= CS_i + s_{il}\pi_i + t_i x_{ji}, \quad l = M, A \\ W_{iG}(t_i, t_j) &= \gamma W_{iA}(t_i, t_j) + (1 - \gamma) W_{iM}(t_i, t_j) \\ W_{jF}(t_i, t_j) &= CS_j + s_j \pi_j + t_j x_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

The political support functions W_{il} and W_{jF} of each actor comprise the consumer surplus of the home country (Japan) and the foreign country (CS_i and CS_j respectively), firms' and farmers' profits in the home country and the foreign country (π_i and π_j respectively), and tariff revenue in each country ($t_i x_{ji}$ and $t_j x_{ij}$). The weights of the profits relative to the consumer surplus and the tariff revenue are given by s_{il} and s_j respectively. The weights represent the political pressure exerted on the actors by agricultural groups and the Zoku Diet, and a higher s_{il} indicates greater political pressure. The political support function of the Japanese government (W_{iG}) is constructed as a weighted average of MAFF's function (γ) and MITI's function ($1 - \gamma$), in which γ represents MAFF's political influence.

We can analyze the ministry bureaucrat-led policymaking by controlling the value of the parameters s_{iA} and γ . Increased protectionist political pressure is indicated by an increased s_{iA} . In addition, the political influence power of MAFF is indicated by the value of γ . If γ is close to one, MAFF has effective influence. Specifically, if $\gamma = 1$, MAFF has not only the right of veto but also the right of proposal.

2) Optimal tariff rates. I assume that each actor chooses its optimal tariff rate to maximize its political support function as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} (t_{il}, t_{ji}) &= \arg \max W_{il}(t_i, t_j), \quad l = G, M, A \\ (t_{iF}, t_{jF}) &= \arg \max W_{jF}(t_i, t_j) \end{aligned}$$

In solving the problem, the optimal tariff rates t_{il} and t_{jF} for each actor are determined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} t_{il} &= x_{ji} + (1/2)(2s_{il} - 1) x_{ii}, \quad l = M, A \\ t_{iG} &= \gamma t_{iA} + (1 - \gamma) t_{iM} \\ t_{jF} &= x_{ij} + (1/2)(2s_j - 1) x_{jj} \end{aligned}$$

The sufficient conditions for the optimal tariff rates t_{il} (t_{jF}) in the home country (foreign country) to be positive are $s_{il} \geq 1/2$ ($s_j \geq 1/2$). The levels of the optimal

trade barriers t_{ij} for Japan's actors depend on the weight s_{ij} of the profits relative to the consumer surplus and the tariff revenue in Japan's political support function. MAFF is assumed to be more interested in the welfare of domestic firms and farmers than in the welfare of consumers and, hence, it is more protective of them than are the representative negotiator and MITI, who are focused on free trade ($s_{iA} > s_{iG} > s_{iM}$). Therefore, the optimal tariff rate of MAFF is higher than the optimal tariff rates of the representative negotiator and MITI. MITI's optimal tariff rate is the lowest of the three ($t_{iA} > t_{iG} > t_{iM}$).

Appendix 3: Equilibrium of Trade Negotiations

The equilibrium of this game is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In the trade negotiations, Japan's representative negotiator, who represents the prime minister, has the right of proposal, and Japan's MAFF and the foreign country's government have rights of veto. The equilibrium tariff rates of the trade negotiations (t_{i0} and t_{j0}) are expressed as follows. Japan's representative negotiator offers t_{i0} and t_{j0} , and both MAFF and the foreign government accept them.

$$(t_{i0}, t_{j0}) = \begin{cases} (t_{ia}, t_{ja}) & \text{if } t_{ia} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG} \\ (t_{iG}, 0) & \text{if } t_Z - t_{iG} < t_{ia} - t_{iG} < t_{jF} \\ (t_d, 0) & \text{if } t_{jF} < t_{ia} - t_{iG} \end{cases}$$

In these function equations, $t_d = t_{iA} - t_{jF}$ and t_Z are defined by $U_{jF}(t_{iG}, 0) = U_{jF}(t_Z, t_{jF})$. In turn, (t_{ia}, t_{ja}) is situated on the contract curve. (t_{ia}, t_{ja}) is composed of a combination of domestic and foreign tariff rates that give the foreign country's government the same political support ($U_{jF}(t_{ia}, t_{ja}) = U_{jF}(t_{iA}, t_{jF})$) as does the Nash equilibrium (status quo).

The equilibrium of the trade negotiations is classified into three possible cases. In Case 1 ($t_{iA} - t_{iG} < t_Z - t_{iG}$), Japan's representative negotiator is free-trade-oriented and the ministry bureaucrat's preferences are sufficiently similar; therefore, the home government and the foreign government will agree to the tariff rates on the contract curve (t_{ia}, t_{ja}) . MAFF's political influence power is not strong in this case. In Case 2 ($t_Z - t_{iG} < t_{ia} - t_{iG} < t_{jF}$), MAFF is more protective and the ministry bureaucrats' preferences are moderately different; therefore, the result of the trade negotiations is the ideal point $(t_{iG}, 0)$ of the prime minister in Japan. In Case 3 ($t_{jF} < t_{ia} - t_{iG}$), the preferences between MAFF and MITI are sufficiently different and the result of the trade negotiations is $(t_d, 0)$. In this case, MAFF has strong influence, resulting in a MAFF-led policymaking regime.

Asia's Contribution to IRT

Takeshi Uemura

INTRODUCTION

The assumption of exploring Asia's contribution to IRT (International Relations Theory) is that the discipline should not be a predominantly Western enterprise. As Acharya and Buzan maintain, the underdevelopment of an Asian IRT owes much to 'a lack of institutional resources, the head-start of Western IRT, and especially the hegemonic standing of Western IRT'.¹ Most scholars participating in this discussion seem to agree that IRT is very different from natural sciences. They argue that Asia lacks interest in IRT, because there is a growing 'dissatisfaction about the lack of fit between Western IRT and local milieu',² though there have been some quasi-theories in the Asian countries. Inoguchi, for instance, introduces three Japanese thinkers and their theoretical relevance in philosophy, international law, and economics. Qin suggests the possibility for a Chinese school of IRT based on traditional Confucianism.³ This chapter goes beyond the question of '*whether* Asia has anything to offer to IRT' to discuss *how* the region can make scholarly contributions to this discipline.

I argue that any meaningful dialogue between mainstream IRT and regional minorities is only possible when there is a common ground, that is, a significant intersubjective space where people from different sociocultural backgrounds can make sense of each other. I believe the attempt to explore Asia's contribution is a healthy one to overcome ethnocentrism in the discipline. Challenging as it may be, the work is all worthwhile if we truly want to understand world politics and complement the discipline.

While it is important to elucidate what this chapter is about, it is just as important to clarify what it is not, to avoid misunderstanding. This chapter is not about an attempt to search for any possibilities of an Asian school of IRT. Neither does it aim to identify national characteristics, nor to find the Asian way. Distant from the post-modernist stream, the author believes that IRT, as a social scientific discipline, should seek to nurture universally applicable theories in international political phenomena. This being said, no one can treat Asia as monolithic, because it is not. The region is a very diverse area with differences in all perspectives, from indigenous philosophy, to socioeconomy, to people's everyday life.

The aim of the chapter is rather modest, that is, to show a possible path toward identifying a few of the many Asian perspectives and incorporating them into IRT to make the discipline a more holistic scientific program. I argue that the region can complement the discipline at three levels. At the macro level, indigenous philosophy provides a coherent understanding of the most fundamental nature of human societies. Without correct ontological knowledge at this level, we cannot make sense of the information presented in front of us. Using Derek Yuen's recent interpretation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, I illustrate this point by contrasting the philosophical differences between the mainstream Cartesian tradition and the relational China.

The meso socio-anthropological level, built on the macro level, emphasizes the behavioral dimension to enable rigorous empirical analysis. The purpose is to improve the explanatory power of IRT by shedding light on diverse behavior rationales based on local behavior patterns. This would benefit tremendously from an interdisciplinary approach, inter alia sociology and anthropology. In order to illustrate this point, I introduce Uemura's Cultural Constructivist theory. Instead of attempting to revive the national-character approach, researchers should heed the behavioral dimension of culture to improve falsifiability and the explanatory power of cultural studies in IR.

In addition, at the micro level of empirical analysis, Asia provides abundant historical resources for our research. The rest of the article addresses each of these levels accordingly, and a conclusion follows.

MACRO PHILOSOPHICAL LEVEL — CHINESE MORAL RELATIONALITY

At this most fundamental level, Asia sheds lights on different world views of the political. In this section, I aim to illustrate this point by introducing Derek Yuen's work on deciphering Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.⁴ The reason that I choose a Chinese philosophical strand instead of others is twofold. First, Chinese IR scholars have been one of the most (indeed, probably the most) ambitious groups in promoting their own theories. The China School of IRT has grown to

challenge the dominant, US discipline.⁵ Since the end of last century, there has been no shortage of debates in developing IR ‘with Chinese characteristics’.⁶ As Acharya points out, though most of these works mainly focus on concepts and ideas that do not go beyond the Chinese civilizational context, there are burgeoning efforts in developing Chinese IRT to reinforce and enrich Western IRT.⁷ In short, this booming area alone justifies our scholarly attention. The second reason is more practical. As China ascends, it becomes increasingly important for both academics and diplomatic professionals to understand its intentions and course of development.

As such, Yuen’s work has significance. He argues that the ancient Chinese book is one of the most read, yet misread, about Chinese strategy in the West. According to Yuen, the failure to correctly grasp *The Art of War* is not entirely born out of language barriers; the work has been misinterpreted, rather, because most English translations treat it purely as a thesis on military strategy, without being aware of its underlying philosophical foundation. Indeed, *The Art of War* is only meaningful when read in conjunction with Lao Tzu’s *Tao Te Ching* (Taoism). In Yuen’s words, ‘the strategic thought of Taoism is precisely the blind spot of the Western strategic community’.⁸ Since Taoism lays the foundation for Chinese strategic calculation, Yuen begins with an analysis of ‘the system of Chinese strategic thought’, focusing on Lao Tzu. Throughout the work, Yuen emphasizes that the Chinese philosophy differs substantively from its Western counterpart; leading Western thinkers find the Chinese strategic tradition ‘utterly baffling’.⁹ Although Yuen’s focus is not exclusively on IRT, he nonetheless presents an important point of the philosophically laden nature of any research program, with significant implication for IR theories.

Generally speaking, Chinese philosophies tend to be theoretical, in contrast to the more practical ones in the West. Here, I mostly define philosophy in terms of a series of ontological questions of what the world is made of and what the basic natures of human society are. Such questions are generated in each society based on people’s unique history, culture, climate, and other factors. Philosophers, among intellectuals, are authorities in defining ontology, epistemology, logic, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics.¹⁰ Any enquiries we have in IRT would certainly be embedded in the inquirer’s own indigenous philosophical background. Thus, as Yuen argues, an additional philosophical angle complements the theory, making it a more well-balanced and comprehensive one.¹¹

As Yuen illustrates, Western and Chinese philosophy each asks a different set of questions and seeks for different answers. The goal of Western reasoning is to rationally resolve contradictions.¹² In contrast, Chinese philosophy is far more tolerant of contradictions. According to Yuen, the difference in the acceptance of the indirect approach in the West and China exemplifies this philosophical difference. Initiated by Liddell Hart, the indirect approach is mostly about creating suitable conditions for military success.¹³ This approach sits awkwardly within the Western goal-oriented philosophical foundation, which tends to focus

on directly identifying actions to achieve an effect. Western critics of the indirect approach, such as Richard Swain, lack the philosophical framework and language necessary for the proper understanding of key concepts in the approach. To the contrary, the indirect approach is well accepted in Chinese academia, mainly because the Chinese philosophical concepts and vocabulary, such as yin and yang, made such acceptance easier.

This tolerant attitude for contradictions nurtures a certain type of relationality. According to Zhao Tingyang, the Chinese concept of *tianxia* (all under heaven, 天下) reflects a relationality based on diversity.¹⁴ In *Tianxia*, nations do not have to be alike to coexist, and different types of relationships can exist simultaneously. This is a fundamental contrast from the Wendtian view of world culture, which must be shared among countries.¹⁵ In *tianxia* relationality, Chinese leaders have to be keenly aware of nuanced differences and balance foreign relations accordingly.¹⁶

Through this view of world order, the Chinese perceive, legitimize, and evaluate their foreign policies. China's past foreign policy behavior does not simply betray economic rationales. Instead, Chinese leaders would rather yield apparent short-term gains in order to secure a long-term relationship. Huang and Shih call this the Chinese way of managing transaction costs in the long term.¹⁷

In addition, this relationality also reflects a cultural rationale for dealing with uncertainty, especially in the international environment of anarchy. Although uncertainty is a universal feature in world politics, different countries with different philosophical foundations choose different sets of tools to cope with it. From a Realist perspective, states cope with uncertainty through bandwagoning or balance of power. From a Liberal Institutionalist perspective, states deal with the same issue through institutional arrangements. And from a Chinese perspective, states seek long-term reciprocal relationships. This rationalizes China's tendency to give higher priority to the preservation of stable relationships than more concrete interests, such as territory, power, energy, supplies, or economic gains. Since *tianxia* is filled with diverse types of relations under constant change, the future is extremely uncertain. This makes a solid relationship, or harmony, a valuable asset in the long run.

Thus, harmony is more than an ethical symbol in Chinese philosophy. Rather, it is a 'comprehensively realistic consideration with the hope for better future gain or less future loss by preserving positive relations with all concerned parties'.¹⁸ In short, in Chinese relationality, moral principles are also laden with pragmatic values. Such reciprocity, however, does not have to be maintained in a single round of negotiations. Rather, reciprocity in the Chinese context is an investment during times of abundance and an asset to spend when needed. A solid relationship serves as reassurance in a world of uncertainty.

This appreciation of relationship and context gives rise to a more holistic perspective in Chinese thinking than in Western philosophy. Going back to *The Art of War*, for instance, although the book is primarily about warfare, it integrates

a variety of other factors, including organization, logistical support, economic calculation, and psychological effects. It states that the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities. This holistic approach to warfare is most succinctly reflected in Sun Tzu's famous maxim: 'subjugating the enemy's army without.'¹⁹ Based on a holistic Taoist philosophy, Sun Tzu makes full use of the whole spectrum of war, instead of limiting security issues to the military aspect. Through a spectrum of non-military (or 'indirect', using Hart's expression) strategies, a victorious army seeks to realize the comprehensive conditions for victory before entering into the battleground.

Clearly, Sun Tzu emphasizes creating advantageous conditions through any means available prior to the point of military engagement. If the conditions are already substantially advantageous, a wise general will fight only seemingly easy battles, where victories are assured and inexpensive.

Sun Tzu argues that a 'good' victory should be easy and unexceptional, like 'lifting an autumn hair', 'seeing the sun and moon', and 'hearing a thunder clap'. It should be so prosaic that everyone expects it, and nobody will think it is so extraordinary as to be 'excellent.' ... 'His victories in battle are unerring. Unerring means that he acts where victory is certain, and conquers an enemy that has already lost.' ... The enemy is to be unraveled before a battle has even taken place.²⁰

This holistic approach is also effective. Because 'attacking the enemy's plans and alliances' does not have to involve military means, the strategies that are used are more likely to be surreptitious and less likely to be countered. This stands in sharp contrast to Clausewitz's idea of leading the enemy into a decisive battle.

Based on a holistic relationality, Sun Tzu's goal was always bigger than simply winning any single battle. Rather, his goal was to put everybody under the rule of China. Each battle, therefore, had to be situated in the continuation of this larger context. If winning a specific war would prove too costly or jeopardize the realization of the goal, Sun Tzu would not choose military engagement with that opponent.²¹

The Art of War is heavily influenced by Taoist philosophy, particularly yin-yang relationality. Traditional Chinese philosophies have long held that the universe consists of an infinite number of correlating pairs, mutually complementing each other, forming a dynamic whole. This is a systemic view emphasizing the interdependent nature of seemingly contradictory things. The yang represents the positive, the yin the negative. The two exist in an inseparable yet contrary continuum. Taoist philosophy views everything existing in this continuum, rather than an isolated individual. The yin and the yang are more than just interdependent: they are interconnected, interpenetrating in an uninterrupted manner. Such a philosophical view defies the Western law of identity that something cannot be A and at the same time non-A. Wisdom lies in the ability to discern the relationship of the pair and to profit from it, instead of attempting to exclude one contrary for the sake of the other.²²

This philosophy appears in Sun Tzu in his understanding of war and peace as yin and yang respectively. War as yin is the unorthodox, whereas peace as yang is the orthodox. While any war must serve for the purpose of peace, peace must also prepare the nation for victorious wars. Thus, war and peace are not two mutually exclusive concepts as conventionally recognized. Rather, they represent the Chinese dialectical system of the yin–yang principle. They are the two irreducible consecutive stages, where ‘the enemy and even the situation are part of the overall system’.²³ As Yuen argues, ‘there are none that are not orthodox, none that are unorthodox’.²⁴ The Taoist purpose is to unite the correlating pairs and turn them into an organic, dynamic whole. Understanding this seeming paradox of yin and yang provides us with new insights with regard to a possible Asian IRT.

However, understanding of this basic philosophy is not easy to come by. To begin with, the yin–yang concept does not have any parallel in Western scientific notions. Criticizing Johnston’s work on the Chinese strategic culture,²⁵ Yuen concludes: ‘the real picture of Chinese strategic culture and thought could be distorted and misread without taking Taoism into consideration... [since] the strategic thought of Taoism is precisely the blind spot of the Western strategic community’.²⁶ Due to his lack of understanding of the Chinese philosophical tradition, particularly Taoism, ‘Johnston can only look at the change and continuity of Chinese strategy from a number of relatively superficial characteristics of Chinese strategic culture’.²⁷ The strategic cultural perspective essentially fails to explain the linkage between Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, because such continuity ‘is more than strategic-cultural in nature – it is strategic-philosophical’.²⁸ Therefore, without a comprehensive grasp of Taoist philosophy, the study of Chinese strategic culture is doomed to fail. Even if Johnston was able to identify an ‘unbroken chain’ throughout China’s strategic phenomenon, i.e., a preference for strategic defense and limited war, he could not explain why such continuity exists.

Thus, if we want to understand Chinese strategy, we must understand it on its own terms. Yuen concludes that it is absolutely necessary for scholars to be equipped with linguistic, cultural, and philosophical knowledge in order to accurately interpret Chinese strategy. Some scholars from the West have attempted to incorporate Chinese philosophy into strategic studies. Boyd, for example, realizes that some of the key notions in Taoism, such as yin and yang, do not have any Western scientific parallel and even contradict conventional logic. Therefore, Boyd decides to start from the most fundamental philosophical level in his analysis of Chinese strategy, by importing a number of aspects of Chinese philosophy and reproducing them in Western scientific language.²⁹

The same also applies to IRT. Indigenous philosophical perspectives could be one of the promising approaches in making sense of local political phenomena. If so, IRT has to become a more cross-disciplinary field. The discipline should not be an exclusively Western or Asian enterprise. Rather, a balanced IRT should go beyond disciplinary and regional divides and explain sociopolitical realities by bringing the often diverse and hidden philosophical assumptions to the forefront.

Heeding diverse philosophical assumptions, though, does not amount to a post-modernist challenge to the scientific nature of IRT. As Qin Yaqing correctly points out, relationality is not a uniquely Chinese concept. A relational approach might as well be applied to the Western IRT.³⁰ Indeed, Hagstrom and colleagues have launched the relational constructivist program in earnest, illustrating how a relational concept of power can enrich IR.³¹ This is probably the first research program to empirically apply the relational approach in IR, responding to the theoretical call by Jackson and Nexon in 1999.³²

The relational turn in IR owes much to network theory and its direct application in sociology. Network theory mathematically maps out any network, natural or human, to understand how individual nodes are connected to form networks, and how networks function. Sociologists have cultivated network theory since the 1930s.³³ Today, the approach is widely applied to migration,³⁴ finance,³⁵ voting pattern in democracies,³⁶ art, science, technology,³⁷ and the list goes on.

In sum, Chinese relationality does not necessarily amount to cultural essentialism but, rather, implies a possible enrichment of IRT from a novel angle. As a scientific discipline, new IR theories have to be general enough to generate universally meaningful hypotheses, while flexible enough to be tailored to make sense of local realities. Too much emphasis on the former (as has been the case so far) will end in academic imperialism,³⁸ discriminating against non-Western contributions to the detriment of the whole discipline. Too much emphasis on the latter risks weakening the scientific nature of the discipline. Here I concur with Yuen that IRT should incorporate more Asian perspectives to regain balance, because so far it has been negligent in doing so. In the next section, I move to the meso socio-anthropological level to illustrate how IRT can both remain scientifically universal and improve its explanatory power in different cultural and regional milieus.

MESO SOCIO-ANTHROPOLOGICAL LEVEL — CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS AN EXAMPLE

At this meso level, Asia can help improve the explanatory power of IRT by shedding light on diverse behavior patterns based on indigenous philosophies. Built on the macro philosophical level, the meso level of IRT moves closer to social realities to make sense of political interactions among different cultural groups. The focus at this level shifts from ideational philosophy to real behaviors and actions. As at the macro level, there should be an interdisciplinary approach at the meso level, particularly one paying attention to sociology and anthropology. In this section, I intend to illustrate this point by introducing Cultural Constructivism, a theory that I have developed.

Cultural Constructivism is a meso-level theory designed to empirically examine to what extent a group's cultural behavior pattern is salient in its interactions

with another group. It stands out from earlier cultural studies in IRT in the following aspects. First and foremost, Cultural Constructivism mainly focuses on behavior patterns rather than ideas. Similar approaches, such as Strategic Culture and conventional Constructivism, are mostly committed to the analysis of the ideational; central concepts in these theories, such as culture, norm, and identity, are all defined as ideas in one way or another. The three generations of Strategic Culture did exactly that, with the first generation treating culture as a set of norms and context that gives meanings to behavior, the second as ideas in discourse and the third as causal ideas that entail a certain course of policy choices.³⁹ Conventional Constructivism also focuses on social structure consisting of shared ideas.⁴⁰

This very definition of culture and norm in ideational terms, however, is problematic in that ideas are essentially something only in our heads. As Johnston pointed out, it is extremely difficult to establish a cause–effect relationship (or any type of relationship) between a cultural idea and its possible resulting behavior. To put it bluntly, we simply cannot get inside the heads of decision makers.⁴¹

In contrast, I argue that we must explore Asia's contribution to IRT from a behavioral approach. This would benefit the theory in the following ways. First, behavior is more observable and falsifiable. I have argued elsewhere that, unlike ideas, behavior does not exist in our heads, but 'actually, physically, and observably take place out there'.⁴² Because behaviors and actions are observable, we can see fairly clearly when a certain set of behavior patterns appear (or do not appear) in social interactions. Indeed, this is why Cultural Constructivism mainly focuses on behavior patterns of cultural groups.

Previously, I have applied this theoretical framework to analyze contemporary China's foreign relations with multiple countries. I first identified a series of cultural behavior patterns in the dominant Chinese culture. These behavior patterns are nothing new in the disciplines of Chinese sociology and anthropology. However, they are basically patterns at the individual level – and there is obviously the problem of applying such individual-level observation directly at the collective level, such as inter-state interactions. Cultural behavior patterns at the individual level are not necessarily relevant at the international level. There might be different power dynamics working at the collective level, rendering observations of behavior patterns at the individual level inappropriate in the analysis of inter-state interactions.

In order to avoid conflating cultural behavior patterns at the individual level with international interactions, we must take an agnostic stance and carefully test the hypotheses in every case where the local behavior pattern appears in collective-level social interactions. Without *a priori* assumptions, researchers may then test this hypothesis in real empirical analysis. Based on this approach, I have previously analyzed China's relations with Japan, Vietnam, the former Soviet Union, and the United States. China's cultural behavior pattern (at the individual level) was identified in the country's relations with all but the United States

during the period of observation. This falsifiable approach distinguishes Cultural Constructivism from national-characteristics studies by empirically testing not only when the dog barks but also when it does not. Again, this is only possible when researchers focus on observable behavior, rather than hidden ideas. After all, the last thing we want is a snake-oil type of theory that can be used to explain everything and nothing.

The second aspect that sets Cultural Constructivism apart from other cultural studies in IRT is that the theory provides a universally applicable roadmap to analyze any cultural group. True, the theory is premised on the agnostic assumption that different cultural groups might behave differently (or similarly), and such differences could have significance in the group's interactions with another (or not). However, it does not stop at simply identifying the cultural differences of a particular group. More importantly, it also provides an analytical framework across cultural groups. Thus, it is useful both for generating a universally meaningful hypothesis and flexibly adapting itself to make sense of local realities. If researchers follow two steps, they can analyze any cultural group's behavior patterns and test their significance in international interactions.

The first step is to identify relevant (or possibly dominant) behavior patterns of the target cultural group. This is the part where sociology and anthropology become relevant. A researcher would have to conduct an intensive literature review in these disciplines about the target cultural group. From my literature review of Chinese culture, for instance, I learned that the people try to fulfill their moral obligations by reciprocity. Such reciprocity, however, is driven by long-term economic and social security values, providing people with strong incentives to make short-term sacrifices in order to gain long-term benefits. This means that the Chinese are less concerned with equity in a single round of negotiation than most Western people.

The second step is to test empirically when and under what material conditions such cultural behavior patterns appear salient in that cultural group's interactions with other groups. In my previous analysis of China's foreign relations, I found that China's cultural behavior pattern (at the individual level) has appeared in the country's foreign relations with Japan, Vietnam, and the former Soviet Union, but not with the United States. In its relationship with Japan, Beijing was able to impress Tokyo by unilaterally forgoing war reparations in their initial stage of rapprochement, in the early 1970s. In a similar cultural behavior pattern, the Chinese seized the moral high ground vis-à-vis their Vietnamese counterparts during the first two Indochina wars by lavishly providing material and political support to Hanoi. China's relationship with the former Soviet Union followed a reverse behavior pattern from that with Japan and Vietnam. As a junior partner, China expected generous support from the USSR in exchange for its political loyalty. Once the Soviet Union was deemed morally inappropriate, the Chinese vented their fury and confronted their erstwhile ally regardless of their significant power disadvantage and security vulnerability. I conclude that China's behavior

pattern with these three countries can be better explained from the Chinese cultural-behavior-pattern perspective than from other theoretical angles, such as Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, and conventional Constructivism.

The outlier, however, was the United States. This is because the Sino-American relationship did not meet the material conditions for Chinese cultural behavior patterns to emerge. To begin with, unlike in the other three cases, China did not possess enough material resources to morally dominate the United States. Even after entering a quasi-alliance in 1972, Beijing had very little to give to impress Washington and therefore little chance to gain the moral high ground. Neither was it willing to become a junior partner of Washington, the leader of the capitalist camp.

Thus, by empirically testing and clearly delineating its scope of relevance, Cultural Constructivism cannot only improve its explanatory power but also shed light on how the material and the cultural interact. While cultural behavior patterns always have to face material limitations, material factors are also culturally bounded. Against the Realist balance-of-power theory, China could not help but antagonize the Soviet Union during the entire 1960s. This is all the more significant, because China had a very hostile relationship with the United States during the same period of time. China's defiance of its erstwhile powerful ally, the former Soviet Union, presents a puzzle for Realism. For Cultural Constructivism, though, this only confirms the hypothesis that China's cultural behavior pattern was salient in the country's relationship with the former Soviet Union. With its fragile security capability, China dared a nuclear war against both superpowers. In this sense, it was a moment when the cultural conditioned the material. On the other hand, the material also limited the cultural, as in the case of the Sino-American relationship.

However, meso-level theories such as Cultural Constructivism should not stop at identifying a particular cultural group's behavior pattern and testing to see if that pattern also appears at a higher collective level. Instead, Cultural Constructivism is a framework applicable to the analysis of any cultural group. Recently, I have used the framework to analyze Japan – another country's foreign relations. I followed the same process as I did in the Chinese case. Beginning with a literature review of sociology and anthropology studies about Japan, I identified the dominant cultural behavior pattern in Japanese society. I then tested to see if this behavior pattern also appeared saliently in its relationship with China. Although not as conclusive as the Chinese case, my preliminary finding is that some puzzles about Japanese foreign relations can be better explained by this approach.⁴³ As expected, the Japanese people follow a very different behavior pattern from that of the Chinese.

The interesting point is not just about recognizing differences. More importantly, understanding these differences and their implications in cross-cultural interaction is of crucial importance for a range of IR questions, such as incomplete information, miscommunication, and uncertainty, to name just a few.

Conventional Constructivism departs from other IR paradigms in conceptualizing these key terms.⁴⁴ Yet, Constructivists are mainly interested in how political actors share intersubjective meanings and norms.⁴⁵ The Constructivist concept of intersubjectivity assumes a consensus-oriented nature, following the philosophical line of Berger and Luckmann.⁴⁶ In a Wendtian world, Western international society is the locus for intersubjectivity to take shape among states. But what happens in an interaction between a Western state and a non-Western state? How do states create an 'intermundane space' across their cultural boundaries?⁴⁷ For Kratochwil and Onuf, intersubjectivity and speech acts are often limited to domestic confines. This notion again presupposes sociocultural homogeneity, i.e., intersubjective meanings are to be shared among people with a homogeneous cultural background. Thus, this 'stability of social interaction' is only viable within a 'common culture' which allows its people to share a 'basis of normative order'.⁴⁸ The 'intermundane space' created through a shared visual world may not be as easy to come by when international relations in practice take place across cultural boundaries.

Taking the relationship of China and Japan, for example, I argue that the two sides often face uncertainty and misunderstandings due to a cultural fault line of intersubjectivity. Failures to communicate intentions were often born of the same interaction being interpreted differently by each side. When the Chinese voluntarily gave up their claim on war reparations from the Japanese, in 1972, they were preparing themselves for a new relationship with the Japanese; they were in it for the long haul. The cultural rationale behind Beijing's move was to seize the moral high ground vis-à-vis Japan, thereby dominating the relationship over time.⁴⁹ Without knowledge of this cultural behavior pattern, the Japanese took the Chinese move purely as goodwill. This misunderstanding was crucial, for it essentially set the basic parameters for the relationship thereafter. Based on two different cultures and assuming different rules of relationality, the two states failed to develop a solid intersubjective ground for meaningful interactions.

Yuen concurs with this point, claiming that judgment is the key in the realm of strategy, and an important aspect in judgment is pattern recognition.⁵⁰ Such recognition is often achieved intuitively. Intuition, though (at least partly) a cultural product, needs to be packaged in scientific terms. In this regard, Huang and Shih have explained Chinese intuition in language familiar in IRT. With the concept of 'balance of relationship', Huang and Shih invoked the balance of power and relational constructivism. This makes the entrance of balance of relationship to the discipline much easier.⁵¹

However, there is an important point on which I disagree with Huang and Shih. Although the two authors admit that balance of relationship is not a uniquely Chinese concept and behavior pattern,⁵² they grasp the uniqueness of Chinese relationality in terms of its intensity. Yet, each individual, no matter where they are from, lives in some kind of relationship with other group members. In other words, the Chinese do not have a more intense relation-oriented strategy than

other peoples, but only a different type of relationality. As such, what merits attention is the different cultural mechanism and behavior pattern in each type of relationality.

Indeed, I addressed this point elsewhere by comparing Japanese and Chinese relationalities at both the philosophical and behavioral levels.⁵³ Although both cultures are known for their relational characteristics, the two peoples rationalize their relations with others, behave, and expect reactions based on their own philosophical assumptions and following their cultural behavior patterns. Where the Japanese often relegate the individual to a relatively insignificant ontological status, the Chinese collectivism relies on social moral imperatives.⁵⁴

In contrast with Huang and Shih's argument, it is not that China has a more relation-oriented set of strategies than Japan does. The Chinese may emphasize the importance of key concepts such as reciprocal interaction and harmony in the human relationality,⁵⁵ but the same key concepts are also very powerful in the Japanese context. Both of these cultural groups are highly relation-oriented, only in different forms. Just as China's domestic culture may incline toward certain relational patterns in foreign relations, so may other countries'. The fact that the Chinese and the Japanese share a few key concepts in their cultures does not mean they will behave alike. And behavior is what it matters, in this discipline, for cultural studies to clean the tarnished name of bad science.⁵⁶

Cultural studies in IRT must take an additional step beyond identifying key concepts in a target cultural group's relationality to make sense empirically of each cultural relationality. I reiterate, for the reasons above, that cultural studies in IRT should make a behavioral turn in order to test hypotheses empirically and improve their explanatory power.

This being said, empirical observation must be combined with understanding of the philosophy behind each behavior pattern in order to make sense of the latter. The weakness of existing cultural studies lies in confusing analyses of either a behavior pattern without philosophical corroboration (Huang and Shih⁵⁷) or philosophical ideas without empirical behavior observation (Qin⁵⁸). Sometimes even serious researchers jump between the two levels arbitrarily, using abstract words without explanations (Pye⁵⁹). I agree with Yuen that in order to understand a country's strategic behavior we have to look directly at that country's strategic mindset and thinking. As such, the twofold approach means both the macro and meso levels are complementary. While each side's behavior in a relationship has to be subjectively interpreted, the validity of philosophical interpretation in turn has to be empirically tested in a specific relational process. This involves two sets of methodological approach, i.e., the interpretive and the relational ones.⁶⁰

Huang and Shih seem to concur with this point. They argue that in any social relationship, 'determining how threatening a condition is requires judgement', and 'different leaderships may make different judgements even under the same conditions. Therefore, balance of relationship, aside from being a system, is a skill, an attitude, and a value'.⁶¹ If judgment involves attitude and value that can

change when leadership changes, then subjective interpretation is a valid methodology to analyze judgment.

In Japan's case during the post-war era, a hierarchy-oriented philosophy has dictated the nation's subjective interpretation of the world order and its relationship with other countries. As a junior ally for the United States, Japan has been firmly committed to loyal membership of the Western liberal camp. This membership explains the country's rapid adaptation to its new identity as an ally to its erstwhile nemesis, without suffering significant psychological trauma.

Japanese foreign policy behavior in turn confirms this philosophical undertone. Contrary to Realist predictions, Japan did not show ambition to upgrade its military might commensurate with its burgeoning economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s.⁶² Loyal following Washington's leadership, Tokyo refrained from making unilateral moves in amending ties with Beijing. Identifying itself as a member of the post-war US-led hierarchy, Japan did its best to consolidate the US–Japan alliance. This understanding of world politics prohibited Japan from developing a strategic view of alliance shift, depreciating its political value in the eyes of other major powers, *inter alia* the United States. In other words, the more loyal Japan became, the more the United States took it for granted. This was clearly shown in the Nixon Shock, when in 1971 US president Richard Nixon suddenly announced that he would visit China the next year. This information reached Tokyo only shortly before the public announcement. As a result, Tokyo was left behind the then strategic development of world politics, leaving the Japanese government under enormous diplomatic pressure to quickly normalize with Beijing.⁶³

Even today, the Japanese government remains highly sensitive to its position in the international hierarchy. In his speech at the joint meeting of the US Congress in April 2015, Prime Minister Abe emphasized that his party was 'working hard to enhance the legislative foundations' to 'make the cooperation between the U.S. military and Japan's Self Defense Forces even stronger'. He also promised, '[w]e will achieve this by this coming summer'.⁶⁴ Abe's promise caused a strong reaction in Japan as it was made before reaching agreement in the Japanese Diet.

As for future tasks in this area, Asia could empirically enhance our understanding of the interplay between the ideational and the material factors in international politics. Emphasizing ideational uniqueness, cultural studies tend to fall into a trap of unfalsifiability, in which cultural ideas explain everything. Chinese culture can both prompt the country to wage wars against its neighbors and make it a peace-loving state. Ideational factors alone certainly do not explain 'how and why those ideas that make different anarchies (i.e., Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian) came to form in the first place and then spread'.⁶⁵

Vigorous empirical research would have to take both the ideational and the material into account, by analyzing 1) cultural behavior patterns under different material constraints and 2) different cultural behavior patterns under similar material constraints.

Huang and Shih empirically identified China's cultural behavior pattern in the country's intervention policy in North Korea and Myanmar. However, would China consistently show this behavior pattern under different material conditions? How would it behave vis-à-vis a larger counterpart (in terms of military and economic superiority), such as the United States? An empirical study in that area would further complement their research and shed light on the dynamic interplay between the cultural and the material.

Comparative studies of cultural behavior patterns under similar material constraints are equally important. When facing a similar situation, how would China and Japan behave differently based on their respective philosophical assumptions? This research question is particularly meaningful when we try to understand how and to what extent cultural rationalities impact bilateral interactions.⁶⁶

MICRO EMPIRICAL LEVEL

At this micro level, Asia serves as an abundant resource of empirical knowledge to enrich IRT. Area Studies and History research are particularly relevant. Existing IR theories will be corroborated if they can explain the Asian realities just as well as they can the Euro-American ones. Or if Asia deviates from existing IRT, researchers must readjust the paradigm to make sense of the Asian realities. In either case, researchers are required to grasp the reality by putting together fragments of information. Archive and library research would be a major approach. This process is a painstaking one, but it is the ground base supporting everything that would be built upon it.

However, this involves more than retrieving valuable information from a dust-covered shelf. Text and speech have to be analyzed against their context. Discourse analysis is about understanding the talk and text in context.⁶⁷ A qualified researcher would not only have to be linguistically proficient but also savvy of the larger sociocultural background of the issue at hand. I will come back to this point in the Conclusion.

CONCLUSION

Social science is a down-to-earth enterprise. This means that the primary goal of a solid piece of research work is to help make sense of a social phenomenon. Perhaps the fact that a chapter like this is being printed by a major scholarly outlet already signals the changing attitude of mainstream IRT toward minority perspectives. The situation of the discipline, however, remains deplorable. The institutionalist camp in particular is still mostly interested in building beautiful (read *parsimonious*) equation models. Yet the truth is that IRT can never be elegantly built in a laboratory vacuum. Although the academic orientation for

parsimony per se is not necessarily wrong, political science is premised on a fundamental understanding of the people involved in the political. And people are not parsimonious. They are complex. Just as indigenous philosophy and culture cannot entirely satisfy the scholarly demands of IRT, neither can institutions, legal rules, or other material factors solve all the puzzles in the discipline.

If IRT researchers are serious in exploring contributions from previously marginalized world views, they have to reach out to learn indigenous philosophy and culture in order to understand local peoples on their own terms. I have no doubt that Asia, with its diversity in every sense, serves as a fascinating frontier for IRT to make balanced progress. I also have no doubt that making such progress will be extremely challenging – challenging mostly because the mainstream scholarship has limited incentive to extend this effort to the periphery. Mainstream IRT, as in any other mainstream networks, fully exerts its influence right across academia, attracting proponents while discriminating against minority views. As a result, the mainstream maintains momentum for continuous growth, while minority views dwindle.⁶⁸

After all, how many comparative political scientists and IR theorists from established Western universities are proficient in the local language, particularly a non-European one? With a handsome research fund, they *think* they can get by without going through the painstaking process of learning and dominating a foreign language. They *think* all they have to do is to hire someone for the job of translating local materials into their native tongues. However, no translation work is ever good enough to capture the linguistic impact on the larger sociocultural context, such as perception,⁶⁹ reasoning,⁷⁰ economic behavior,⁷¹ and decision making.⁷²

Asian scholars, when introducing new ideas to IRT from their own cultural perspectives, also face a tremendous challenge, but a different kind. Although some Asian concepts might provide useful hints to capture international relations from a novel angle, they have to be presented in familiar terms in order to be accepted in mainstream IRT. As we saw, Huang and Shih made such an effort in coining the term ‘balance of relationship’, thereby effectively invoking conventional IRT ideas of balance of power⁷³ or balance of threat.⁷⁴

In addition, minority perspectives are often forced to compete with mainstream theories even when the nature of the two camps is complementary. When Constructivists first made their way to mainstream IRT, they went to great lengths to make just this point.⁷⁵ This is tantamount to first-mover advantage, raising the bar for newcomers. Providing a new theory just as sensible as an existing one would not merit attention. To enter the club, a newcomer must show how *better* it is as a competitive theory.

However, existing academia, with its vested interest in the system, has strong incentives and power to discriminate against such moves. Even creative students willing to venture in that direction might face the real pressure and ask

themselves, 'Will my dissertation supervisors like my approach? If I talk about indigenous philosophy or culture in the poli sci discipline, will they smirk and show me the way to the anthropology department'? It is hard to nurture an Asian perspective, even a well-thought one, in such an environment.

Interestingly, though, the discussion about Asian IRT, no matter how marginalized, is never exterminated. Perhaps in a Foucauldian sense, this is how power functions in a relationship between the dominant and the marginalized.⁷⁶ The mainstream IRT discourse not only dictates how researchers behave, that is, expression of their scholarly interest and choice of language in their works: more fundamentally, it is a device for generating knowledge and constituting who researchers are and what a good or bad science is.⁷⁷ For now, the least we expect is that Asia serves as a catalyst in bringing this awareness to the fore, leading to the understanding of local peoples on their own terms.

Notes

- 1 Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan. (2007) 'Conclusion: on the possibility of non-Western IR theory in Asia', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7 (3): 428–438, 427.
- 2 Ibid., 429.
- 3 This very brief literature review is drawn from a special issue of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7 (3): Amitav and Buzan, op. cit.; Qin, Yaqing. (2007) 'Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7 (3): 313–40; Inoguchi, Takashi. (2007) 'Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7 (3): 369–90.
- 4 Yuen, Derek. (2014) *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read 'The Art of War'*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 5 Tickner, Arlene and Ole Wæver. (2009) *International Relations Scholarship around the World*. London: Routledge, 336.
- 6 Liang, Shoude. (1997) 'Constructing an International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics', *Political Science* 49 (1): 23–39; Chan, Gerald. (1998) 'Toward an International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics?', *Issues and Studies* 34 (6): 1–28; Callahan, William. (2001) 'China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: Discussion of "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics"', *Journal of Contemporary China* 10 (26): 75–88.
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- 8 Yuen, op. cit., 167.
- 9 Ibid., 13.
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- 11 Yuen, op. cit., 29.
- 12 Ibid., 15.
- 13 Hart, Liddell B. H. (1967) *Strategy*. New York: Meridian.
- 14 Zhao Tingyang. (2005) *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhaxue Daolun* (The Tianxia System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of World Institution). Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
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- 16 Huang, Chiung-chiu and Chih-yu Shih. (2014) *Harmonious Intervention: China's Quest for Relational Security*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- 17 Ibid., 125–6.
- 18 Ibid., 18–20.
- 19 Yuen, op. cit., 14.
- 20 Yuen, op. cit., 116, 113–14.
- 21 Ibid., 116.
- 22 Ibid., 29.
- 23 Ibid., 17.
- 24 Ibid., 35.
- 25 Johnston, Alastair. (1995) *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 26 Yuen, op. cit., 167.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid., 172.
- 29 Ibid., 150–3, 173.
- 30 Qin, Yaqing. (2016) 'A Relational Theory of World Politics', *International Studies Review* 18 (1): 33–47.
- 31 Hagstrom, Linus. (2005) 'Relational Power for Foreign Policy Analysis: Issues in Japan's China Policy', *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (3): 395–430; Hagstrom, Linus and Karl Gustafsson. (2015) 'Japan and Identity Change: Why It Matters in International Relations', *The Pacific Review* 28 (1): 1–22; Hagstrom, Linus and Ulv Hanssen. (2015) 'The North Korean Abduction Issue: Emotions, Securitization and the Reconstruction of Japanese Identity from "Aggressor" to "Victim" and from "Pacifist" to "Normal"', *The Pacific Review* 28 (1): 71–93.
- 32 Jackson, Patrick T. and Daniel H. Nexon. (1999) 'Relations before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (3): 291–332.
- 33 Moreno was purportedly the first to bring network theory to the analysis of social science. Moreno, Jacob L. (1934) *Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations*. Washington, DC: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co.
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- 35 Garmaise, Mark J. and Tobias J. Moskowitz. (2003) 'Informal Financial Networks: Theory and Evidence', *The Review of Financial Studies* 16 (4): 1007–40.
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- 37 Malina, Roger F. (2006) 'Network Theory: Art, Science and Technology in Cultural Context', *Leonardo* 39 (4): 287–8.
- 38 Alatas, Syed Farid. (2003) 'Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences', *Current Sociology* 51 (6): 599–613; Alatas, Syed Hussein. (2000) 'Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits and Problems', *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 28 (1): 23–45.
- 39 Studies about culture in IRT have gained some attention as Constructivism has ascended to the major IR stream in this millennium. Indeed, some even say that there is no distinction between Constructivism and Strategic Culture. Instead of treating culture and policymaking as a cause–effect relationship, some recent studies think of culture as a constitutive factor in IRT. See Lantis, Jeffery. (2002) 'Strategic Culture and National Security', *International Studies Review* 4 (3): 87–113; Lock, Edward. (2010) 'Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation', *Review of International Studies* 36 (3): 685–708.
- 40 Uemura, Takeshi. (2013a) 'Understanding Chinese Foreign Relations: A Cultural Constructivist Approach', *International Studies Perspectives* 16 (3): 345–65; Uemura, Takeshi. (2013b)

- 'Understanding Sino-Japanese Relations: Proposing a Constructivist Approach in Chinese Studies', *The Journal of Contemporary China Studies* 2 (1): 95–127.
- 41 Uemura, op. cit. (2013a).
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Uemura, Takeshi. (2018) 'Philosophy, culture, and Sino-Japanese relations', in Leng Tse-kang and Rumi Aoyama Eds., *New Directions in Chinese Foreign Policy*, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 57–83.
- 44 For a detailed study of the concept of uncertainty, see Rathbun, Brian. (2007) 'Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (3): 533–57. According to the literature of incomplete information, the possibility of war increases when countries lack critical information regarding the factors that determine their counterparts' evaluation of war. Fearon, James. (1994) 'Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes', *American Political Science Review* 88 (3): 577–92; Schultz, Kenneth. (2001) *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Also see Weiss's work on audience cost in China's anti-Japanese protests: Weiss, Jessica Chen. (2014) *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protests in China's Foreign Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press. The argument here, though, is that wars and conflicts can occur even if states have complete information. The fundamental question is not whether states have complete information or how they overcome the incomplete-information problem, but how they interpret information. If culturally different states interpret the same information and events differently, such interpretational differences could cause misunderstandings between states and increase the chance of war.
- 45 Finnemore, Martha. (1996) *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Wendt, op. cit.
- 46 Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- 47 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (1968) *The Visible and the Invisible*. Alphonso Lingis trans., Claude Lefort. ed., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- 48 Parsons, Talcott. (1968) 'Interaction: Social Interaction', in D. L. Sills ed., *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, vol.7. New York: Macmillan, 492–441 (437).
- 49 Uemura, op. cit. (2013).
- 50 Yuen, op. cit., 147–9.
- 51 Huang and Shih, op. cit.
- 52 Ibid., 20.
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Beyond West and East: IR Intellectual Traditions?

Kosuke Shimizu

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline has been established based on a particular epistemology: positivism (Smith et al., 1996). Positivism claims that, like natural science, the social scientific theories grounded in it are universally applicable regardless of time and place. It argues that this epistemology can accurately explain events that occurred in the world by objectively analysing them. In the recent literature, neo-realism and neo-liberalism make typical examples. On the other hand, there is a camp called post-positivism that mainly focuses on the constitutive dimension of IR by questioning such uncritically accepted concepts as ‘power’ and ‘sovereignty’. Robert Cox’s canonical saying ‘theory is always for someone for some purpose’ beautifully illustrates what post-positivism is up against (Cox, 1981).

The epistemological debate between positivism and post-positivism dominated the IR discourse in the 1990s and came to be called the Third Great Debate of IR following the First between realism and idealism, and the Second between behaviouralism and traditionalism. The Third Great Debate had a substantial impact on IR literature, and it became fashionable to use such words as ‘epistemology’, ‘ontology’, ‘deconstruction’, ‘genealogy’, ‘structure/agency’, ‘power/knowledge’, ‘narrative/discourse/language’, and ‘textuality’ (Shapiro and Darian, 1989; Walker, 1992; Smith et al., 1996). Post-positivists argue that what is appropriate and inappropriate in IR has been decided based on the prevailing order of the Westphalian system, a state-centric idea of rationality, and is thus far from being universal or objective.

What post-positivism has created in the IR literature is the intellectual space in which it is possible for unconventional actors' stories to be narrated as if they were those of important actors; thus, it changed the agenda of IR (Devetak et al., 2007: 11). The post-positivist attack on positivism was followed by critical theory, feminism, environmentalism, post-colonialism, and constructivism. Some of these theories contended that traditional IR has been based on a rationality of a particular geographical area, namely the West, and thus it is necessary to 'provincialise' the mainstream IR (Chakrabarty, 2008). It is in this context that the recent emergence of the 'non-Western' IR discourse can be explicated and understood. The 'non-Western' discourses strive to provide alternative perceptions to the 'Western' understanding of international relations, and some of them attempt to go beyond 'the West and the rest' division (Acharya and Buzan, 2007).

These 'non-Western' discourses certainly seem to try to go 'beyond the West and East' (BWE) in one way or another; they are diverse and fluid and extremely difficult to categorise. But there seem to be at least three variants in the 'non-Western' discourse: radical, syncretic, and transcending. The radical version looks to replace the 'Western' worldview with an 'Eastern' one, the syncretic to complement the mainstream discourse of world politics by filling in the theoretical vacuum in the mainstream of IR. The transcending version looks to deconstruct the dichotomy of the 'West' and the 'East' by pointing out that the line between them is vague and fluid. This chapter introduces these three variants in detail in order to clarify the similarities and differences between them.

But why should we clarify the similarities and differences between them? It is to discover their backgrounds and purposes to develop distinctive approaches to the world and the political implications they might have for the contemporary IR literature. In order to clarify the political meanings, I will investigate the purposes and consequences of similar intellectual history in the past, mainly drawn from Japan. Indeed, critical assessments of the 'West' are not a new phenomenon and are by no means confined to the contemporary IR literature. There have been numerous similar attempts, particularly in the 1920s to 1930s. By introducing these cases, I will try to explain how they endeavoured to go BWE, and analyse their backdrops, contexts, contents, political meanings, and consequences.

CONTEXTUALISING THE 'BEYOND THE WEST AND EAST' DISCOURSES

Why are we now in need of revisiting the BWE that was developed mainly in the distant past? There are at least two reasons. First, the geopolitical conditions in the present and the 1920s–30s look similar; thus, we might well expect that the reasons for the advent of such discourses were similar too. For example, both periods witnessed the rapid decline of the hegemon of the time, the Great Britain of the inter-war period and the United States in the present. In the case of the

pre-war period, Oswald Spengler's well-known *The Decline of the West* was published in 1918, in which the overwhelming power of the British Empire was largely seen as being in the process of fading away (Spengler, 1918). E. H. Carr partly attributed the failure of the League of Nations to the decline of British power in the early 20th century (Carr, 1946). It is also a widely shared view nowadays that the US hegemon is losing its relative power over other nation-states. Some researchers see that the United States is not 'about to suddenly lose its power and influence'; however, it has 'perhaps already passed its zenith' in the broader historical context (Devetak et al., 2007: 27). In fact, Robert Keohane predicted the decline of US hegemony in the middle of the 1980s in his book *After Hegemony* (Keohane, 1984). Here, it is worth analysing what the common/different backdrops and conditions the newly emerging discourses would take.

Second, if the state of affairs in the concerned periods is indeed similar regarding the relative power of declining hegemony, then we need to contemplate what we can do in order to avoid the same consequence of the previous era – that is, the devastation of people's lives brought about by the world war. In other words, our intellectual practices should be extended to prescriptive discussion. In this case, we need to thoroughly and cautiously analyse the mechanism by which the decline of hegemony led the world to demoralising war, and this would be a prerequisite for the construction of normative theories of IR. This thorough analysis is extremely important because it is too hasty to jump to the conclusion that the decline of hegemonic power directly causes the outbreak of devastating wars. Therefore, we must historically grasp and understand in detail the way in which the circumstance directed the competing powers to confront each other. If the backdrops and conditions are not similar, then we need to make sure that world politics does not swerve from the current path and navigates itself through the stable condition. Thus, the questions to address here include 'what are the differences between the past and present?', 'how much are these differences decisive in maintaining world peace?', and 'how could we uphold the differences?'. They are by no means easy questions, yet they seem to be indispensable in providing prescriptive arguments. In any case, it is the privilege of those living in the contemporary world to learn from past human experience, and this should not be wasted.

Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the discourses of BWE in the present and past, it will be helpful to set out the types of BWE discourse in terms of their purposes. As I mentioned above, there seem to be at least three different versions of BWE discourses: radical, syncretic, and transcending. Radical BWE concentrates more on the 'West' than on transcending the 'West' and 'East' dichotomy; this is to replace the 'Western' worldview with an 'Eastern' one. Here the 'Western' worldview refers to a perception based on individualism, liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. Scholars in this camp tend to contend that the world disorder is a result of these ideas, and that the world should be reconstructed based on different norms and values, usually drawn from the

'Eastern' tradition (Zhao, 2006). The underlying assumption is that norms and values in the 'West' and 'East' are incommensurable; thus, there is no middle way, and 'Western' values should be replaced with 'Eastern' ones. Discourses of this sort deny the value of the enemy; they are usually classified as 'non-Western IRT' in the contemporary discourse.

The syncretic approach to BWE focuses more on the 'West'–'East' dichotomy than on the 'West'. It tends to assume that there are some possibilities for reconciling 'West' and 'East', and it often attempts to complement the mainstream discourse of world politics by filling in its theoretical vacuum. It takes for granted the autonomous and independent subjectivities of the 'West' and 'East'; thus, the borders between them are clear and fixed (Qin, 2016; Yan, 2011). This approach too is often referred to as 'non-Western' discourse in the current IR community.

Those who try to 'transcend' often see the 'West' and 'East' dichotomy differently by taking the 'beyond' part seriously. They see the 'West' and 'East' as cultural products that have never been fixed; and as the 'West' and 'East' dichotomy is constructed culturally, they tend to deconstruct it by pointing out that the line between the 'West' and 'East' is vague and fluid. Sometimes the 'West' is found in the 'East', and the 'East' in the 'West' (Ling, 2014), and this is sometimes referred to as 'post-Western IR' (Behera, 2007; Shani, 2008; Shimizu, 2018).

The three types of BWE can also be found in the inter-war period in Japan. This by no means suggests that the three types are peculiar to Japan; they certainly can be found elsewhere. However, the Japanese BWE literature in the 1920s and 30s is crucial for understanding contemporary IR, as Japan was one of the most advanced nations in such discourse.

THREE VERSIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY 'NON-WESTERN' IR DISCOURSES

As is well known, the contemporary IR discourse is, at least partly, characterised by the advent of 'non-Western' approaches. It includes Asian IR, African IR, post-colonialism, and so forth. Among these, the East Asian scholars are most enthusiastic in providing powerful and influential discourses (Zhao, 2006; Qin, 2011, 2016; Shih, 2012; Yan, 2011; Shih and Huang, 2013; Ling, 2014). Chinese School scholars, for instance, have developed IR theories with 'Chinese characteristics', at least partly reflecting China's 'rising'-power status in contemporary world politics (Wang, 2013). This parallels Japan in the inter-war period, which was also enjoying 'rising' status in world politics after the victories of the Sino-Japan War of 1894–5, the Russo-Japan War of 1904–5, and World War I. The Chinese school and Japan's inter-war BWE literature share a sense of responsibility for forecasting and designing the future order of world affairs. It is also worth noting that both try to promote a moral as well as a

scientific view of the world. This is because they share an understanding that the world of their times is/was dominated by self-centred economic interests and thus functioned only to promote economic growth and wealth maximisation. Consequently, they diagnose that the world totally lacks interest in the moral dimension.

The Chinese School of IR uses such interesting concepts as relationality', or *Guanxi*, in IR (Qin 2016), the Confucian *Humane Authority* of hegemony (Yan, 2011), and, most radically, the (re)introduction by Zhao Tingyang, a prominent philosopher of contemporary China, of the pre-modern concept of *Tianxia*, or all-under-heaven, to the discourse of world politics. By (re)introducing ancient Chinese philosophy and applying it to contemporary issues, Zhao argues that we should appreciate ancient Chinese thought. Unlike Western political thought, which is characterised by its exclusivist orientation against difference, *Tianxia* can be understood as inclusivist thought because of its 'flexibility and inclusiveness' (Zhao, 2006: 36). It is now attracting a wide variety of audiences, and many IR scholars have touched upon it in their arguments, whether favourably or critically (Callahan, 2008, Zheng, 2010; Chang, 2011, Cheng, 2012; Shih and Huang, 2013). It largely denies the Western approach to IR – an idea of the world Zhao sees as too concentrated on individualism and competition among individuals – replacing it with the 'holistic' view of all-under-heaven. In this sense, Zhao's contention is more about BWE than transcending the dichotomy of the 'West' and 'East'. Therefore, it is not dialectic but a replacement of the thesis with antithesis and could be called 'anti-Western' IR.

What is salient in the radical version of BWE discourses is the underlying purpose to provide an alternative world order in the age of declining US hegemony. Taking China's 'rise' as well as the decline of US hegemony as important backgrounds, the radical BWE discourses compare the two types of world order, the international and the all-under-heaven, in order to prove that the latter should be the next generation.

Qin Yaqing's more syncretic version is based on Confucianism, which is often represented by 'ripples in a lake', and provides a different perspective on the world. He argues that the world can be described in terms of subjects 'inter-connected with one another and forming concentric circles'. It is 'composed of overlapping relational circles of people linked together through differentially categorized social relationships' (Qin, 2016: 3). As a result, IR theorising becomes more contextual than rule-based and abstract. Qin emphasises in this context the concept of 'relationality' by drawing upon Mencius as well as Confucius, and he contends that employing such traditional thought is not yet popular in IR but not uncommon in such fields as business administration (Qin, 2011: 119). What is distinct in this articulation of international relations is his emphasis on the fluid and ever changing nature of actors. Actors are 'interdependently related, complementarily constructive, and mutually inclusive' (Qin, 2010: 138). This relativist and constructivist idea of actors is the most salient character of Qin's argument,

and his articulation of relationality has had a substantial impact on IR theorising in Asia, with scholarly works citing the concept of relationality succeeding one another (Paltiel, 2011; Kristensen and Nielsen, 2013; Acharya, 2016; Kavalski, 2016). Another widely regarded Chinese School intellectual, Yan Xuetong, has also introduced Confucianism to IR. By focusing upon the pre-Qin dynasty period, which he regards as being close to the contemporary inter-state system, Yan argues that hegemony must appear in the form of *wang* (human authority or true kingship): it must be founded not only on power but also on morality. This morality is sharply different from how he thinks of contemporary hegemony, which is constructed based only on power (Yan, 2011). Because of his thorough concentration on the concept of power, Yan seems to come closer to contemporary IR realism than Zhao and Qin (Kristensen and Nielsen, 2013: 22).

Like Zhao's radicalism, the approaches of Qin and Yan may seem to claim, more or less, theoretical ascendancy over the allegedly 'Western' IR. They argue that 'Asian' or 'Chinese' thought, East Asian IR in particular, provides a better explanation of contemporary world affairs. It also provides the basis for more morally oriented theories of international relations, which we are supposedly unable to find in 'Western' mainstream discourses. However, Qin and Yan are more likely to promote a collaboration between the 'West' and 'East' by adding a neglected dimension to the existing literature. It seems that they are more concerned with the reconciliation of the 'West' and 'East' than going 'beyond' them. Qin, for example, contends that the relation-based governance of China is equally important to the rule-based governance of the 'West'. The issue is not about which is correct or appropriate but about the ways to achieve balance between them and to maintain it (Qin, 2011: 119). In fact, Qin's focus is more on East Asian IR or Chinese foreign policies than on world affairs in general. Thus, his approach is not to replace the 'Western' style of IR or to 'transcend' the 'West' and 'East' dichotomy but to find a way towards a more 'synthetic approach' (Qin, 2011). Similarly, Yan states that one of the purposes of his book of ancient Chinese thought is 'to enrich current international relations theory, to deepen understanding of international political realities, and to draw lessons for policy today' (Yan, 2011, 199). Again, Yan's intention is not to provide a counter argument to mainstream IR. It is rather to 'develop a new theory based on combining pre-Qin thought and contemporary international relations theory, rather than to use pre-Qin thought as a basis for creating a new theory to replace contemporary international relations theory' (Yan, 2011: 200).

Plurality is the main concern of the syncretic approach in this context. As the world is pluralising, with the emergence of China and Russia as actors challenging the US-based international order, syncretic scholars foresee a multi-centred world. In this world, Qin argues that by focusing on relationality of IR one may have different relationships with different actors. Even if the UK has a relationship with another civilised nation on the basis of reciprocity, it may have a far less reciprocal relationship with a non-civilised, 'barbaric' nation. In other

words, there is no pre-given universal standard of relations among actors, such as international laws or treaties: all are contextual and there are ‘no absolute norms’ (Qin, 2016: 220).

Plurality is also the focus of Amitav Acharya’s ‘Global IR’. Acharya argues that IR as an academic field has been dominated by the Western/US intellectuals. Thus, what is needed is to critically reassess the dominant position of realism, and introduce dialogues of civilisations. This will ‘pave the way to a Multiplex World in which non-Western actors may find greater voice’ (Acharya, 2016: 7). This is not ‘to displace but subsume existing IR and enrich it with infusion of ideas and practices from the non-Western world’ (Acharya, 2016: 6)

As well as the Chinese School and Global IR scholars, L. M. H. Ling’s introduction of Daoism into IR is also worth mentioning here. Ling’s argument is, however, not to replace or enrich the Western IR: it is to question the ‘West’ and ‘East’ dichotomy itself and, therefore, to go BWE. Ling argues that by taking ‘Chinese dialectics’, particularly *yin/yang* dialectics, seriously we can see the world differently. In *yin/yang* dialectics, two oppositional poles are not strictly demarcated: we can find *yang* in *yin*, and *yin* in *yang*. Thus, the border is always unfixed and changing. This form of dialectics is extremely important in developing a prescriptive argument of international relations (Ling, 2013: 559–60). In fact, in Daoist dialectics, the world is no longer characterised by the Hobbesian state of nature with ‘individuated states competing murderously for survival’ (Ling, 2013: 566), which the mainstream IR discourses often take for granted. Ling argues that ‘world politics under Daoist dialectics operates as an organic entity filled with hybridities, whose complicities and complementarities proliferate despite, and sometimes because of, the conflicts and contradictions between polarities’ (Ling, 2013: 566). Thus, the world in this approach is not a place stuffed with continuous confrontations and conflicts but contains several other possibilities (Ling, 2013; 2014).

Yet Ling’s purpose for introducing Daoist dialectics into IR is more fundamental than this. Rather than taking methodology as the point of analysis, Ling questions the ontological presumption of the mainstream IR, which is largely constructed on a series of dichotomies such as West/East and US/China, and uses Daoist dialectics in order to destabilise them. This approach is determinedly critical of the IR literature in general, including radical and syncretic BWE discourses, and the ontology of the dichotomy in particular, and consciously strives to go ‘beyond’ them. In other words, Ling invites a more inclusive approach to world affairs by questioning the privileged status of geo-political actors such as ‘West’ or ‘Japan’ and opening up a space for gender, race, and economic disparity. As a result, nation-states are no longer the only or main actors in IR: ordinary citizens, refugees, victims of sexual violence, and those living in or close to battlefields or military bases, for example, are too. In this sense, approaches of this sort can be named ‘post-Western’ or even ‘post-IR’.

The following section of the chapter will introduce arguments similar to the above-mentioned discourses regarding ‘West’ and ‘East’ but from Japanese intellectuals in the inter-war period. My aim is to investigate their backdrops, developments, and consequences in order to understand the political meanings of contemporary BWE discourses.

REPLACING THE ‘WEST’ IN HISTORY

The most radical approach to the ‘West’ and ‘East’ dichotomy in Japanese intellectual history can be found in the inter-war period. ‘Most radical’ here means, like Zhao in the case of the contemporary IR literature, an approach undertaking to replace the ‘Western’ intellectual hegemony with an alternative worldview constructed upon alleged ‘Eastern’ wisdoms, with an assumption of the incommensurability and impossibility of reconciliation of the ‘West’ and ‘East’. Shumei Okawa was one of those radical philosophers in pre-war Japan. Okawa was born in 1896 in Yamagata prefecture. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, he started his career as a political activist and later became a lecturer at Takushoku and Hosei universities. He regularly gave lectures and became well known for his enthusiastic political support for the imperial government. In fact, Okawa was the only civilian who was prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial, in 1946, although he was later released due to his alleged psychological disorder.

Okawa published a substantial number of books and articles, many on Japan’s confrontation with the ‘West’. A very interesting fact is that he supported the Indian nationalist movement. He had a close relationship with their members and sometimes invited them to Japan. Okawa was under the profound influence of Tenshin Okakura, whose famous saying ‘Asia as one’ still has power over Asianists even today, and inherited the concept of ‘spirituality’ from him. Okawa’s commitment to ‘spirituality’ became the foundation of his thought. He repeatedly contended that the materialistic imperialism of the ‘West’ and spiritual moralism of Japan would inevitably clash soon; thus, all Japanese must prepare for it (Sato and Okawa, 2012: 203/5269).

Okawa’s discourse of confrontation between the ‘West’ and ‘East’ is largely characterised by what we now call the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (Huntington, 1996). As Okawa presupposed the incommensurability of the ‘West’ and ‘East’, the clash between them appeared to him to be inevitable. In this context, he used the national flags of Japan and the United States as metaphors for each nation’s characteristics, depicting Japan as day – the sun – and the United States as night – the stars. As day and night cannot simultaneously reside with each other, Okawa maintains, the relationship between Japan and the United States is impossible to reconcile. However, this was not a state of affairs that the Japanese should regret or grieve. The Japanese should rather think of this to be an ideal, in a sense that

the clash would lead us to a new phase of world history (Sato and Okawa, 2012: 203–9/5269). In fact, a contemporary literary critic, Takeuchi Yoshimi, read Okawa's intention in his argument for Asia to save the world from a weakening Europe by establishing moral subjectivity (Takeuchi, 2002).

Okawa's logic was straightforward and easy to understand. This is because his logic of the clash of civilisations was constructed on easy dichotomies such as the 'West' and 'East', materialism and spirituality, day and night, and so forth. Okawa's argument parallels contemporary radical non-Western IR literature in that both claim the West is characterised by a lack of morality and the non-West is a representation of it. However, Okawa was missing those who were living outside of the dichotomies. For instance, Matsumoto Kenichi, a contemporary historian of Japan's inter-war period, argues that Okawa's total lack of attention to China is what is most shocking in his articulation of US–Japan relations. Matsumoto argues that the clash was not between a moral nation based on spirituality and an imperial nation based on materialism: it was rather between two imperialist nations who were simply competing with each other over the colonisation of China for their national interests (Matsumoto, 2006). Similarly, Takeuchi points out that the weakest point in Okawa's political argument is his ignorance of the revolution of China in 1911. Takeuchi infers that Okawa saw the revolution as an importation of Western ideology and that this was why he did not show any interest in the revolution and never became aware of ordinary Chinese citizens' hope for democracy (Takeuchi, 2002: 2912/4320). Okawa not paying attention to China was typical of the discourses of confrontation. Too much concentration on the parties of the dichotomy leads researchers to focus only on the parties' differences and blinds them to the world outside the dichotomised camps.

Another example of the discourse of the incommensurability of the 'West' and 'East' is the Kyoto School's 'philosophy of world history'. The Kyoto School is perhaps the only Japanese philosophical school that has had a worldwide recognition, for its existentialist philosophy, and it became well known in the inter-war period among ordinary citizens in Japan as well as philosophers and intellectuals abroad. The school's prominent philosophers, Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime, had disciples including Nishitani Keiji, Kosaka Masaaki, Koyama Iwao, Suzuki Sigetaka, Miki Kiyoshi, and Tosaka Jun. Nishitani, Kosaka, Koyama, and Suzuki are usually regarded as right-wingers or conservative scholars, while Miki and Tosaka were renowned Marxists. Unlike the pure philosophical discourse of the School, based on their version of existentialism, the 'philosophy of world history' is outspokenly and straightforwardly political.

Nishida Kitaro was born in Kanazawa prefecture in 1870 and graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. After he resigned from his teaching job in Yamaguchi prefecture, he took up a position at Kyoto Imperial University and developed his existentialist philosophy. He was, and still is, said to be the only world-class Japanese philosopher, and he is often compared to Heidegger even now. However, like Heidegger with Nazism, Nishida is infamous for his involvement with the

imperial government of Japan, to which I will return shortly. Nishida's numerous books and articles appear in the series of his collected works, which consists of more than 20 volumes.

A typical example of the discourse of the incommensurability of the 'West' and 'East' is Nishida's infamous article 'The Principle of the New World Order'. It is a manuscript prepared for Prime Minister Tojo's speech to the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Conference in 1943. The conference was to disguise Japan's aggressive expansion over the Asian continent with a harmonious cooperative tone in the presence of the leaders of pro-Japan Asian nations. Although Nishida wrote the declaration with some sympathy towards peoples in Asia, it was largely coloured by confrontation between the 'West' and 'East'. Although he died before the end of the war, Nishida was continuously accused of support for the imperial government in the post-war period, and his existentialist philosophy has been compromised for Japanese as well as overseas intellectuals ever since.

While the 'Principle' article was filled with suggestions and advice for the imperial government to promote the coexistence of Asian peoples with a multiculturalist tone, based on Nishida's Buddhist faith, its articulation of the 'West' and 'East' was inevitably confrontational, as the 'Principle' article was drafted after World War II broke out. Like Okawa, Nishida regarded the war against the United States as history-defining. He stated: 'long ago, just as the victory of Greece in the Persian War determined the direction of the development of European culture up to this day, so the current East-Asian war may determine a direction for world history to come' (Nishida, 1996: 19). His theory was mainly constructed on the perception that competition among imperial nations had led the League of Nations, based on the abstract and universalised idea of liberalism, to a destiny of absorption and abuse. This was reified in the UK and US colonisation of Asia. Japan, with the Imperial household as a representation of spiritual superiority and the ideal of *hakko ichiu* (eight corners under one roof), must defeat 'Western' imperialism, Nishida declared. As he explained: 'what I mean by "formative globalism" contrasts with Anglo-American imperialism and federalism which colonise others; it represents the globalism of "eight corners, one world", founded upon the Royal Spirit [*kodo seishin*]' (Nishida, 1996: 20). Nishida saw that abstract federalism was in reality the flip side of imperialism; therefore, Nishida maintained, the world based on Japan's spirituality must replace the world of imperialism. In this way, like Okawa, Nishida constructed his 'beyond the West' political argument with an assumption of the incommensurability and superiority of the Japanese spirit.

Nishida's disciples in the Kyoto School, who are infamous for their close association with the navy, similarly declared, in the roundtable called 'overcoming modernity' after the outbreak of the World War II, that 'the Great East War [*daitoasen*: the Pacific War] is a representation of overcoming the practice of European domination'. In criticising European imperial powers, they often attributed the cause to 'modernity', which in their understanding consisted

of 'democracy in politics, liberalism in ideas, and capitalism in economy' (Kawakami et.al., 1979: 176). It is worth noting here that this type of discourse was not dominant in the 1920s in Japan when the liberal international order was prevalent; however, it became evident immediately before World War II, and, in fact, many of the publications of the Kyoto School with a confrontational tone were written in the 1930s and 1940s.

Like Okawa, Nishida and the Kyoto School philosophers were blind to the plight of peoples in the areas colonised by Japan. While their version of the new world order was illuminated by the abstract ideas of world history, there was no reference to the lives of those under Japan's colonial rule. The Kyoto School's experiences seem to confirm our assumption that too much concentration on the dichotomised and confrontational ontology of the 'West' and 'East' hides from the eyes of intellectuals the lives of those on the margins who suffer the most from the confrontation.

What these scholars have in common is the stability of subjectivity. Like the contemporary literature of non-Western IR, these scholars assumed that Japan, for example, existed prior to the confrontation with the 'West'. It was presumed to have been present for a long time in history, and its core was consistently maintained despite the Kyoto School's existentialist philosophy, which clearly claimed that the subject is established only in relation to others. In other words, the subject is constructed in relationality in the moment of the encounter with the other. This ontological inconsistency in fact allowed Okawa, Nishida, and the Kyoto School philosophers to depict the world in the competing and confrontational manner assumed by the realism of contemporary IR.

SYNCRETISATION WITH *BUSHIDO*

Bushido (chivalry) is one of the Japanese words that attracts many IR scholars abroad. Usually, it is closely associated with Nitobe Inazo, who used it to try to promote reconciliation of the 'West' and 'East'. Nitobe was born in Iwate prefecture in 1862 and studied at Sapporo Agricultural College. He taught colonial studies at Kyoto Imperial University and Tokyo Imperial University; he later became a diplomat and was appointed as one of the under-secretaries general of the League of Nations in 1920. The books he published were, interestingly, mostly written in English for an audience abroad in order to promote mutual understanding of Japan and the 'West', which, he thought, would contribute to the further development of human civilisation (Nitobe, 1904).

In the preface of his well-known book *Bushido*, Nitobe stated that during his long stay in the United States, he was asked several times about the high morality of the Japanese despite their atheist attitudes. To Nitobe, it was very much obvious that Japanese moral conduct mainly came from their feudal tradition of *bushido*. What, then, does *bushido* consist of? *Bushido*, Nitobe argued, came

from several different sources, including Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and indigenous Shintoism; *bushido*... is the code of moral principles which the knights were required or instructed to observe' (Nitobe, 1904: 101/1414). Later in the book, Nitobe explained in detail the principles and maxims of *bushido*, which include 'rectitude', 'courage', 'benevolence', 'politeness', 'veracity', and 'duty of loyalty' (Nitobe, 1904).

Throughout the book, Nitobe developed his argument based on an assumption that the 'West' and 'East' division was commensurable and reconcilable. While he admitted that European and US intellectuals had regarded the 'East' as inferior to the 'West', the division itself was an illusion. He stated that 'far from their never meeting, the East and the West are always and everywhere meeting'. Therefore, he maintained that 'the partition of the East and the West' is 'only artificial' at best (Nitobe, 2011: 89). Underlying this statement was his firm commitment to civilisation and universality. Here Nitobe saw the possibility of combining Protestantism and his understanding of *bushido*. In his generation, it was not uncommon to connect *bushido* to newly imported Christianity. His contemporary Kanzo Uchimura writes: '*Bushido* is the best product of Japan... putting Christianity onto the base of *bushido* would generate the best product of the world, and this will save not only Japan, but the entire humanity' (Uchimura, 1981: 393). In order to achieve the goal of a universally applicable morality and ethics regardless of nation or race, Nitobe emphasised the importance of education. The 'West' and 'East' were narrated as completely separate sites of identities, but Nitobe denounced the nationalist education that was in ascendancy in every nation at that time to recover the unity of humanity (Nitobe, 2011: 95).

No one would deny that Nitobe was one of the earliest and most prominent 'internationalists' of Japan. He spent his entire life dedicated to the reconciliation of the 'West' and 'East'. However, like those who subscribe to the confrontational ontology of the 'West' and 'East', Nitobe's enthusiasm for reconciliation between the 'West' and 'East' blinded his eyes to those who were on the margins. For example, in introducing Japan to the 'Western' audience, Nitobe described the Ainu people, the indigenous population of Japan, as 'pigmy', 'uncivilised', and 'hirsute', who had 'not yet emerged from the Stone Age, possessing no art beyond a primitive form of horticulture, being ignorant even of the rudest pottery' (Nitobe, 2009: 86–7). Similarly, he found the Korean population the embodiment of 'unhealthiness' and went on to say that their habits of life are 'habits of death'. Because of this, he bluntly said that it might be hundreds of years before colonial people could attain a level of evolution commensurate with civilisation (Weiner, 1994: 27).

This tendency to neglect the marginalised is not limited to Nitobe among 'internationalists'. Shumpei Goto, the most admired governor of Taiwan, and Tadao Yanaihara, the father of Japanese IR and a disciple of Nitobe's, made statements in which they advocated the mutual understanding and the collaboration of the 'West' and 'East' while confirming the colonial rule of Japan over those they

regarded as being ‘less civilised’ peoples, in Korea, Taiwan, and other areas (Kan, 1996). Matsumoto argues that the tendency of alleged liberal internationalists to be ignorant of the two different systems – the international community, a system of equality among ‘civilised’ nations, and the system of exploitation based on domination of ‘uncivilised’ areas – was due to the widespread perception that ‘expansionist nations are the civilized nations’ and ‘nations without colonies are not civilized by definition’ (Matsumoto, 2010: 390/1978).

A similar idea can be found in Nishida Kitaro’s philosophical discourse of culture. As noted above, while Nishida’s political writings came close to the non-Western IR discourse, his philosophical writings were quite different. He published a number of books and articles throughout his life, in which he tried to transcend the ‘West’ and ‘East’ division philosophically. His *Nihon Bunka no Mondai* (The Problem of Japanese Culture) is probably the best-known work in this context (Nishida, 1966a). In the book, Nishida contended that there were common fundamental elements in ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ cultures. He used the metaphor of giraffes and whales: they are both mammals although they look completely different. Giraffes have long necks and live in the savannah, while whales do not seem to have necks and spend their entire lives in oceans. However, giraffes and whales (and other mammals) have a common feature: their cervical spine consists of seven bones. In fact, almost all mammals have seven bones in their necks – and Nishida insisted that we must find the universal foundation underneath different cultures by digging deep into each (Nishida, 1966a: 282).

I suppose that we could fully understand the Western culture by digging deep into it, and digging into the Eastern culture even deeper so that we can grasp a different direction from the Western culture, then we might clarify the wide and deep essence of the entire humanity. This is not to deny Western culture by an Eastern one or deny Eastern culture by a Western one. Neither is it to absorb one into the other. Rather, through discovering the deeper and bigger underlying, both (‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ cultures) will be illuminated by a new light. (Nishida, 1966b: 391)

Nishida had a sort of liberal universalist perception of the world. He believed that there is some ‘essence’ common in humanity regardless of the ‘West’ and ‘East’. This common essence is the deep root from which all cultures originate.

I think my intention is to find an origin of human culture.... [Even though there are different cultures in the world] we can reveal a deep essence of the human culture by comparing different cultures and mutually complementing each other. I am not sure how significant Eastern culture currently is.... However, it is not acceptable that the development of Eastern culture absorbs the Western culture or the Western culture absorbs the Eastern. Nor is it that East and West remain distant from each other. We should rather see them as two branches of the same tree. They are physically apart but the same in the root. It is impossible to imagine the world culture without finding a deep root from which both of the cultures emanate. (Nishida, 2007: 35)

By conveying his idea of the ‘West’ and ‘East’, Nishida was neither supporting one against the other nor encouraging the clash between them. In this context,

he was in search of a way for making the 'West' and 'East' commensurable, and he firmly believed that the key resided in the depths of each culture. However, again, he was too much concerned with the 'West' and 'East' dichotomy, and his articulation was practicably controlled by independent, autonomous, and sovereign existences. What he missed, of course, were those living in neither the 'West' nor the 'East', of whom he makes no mention. Neither can we find in Nishida's articulation of cultures anyone on the margins of the sites, such as the Ainu people, the Okinawans, or those living under the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism. A common feature of the discourse seems to be that those on the margins or outside of the dichotomised concepts do not get sufficient attention and are largely omitted from the concern of commensurability and reconciliation.

Again, Nitobe and Nishida uncritically accepted the pre-given ontology. While they firmly believed in the commensurability of the 'West' and 'East', they were unaware of how they constructed them on the basis of colonialism. The dialogue they supported was among the 'civilised' nations, not with the colonised peoples. Their liberal perception towards the world ironically blinded them to the power relations which every moment were actually constructing the identities of the 'civilised', because, for them, that Japan and the Western countries were civilised nations was a fact.

BEYOND THE WEST AND EAST WITH THE 'POST-WESTERN'

Attempts to truly go BWE do not seem to have as long a tradition in Japan as the confrontational or commensurability and reconciliation discourses. It is, in fact, a very demanding task to find an argument which promotes transcending the 'West' and 'East' division in international politics, similar to what is called the 'post-Western' in the contemporary IR discourse (Behera, 2007; Shani, 2008). However, some of them appeared in the form of severe critiques of the 'West' and 'East', or the 'West' and Japan', a dichotomy that was prevalent in the intellectual life of the time. Interestingly, they can be found in discourses of the extreme left and extreme right: those of Tosaka Jun and Kita Ikki.

One of the most severe critics of government policies based on the easy dichotomy of 'West' and 'East' or 'West' and 'Japan', Tosaka Jun was also a member of the Kyoto School. While Nishida and his disciples are widely regarded as the conservative branch of the School, no one would disagree that Tosaka was its most progressive scholar. Tosaka was born in 1900 in Tokyo and studied at Kyoto Imperial University. He was by one year the junior of Miki Kiyoshi, another well-known leftist scholar of the School, and he followed Miki's path (Shimizu, 2015).

Tosaka was interested in physics in his high-school days, but he was inspired by the Kyoto School philosophy and decided to choose it as the next stage of his intellectual life. Tosaka studied under the supervision of Tanabe Hajime,

Nishida's closest colleague, and later turned to Marxism. He was arrested for an alleged violation of the Peace Preservation Law and died in prison right before the end of World War II.

Tosaka was probably the harshest critic of the Japanese government at the time, and his writings were mainly concerned with current affairs. His political works were coloured with a historical-materialist tone, which shows that he had a very strong antagonism to capitalism and imperialism. Tosaka severely criticised the prevalent 'spirituality' theorem of Japan in contrast with the 'materialist West'. He stated:

The discourse that Asia is spiritual and therefore Asianism is spiritualism means that Asianism was a mere extension of Japanese spiritualism. That is the reason why there are such bizarre expressions as 'Japan-Asianism'. However, Japan is obviously not equal to Asia as a whole, and the advocates must find a way to expand Japanese spiritualism to Japan-Asianism. The solution is simple. Japan expands itself territorially to the entire East – Asia as a whole. They declare Japan to be the leader of the East and Asia, and this is the strategy and philosophy of Great Asianism. (Tosaka, 1935: 1874/5586)

Tosaka accurately found the cause of Japan's imperialist expansion embedded in the dichotomy between the 'West' and 'East'. This dichotomy was closely tied to that of 'materialism and spiritualism'. Tosaka contended that it was the series of dichotomies that constructed the 'reality' of the 'East' (Tosaka, 1935: 1849/5586). However, he maintained that the 'reality' based on the 'West' and 'East' was a product of the 'world of meanings' (Tosaka, 1935: 2790/5586). This inter-subjective world produces 'metaphysical and ideational theories', which Tosaka regarded as being detached from people's everyday lives. In this context, Tosaka criticised Nishida's philosophy in that Nishida's ontology only tried to find the way in which being 'can be made sense of', not what being actually 'is'. For Tosaka, Nishida appeared interested only in the 'category' of being, not being itself (Tosaka, 1935: 3100/5586). In fact, Nishida's articulation of Japan only made sense in contrast to non-Japan: the 'West'. In other words, Nishida had no methodology to look into what Japan is without putting it into a series of dichotomies, and this was the reason why Nishida's political writings, which were supposedly an application of his existentialist philosophy, were coloured with the confrontation between the 'West' and 'East'.

What characterised Tosaka's writings was his critical attitude to 'Japan' and the 'East'. He not only criticised the 'West' for its ethnocentric thought embedded in the imperialist expansion of territory: he also severely criticised the 'self' of Japan. This self-critical attitude seems to be one of the important elements in contemplating the discourses of the 'beyond'. A similar attitude is found in the work of Kita Ikki, a far right thinker of the inter-war period. Usually, Kita is regarded as one of the agitators of the war against the United States, and indeed he instigated the rise of the military against the corrupt government and was executed for ideological leadership of the military coup d'état on February 26, 1937. Kita was one of the most unpopular thinkers in the post-war period.

For instance, Maruyama Masao called Kita a ‘right wing unemployed *samurai*’ (*uyoku ronin*), and Takeuchi called him a ‘mere nationalist’ (Matsumoto, 2010: 135/1978).

Kita was born in 1883 in Niigata prefecture and later studied at Waseda University. He published a controversial book entitled *Kokutairon oyobi Junsei Shakaishugi* (Theory of National Polity and Pure Socialism) in 1909, which was banned immediately after publication, and he was placed under police surveillance. Kita was seriously committed to the liberation of the Asian population from imperialist oppression, and, in fact, he travelled to China to participate in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. It was his commitment to collaboration among Asian citizens that prevented him from being caught up with the easy discourses of confrontation or collaboration with other imperial nations, and he consequently went BWE.

Kita had a strong antipathy to the populist politics of his time, often represented by such prime ministers as Okuma Shigenobu and Konoe Fumimaro. In 1915, after defeating Germany in northern China in World War I, Okuma demanded China conclude an unequal treaty called the ‘Twenty-One Demands’, by which Japan tried to enforce greater control over Manchuria and China, and prohibited China from giving coastal concessions to other foreign nations without the consent of Japan. The Chinese people responded in the form of a nationwide protest, in which Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong participated as students, boycotting Japanese products (Matsumoto, 2010: 458/1978).

Kita did not hide his strong disagreement with the unreasonable Demands. He foresaw their disastrous consequences – that is, the direct clash of Japan and the United States. Kita argued that the United States and China had a close relationship even before the Demands. Forcing China to accept the Demands would encourage China to promote its relationship with the United States, and Japan would be eventually attacked from both sides (Matsumoto, 2010: 507/1978). Here we can see the relationality discourse regarding ontology. For Kita, ‘China’ was not a pre-given: it was rather in a process of construction, and relationality was an imperative element in this construction.

But Kita was against the Demands not only because he thought they would have devastating consequences for Japan. He was also sincerely committed to the liberation of China. It may sound amazing that Kita, a blunt right-wing activist, maintained a pro-China attitude throughout his life. However, his target was solely European imperialist nations and their exploitation of the Asian population. He even proposed a collaborative project between Japan and the United States to help China develop its economy, and Kita thought that this collaboration would also prevent the direct clash of Japan and the United States (Matsumoto, 2010: 519/1978).

Similarly, Kita insisted in dealing with the Korean people as equal to the Japanese. Although he regarded Korea as a part of Japan, Kita was against any type of discrimination against Koreans. Kita argued that there was no difference

between Koreans and Japanese in terms of ethnicity or cultural heritage. The only differences he could see were language and customs. Therefore, Kita contended that Koreans should be given the right to vote for their own governance as well as for the Japanese parliament (Kita, 2014: 912–82/1886).

In general, Kita saw the Japan of his day as too immature to compete with other imperialist nations. Kita thought that without a rational and objective perception towards the world, Japan had no way to survive. For Kita, conceiving the world only in terms of the ‘West’ and ‘East’ confrontation was immoral in the sense that it ignored the plight of Asian citizens and ended up justifying Japan becoming one of the imperialist exploiters. His self-critical attitude to Japan was the key to understanding his strong political stance against imperial domination.

What unites Tosaka and Kita is their determined attention to the peoples on the margins and the consequent self-criticism of Japan. Because Tosaka was more concerned with the political-economic structure of capitalism and with thinking of the world in terms of capitalist domination of people’s everyday lives, he maintained his critical attitude not only towards the ‘West’ but also towards the ‘East’. Similarly, Kita’s firm commitment to people’s liberation in Asia never failed to prevent him from seeing the world only in terms of the ‘West’ and ‘East’ dichotomy. He maintained throughout his life a critical political stance to both the ‘West’ and ‘East’ and tried to go BWE.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I introduced different ‘non-Western’ discourses in order to clarify the way to go BWE. To reiterate, there are at least three interpretations of BWE: one is to go ‘beyond the West’, the other is to stick to ‘West’ and ‘East’, and the third is to go ‘BWE. The first discourse is characterised by its subversive character, arguing that ‘Eastern’ values will do better than ‘Western’ ones in constructing a new world order. The second discourse contends that the ‘East’ will complement the theoretical incompleteness of the ‘West’ and contribute to a more stable world order. The third argues that the discourses of the ‘West’ and ‘East’ are misleading in the sense that they ignore everyday people’s lives on the margins. In order to make the lives of ordinary citizens safe and stable, they argue, we have to transcend the ‘West’ and ‘East’ confrontation.

My focus was mainly directed on Japanese intellectuals in the inter-war period. However, there are certainly more examples from across the world in the same period. For example, Cemil Aydin provides a comparative study of Turkey and Japan in the inter-war period showing that Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism appeared almost at the same time (Aydin, 2007). And more historical studies on BWE would be welcome. By comprehending what happened in the pre-war period in the ‘rest’ of the world regarding the dichotomy of the ‘West’ and ‘East’, we would obtain a more accurate picture of our contemporary world.

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PART II

Themes



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East Asian Migrations: An Overview

Tony Fielding

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces, and reflects upon, internal and international migrations in the East Asian region. East Asia is defined as being composed of three large sub-regions: 1) Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Timor Leste, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines); 2) ‘China plus’ (China PRC, including Hong Kong and Macao, plus Taiwan and Mongolia); and 3) Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea and the Russian Far East). The main emphasis is on contemporary migration flows, and the chapter draws heavily upon the 2009–11 round of population censuses, but the main migration events of the long post-World War II period are also included. The principal analytical focus is on describing and explaining the migration flows, but the consequences of migration – political, economic, cultural and demographic – also receive attention. To make sense of a very complex reality, the chapter selects material from a wider publication (Fielding, 2016) and adds a summary map of the main migration flows (Figure 8.1) and a conclusion which explores the distinctiveness of East Asian migration flows relative to those in other parts of the world.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN MIGRATION FLOWS IN EAST ASIA SINCE ABOUT 1990

The picture presented in Figure 8.1 is complex, but it still represents a summary of the main migration flows only; had all the flows that figure in the literature been included, it would have been even more complicated!




Figure 8.1 An overview of internal and international migration flows in the East Asian region 1990–2015

Let us proceed from south to north. Indonesia is a country of net emigration with major flows to the Gulf States, to Malaysia and Singapore and to the high-income countries of Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). It also has important internal migration flows, mostly away from Java and Madura towards the northwest (Sumatra and the environs of Singapore), north to Kalimantan and east towards Papua, but also centripetal ones towards Jakarta and the capital-city region. Singapore is a city-state dominated by net immigration; its migrants come from nearby countries in Southeast Asia (notably Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) but also from Northeast Asia, China PRC, the Indian subcontinent and beyond. It sends migrants all over the world but, like Malaysia, especially to Australia. Malaysia is also a major country of immigration, with most of these migrants coming from Southeast Asia (including the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar) but also from the Indian subcontinent (especially Bangladesh). East Malaysia (especially Sabah) is the destination for many migrants from Indonesia and the Philippines. Thailand is a significant country of emigration, with flows to Malaysia and Singapore, to Northeast Asia and to Western countries. It is even more so now a country of immigration, especially from Myanmar but also from Laos and Cambodia. Its internal migration flows are very important; they consist largely of flows from the northeast and north towards Bangkok and major tourist resorts. Myanmar, along with Laos, Cambodia and Singapore, receives new migrants (*Xin jimin*) from China PRC and is the source of refugee flows to Thailand and Bangladesh. Vietnam is the origin for migration flows to Southeast Asia (Singapore and Malaysia), to Northeast Asia (Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) and to Western countries (especially the United States). Internal migration flows are largely north to south (and especially to Ho Chi Minh City) but include also the migrations associated with the opening up of the Central Highlands. Finally, the international migrations of the Philippines will not be discussed here because they are dealt with in the next section; internal migration rates are high, especially towards the Manila capital-city region and within Mindanao.

Massively dominating 'China plus' are the internal migrations within China PRC from the interior provinces towards the coastal ones; the destination of many of these flows in the south of the country is the Pearl River Delta region, centred on Guangzhou; in the centre it is Shanghai and the lower Yangtze; and in the north it is Beijing/Tianjin. Also important are the more local flows within provinces, usually towards the provincial capital cities, and the long-distance ones westwards to Xinjiang. However, China PRC is also a country of international migration, emigration especially to North America, Europe, Australasia and now Africa, as well as to Taiwan (the *waishengren*) and Hong Kong, and immigration to Shanghai and Beijing. Hong Kong has become a major destination for migrants from Southeast Asia, especially from the Philippines. Taiwan sends migrants to southern China PRC (notably businessmen: the *Taishang*) but also to Western countries and now to Shanghai. It receives many migrants from Southeast Asia.

South Korea and Japan also have major immigration flows from Southeast Asia, but in both cases these are matched or exceeded by flows of 1) co-ethnics, from China PRC (*joseonjok*) and Central Asia (*koryo-saram*) in the case of South Korea, and from Latin America (*nikkeijin*) in the case of Japan; and 2) non-co-ethnic migrants from China PRC. Both countries have major flows of internal migrants (mostly young adults) from provincial areas to their capital-city regions (Seoul and Tokyo respectively), and both countries lose young adults to Western countries (North America, Europe and Australasia). North Korea has very limited internal migration, no immigration to speak of and very little emigration (apart from those who risk migrating to China PRC). The Russian Far East receives a net inflow of migrants from China PRC but loses far more through net internal migration to central and western Russia.

It would obviously take more space than is available in this chapter to explore all of these migration flows in detail, explaining their causes, characteristics and consequences. Instead, three cases have been selected: the first is located in Southeast Asia, the second in 'China plus' and the third in Northeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION – THE CASE OF EMIGRATION FROM THE PHILIPPINES

The first selection from the wider text refers to the important case of international migration to and from the Philippines (Fielding, 2016: 83–92). The Philippines is the big story of Southeast Asian international migration. This is so not just because the numbers are enormous (8.6 million Filipinos were working overseas in 2009) and the proportion of those of Filipino descent living abroad is extraordinarily high (thought to be about 20% of the current resident population of the Philippines of 96.5 million), or even because the Philippines government is uniquely active in promoting emigration, but because the Philippines case raises very important theoretical issues about the economic, social and political effects of migration. In particular, this case sits uncomfortably with the current fashion to see international migration as a 'win, win, win' process. According to this view, migration produces 1) gains for the receiving country through the supply of cheap labour in the form of hard-working young adults to solve difficult and costly recruitment problems; 2) gains for the migrants themselves through improvements in their living standards and future prospects; and 3) gains for the sending country in reducing unrest and unemployment, in raising income in the form of remittances and through investment by returnees who are seen as 'heroic' agents of modernization. At the start of the post-World War II period, the prospects for prosperity and development were higher in the Philippines than they were for any other Southeast Asian country. But now the country is not far from being the poorest, most unequal, most conflict-ridden society in the region. This is despite the vast wealth that

has entered the Philippines through migrants' remittances. In the year 2010, remittance income, which had continued to rise through the economic crisis after 2008, came to a staggering 21.4 billion dollars – equal to 41.6% of the value of Philippines exports in that year! It might seem impossible that this enormous monetary gain could be outweighed by the effects of the loss of the country's 'brightest and best', and yet, while migration is, of course, only part of the picture of national development, it is the judgement of this author that you cannot lose to emigration a high proportion of your most ambitious and hard-working non-graduates, and one out of every three graduates, over several generations without putting at risk your social development, political stability and economic performance.

The culture (or 'taken-for-granted world') of migrating away from the Philippines to find work and a better life (especially in the United States) was well established before 1946 but has flourished since then (a 2010 study found that over 50% of people aged over 14 wanted to work abroad on a temporary basis and nearly 20% wanted to migrate permanently from the Philippines). Over the last 50 years, Filipinos have migrated to almost every country in the world, partly in response to the context of their lives – poverty and poor job prospects, and to the fatalism generated by the country's class structure and its politics – but also because they decided to go on a journey. You migrate to see the world, to grow up, to avoid the people who bore you and to have fun: you possess agency in the migration decision.

Emigration built up during the 1970s and 1980s, and, realizing the potential for remittance income (but also the threat to good international relations when things go wrong for overseas Filipino workers – for example, through the deaths of Flor Ramos Contemplacion in Singapore and Maricris Sioson in Japan), the 'labour brokerage' state, with NGO backing, became centrally involved in the creation and support of the overseas-employment programme and the protection of overseas contract workers. Most of the migrants come from central and northern Luzon, especially from the Ilocos Region, and from Metro Manila, which tends to gather future emigrants by internal migration from other areas, such as Southern Tagalog. Results from the 2010 census show 1) that many of the source regions of overseas workers are parts of the country that have above average per capita incomes; such higher incomes facilitate new emigration due to higher levels of education and greater resources to finance the migration, but they also reflect the economic benefits derived from the remittance incomes of past emigration; 2) that the gender composition of emigration flows is very regionally distinctive; the high rates of male emigration tend to be in the central regions of the country (central Luzon and the Visayas), while the high rates of female migration are found in the far north (where young women leave to work as domestic workers in Hong Kong and Singapore) and in the far south (where young women leave to work as domestic workers in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States).

Five main migration streams can be distinguished:

- 1) Continued permanent migration to North America – to both the United States (3.43 million people of Filipino descent in 2011) and Canada (843,000), where many have arrived under the Live-in Caregiver Program and are sometimes seen as ‘ideal immigrants’. A steady stream of Filipinos achieves permanent residency in the United States (that is, they obtain a ‘green card’) (57,000 in 2011), and many also go on to become US citizens (42,000 in 2011). Populations of Filipino descent are highly concentrated in California and Hawai‘i. Some of the recent female migrants to the United States are caregivers and domestic workers who live in a situation of ‘normalized irregularity’. It has been argued that Filipinos in Los Angeles, due to their Asian geographical origin and their Spanish and American colonial inheritances, have developed a hybrid ‘pan-ethnic consciousness’; this sometimes, however, has the effect of locating them socially, not alongside other upwardly mobile Asians but closer to their Latino neighbours. Some of the child migrants to the United States from the Philippines are adoptees; others are Amerasians.
- 2) Migration to the Middle East (during the 1980s and early 1990s this migration flow was an amazing 250–300,000 per annum): these are predominantly temporary contract workers deployed through the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); POEA estimates that the stock of migrants in 2011 was 1.55 million in Saudi Arabia, 680,000 in the UAE, 187,000 in Kuwait and 342,000 in Qatar. These migrant workers are employed in all kinds of jobs, including professional and managerial middle-class ones, but in the early days male construction workers were numerically dominant, followed more recently by female domestic workers and nurses, notably in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan, but also Israel.
- 3) Migration to Australasia; permanent migration to Australia is very important.
- 4) Migration to Western European countries especially to Italy (mostly as domestic workers), but also to the UK, Germany, France and Spain, where many are nurses and care workers (and au pairs in Denmark), but some are professionals.
- 5) (Increasing) Migration to East Asian countries (43% of it illegal/irregular), notably to Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, but also to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan (where many of the early migrants were female ‘entertainers’ (hostesses, sex workers and dancers)). Most of these migrants are employed as domestic workers (though not in Japan), factory workers (especially in Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea, but also Saipan in the Marianas) and construction workers. Once again, many of the migrants are contract workers deployed through POEA; in 2011, POEA estimates that the stock figures for migrants were 221,000 for Japan (a sharp drop since 2004), 569,000 for Malaysia, 175,000 for Hong Kong and 180,000 for Taiwan and for Singapore, 180,000.
- 6) Not so much a migration as a long-term absence: the Filipino seamen who crew many of the world’s cruise and cargo ships (they made up 20% of all seafarers in 2000). It has been argued that through the daily experience of hard physical labour and risk, many Filipino seafarers have acquired the ‘package deal’ of successful masculinity, something that is difficult to achieve in the low-opportunity environments of Philippine urban and rural areas. Some Filipino seamen, however, leave the Philippines altogether for foreign countries (such as the Netherlands); in this way, the boundaries between transnational employment and migration become blurred.

Philippine emigration was, as might be expected, significantly influenced by the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8: it halted the growth of emigration; it differentially affected land-based and sea-based workers (favouring the latter) and particularly hit new hires rather than rehires; flows to Malaysia and South Korea were most severely reduced (by more than 50%); men were more affected than women; and, for a time, remittances were lower (especially from land-based workers). Broadly speaking, however, the current economic recession has not

slowed down international labour migration from the Philippines, which is about one million persons per annum, but it has, at least temporarily, slowed its increase. Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa has necessitated the return of Filipino workers, notably from Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and Syria.

All migrants are influenced (but often in complex ways) by the social networks in which they are embedded and the social capital that they possess. And many Filipinos find that connections forged through worship at a Catholic Church help them to settle in the host country. There are, in addition to the skilled and unskilled working-class migrants, many professionals, managers and entrepreneurs living abroad, but one of the defining characteristics of Philippine migration has been its 'brain waste' character – that is, the tendency for employers to recruit Filipino workers for jobs that are below their level of qualification and experience. Female migrants in particular, despite being the active agents of change at home (see, for example the agricultural changes in a part of northern Luzon brought about by remittances from emigrant domestic workers) are forced to 'perform subordination' overseas; this subordination and deskilling in the labour market sometimes pushes Filipinas (and even some Filipinos) towards marriage to foreigners. Certain writers, of course, reject this victim discourse along with its opposite (the migrant as a hero of national development), arguing instead for a view of the migrant Filipina domestic worker as being upwardly socially mobile and of belonging to a social class (in practice this means *petty bourgeoisie*: a small-scale business (co)-owner and/or landlord) that is in the 'process of becoming'.

In this debate, Filipina nurses and domestic workers have attracted a particularly high level of political and academic attention. So strong has been the tendency for doctors and nurses to seek employment outside the Philippines that the efficiency of the country's own healthcare sector has been put at risk. Despite the efforts of the Philippine government, NGOs and labour unions to protect the interests of Philippine overseas workers, women in the health and social-care professions often face poor working conditions, discrimination, long working hours and low wages. On top of this, there is concern that, while caring for the wealthy or relatively well off in the countries of immigration, and saving their often meagre wages to send home to support their families, Filipinas (and often their 'left-behind' children) are missing out on their own family life. They are, in short, part of a 'care chain', in which it is their labour, looking after the children and the elderly of the rich elsewhere, that releases those privileged women (and men) in the countries of destination from their 'duty of care' for their relatives, thereby allowing them either to lead a life of leisure or to develop their own professional and managerial careers (at incomes which are much higher, of course, than those upon whose labour they have come to depend). Meanwhile, the migrants' mothers, sisters and husbands/partners care for their own children in the Philippines, albeit with the benefit of the remittances sent back home by the migrant, which may be used in ways that improve the education of the children

(for example, enrolment in private school, thereby enhancing the likelihood of their emigration) or the health and wellbeing of the migrant's elderly parents. As gender roles back home can be reversed, with the men 'left-behind' becoming carers, so also 'left-behind' women sometimes take on male roles in farming; but even without gender-role reversals, the power relations between men and women can be drastically altered by the earning capacity of female migrants.

While some migrant domestic workers adjust well in the destination country – especially those who were adventurous, have relatively high status, good social networks (for example, friendships made through religious observance) and were earning good wages – others suffered psychological stress; this was due to three main causes: the abusive behaviour of their employers, their burden of debt and the threat of failure of their family relationships. Despite the advantages that it brings to some, this care-chain complex of social and economic relationships is clearly full of social injustices, both great and small. One is tempted to come to the judgement that it, alongside other abuses of migrant labour, notably bullying related to debt and the bonded-labour contract, tends to reproduce in the post-colonial world of today the very same exploitative power relations in which class, gender and ethnicity intersected to produce multiple disadvantages during the colonial period prior to World War II.

While the vast majority of female migrants from the Philippines are seeking advantages through employment in mainstream jobs in the receiving country, there are two migration streams that form exceptions. The first is the marriage migrations primarily arranged by matchmaking agencies, now using internet websites, which take Philippine women to Japan, the United States, Australia and elsewhere. These marriage migrations all too often draw upon Western eroticized images of deferential Filipino women. The second stream is migrations associated with sex work. These are sometimes disguised as 'entertainment' (though, originally, and perhaps paradoxically, many of the early Filipino migrants in Japan were, indeed, jazz musicians). This latter migration was, at one time, a major feature of migration from the Philippines to Japan and South Korea (with major income and status effects back in the Philippines); but, largely as a result of changes in policy and procedures mostly around 2005 (brought about by pressure from a lobby-group-influenced US government), this migration flow has greatly decreased.

Migration issues are of increasing importance in the international and internal politics of the states of Southeast Asia (though not yet, perhaps, to the degree that they have dominated political discourse in the EU). The reason for this is fairly easy to understand: as the means to migrate have become greater (through cheap and rapid transportation and electronic communication, the rapid growth of the migration brokerage industry and the facilitation of migration through friendship, family and other co-ethnic connections), the resistance to immigration among the populations of East Asian countries has grown too (as reflected in the shift to an identity-based politics and towards nationalist, xenophobic and exclusionary forms of popular political mobilization).

CHINA PLUS: INTERNAL MIGRATION – THE MIGRATION EFFECTS OF A TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN CHINA PRC

The second instance of East Asian migration selected from the wider text relates to contemporary internal migration flows in China PRC (Fielding, 2016: 162–80). In a relatively low-income country undergoing rapid capitalist modernization from socialism, one would expect four major shifts in interregional (in this case, inter-provincial) migration flows: 1) a tendency for migration distances to increase as overall migration rates go up and as distant parts of the space economy become increasingly connected; 2) a tendency for the destinations of the migration flows to reflect the opening up of the economy to international trade and foreign investment, particularly in the early stages of the transition; 3) as the process matures, a tendency for working-class migrations to be partially replaced by middle-class migrations, especially flows to and from the key urban regions in the system (in this case Beijing–Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou–Hong Kong); and 4) a tendency for the flows that were dominant under socialism (often associated with decentralization and the geostrategic integration of the territory) to be replaced by those produced by market relations (often associated with concentration in the core regions, which benefit from economies of scale and agglomeration).

Do the interregional migration flows in contemporary China PRC match these expectations? This question can be answered with the help of ‘migration velocities’ (defined as the number of migrants from origin *i* to destination *j* divided by the product of the populations at *i* and *j*). These migration velocities allow us to compare the rates of migration flow over time and space. The data show 1) that migration velocities increased for five-year migration flows between 1995–2000 and 2005–10; and 2) that the rates of increase were particularly strong for origins and destinations that were far apart from one another. Therefore, the expectation that a rapid capitalist modernization of the country would lead to a more spatially integrated pattern of migration flows is fully borne out by the facts. People migrated more and further.

Second, the data show the enormous attraction of the export-oriented south-east coastal provinces to interregional migrants. In the late 1990s in particular, the rates of flow of people into Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces from the inland rural provinces to the west and northwest were quite astounding. This migration is dominated by young adults and is biased towards women and those with minimal educational qualifications. It is a mass migration associated with the expansion in these provinces of a ‘peripheral Fordist’ regime of accumulation – that is, the mass production of consumer goods for mass (mostly export) markets. Whatever their family backgrounds (predominantly, of course, farming), these young people were turned by migration into proletarian industrial workers. The phenomenal growth of cities in the Pearl River Delta area, such as Shenzhen and Dongguan, as well as the rapid growth of Guangzhou itself, is a product of these mass migrations.

Third, while most commentators focus only on this mass migration to the coastal provinces of southeast China PRC, plus, perhaps, migration to Beijing–Tianjin and Shanghai, the truth is that many other kinds of interregional migration already exist or are emerging in China PRC. A good example is the migration of educationally successful young people to those provinces in which major university cities are located. This migration channels the ‘brightest and the best’ towards the largest cities and especially to Beijing–Tianjin and Shanghai. Once there, promotion within managerial careers in both public-sector and private-sector organizations might well involve an intra-organizational transfer to a distant province for a period of time, sometimes with the expectation that such a service will be generously rewarded on the migrant’s return. Indeed, an examination of the flows to and from Beijing and Shanghai shows that they are biased towards older adults, those with higher levels of education and those with professional or managerial occupations. In the case of public-sector employees, the ‘Law of Avoidance’ policy has ensured the posting of bureaucrats to provinces, counties and townships other than those in which they were brought up.

This rather surprising diversity of migration flows is demonstrated by research carried out by this author on the northeastern province of Heilongjiang (Fielding, 2015: 51–65). Far from there being only one kind of migration flow (that of peasant youths to cities with manufacturing-employment growth), there were, in this instance, four! The first was the distinctive tendency for migrants from large cities like Beijing and Shanghai to go to those places (especially, of course, the provincial capital, Harbin) that had many jobs in modern sectors such as information technology, financial services and real estate. Second, there was, uniquely, no bias towards urban areas for migrants from the traditional source regions for agricultural migration to Heilongjiang (notably Shandong Province); this indicates a continuation of long-established socio-familial, cultural and economic links between these provinces. Third, yes, there were migrations from rural provinces into the industrial cities in Heilongjiang (such as migrants from Anhui to its mining settlements); this is similar to the mass migrations to the southeast provinces, except for one important thing: Heilongjiang is very decidedly not a province of net in-migration but one of net out-migration! Finally, and intriguingly, in-migrants to Heilongjiang from the southeastern provinces, such as Zhejiang and Fujian, although small in number, went overwhelmingly to those places within the province that specialized in trade and commerce (especially towns located on or close to the frontier with Russia). Once again, it seems that both economic and cultural forces are at work: people who come from a region with a well-developed trading culture are responding to new trading opportunities.

Finally, the partial and incomplete transition from a centrally planned socialist state to a market economy has, it seems – at least from the evidence of migration flows – diminished the capacity of population-redistribution policy to bring about intended development outcomes. If one compares the patterns of flows for

the late 1990s with those for the late 2000s, instead of seeing a trend towards migration gains in the regions marked out for growth by the government, such as central rural provinces, northeastern provinces and frontier provinces in the west and southwest, the trend has been unequivocally towards the metropolitan regions of Beijing–Tianjin and Shanghai (especially the latter) becoming even stronger magnets for interregional migrants than they were before. The 2010 census results show that Shanghai even gained migrants from Beijing! And that the greater Shanghai region (Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu) was exceptional in that it was the one major area that sent fewer migrants to Beijing in the 2005–10 period than in the 1995–2000 period (presumably due to its own economic dynamism). The big change, however, was in the migration situation of Guangdong Province. Much of its attractiveness, especially to migrants from nearby provinces such as Hunan and Jiangxi, has disappeared. A contributory factor to this might well be the greater cost and difficulty in employing labour in the Pearl River Delta, which, along with a shift in the policy emphasis towards the domestic market, is leading to some industrial investment moving away from the coastal provinces towards those in the interior. This acts as a stern warning to the many commentators who imagine that the patterns of urban and regional migration in China PRC typical of the recent past will continue unchanged into the future.

Chinese internal migration matters enormously; it is one of the main means by which rapid economic growth has been achieved (by massively increasing labour productivity), and hence it has contributed pivotally to China PRC's political clout both in East Asia and in the wider world.

NORTHEAST ASIA: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION – SOLVING THE PARADOX THAT 'LOST DECADES' IN JAPAN AND SLOWER GROWTH IN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN COINCIDE WITH THOSE COUNTRIES BECOMING 'NEW IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES'

The third example selected from the wider text is not taken from the main account but from one of the discussion boxes (Fielding, 2016: 153–7). This is where connections are made between what is occurring in East Asia and what is already understood about migration from studies mostly conducted in North America and Western Europe. At several points in *Asian Migrations*, I explored the similarities and interdependencies between internal migration and international migration. I want now to draw attention to the relationship between economic development and international migration flows to show 1) that this relationship has some rather puzzling characteristics (which can be expressed as a paradox) and 2) that this paradox can be resolved by examining the connections between internal and international migration.

First, here is the paradox. In the early post-1950 period, first Japan, then South Korea and then Taiwan experienced rapid economic development. They

did so without attracting large-scale international labour migration; in fact, the opposite happened: they continued to lose in international migration to the high-income countries of North America and elsewhere, to new settlement countries such as those in South America and, in the case of South Korea, to the emerging oil-revenue-rich countries of the Persian Gulf States. However, just at that moment when their economies began to turn down towards stagnation or low growth, they suddenly became countries of net international migration gain: ‘new immigration countries’. For Japan, this turning point was around 1990: in other words, it coincided with the shift from the high-growth ‘bubble economy’ of the 1980s to the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s (now the lost two-plus decades: 1990–). How could a country suffering poor economic performance – laying off or not recruiting its own workers, leading to higher unemployment – be recruiting foreign workers in such numbers that it was turning itself into a net-immigration country?

The solution to this puzzle lies in Figure 8.2. It sets out a three-stage representation (a schematic model first developed to explain the migration turnaround in Southern Europe) of a dual-labour-market economy (with high-productivity and low-productivity sectors) undergoing rapid economic development. During stage 1 there are effectively unlimited supplies of (unskilled) labour to urban labour markets due to rapid rural-to-urban migration of young adults whose prospects for making a living from agriculture and from traditional rural industries are very poor. This keeps wages down to a low level, both for the indigenous urban low-productivity sector and for the modern mass-production high-productivity sector.




Figure 8.2 The new immigration model

Source: Fielding (2016: 154).

The latter is especially profitable, since the distance between the high productivity of its workers and what it has to pay them in wages is very great. Rapid capital accumulation leads to high rates of investment in the high-productivity sector. Low wages in the cities mean that some people from rural areas will continue to emigrate.

Eventually, the momentum of growth will be such, despite improvements in labour productivity, that labour shortages in urban labour markets result – and we enter stage 2 of the model. Now, emboldened by their scarcity (resulting also from slower growth in the labour force due to demographic changes), the workers in the high-productivity sector successfully bargain up their wages to levels commensurate with other high-income economies. This has two effects: 1) it undermines production in the low-productivity sector of the economy: producers there simply cannot afford to pay the higher wages and must make do with older workers and with the least qualified of the new labour-market entrants; 2) it severely reduces the profitability of the high-productivity sector, because the margin between labour productivity and wages paid to workers is now so small. The outcome of these effects (following the so-called Lewisian ‘turning point’) is shown in stage 3.

Facing tighter margins due to high labour costs, producers in the high-productivity sector will invest abroad to find new sources of low-cost labour and so remain competitive in global markets. Their disinvestment in the home country will result in the closure of production sites and the laying off of indigenous workers. At the same time, producers in the low-productivity sector, unable to internationalize due to their small size and limited financial clout, will recruit low-cost labour from abroad. In this manner, the paradox set out at the beginning of this section is resolved: the country turns from being a net loser in international migration to being a net gainer at precisely the same time as its growth rate goes down and its unemployment rate goes up.

Compatible with this view of the relationships over time between internal and international migration (notably for the smaller companies that often act as the suppliers to the large multinationals there is a substitution of foreign immigrant workers for internal rural-to-urban migrant workers) is the tendency for immigrant workers to go to the same places and into the same branches of production as were previously occupied by internal migrant workers. This is, indeed, broadly the case in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Clearly, the immigration-dominated city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore do not fit this model; they did not have supplies of surplus rural labour sufficient to meet the labour needs of rapid industrial growth in the 1970s to 1990s. They did, however, have very large unemployed and underemployed urban populations, which acted, to some extent, as an alternative source of labour in the early years of industrialization. When this supply had been exhausted, foreign (and, in the case of Hong Kong, mainland) migrant workers were drawn in as a ‘reserve army of labour’.

REFLECTIONS ON ASIAN MIGRATIONS: IN WHAT WAYS DO THEY DIFFER FROM MIGRATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD?

Finally, the eight-category typology of migrations at the end of chapters 1 and 2 of *Asian Migrations* (Fielding 2016: 13–6 and 40–3) can be used as a framework for thinking about the ways that the migrations of this region differ from those elsewhere.

The first category is a very large one: the migration of poor, low-paid and unemployed working-class men and women in search of well-paid, secure blue-collar and white-collar employment. The distinctive features of East Asian migrations in this category are 1) the ‘sojourner’ tradition. This is where historical tradition and contemporary reality coincide: much of the migration, especially in Southeast Asia, is temporary. It involves one person leaving the family home to work for a period (from a few months to many years) in a foreign place far away (yet sometimes still within the boundaries of the national territory, especially so in China PRC and Indonesia). Sometimes this migration over many years forms a circulatory pattern, with life being divided between time spent away at a specific destination and at home. Often the migrants try out different destinations, combining, for example, labour migrations to the Persian Gulf states with periods of time spent in the higher-income countries of Northeast Asia. The sojourner tradition, inherited from the 19th-century migration of Chinese into Southeast Asia, has, without massive change, become the ‘guest-worker’ migration of the early 21st century (exemplified by recent immigration to South Korea under the Employment Permit System). 2) In line with this tradition, East Asian countries do not, for the most part, allow settlement; this means that family reunification, which is so important in many Western countries, is distinctively absent in the East Asian region; and 3) despite this, there has been a rapid feminization of migration in the region. This is distinctive not only because of its rapidity but also because it is very largely women migrating on their own for factory or domestic work, or marriage purposes.

The second category is smaller but has become increasingly important in recent years: this is the migration of the middle classes, those with higher social status, educational qualifications and/or technical or managerial skills. East Asia is distinctive 1) for the very large number of ‘global households’: households where life is lived out in two or more countries. Many of the international migrations in East Asia involve family separation, with one or both parents working away from their children. Examples abound and include the ‘astronauts’ of Hong Kong, where, in the face of the uncertainty that followed the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the family was moved to an English-speaking country while the main (businessman) earner remained in Hong Kong, thus necessitating frequent long-haul flights for family reunions. Another example is the South Korean *kirogi gasok*, or ‘wild geese’, families, where to be certain

of future academic and social advancement, the children, usually accompanied by their mother, are educated in an English-speaking country but at the cost of splitting the family. 2) East Asia is also distinctive for the recent emergence of major new destinations for middle-class career development: Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Hong Kong, of course, but, above all, Shanghai. The 'Shanghai rush' experienced by middle-class Taiwanese has now become more generalized, with many university-educated managers, professionals and business owners from high-income countries spending part of their working lives in this increasingly cosmopolitan city.

The third category is migration as a business. East Asia has a lot of this, some of it venal and violent (notably the trafficking of women and children into the nastier parts of the sex industry), some of it only slightly less exploitative (smuggling and debt bondage), but much of it simply the commoditization of the migration process through the routine use of brokers and intermediaries, job recruitment companies, travel and accommodation agents, advice and document services, etc. These businesses do not cause migration, but they greatly facilitate it, and they shape the forms it takes and the resulting pattern of flows. In many cases these businesses are set up and run by former migrants.

The fourth category, forced migration, is, unfortunately, very important in East Asia. 1) The region is subject to many of the most destructive natural disasters on earth, each of which results in temporary and/or permanent displacement. Historically, it was major drought and flood events. Today, it is earthquake and tsunami disasters, such as those in Indonesia in December 2004 and Japan in March 2011, and typhoons, volcanic eruptions, landslides and forest fires. 2) East Asia also has very many ethnic and politico-cultural conflicts – man-made disasters – some of them made all the more vicious by religious extremism. This has resulted in large populations of internally displaced people (notably in Indonesia: Sulawesi, Papua, Aceh; in the Philippines: Mindanao; and in Myanmar: Rakine) and large populations of cross-border refugees (notably those from Myanmar in Thailand and Bangladesh, and from North Korea in China PRC). Unfortunately, only seven of the 18 countries of East Asia are signed up to the UNHCR Refugee Convention and Protocol, and even those countries that have signed up (notably China PRC, South Korea and Japan) have done little or nothing to meet their international treaty obligations. Therefore, East Asia is distinctive both for the great size and seriousness of its refugee problem and for the appalling paucity of effort, resources and political will committed to solve that problem.

The fifth category is place-preference migration. Since personal income and security levels are low to middling in much of East Asia, the privilege to be able to choose where to live in a relatively unconstrained environment is restricted to a very small minority. Where that privilege does exist, however, it tends to be exercised in favour of two kinds of places: 1) major centres of luxury consumption (which in East Asia often means 'primate' capital cities such as Jakarta, Bangkok, Manila, Seoul and Tokyo) or major 'gateway cities' such as Singapore

or Hong Kong; and 2) tourist-resort 'paradises' such as Bali in Indonesia or Phuket in Thailand.

East Asia is highly distinctive when it comes to the sixth category 6: 'life course' migration for education and training. There is a massive emigration of students from East Asian countries to the university cities of English-speaking countries (notably the United States and Canada, the EU and the UK, Australia and New Zealand). And as the students move away, the language teachers from these same countries move in.

The seventh category also relates to the life course, and it is something that is much more pronounced in East Asia than in other parts of the world: long-distance marriage migration. Its importance is enhanced by the brokered nature of these migrations and by the rather 'instrumental' character of much marriage-partner choice in East Asian societies; the 'Hollywood' model of affective human relationships, with its heavy emphasis on individual choice and romantic love, has not (yet) fully replaced family-centred 'down-to-earth' decision-making in this sphere of social life. Notable examples of these long-distance marriage migrations are west to east migrations of young women in China PRC, the international migrations of Vietnamese women to Taiwan and South Korea, and now of Chinese women to Japan, and the out-migrations associated with the marriages of Japanese, Filipina and Thai women to men in North America, Western Europe and Australasia.

Finally, and particularly distinctive in East Asia, there are migrations that are shaped by, or directly the result of, political projects and policy agendas. Several of these political projects are rooted in the history of migration in the region. 1) There is, for example, a long history of placing constraints on mobility: Japan's *sakoku* (national isolation) during the Edo period ensured that for about 300 years almost nobody entered and nobody left the country, while Joseon Korea (the 'hermit kingdom') and the Ming and Qing dynasties in China imposed similar regimes. Today, the most extreme case of enforced immobility (both internal and international) is North Korea, but powerful vestiges of constraints on migration are still to be found in the application of the household-registration systems of China and Vietnam. 2) There is a long history, too, of the attempts to achieve national economic development and socio-political cohesion through 'internal colonialism': the planned migration of settler migrants to un- or underpopulated regions within the national territory. The best known case of this is the transmigration programme in Indonesia, which brought many people from Java to Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua; but the opening up of the Central Highlands in Vietnam and of Mindanao in the Philippines, as well as the sponsored migrations to Xinjiang in China, all contained national development and security goals. 3) Also rooted in history are the displacements associated with major infrastructure investments (such as those brought about by the decision to relocate the capital city). A modern version of this displacement is that which resulted from the building of the Three Gorges Dam in central China PRC, affecting more

than one million people. 4) East Asia is notable for the fact that it is here that one finds governments that actively promote emigration, notably and for many decades the Philippines, but now also Indonesia. And, finally, 5) in line with the dominance of *ius sanguinis* (law of blood) over *ius solis* (law of the soil) as a basis of citizenship in the East Asian region, the immigration policies of most of the major countries reflect a strong degree of co-ethnic preference. This explains the great significance of *joseonjok* (ethnic Korean) immigrants in South Korea, of *waishengren* (mainlander) immigrants in Taiwan and of *nikkeijin* (Japanese descendent) immigrants in Japan.

To summarize, while there are many migration patterns and processes that are common to East Asia and to other parts of the world, both international and internal migration flows in this region display a distinctiveness – a degree of difference – that is not just empirically and politically important but requires us to think again about the universality of the concepts and theories we use to understand human migration.

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Migration in Northeast Asia: Human Development, Human Security, and Foreign Policy Consequences

Tsuneo Akaha

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a global phenomenon and includes internal and international migration. According to the *International Migration Report, 2015*, the number of international migrants worldwide has grown rapidly over the past 15 years and reached 244 million in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010, and 173 million in 2000.¹ Nearly two thirds of the migrants live in Europe or Asia. In 2015, 75 million international migrants were residing in Asia. Between 2000 and 2015, Asia added more international migrants than any other major area of the world, hosting about 26 million new international migrants. This represented 1.7 million additional migrants each year.² Northeast Asia – including China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Russia – is a part of this dynamic global and regional migration phenomenon.

In this brief analysis, we will examine the level and trends of international migration in Northeast Asian countries. First, we will place Northeast Asia in the global context and briefly describe the main patterns and trends in migration flows between the region and the rest of the world in recent years and note the region's growing importance as a source and a destination of international migration. We then briefly look at international migration, refugee, and human trafficking flows in the region. With respect to China, we need to make clear distinctions between migration to and from China proper and its special administrative regions of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. In discussing Korea, it is

obviously necessary to look at migrations in North and in South Korea separately, the former as a source of refugees and the latter as a source and destination of labor and education migrants. Although much of the literature on Northeast Asia excludes Russia, we will briefly touch upon migration in Russia because there is a significant number of Chinese citizens and an unknown number of North Korean workers in Russia's far eastern regions. The chapter then examines the human development and human security challenges facing international migrants in the region, as well as the state of international legal norms pertaining to the rights of international migrants, including migrant labor, refugees, and human trafficking. Finally, we will illustrate the foreign policy consequences of international migration in Northeast Asia by briefly introducing some of the more prominent examples of migrant communities in the region.

'Migration' includes internal migration (people crossing some administrative borders within a country) and international migration (people crossing national borders). In this study we will focus primarily on international migration, although we will make some passing references to internal migration where necessary. People migrate for different reasons, some voluntarily and others reluctantly, and their movements have both foreseen and unforeseen consequences. This makes it necessary for us to include in our discussion voluntary labor migration, reluctant refugee migration, coerced human trafficking, and other movements of people, such as migrating for educational purposes.

Some additional caveats are in order. Although modern nation-states have established various mechanisms to control both the inward and outward flow of people, including their own citizens and foreign nationals, people have found ways to cross national borders through unauthorized or unregulated channels, some outright illegally and others by taking advantage of loopholes in official laws and policies. Statistics on migration and migrants include both figures that are officially and systematically compiled – for example, through censuses and alien registration – as well as estimates, particularly for illegal, undocumented, or irregular migration. The definition of 'migrant' adopted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other international agencies, given as someone who has lived in a country other than their country of regular residence or citizenship, applies to both 'legal' and 'illegal' migrants. Estimates of 'illegal', 'irregular', or 'undocumented' migrants are liable to deviate from the actual numbers as they are approximations. Also, the legal status of migrants changes officially or unofficially, for example from that of a student to that of a worker, from a legal migrant worker to an illegal labor migrant by overstaying their visa, from an undocumented migrant to an asylum-seeker, and possibly to a refugee after receiving refugee status. Moreover, a person who may qualify as a 'migrant' in one country may not be recognized as such in another because countries apply different definitions and standards for defining the legal status of non-nationals within their territory. Therefore, we need to look at statistics on migration and migrants with these complexities in mind.

After looking at broad patterns and trends in migration in and out of Northeast Asia, as well as within the region in recent years, we shift our focus to the human development and human security aspects of international migration within the region. Until recently, ‘migration-induced development’ generally meant quantitative increases and qualitative improvements in the material assets that migration brings to the countries of origin and countries of destination. It is beyond the scope of this brief analysis to describe the various contributions migration has made to the ‘development’ that economists have examined.³ It suffices to point out that their primary focus has been those aspects of migration that can be readily captured by quantitative data, remittances being a prime example. ‘Brain drain’ has also been a popular subject within the economic analysis of the migration-development nexus. Among the economic analysts of migration, there is a broad consensus that the net impact of international migration is generally positive, that is, that international migration contributes material and monetary value to the world. These analysts have long urged the international community to encourage developing countries to place migration within their national development strategy,⁴ and their recommendation has found its way into the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations Summit in 2015.⁵

Another approach to development that has direct relevance to the study of migration is that of ‘human development’ – and its associated concept of ‘human security’. ‘Human development’ refers to the development of an individual person’s potential as a human being and the familial or community context within which the individual’s potential is, or is not, realized. The concept has been developed and elaborated to the point where a country can be ranked and compared with other countries on a human development index (HDI) which is ‘a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and have a decent standard of living’.⁶ In recent years, the concept of ‘human development’ has been applied to research on migration and has shown its value in highlighting both positive and negative effects of migration on human development.⁷ The related but distinct concept of ‘human security’ views the security of individual persons in terms of three pillars, ‘freedom from fear’, ‘freedom from want’, and ‘freedom from indignities’, and is used as an alternative or a supplement to – and not a substitute for – the concept of ‘national security’. The latter concerns the protection of national sovereignty, political independence, and the territorial integrity of nation-states. Whereas national security concerns do arise in international migration – such as with respect to the breach of national borders, terrorism, trafficking in persons, drugs, arms, and other forms of threats to public order and security that border-crossing individuals or groups of individuals may pose – this chapter will emphasize, in addition to human development, the human security of migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees, as well as victims of human trafficking. With respect to the three pillars of human security, these are some of the most vulnerable populations.

The human development and human security dimensions of international migration clearly have consequences for relations between the countries of origin, destination, and transit as individuals crossing national borders may bring harm or benefit to the political system, economic development, social integration, and security interests of the countries concerned. A country's immigration law, policy, practices regarding border control, passports and visas, foreign nationals' entry and exit, refugee admission, remittances, and the legal status of foreign nationals including naturalization, have consequences for other countries. In fact, many countries enter into specific agreements regarding their citizens' entry into their respective territories. There are also multilateral arrangements countries enter into to ensure the safety and wellbeing of their citizens abroad. An example of a bilateral arrangement is the Philippines–Japan agreement on labor migration in the nursing sector and an example of a multilateral arrangement is the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

NORTHEAST ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

As noted above, Northeast Asia includes China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Russia. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) uses the geographical category of 'Eastern Asia' which includes these countries/areas as well as 'China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)' and 'China, Macao SAR' but excludes Russia, which the IOM includes in 'Eastern Europe'. The IOM's *World Migration Report (2018)*⁸ describes several main migration patterns and trends in Eastern Asia that are roughly applicable to Northeast Asia as defined in this chapter.

First, the IOM report notes, 'Eastern Asia is in the midst of unprecedented demographic change, with several countries experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, leading to a reconsideration of immigration policies'.⁹ With Japan undergoing a population decline due to a low fertility rate and fast-ageing population and South Korea experiencing the lowest birth rate and the fastest-ageing population profile among OECD countries, policymakers in these countries have begun to review their historically restrictive approaches toward immigration and are increasingly promoting temporary foreign labor immigration.

Second, according to the report, 'Migration in Eastern Asia is increasingly characterized by significant outward and inward student mobility'.¹⁰ The number of students from Northeast Asian countries – particularly China, South Korea, and Japan – who study abroad – especially in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom – has increased significantly, although the number from Japan has begun to decline more recently. In the academic year 2015/2016, these three Northeast Asian countries were among the top 10 countries of origin of international students in the United States, with more than 300,000 students from China

alone. China has become one of the most important sources of international students in the world, representing one out of every six such students in 2014. Northeast Asian countries are also becoming an important destination for foreign students, many of them coming from within the region itself. For example, there are more international students from South Korea studying in China than from any other country. Japan also attracts a large number of international students and numbers are expected to reach 300,000 by 2020.¹¹

Third, as a result of the large outward labor migration, particularly from China, the region has also become an important destination of remittances in the world. In 2015, for example, Chinese-born international migrants were the fourth largest foreign-born population in the world after Indians, Mexicans, and Russians, with nearly 10 million Chinese migrants living outside of China and in 2016, China received \$61 billion in remittances, the second largest share of global remittances after India.¹²

Let us now take a brief look at migrant populations and international migration within Northeast Asia.

MIGRANT POPULATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Migrant Populations (Migrant Stocks)

Table 9.1 shows the migrant population and its proportion (%) of the total population in each of the Northeast Asian countries/areas, including Russia.

The international migrant population (stock) in Northeast Asian countries/areas in 2015 ranged from over 11.6 million persons living in Russia, representing 8.1% of the total population in the country, to over 17,000 persons living in Mongolia, or 0.6% of the population in the country. The largest part of the international migration into Russia was due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the migration (and naturalization) of ethnic Russians from other Soviet republics to the Russian Federation. Hong Kong SAR was home to the second largest international migrant population of any country/area in Northeast Asia, hosting over 2.8 million migrants, or nearly 40% of the population in the territory. This was followed by Japan with an international migrant stock of more than 2 million persons and South Korea with over 1.3 million. Comparable statistics for the other countries/area of Northeast Asia were: China, 1 million international migrants (0.1% of the population in the country); Macao SAR, 342,000 migrants (58.3%); North Korea, 48,458 migrants (0.2%); and Mongolia, 17,620 migrants (0.6%). In terms of the international migrant population as a proportion of the total population in a country/area, Macao and Hong Kong were the most open, and North Korea and China were the least. Japan presents a particularly striking profile. Despite its advanced economy and declining and ageing population, which has created significant labor shortages, the country has long

Table 9.1 International migrant stock at midyear and as a proportion of total population in Northeast Asian countries/ areas

Country/area of destination	International migrant stock at midyear and as % of total population											
	1990	%	1995	%	2000	%	2005	%	2010	%	2015	%
China	376 361	0.0	442 198	0.0	508 034	0.0	678 947	0.1	849 861	0.1	978 046	0.1
Hong Kong SAR	2 218 473	38.3	2 443 798	39.8	2 669 122	39.3	2 721 235	39.8	2 779 950	39.8	2 838 665	38.9
Macao SAR	205 047	57.0	224 929	56.4	240 791	55.8	279 308	59.7	318 506	59.6	342 703	58.3
North Korea	34 103	0.2	35 143	0.2	36 183	0.2	40 097	0.2	44 010	0.2	48 458	0.2
South Korea	43 017	0.1	123 886	0.3	244 178	0.5	485 546	1.0	919 275	1.9	1 327 324	2.6
Japan	1 075 626	0.9	1 381 097	1.1	1 686 567	1.3	2 012 916	1.6	2 134 151	1.7	2 043 877	1.6
Mongolia	6 718	0.3	7 424	0.3	8 206	0.3	11 475	0.5	16 061	0.6	17 620	0.6
Russia	11 524 948	7.8	11 928 927	8.0	11 900 297	8.1	11 667 588	8.1	11 194 710	7.8	11 643 276	8.1

Note: Taiwan is not included in the table because the UN source indicated below does not include statistics on Taiwan, a non-UN member.

Source: Compiled from data in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Trends in International Migrant Stock, The 2015 revision, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/STOCK/REV2015. Available from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml> (accessed December 15, 2016).

Table 9.2 Refugee population by country or territory of asylum

<i>Country/area of asylum</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2015</i>
China	287 276	301 052
Hong Kong SAR	8 161	133
Macao SAR	205	0
North Korea		
South Korea	230	1 463
Japan	6 819	2 474
Mongolia		9
Russia		314 506

Note: Taiwan is not included in the table because the World Bank source indicated below does not include statistics on Taiwan.

Source: The World Bank, Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum. Available from <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR> (accessed December 15, 2016).

maintained a very restrictive immigration policy and has received a very limited number of foreign migrant workers over the years.

In terms of the change in the size of the international migrant stock since 1990, South Korea experienced a spectacular growth in the number of international migrants within the country, by nearly 1.3 million persons (an almost 30-fold increase). Japan's international migrant stock grew by only about 1 million persons (a 90% increase). China added 601,685 foreign migrants, an increase of nearly 160%. The other Northeast Asian countries/areas experienced more modest increases in their foreign migrant populations.

Rapid increases in foreign populations represent a recent phenomenon in all Northeast Asian countries that have historically adopted restrictive immigration policies, with the notable exception of the two special administrative regions of China that have been heavily populated by expats from Europe along with the mostly Chinese native residents. Dramatic increases in international migration in the regional countries pose both significant opportunities and serious challenges, and we will discuss some of the most notable effects later in this chapter.

Refugees

Refugees are another important part of migration flows around the world, but their numbers in Northeast Asia are relatively small. Table 9.2 shows the number of refugees in each of the countries/areas of the region, as reported by the World Bank.¹³ China and Russia are the two major destinations of international refugees in Northeast Asia.

The vast majority of the refugees in China are Indo-Chinese refugees who arrived in China between 1978 and 1979 after the Vietnamese authorities forced several hundred thousand refugees to leave their homeland in 1977. '[T]he

Chinese government received about 286,000 Indo-Chinese refugees, of whom about 91% are Chinese, 8% Vietnamese, and 1% Lao'.¹⁴ Additionally, between 1981 and 1982, China received about 2,500 refugees from Laos and Cambodia who were fleeing the civil war and the Chinese exclusion measures in their countries.¹⁵ These Indo-Chinese refugees were resettled in China. However, 'Nowadays, the biggest refugee problem in China relates to identity issues. By law, refugees have no right to work in China. For international refugees, China mainly makes donations or receives refugees as a transit country'.¹⁶

The vast majority of the refugees in Russia are those who left the conflict-ridden Ukraine.¹⁷ Some of these Ukrainian refugees have been resettled in the Russian Far East.¹⁸

It is interesting to note, that a May 2016 survey by Amnesty International found that the Chinese are the most welcoming toward refugees fleeing war and persecution and the Russians are the least welcoming.¹⁹ Unfortunately, none of the other Northeast Asian countries or areas were included among the 27 countries surveyed.

The other countries/areas of Northeast Asia have hosted far smaller numbers of refugees. Of particular note are Japan and South Korea, who respectively admitted only 2,474 refugees and 1,463 refugees in 2015. Both countries have very restrictive refugee recognition and admission policies and prefer to extend financial assistance to international refugee assistance efforts rather than welcoming them in their own countries.

Human Trafficking

The most serious cases of human trafficking in the region involve Russia as a source, transit, and destination country in forced labor and sex trafficking. According to the US State Department's 2016 *Trafficking in Persons Report*, 'Labor trafficking remains the predominant human trafficking problem within Russia'. 'Workers from Russia and other countries in Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia – including Vietnam and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) – are subjected to forced labor in Russia'.²⁰ In 2015 it was found that the Russian government had not reported investigations of slave-like conditions among North Korean workers in Russia.²¹ Sex trafficking in Russia involves women and children from Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia and many Russian women and children are victims of sex trafficking domestically and internationally, including in other Northeast Asian countries.²² The 2016 TIP Report places Russia on Tier 3, indicating that Russia 'does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making a significant effort to do so'.²³

North Korea is another Tier 3 country. It is a source country for men, women, and children victimized in forced labor and sex trafficking. According to the 2016 TIP Report, 'Government oppression in the DPRK' causes many North Koreans

to flee the country ‘in ways that make them vulnerable to human trafficking in destination countries’.²⁴ The Report notes, ‘The North Korean government sends laborers to work abroad under bilateral contracts with foreign governments’, the majority of them working in Russia and China under ‘conditions indicative of forced labor, such as working excessively long hours in hazardous temperatures with restricted pay, for up to three years’.²⁵ The Report further states:

Many of the estimated 10,000 North Korean women and girls who have migrated illegally to China to flee from abuse and human rights violations are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, and traffickers reportedly lure, drug, detain, or kidnap some North Korean women upon their arrival. Others offer jobs but subsequently force the women into prostitution, domestic service, or agricultural work through forced marriages. These women are subjected to sexual slavery by Chinese or Korean-Chinese men, forced prostitution in brothels or through Internet sex sites, or compelled service as hostesses in nightclubs or karaoke bars. If found by Chinese authorities, victims are often forcibly repatriated to North Korea where they are subject to harsh punishment, including forced labor in labor camps or death.²⁶

In contrast, South Korea is a Tier 1 country and ‘fully meets the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking’.²⁷ Nonetheless, the country is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and child victims of forced labor and sex trafficking.²⁸ The 2016 TIP Report observes, ‘Men and women from China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and South America are subjected to forced labor in South Korea; some women from these regions are subjected to forced prostitution’.²⁹ Some foreign workers find themselves in debt bondage or in working conditions indicative of forced labor, and this includes some laborers in the government’s employment permit system. Moreover, some foreign women on entertainment visas are subjected to forced prostitution, and some women from China, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia marry South Korean men through arrangements made by international brokers and are then forced to work in prostitution or forced labor.³⁰

China is a major source, transit, and destination country of forced labor and sex trafficking. The country is on the Tier 2 Watch List according to the 2016 TIP report. This means that the Chinese government ‘does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking’ but ‘it is making significant efforts to do so’.³¹ The TIP report states, ‘China’s internal migrant population, estimated to exceed 294 million people, is vulnerable to trafficking with Chinese men, women, and children subjected to forced labor in coal mines and factories, some of which operate illegally and take advantage of lax government enforcement’.³² The Report also notes, ‘State-sponsored forced labor continues to be an area of significant concern in China’.³³ Sex trafficking in China victimizes Chinese women and children, many of whom are from rural areas and are then trafficked by organized crime to urban settings. Many Chinese men, women, and children are also subjected to trafficking for sex and forced labor abroad.³⁴ Forced labor and sex trafficking in the country also involve women and children

from neighboring Asian countries, Africa, and the Americas. The TIP Report also notes,

'The Chinese government's birth limitation policy and a cultural preference for sons create a skewed sex ratio of 117 boys to 100 girls in China, which observers assert increases the demand for prostitution and for foreign women as brides for Chinese men – both of which may be procured by force or coercion. Women and girls are kidnapped or recruited through marriage brokers and transported to China, where some are subjected to prostitution or forced labor'.³⁵

Both Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR are also areas where forced labor and sex trafficking take place. Hong Kong SAR is on the Tier 2 Watch List in the 2016 TIP Report, which observes that the territory 'is primarily a destination, transit, and to a much lesser extent, a source territory for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor', with victims coming from mainland China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian countries as well as countries in South Asia, Africa, and South America. Further, some of the approximately 340,000 foreign domestic workers, primarily from Indonesia and the Philippines, who work in Hong Kong 'become victims of forced labor in the private homes in which they are employed'.³⁶ Macao SAR, a Tier 2 territory in the 2016 TIP Report, is 'primarily a destination and, to a much lesser extent, a transit territory for women and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. Sex trafficking victims originate primarily from mainland China' but some are from Asia, Russia, Africa, and South America.³⁷

The 2016 TIP Report places Taiwan on Tier 1. However, according to the Report, Taiwan is a destination for men and women victims of forced labor and sex trafficking and also a source of men and women victims of forced labor and of women and children trapped in sex trafficking.³⁸ The Report notes, 'Most trafficking victims are migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, individuals from China and Cambodia'.³⁹ The Report also observes, 'Most of Taiwan's more than 587,000 migrant workers are hired in their home countries through recruitment agencies and brokers, some of which are from Taiwan, to perform low-skilled work as home caregivers and domestic workers, or in farming, manufacturing, construction, and fishing industries'.⁴⁰ 'Women from China and Southeast Asian countries are victims of sex trafficking brought to Taiwan through fraudulent marriages and deceptive employment offers'.⁴¹

The 2016 TIP Report lists Japan as a Tier 2 country and states that it is a source, transit, and destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking and for child victims of sex trafficking. The Report notes,

'Male and female migrant workers, mainly from Asia, are subjected to conditions of forced labor, including some cases through the government's Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). Some men, women, and children from East Asia, Southeast Asia (mainly the Philippines and Thailand), South Asia, South America, and Africa travel to Japan for employment or fraudulent marriage and are subjected to sex trafficking'.⁴²

Sex trafficking in Japan also involves ‘Japanese citizens, particularly runaway teenage girls, children of foreign and Japanese citizens who have acquired citizenship, and their foreign mothers’. According to the 2016 TIP Report, Japanese men have been and continue to be a significant source of demand for child sex tourism in Asia.⁴³ Additionally, Japan serves as a transit country for trafficking victims bound for other destinations, including East Asia and North America.⁴⁴

Mongolia, a Tier 2 country,

‘is a source and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Mongolian men, women, and children are subjected to forced labor in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Israel and to sex trafficking in South Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Germany, Sweden, and the United States’.

The 2016 TIP report observes, ‘Women are subjected to domestic servitude or forced prostitution after entering into commercially brokered marriages to Chinese men and, with decreased frequency, South Korean men’.⁴⁵ The Report further notes, ‘North Korean and Chinese workers employed in Mongolia are vulnerable to trafficking as contract laborers in construction, production, agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, wholesale and retail trade, automobile maintenance, and mining’.⁴⁶

In summary, human trafficking is a widespread problem throughout Northeast Asia and presents serious human security problems.

THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY OF MIGRANTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

In 1990 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released its first *Human Development Report*, introducing the concept of ‘human development’. According to the UNDP, human development is about ‘expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy in which human beings live’.⁴⁷ ‘Human development’ has three main components: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. The necessary conditions for it include: participation in political and community life, environmental sustainability, human security and rights, and promotion of equality and social justice.⁴⁸ International migrants face varying degrees of challenges to their human development. Fundamental to the challenges they face is their limited or nonexistent ability to participate in the political or community life in the host country. It is reasonable to assume that opportunities for international migrants, as ‘outsiders’ in their host country, are generally more limited than those for the local citizens.

In this context we note that Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong SAR were among the ‘very high human development’ countries/areas in terms of HDI in 2015, and China, Mongolia, and Russia were among the ‘high human development’

countries, with a HDI score for North Korea unavailable.⁴⁹ Therefore, there is reason to believe that international migrants in Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong have a better chance to pursue human development opportunities than those in other Northeast Asian countries.

The human security of international migrants in Northeast Asia is at risk. Particularly vulnerable are victims of human trafficking. As noted above, all Northeast Asian countries and areas are implicated in human trafficking. Trafficking victims in the region come from within the Northeast Asian countries/areas as well as from outside of the region.

Hundreds of thousands of labor migrants in Northeast Asia, both documented (legal) and undocumented (illegal), are also subjected to a myriad of human rights abuses. Undocumented workers include those who have been smuggled into destination countries, typically with the aid of recruiters in their home countries and other intermediaries. Among the problems that documented and undocumented migrant workers face in destination countries are working in unsafe conditions, lack of healthcare, unpaid wages, delayed payment of wages, substantial debts to recruiting agents, difficulty or impossibility of changing jobs, and lack of readily available legal and other forms of assistance. Even when government programs encourage foreign nationals to undergo training in officially sanctioned internship/training programs, such as those in place in Japan and South Korea, the foreign interns/trainees are not legally considered part of the workforce and are therefore not protected by the country's labor law.

The rights of migrant workers, asylum-seekers, refugees, and victims of human trafficking are enshrined in various international conventions. Those of labor migrants are spelled out in the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, as well as two International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions: Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (ILO C097) and Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO C143). Table 9.3 shows the status of ratifications made by the Northeast Asian countries of these conventions, as well as other principal international conventions on refugees, human trafficking, and people smuggling – which we will discuss below.

None of the Northeast Asian governments have accepted the migrant workers convention (CMW in Table 9.3) or either of the two ILO conventions noted above. This means these governments are not legally required to protect the rights of migrant workers, as provided for in the international convention, or accord them such basic workers' rights as they afford their national workers under domestic law. China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia have acceded to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (RC in Table 9.3), but only China and Japan have also acceded to the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (RP in Table 9.3) which extended the legal protection of refugees beyond the European refugees in the immediate post-WWII period as envisaged in the 1951 refugee

convention. This means that the other Northeast Asian countries are not bound by the protocol's provisions for the protection of the rights of refugees. This is hugely problematic because, as noted above, there are hundreds of thousands of refugees within the region and they are at the mercy of the countries in which they reside as far as their rights as refugees are concerned. In the case of North Korean defectors inside China, the fact that China has acceded to both the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol does not necessarily mean China offers protection to those North Koreans. The Chinese government typically refuses to recognize them as refugees and instead labels them as illegal 'economic migrants' and, in accordance with a bilateral treaty with North Korea, forcibly returns the North Koreans to North Korea where they face harsh punishment.⁵⁰

With respect to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TIPP in Table 9.3), Russia

Table 9.3 Status of ratifications by Northeast Asian countries of principal international conventions concerning migrants, refugees, and human trafficking and smuggling

<i>Convention</i>	<i>CMW</i>	<i>RC</i>	<i>RP</i>	<i>CTOC</i>	<i>TIPP</i>	<i>MSP</i>	<i>ILO C097</i>	<i>ILO C143</i>
Country								
China		a	a					
Japan		a	a	r	s	s		
North Korea								
South Korea		a		r	s	s		
Mongolia								
Russia		a		r	r			

Notes: Taiwan is not included in the table as it is not a member of the United Nations.

CMW: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

RC: 1951 Refugee Convention

RP: Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

CTOC: UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

TIPP: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

MSP: Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

ILO C097: ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949)

ILO C143: ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers

'r': ratification

'a': accession

's': signature only

Sources: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations.

has ratified it and Japan and South Korea have signed but not yet ratified it. China, North Korea, and Mongolia have taken no action on the protocol. Therefore, victims of human trafficking in most Northeast Asian countries are subject to the domestic law of these countries. As noted above, they face serious rights violations, although those who are discovered by local authorities in South Korea and Taiwan have a better chance of protection than those in the other countries of the region. People who are smuggled across national borders typically ask to be smuggled, but they also face serious rights violations in destination countries. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (MSP in Table 9.3) was adopted to extend legal protection to such individuals. Japan and South Korea have signed but not ratified the protocol and the other Northeast Asian countries have not taken any action on it.

FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Contemporary labor migration in the world is largely an economic phenomenon, driven by migrants' desire to improve their material wellbeing by seeking better economic opportunities abroad. Perceived gaps in these opportunities incentivize labor migration and the discrepancies in growth rates between national economies and the gaps between labor demand and supply in national economies are the main, if not the only, economic factors accounting for labor migration between countries. In addition, the immigration laws and policies of the potential destination countries and the nature of the relationship between those countries and the migrants' home countries are also important factors affecting the level of international labor migration. In Northeast Asia, after the end of the Cold War, improvements in bilateral relations and the growth in trade and other economic relations between the countries of the region have all contributed to the expansion of international labor migration.

The international refugee law currently recognizes only those legitimately fleeing war and political persecution as eligible for seeking asylum. Although people leave their countries for other dire reasons, such as poverty, famine, natural disasters, and environmental dislocation, they are, strictly speaking, not 'refugees'. However, the international community and many individual countries do often accord such people protection similar to that which they extend to legitimate refugees. In Northeast Asia, the most notable example of people leaving their country for political reasons as well as for economic survival is the North Korean defectors. Most of them first cross into China and plan to settle in South Korea, with a much smaller number of them resettling in Mongolia. In South Korea they hope to establish their lives in what they expect to be culturally familiar environments, but many of them have serious adjustment problems

because of the significant economic, social, and political differences between North and South Korea. Although South Korea has generally welcomed North Korean defectors with housing and financial aid, their presence in the country has raised difficult issues for South Korea's relations with China. If discovered inside China, the North Korean defectors are likely to be deported back to their country. International publicity surrounding their plight in China, or even their successful trip to South Korea, has exposed China's complicity in the humanitarian crisis that the defectors represent. In contrast, Seoul's policy toward the North Korean defectors is informed by the humanitarian concern among the South Korean public and also by the South Korean constitution that recognizes both North and South Koreans as their citizens. The Korean nationalism that binds North Korean defectors and South Korean supporters is also detectable in the sympathetic attitudes of many South Koreans toward the growing numbers of Chinese citizens of Korean ethnicity who also come to South Korea as immigrants. However, the Chinese government is very sensitive to any special treatment Korean Chinese may receive in South Korea as it may promote Korean nationalism within China, particularly in its northeastern provinces where there are nearly 2 million ethnic Koreans.

Apart from refugees, there are several other notable cases of migrant communities that have raised sensitive foreign policy issues. One such case involves 'Soviet Koreans', who were forcibly moved to Central Asia under Stalin. Some of their children have since moved to the Far East after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Soviet Union also saw many Korean Russians in Sakhalin return to their ancestral land, namely South Korea. They had been moved to Sakhalin by Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, when the southern half of the island was Japanese territory, but most of them and their children became Soviet citizens when the entire island became part of the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the Second World War. Those who wanted to resettle in South Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded and eventually received Japanese government assistance in their move to South Korea. An unknown number of them, however, found it very difficult to live in the dramatically transformed South Korea and returned to Sakhalin, but only after they had surrendered their right to Soviet-era pensions.

Another case relates to the Chinese of Korean ancestry who have migrated permanently or temporarily to the Russian Far East, mostly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s there were hundreds of thousands of Chinese, including Korean Chinese, who entered the Russian Far East, mostly as shuttle traders, and this raised fears among the locals that the Chinese government was encouraging their citizens to settle in the Russian Far East as a strategic move to seek China's territorial expansion. In 1993, Moscow responded to these fears by reaching an agreement with Beijing on tighter visa requirements. The number of Chinese entering Russia plummeted, but so did the border trade mostly carried out by these shuttle traders.⁵¹ Although serious concerns about China's 'peaceful

invasion' of Russia have since disappeared, the possibility of significant Chinese migration into the Far East has been raised in some xenophobic Russian media reports and remains a potentially sensitive issue in Russian–Chinese relations.

The growing presence of Chinese migrants in Japan has also been an issue of some sensitivity in China–Japan relations in recent years. Out of the 2,688,000 foreign nationals registered in Japan at end of 2015, the largest by far (785,982 persons) were Chinese, followed by 519,134 Koreans, 252,581 Filipinos, 175,351 Brazilians (mostly of Japanese ancestry), and 149,778 Vietnamese.⁵² Numerous books and magazine articles have depicted Chinese migrants as crime-prone and maladjusted in Japanese society. Visual media have also occasionally carried sensationalist reports on Chinese nationals in the country. There are also studies of Chinese interns and trainees who experience various barriers to human development.⁵³

The Korean diaspora in Japan has been the subject of extensive discussion in scholarly publications and in popular media. A lasting legacy of Imperial Japan's colonial control of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, the so-called 'zainichi' Koreans have long experienced mistreatment and outright discrimination in Japan – in employment, education, housing, and many other social realms. The zainichi Koreans, who have been the largest ethnic minority in Japan for most of the post-WWII decades, today constitute the second largest foreign community after ethnic Chinese and number around 344,000, or about 16% of the total population of foreign nationals registered in Japan.⁵⁴ Their demand for participation in the political life of Japan has long been rejected by the national and local governments, but the movement for civil rights at the local level has been gathering momentum since 1995 when the Supreme Court ruled that Japan's constitution does not bar granting voting rights in local elections to permanent foreign residents.⁵⁵ However, with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party firmly opposed to voting by foreign nationals in the country, the prospect of zainichi Koreans gaining the right to participate in elections, at the national or even at the local level, remains dim today.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

White not an exhaustive study of international migration in Northeast Asia, the foregoing analysis has reviewed recent trends in cross-border migration in the region, pointed out the human development and human security implications of international migration, and illustrated the foreign policy consequences of migration involving significant migrant communities in the region. Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.

First, there is great variation among the Northeast Asian countries/areas in the size of migrant populations, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of the total population, as well as changes in their size. Russia hosts by far the largest

migrant population of all the countries/areas of the region. Japan and South Korea both indicate a substantial need for increasing the availability of foreign migrant workers in the face of their demographic trends but continue to maintain restrictive immigration policies. China, with its spectacular economic growth, has attracted an increasing number of migrant workers, but far more important has been the emigration of Chinese laborers abroad due to a growing gap between labor demand and supply in the country. The presence of Chinese laborers in Japan has provoked a xenophobic response among the Japanese public who are long accustomed to their generally homogeneous society. The population growth rates, labor supply and demand, and economic growth rates in the region's economies are such that we can anticipate further expansion of international migration within the region and the key countries of China, Japan, and South Korea will be pressed to adjust their emigration and immigration policies and prevent cross-border migration from becoming contentious issues in their diplomatic relations.

Second, the refugee situation in Northeast Asia presents a much simpler picture. China and Russia are the two main host countries of refugee populations, the former largely due to events in the 1970s and 1980s (namely, instability in Indo-China), and the latter because of events in the 1990s (the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the last several years (the Ukrainian crisis). Other regional countries/areas host very small numbers of refugees. With the deepening refugee crisis in the Middle East and northern Africa, the international community is pressed to lend support to the growing numbers of refugees of all ages from the conflict-torn regions of the world. Unprecedented numbers of refugees have made their way into the neighboring countries and the European Union member countries, challenging their host countries' capacity to accommodate them and triggering anti-immigrant sentiment among their publics. In contrast, very few recent refugees have reached Northeast Asia. If the countries of the region are to shoulder their fair share of the burden of the humanitarian crisis, they must respond not only by offering financial assistance but also admitting substantial numbers of refugees into their territory.

Third, all of the Northeast Asian countries/areas are implicated in trafficking for forced labor and forced prostitution. The authorities of South Korea and Taiwan have been making steady efforts to detect and prosecute the culprits and to protect the victims of human trafficking, while those of Japan and Mongolia have been making some efforts but those efforts are seen as falling short of the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. China's efforts are falling below those of Macao SAR, Japan, and Mongolia, and Russia and Hong Kong SAR's efforts are woefully inadequate. North Korea is a particularly alarming case, as a source country for forced labor and sex trafficking.

Fourth, the human development and human security implications of international migration in the region are far reaching. Even using the existing international law on the rights of border-crossing individuals as a standard measure of nations' commitment to the protection of those rights, the record of most

Northeast Asian countries is wanting. Every country of the region has failed to accept one or more of the international conventions and protocols relating to migrant workers, refugees, human trafficking, and people smuggling. None of the Northeast Asian countries have embraced the 1990 migrant workers convention, or the two ILO conventions regarding the treatment of migrant workers. The human development approach and the human security perspective shed further light on the state of affairs in the region when it comes to the development of international migrants' human potential and the protection of their freedoms from fear, want, and indignities. North Korea is the most acute case. All other countries, through sustained economic development and growing social mobility, are providing expanding opportunities for human development and human security enhancement for their citizens, but their record on extending the same opportunities to foreign migrants is woefully inadequate, if not totally nonexistent.

Finally, there have been several notable cases of international migrant populations becoming important foreign policy issues affecting bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. Of particular importance are the cases of Koreans both inside and outside of the Korean peninsula in the 20th century as well as ethnic Korean minorities in China, Japan, and Russia in the 20th and 21st centuries. With China becoming a major exporter of labor to the neighboring countries, the region will likely to see greater pressure to accommodate Chinese and other foreign migrant workers in a way that is conducive to the human development and human security of the migrants concerned. This would require a carefully and a no doubt very difficult task of balancing domestic constituents' priorities and foreign nationals' needs and desires against the backdrop of deepening globalization and anti-immigrant sentiments in the region and beyond.

Looking to the future, what are the prospects of international migration in Northeast Asia? What are the likely human development and human security implications?

Substantial numbers of people will continue to move within the region and beyond as economic, political, and social pressures for mobility continue to grow and significant gaps will remain between their needs and the opportunities available. Their neighboring countries will offer the most immediate and the most readily reachable destinations for most of the migrants because of geographic proximity, economic ties, and cultural affinity. Within Northeast Asia, China, South Korea, and Japan will become increasingly desirable destinations for the growing numbers of migrants. China, and to a lesser degree South Korea, as well as Russia and Mongolia will be the main source countries for international migration. Refugee flows of smaller but still significant scales will challenge the Northeast Asian countries' ability to respond to the humanitarian needs of people fleeing conflict, violence, political persecution, and, increasingly, environmental and natural disasters. Human trafficking, too, will continue to be a major problem in the Northeast Asian countries as the 'supply' and 'demand' in modern-day slavery will push and pull vulnerable persons across national and regional

borders. These probable future developments call for expanded studies of international migration and its human development and human security implications, as well as foreign policy consequences.

The growing migration phenomenon in Northeast and other parts of Asia is receiving increasing attention among researchers working in a variety of disciplines. However, the nexus of human development-human security and international migration in Northeast Asia remains an understudied subject. The IOM's *World Migration Report 2018* includes summary reviews by the editors of some leading academic journals on migration in and out of Northeast Asian countries/areas and the themes of migration examined by their journals' articles published in 2015 and 2016. The two chief editors of the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, which focuses on migration issues in the Asia-Pacific region, note 'diversity in the types of migrants, origins and destinations covered'.⁵⁷ The journal's articles in those two years dealt with Korean and Indian student migration, unaccompanied adolescent Korean students in the United States, the return of Chinese students, Japanese student migration, and Filipino teachers in Indonesia. Other topics covered include Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in Singapore, Afghan-native fertility differentials in Iran, Vietnamese migration to Poland, the adaptation of multicultural children in South Korea, and children migrating with their families to Asia.⁵⁸ These articles are generally concerned with conventional issues of international migration and none of them analyze the issues from the perspective of human development or human security.

This author's review of the 2014–18 issues of the *Journal of Human Security* reveals that only one article specifically addressed the issue of the human security of migrants in East Asia and one book review dealt with human insecurities in Southeast Asia. The article on East Asia, 'Redefining Human Security for Vulnerable Migrants in East Asia', argues that human security, defined as the 'securitisation of human rights', is 'a better framework and policy discourse than human rights to engage with state and non-state actors, especially in East Asia where political leaders are more receptive to the former idea'. The article draws illustrative examples from 'stateless Rohingyas, undocumented sex workers in Thailand and Singapore, trafficked brides from Vietnam and Cambodia, and smuggled North Korean refugees in China to demonstrate the nexus between human security and irregular migration'.⁵⁹ The author of this chapter offered a similar argument in his article published in the 2009 issue of the *Journal of Human Security*.⁶⁰ It examined the pressing human security issues of human trafficking, labor migration, and HIV/AIDS in East Asia and the scope and form of institutionalized regional cooperation to deal with them. It also discussed the extent to which the regional countries had embraced the global norms regarding the rights of trafficking victims, migrant workers, persons living with HIV, and AIDS patients, as well as the main obstacles to further multilateral cooperation. It concluded that, despite the growing regional cooperation in addressing these challenges, the human security of border-crossing individuals remained

particularly vulnerable to the violation of their basic rights, a view the author holds to this day.

The human development needs and human security challenges of international migrants in Northeast Asia are bound to grow and this author calls on the research community to engage in vigorous theoretical and empirical studies of the issues concerned. With China, Japan, and South Korea together constituting one of the most important centers of economic gravity in the world, North Korea being one of the most precarious conflict zones in the world, and bilateral political relations in the region often strained and potentially volatile, Northeast Asia will present both human development opportunities and human security challenges to hundreds of thousands of voluntary and forced migrants moving in and out of the region. The research community must study their plight and advocate for their rights in the years to come.

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From Global Issues to National Interests: The Role of Non-State Actors in Redefining Japanese Diplomacy

Jennifer Chan

INTRODUCTION

Everything will begin with refortifying Japan's true abilities and its economy once more. The growth of Japan will benefit the world. Japan's decline would be a loss for people everywhere. So how, then, does Japan aim to realize this growth? What will serve as both a factor for and outcome of growth will be to mobilize the power of women, a point almost self-evident at this gathering. There is a theory called 'womenomics', which asserts that the more the advance of women in society is promoted, the higher the growth rate becomes... Declaring my intention to create 'a society in which women shine', I have been working to change Japan's domestic structures. However, this is not confined merely to domestic matters. Now I would like to address how this is also a thread guiding Japan's diplomacy.

Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Sixty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 26, 2013¹

Japan prioritizes global health in its foreign policy. By fully mobilizing its knowledge and expertise, Japan contributes to realizing a world where every person can receive basic health-care service. Japan promotes universal health coverage, while accelerating its efforts towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy, 2013²

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that 'Warming of the climate system is unequivocal'. Six years ago, Prime Minister Abe announced the Invitation to 'Cool Earth 50'. Since then, the emerging economies have continued rapid development and China has become the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG)... Against this backdrop, Japan finds itself in a position to be able to contribute to the world with its outstanding environment and energy technologies. This presents Japan with an excellent opportunity to serve the world and dramatically heighten its international presence by taking

a proactive stance and to steer international negotiations on climate change backed by viable and effective measures.

ACE: Actions for Cool Earth Proactive Diplomatic Strategy for Countering Global Warming, 2013³

Mahatma Gandhi famously said of the grassroots struggles for Indian independence, 'First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win'. Little would have women's rights, health, and sustainability activists – Japanese and non-Japanese alike – imagined their agenda figuring prominently in Japanese foreign policy. While human rights, health, and the environment were all staple items under 'Global Issues' within Japanese diplomacy, the government's recent shift from passive cooperation to proactive strategy in these areas raises many interesting questions: How did Japan come to adopt 'womenomics' as part of its foreign policy? What is the role of women's movements in shifting the discourses from 'the status of women' in the 1970s to 'women's equality' in the 1980s and 'women's human rights' in the post-Beijing Process? When and why did Japan change its global health strategy from an infectious-disease approach to universal access to healthcare? In a field as contentious as climate change, how did global leaders come to a consensus to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels? Is Japan's diplomatic strategy on global warming, Actions for Cool Earth 2.0, part global commitment and part self-interest (exporting green technology)? Are 'checkbox diplomacy' and 'pragmatic' human security (Gilson and Purvis, 2003) things of the past? What is the role of civil society in redefining Japanese diplomacy? What are the limits of Japan's human rights foreign policy?

While foreign policy remains largely a domain of national political, military, and economic interests, the rise of global civil society, the expansion of new communication technologies, and the challenge of cross-border issues from health, to counterterrorism, to sustainability since the 1990s have greatly expanded the terrain of diplomacy. This chapter examines global civil society's mobilization on women's human rights, health, and sustainability in the past 20 years and its impact on Japanese diplomacy. Using constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, I look at how the Japanese government redefines its national interests and foreign policy based on human rights norms and global development discourses mobilized by civil society. The chapter is structured in four sections. The first part introduces the conceptual shift in international relations (IR) from neorealism and neoliberalism to constructivism and poststructuralism in which power is conceived differently, opening up new ways to understand how nation-states define and project their interests on the world stage. The second part focuses on three examples of civil-society mobilization in the past two decades: women's human rights, health, and climate change. I then gauge the impact of this civil-society mobilization on recent shifts in Japanese foreign policy. I conclude by projecting a few key challenges concerning civil society, human rights, and diplomacy in Asia.

FROM INTERESTS TO KNOWLEDGE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST AND POSTSTRUCTIVIST TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Norms of international society may create similar structures and push both people and states toward similar behavior, but the body of international norms is not completely congruent. Certainly, it is not congruent enough to produce homogeneity or equifinality. Tensions and contradictions among the norms leave room for different solutions and different arrangements, each of which makes legitimacy claims based on the same norms. The compromises arrived at may be contingent on local circumstances and personalities and are likely to reflect the local norms and customs with which international norms have had to compromise.

Martha Finnemore (1996: 136)

IR has traditionally been dominated by neorealist and neoliberalist approaches. Neorealism, as outlined by Kenneth Waltz's *A Theory of International Relations* (1979), emphasizes state interests and power in an anarchic international system. Neoliberalism, delineated by Robert Keohane's book *After Hegemony* (1984), rose as a response to neorealism, focusing on the role of ideas and institutions as additional variables to understand international relations. The collapse of the Cold War, the deepening of institutionalization of the world economy, trade, and security, and the emergence of civil society and a human rights regime in the 1990s have led social constructivists away from state interests to look at how shared ideas rather than material forces shape state identities. Led by John Ruggie (1998), Alexander Wendt (1999), Peter Katzenstein (1996), and Martha Finnemore (1996), constructivists shift IR debates to normative and ideational realms. Among them, transnational advocacy network theorists centered around Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink (1998) focus specifically on the ability of non-traditional international actors to shape the global political agenda by mobilizing information strategically to transform the terms and nature of the debate and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Poststructuralist IR theorists such as Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker (1990) challenge the assumption of neorealists, neoliberalists, and constructivists of a unitary, self-knowing subject (whether state or non-state actors) and the meta-narratives of universalism, sovereignty, progress, rights, and justice. Instead, following Foucault (1972; and Rabinow, 1984), poststructuralists are interested in analyzing how power is productive – that is, how it produces new subjects and subjectivities by legitimizing discourses and knowledges that shape state and individual identities and interests. In this lens, the state is only one among many actors, and traditional political, military, economic, or cultural power is only one kind of power; whoever can produce and legitimize new knowledges can assert their power on the global stage. The poststructuralist turn opens up scholarly and political space to traditionally powerless non-actors, who wield influence through their expertise and information control, often in niche areas.

The study of Japanese politics reflects these conceptual developments in the field of IR. Until the 2000s, Japanese domestic political change and foreign policy were exclusively explained by neorealist and neoliberalist approaches based on a tripartite dominance of the bureaucracy, political parties, and interest groups. Chalmers Johnson's analysis of the Japanese 'developmental' state (1982) is a classic example of the Japanese elite bureaucracy as the prime political actor in Japan. According to this explanation, policy outcomes can be explained by examining bureaucratic interests, power, and strategy, especially the omnipotent Ministry of International Trade and Industry. He argues that the cooperative relations between the state bureaucracy and private businesses account for the extraordinary success of the postwar Japanese economy. Moreover, in a neorealist light, postwar Japanese foreign policy is dominated by the pursuit of economic interests in the world stage. The bureaucratic-dominance model has gained enormous traction: scholars explain postwar social conflicts in Japan from the environment to Buraku liberation and sex discrimination through informal bureaucratic mediation. A second neorealist strand focuses on party politics. According to this camp, political parties, factions, and leaders are the primary actors in Japanese politics, and policy changes are a result of shifting interests and power among parties. Curtis (1988), for example, argues that politicians are the core in the logic of Japanese politics. A third neorealist focus examines major policy changes as a result of interest-group co-optation. Finally, a few scholars use a hybrid model to look at the Japanese state as a network state. Okimoto (1989) argues that the strength of the Japanese state derives from its network characteristics rather than the particular dominance of the bureaucracy, the parties, or interest groups. Studies of grassroots social movements were constrained by these predominant political conceptions. In their classic analysis of protracted grassroots opposition to the construction of Narita Airport, Apter and Sawa (1984) argue that extra-institutional protests have largely failed to generate institutional reforms. Similarly, Broadbent's (1998) research on Japanese environmental politics focuses on the role of domestic interests in shaping environmental policy.

The constructivist turn in Japanese politics did not happen until after the 2000s, when a body of work began to trace the influence of civil-society mobilization on a range of human rights, development, and environmental issues. These studies (Chan, 2004; Flowers, 2009; Chung, 2010) focus on the role of nongovernmental advocacy networks in legitimizing global human rights and development discourses and their impact on Japanese politics. Further, a postconstructivist shift documents the role of globally connected Japanese social movements in creating alternative narratives about economic growth, human rights, and citizenship, fostering a new identity of Japanese as global citizens (Chan, 2008). However, the leap from domestic political change to foreign policy requires further analysis. The rest of this chapter looks at how global civil society's framing of women's human rights, health, and sustainability shapes the Japanese government's diplomatic

strategies surrounding these issues. A constructivist approach to examining Japanese foreign policy in human rights and sustainability complements the predominant neorealist and neoliberal approaches in other foreign policy areas in this volume; it extends our understanding of Japan's evolving interests and role in a constantly unfolding global political landscape.

CIVIL-SOCIETY MOBILIZATION ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, HEALTH, AND SUSTAINABILITY

The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of women in political, civil economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community. Gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated. This can be achieved by legal measures and through national action and international cooperation in such fields as economic and social development, education, safe maternity and health care, and social support. The human rights of women should form an integral part of the United Nations human rights activities, including the promotion of all human rights instruments relating to women. The World Conference on Human Rights urges Governments, institutions, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify their efforts for the protection and promotion of human rights of women and the girl-child.

The Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action, 1993, para. 18⁴

The national and international landscapes for civil-society mobilization are so different today from in the 1980s and 1990s that it is worth recalling what activism was like then. The UN was a state-centric, Westphalian structure with far fewer access points for nongovernmental actors than is the case now. Civil society, both as concept and practice, was dominated by Western perspectives. In Asia, despite the presence of grassroots groups, civil society was heavily constrained by structural legal and political barriers (such as NGO-registration requirements and myriad laws restricting funding, expression, association, and assembly) and repressed. Until women's mobilization in the 1990s, international human rights were largely gender-blind. International health diplomacy was characterized by a disease-control approach, strong Euro-American focus, reliance on treaties and formal international organizations, and the limited involvement of non-state actors (Fidler, 2001). Similarly, environmental multilateralism was dominated by a state-centric UN-convention approach, with little civil-society participation.

Civil-society mobilization on women's human rights, health, and climate change in the past two decades, however, has transformed the framing of each issue and global agenda setting. For the first 40–50 years, the international human rights regime was 'universal' – that is, civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights are supposed to apply to all, men and women. The predominant

equality framework in the first UN Decade for Women (1975–85) and the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) focused on putting in place national machinery to promote women's status (as equal to men) and to end discrimination against women. An equality frame meant that many acute human rights abuses suffered uniquely by women were ignored (Riding, 1993). The Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights by a coalition of 950 women's organizations around the world took the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna by storm (Bunch and Reilly, 1994). The proclamation that 'women's rights are human rights' formed the guiding principle for the subsequent 1995 Beijing Platform for Action with a comprehensive 12-item action plan encompassing all critical areas of women's rights. The Beijing process triggered an unprecedented level of participation of women's groups in all areas of international development and human rights from security and violence against women in conflict situations to international war crimes, poverty reduction, indigenous rights, health, and sustainability. It engendered significant normative developments such as the inclusion of rape and other sexual violence as acts of genocide under the Rome Statute for the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998; the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children in 2000; the inclusion of gender-related goals in empowerment, education, and health in Millennium Development Goals (2000–15) and Sustainable Development Goals (2015–30); and climate-change negotiations.

Postwar international health cooperation was marked by a neorealist health-security approach centered on the interests of a hegemon (US dominance within the World Health Organization (WHO)), or by a neoliberal health-cooperation approach, out of shared interests and interdependence (various health campaigns and partnerships). Although the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health was clearly stated in the WHO Constitution, a people-centered approach to health and a rights framework did not emerge until the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration.⁵ From the 1980s, a People's Health Movement (PHM) grew out of different grassroots movements that affirm health as a fundamental human right and put the responsibility for primary healthcare on governments.⁶ These local popular health movements in the South did not receive much global attention until the AIDS epidemic. Three milestone developments – the declaration of the 'GIPA' (Greater Involvement with People Living with HIV/AIDS) principle in 1994, the Access to Essential Medicines Campaign by *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) in 1999, and the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis in 2002 – transformed health activism (Chan, 2015). National, regional, and global networks of people living with and affected by HIV and AIDS were formed to demand treatment and a role in global health governance. MSF's Access Campaign brought pharma greed to public light and legitimized a right to health discourse in a global free-trade regime. The creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis in 2002 spurred

the formation of thousands of local, regional, and global nongovernmental AIDS networks. Ironically, successful AIDS activism (through vertical, disease-specific funding) brought forth the importance of strengthening national health systems and universal healthcare, without which AIDS victories would remain piecemeal and disconnected from larger health-system gains. Two decades later, AIDS activists came full circle to the earlier PHM's demands for universal public healthcare.

A third contentious global issue that has garnered policy, activist, and scholarly attention in the past two decades is the climate-change movement. International environmental cooperation in the form of multilateral environmental agreements are reflections of neorealism and neoliberalism par excellence. Hegemons readily ratify conventions that have no legally binding mechanisms but withdraw participation from any that may harm their national interests (e.g. Japan's notorious position against the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the US's non-ratification of, and Canada's withdrawal from, the Kyoto Protocol). International cooperation is possible but is beset by bitter defenses of national self-interest. However, to some extent, climate-change negotiations in the past 20 years also support constructivists' view of normative agenda setting by both 'epistemic communities' (Haas, 1992) of scientists and NGOs. Largely led by climate scientists and NGOs, it took 14 years from the first World Climate Conference in 1979 to the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Conference in 1992 to negotiate the first climate-change treaty. It took another 13 years, until the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, for governments around the world to accept the scientific consensus from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – that global warming exists and is caused by man-made CO₂ emissions – and commit to time-bound targets to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. After the first commitment period (2008–12), post-2012 targets were stalled when the 2009 Conference of the Parties (COP), also known as the Copenhagen Summit, failed to yield legally binding commitments for reducing CO₂ emissions, despite recognizing that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the world and that actions were necessary to keep any temperature increases to below 2°C. Finally, the Paris Agreement in 2015 was signed by all 196 participating states to set a goal of limiting global warming to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The role of civil society in the climate-change movement has been well documented (Carpenter, 2001; Florini, 2007; Unmüßig, 2011; Szarka, 2013; Hanegraaff, 2015). The Climate Action Network, led initially by Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth International, and the World Wildlife Fund, is the biggest worldwide network of over 950 NGOs in over 110 countries that helped lobby for legally binding time-bound targets and mitigation instruments. In 2007, Climate Justice Now was created at a UNFCCC meeting in Bali, with a stronger presence of Southern NGOs, to lobby for post-2012 commitments.

As is true for the women's movement and the health-for-all movement, it would be naïve to believe that there is no disagreement among civil-society actors in the climate-change movement. Northern NGOs tend to frame climate change from the perspectives of natural protection and economy, while Southern NGOs rally around climate justice (Szarka, 2013). According to Unmüßig (2011), the climate-change movement was fragmented until the mid 2000s. Climate activists from large Northern NGOs, enjoying the status of co-elitists with climate scientists, often did not bother to mobilize their own membership base or the wider public. Global civil society only sprang into action once the wake-up call came from climate scientists. The climate-change movement remains divided over three main lines of tension: burden sharing between the North and the South, market mechanisms versus systemic change, and local versus global change. That the United States demands Southern countries, especially China and India, increase their reduction targets while not committing itself to do so is problematic. Some NGOs continue to be skeptical about market mechanisms such as emissions trading, while others question the efficacy of the bureaucratic, time-consuming, and costly COP process at the expense of local mobilization for adaptation and mitigation. Despite these differences, global civil society agrees on the 2°C threshold based on climate science. This scientific and civil-society consensus provides the important political context to understand the shift in Japanese foreign policy.

GLOBAL NORMS REDEFINING JAPANESE DIPLOMACY: BEYOND CHECKBOOK DIPLOMACY AND HUMAN SECURITY?

Japan will stand in solidarity with people in vulnerable positions in the international community and make international contributions towards realizing a society which maximizes the potentials of people. Under the slogan of realizing 'a society in which all women shine' in Japan and overseas, the Abe administration organized an international symposium for creating 'a society in which women shine' in September called the World Assembly for Women in Tokyo ('WAW! Tokyo 2014'). The output of the discussions was compiled as recommendations and distributed to the world. Japan will continue to further strengthen its efforts in this area, including collaborating with the international community and assisting developing countries...

Japan proactively takes part in the discussions in the new international development goals (Post-2015 Development Agenda) to be adopted in 2015. Japan is working to ensure that the agenda reflects the principle of human security, and that it incorporates development issues to which Japan is expected to make significant contributions, such as issues in the areas of health and disaster risk reduction...

To reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, Japan actively contributes to the negotiations to adopt a fair and effective framework.

Diplomatic Bluebook, 2015: 177

Postwar Japanese foreign policy was guided by its pacifist constitution, security relations with the United States, and economic growth (Cooney, 2006). Due to her war past, Japan had to regain her credibility as a peaceful nation, especially

vis-à-vis her Asian neighbors. Rapid economic growth throughout the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by an increased participation in international and regional organizations to further her economic and trade interests on the one hand and a significant financial contribution to various international initiatives, from peacekeeping to health, on the other. Japan's largely low-key and non-assertive 'checkbook diplomacy' through economic aid drew criticism for its passive role in global security and international development (Cohen, 1991; Samuelson, 1991).

The adoption of a human-security framework in 1997 provided Japan with a broader foreign policy platform. Based on Nobel laureate Amartya Sen's notion of human development, a human-security approach extends the traditional security focus to include non-military issues: education, healthcare, minimum living standards, fair trade and markets, an equitable global system for patent rights, and the security of people on the move (UN Commission on Human Security Report, 2003). In the past two decades, Japan has been a leading proponent of human security on the international stage, through its financial support for the creation of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999, the creation of the UN Commission on Human Security in 2001, and the revision of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) charter in 2003 to guide and actualize human-security projects. In neither of the pre- and post-human-security phases did human rights or ecology figure prominently in Japanese foreign policy.

Until the 2010s, Japanese diplomacy on women's rights, health, and sustainability followed these broad foreign policy frameworks. In the pre-human-security era, women's rights were entirely absent as a concern. In the 1995 Diplomatic Blue Book, for instance, the brief paragraph under Japan's 'human rights diplomacy' focused on Japan 'being a member of the U.N. Commission for Human Rights since 1982 (serving as the vice-chair in 1994), and has actively contributed to the strengthening of the human rights activities of the United Nations'.⁸ Gender equality was first mentioned in Japanese foreign policy in 1999, based on a dual approach of UN cooperation and 'checkbook diplomacy':

In terms of efforts for gender equality and the advancement of the status of women, Japan participated actively in deliberations and the adoption of resolutions in the follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women at the 42nd session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, held in March. Japan is also active for supporting the women of the world through its contribution of roughly US\$5.8 million in 1998 to such funds as the Women in Development (WID) fund for the support of capacity-building for women in developing countries, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UNIFEM Trust Fund in Eliminating Violence Against Women, the latter established as a Japanese initiative, as well as the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women.⁹

It was not until 2004 that gender equality was first reframed under Japan's human-security foreign policy, but its scope was limited to providing foreign aid (e.g. US\$470,000 to UNICEF's anti-trafficking project in Myanmar) and raising

issues in developing countries, such as female genital mutilation. Prime Minister Abe's address on 'womenomics' to the UN General Assembly in 2013 signaled a major shift in Japan's gender foreign policy. It went beyond the traditional focus on UN treaty compliance, used the language of women's rights, integrated domestic and international focus, and dramatically increased ODA to promote women's participation, health, and peace and security (US\$ 3 billion over three years, from 2013 to 2015).¹⁰ At the UN General Assembly the following year, Prime Minister Abe announced:

In less than a year, the empowerment of women has become a guiding principle that has driven Japan's policies both domestically and overseas... We intend to make the 21st century a world with no human rights violations against women. Japan will stand at the fore and lead the international community in eliminating sexual violence during conflicts... Fundamental rights such as education and health must be ensured everywhere throughout the world. It is necessary for the U.N. and indeed the world to come together as one to take action so that girls and boys can attend school equally, and that expectant mothers can receive medical care with peace of mind. Moreover, in order for women to lead lives full of pride and hope I consider it essential to grow their ability to be economically self-reliant above all else. I do not have the slightest doubt that the creation of a society in which women shine holds the key to changing the entirety of society.¹¹

In the 2015 Diplomatic Blue Book, women's rights stood alone as a separate category from other 'human rights' to encompass a wide range of issues from women's economic participation to sexual violence in conflicts and the promoting of women's empowerment overseas.¹²

Japanese health diplomacy in the past two decades has been through three different phases: 1) a single issue focus on AIDS; 2) an infectious-disease approach within a human-security framework, and 3) health-system strengthening and universal healthcare. Until 1995, health was not a foreign policy matter. Japan's initial response to the global AIDS crisis followed the traditional mode of international cooperation, working through the WHO and the newly established UNAIDS.¹³ Healthcare was framed as a human-security issue for the first time in 2000. Through an infectious-disease approach, Japan made public health one of the ODA priority issues and played a leadership role in the Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative in 2000 during the G-8 Summit in Okinawa and the subsequent establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.¹⁴ The infectious-disease focus lasted for over a decade until Japan announced the broader Strategy on Global Health Diplomacy in 2013. It prioritizes global health in its foreign policy, promotes health-system strengthening and universal health coverage within the context of the Millennium Development Goals, and integrates a gender focus on maternal and newborn health.¹⁵ The following year, two new global health strategies – the Basic Design for Peace and Health and the Basic Guidelines for Strengthening Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases – were endorsed, which focus on building resilient health systems and achieving universal healthcare.¹⁶ In December 2015, Prime Minister Abe published 'Japan's Vision for a Peaceful and Healthier World' in *The Lancet*:

In September, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, which includes universal health coverage (UHC), to which Japan attached great importance during the negotiation process.³ Achieving UHC requires comprehensive changes to systems, human resources, and public awareness. To catalyze such changes, leaders must commit to leave no one behind in the drive for the best attainable health gains. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have created an opportunity to connect sectors and empower individuals, families, and communities. It is crucial that we agree on a monitoring and evaluation framework so that the impact of UHC against investment is measurable and thus attainable...

I reiterate that health issues are not purely the domestic concerns of individual countries. Health is a cross-border, global challenge. It is urgent that we all work to set up a framework for collaboration as soon as possible. At this crucial juncture for the future of global health, Japan will host an international conference, Universal Health Coverage in the New Development Era, on Dec 16, 2015, in Tokyo. In the lead-up to Japan's G7 presidency in 2016, this conference is expected to highlight global preparedness for health emergencies, as well as explore resilient and sustainable health systems under the SDGs. In a world more interconnected than ever before, leaders must strive to unite rather than divide, and enhance human security and peace through the pursuit of health and wellbeing for all. (Abe, 2015)

Unlike women's rights and health, environmental issues did figure in Japanese foreign policy early on. Japan first noted global warming in its 1989 Diplomatic Blue Book, right after the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988.¹⁷ By 1995, Japan regarded 'environmental problems as one of the top priorities for Japan's foreign policy'.¹⁸ As the host of COP3 in Kyoto, it used a three-prong approach to climate change: 1) facilitating UNFCCC COP process, 2) environmental ODA, providing technical and financial support for developing countries, and 3) financing multilateral environmental institutions like the UN Environment Programme. As the most energy-efficient country, fifth-largest greenhouse-gas emitter, and the largest donor of environmental ODA in the world, Japan tried to take up a leadership role in climate change. It ratified the Kyoto Protocol in June 2002, committed to reducing its greenhouse-gas emissions to 6% below their 1990 levels, and passed legislation in 2005 on efforts to meet its target (International Energy Agency, 2009). Climate change was reframed as a human security issue in 2004, and Japanese efforts were stepped up in 2008 during the global negotiations for a post-2012 framework. Prime Minister Abe announced the 'Cool Earth 50' to set a long-term goal of reducing global emissions by half from the current level by 2050.¹⁹ After the Copenhagen Summit failed to produce a legally binding agreement in 2009, all hopes were put on COP21 in Paris in December 2015. At the historic meeting in Paris, Prime Minister Abe announced the 'Actions for Cool Earth 2.0', a reinforcement of Japan's contribution to climate-change actions through increased funding to developing countries, development of innovative technologies, and collaborations through the Global Climate Fund and Joint Crediting Mechanism.²⁰

While there is not enough evidence to suggest causal relationships between global norms and Japanese foreign policy concerning women's rights, health, and climate change, it is safe to say neorealist or neoliberalist concerns alone

cannot explain the shift in Japanese diplomacy in these areas. While a human-security paradigm adopted in Japanese foreign policy certainly encompasses the language of rights, health, and ecology, the recent articulation of Abe's 'wom-enomics' cannot be fully accounted for without looking at trends at the global level since the Beijing Conference. Japan's current strategy on women's human rights mirrors the Beijing Platform for Action that continues to be mobilized by the global women's movement. Similarly, the shift from a narrow infectious-disease approach to a broader health-systems perspective and universal health-care reflects the push by the People's Health Movement and the AIDS movement globally. Japan's climate-change diplomacy is inseparable from global climate-change-prevention norms.

Most constructivists and poststructuralists do not argue that norms, ideas, and discourses are the sole variables in explaining sociopolitical phenomena. Material interests can interact with norms to produce specific outcomes; domestic actors and preferences shape global norms in specific ways so that such norms manifest themselves differently in national and local contexts. Abe's 'womenomics' can very well have a functionalist *raison d'être* in a country with the lowest birth rate. Industry-led negotiations may be the reason why Japan's record in climate-change diplomacy is mixed: it plays an active role in the COP process and has been instrumental in developing countries through its environmental ODA while failing to meet, let alone being able to increase, its emissions target (Pajon, 2010). National self interests may well be served, too, in Japan's emphasis on exporting green technology. What interests IR scholars is pinpointing when and how global norms permeate borders and enter into national political conversations, and how in turn they become articulated as foreign policy strategic goals.

The three cases of women's rights, health, and climate change examined in this chapter suggest five factors that affect the adoption of global norms as foreign policy goals: 1) a strong, sustained domestic NGO mobilization of specific global norms (e.g. women's rights); 2) Japanese leadership in a global issue (e.g. health under Obuchi); 3) overlapping national interests (a declining birth rate, and women's economic power as both a material condition and a rights issue; climate-change technology); 4) partnership with other stakeholders to institutionalize global norms (e.g. Japan's contribution to the establishment of the Global Fund); and 5) an overarching normative/ideological framework (e.g. human security) to incorporate a new norm or to articulate an existing strategy in new, expanded language.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to gauge the influence of external and non-state actors on the shaping of Japanese foreign policy. It began with a brief discussion on the conceptual shift from neorealism and neoliberalism to constructivism and post-structuralism to look at the role of norms and discourses in IR. I then

documented global civil-society mobilizations in three areas: women's human rights, health, and climate change in the past 20 years. Finally, I looked at major shifts in Japanese foreign policy in these three fields and examined how global norms on women's empowerment, national health-system strengthening and universal healthcare, and climate change permeated and became part of Japanese diplomacy after the mid 2000s.

Civil-society mobilization is not always successful in bringing domestic political and foreign policy change. In the past two decades, global civil society also mobilized around many other issue areas, such as indigenous rights and migrant rights. While a few of them, including children's rights and the rights of people with disabilities, also became part of Japanese foreign policy, many others, like minority rights, did not receive any attention. A pertinent example in this latter category is the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement in Japan and the world. Despite strong mobilization (up to 200,000 in front of the Prime Minister's office in 2013), civil-society efforts to stop nuclear energy in Japan did not achieve the desired outcome. Prime Minister Abe has put nuclear energy back on the political agenda, with plans to restart as many reactors as possible. It is unclear how climate activists and anti-nuclear activists can work out the tension between the two movements. In its proposal to meet Kyoto Protocol targets, the Japanese government counted on using nuclear power to meet at least 20% of Japan's electricity consumption by 2030. It may be too early to determine the impact of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement on Japanese foreign policy, which has traditionally focused on nuclear non-proliferation rather than nuclear-energy abolition. At this point, there is no evidence to suggest the largely youth-led movement has had any ideational influence on Japanese diplomacy in this area.

In cases when they work, the influence of global norms on foreign policy is far from being a linear, causal relationship. The cases of women's rights, health, and climate change show us how the translation into foreign policy goals is shaped by continuous mobilization (Beijing+ process), national leadership, partnership with other important global stakeholders to institutionalize new norms, and the ability to align movement goals with domestic national interests. It is too early to proclaim the death of Japanese 'checkbook diplomacy'; ODA remains a primary mechanism through which Japan exercises influence in these and other areas. Is Japan moving beyond a 'pragmatic' human-security approach through the adoption of a normative rights framework? Will Japan adopt foreign policy goals in areas such as indigenous and minority rights, where there may be neither national leadership nor domestic interests? Until then, human rights activists can claim only partial victories.

Notes

- 1 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html [accessed on February 3, 2016].

- 2 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000005946.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 3 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000019537.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 4 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 5 http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration_almaata.pdf [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 6 <http://www.phmovement.org/en/about> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 7 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000106465.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp2_3.html#3 [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 9 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/II-3-d.html> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 10 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 11 http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page24e_000057.html [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 12 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/html/chapter3/c030109.html> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 13 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp2_3.html#3 [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 14 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-3-f.html> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 15 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000005946.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 16 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000110234.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 17 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1989/1989-contents.htm> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 18 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp2_3.html [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 19 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2008/chapter3.pdf> [accessed on February 3, 2016].
- 20 http://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ch/page24e_000119.html [accessed on February 3, 2016].

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Civil Conflict and Third-Party Intervention in The Asia-Pacific

Yuichi Kubota

INTRODUCTION

In the Asia-Pacific, armed civil conflict has been one of the most serious security concerns. Although part of the region experienced a significant reduction in the number of battle deaths and conflict-related deaths after the 1980s (Centre for Human Security, 2004), the conflicts have brought about a massive amount of damage to states by destroying economic infrastructure and social capital. In addition, confrontation during the conflicts perpetuated and deepened hostilities between belligerents and also between supporters. In many cases, such post-conflict ruin made it difficult for both political leaders and citizens to reconstruct their society.

Civil conflicts can have an impact on foreign affairs and policies in the region, as a result of the internationalization of domestic disputes and increased competition among regional powers (Reilly, 2002).¹ More importantly, civil conflicts often arouse the strategic interest of neighboring states and regional powers in the domestic turbulence and bring about the intervention of third-party actors. It is important to understand the mechanism of how and why third-party intervention occurs, because it does not always help settle the disputes and can in fact make solutions difficult. What motives drive states to intervene in civil conflicts? What role do regional powers and international organizations play in their involvement in the conflicts? How do they actually attempt to deal with these internal disputes? Focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, this chapter aims to address these questions.

Third-party intervention influences many aspects of civil conflict, including duration (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Collier et al., 2004; Regan, 2002; Rowland and Carment, 2006), conflict dynamics (Kathman, 2010; Lemke and Regan, 2004; Wood et al., 2012), and consequences (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; Gent, 2008; Hartzel et al., 2001; Mason et al., 1999; Regan, 1996; Walter, 2002). Although the impact of intervention has attracted the interest of academics, this chapter pays more attention to the pattern of civil conflict and its link to third-party involvement.²

To create an overview of the pattern of civil conflict in the Asia-Pacific, the next section discusses what conflicts have been fought and why. The region has hosted many civil conflicts since the end of World War II and remains an area where some armed conflicts are still active. The conflicts are not observed evenly over the region, but are concentrated in particular states. For many states in the region, the colonial legacy influenced state- and nation-building and determined the relationship between the political elites and citizens. The intricate nature of ethnic composition is often associated with this historical experience and tends to influence horizontal inequality in political and economic status between sub-national groups.

Each of the subsequent sections discusses the intervention in civil conflict by third parties including individual states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). First, theoretical considerations for their motivation to intervene in civil conflict are explored. Whereas both actors strategically take into account the prospects of operation, the ‘opportunity’ and ‘willingness’ for intervention needs to be satisfied in order for them to take action. Second, special attention is paid to regional powers and IGOs, who have the potential to overcome hurdles and have a critical interest in conflicts and states/parties involved in the conflicts. The former is represented by states such as India, Pakistan, and China, and the latter includes affiliated organizations of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM -Plus). The final section concludes with a perspective on the development of a regional scheme for conflict management.

CIVIL CONFLICT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The Asia-Pacific is a sub-region that encompasses East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. The region has been among those with the highest frequency and density of civil conflicts per country in the world (Goldstein, 2011; Gurr, 1994). Figure 11.1 shows the number of civil conflicts that have occurred in the region compared with the rest of the world, between 1946 and 2015. The statistics are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset ver. 4 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The dataset defines conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that




Figure 11.1 Number of civil conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and other regions, 1946–2015

concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year' (UCDP/PRIO, 2016: 1). To capture the pattern of civil conflict, this chapter focuses on the cases which were fought between the government of a state and internal opposition groups. These conflicts may or may not have been intervened upon by third-party states.³

With major internal conflicts such as the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, between the 1940s and 1950s the region of the Asia-Pacific accounted for nearly half of the world's occurrences of civil conflict. After the 1960s, many conflicts erupted in other regions and the number of cases greatly increased toward the 1980s. Although the proportion of civil conflicts in the Asia-Pacific diminished during these periods, a significant number of conflicts remained active into the 2010s.

Figure 11.2 breaks down the conflicts that occurred in the region, according to two types of incompatibility: territory and government. These categories represent what warring parties claim to fight over: the parties dispute the status of a territory (e.g., secession or autonomy) or the governmental system (UCDP/PRIO, 2016: 8).⁴ As for the 1940s, there were more reports of civil conflicts concerning government than conflicts that were fought over territory. In the Asia-Pacific, many states became independent in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Under the turmoil of decolonization, state-building that involved the development of political systems would have been a major concern for both elites and citizens. While conflicts over government have accounted for nearly a third of the armed civil conflicts that occurred from the 1940s through to the 2010s, territorial dispute, however, became a frequently observed type of conflict after the




Figure 11.2 Proportions of civil conflicts over territory and government, 1940s–2010s

1950s. During these periods, separatism swept across the region. Secession and autonomy may have been a feasible alternative for sub-national groups once the political structure was formalized after decolonization, because compared with an attempt to overthrow the government, the demand for separation would have been less of a threat for the incumbents.

Civil conflicts tend to occur in a particular context; in other words, some states are troubled by armed conflicts for years whereas others successfully maintain domestic order. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that a single state may experience multiple domestic conflicts concurrently. Reilly (2002) rightly points out that while security issues of the northern part of Asia tended to be occupied by interstate rivalry, the southern areas suffered from intrastate conflicts as well as interstate conflicts. Following the breakdown of incompatibility types in Figure 11.2, Figure 11.3 shows the conflict year of states that experienced civil conflict after 1946.⁵ Myanmar (Burma) stands out for its intensive number of conflicts; it has been primarily disputing territory with several anti-governmental groups since the 1940s. India is the second major state in terms of the frequency of civil conflict. Similar to the case of Myanmar, India has been involved in domestic conflicts over territorial disputes in Assam, Kashmir, Manipur, Nagaland, Punjab, and Tripura, for example. These two states are followed by the Philippines and Indonesia. It is apparent that all of these states are geographically diverse and therefore encompass various socioeconomic groups. Civil conflict is partly associated with the inability of existing institutional mechanisms to adequately address the concerns of sub-populations (Dahal et al., 2003: 8).

Although most of the states listed here experienced more territorial conflicts than conflicts concerning government, disputes over the governmental system accounted for all conflicts in states such as Cambodia (Kampuchea), Laos, and




Figure 11.3 Conflict year by state

Nepal. This pattern is a result of both domestic structural-context (e.g., historical legacy and ethnic composition) and the status of anti-governmental groups relative to that of the central government. These factors influence what the rebels (can) strategically pursue in their armed struggle against the government.

Since 1945, many cases of civil conflict have taken place in the former colonies of the Asia-Pacific (Henderson and Singer, 2000). Because many of the region's states have experienced colonial rule by the imperial powers, this structural context may have influenced the course and pattern of civil conflicts. In post-colonial states, political elites often faced a 'state-strength dilemma'. At the point of decolonization, the local elites sought to create a strong state and cohesive nation. This attempt may have increased the possibility of resistance by sub-national groups within the state as well as empowered these groups, because it was unlikely they would have recognized the legitimacy of the state and, therefore, did not share a national identity. As a result, post-colonial efforts in state- and nation-building further weakened the state (Holsti, 1996; see also Cohen et al., 1981; Henderson, 1999; Reilly, 2002). For this reason, the elites became unwilling to accommodate the groups' needs and instead turned to repressing them in an attempt to ensure security; the opening of political opportunity has the potential to escalate the mobilization of the rival groups that threaten the incumbency (Job, 1992). This situation provides the opposition groups with an incentive to heighten their security and resort to self-defense actions (Posen, 1993). As a result, the tension is not eased between the two sides.

Such a colonial heritage was often entwined with ethnic complexity (Khosla, 1999). The Asia-Pacific region is populated with ethnic groups that form a collective total of more than 1,000 different languages. These groups have been characterized by an uneven status of affluence, where particular sub-regions and

socioeconomic groups were excluded from the development projects administered by the central governments (Bhambhri, 1986). These structural conditions resulted in a sense of deprivation and discrimination among particular ethnic groups.⁶ Furthermore, rapid democratization was often linked to ethnicity-based self-determination and secessionist movements, in which disaffected groups employed violent measures to act on their political aims (De Nevers, 1993). This process opened up an opportunity for the groups, because democracy in principle grants citizens the freedom to choose a form of political institution and government.

However, it is evident that these socioeconomic conditions did not always lead to armed resistance, given the fact that the intensity of ethnic conflict varied across the states, most of which domestically had ethnic complexity (Varma, 1986: 15). Depending on the level of social mobilization, ethnic conflicts had rather been caused by minorities' strategic position and their political/economic relations with the government. Therefore, the decision for ethnic minorities to initiate an armed struggle was contingent on factors such as their internal/external resource base, cohesiveness of community, and perception of homeland (Phadnis et al., 1986; Rupesinghe, 1988).

While these ethnic conflicts tended to be fought over self-determination or secession, rebels may have pursued political goals such as power-sharing with the incumbent government and the overthrow of the current regime. To assert their causes, the rebels brought ideological claims to the dispute. Some cases of armed conflict were fought over ideology, such as in Cambodia (1970–5) and Nepal (1996–2006). Whether it is identity- or ideology-based, civil conflict within a state is bound to spill over into the intra-regional relations of different states (Dahal et al., 2003). In South Asia, for instance, rebel groups have cross-border linkages; the Maoists in Nepal had close links with the Maoist movements in India; the Afghan Taliban received support from Pakistan's border areas; and the LTTE in Sri Lanka relied on the support from Tamil populations in India and abroad (Iyer, 2009: 28).

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: THEORY

Civil conflict is a critical concern for external actors, because not only does it destabilize the state and region in conflict but it also may threaten their survival if the influence of conflict extends across borders. For this reason, by intervening in a dispute, third parties often seek to manage the conflict by shifting or maintaining the balance of power between belligerents (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Gent, 2007; Regan, 2002).

In this sense, intervention is the third party's entry into a civil conflict, to support or oppose belligerents or mediate between them. Third parties can ultimately play the role of imposer of solutions or impartial mediator (Nalbandov, 2009:

9–10). Whether the intervener is an imposer or mediator, the intervention could entail both nonmilitary and military activities. The intervener would pursue its goals through as many means as possible, ranging from diplomatic statement and engagement to the provision/withholding of economic treatment, intelligence, weapons, cross-border sanctuaries, and military training (Wood et al., 2012: 654). While third parties are engaged in civil conflicts through various means, this chapter pays particular attention to intervention that involves the movement of troops. This definition of intervention is conservative and, of course, excludes many other types of intervention. However, because military intervention of this nature is unusual due to its financial and human commitment, it deserves special attention (Talentino, 2006: 12–3).

Intervention is likely when third parties have a strategic interest in the conflict. It is critically important for external states to strengthen their position or weaken that of their rivals through intervention (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Byman et al., 2001; Findley and Teo, 2006; Fordham, 2008; Gent, 2007). The United States–Soviet rivalry is a typical example of this pattern of third-party intervention (Feste, 1992; Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008; Regan, 2000; Scott, 1996; Yoon, 1997). States may also intervene in civil conflicts for economic reasons as well; Fordham (2008) finds that US intervention is driven by economic interests, and Findley and Marineau (2015) argue that the availability of lootable resources provides an incentive of profitability for states to intervene in conflicts (see also Aydin, 2010). In this sense, states would be reluctant to intervene when the conflict is not beneficial enough to satisfy their interests. In theory, humanitarian motives remain a weak consideration for states to take action unless the conflicts affect their security or affluence (Pearson et al., 1994; Wayman and Diehl, 1994).⁷ In international law, unilateral humanitarian intervention by states tends to be permitted (1) when there are massive human rights abuses within a state, (2) when a state has collapsed, and (3) when a democratic government has been overthrown against the will of its domestic population (Levitt, 1998: 336–7). Yet, for the above-mentioned reasons, states are considered as having more complicated motives for civil-conflict intervention.

Then, what aspect of civil conflict attracts third-party interveners, beyond strategic and economic concerns? One of the most prominent components would be cross-border linkages between ethnicities. Ethnic minorities may pose a threat to the security and sovereignty of the state because ethnicity complicates the conflict, in particular when ethnic groups have kin within groups that hold power in a neighboring state (see Davis and Moore, 1997; Davis et al., 1997; Saideman, 2002; Salehyan, 2009). Given that both the ease of operation and foreign threats⁸ are a function of geographical proximity (Pearson, 1976), states are more likely to intervene in adjacent countries than in remote locations (Davis and Moore, 1997; Kathman, 2010; Khosla, 1999; Luard, 1988).⁹ Yet, findings on the link between ethnic conflict and third-party intervention are mixed. Gurr (1993) argues that such disputes attract third-party intervention (Walter, 1997).

In contrast, Heraclides (1990) claims that international norms of territorial integrity and the sovereignty of recognized states prevent third parties from intervening in such disputes (see also Suhrke and Noble, 1997). Furthermore, Cetinyan (2002) notes that the ‘powerful brethren abroad’ do not merely prevent co-ethnic groups from being domestically discriminated against due to their presence but are less motivated to intervene because of the cost relative to the expected improvement of the status of the groups (see also Moore and Davis, 1998).

These state interests have an influence on the intervention by nonstate actors. For instance, the United Nations (UN) is an example of an IGO that has played a central role in the involvement of the international society in civil conflict. The UN has considered and implemented intervention for the ‘hardest cases’ of civil conflict with a high number of casualties and failed attempts of mediation (Regan, 2010: 465; see also de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). Yet, during the Cold War era, its attempt at intervention was influenced by the interests and positions of the great powers (Schachter, 1974). Specifically, civil conflicts that were fought over ideology and involved the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council were less likely to be intervened upon by the UN (Ruggie, 1974). In the post-Cold War period, in contrast, it has become more likely to intervene in disputes where the permanent members have maintained a national interest (de Jonge Oudraat, 1996) or belligerents fought over ideology (Fortna, 1993). This finding is supported by the evidence on the IGOs’ frequent involvement in civil conflicts: multilateral intervention increased by 356% in the post-Cold War period while unilateral action decreased (Talentino, 2006: 26).¹⁰ Many such interventions included the operations aiming to design and develop political institutions to prevent and manage internal conflicts.

Third-party military intervention is typically either unilateral or multilateral, but it can be both. A unilateral intervention is conducted under the leadership of one state, while a multilateral intervention is based on international command structure (Aubone, 2013: 280). In either case, in order for third parties to intervene in civil conflicts, they need to have the opportunity (i.e., capability) and willingness to intervene (Most and Starr, 1984). Indeed, the cost of intervention is unignorable. For instance, foreign governments weigh the likelihood of a successful impact on the conflict with the cost of action (e.g., financial burden, loss of life, political survival of the incumbent government, and loss of perceived legitimacy in the international community) (Kathman, 2010; Regan, 2002).¹¹ States are hesitant to engage in civil conflict where interventions have been repeatedly attempted by other states or IGOs and failed to influence the belligerents’ behavior (Aydin, 2010).¹²

It is understandable that individual states are sensitive to the cost of intervention. When unilaterally intervening in civil conflict, a third-party state has to finance a wide range of military, social, and economic programs by itself. The state thus has a great incentive to be realistic and strategic in intervention and is likely to engage in conflicts that bear minimal costs for its purpose (Aydin, 2010).

While individual states may lack such ‘opportunity’ and ‘willingness’,¹³ regional powers and IGOs would be able to carry out operations and defy the potential cost of intervention to a certain degree because of their strategic aims and resources.¹⁴ Regional powers are states that have ambitions for a major role and/or status within their respective regions and take action to achieve these goals. In addition, those states need to have access to dominant economic resources and possess the military capability to influence neighboring states (Wagner, 2005). In the Asia-Pacific, India, Pakistan, and China are considered regional powers due to their orientation and actions that focus on the region (Khosla, 1999: 1147). Other than the UN and the United States, which have been frequently involved in civil conflicts around the world, interveners often come from within the same geographic region as the target country (Regan et al., 2009: 140). This trend is especially salient in the post-Cold War period, when the major powers reduced their involvement in civil conflicts (Khosla, 1999).

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Regional Powers

In South Asia, foreign links were suspected in many cases of domestic insurrections, including those in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India. Along with its geographical contiguities and mass-level socio-cultural ties across borders, the region has been characterized by Indo-centricity and hegemony that has required a balance between India’s demands and those of neighboring states (Devotta, 2003; Jetly, 1986; Mitra, 2003).¹⁵ This is evident, for instance, in Indira Gandhi’s doctrine claiming that India’s neighboring states were considered to be part of India’s national security and, more importantly, that any of their domestic conflicts were to be resolved with the help of India and not by the interference of outside actors (i.e., states and international organizations) (Hagerty, 1991). India’s interventions in East Pakistan (in 1971) and Sri Lanka (from 1987 to 1990) were based on these ideas (Wagner, 2005). Beyond these cases, the Indian government helped the Royal Bhutan Army take the offensive against the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Although there was no military intervention, the Indian government also supported the Royal Nepal Army until 2005 (Iyer, 2009). India later became less inclined to intervene in civil conflicts abroad, but it had had both capability and willingness to act as an intervener during the 1970s and 1980s at least.

Thus, the neighboring states had apprehensions about India’s interference in domestic conflicts. On the other hand, India also had concerns about neighboring support for rebels in its own state (Muni, 1986). Pakistan has long been involved in the civil conflict in Afghanistan, recognizing the Taliban government until 2001, and thereafter contrarily helping the US battle against the regime.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan brought about their mutual intervention in conflicts; India supported minority groups in Pakistan such as the Ahmadis, Hindus, Mohajirs, Pashtuns, and Sindhis, and Pakistan provided support for Kashmiris, Sikhs, Nagas, and Muslims residing in India (Khosla, 1999: 1148).

China also has a record of military intervention in civil conflicts in the region; for instance, it was a major third party in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. Yet, the state had basically a negative attitude toward the intervention of outsiders in civil conflicts. Since the 1990s, seeing the development of the interventionist trend, China has gradually and reluctantly come to accept the idea of international interference in domestic disputes. For China, third-party intervention has to meet the following requirements for intervention to be legitimate: respect for sovereignty, UN authorization, the invitation of the target state, and limited use of force. Although China continued to oppose the 'West's right' to intervene in civil conflicts throughout the world, this change in attitude led to its limited participation in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations, such as the deployment of civilian police in East Timor and subsequent support for the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) (Carlson, 2004).

In the Asia-Pacific region, the environment for third-party intervention, whether it is carried out by states or IGOs, is not as favorable as that in other regions. Most of the states have been resistant to ideas such as 'preventive diplomacy' and 'early warning' (Reilly, 2002). For instance, nontraditional concepts of security, such as human security, were alien to East Asian states because they were considered as having the potential to erode state sovereignty and territorial integrity (Acharya, 2001). Reflecting debates among member states and the commitment to the principle of noninterference, regional IGOs, such as the ASEAN, ASEAN Plus 3, the ARF, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), have basically been hesitant to make official comments on this issue.

Regional IGOs

However, the attitude toward multilateral intervention has been changing, and the international management of civil conflict has shifted from unilateral to multilateral means since the end of the Cold War (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). Although there was neither action nor discussion by ASEAN member states over the genocide issue in Cambodia in the second half of the 1970s, the 1998–9 crisis in East Timor created a need for external intervention, even the deployment of military force, among the states (Evans, 2004: 273).

Regional IGOs are active interveners in civil conflicts; peacekeeping operations have been organized by regional IGOs, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Commonwealth of Nations (CON), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the

Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Mullenbach, 2005: 531). They are not only important actors but also effective mediators in civil-conflict intervention. Compared with individual states and the UN, regional IGOs are more motivated to stop violence because of the fear of potential repercussions from civil conflict spreading over the respective region (Carment and Harvey, 2001).

The framework of multilateralism had been overall underdeveloped in the Asia-Pacific. One of the reasons for this was the lack of commitment by the United States for the building of such a partnership in this region (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Another factor was the tension between individual states.¹⁶ However, multilateralism took hold in the region around the end of the Cold War, and several organizations and meetings were set up. The ARF may be a typical example of such an organization that was aimed at dealing with security cooperation, including 'confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and "elaboration of approaches to conflicts"¹⁷' (Acharya, 1997: 9). At the Brunei ARF meeting in August 1995, three working groups were set up for tasks such as confidence-building measures, peacekeeping operations, and search-and-rescue cooperation.

Due to the extended membership, however, the ARF has been considered ineffective for carrying out necessary measures for the management of civil conflict. The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM -Plus), a regular meeting of defense ministers in the region, was instead established to further develop the security scheme. While the ARF has 27 participants that include ASEAN member states, Asia-Pacific states and the EU, the ADMM-Plus generally grants its membership to a limited number of outside actors. Thanks to its restricted membership, it seems that the meetings function to help the member states facilitate discussion on regional security. Although a consensus was not reached, the possibility of ASEAN peacekeeping forces was discussed in the first ADMM in 2006 (Shoji, 2013: 7). The second ADMM in 2007 adopted the Three-year Work Programme that emphasized the importance of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and peacekeeping. This is based on ASEAN member states understanding that they need to be able to effectively deal with civil conflicts in the region (such as the commotion in East Timor) (Shoji, 2013: 8). In the meetings that followed between 2011 and 2013, the initiative developed into a proposal to design a common training program and establish peacekeeping centers in the ASEAN states.

CONCLUSION

The Asia-Pacific region has long experienced intense civil conflicts that have attracted the attention of third parties. Regional powers such as India, Pakistan, and China have had strategic interests in the conflicts of their neighboring states and have intervened to alter or maintain the course of disputes. Although military intervention has required them to bear financial and human costs, the successful management of each conflict has been aimed at compensating for these burdens

by assuring the protection of co-ethnic brethren or regimes favorable to the interveners.

Unilateral intervention by states was more or less tolerated in the shadow of the Cold War. Superpowers themselves, the United States and the Soviet Union, were active interveners in civil conflicts over the world. During this period, most conflicts were framed by, or even replaced with, ideological disputes. Along with security concerns about their immediate neighbors, the foreign policy of regional powers was influenced by the rivalry between superpowers. By sometimes upholding their ideological causes, the regional powers sought either to side with particular belligerents or mediate disputes.

Due to their capability and policy orientation, regional powers tend to be well positioned to intervene in conflicts. Likewise, regional IGOs have an incentive to contribute to the stability in the region. In the Asia-Pacific, states have been reluctant to adopt any collective scheme for conflict management (e.g., ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘early warning’). It is evident that interstate tensions such as those between India and Pakistan have been hindering the development of multilateralism in collective conflict-management, which may be related to their interference in domestic disputes. Multilateral intervention is expected to promote change in the status quo by encouraging a local process through which new political systems and institutions can be created (Talentino, 2006: 31). Because of long-lasting interstate tensions, the attitude of individual states toward multilateralism has remained passive.

Recently, however, the idea of multilateral management of civil conflict has germinated in the region. Experiences that had previously discouraged policy makers (e.g., the 1998–9 riots in East Timor) in turn motivated them to discuss the possibility of collective management of conflict through measures such as (the training of) peacekeeping forces. Despite the existence of ongoing and potential interstate confrontation, while it is not probable that interstate disputes will immediately disappear in the region, a window has been opened for the adoption of multilateral conflict-resolution.

Notes

- 1 For instance, in South Asia, defense expenditures rose during civil conflicts. In the search for weaponry and training facilities, the governments became dependent on external powers in the Cold War period, including the United States and China. This inevitably limited their foreign policies (Muni, 1986: 62).
- 2 Aubone (2013) categorizes previous studies according to their emphasis on dynamic or fixed characteristics of civil conflict and target state. In addition, studies focusing on the domestic conditions of interveners are recognized as one of the distinctive approaches.
- 3 The dataset distinguishes these two types of internal armed conflict: one without intervention from other states and another with intervention from other states (UCDP/PRIO, 2016: 9).
- 4 Although it is theoretically possible that the parties dispute both territory and government, the dataset does not record such civil conflicts.

- 5 The data were also taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.
- 6 Yet, it is also true that ethnic conflicts were not always caused by such feelings but were incited by the intra-elite conflicts and competition (Muni, 1986: 60–1).
- 7 Regan (2000) contrarily shows that unilateral interventions are also likely to occur when the conflicts contain concerns of humanitarian crisis (see also Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Licklider, 1995).
- 8 The threats include substantial death and destruction, regime change, or an end to survival of those states that share a border with the state in conflict (Kathman, 2010: 990).
- 9 Religious linkages can also be a motivation of intervention (see Byman et al., 2001; Fox, 2001).
- 10 After the end of the Cold War, multilateral intervention has come to be viewed as a part of conflict-resolution efforts. In this sense, collective action organized under IGOs gained legitimate status (Talentino, 2006: 49–50).
- 11 The effectiveness of action is also contingent on the solidarity and cohesion of groups to be intervened (Nalbandov, 2009: 14–5).
- 12 Yet, a significant number of civil conflicts was not intervened upon by third parties: about one third of such conflicts was not intervened upon in the post-World War II period (Regan, 2002).
- 13 A neighboring state may be an exception: their proximity to a place of conflict increases the opportunity. In addition, the neighboring state is motivated to intervene by the threat received from the war and connection to the civil-war state (Kathman, 2010).
- 14 For the same reason, it is not surprising that major powers were the primary interveners during the Cold War (Regan, 2010: 466; see also Lemke and Regan, 2004).
- 15 Wagner (2005) argues that India's regional policy shifted from hard- to soft-power strategies between the 1980s and 1990s.
- 16 An important exception is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was established in 1985, despite bilateral tensions between India and Pakistan, for example, to facilitate a multilateral approach to conflict resolution.
- 17 This is equivalent to 'conflict resolution'. The term was amended as a concession to China who opposed any such role for the ARF (Acharya, 1997: 16–7).

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Asian Cybersecurity

Motohiro Tsuchiya

INTRODUCTION¹

On February 19, 2013, the *New York Times* reported that a 12-story building in the northeastern part of Shanghai was the source of cyber operations against the United States and other countries (Sanger et al., 2013). The article said that Unit 61398 of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was housed in the building and that this unit was organizing large-scale and sophisticated cyber operations, quoting a report by an American private security company, Mandiant (Mandiant, 2013). The area where the building was located is well known among native Shanghai residents as a military district. Apartments for military families surrounded the building.

The news was the impetus for the US government to seek further funding for cybersecurity. Right after the report, in February 2013, President Barack Obama signed an executive order for cybersecurity, referring to it in his State of the Union Address of the same day. The importance of cybersecurity in political arenas was clear.

On March 20, 2013, the Republic of Korea (ROK) saw cyberattacks against broadcasting stations and banks. Back office systems of broadcasters were forced to stop operations and automated-teller machines (ATMs) of banks were disabled. However, these attacks had some strange features. Broadcasters were compromised, but the broadcasting systems themselves were alive, allowing broadcasters to broadcast that they were under cyberattack. The fact that the attackers did not break the broadcasting systems might have been motivated by the desire for

these attacks to be advertised in the news. The attacks against ATMs could also have been meant as a kind of demonstration. If the attackers had really wanted to disrupt the South Korean economy and cause damage to its military forces, other strategic targets would have been selected. It was reported that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched these attacks. The DPRK is reportedly said to have thousands of cyber warriors inside its military forces.

In late May 2015, the Japan Pension Service (JPS) lost 1.25 million pension records owing to a cyber espionage act using four types of computer viruses. Japan is an aging society and pensioners are politically powerful. The incident became a political issue that reminded the nation that Japan is never immune from cyber-related attacks.

During the 2016 American presidential election, e-mail messages of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) were stolen and revealed on several websites. The US government realized an intrusion to the DNC in the summer of 2015, one year before the revelation, but didn't respond to it. Fake news related to two presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, were also spread all over the cyberspace. After the election, US President Barack Obama said that a series of election interventions had been organized by the Russian government and authorized sanctions to expel 35 Russian diplomats and intelligence agents and to close two Russian compounds in the United States. This Russian intervention shook the Trump administration and the US–Russia relationship (Miller et al., 2017).

Such political use of cyber methods is becoming more common and more sophisticated. A series of interventions and influences were also seen in the 2017 UK national election and the 2017 French presidential election. East Asia won't be an exception. It is one of the hottest cyber battling places. State and non-state actors are launching various kinds of cyber operations and attacks out of political, economic, military and even individual motivations. They disrupt online activities, steal confidential information, or prepare for future warfare. The perpetrators always try to hide themselves in vast clouds of digital bits.

THREE TYPES OF CYBERATTACKS

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

Although there are various types of cyber 'attacks', most of them do not harm anyone/anything physically. There are very few cases of such attacks causing bodily injury or physical damage to property. However, the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* defines a cyberattack as a 'cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects' (Schmitt, 2013).² This definition leaves some gaps in the understanding of what cyberattacks mean.

A more general term which is sometimes used instead of 'cyberattack' is 'cyber operation'. It is defined in the *Tallinn Manual* as 'the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or by the use of cyberspace' (Schmitt, 2013: 15). Strict differentiation between terms is naturally desirable, but it is becoming very common to refer to various types of cyber operations, which do not cause physical damage, in the broad sense of cyberattacks.

Here we categorize cyberattacks in three groups. The first is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. This is a classic type of cyberattack of which there are many examples in the world. A notorious example of DDoS was the attack suffered by Estonia in 2007. Estonia is located next to Russia and is one of the three Baltic states which were occupied by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Estonia's capital city is Tallinn, and a bronze statue erected to the memory of Soviet heroes was located in a park in the center of the city. Following all the required procedures, the Estonian government set out to move the statue to a suburban cemetery for fallen heroes. Right after this was reported in the news in Russia, DDoS attacks broke out against Estonia.

DDoS attacks utilize so-called zombie PCs, which are infected with computer viruses and are distributed across the world. Zombie PCs form networks called 'botnets'. Upon being issued commands by attackers, those botnets start accessing targeted computer servers. These servers receive an enormous number of accesses from an army of computers distributed throughout the world and each access seems legitimate to its target. It is very difficult to distinguish malicious access by zombie PCs from normal access. Finally, the targeted servers are overwhelmed and are forced to shut down.

Estonia is one of the most advanced information societies in the world. People carry very little cash on them in daily life. They use electronic money stored in smart cards or mobile phones. The DDoS attacks took down many servers and systems required for the smooth operation of Estonian society for several days. This was the first case of a country losing social functions as the result of cyberattacks.

Similar DDoS attacks occurred in many countries after this. One of the most shocking DDoS attacks was the one against the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in July 2009. It broke out on July 4, Independence Day of the United States. Websites of the Department of Defense, the Department of Treasury, and other governmental and commercial organizations were hit simultaneously by infected zombie PCs located all over the world. Owners of such infected computers had no idea what their computers were doing. Those websites were forced to shut down or became very slow to respond to the flood of accesses.

Three days later, the same type of attacks took place against the ROK. Later investigation revealed that the same attacker had launched those attacks against the two countries. It was also reported that the DPRK was the culprit. Japan was not targeted, but was shocked to learn that eight servers in Japan had been used

to attack the two countries. South Korean police contacted their Japanese counterpart and identified the eight servers, but the owners of the servers in Japan were completely unaware that their servers had been involved in those attacks. Someone had managed to penetrate into the servers and embed malicious code in them.

However, this shocking fact was not widely discussed in Japan. In July and August 2009, Prime Minister Taro Aso's administration was entering its last days. Prime Minister Aso's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost a national election in August, and Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the new prime minister. At this juncture, the Japanese government was too busy with domestic political matters to respond to the July DDoS attacks in the United States and the ROK.

In December that year, five months after the attacks, Hirofumi Hirano, Chief Cabinet Secretary of the DPJ Hatoyama administration, said in a press conference on December 17, 2009, 'the government is assuming that Japan can be a target of similar attacks. Cyberattacks are issues of national security and crisis management'. It took five months for the government to draft the 'Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation' in May 2010 (Information Security Policy Council, 2010).

In September that year, a Chinese fishing boat crashed into a patrol boat of the Japan Coast Guard, which arrested the captain of the Chinese fishing boat. After this incident, large-scale street demonstrations against Japan started in many cities in China and they spilled over to the Internet. Messages such as 'Attack Japan Online!' were posted on online bulletin boards. One such bulletin board listed Japanese government websites and private sector targets, including famous cartoonists, as possible targets of DDoS attacks. The list of targets was very long and largely indiscriminate. However, the Japanese government could read such online postings from Japan, and the government was so well prepared after the 2010 Strategy that the damage caused by those DDoS attacks was minimal. DDoS attacks are annoying to the victim, but they are not lethal.

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

The second type of cyberattacks is called Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). E-mail is a popular application for most Internet users and many APTs use e-mail as a starting point. On March 11, 2011, big earthquakes and tsunamis hit Japan. Thousands lost their lives and east Japan was thrown into widespread and deep confusion. Twenty days later, some Japanese government officials received e-mail messages titled 'Yesterday's Radiation Level'. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was in serious trouble and leaking radiation after the tsunami hit its generators. Everybody in Japan was so worried about this situation that most of the government officials who received these e-mail messages opened the attached files without any misgivings or doubts.

The attached files contained customized computer viruses that allowed the attackers to penetrate government networks. A customized virus is a virus that is designed according to the system and environment of a specific target. As they were not commodity type viruses, anti-virus software could not detect them at first. Anti-virus software adds newly found viruses every day, but updating of virus definitions takes some time. A non-detection period of a few days is plenty for attackers, allowing them to use advanced persistent methods to get into target computers and networks. Once they gain access to someone's computer, they make the best use of the available information. For example, they send disguised e-mails to the target's friends, partners or higher value targets to get into more computers and networks.

Six months later, in September 2011, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, one of the most popular newspapers in Japan, reported on the first page that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) had been a target of an APT. MHI is Japan's largest military contractor and 36th in the world (Defense News, 2015).

Before the attacks against MHI, an industry association was the first victim. The association did not have any cybersecurity measures in place, as it considered that it did not have confidential or high-value information. The computer of one of the employees of the association was compromised and this employee's e-mail account was manipulated remotely. Disguised e-mail messages were sent to MHI and other military contractors in Japan. One or more employees of MHI opened disguised e-mails and attachments from the association because they looked real. At least 83 computers (45 servers and 38 personal computers) at MHI were infected by viruses and started covertly sending out pilfered information to 20 overseas computers outside MHI. As a major military industry player, MHI's dockyard in Kobe was producing nuclear plants and submarines and its dockyard in Nagasaki was producing ships for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). IHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, other major military industry players, were also targets, but were not infected.

Political leaders at the National Diet (Parliament) of Japan were upset by this development, as MHI held high-tech information from American military contractors for the joint production of weapons and other equipment. Loss of such high-tech information might ruin the Japan-US relationship. Later investigations revealed that the e-mail passwords of all National Diet members were also stolen and that their e-mail messages were being read by someone. Kaspersky Lab called the attacker group 'Icefog' and reported that the group was attacking not only Japanese but also South Korean military contractors. The attackers were probably cyber mercenaries. Analysis of the computer viruses found signs that their creators must be native Chinese users, but the attacks required native Japanese and Korean speakers too. As the attacks were executed very quickly, it is probable that a group of mercenaries was hired for their professional skills (Kaspersky Lab, 2013; Menn, 2013).

APTs usually do not cause physical damage or loss of lives. They are rather cyber espionage activities to steal confidential information or intellectual property. However, some attackers intend to destroy data too. In 2012, Aramco, an oil company in Saudi Arabia, lost data from 30,000 computers. As written earlier, South Korean broadcasters' computers lost data and bank ATMs failed to work in March 2013. The methods used for the attacks in the two countries had many similarities. Notwithstanding the data theft from Aramco, the attackers seemed more interested in disrupting the targets' businesses than stealing data from them.

Cyber-Conventional Combination (CCC)

The highest risk comes from Cyber-Conventional Combination (CCC) attacks. When cyber weapons and conventional weapons are combined, they can have the highest impacts in both the cyber and real worlds. A famous case of a CCC attack broke out in Syria. A satellite photo of a building in a desert of Syria was taken in 2008. Experts realized that it looked like a nuclear facility of the DPRK. A tie between Syria and the DPRK was doubted in many areas. In vain, Israel asked President George W. Bush to bomb the facility. The United States was busy handling Afghanistan and Iraq. One day, however, the facility was destroyed, but the United States, Israel, and even Syria remained silent. Most people did not understand what had happened. Richard Clarke, a former White House staff member, revealed in his book with Robert K. Knake that Israel jet fighters had bombed the facility without Syrian counterattacks (Clarke and Knake, 2010). Israel had manipulated Syria's air-defense radar by covert cyber operations in order to avoid detection of its jet fighters flying over Syria's territory. This case clearly illustrates the effectiveness of a CCC attack.

A more famous case is the STUXNET attack against Iran, which was uncovered in June 2010. The Iranian government was constructing a nuclear facility in a remote city called Natanz. Iran claimed it was for peaceful purposes, but other governments doubted Iran's intentions. One day, operators of the facility realized some of the centrifugal machines at the site were not working well. At first they did not understand what was going on inside the facility. When one of the operators took his laptop back home and plugged it into the Internet to check the system, a computer virus was released to the outside world. A foreign security vendor found the virus and named it 'STUXNET'. Analysts found that STUXNET was so sophisticated and complicated that they assumed state actors had developed it. Its size was much larger than usual viruses or malware. It was designed to work on a specific control system developed by Siemens, a German vendor. Its infection capabilities were very high, but it was developed for a specific Siemens control system only. STUXNET was found in many control systems of the world. For example, a Japanese water supply system was infected, but it did not cause any harm because the system was not using the specific Siemens

control system used at the Natanz nuclear facility. Analysts traced the infection and found that Iran's control systems were the first targets. Only then did Iran realize that their centrifugal machines in Natanz had been cyberattacked.

It is common sense not to connect sensitive control systems of critical infrastructure to the Internet. Actually, Natanz's control systems for the centrifugal machines were not connected to the Internet until the operator took his laptop back home. It was speculated that someone introduced STUXNET viruses into Natanz's system manually, probably through a thumb drive. This incident alerted security operators to the fact that an 'air gap' with the Internet does not guarantee the safety of systems.

In June 2012, the *New York Times* reported that STUXNET was part of OPERATION OLYMPIC GAMES, a joint operation by the United States and Israel. David Sanger, author of the article, published a book describing the operation in detail based on leaks by government insiders (Sanger, 2012). President Barack Obama did not confirm whether this was an operation mounted jointly by the United States and Israel.

In December 2014, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) was compromised and lost blueprints of a plant and other data from its server. The attacker demanded money, but KHNP chose not to comply and some of its data was leaked. Investigation by the Korean government showed that the attack was not serious and did not lead immediately to the destruction of the plant. However, this incident was a reminder that critical infrastructures in the private sector could be the target of cyber operations.

On December 23, 2015, there was a huge power blackout involving 1.4 million households in west Ukraine (Geers, 2016). It was reportedly caused by a Russian intelligence agency. There was no serious impact on Ukraine society. However, such an attack might have a greater impact and cause more damage if directed against a major city such as Tokyo, Seoul or Beijing.

RESPONSES FROM JAPAN, ROK, AND PRC

Japan's Response

In November 2014, it was reported that Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) was the target of cyberattacks. SPE is an American company, but the SONY brand originates from Japan. The case was shocking for Japanese industries and the general public. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US government repeatedly stated that the DPRK organized the attacks, several private sector analysts were skeptical of North Korea's involvement. It might take more time before the real story comes out, but if the FBI's conclusion were true, it might be the first big case of a state using cyberattacks against a specific commercial company in a foreign country to disrupt its business.

The Japanese government bore 6.13 million cyberattacks in fiscal 2015. This means that the Japanese government was attacked every 5.2 seconds. The number for the private sector is likely to be even higher. Financial sector companies are forced to warn their customers when they are targeted. The MHI incident in 2011 became a notorious case of weak cybersecurity demolishing a company's reputation and affecting stock prices.

As stated above, after the DDoS attacks against the United States and the ROK in July 2009, the Japanese government issued the 'Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation' in May 2010. The 2010 Strategy was published under the DPJ government. Shinzo Abe's LDP administration, which came to power in late 2012, wanted to renew it. On June 10, 2013, the government published 'Cybersecurity Strategy', which was authorized by the Information Policy Security Council (ISPC).

However, this Cybersecurity Strategy did not have any legal status. The ISPC itself was a subunit under the IT Strategic Headquarters and its strategy did not bind any ministry or agency in the government in a legal sense, but as most of them were involved in drafting the Strategy, they were eager to follow it and fulfill the commitments stated in the Strategy.

In response to a series of high-profile attacks against business and government targets – for example, MHI in 2011, SPE in 2014, and JPS in 2015 – the Japanese government has taken significant steps to improve cybersecurity. Even before the SPE incident became public, the Japanese Diet was taking steps to reinforce cybersecurity. In November 2014, the Diet passed the Cybersecurity Basic Act, and it became effective in January 2015; in the Japanese system, a basic act sets the country's long-term strategic goals in a certain policy area.

After passing the act, the National Information Security Center was transformed into the National Center for Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC).³ It acquired more authority and strengthened its legal basis for overseeing cybersecurity issues in Japan, which means that the NISC now has the ability to 'request' information from each of the ministries. However, the fact that they are not required to comply with these requests is likely to take away from NISC's ability to execute its mission.

The ISPC, which set cybersecurity policies across the government and reported to the Chief Cabinet Secretary, was promoted and renamed the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters (CSH), and today this body cooperates closely with the new Japanese National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the Prime Minister. The CSH's mandate is broad, covering the setting of Japan's strategic goals for cyberspace, protection of critical infrastructure, raising of public awareness, research and development, and information-sharing.

There is an international component to the Cybersecurity Basic Act. Article 23 requires Japan to contribute to international arrangements that improve its cybersecurity. The SPE incident came at a timely moment to test Japan's new responsibilities.

Based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, the CSH laid out its draft of a new Cybersecurity Strategy on May 25, 2015. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, who heads the CSH, immediately ordered a second version of the draft when the JPS was found to have been hacked. The new strategy was finalized on August 20, 2015, and was approved by the Cabinet on September 4. While the Cabinet's approval did not make the strategy law, it did confer it quasi-legal status. The strategy demonstrated Japan's high-level commitment to cybersecurity and formed the basis of measures to be implemented henceforth at ministries, agencies, and other government organizations.

Looking at the new strategy, the first thing to note is the stepped-up capabilities of the Government Security Operations Coordination team (GSOC). As a part of the NISC, GSOC has mainly been responsible for watching over the computer systems and networks of central government ministries. It was GSOC that first discovered the hacking of JPS and informed it of the intrusion, though (owing to the nature of the hack) the breach could not be addressed quickly. In response, the government extended GSOC's monitoring abilities to cover government-affiliated organizations as well, including incorporated administrative agencies and special public corporations (JPS falls under the latter). It is also expected to bolster the budgets and staff of the NISC and GSOC to enable them to fulfill their roles as cybersecurity control towers.

A second point of the strategy is the government's efforts toward not only post-incident response but also proactive prevention. The strategy promotes understanding among relevant parties of the need to report even small-scale damage and signs of suspicious activity to safeguard against large-scale cyberattacks. It also puts emphasis on bolstering both internal and external systems of cooperation and information-sharing. It goes without saying that a speedy response and recovery is essential following a cyberattack, but it also should be possible to prevent incidents from occurring by monitoring networks and systems and sharing information about hacking incidents among different agencies and with global partners.

A third point is the strategy's effort to strike a balance between security and free access. It underscores the impossibility and impracticality of tasking the government with maintaining order in cyberspace. In global cybersecurity talks, China and Russia have called on states and governments to take greater roles in policing unlawful activities by boosting surveillance and control measures. In response, Japan, the United States, and European countries have argued for the need to guarantee freedom of speech and the free flow of information. Entrusting cybersecurity solely to the state may result in a kind of surveillance society. Japan has openly expressed its opposition to such a scenario. The Japanese strategy articulates the government's firm stance against state use of cyberspace to control, censor, steal, or destroy information, as well as its 'illicit use' by terrorists and other non-state actors. It goes on to establish the government's commitment to proactively contribute to conserving cyberspace for 'peaceful purposes' while also ensuring the safety of the country.

ROK's Response

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the most frequently cyberattacked countries in the world. The country has been attacked many times, especially by the DPRK, and reconnaissance activities are seen on an everyday basis. It is said that the DPRK has around 6,000 cyber warriors, but Internet use among the general public is extremely limited and only the privileged elite use the Internet. Most of the Internet connection in the DPRK is going through China. Although the United States holds 1,500 million IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, the DPRK has only 1,024 addresses (Pagliery, 2014).

On November 4, 2016, the China–Japan–Korea (CJK) Cybersecurity Track 2 Dialogue was held in Seoul, ROK. ‘Track 1’ refers to official government discussions, and the Track 1 level ‘Trilateral Cyber Dialogue’ has been held since 2014. ‘Track 2’ usually refers to a dialogue that takes place in the private sector, mainly involving think tanks and research institutes which are government-affiliated in many Asian countries. Track 2 dialogues are used to have frank and honest discussions, usually by academic institutions.

The CJK Cybersecurity Track 2 Dialogue was held at JW Marriott Dongdaemun Square Seoul while a political scandal at the Blue House of President Park Geun-hye was drawing people’s attention. On the next day of the dialogue, 45,000 people assembled for demonstration activities near the Blue House, according to a police statement.

The Dialogue used a whole day to discuss cybersecurity issues. It was called and organized by Professor Nohyoung Park of Korea University, which is well known for its leading role in cybersecurity initiatives in ROK. Professor Jongin Lim at the university was a special assistant to President Park in security affairs.

At the Dialogue, China was represented by Dr Longdhi Xu of the Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. Dr Xu was a panelist at the Seoul Cyber Space Conference in 2013 as the Chinese representative for a panel on ‘International Security’. He is one of the leading scholars in cybersecurity in China. Japan was represented by the author and two others from Keio University. Three researchers from three countries (nine researchers in all) participated in three panels at the Dialogue.

This Track 2 Dialogue was not a ‘formal’ track 2 dialogue, which is authorized by each of the three governments. The researchers agreed to have this dialogue and it was a purely independent gathering, although it was sponsored by the National Security Research Institute (NSRI) of Korea. The author had met Prof. Park and Dr Xu on several occasions at world cybersecurity conferences. The researchers were worried about cyberattacks and operations in East Asia as these were mounting in intensity, although aware that the Track 1 CJK Dialogue had been held; there are issues that governments hardly discuss frankly.

Track 2 dialogues are frequently used in cybersecurity. One of the most famous cases is the US–China Track 2 Dialogue. In May 2014, the US Attorney General,

Eric Holder, suddenly held a press conference to declare that the US government would prosecute five Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers who were engaged in cyber operations against the United States. The surprised and angry Chinese government responded by cancelling the activities of the US–China Cyber Working Group.

However, the Track 2 Dialogue between the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the United States and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) was kept alive and it functioned as the default Track 1.5 Dialogue as government and military officials on both sides joined it occasionally. Even after Track 1 was cut off, Track 2 survived as an important communications channel.

The CICIR has Track 2 dialogue with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of the UK and another channel with the European Union (EU). The CICIR also supports diplomatic activities of the Chinese government in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on cyber issues.

The Chinese government has the Cyber Administration of China (CAC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has the Central Network Security and Informatization Working Group as a responding organization to the CAC. Both the CIIS and CICIR are think tanks, which are helping the Chinese government.

The Track 2 Dialogue had three sessions: (1) Current Developments of Law and Policy on Cybersecurity, (2) Current Developments of Technical Aspects on Cybersecurity, and (3) International Developments in Cyberspace. As the Dialogue adopted the Chatham House Rule, details of the discussions could not be shared, but the participants understood that the development of legal systems in each country was underway.

In July 2013, the ROK adopted National Cybersecurity Comprehensive Countermeasures. After that, several bills were introduced in Congress and the Act on Promotion of Information Security Industry was enacted in 2015. Some other bills were introduced in the congressional session which started in May 2016, but none had been enacted as of December 2016.

The CJK Track 2 Dialogue was held in Beijing in 2017 and in Tokyo in 2018, with the ROK hosting the Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang in February 2018 and Japan hosting the Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo in August 2020. The dialogue facilitates the sharing of information and experience at such big events.

PRC'S RESPONSE

In September 2015, President Barack Obama of the United States and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China (PRC) met in Washington DC and discussed cybersecurity. They held a joint press conference after the meeting and said that they had agreed not to use and support cyberattacks. However, no

document describing the agreement was drafted. By then, the PRC had been advocating that China was a victim, not a perpetrator, of cyberattacks and rejecting making any agreement with the United States. It was assumed that China would not change its position and that it would reject the US argument again. In that case, the media reported that the US government would launch economic sanctions against China.

However, China had been preparing well enough to avoid economic sanctions. President Xi visited Seattle, an American west coast city, where Microsoft and Boeing have their headquarters, to have a large meeting with top executives of American IT companies, where he stressed that both countries were deeply interdependent. Further, President Xi announced a plan to purchase 300 airplanes from Boeing. During President Xi's visit to Seattle, Washington DC was welcoming the Pope from Rome and the news coverage about China was smaller.

At the summit meeting in Washington DC with President Obama, President Xi agreed that both countries would not use cyberattacks to steal intellectual property rights and would not support such acts, and that they would establish a new high-rank dialogue mechanism twice a year. The US–China Cyber Working Group had been suspended after the sudden indictment of five PLA officers by the US Department of Justice in May 2014. The summit agreement resumed the discussion between the two countries in a substantial way.

An important point to note on this agreement is that neither government admitted that the Chinese government or PLA had launched any cyberattacks against the United States. They did not touch upon the past, but agreed not to launch cyberattacks in the future. This enabled China to agree while not losing face and avoiding economic sanctions. The Chinese government wanted the summit talks to succeed and this meant that US pressure worked in a way.

Before this summit talk in September 2015, US pressure had had some effect on the Chinese government's actions. The first US–China summit talk, which broached cybersecurity for the first time, was held in June 2013. Both presidents met in California after President Xi's visit to Central and South American countries. At this meeting, President Xi repeatedly said that China was a victim of cyberattacks and that they could not make an agreement. However, after coming back to Beijing, President Xi organized the Central Network Security and Informatization Working Group and became the leader of the working group. Prior to this, there had been no one in charge of cyber issues in the Chinese government.

In 2011, the Chinese government had established the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and Lu Wei was named as its head. Lu was authorized to have more power over cyber issues after being made the working group leader by President Xi. Before the summit meeting in September 2015, the CAC and the Ministry of Public Safety arrested many cyber criminals and sent a special envoy to Washington DC to discuss issues. These arrangements were helpful

in avoiding economic sanctions and making Xi's visit a success. However, once the agreement was made, both governments, especially the Chinese government, were bound to follow its terms. Of course, the Chinese government can complain about cyberattacks from the United States on China, but the focus is on whether China can stop alleged cyberattacks from China on the United States. The US government, with the Chinese promise in hand, is closely observing China's online behavior.

China is a usual suspect in cyberattacks. The number of Internet users in China exceeds 700 million, or double the entire population of the United States. There are still many illegal copies of software used in China and a lot of less secure software and hardware.

Looking from outside China, it seems that the CCP is planning and directing everything. Even so, such plans and directions are not working well in view of the Chinese economic downturn in recent years. Different from western countries, the CCP is higher placed than the Chinese government. In Japan, the ruling party and the government are organizationally separated, even though the prime minister is at the top of the ruling party. A prime minister gets their party's support and cannot neglect their party's intentions, but the party's decisions are different from the government's decisions.

In China, however, CCP's Politburo Standing Committee is a decisive body. This is called the 'Party-State System' and this type of organization is seen in several communist countries. Impressions of Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping are as strong leaders, and Xi Jinping is also seen as an autocratic leader, but the current Chinese leadership is governed by groups represented by the Politburo Standing Committee.

Cybersecurity policy is, as stated above, administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) on the government side and the Central Network Security and Informatization Working Group, which is led by Xi, on the party side. These two organizations are combined as one body. In addition, another three are competing in the area of cybersecurity policy: The Ministry of Public Safety (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). The MPS is a law enforcement body and the MSS is an intelligence body. The MIIT is a mixture of telecommunications and information technology services and devices. As cybersecurity is increasingly becoming an international problem, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are joining the discussions.

The ministers of these ministries are not so influential in policy-making processes. They are rather conduits between ministries and the CCP. Most ministers are in the middle of promotion ladders, and are trying to avoid conflicts with the party to get promoted to reach the CCP's Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee.

Three days after the Track 2 Dialogue in Seoul, on November 7, 2016, the Chinese government enacted the Cybersecurity Act. The main purpose of the act is to mandate a real name registration system for Internet use in China.

Even before this act, a kind of real name registration system was used in China. As it is quite difficult to monitor 700 million Chinese Internet users individually, the government has tightened its control of Internet service providers. Chinese Internet services including access and content require licenses, and the government is able to revoke licenses when necessary. The government requests providers to regulate their customers in an effective way and those providers censor their customers in order to avoid business suspension. Even so, customers have tried various ways to get beyond governmental and providers' regulations to access content overseas. One characteristic of Chinese cybersecurity is the inclusion of content regulation (in common with Russia). Anti-government statements, pornography, and socially destabilizing information are subject to control and such control is part of cybersecurity. Chinese cybersecurity greatly differs on this point from Japan and ROK.

GOVERNANCE OF CYBERSECURITY

UN GGE

The increase in the number of cyberattacks is affecting the governance of cyberspace, which used to be heavily dependent on technologists. As more societies rely on the Internet, some countries are supporting tighter regulation of the Internet and others are opposed to this.

In August 2015, the United Nations' Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) published a report online. The UN General Assembly has six committees and its first committee deals with disarmament and international security. Cyber GGE comes under this first committee. GGEs are called not only for cybersecurity but also the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and space activities. The governmental experts here are diplomats who are knowledgeable in specific issue domains. Just as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an ambassador for cyber policy, each country has a representative for negotiations on cyber issues.

The Cyber GGE is not open to all UN member countries. A proposer of GGE (in this case, Russia) and permanent members of the Security Council form the core and several other countries are recruited by the UN Secretary General while considering the regional balance. The first Cyber GGE was held in 2004 and 2005; the second was in 2009 and 2010; the third was in 2012 and 2013; and the fourth was in 2014 and 2015. The fifth Cyber GGE was due to be held in 2016 and 2017. China has participated in all of these GGEs, Japan joined the third through to the fifth, and ROK, the fifth.

The Cyber GGE discusses how to avoid cyber conflicts and wars, determining how international laws are applied to cyberspace. Discussions consider whether new rules, laws, treaties, and other elements are needed to respond to new risks and threats raised by cyber operations, espionage, and attacks.

One of the discussion focuses is why and how states must be responsible for cyberspace. The Internet was born in the United States and it has been assumed as a new domain of free expression. However, some countries are saying that states must be responsible for order in cyberspace and take appropriate administration and control measures including censorship. If concepts of state sovereignty or non-interference in internal affairs are adopted for cyberspace, these might hinder complaints about censorship in foreign countries and disrupt the free flow of information on the Internet.

China and Russia claim that states must be responsible for problems in cyberspace as cyberattacks are becoming a common daily problem. However, the United States, European countries, Japan, and others are saying that we must respect human rights and freedom and that over-regulation and state interventions are not ideal. These countries hold the view that cyberspace and the Internet are not special and they do not see a need to discuss and reach agreements on such problems.

A report of the Fourth UN Cyber GGE was submitted to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, but it did not have any legal effect. Although the participants of the GGE agreed on the report and should respect it, non-participants, who were not part of the agreement, are not bound by it. Even so, the report should be treated respectfully following the discussion at the UN.

Human beings have relied on seas and oceans for a long time, but the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was finally signed in 1982 and became effective in 1994, still has many problems. It took a very long time to start making rules regarding the sea. In cyberspace, there is the Convention on Cybercrime, which was signed in 2001, but in Asia, only Japan and Sri Lanka have ratified the treaty. It took 11 years before Japan ratified it, in 2011.

The London Process

While the UN GGE has received attention in cybersecurity policy circles, the limited participation (20 to 25 countries) in it was criticized. British Foreign Minister William Hague called a conference on cyberspace in 2011. The conference (called the 'London Process') was held in London and discussed five points:

- 1 Economic growth and development
- 2 *Social benefits*
- 3 *Safe and reliable access*
- 4 *International security*
- 5 *Cyber crime*

The London Conference on Cyberspace was a venue for like-minded countries which responded to the call by Minister Hague. The discussions there overlapped with the UN GGE, but provided an open forum for more countries and actors,

though the results did not bind anyone. The framework of the London Process was handed over to Budapest, Hungary in 2012; Seoul, ROK in 2013; The Hague, the Netherlands in 2014; and New Delhi in 2017.

The London Process itself was for like-minded countries, but in Seoul 2013, China and Russia spoke up in a proactive manner. Seoul 2013 included more interested parties, but a greater number of parties makes it more difficult to agree on issues and risks making the conference just a talking and chatting event. This conference might follow the paths of past conferences and frameworks such as the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Internet Governance Task Force (IGTF), the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and others. These venues provided discussion fora but could not reach an agreement.

Freedom or Security?

A new phase appeared in cybersecurity when Edward Snowden, former NSA contract worker, revealed top secret documents of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States in June 2013. It was right before a summit talk between US President Obama and Chinese President Xi in California (Greenwald, 2014; Harding, 2014). The NSA and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of the British government were expanding their signal intelligence (SIGINT) activities in cyberspace to stop physical and cyber terrorism.

In the age of wired telephone lines, numbers were fewer than today and the lines were fixed to houses and offices, making them easy to administer. Today, however, almost everyone has a mobile phone and uses various communications tools such as e-mail, short message, chat, and social media apps. As a result of such changes, SIGINT coverage is growing wider.

In order to stop both physical and cyber terrorism, attribution, that is, identifying perpetrators – is critical. In cyberattacks especially, it is much easier to disguise and hide the identity and location of attackers. Therefore, it is not enough to watch specific suspicious persons; it is necessary to search wider for clues to the attackers. Powerful data processing capabilities and smart human resources are needed to find the necessary data from the mountains of big data and use them to the best advantage. If much of intelligence involves finding a needle in a haystack, Keith Alexander, former NSA director and first US Cyber Commander, once said that you have to have access to ‘the whole haystack’ (Kaplan, 2016).

Solving the attribution problem is technically, legally, and politically difficult. Mass surveillance of people’s communications might violate civil liberties. When terrorist attacks occur in the United States, the UK, France, Belgium and other countries and cyberattacks are seen worldwide, many governments are trying to expand SIGINT activities, but their inner acts are rarely revealed. Such revelations would give good hints to terrorists, attackers, and criminals.

After Snowden's revelations, the UK government claimed, terrorists and cyber attackers changed their tools and methods of communication. On November 7, 2013, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament held a hearing with the top directors of three British intelligence agencies. It is quite rare for the three to get together and appear in front of a camera. They were Sir Iain Lobban of GCHQ, Andrew Parker of MI5, which is in charge of domestic security, and Sir John Sawers of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which is in charge of foreign intelligence. During the testimony Sawers said:

What I can tell you is that the leaks from Snowden have been very damaging. They have put our operations at risk. It is clear that our adversaries are rubbing their hands with glee. Al-Qaeda is lapping it up ... (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2013)

The choice between freedom and security is becoming a worldwide common issue. In the United States, there are many discussions claiming that we must strike a balance between them. In the UK, however, which saw many terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) inside the country, many people support security over privacy and other civil rights. Snowden's top-secret documents were revealed by a left-leaning newspaper, *The Guardian*, but some people did not mind the government's mass surveillance. In some Asian countries, such kind of government surveillance is common. People may not be satisfied with such a situation, but it is widely accepted to maintain social order.

Successful intelligence activities are not usually reported, because success means no terrorism, crime, or attacks. On the other hand, a failure of intelligence activities means that terrorism, crime, or attacks break out, and they are criticized. Outsiders do not have the clues to judge the balance between successes and failures.

If a cyberattack falls within the scope of sabotage or data theft, it can be punished as a crime. But a state-sponsored cyberattack or an attack by a state proxy can be different. Many cyberattacks cannot be easily recognized as armed attacks. Table 12.1 shows an escalation ladder; the difficulty lies in how to establish clear identification standards for each rung of that ladder.

CYBER GOVERNANCE WITHOUT A DECISIVE VENUE

We can conclude that there is no decisive venue for cybersecurity governance in Asia or elsewhere in the world. China, which is always pointed out as the origin of cyberattacks, agreed with the United States that both nations would cease launching cyberattacks. The reliability of the agreement was in doubt, but the media reported in June 2016 a decrease in the number of cyberattacks from China directed at the United States. China is changing direction toward better coordination with the United States.⁴

Table 12.1 Acts using cyber methods

<i>Acts</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
Cyber crime	Criminal or illegal acts using cyber methods
Cyber espionage	Data espionage using cyber methods
Use of cyber arm	Use of cyber weapons and equipment that can kill a person
Use of cyber force	Use of cyber weapons and equipment that can kill a person, by an organization such as a military force
Cyber armed attack	Use of cyber weapons and equipment by an organization such as a military force to attack a foreign country
Cyber armed conflict or war	A war act between states using cyber methods

China and Russia used to have common fronts at the UN GGE discussions to seek a new treaty to govern cyberspace. Both proposed a code of conduct in cyberspace based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, Russia was said to have caused a blackout in Ukraine in December 2015 and to have intervened in the US presidential elections in August 2016. China blamed Russia for not following the UN GGE report.

One effective way to dissuade a country engaged in cyberattacks is to heighten attribution. Due to the difficulty of identifying cyberattackers, cyber operations occurred frequently, but easy attribution would reduce the use of such operations.

Cyber operation methods are growing increasingly sophisticated day by day, and as proxies are hired for such operations, a final solution to cyberattacks is far from being reached. The lack of a decisive venue further postpones reaching a solution.

What is important is that no one hopes for the entire collapse of the Internet. Even for cyber criminals, the Internet is an absolutely necessary infrastructure. Without it, they could do nothing. Stopping illicit use of the Internet is critical for cyberspace governance.

Notes

- 1 Part of this chapter is based on Tsuchiya (2016).
- 2 The *Manual* was edited by a project at NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) CCD COE (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) located in Tallinn, Estonia. The project consisted of 19 researchers of international law. The *Manual* was not formally authorized by either NATO or NATO member countries. It lists 95 rules applicable to cybersecurity.

- 3 The NISC tried to keep its acronym as NISC and ended up with a strange name including 'cybersecurity' but without 'information security'.
- 4 Interview with a Chinese researcher in September 2016 (anonymous at the interviewee's request).

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RECOMMENDED READING MATERIALS

Andreasson, Kim, ed. (2012) *Cybersecurity: Public Sector Threats and Responses*, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

This book discusses global trends, national and local policy approaches, and practical considerations on cybersecurity covering several countries in Asia and others.

Elsberg, Marc (2017) *Blackout: Tomorrow Will be Too Late*, London: Black Swan.

This is a novel describing how the European Union collapses after cyberattacks. They can disrupt social functions and break social ties among people, a worst-case scenario of cyberattacks.

Kaplan, Fred (2016) *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kaplan traces the history of cyber incidents and attacks, which took place mainly in the United States. This is a very good introduction to cybersecurity and international relations.

Rid, Thomas (2013) *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, London: Hurst & Company.

Rid analyzes past cyber incidents and points out that a real cyber 'war' is quite rare. Most of the so-called cyberattacks are just variants of cybercrimes, espionage and operations, not real wars.

Rid, Thomas, and Ben Buchanan (2014) 'Attributing Cyber Attacks', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(1–2), pp. 4–37.

The authors reveal how attribution, or identifying cyberattackers, is possible if a team of strategic, operational and tactical levels is well coordinated.

Sanger, David E. (2012) *Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power*, New York: Crown Publishers.

This book shows how the Obama administration responded to cyber incidents and used cyber methods to affect the real world.

Schmitt, Michael N., ed. (2013) *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nineteen international legal scholars have compiled rules to be applicable to cyberspace. The authors have tried to use existing international laws as much as possible.

Singer, P. W., and August Cole (2015) *Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

This novel vividly describes how cyber, drone, space and other high-tech attacks can ignite a future war.

Taplin, Ruth, ed. (2016) *Managing Cyber Risk in the Financial Sector: Lessons from Asia, Europe and the USA*, London: Routledge.

The financial sector is one of the highest targets of cyberattacks and crimes all over the world. How Asia, Europe and the United States have responded to them is analyzed.

Zetter, Kim (2014) *Countdown to Zero Day: STUXNET and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon*, New York: Crown Publishers.

The most serious cyberattack, STUXNET, against Iran's nuclear facility is described and analyzed.

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PART III

Transnational Politics



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Citizens and Regimes

Takashi Inoguchi and Lien Thi Quynh Le

THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Kenneth Waltz (1959) first explicitly raised the awareness of three levels of analysis in international relations, especially in explaining war and peace. They are the level of individuals, the level of domestic society, and the level of the international system. This awareness has prompted new types of investigation into the causal direction of the three variables, individual, national, and international.

The examples used to advance his argument are: 1) war springs up in the minds of people, according to the Charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. If people keep peace in mind, then the likelihood of peace prevails in the world; 2) war springs up in the peculiar characteristics of domestic society. Nationalism of a narrow-minded and aggressive bent tends to resort to solutions prompting external war in order to divert the attention of people who are dissatisfied with daily livelihood; 3) war springs up with the malfunctions of the international system, whether it is the breakdown of balance of power or hegemonic decline.

J. David Singer (1961) made a further step forward in raising the awareness of the levels of analysis of war and peace. Riding on the behavioral revolution in psychology and social psychology, the social sciences have been heavily influenced. The third quarter of the last century witnessed a steady advance in scientific research in economics, sociology, political science, and international relations.

In linking the different levels of analysis, especially between the national and international levels of analysis, two important works are those of Barrington Moore (1993) and Peter Gourevitch (1978). Barrington Moore is interested in the

divergent paths adopted in the 1930s by major powers whose fate was determined by how each major power handled the agricultural sectors. He argued that those powers which adopted fascism resorted to external aggression through diverting opposition from within in the agricultural sector. External aggression through fascism is called the second image. The first image is so called because individual aspiration is targeted directly toward the international level. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Charter says that peace is borne in the minds of each individual. For instance, while Germany kept a cautious diplomatic policy line under Bismarck, Wilhelm II who succeeded him adopted an aggressive war policy. The third image portrays war coming from the international system itself. The sovereign state system, the Westphalian system, does not necessarily keep peace because the balance of power among the major powers sometimes breaks down, as hegemonic powers' decline sometimes prompts an aspiring hegemon to resort to war.

Peter Gourevitch (1978) argues that 'the second image reversed' is no less important than the second image whereby the forces at the national level are targeted at the international level, just like Barrington Moore's fascist-led external aggression. By 'the second image reversed' he means that forces at the international level prompt forces at the national level to transform themselves within domestic society to better cope with forces at the international level. Peter Gourevitch's example includes isolationist America transforming itself into a war state by the advent of fascist Japan and Germany in order to beat them. Ayse Zarakol (2013) gives the illustration of Turkey and Thailand transforming themselves within through forces at the international level. Self-transformation is that of turning to more authoritarian regimes led by 'a modernization-generated statist/bureaucratic social middle class that justifies its skepticism of democratization on the basis of norms upheld by the international society itself' (Zarakol, 2013).

In this chapter I examine three examples of analysis across levels in a scientific fashion: 1) individuals directly and indirectly influencing multilateral treaties' participation; 2) daily life satisfaction in life domains and lifestyles shaping types of domestic societies; 3) a national election of a hegemonic power impacting many countries' regimes.

The tide of globalization and digitalization has fast been permeating Asia because Asia is one of the most dynamic regions of the world in which the conventional conception of the self-contained sovereign nation-states has been getting more difficult to sustain, especially in Asia. Technological advances, financial flows, and economic interactions have been metamorphosing dynamic Asia from within. The Economist Group has published recently about the importance of the rising digital wave in Asia (The Economist, 2018). Having just over half of the world's online population, Asia has been riding on rising incomes, massively produced affordable Chinese smartphones, highly ranked patent filings in Asian technology hubs (for example, Tokyo–Yokohama and Shenzhen–Hong Kong), and steadily advancing Big Data movements whereby interconnecting

information *sans frontiers* provides integrated data insights into business operations and strategy. We take three illustrations: 1) multilateral treaties pushing invisible globalization *sans frontiers*; 2) changing life satisfaction and expressed dissatisfaction with daily life molding types of society; and 3) the hegemonic strength of the United States leading non-US citizens to global quasi-democracy with the slogan of ‘no taxation without participation’.

1) In Asia as well as in the rest of the world, multilateral treaties have become the most frequently demanded vehicles for dispute settlement and conflict resolution. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement among 11 countries hailed against the tide of rising protectionism stemmed from Pacific Asia. The UK has recently taken the initiative to join the TPP11 amid its post-Brexit chaos. The Paris climate change accord, a multilateral treaty, has been focused on Asia, with China the largest CO₂ emitter and the United States possibly the largest cost-bearer in the pre-US-exit accord. The United States–China tariff war has invigorated the initiative to reform the World Trade Organization, one form of a multilateral treaty. After North Korea and the United States almost rattled the saber over the former’s nuclear missiles, initiatives are slowly being taken as to which alternatives are feasible: North Korea returning to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty or North Korea choosing a variant of the Israeli option of stating that North Korea or a confederated united Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, without allowing intrusive inspection. The beauty of multilateral treaties is that once the sovereign states join multilateral treaties, they must sometimes legislate new domestic laws or revise them, appropriate budgets, and change standards and criteria accordingly. In other words, multilateral treaties have transformative potential in domestic society; the level of analysis cannot stay put in the same place.

2) Changing life satisfaction and dissatisfaction are the basis for types of societies. Asia has been metamorphosing itself steadily; its economic activities are the most dynamic in the world with huge population size, rising incomes, patent filings being registered steadily, and interconnecting information and integrated insights coming from fintech dramatically changing corporate operations and strategy. These social changes have been taking place increasingly beneath, beyond and across sovereign states. That is why the pattern of satisfaction with daily life matters. It changes the type of society. The level of analysis cannot stay put; it has to cross over levels. Take North Korean society, for example. The chairman of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong Il, executed the military first policy line, which means that the military budget has the highest priority and economic welfare, second priority. All the earnings from selling mineral resources and selling hard labor abroad, for instance, went to the military budget. Massive famines resulting in 2–3 million deaths in the mid 1990s on top of the persistent complaints about daily survival prompted Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il’s successor, to change the policy line to i) the two wheels policy line of taking care of weapons and welfare; yet ii) of all the military weapons, priority was given to the development and production of nuclear weapons especially intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBMs); iii) allowing black markets to mushroom in many places to give people hope for survival and small luxuries (Baek, 2016). Kim Jong Un's policy change has yielded spectacular success in prompting US president Donald Trump to talk to him while US-led sanctions have not loosened except that China has relaxed sanctions to a significant extent. The new-found national pride of nuclear weapons and the generally loosening regulations of economic sanctions have further enlarged the role of black markets in North Korea. Here daily life satisfaction increases as the black markets mushroom. This is how the type of society starts to change from within. Once the ICBM is perceived as a big success, and the loosened economic sanctions continue or stop in their entirety, what life satisfaction patterns will emerge in North Korea? The level of analysis changes here; these two new changes make it necessary to analyze all levels, that is, individual, domestic, and international. First, domestic policy change was the starting point. Second, one of its policy consequences, pride, has been nurtured. Third, another of its policy consequences, black markets, have mushroomed. Fourth, daily life satisfaction is bound to improve. Fifth, with the improvement of satisfaction, the type of society will change slowly.

3) Strength or exercising power entails added vulnerability (McNeill, 2001). First, the United States was very successful in constructing the US-led liberal world order by sheer military strength in World War II (Ikenberry, 2000, 2012). Second, the sense of responsibility to spread freedom, democracy, economic development, free trade, and universal institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has been amazingly strong. Its sense of responsibility to shoulder is so strong that in due course the United States, the Gulliver, has accumulated troubles and vulnerabilities (Hoffmann, 1968; Walt, 2018). Third, in response to the US influence, the rest of the world sometimes calls for 'no taxation without representation' as if the world keeps its assembly where the global citizens vote for the US president. That is why I call it global quasi-democracy. My provisional analysis of the 2016 US presidential election shows that those countries inclined to support Donald Trump included Russia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the BRICs countries (India and China are two of the big pillars of the group) and that those countries inclined to support Clinton included Japan and Bangladesh (Inoguchi et al., 2018). In sum, the Asian countries play a big role in this global quasi-democracy.

GLOBAL CITIZENS SHAPE MULTILATERAL TREATIES

Inoguchi and Le (2016) first validated the insight of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *The Social Contract* by examining the empirical and statistical link between two variables: global citizens' preferences of values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other. They simultaneously validated the insight of John Locke in *Two Treaties of Government* by a

similar examination with the two key step links: 1) global citizens' preferences are aggregated into sovereign states' participation or non-participation and 2) sovereign states join multilateral treaties, first by signing and then by ratifying.

Until the 20th century, the conventional idea was that without a world government there would be no world assembly. Without a world assembly, representative democracy on a global scale is not possible. Likewise, without face-to-face discussion in a reasonably small well-knit community, direct democracy is not possible. Therefore direct democracy on a global scale would be near impossible. By the dawn of the new millennium, the tide of globalization and digitalization had made the world unprecedentedly tightly connected. The end of World War II left the globe full of ruins and ashes. The advent of the Cold War made industrial democracies highly interdependent, largely across the Atlantic on the basis of military alliance and heightened production. Once the Cold War was over, the movement of goods and services was accelerated. Furthermore people moved across borders in an unprecedented fashion. Perhaps most importantly, digitalization swayed and transformed the globe (Lessig, 1999; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). Currency trade has overtaken the trade of goods and services. People have stopped using the words 'international economy'. Instead, the term 'world economy' has become commonly used. The consequences of these trends have yielded a situation of the end of democracy (Guehenno, 2012) in the sense that the sovereign state has become less powerful and national citizens have less allegiance to the state (Dalton and Welzel, 2014), while transnational business firms, social movements, and organizations have come to act *sans frontiers*. The advent of digitalization and globalization, however, has given these two kinds of democracy dramatic opportunities to exploit. Digitalization and globalization have enabled individuals to communicate with anybody in the world face-to-face on Skype and other similar devices. They have enabled representation of sub-national, non-governmental, supra national, regional, and international organizations along with the representation of sovereign states on a world scale, a reality again on Skype. They have given surreal opportunities for opinion polls to know the distribution of views and sentiments worldwide with their results kept downloadable anywhere and anytime. When ideas are articulated and emotions emitted, their diffusion and reception worldwide becomes easier. Thus quasi-direct democracy and quasi-representative democracy have both become a reality on a global scale, in a sense.

Sovereign states' participation in 120 multilateral treaties is the registered outcome of global quasi-legislation in the United Nations system since 1945 (Inoguchi and Le, 2019). These treaties come under six policy domains: labor, health, intellectual property, human rights, communications and commerce, peace and disarmament, and the environment. No less important than policy domains are the differences between the date when a sovereign state signs and the date of ratification when citizens' representatives lend support to the treaty. Also the manner in which other countries and your country participate is another variable. How can the modes of participation be aggregated? Using factor analysis with

varimax rotation, three key dimensions emerge: 1) agile versus cautious; 2) global commons versus individual citizens' interests; and 3) aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. 'Agile versus cautious' is the speed with which they participate in multilateral treaties. 'Global commons' are elements such as climate change and marine commons. 'Aspirational bonding' is declaring solidarity with signers toward the unattained goal, while 'mutual binding' is to declare universal abiding. What about the link between the two, that is, between global citizens' preferences and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties? The correlation coefficients are high between emancipative and protective, and agile and cautious, and between sacred and secular and between aspirational bonding and mutual binding. Also important is the similar locations of countries on these dimensions. Noteworthy are the low-level locations (very secular) of the New West, especially the United States, in terms of sacred versus secular. No less noteworthy are the high-level locations (mutual binding) of the Sinic East regarding aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. To sum up, global citizens' preferences and sovereign states' participation in mutual treaties show a strong linkage.

The policy domains of multilateral treaties have also expanded in leaps and bounds. The six policy domains of a) peace and disarmament, b) health and labor, c) communications and commerce, d) intellectual property, e) human rights, and f) the environment are major domains. During the fledgling inter-war period, the policy domain of peace and disarmament dominated, however small the number of multilateral treaties in that domain. Since 1945, and especially since 1989, each of these six policy domains has become full of such treaties.

No less importantly, transnational citizens and social movements (NGOs) have increased their participation in multilateral treaties. Sovereign states have ceased to be the sole signatories of the treaties, which means that citizens and regimes are often more directly linked.

Inoguchi and Le (2016; 2019) have presented the links between citizens' preferences about values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other, via factor analysis. These links can be interpreted by representative democracy à la John Locke as well as by direct democracy à la Jean-Jacques Rousseau, both on a global scale.

DAILY LIFE SATISFACTION MOLDS TYPES OF SOCIETIES

One's daily satisfaction with life domains, life aspects, and lifestyles is important in terms of one's quality of life. Its accumulation in society is important in showing the characteristics of the society where one lives. Aggregating all the respondents' satisfaction levels in a society shows the key dimensions that determine daily life patterns. Factor analyzing each of the 29 Asian societies yields three dimensions of materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. The size of the eigen value of each dimension differs as well as the order in

which the three key dimensions determine the feature of a society. Empirically there are six types of Asian societies. When materialism is the first dimension, let me call this A. When post-materialism is the second or third dimension, let me call this a. When post-materialism is the first dimension, let me call this B. When materialism is the second dimension, let me call this b. When public sector dominance is the first dimension, let me call this C. When public sector dominance is the second dimension, let me call this c (Le et al., 2014).

With this notation, Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, Ca, and Cb are six types of Asian societies. In our empirical analyses there is no type Bc, which leaves five types of Asian societies. Ab society is determined primarily by materialism and secondarily by post-materialism. Ac is determined primarily by materialism, and secondarily by public sector dominance. Ba society is determined primarily by post-materialism and secondarily by materialism. Bc society is determined primarily by post-materialism and secondarily by public sector dominance. Ca society is determined primarily by public sector dominance and secondarily by materialism. An Ab society is represented by Japan, Ac is represented by India. A Ba society is represented by Thailand, Bc is represented by Pakistan, and Ca is represented by Singapore. Although empirically Cb does not exist among the 29 surveyed societies, a Cb society resembles North Korea.

Materialism is survival-oriented, post-materialism is social relations-oriented and public sector dominance is state-oriented. Materialism and post-materialism are derived from Abraham Maslow (1941, 2013 reprint edition) and further developed by Ronald Inglehart (1977) on the basis of the World Values Survey. Public sector dominance naturally looms large in contemporary society woven by a myriad of rules, regulations, and practices.

Ronald Inglehart first systematically analyzed the new trend of post-materialism which stresses the new lifestyle of going beyond survival and seeking leisure as at a dinner party. Post-materialism takes many forms: social relations encompass non-profit and non-government and associational activities such as leisure and sport. It encompasses private sector interest and pressure group activities. Francis Fukuyama (2015) defines political decay as the colonization of government by private sector interests when the government manifests instability and negligence of duties. Public sector dominance differs from society to society. Authoritarian society is often full of rules, regulations, and orders. When it attempts to tighten regulations to the extreme, post-materialism looms large in such forms as corruption, drugs, and underground markets. Unless good social relations can be crafted with security personnel, customs officials, police officials, gangsters, and the mafia, such post-materialist activities expand.

Let me provide two examples. The Ba society, Thailand, alternates democracy and military rule. Those representing certain private sectors push themselves into government, parts of which are colonized. If partisan strife goes extreme, sometimes the military resorts to a *coup d'état*. During the militarist period, rules, regulations, and orders tighten up. The Cb society, North Korea, has an acute

dilemma. It boasts itself as a powerful nuclear-armed state, whereby it wants to induce the United States to reach a peace accord. When it stood on the policy line of military-firstism during the Kim Jon Il period, military budgets were boosted and the subsistence-sustaining budget shrank. Chronicled floods and famines were rampant. Survival was at stake for one or two million people. After Kim Jong Un took power, the policy line changed to the ‘walking on two legs’ policy. The military budgets focused on nuclear weapons and missiles while tight regulations on food and energy provision were loosened and underground markets became dominant. Thus post-materialist activities and underground systems loomed large, leading some observers to argue that North Korea was becoming a capitalist system of underground markets (Baek, 2016; Ito, 2017).

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS A GLOBAL QUASI-ELECTION

WIN/Gallup International carries out an annually worldwide poll on what is deemed the most attention-getting subject of the year. In 2016 it was the US presidential election. In 2011 it was the Japanese triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power meltdown. In 2016, 44 countries carried out surveys on seven questions from July to September 2016. The seven questions are:

- 1 *If you were to vote in the American election for president, who would you vote for?*
- 2 *How much in your view, is the impact of the American election in your country on issues such as economic progress, trade, peace etc. In other words, how much is the impact of the American president on what happens in your country?*
- 3 *Considering that America leads the global economy, should the new American president give priority to the economic interests of American people, the interests of the people of the world as a whole, or equally to both?*
- 4 *Would you advise the American president to pour more American resources into the war against terrorism (for example, ISIS)?*
- 5 *What in your view has been the overall impact of President Obama on the power of America in the world? Has he made it stronger, weaker or made no difference during his 8 years in office?*
- 6 *If Mrs Clinton becomes the next president, would she perform better than Obama, worse or just as well?*
- 7 *If Donald Trump becomes the next president, would he perform better than Obama, worse or just as well?*

What I’ve attempted to show is that given the tide of globalization and digitalization in the dawn of the 21st century, ‘democracy in one country’ is not tenable and non-US citizens are no less interested in the US presidential election and do express their preferences on candidates, issues, and policies in the poll even though voting rights are not given to them.

I analyzed all 44 countries’ responses, including the United States, using a hierarchical Bayesian model. I focused on the question of which candidates they would support, Clinton or Trump, by key demographics of age, gender, household income, religion, employment, education, and country. A hierarchical Bayesian

model enables a global profile of respondents' preferences and the major determinants of the degree of leaning to Trump for each of the 44 countries in one shot. This method suits my purpose as I argue that it is time not for 'democracy in one country' but 'quasi-democracy', because non-US and US citizens revealed their preferences through the polls and thus participated in quasi-democracy. By quasi-democracy I mean that non-US respondents may not be entitled to vote in the US presidential election but can participate in it through the polls. The analysis in this section is still underway but the tabulations, cross tabulations, principal component analysis, and regression analysis enable me to discuss the results with some confidence (Inoguchi et al., 2018).

First, the dependent variable is defined as 'support for Trump' minus 'support for Clinton' for each country. Second, the independent variables are the demographics. Third, missing values are estimated by randomized figures. Fourth, the soft program used for the hierarchical Bayesian method is STAN (Matsuura and Ishida, 2016).

Thus countries leaning to support for Trump are Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. The strongest pro-Trumpian country is Russia. Those devastated by US military intervention, Afghanistan and Iraq, also show pro-Trumpian inclination as do the BRICS countries.

Looked at in terms of age groups, those aged 45 years and more register mildly pro-Trumpian in most countries. Two exceptions are Japan and Bangladesh, which register a strong pro-Clinton tilt.

Looking at education groups, those educated at university and show a statistically significantly higher tilt to Clinton in the following countries: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK, and the United States.

A single strong conclusion of this global analysis is that the US presidential election is not only a local phenomenon but also a global phenomenon. Non-US citizens do not vote in the US presidential election but do participate by expressing their preferences. In an era of globalization and digitalization, global quasi-democracy is in the offing. 'Democracy in one country' is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

President Obama, accusing Russia of hacking US election data for Clinton, ordered 35 Russian diplomats to be expelled from the United States. President Putin did not take any counter-action in retaliation, knowing President-elect Trump's position on the Russian hacking and the Crimea. President Trump commented that President Putin was intelligent and smart. All these interactions at the highest level between the United States and Russia are built on public opinion at the grass-roots level.

END OF THE THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS?

Seeking to gauge the link between citizens and regimes at the national and international levels, I have come to the conclusion that sharply distinguishing the three levels of analysis as Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer do might not be conducive

to better understanding the link between citizens and regimes. The distinction has become blurred and murky as the new millennium deepens. Robert Cooper (1995) recognizes the divergence of international norms and values among countries and argues that post-modernity is pervasive in Western Europe, modernity is pervasive among newly sovereign states in the 20th century, more primordial concerns are with territorial sovereignty and national interests, and pre-modernity is pervasive among some developing countries, especially those without fully functioning states.

Takashi Inoguchi (1999) systematizes the increasingly salient divergence of guiding concepts in international relations. Inoguchi argues that instead of linking guiding concepts with geography, three paradigms, Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian, represent three major lines of thought and behavior in the new millennium. The Westphalian paradigm is state-centric, best articulated by Henry Kissinger in geopolitics, Alexander Gershenkron in geoeconomics, and Benedict Anderson in geoculture. The Philadelphian paradigm is global republican and best articulated by Francis Fukuyama in geopolitics, Robert Reich in the geoeconomic foundation, and Benjamin Barber in the geocultural network. The anti-utopian paradigm is post-post-colonialism and multiculturalism and is best articulated by Samuel Huntington in geopolitics, by David Landes in the geoeconomic foundation, and by Robert Kaplan in the geocultural network.

In less than two decades since Inoguchi (1999) the increasing and varying mixture of the three paradigms have manifested themselves. Mark Leonard (2006) gives a wide array of examples. To take the example of the sovereignty borders. This was violated by the West in triumphant mood after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example upholding order in Kosovo and Sierra Leone; supporting government repression (Russia in Syria); ethno-religious proxy wars (Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East). Also take multilateral organizations which have been key to the post-1945 liberal world order; the World Trade Organization has not been functioning well for decades, the Climate Change agreement has been withdrawn by the Trump-led United States, and the marine commons concept enunciated in the Conference on the Law of the Seas in 1976 has been practiced differently in the South China Sea by China. In the longer term, Inoguchi (1999) identifies three world trends, that is, information-manufacturing technologies, demographic and environmental change, and the state's enhanced capacity to provide symbolic and cultural identity, a sense of stability and achievement for citizens, all of which affects the future links between citizens and regimes.

In conclusion, the level of problematique analysis seems to get murky and ambiguous decade by decade. The development of global legislative politics (Inoguchi and Le, 2019) shows that these all entail transformative roles whether it is about nuclear non-proliferation, free trade, climate change, intellectual property, or international terrorism. Global issues such as peace and disarmament, human rights, the global environment, health and labor, commerce and communications, and intellectual property are widely regarded as proper global issues; one country can never hope to give global solutions. People's perceptions

have changed dramatically at the dawn of the new millennium. At the domestic level, increasingly many sovereign states, social movements, supranational organizations, and non-governmental individuals are demanding global solutions, often by prompting international organizations and participating in multilateral treaties. At the international level, the number of international organizations and their offshoots has reached 8,000–9,000 and the number of multilateral treaties has registered around 580. The demand for solutions at the international level has been moving up while the supply of solutions at the international level has reached saturation and stalemate.

Table 13.1 Outline of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian legacies

<i>Geopolitical framework</i>	<i>Westphalian (state-centric)</i>	<i>Philadelphian (global republican)</i>	<i>Anti-utopian (post-post-colonial multicultural)</i>
Principal author	Kissinger	Fukuyama	Huntington
Key concept	State sovereignty	Popular sovereignty	Post-sovereignty loss of sovereignty
Institutional unit	Nation-state	Liberal democracy	Civilizational superstate & failed/failing state
Behavioral principle	Balancing/ bandwagoning	Binding/hiding	Fortifying, hollowing out/ collapsing
Peace	Peace by war	Liberal democratic peace	Neither war nor peace
Democracy	Indifference	Aggressive export or opportunistic silence	Military intervention or cynical neglect
Geo-economical foundations			
Principal author	Gerschenkron	Reich	Landes
Key concept	National economy	Global market	Economic development
Driving force	State-led industrialization	Market-driven megacompetition	World cultures that guide the inner values and attitudes of a population
Critical variable	Large input of capital and labor	Critical input of technology	Invention and know-how
Geocultural networks			
Principal author	Anderson	Barber	Kaplan
Key media	State-run radio/TV	Cable TV network	Underground network
Key purpose	Nation building	Global penetration	Antistate reaction & dissident communication, reconstituting order in cultural sphere
Key effect	Video legitimization	Video globalization Homogenization	Subversive operations Legitimization of civilizational superstates

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Global and Regional Organisations

Ryan Hartley and Edward Newman

This chapter traces the evolution of regional organisations in Asia – in particular East and Southeast Asia – and the engagement of these regions with global international organisations. A number of themes will form the background for this analysis, and these relate both to the longstanding challenges of regional cooperation and the more recent implications of the shifting global balance of power. Asia has historically had difficulty in developing regional mechanisms – including organisations – for dealing with collective challenges. Bilateral relationships and informal alliances have characterised the region, and a history of major armed conflict – and the legacy of this conflict – has obstructed cooperation, as have ongoing political conflicts between key states. The Westphalian political culture of the region, with an emphasis upon state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, has also hindered institutionalised regional cooperation.

Asia's engagement with regional and global organisations has reflected the changing international environment of recent decades. There has been a global shift of focus to Asia in terms of economic growth and this has driven growing success in the economic field regionally. Asia's engagement with international organisations – and to some extent the politics of regional organisations – reflects the dynamics of the transitional international order, and in particular the 'rise' of non-Western countries. This has resulted in Asia pushing back against 'Western-led' institutions/norms, and creating alternative multilateral arrangements, and it has generated contestation around the norms of international society and control of the international agenda. In addition, there are questions about the future US presence in Asia as a function of this changing international order, particularly with regard to its relationship with key allies such as South Korea and Japan, and

its rivalry with China. A study of Asia's regional and international organisations therefore raises questions related to the key political trends of the region. Will the global economic shift towards Asia spur new incentives for regionalism, overcoming historical obstacles to closer cooperation? Will the global transition in power – in which Asia is a driving force – affect the dynamics of Asia's regional cooperation and its engagement with global organisations? Will Asia promote normative changes in terms of the principles that underpin regional and global organisations? What are the implications of the possible decline of US hegemony; will it facilitate greater regional cooperation in the longer term, or result in destabilisation and conflict? What leadership can rising states – in particular, China – show in the future evolution of regional organisation in Asia?

THE EVOLVING CONTEXT: THE RISE OF DIVIDED ASIA

It is widely accepted that the rise of Asia – and particularly China – has had a structural impact upon international relations, in the context of a broader shift in international order.¹ This raises interesting implications for the dynamics of regional cooperation and Asia's engagement with global organisations. At the same time, Asia is beset by political problems and rivalries which have hampered cooperation.² These themes provide the broader political context for this examination of regional and global organisations and this section will sketch these themes.

First, Asia is now a key driving force of the global economy, and it has experienced spectacular economic growth for a number of decades, even if this growth is not evenly distributed and is slowing. A number of countries, such as China, Indonesia, India, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, among others, have taken the lead in this. This has provided immense incentives for regional cooperation in economic areas such as finance and trade, but also for political cooperation more broadly. There has been a surge in bilateral and multilateral free trade arrangements – in particular associated with ASEAN and East Asian economies – and these have been a defining feature of the global economy and Asia's relationship with the rest of the world. However, economic growth has also generated internal pressure for political and functional cooperation, and this is widely regarded as the key challenge for future economic success.

Second, despite the incentives for cooperation, there have been acute difficulties in establishing durable collective action mechanisms at the regional level in Asia, in areas such as collective security, environmental management and political cooperation. Compared with the sub-regions of Africa, Latin America and Europe, Asia registers the lowest number of regional organisations. Asia's vast size means that it is in fact not a 'region' but rather a number of separate regions or sub-regions, comprising very different economic, social and developmental experiences and interests. The challenge of regional cooperation is therefore

not comparable with Western Europe or the Americas in terms of the range of divergent interests that need to be accommodated. In addition, Asia hosts a range of political and sometimes military conflicts, many of which are the legacy of a deeply troubled history, which make it difficult to establish cooperation and organisations. The legacy of historical conflicts related to the Second World War and the Cold War, and new territorial conflicts, are manifested in suspicion and animosity between many of the key countries in the region. Against this background, regional suspicions and rivalries take on a particular sensitivity, such as the conflict between China and a number of its neighbours regarding access to, and the territorial rights in, the South China Sea.

Third, even where sub-regional organisations have been established – notably, in Southeast Asia – the political culture of the region, underscored by its fractious history, has tended to make countries very sensitive towards issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity and ‘interference’. As a result, commitment to the principles of reciprocity, give and take, and to political cooperation has been quite shallow, and regional initiatives have tended to be conservative in nature. Furthermore, there has not been much expectation that organisations such as ASEAN would be able to make radical decisions in relation to pressing challenges, or to apply coercion to individual members if seen to be collectively necessary. Rather, they are more likely to perform the simple function of a forum for discussion and coordination.

Fourth, the evolution of regional cooperation in Southeast and East Asia, and its engagement with global politics, including international organisations, will reflect the shifting international order, and in particular the ‘rise’ of China. The international order is undergoing a fundamental transition, and this is likely to define international politics in the 21st century. While this process is the subject of debate and controversy, there is broad agreement that key non-Western states, including some in Asia, are rising in power and influence in an increasingly multipolar world. This is evident in economic performance, diplomatic influence, and the exercise of both hard and, to a lesser extent, soft power. Simultaneously, there is wide, although not uncontested, agreement about the relative decline in influence of established Western powers.³ The ‘transitional international order’ is therefore a central, but often ambiguous, theme in both policy and academic debates. These debates generally focus upon the distribution of material resources, declining and emerging powers, and the consequences of this for international institutions, public goods and the management of shared needs and challenges.

One of the central themes running through the literature on rising powers is whether the new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order.⁴ In some ways Asia is pushing back against Western-led institutions and norms, and creating alternative multilateral arrangements. To some extent this represents contestation around the norms of international society and control of the international agenda. At the same time, engagement with existing global norms has served the interests of Asian countries, and so it is unlikely that they – even China – are

truly 'revisionist' in terms of the institutions of international order. Rather, some rising powers seek greater access to, and representation in, the institutions and processes which define, administer and uphold international rules.⁵ For example, China appears to wish to avoid confrontation with the West through their pursuit of a 'Go West' strategy rather than southern expansion. Furthermore, as Kishore Mahbubani argues, China, and the other economies of Asia, are simply trying to rise to similar levels of prosperity and to achieve political parity with the United States and the West.⁶ The apparent 'threat', as Peter Shearman notes, is China's situated otherness as the United States' latest 'evil empire'.⁷ Rising powers, including the BRICS, are largely integrated into the existing institutions and forms of global governance, and they have shown little desire to take on a *global* leadership role. Nevertheless, the rise of Asia and its engagement with regional and global international organisations does raise broader questions of whether Asia is 'converging' with the West politically and economically in an era of globalisation, or whether Asian regional organisations would be fundamentally 'different', and whether, most importantly, China is challenging pre-existing organisational arrangements.

Fifth, and finally, the evolution of regional organisation raises questions about the future US presence in Asia, as a function of this changing international order, and in particular its apparent declining strategic reach. The election of US President Donald Trump in 2016 – someone who had clearly signalled that US allies in the region would not be able to count on indefinite or unconditional support in the future – also pointed to a declining commitment to the region. The United States' role in organisations in East and Southeast Asia is often contradictory, demonstrating a hegemonic desire to protect its established organisational power in the face of shifting local circumstances. This refers to the US tendency to protect the role of multilateral organisations over which it has control by quashing local initiatives and maintaining its bilateral authority with various security partners in the region. Yet despite these efforts, the United States and the organisations it supports often appear incapable of dealing with the many protracted issues in the region. This raises important implications for allies such as South Korea and Japan, but also for rivals such as China which may feel empowered by doubts about the US commitment to the region. This is relevant to regional organisations in a number of ways, and raises further questions. Historically, has the presence of the United States hindered the development of regional cooperation by stifling regional entrepreneurship and exacerbating tensions between Asian states? What are the implications and consequences of the decline of US hegemony: will it facilitate greater regional cooperation in the longer term, or result in destabilisation and conflict? What leadership can Japan and China show in the future evolution of regional organisation in Asia, in an era of declining US hegemony?

As this section demonstrates, the evolution of Asia's regional organisations and its engagement with international organisations raises broader questions about the politics of the region in a changing global order.

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A historical review of the formation of regional organisations reveals a number of phases (see Appendices A–D). Following the Second World War, colonial empires declined, independence movements arose and new political allegiances divided the region along Cold War lines. Emerging from this patchwork was the shifting bases for regional cooperation and organisational development. This uneven process can then be broadly characterised as developing in five often overlapping phases.

- Phase 1 (1918–1945): Colonialism and Empire Driven, with great power rivalries between the West and Japan around competing spheres of interest.
- Phase 2 (1945–1971): Security Driven, featuring the lingering dominance of Western actors, the divisions of the Cold War, independence movements, rising nationalism and neutrality in Southeast Asia.
- Phase 3 (1971–1991): Economics Driven, featuring an increasing role played by Japan and the core ASEAN members in regionalisation, and later to feature the transitioning of the Communist bloc.
- Phase 4 (1991–2015): Tentative political regionalisation, with the expansion and consolidation of the ASEAN project and the Asia-Pacific project.
- Phase 5 (2015–2025>): Globalisation Driven, involving a rising China, the US reaction and great power rivalries in Southeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea).

This evolution has reflected a strong tendency for formal cooperation if it is economic in nature, but a tendency to resist such cooperation if external powers are involved or if security issues are at stake. There is also a willingness to pursue organisations that are politico-diplomatic in nature, but for these to be weak and easily destabilised by intra-regional rivalries or divided by concerns about the intentions of global power actors. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy in the degrees of regional organisation in East and Southeast Asia, with organisations being strongest in Southeast Asia and weakest in the Asia-Pacific. The lack of intra-Northeast Asian cooperation leaves Southeast Asia as the strongest organisational wellspring of regional cooperation. Indeed, Southeast Asia has positioned itself to be the necessary bridge-builder for many broader organisational efforts, becoming what Yamamoto Yoshinobu characterises as a ‘reverse hubs and spokes system’ and what Evelin Goh calls Southeast Asia’s ‘omni-enmeshment’ strategy.⁸

Consolidated Regional Organisations: the Primacy of Economics

East Asia is at the heart of a burgeoning global free trade movement. According to the World Trade Organisation, the close of the Cold War saw an increase in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), with a sharply rising number of cumulative RTAs in force every year, rising from around 50 in 1991 to a total of 423 by 2016.⁹

A great deal of this increase is accounted for by developments in East Asia. The Asian Development Bank's Asia Regional Integration Center statistics reveal that – especially from the turn of the millennium – the growth of Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs) in the region has risen exponentially at a rate of around 11 per year, resulting in 249 FTAs as of 2018 compared with just seven in 1991.¹⁰ The leading 10 economies driving this process are (as of 2017 data): Singapore (33 FTAs), India (29), China (28), Korea (27), Japan (24), Thailand (23), Australia (22), Malaysia (22) and Indonesia (20). As this list indicates, aside from India and Australia, the drivers of this growth are largely the Northeast Asia and original core ASEAN-5 states.¹¹

A key driving force of this trend is ASEAN and, with the coming into force in 2015 of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the most stable politico-economic organisation in the region came into being. The AEC rests on a staggered history of fragmented organisations. With the creation in 1947 of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), post-WWII economic cooperation was ostensibly multilaterally led. During the 1950s–1970s Southeast Asia split between pro-Western capitalist (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, later Singapore), pro-Russia/China communist (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar) and neutral (Indonesia). It took until 1976 with the affirmation of political neutrality, a commitment to the primacy of economic development, and the acquiescence of Indonesia, before any serious organisation-building could occur. The Malaya Federation had earlier proposed the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty in 1959, an ostensibly economics-based treaty that nonetheless held political integration potential. This failed due to opposition from Indonesia, but the proposal sparked the process that led to the Association of Southeast Asia from 1961 to 1967,¹² then the MAPHILINDO grouping from 1963 to 1967.¹³ That served to allay Indonesia's suspicions of regional groupings, after which ASEAN was born in 1967 with Indonesia's full support.¹⁴ The treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) was signed by the core ASEAN-5 and the membership has been expanding ever since, developing into what has come to be called the 'ASEAN way': mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves. The core ASEAN-5 would dramatically increase their economic development while those that did not join languished in conflict.

By the 1980s, a glaring problem had become apparent: ASEAN, the Southeast Asia organisation, did not represent all of Southeast Asia. However this changed with the launching of a series of liberalisation reforms in China by Deng Xiaoping, and a path was beaten whereby Communist parties could remain in authority while simultaneously relinquishing their ideological opposition to the West and the free market.¹⁵ China's reforms became replicated in 1986 in Vietnam's *doi moi*

(renovation) reforms, which then trickled down into Vietnam's 'little brother' of Laos with its *chintanakanmai* (new thinking) reforms.¹⁶ ASEAN would subsequently become a patchwork of democratic, semi-democratic and Communist regimes, rather than the post-Cold War thawed site of the 'end of history' that some predicted.

Reconciliation with these more accommodating Communist countries facilitated the ability to: first, expand ASEAN politically into the 'late comers' (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam); second, attempt to bridge the economic gap between those latecomers and the core ASEAN economies; and third, better integrate ASEAN with itself, the wider world and to further develop pan-East Asia or pan-Pacific organisations. Expansion began quickly after 1991 to bring the latecomers into ASEAN, which Vietnam achieved in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

Attempts were quickly made to bridge the gap between the core ASEAN-5 and these newcomers. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and multilateral UN organisations began promoting the importance of sub-regional growth zones in the form of the Greater Mekong Sub-region project starting in 1992, the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle in 1993 and the Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area in 1994. These ostensibly economic projects, that nevertheless had clear underlying political goals,¹⁷ were intended to 'pin together' all parts of ASEAN so as to cement the organisation's expansion and develop economic linkages between the core ASEAN-5 economies and the latecomer economies. Slow progress in bridging these gaps led to the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle Area in 1999 and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration in 2000, both being attempts to deal with concerns over the slow pace of integration and to prevent any backward slippages that could risk post-Cold War ASEAN unity.¹⁸

Finally in relation to integration, important steps were taken by interested outside actors and ASEAN itself to quickly 'port' ASEAN into global level power frameworks. The highly significant 1992 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) achieved this by creating the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, positioning Southeast Asia as an investment and manufacturing hub. With the latecomer states trickling into ASEAN they also trickled into the AFTA, building it to become a highly important regional trade bloc that laid the foundations for deeper union with the 2015 ASEAN Economic Community. This shift was facilitated by Japan's 1988 Asian Network concept and concomitant desire to implement a Tokyo-oriented Asian Industries Development plan,¹⁹ as the lead economy of the region began to structurally alter in ways that required external expansion.²⁰

Furthermore, just as ASEAN was positioning itself as a vortex for wider inward economic investment, towards the end of the 1990s it also began projecting itself outwards to create wider, if limited in scope, regional economic attachments. In 1997, as an indication of a 'reverse hubs-and-spokes' organisational model,²¹ it was agreed that ASEAN would bilaterally link with China, South Korea and Japan

with ASEAN+3. This finally created a substantive organisational link between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This was significant because Northeast Asian states consistently found, and continue to find, it difficult to build cooperative organisations among themselves.²² Simultaneously, the Asia–Europe Meetings began in 1996, interestingly using a framework that is of a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional character than is generally adopted between East Asian states themselves. The 2002 initiated Asia Cooperation Dialogue aimed at bridging the organisation between all of the other regional organisations in East Asia with the goal of an Asian Community organisation (although little on this has actually developed). And finally, this trend towards a reverse hubs-and-spokes organisation-building approach was used again in 2005, when ASEAN+3 broadened at the important East Asia Summit to ASEAN+6, which includes India, Australia and New Zealand.

In terms of broader East Asia or Pacific level organisations, the formation of the Japan (and US) chaired Asian Development Bank in 1966 and the Australia-initiated Pacific Basin Economic Council in 1967, coupled with the Pacific Trade and Development Conference in 1968, began to generate some semblance of wider regional organisation. With a shift of the conceptual boundaries from a geo-political towards a geographical definition (meaning any country touching the Pacific Ocean could be included), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation was founded in 1989. However the use of this ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept has geo-political overtones and demonstrates the US tendency to resist self-contained East Asia regionalism and China’s rising influence. This was also the case with ASEAN+6 that was formed in 2005 in order to dilute ASEAN+3 by also including India, Australia and New Zealand.²³

From around 2004, a flurry of differing proposals for greater regional trade-based organisations began to emerge. Some of these were clearly based more on geo-political power considerations rather than on the local capabilities or requirements of business in the region, as the growth of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) rather than multilateralised trade liberalisation became a key trend of the post-millennial period in East Asia. With ASEAN+3, Japan moved to propose the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). Then once ASEAN+6 formed in 2009, Japan again moved to shift from bilateral regionalism to multilateral regionalism and proposed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA). Both proposals achieved only minimal success due to lukewarm support in ASEAN and a lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian states. Instead, ASEAN’s own 2011 proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has superseded references to both EAFTA and CEPEA in extra-ASEAN negotiations. RCEP would appear to be a reaction to FTAs such as the US-led TPP that attempted to exclude China and thereby limit ASEAN’s flexibility in extra-ASEAN relations.²⁴ China’s proposal for an East Asia-wide FTA in 2014, in the form of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), is further evidence of this and is placing ASEAN in a difficult political position of having to choose between FTAs.

There have also been efforts to broaden ASEAN's global links even further. Connections are being made with Africa (building on the 1955 Asian African Conference and the 2005 New Asian–African Strategic Partnership), with the Middle East from 2009 (with the ASEAN–Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial meetings) and with Latin America from 2015 (with the ASEAN–Pacific Alliance).

Failed Organisational Proposals: the Problem of Great Powers and Security

It has been possible to generate a degree of institutionalised cooperation that is economically driven, Southeast Asia-centred and 'soft' (rather than EU-style 'hard'). However, there is a strong tendency *against* organisation-building in East Asia when security exists as the major issue, especially when great power actors have had an interest in the outcome (see Appendix 14.B). Security and inter-imperial rivalries were the original antecedent to regional organisation-building during the pre-WWII colonial period of 1918–1945, just as economics became the driving force once the colonial structures had been shaken off. Regional organisations at that time were developed by external actors during a period of fading imperialism, and were divided between the long-existing European colonialists, the imperialist challenger Japan and the anti-colonial United States. It is this colonial history that continues to make many regional actors wary of security-oriented organisation-building.

In the early post-WWII period up to the 1954 Geneva Conference, regional organisation-building was still a colonial affair. Three groupings of proposals for regional organisations emerged – those initiated by the West, local anti-West proposals and regionally led pro-West proposals. For the West, or rather the Europeans, the zeitgeist of the time, given US anti-imperialism was to shift from colonial control to post-colonial 'federations'. This resulted in the following short-lived organisations. Britain's WWII era South East Asia Command (SEAC) was scaled back in favour of bilateral arrangements due to differences between UK and US security visions for East Asia. Britain helped to create the Malay Federation (1948), and instituted Crown colony rule in Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. The United States went about signing bilateral security agreements with Thailand in 1950 and the Philippines in 1951. Holland transitioned their colonial possession of Indonesia from the Dutch East Indies into the United States of Indonesia (USI) in 1948. France transformed its French Empire into the French Union in 1946, and then went about conforming to the federalist zeitgeist of the time by gathering together southern Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the Indochinese Federation in 1946 and subsequently folding that into the French Union.

Western imperialism also drove local attempts at organisation-building intended to provide a bulwark against reinvigorated Western imperialism. Some were attempted in the Communist bloc. Ho Chi Minh attempted to link the Communist

parties of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the Indochinese Communist Party from 1930. The anti-Empire of Japan-oriented Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement attempted to link together the overseas Chinese diaspora with motherland China. Some local efforts were also attempted in the pro-Western capitalist camp. Thailand's foremost liberal of the time, Pridi Banomyong, proposed in 1947 (with UK backing) a nationalist populated anti-communist grouping based out of Bangkok – the South-East Asia League (SEAL). India's Nehru saw an opening for former colonies to unite against their colonial masters and proposed an Asian Organisation at the Indian Council of World Affairs' Asian Relations Conference in 1947, and attempted again in 1949 to form a South-Southeast Asian, Indo-centric organisation to resist Western imperialism. The Philippines proposed a NATO-like arrangement in 1949 with the Pacific Pact, albeit under the US security umbrella but seemingly with lukewarm support from the United States itself.

Western attempts to remain as definers of the regional order complicated efforts by local states to develop regional cooperation. The 1954 Geneva Conference had left France's Indochina problem nominally but unsatisfactorily settled, and heralded the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) – a NATO for the region. However the UK and the United States were divided over its role and as such it was not provided with any NATO-like collective defence responsibilities, nor was it provided with a standing military force. It did however mean the continued presence of Western actors in the region. This caused major issues for regional organisation-building; Indonesia under Sukarno came to regard regional organisations as Trojan horses for continued Western interests, for example.

The seeds of non-alignment as a response to this lingering 'post-colonialism' began to be developed by Indonesia at the 1955 Bandung Conference, an attempt to build broad anti-imperialist cooperation. Indonesia had taken the lead – and succeeded – in forcing through the notion of a neutralised Southeast Asia, with the tacit blessing of a UK that had considered favourably the idea of a neutral region.²⁵ In 1966 Thailand (but really representing Indonesia) proposed a collective security arrangement – the Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation – that required the removal of US bases in the region. The proposal failed due to the United States' role with its regional security partners and their desires to maintain US security guarantees, although Thailand later bilaterally removed its US bases by the early 1970s. The scaling back of British security guarantees with a shift from the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement of 1957 to the Five Power Defense Arrangements in 1971 was immediately seized upon by Indonesia to create ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) thereby turning Southeast Asia into a non-aligned region.

Some great powers did attempt to replace the reduced UK-centric power vacuum with their own security-based organisational frameworks. The USSR attempted and failed twice with their Asian Collective Security proposals in 1969

and 1972. Lingering desires from India to play an inter-regional/post-colonial compatriot type role also came to naught after siding with the USSR with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The United States established Pacific-level military exercises during the 1970s and 1980s – the Rim of the Pacific Exercise from 1971; the Pacific Armies Management Seminar from 1978; the Cobra Gold annual exercises from 1982; and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium from 1988. These have grown to include various Southeast and East Asian states, but have not fostered any ‘harder’ form of organisational security apparatus. The USSR responded to these Pacific activities by proposing in 1986 and again in 1998 a Pacific Ocean Conference. Both failed due to lack of engagement from East Asian states. China came late to such efforts but joined with by Russia to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, initiated in 1996, which attempts to build cooperation not ‘vertically’ (down through the Asia-Pacific) but ‘horizontally’ (across Eurasia). Arguably, this China-centred organisation has proved more successful than Russia’s pan-East Asia proposals, but remains limited in East Asian membership.

The most that appears possible in the post-Cold War period is for the creation of region-wide ‘talking shops’ that do not commit to any formal obligations. The launching of the Pacific-wide talking shop of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), both in 1993, revealed once more the preference for ASEAN-rooted, albeit externally engaged, organisation-building.²⁶ Supported by the Bangkok Treaty signed two years later in 1995 that reiterated Southeast Asia as a non-aligned (in this case, nuclear-free) region, multiple but toothless dialogue organisations have been generated, and attempts to upgrade the ARF have met with limited success.

Extant but Weak Organisations: Local Political Cultures, Local Political Suspicions

The ASEAN Economic Community came into being in 2015 and the agreement of a roadmap for 2025 has been an achievement, but it has been a rocky historical process and not one without lingering problems. With the ASEAN integration process appearing promising in the 1970s, multilateral economic efforts began through the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific aiming at regional integration. However, attempts by the UN to create Preferential Tariff Arrangements in 1977, the ASEAN Industrial Projects Scheme in 1980, ASEAN Industrial Cooperation in 1981 and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures in 1982 failed due to the application of Europe-inspired functionalist economic initiatives. The fundamental political problem of the day was that few states were thinking regionally and even if they were, the initiative would have to emerge locally rather than being imposed.²⁷ These problems and new ones reside within the AEC today. One issue is that with the vast array of overlapping trade regimes now in existence it is difficult to discern where the AEC sits among

them. Second is the lack of awareness among the people and the businesses of Southeast Asia in terms of what the AEC is or of any benefits it creates.²⁸ Third is the remaining divergence of economic levels among the AEC economies. For example, it is difficult to consider how businesses in Cambodia are meant to compete with those in developed Thailand. The AEC, while fairly significant, should still be regarded as a work in progress rather than a destination reached.

In wider East Asia terms, when attempts have been made to either broaden regional organisation into an East Asia or Asia-Pacific economic bloc, or to widen integration beyond the economic dimension into deeper political and especially security cooperation, problems have been encountered. South Korea's ambitious proposal in 1970 to build on ASEAN integration and form an Asian Common Market resulted in little. In 1990 proposals for a free trade area – the East Asia Economic Group – were made by Malaysia's Mahatir bin Mohamad that implied an 'Asia for Asians' philosophy that would exclude the United States and Australia. Japan helped scupper the proposal. Instead, the more bilateral in orientation ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 took on a similar if diluted function. Attempts to move from the hubs-and-spokes 'ASEAN+' model towards a pan-regional trade bloc have gained little traction. Japan's efforts to develop wider FTAs, first by building on ASEAN+3 in 2004 by proposing the East Asia Free Trade Area that would exclude Australia and New Zealand, and then to build on ASEAN+6 in 2009 by proposing the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia, both led to naught because of ASEAN's desire to safeguard its position as the bridge-building hub of any efforts at wider East Asia/Pacific organisation-building. Similarly, proposals in 2009 for political cooperation resulting from increasing economic cooperation – one from Japan with the East Asian Community concept that resulted from Malaysia's 2004 East Asia Summit, and one from Australia with the Asia Pacific Community proposal – did not result in long-term cooperation.

At the Pacific level also, the success rate has been equally as mixed. Japan and Australia began attempting to leverage Southeast Asia's integration into Pacific integration as early as the 1960s. Japan's business community had proposed the notion of a Pacific economic community as early as 1962 and the notion was being considered politically by Japan, Australia and the United States. However, the United States argued that it was too early and scuppered further discussion until the gestation of APEC at the closing of the 1980s.²⁹ Attempts to deepen these and further promote the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept would by 1980 – with the joint Japan–Australia proposed Pacific Economic Cooperation Council – simply result in a series of talking shops for intellectuals and various levels of other elites.

These proposals often failed due to a lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian states, with the United States often being involved somewhere. At various points since the early 1990s a Japan–Korea FTA or a China–Japan–Korea FTA have been raised but never instituted, and this is despite the proliferation during a

concordant period of bilateral and regional FTAs. South Korea has floated, with the support of Japan, the idea of a North East Asian Development Bank that has been discouraged by the United States.³⁰ Furthermore, despite the mishandling of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by the IMF and Japan's dissatisfaction with the IMF's preoccupation with market mechanisms,³¹ Japan's proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund were rejected, leaving Japan embarrassed.³² Despite the plans having the support of many Asian countries, they were not supported by the United States and the IMF, and the United States even lobbied China to reject the plan out of concerns of 'Japanese hegemony'.³³ The most that has been achieved are moves towards currency coordination with the Asian Bond Market Initiative (2002), the impractical Asian Monetary Unit proposal (2005) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (2010). They have not progressed in the same way as the European Currency Unit, facilitated by the Euro, however they do appear to be achieving their primary purpose of managing region-affecting currency fluctuations.

In relation to security, attempts to upgrade the ARF have been very limited. Indonesia's ASEAN Security Community of 2003 – the Bali Concord II plan – has come the closest but shown limited development, with the best that has been achieved being the talking shops of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting from 2006, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus from 2010 and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum from 2012. Anything more substantial and larger than this, for example, the 2002-initiated Shangri-La Dialogue, has the potential to overly 'warm-up' East Asian relations as global power rivalries surface more easily. This occurred at the 2015 Shangri-la Dialogue event when China's activities in the South China Sea were openly criticised by the United States and Japan. Little has resulted that could be considered tangible enough to move the ARF's 'cooperative security' arrangements towards a 'collective security' position as in the UN or NATO.

In broader East Asia/Pacific level security terms, progress has been even less pronounced. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, spurred on by increasingly assertive China naval activity in the South China Seas, proposed a range of new security apparatus for Southeast and East Asian security organisation. However, Japan's 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue/Quadrilateral Initiative that would join the United States, Japan, Australia and India into what Prime Minister Abe called a 'security diamond' that would form an 'arc of democracy', failed. So too did Japan's proposal in 2015 to create East Asia's first permanent organisation for maritime cooperation with the Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation. There seems little progress or interest in these Japanese proposals – except from Vietnam – unless they are economic in nature. Even in the face of constant crisis, such as nuclear developments on the Korean peninsula, it has proven difficult to build much beyond 'loose' security organisations. The US-initiated Six Party Talks since 2003 on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme have yielded little development and only more missile launches from North Korea. These have been met by a 2013 South Korea Northeast Asia

Peace and Cooperation Initiative, supported by Japan, in addition to a 2016 South Korea-proposed Five Party Talks (which excludes North Korea), both of which have not amounted to much, and the latter being seemingly counter-productive.

THE TRANSITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Against this complex and fragmented patchwork of organisations in East and Southeast Asia, pressures arising from the transitional international order are also affecting *how* these arrangements are evolving. Principally this is being driven by what has been dubbed by various analysts as the ‘G2’ – China and the United States.³⁴

New Players, New Rivalries: China

China has long since passed the time when it was a developing country and is now able not only to put pressure on existing organisations but also to create its own. 2001 marked China’s 10th five-year economic plan and with it came a policy shift with the government’s ‘go global’ strategy that aimed to shift the country from a recipient of FDI to generator of FDI, with the vast majority going to East Asia.³⁵ By 2015, China began to make it clear that it was going to begin offering alternatives to the prevailing Western-led, Asia-Pacific visions detailed in the previous section. In rapid succession, China first moved to multilateralise and regionalise its aid and investment. In 2014 China created the Silk Road Fund for investment in energy-rich Eurasia to the West of China. In 2015 the New Development Bank – the so-called BRICs Bank – was established. In turn, in 2016, a regional challenger to the Japan/US-dominated ADB was established with the opening of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Despite public statements in favour of cooperation, Japan and the United States did not join the AIIB, being wrong-footed by many European economies and Australia who did. These investment funds also emerged against the backdrop of the Peoples Bank of China attempting from 2013 to internationalise China’s currency, the renminbi, with the creation of so-called ‘dim sum bonds’ and the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.

Not only in finance but also in trade, China is a rising challenger. In response to the increased traction of the US-proposed Trans Pacific Partnership that was finally agreed in 2016, China proposed the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific.³⁶ With the bilateral ASEAN–China FTA already being the most populous free trade zone in the world, attempts to enlarge it Pacific-wide would arguably position East Asia as a significant challenger to a global economic order centred on the West. Bolstered by the fact that China is predicted by 2020 to become the world’s largest source of foreign investment,³⁷ that centre of gravity may indeed have already shifted.

This is inevitably creating concerns for the existing status quo players. Japan's strong economic presence in China's southern-side Mekong peninsula countries is being felt. From 2008, Japan began attempting to shift Mekong states away from the ADB-spearheaded Greater Mekong Subregion project, towards a Mekong integration project better connected to Tokyo. Agreeing to a list of development projects under the framework, Japan began using its economic power for a more overly geo-political effect by attempting to move and alter the objectives of existing organisations. China's response was the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework, a carbon copy of Japan's own cooperation frameworks with the GMS sub-region, but from a neighbour much closer to the region than Japan is.

Challenging the United States and the West is a different matter, however, and China's foreign policy, encapsulated through its efforts at organisation-building, exhibit a more cautious approach that essentially seeks similar levels of prosperity and political parity with the United States and the West.³⁸ Aside from issues in the South China Seas, China is not intent on confrontation with the West. In 2012, Peking University's Dean of International Studies, Wang Jisi, proposed a strategy which explicitly enunciated the need for China to avoid confrontation in its rise, and the best way to achieve this, according to Jisi, was his Look/Go/March West Strategy.³⁹ That is, understanding that the United States takes a keen interest in all matters related to the Malacca Strait, China's focus should be oriented westwards rather than southwards. It is possible to witness this reflected in the government of China's New Silk Road Policy, a major energy and infrastructure construction programme – the 'One Belt One Road' framework (now recently referred to as the Built Road Initiative). This 'Look West' concept also explains the emphasis China is making in building organisations that include Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia connections, in addition to East Asian states. Indeed, if China seriously wanted to challenge the West in global organisational terms, it has been able to since WWII through its membership of the UN Security Council, yet rarely does so. Despite often voting with the USSR/Russia in support of the principle of state sovereignty over humanitarian intervention, for the period 1945–2014, at ten uses, China has been the least active employer of its veto power compared with the United States (77) and Russia (68).⁴⁰ Still, at the regional level, China's 'air defence identification zone' has put down an assertive marker, and initiatives such as these overshadow, and problematize, all efforts to establish regularised regional cooperation. This gap between China's actions globally and actions regionally is a key point of dissonance for how many view China's 'peaceful rise' ambitions.⁴¹

The United States and the Liberal Order

The post-war liberal order and its multilateral institutions possess a staggered record of acceptance of East Asian states (see Appendix 14.C), yet it is this

creasing liberal architecture that the United States seeks to uphold. Diplomatically, membership of the UN for East Asian states occurred in broadly three ‘waves’ (see Appendix 14.D). The first wave in the 1940s was associated with the Allies; the second wave came in the 1950s post-Colombo Plan period; and the third wave emerged from the 1960s onwards as national divisions were eventually resolved. In security terms, membership of the nuclear weapons body, the IAEA, developed along two waves that reflected geo-political concerns about great powers in the region. Most of the core ASEAN members who desired a non-aligned Southeast Asia joined in 1957 at the time of the IAEA’s creation, as did Japan and Cold War hot spot South Korea. Following this initial flurry, late-comers joined in a trickle, each having their own circumstances and outlooks regarding nuclear weapons to take into account. Along the economic dimension, the world’s oldest global financial institution – the Bank for International Settlements – began accepting non-Western banks from the 1960s, as the Bank of Japan slowly began to be accepted. It would not be until 1981 that Northeast Asia would see another BIS member join in the form of the Peoples Bank of China. After this initial, and slow-moving, first wave, the BIS began opening up to East Asia. A second wave of new members were invited from 1996 that comprised mainly the former ‘tiger economies’ and then a third wave from 1999 with key ASEAN state banks. Membership of the OECD, G8 and G20 – the rich clubs of global organisations – is dependent on economic development levels, so they would remain locked to many East Asian economies.

While global organisations have usually remained closed to most states of East Asia over the post-WWII period, regional economic organisations have been enthusiastically formed and joined, and this is something that the United States has sometimes found threatening.⁴² When the ADB was established in 1966 almost every state in East Asia joined immediately. Equally, when China initiated the AIIB in 2015 there was, again, wide acceptance. As a result the United States has rebuffed or sabotaged many additional attempts by regional actors to create organisations that may develop the potential to dilute or exclude US power from the region. This tends to be achieved with the help of one of its regional partners – usually Japan or Australia – through their presenting alternatives that will ‘keep the United States engaged in the region’. There have been multiple attempts since WWII to recreate Western-originated multilateral organisations in the East Asia region. SEATO in 1954 was to be a model of NATO for the region, and South Korea’s Asian and Pacific Treaty Organization proposal in 1966 was a further attempt at something similar. Australia attempted to create a Pacific OECD-like organisation with the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development proposal in 1989. South Korea attempted, in 1993, to recreate the World Bank/IMF architecture at the regional level with the NEADB, and Japan sought the same in 1997 with the AMF. Japan’s attempts in 2015 to promote the Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation was a desire to replicate Europe’s OSCE. Each time the United States feels threatened by regional organisations

that it is not involved in, it reverts to promoting traditional multilateral organisations or only new organisations in which it is involved.

However, the United States is increasingly appearing impotent in a region rife with change.⁴³ Economically, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis remains a key case study for how global organisations, and the United States through them, can use crisis in order to engineer desirable (to them) structural change and reconfigure politico-economic structures.⁴⁴ The lingering distrust in Southeast Asia at the IMF's failure to contain the 1997 crisis has led many in the region to become open to economic measures of self-defence (such as an openness to new financial instruments) that it is hoped will provide a bulwark against perceived meddling, ineffectual, or biased global organisations.⁴⁵ There may also be a renewed willingness to turn inwards towards the region and become more open to the organisational ideas of regional leader states such as Japan, Australia or China. In security terms, the glaring inability of the United States to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue demonstrates the realism and potential weakness of US security guarantees. The United States' impotence with North Korea is also increasingly being matched by impotence in dealing with what it and its allies regard as aggressive behaviour from China. China is being left free to rise unchallenged in East Asia, resulting in various disputes. Japan–China conflicts over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in which China is challenging both ownership of the islands, the sea and the airspace, have left the United States seemingly paralysed. Coupled with the difficulty of dealing with China's wider regional territorial claims, US authority appears paper-thin.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed two main points in relation to global and regional organisations in East Asia. The first is the nature of these organisations, how they have developed and the challenges they have encountered. This is addressed within three themes: organisations that have become consolidated, proposals for organisations that have failed and organisations that have come into being but are either weak or failing. The second main focus of the chapter is to address what the current 'transitional order' means for these organisations. This is addressed using two themes: the rise of China and whether this is challenging the prevailing international order, and the role of the United States within this rapidly changing region. The chapter demonstrates that there is a greater chance for organisations in East Asia to emerge if they are oriented around economic and trade issues, and as free as possible from great power rivalries. Security cooperation has also not taken root in the region amid bilateral ties. It is also possible to conclude that the strength of regional organisations is geographically based, with Southeast Asia generating relatively stable organisations, Northeast Asia barely able to muster much cooperation, and efforts at generating East Asia wide or pan-Pacific organisations limited.

In relation to the nature of the transitional international order and organisations in East Asia, it is possible to conclude that the rise of China is likely to destabilise some aspects of the existing status quo, but this may result from a broader regional lack of satisfaction with the existing status quo. For a long time the United States or its regional proxies have scuppered efforts at greater regional organisation-building in favour of protecting the authority of global multilateral organisations where the United States (and others in the West) are dominant. Now, with the rise of China, a power has emerged that possesses the capacity to give voice to the long-time quiet discontent of many in the region. The key to managing this transition, and maintaining relative stability, is for there to be either a greater acceptance of China's power and organisational initiatives – for example if the United States or Japan were to join the China-led AIIB – or to allow for a greater strength and range of regional organisations to emerge that could provide a counterbalance to China. The latter of these two options would justifiably be regarded by China as provocative, so it would be desirable if there could be a broader acceptance of China's initiatives. It is possible to project forward from these conclusions and predict a period of heightened instability that will be impossible to channel safely through robust organisations, because they do not exist. Due to the weakness of the UN, it is hardly likely to act as a multilateral replacement for weak regionalisation. Region watchers will need to remain keenly focused on the development of the AIIB and its relationship with the ADB, as well as the deepening of the AEC project.

Notes

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Appendix 14.A Summary of East and Southeast Asian regional organisation since WWII

	<i>Security</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Politico-diplomatic</i>
East Asia (including Southeast Asia)	<p>Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) (1971) (US led)</p> <p>Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) (1978) (US led)</p> <p>Cobra Gold annual exercises (1982) (US led)</p> <p>Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) (1988) (US led)</p> <p>Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (1993)</p> <p>Shangri-La Dialogues (SLD) (2002)</p>	<p>UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) (1947) later, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (1974)</p> <p>Colombo Plan (1950)</p> <p>Asian Development Bank formed (1966)</p> <p>The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) (1967)</p> <p>Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) (1968)</p> <p>Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) (1980)</p> <p>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1989)</p> <p>ASEAN+3 (1997)</p> <p>Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (1997)</p> <p>ASEAN+6 (2005) (agreed at the East Asia Summit)</p> <p>China's Silk Road Fund founded (2014)</p> <p>New Development Bank (NDB) aka BRICS Bank formed (2015)</p> <p>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank opened (AIIB) (2016)</p> <p>Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (2016)</p>	<p>Bandung Conference ('Asian African Summit') (1955)</p> <p>Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) (1996)</p> <p>Asia Cooperation Dialogue (2002)</p> <p>East Asia Summit (EAS) (2005)</p> <p>New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAAASP) (2005)</p>

Southeast Asia	South East Asia Command (SEAC) (1943–1946)	ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (1992) (Common Effective Preferential Tariff) (CEPT)	Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) (1930)
	US–Thailand military pact (1950)	Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (1992)	Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement (1937)
	US–Philippines military pact (1951)	Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT–GT) (1993)	Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) (1961) [Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia]
	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (1954)	Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–The Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP–EAGA) (1994)	MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia) (1963)
	Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement (1957)	Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV–DTA) (1999)	Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia (MEDSEA) (1967–1974)
	Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971)	Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) (2000)	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) [now including Indonesia], formed with the Bangkok Declaration
	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)	ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) (2015)	ASEAN expansion (1995–1999)
	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976)		[1995 – Vietnam; 1997 – Laos and Burma; 1999 – Cambodia]
	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1993)		Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) (2009)
	The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) aka. Bangkok Treaty (1995)		ASEAN – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ministerial meetings (2009)
	ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (2006)		ASEAN-Pacific Alliance (2015)
	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus (ADMM+) (2010)		ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, launched
	Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) (2012)		

Appendix 14.B Failed/failing proposals for regional organisation since WWII

<i>Proposing actor</i>	<i>Idea</i>	<i>Reaction to/desire to</i>	<i>Reason for failure</i>
Philippines Thailand (but Indonesia in origin)	Pacific Pact (1949) - a US-backed, anti-Communist, NATO-type grouping Southeast Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) (1966)	Reaction to developing Communist movements in Southeast Asia A desire to bring Indonesia into the anti-Communist group of Southeast Asian states by proposing collective security responsibilities that would be handled by Southeast Asian powers themselves, with the military bases of foreign powers (for instance the United States) being removed.	Lukewarm support from the United States. Resisted by the Philippines and Singapore who wanted to keep their US security guarantees.
South Korea	Asia Pacific Treaty Organisation (APATO) (1966)	Possibly secretly proposed by the United States; it represented a desire to organise an Asia Pacific anti-communist coalition that could block China's admission to the UN.	An Asia-Pacific-wide focus was too large. It became the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), however, lingering suspicions over Japan's involvement in East Asia caused problems.
USSR	Asian Collective Security proposal by Leonid Brezhnev (1969, again 1972)	Desire to counter China in addition to reducing Western (US) influence in the region	Vague proposal leading to lack of engagement; in addition to strong US opposition.
USSR	Pacific Ocean Conference proposal, similar to the Helsinki Accords' CSCE (1986, again in 1998)		Strong opposition from the United States
China	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (1996)	Reaction to NATO/desire for a rising China to multilateralise	Still in progress; however aside from some summits, tangible institutions or cooperation is unclear
Indonesia	ASEAN Security Community (ASC) (2003) aka Bali Concord II ¹	To reinvigorate ASEAN after the Asian Financial Crisis; to build on the ARF	Still in progress; however, little has resulted, and suspicions may linger over Indonesia's intent.

United States	Six Party Talks on North Korea (2003)	Desire to de-escalate nuclear weapons development on the Korean peninsula	Lack of progress made, with parties regularly walking away and intermittently attending.
Japan	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue/ Quadrilateral Initiative (QSD) (2007)	Response to increased activity from China and the desire by Japan's Shinzo Abe to establish an 'arc of democracy' with the QSD (or in Abe's words the 'security diamond') as its core	Failed the following year after Australia withdrew.
South Korea	Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) (2013)	Reaction to increased nuclear weapon activity in North Korea	Still in progress, but little cooperative institutionalism has developed.
Japan	Asian Maritime Organisation for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC) (2015)	Desire to create East Asia's first permanent regional maritime organisation and replicate Europe's OSCE	Still in progress, but unclear how much support the United States will provide.
South Korea	Five Party Talks (2016)	Reaction to North Korea's continued belligerence and lack of engagement in the Six Party Talks process.	Only recently proposed but doubts exist as it proposes talks about an actor that is then excluded from those talks.
South Korea	Asian Common Market (1970)	Similar to the other Regional Trade Arrangement of the time, the purpose was national interest rather than regionally oriented only.	Insufficient incentives from trading partners.
UN	Preferential Tariff Arrangements (PTAs) (1977) ²	Desire to increase ASEAN economic inter-dependence	National interests rather than regional focus of ASEAN members, and/or lack of technical capacity to fulfil the plans.

(Continued)

Appendix 14.B Continued

<i>Proposing actor</i>	<i>Idea</i>	<i>Reaction to/desire to</i>	<i>Reason for failure</i>
	ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) Scheme (1976, projects approval 1980) ³ ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (1981) ⁴ ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) (1982) ⁵		
Japan	Asian Network (1988)	A desire to generate a Tokyo-centred Asian Industries Development (AID) plan, and a reaction to the shifting nature of the Japanese economy (requiring greater outsourcing and offshoring).	Arguably still in progress and the backbone of Japan's regional post-Cold War foreign policy, a 'one region' vision centred on Tokyo is difficult to imagine for many.
Australia	Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) (1989)	Proposed by PM Bob Hawke, but brainchild of Kojima Kiyoshi and Peter Drysdale, OPTAD would be East Asia's OECD.	Helped pave the way for APEC, but the proposal itself needed further political acceptance rather than just academic.
Malaysia	East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) aka East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) (1990)	Reaction to APEC and US regional involvement	Opposition from the United States (and Japan)
South Korea	North East Asian Development Bank (NEADB) (1993)	Desire to integrate North Korea in regional cooperation	Opposition from the United States
Japan	Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) (1997)	Reaction to IMF mishandling of the Asian Financial Crisis	Opposition from the United States (and Japan)
Japan	East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA, excludes Australia and New Zealand) (2004)	Desire to building an FTA on the basis of ASEAN+3	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states

Japan	Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) (2005)	Reaction to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the inability to create an AMU, and modelled on the European Currency Unit (ECU). A currency basket approach was suggested (a bundle of 13 Asian currencies to hedge against currency shifts)	Difficult to integrate into global finance due to yen vs renminbi differences. ⁶
Japan	Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) (2009)	Desire to build an FTA on the basis of ASEAN+6	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states
ASEAN	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (2011)	Reaction to the exclusivity of the TPP that excludes China	Still in progress but the RCEP has replaced references to both the EAFTA and CEPEA in extra-ASEAN negotiations. ⁷
China	Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) (2014)	Reaction to the US-backed TPP	Still in progress, however seeming unlikely given the pro-United States positions of many in the region and past behaviour of Japan and Australia
Britain	South-East Asia League (SEAL) (1947), proposed by Thailand's Pridi Banomyong	A desire to combat Communist developments by uniting a collection of nationalists based out of Bangkok.	Other colonial powers returned too strongly.
India	Asian Organisation proposal by Nehru at the Indian Council of World Affairs – Asian Relations Conference (1947). ⁸	Desire by Nehru to draw together all developing anti-colonial movements under Indian rather than British auspices.	Southeast Asian states' reluctance to move forward under either Indian or Chinese superpower masters.

(Continued)

Appendix 14.B Continued

<i>Proposing actor</i>	<i>Idea</i>	<i>Reaction to/desire to</i>	<i>Reason for failure</i>
Malaya Federation	Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (1959)	Reaction to regional organisations with security objectives aimed at combatting communism, and a desire to develop economic-based regional organisations	National interests, principally concerns from Indonesia.
Australia	Asia Pacific Community (APC) (2009)	Desire to develop on ASEAN+3+6 and maintain US engagement in the region.	In progress, situation remains unclear but unlikely.
Japan (and Malaysia)	East Asian Community (EAC) (2009), resulting from Malaysia's 2004 East Asia Summit	Desire to build on ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit	Lack of cooperation among Northeast Asian '+3' states

Source: authors

¹ This plan, according to Indonesia, was not to form a military alliance as per SEATO but, instead, a comprehensive security alliance including political, economic, social and cultural dimensions rather than a defence pact, military alliance or joint foreign policy. It relies on norm-setting, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building rather than military force. It does, however, call for the addressing of maritime security in addition to the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

² This plan focused on trade as an integrating force, and proposed that certain ASEAN tariff lines would be given preferential treatment (with many exclusions allowed, however). States did not want to focus on ASEAN trade and wanted to maintain a long exclusion list of protected goods.

³ This plan focused on industrialisation, with five large collectively beneficial industrial projects agreed – one allocated for each country and the outputs shared by all. States would not agree to limit their industrial productivity to a singular dimension.

⁴ This plan brought in the private sector more, and focused on the development of horizontalised production chains. Industries would operate across multiple ASEAN economies to produce a finally finished product for extra-regional export. National interests again were dominant as countries vied for the higher-value products (final assembly goods) to be located in their country.

⁵ This plan was private-sector oriented again, but with an emphasis on the private sector side. Rather than governments deciding where a production chain would develop, the private sector would decide through the construction of local joint ventures. However, again, national interests won out; to implement this plan would have required liberalised tariff arrangements to allow joint ventures to benefit from each other, and national governments were unwilling to do so.

⁶ The basket would need one currency to act as an anchor for the rest, of which the most likely would be the yen or the renminbi. However, with Japan floating their currency but China controlling theirs, politically choosing one would be difficult.

⁷ ADB, Asia Regional Integration Center [online] *East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN+3)*. Available at [https://aric.adb.org/fta/least-asia-free-trade-area-\(asean3\)](https://aric.adb.org/fta/least-asia-free-trade-area-(asean3)) (accessed 17.04.2016)

⁸ Nehru attempted again in 1949 to form a South–Southeast Asian organisation to resist Western imperialism, but failed.

Appendix 14.C Membership of key global organisations by East Asian States

	DIPLOMACY			FINANCE				TRADE				SECURITY	
	UN (1945)	World Bank IMF (1944)	BIS (1930)	AIB (1966)	AIB (2015)	GATT (1948)	WTO (1995)	OECD (1961)	G8 (1975)	G20 (1999)	IAEA (1957)		
NORTHEAST ASIA													
Japan	1956	1952	1994 ¹	1966	–	1955	1995	1964	1975	1999	1957		
PR China	1945	1945	1996 ²	1986	2015	–	2001	–	–	1999	1984		
South Korea (Republic of)	1991 ³	1955	1996 ⁴	1966	2015	1967	1995	1996	–	1999	1957		
North Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic)	1991 ⁵	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		
Hong Kong	–	–	1996 ⁶	1969	–	1986	1995	–	–	–	–		
Taiwan	–	– ⁷	–	– ⁹	–	1965 ¹⁰	2002	–	–	–	–		
SOUTHEAST ASIA													
Malaysia	1957	1958	1999	1966	2015	1957	1995	–	–	–	1969		
Indonesia	1950	1967	2003 ¹¹	1966	2015	1950	1995	–	–	1999	1957		
Philippines	1945	1945	2003	1966	2015	1979	1995	–	–	–	1958		
Singapore	1965	1966 ¹²	1996	1966	2015	1973	1995	–	–	–	1969		
Thailand	1946	1949	1999	1966	2015	1982	1995	–	–	–	1957		
Brunei Darussalam	1984	1995 ¹³	–	2006	2015	1993	1995	–	–	–	2014		
Cambodia	1955	1970	–	1966	2015	–	2004	–	–	–	2009		
Laos	1955	1961	–	1966	2015	–	2013	–	–	–	2011		
Myanmar	1948	1952	–	1973	2015	1948	1995	–	–	–	1957		
Vietnam	1977	1956	–	1966	2015	–	2007	–	–	–	1957		

Source: authors

¹ 1961 – account requested; 1963 – monthly visits begin; 1964 – began attending Eurocurrency meetings and other meetings as a member; 1967 – began attending monthly governor meetings; 1970 – BIS shares bought; 1994 – board member nation status

² 1981 – established relations; 1996 – full membership established

³ 1948 – observer status; 1991 – full status agreed along with North Korea

⁴ 1991 – began attending executive meetings; 1996 – full membership attained

⁵ 1971 – observer status; 1991 – full status agreed along with South Korea

⁶ 1996 – full membership established (along with China)

⁷ 1944 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1980

⁸ 1945 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1980

⁹ 1966 – founding member, removed under protest from China in 1986

¹⁰ 1965 – given observer status, removed under protest from China in 1971, later restored in 1992

¹¹ 1999 – full membership invited; 2003 – full membership invited (second time)

¹² Singapore would join later once independent of Malaysia

¹³ Joined many organisations once independence from the UK was achieved in 1984 and industrial development using natural resource wealth could occur

Appendix 14.D Waves of East Asia's integration with global organisations

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Wave</i>	<i>Description</i>
UN	1	Post-WWII founding members (1945>)
	2	Post-Colombo Plan (1950>)
	3	Divided country later-comers (1965>)
World Bank & IMF	1	Post-WWII members (1945>)
	2	Post-Colombo Plan (1950>)
	3	Post-Geneva Conference (1955>)
BIS	1	North East Asian states (1960>)
	2	Tiger economies (1996>)
	3	Key ASEAN states (1999>)
ADB	1	Founding member states (1966>)
	2	Latecomers (1969>)
AIIB	1	Founding members (2015>)
WTO	1	Pre-existing GATT members converted after reform (1995>)
	2	Transitioning Communist states (2001>)
OECD	1	Japan (1964>)
	2	South Korea (1996>)
G8	1	Japan (1975>)
G20	1	Japan (1964>)
	2	South Korea (1996>)
IAEA	1	Non-aligned SE Asia and nuclear-prohibited Japan and South Korea (1957>)
	2	Latecomers (1969>)

Source: authors

Note 1: WB, IMF, GATT and WTO are not included as there are no recognisable trends in membership of these Bretton Woods institutions. States seemed to join for individual reasons and at different times.

Note 2: The OECD, G8 and G20 are not included because they are dependent on economic development status alone, rather than the more politico-economic criteria of the other institutions.

Note 3: The AIIB is not included because it is a very new organisation in addition to having unanimous accidence upon its creation

Asia and International Peace Support: Limits of Institutionalization

Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will explore why it has been difficult to develop international institutions in Asia, taking Asian nations' engagement in international peace support operations as a case study to illustrate the point. Although most are keen to contribute to international peace support missions, especially through the United Nations (UN), regional institutions for collectively organizing such operations have been non-existent to date, unlike, for example, in Europe. Asian institutions rarely play roles in international peace support, although there has been ad hoc intra-regional collaboration to support international peace operations and, recently, countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia have been expressing interest in developing Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN)-based collective peacekeeping capacities. This chapter contends that the following factors provide explanations for the lack of institutional development in Asia in this area.

First, even as many Asian states increasingly identify peace support as serving their foreign policy and security interests, international peacekeeping has tended to assume secondary importance (as opposed to a more traditional security agenda) due to a preoccupation with intra-regional security issues, such as often long-lasting domestic security threats or coping with rising China. A binary perception where 'traditional' military security and 'non-traditional' security including peacekeeping are diametrically opposed is prevalent in Asia. This also adds to the tendency to sideline international peacekeeping operations.

Second, Asian institutions have historically served the purpose of safeguarding sovereignty within the region. Notwithstanding increasing interest in conflict prevention and mediation, respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference has been a hindrance for the development of regional peacekeeping capacity, particularly when such missions are becoming more intrusive tools for managing civil wars rather than mere inter-state ceasefire observations.

Third, Asian institutions such as ASEAN serve as a balancing tool for smaller states vis-à-vis potential regional hegemon. These institutions have not developed an overt collective defense or collective security identity, unlike Europe where institutions historically played a large role in forming a security community. In the post-Cold War era, especially, European collective engagement in peace support missions such as those in the Balkans not only resulted in a further strengthening of collective security identity, but also functioned as machinery for redefining alliances with the United States befitting a new era. In Asia, no equivalent interest arose to use international institutions in a similar manner. Alliances in Asia are maintained largely through bilateral relationships, and have much less operational military dimensions compared with Europe. Asian nations have chosen to support international peace missions on individual bases, rather than through regional institutions, a trend that is in itself a reflection of diverse interests and historical backgrounds among Asian nations.

In the following sections, we first provide an overview of contributions by Asian nations to peace support missions, to underline the uneven nature of development of related capabilities. We then address prevalent concerns for safeguarding sovereignty, the bedrock principle of international relations and institutionalization in Asia. The fact that Asian inter-state relations remain deeply wedded to Westphalian sovereignty is a reflection of lingering inter-state rivalries, histories of post-colonialism and diverse interests. Geopolitical rivalries and alliance relations also influence calculations for engaging in international peace and stability missions, especially those far away from the region. We conclude by exploring ways to develop international institutions for collective peacekeeping, based upon the emerging recognition that intra-regional collaboration in peace support may well be beneficial for future stability of the region.

ASIAN STATES AND PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS – TRENDS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Asian nations, including major powers such as China and Japan, are among the 44 ‘newcomers’ to UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. Others, such as most notably Australia and Indonesia, are long-term supporters of UN peacekeeping. Recently, the rise of Chinese influence in UN peacekeeping has been notable, as the second-largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and as the tenth-largest troop and police contributing country in UN

peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) (as of December 2018). Notably, China contributes the largest number of peacekeeping uniformed personnel among the P5. Japan has been one of the top financially contributing countries (FCCs) to UN peacekeeping over the years and although various legal and operational limitations exist, Japan started to routinely engage in UNPKOs after 1992, overcoming its post-war reluctance to engage in international missions. However, having withdrawn from South Sudan in May 2017, it has currently no unit participation in UN peacekeeping missions for the first time since 1992 (as of December 2018).¹ Among middle powers in the region, South Korea is also a newcomer to UNPKOs, though it has a longer history of contributing to various other non-UN-led stability operations as a key ally of the United States. More recently in 2014, Vietnam participated for the first time in UN peacekeeping operations. Cambodia, itself a beneficiary of UNPKOs in the 1990s as it emerged from civil war, has deployed on UNPKOs since 2006.

Within Asia, the perception that the UN is an effective and legitimate world organization with the ability to safeguard world order remains strong. A common motivation for supporting or participating in peacekeeping missions is support for the rule of law and liberal world order. For example, in South Korea, the history of invasion from North Korea, repelled with help from the UN, creates a sense of obligation to participate in UN operations to 'return the favour'.² Another example would be a small city-state, Singapore, whose leaders have argued that the maintenance of international law and stability epitomized by the UN will ultimately enhance the country's security as a legitimate sovereign state. Participating in UNPKOs is, then, about demonstrating support for the rule of law and order realized by the UN, in an otherwise anarchic international system.

Beyond such normative aspects, the drivers for nations in the region to support or contribute to peacekeeping missions vary. Increasingly, however, states in the region regard peacekeeping operations as a necessary and important policy tool to serve their foreign and defence policy goals.

First of all, in a region where the UN is held with high esteem, participating in UN peacekeeping is motivated by prestige and status factors (such as helping in the bid for UN Security Council seats, permanent or non-permanent). States also consider that stronger representation in international organizations including through peacekeeping enhances their power projection beyond the region. For example, for states such as Japan and South Korea, a more visible presence and profile in multilateral peacekeeping institutions is a means to project growing self-confidence and a sense of identity onto the global stage (the former hoped to gain a permanent Security Council seat, which was opposed and actively challenged by the latter).

Perhaps the greatest change in perception can be witnessed in China, whose foreign policy has evolved from suspicion to finally embracing UN peacekeeping as a legitimate foreign policy tool. As He Yin argues, China's doctrine on UN peacekeeping has evolved from one of 'reactive cooperation' during the

1980s and 1990s, of either flatly denying or following UN norms and practices, to 'active participation' since the 2000s, where it is now willing to pragmatically shape norms and operations through participation and debates.³ China now considers UNPKO participation a valuable means to project its 'soft power', through which it is projecting its image as a peaceful rising power. Peacekeeping also serves its 'peripheral diplomacy' where Beijing will no longer be seen as a spoiler of peace processes. Beijing's articulation of a 'New Security Concept' also stresses mutual cooperation for resolving conflicts over great-power intervention, which it has historically opposed.

Other communist, formerly revolutionary, states in the region also have evolved their views on UN peacekeeping. Vietnam deployed its first troops to UNPKOs in May 2014, overcoming its long-term hesitation based on various reasons, including fear that a UN commitment might compromise its neutrality. Cambodia, the recipient of the UN's peacebuilding assistance in the wake of its civil war in the early 1990s, has contributed troops to UNPKOs since 2006. Both nations now view participation in UNPKOs as a way to enhance the country's international prestige and to integrate further into the international community.

For more established long-standing contributors to UN peacekeeping, such involvement has always been part of their foreign policy tools. For Indonesia, UN peacekeeping is a viable way for it to contribute to world peace and to express its commitment to active foreign policy, having abstained from joining any military alliances (the 'Free and Active' foreign policy doctrine enunciated in 1948 prevents it from doing so). Indonesia was active in UN peacekeeping in the 1950s and 1960s. After a hiatus during the transition from President Sukarno to Suharto, it has since been interested in enhancing its international role through supporting UNPKOs.⁴ Jakarta's stance towards UN peacekeeping has been linked to neutrality of the non-aligned movement, where it has historically played a leadership role. Hence the nation has supported the 'traditional' forms of peacekeeping that uphold the so-called 'holy-trinity' of non-use of force, consent and neutrality principles.

Such a traditionally held stance may in the future be evolving as Indonesia is embracing contemporary UN peacekeeping that may go beyond the boundary of traditional principles. Indeed, Anwar argues that the stance towards peacekeeping is showing some signs of pragmatism in practice.⁵ Indonesian administrations under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and President Joko Widodo have been committed to increasing the number of Indonesian peacekeepers to more than 4,000, and such rhetoric is matched by an actual increase in troop numbers (total 2,745 police, uniformed military and observers as of December 2016) now deployed in the field, including in complex missions such as Darfur, Mali and the DRC. What is more significant is its willingness also to contribute much-needed logistical platforms such as helicopters and ships.⁶ For instance, the nation has deployed a sizable proportion of transport helicopters to UN missions in Mali and the DRC.

Other Asian states that are newcomers share the same generic expectations that their troops will benefit from operational experience in the field with overseas deployments. Japan, for example, has been keen to familiarize itself with UN procedures and processes through PKO participation. Tokyo also views participation in UN peacekeeping as a way to train and ready its troops for international missions, as well as enhancing the legitimacy of its armed forces (although a current lack of unit participation in UN peacekeeping means a hiatus in the pursuit of that interest, Tokyo keeps staff officers in UN missions for these purposes). China's peacekeeping commitments since the 1990s have been viewed by Beijing as allowing its military to operate far from Chinese soil, hence is part of the effort to develop an expeditionary capability, as well as a means to improve the country's image globally. Military-to-military exchanges in the context of peacekeeping deployments are viewed in a positive light. Joint training and education schemes are a growing endeavour in the region, as nations see mutual benefits in enhancing capabilities. For example, Cambodia's military have interacted with fellow ASEAN states' militaries in UN peacekeeping missions, such as the Sudan and Lebanon, resulting in a higher degree of socialization. In addition, it has participated in regional peacekeeping exercises, gaining greater familiarity with regional and international norms.

In the region, Australia stands apart somewhat as an exception in this issue of what militaries can gain from overseas deployments with UNPKOs. As one of the most advanced nations with full-spectrum capabilities (with particular advantages in deployable police force and civil-military coordination), there is a strong preference for working outside UN command and control that is generally seen as inefficient, a perception owing in part to past negative experiences in Bosnia and Somalia. In the past two decades when Australian forces were supporting US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Australia seems to have taken the direction of distancing itself from UN-led operations, although it generally supports the UN's goals. The reason involves Australia's calculation of its key national security interests that align more narrowly with the United States.⁷

One important characteristic of the Asian region when it comes to approaches to peacekeeping and peace support operations is that capabilities in the region for conducting these missions are rather uneven and generally remain underdeveloped. Specific peacekeeping contributions have differed from state to state. Most have limited exposure to such missions and are wedded normatively to 'traditional' peacekeeping. In the region, none are strategic players able to command an intervention force (with the possible exception of Australia), and most Asian states have been content with unit/partial contributions.

It is worthwhile, however, to note that many states in the region take a pragmatic approach towards what kinds of peacekeeping missions they participate in. A few more 'mature' peacekeepers in the region have begun to gain experience in more complex and 'robust' peace operations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Some, such as China and Indonesia, are now sending sizable contingents tasked

with logistical support and security/protection duties in volatile missions, such as the DRC and Mali. Many Asian nations, including Indonesia and Japan, have served in UN peacekeeping missions authorized under UN Charter Chapter VII, such as in Haiti, despite their official recognition of traditional peacekeeping principles based upon consent, neutrality and non-use of force.

There is, nonetheless, a distinct lack of institutionalization of peace support at the regional level. For reasons explained below, interest periodically expressed by individual states has not yet resulted in a region-based permanent peacekeeping force. Although smaller ASEAN nations have participated on an individual basis (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in the EU Aceh Monitoring Mission, the long-term implications of such specific deployments on broader regional institution-building for peacekeeping remain uncertain. Some, especially smaller nations in the region such as Singapore, have formed close training and operational cooperation with non-Asian, more experienced militaries such as the Dutch and Americans.⁸ For example, Singapore has participated in US-led stability missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, choosing to contribute high-end 'niche' capabilities such as UAV surveillance and artillery-hunting radar to compensate for its lack of large numbers of boots on the ground.

Doctrinal and conceptual developments in the region remain uneven and underdeveloped. Many defence establishments in the region are unaccustomed to, or have not adopted the peace support or stability concept, preferring to speak of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as an umbrella term to denote all peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance (HA), civil–military cooperation and disaster relief operations (DR). General familiarity with UN peacekeeping concepts and procedures is increasing from greater exposure, but many states do not seriously consider the implications of a 'robust' approach or the potential that tactical-level force might be used to protect civilians and defend mandate. There are also vastly different stances, not to mention a relative lack of capabilities, towards the protection of civilians in armed conflicts.⁹ In a noteworthy development, Japan has recently passed laws to enable its forces to protect civilians in peacekeeping missions in some limited contexts (provisions for so-called 'rush and rescue' (*kaketsuke keigo*)). Even in the case of Australia, doctrinal focus on protection of civilians is lacking, in spite of Australian military practice in East Timor where protection was privileged.¹⁰

Doctrinal and conceptual weakness is not limited to military or protection dimensions of peace support but also extends to peace building or state-building. This is despite the fact that many Asian nations, especially those newcomers to UN peacekeeping, such as Japan and South Korea, engage in so-called 'second generation' peace operations. Beyond the general notion of 'human security',¹¹ Asian peacebuilding methodology lacks theoretical foundations or resources devoted to theorization, underlined by empirical lessons learned and evaluation processes that link practice to guidelines. Most countries in the region are in addition lacking relevant concepts/doctrine and experience in a whole-of-government

or comprehensive approach that is key to peace-building or state-building endeavours. Those that have related practices, such as Australia, South Korea and Japan, developed their own take conceptually, if at all, and adopt varied and diverse approaches in integrating relevant government arms.

This uneven and disparate understanding of doctrinal and conceptual issues further hampers attempts at regional institutionalization for peacekeeping, although there is increasing exchange and sharing of experiences between the peacekeeping training centres that have sprouted in the region under the nascent ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network.

OBSTACLE FOR COOPERATION: THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

These considerations indicate that overall, Asia as a region is still some way from developing a common approach to peacekeeping and peace support. There is no Asian international peacekeeping force or command although, as discussed below, there have been some notable propositions towards that end. Nor is there common conceptual ground or region-wide deepening of debates concerning many key developments in peacekeeping today, including impartial and minimum use of force in the UN context, or the normative and practical boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, for example. This is not only a major disadvantage if Asia-Pacific nations are to undertake more complex missions in the future, but is also indicative of vastly different interests and stances that these nations have towards peacekeeping in general. This stark reality runs counter to the broadly held view that an ASEAN-based peacekeeping force may be of common value to states in the region. An ASEAN peacekeeping force may contain conflicts in the region, such as those long-standing border disputes faced by Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia or even internal separatist/insurgency movements in the Philippines or Indonesia. Such efforts would generate more credibility and signal the regional organization's intention to play a more high-profile role in international politics or, at the very least, maintain regional security for its member states.

There is, then, a need to look for explanations for such discrepancies in peacekeeping practices and the distinctive lack of institutionalization of such practices in the region. The most important explanation is the issue of sovereignty. The very norm of non-intervention and sovereignty that ASEAN was initially built upon has typically engendered a degree of hesitation on the part of some states to intervene militarily – specifically within the ASEAN region and in complex operations.¹²

However, the region has not been short of proposals to create a regional-based peacekeeping force. In March 2004, Indonesia's then-Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda proposed the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force. At that time, however, the idea drew opposition from a number of other foreign ministers,

most notably from Thailand and Singapore, citing ASEAN's established principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of states as well as the purpose of ASEAN. Expressing scepticism, then-Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar noted that: 'ASEAN is really not a security or defence organization ... Perhaps sometime in the future there may be scope for such an organization'.¹³ Syed Hamid Albar, a cabinet minister in Malaysia, also argued that ASEAN is not a 'military bloc'.

Proving even more contentious was the treatment of the UN concept of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, adopted by the UN summit in 2005. Indeed, if, unsurprisingly, R2P principles were not top of the doctrinal agenda of states in the region, it remains even more marginal to ASEAN as a whole, where reticence over the sovereignty issue is the norm.

This lack of interest in the normative and operational aspects of R2P may reflect an array of issues, ranging from a relative lack of capabilities to vastly different approaches by key states such as China, Japan or the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and ASEAN on the issue. The core concern, however, is the safeguarding of sovereignty from potential hegemon both within the region and beyond. Core ASEAN states, such as Indonesia, were historically aligned with NAM and were reticent towards any (perceived) attempt to induce great-power intervention with force, as such a precedent would erode world order based upon mutual respect of sovereignty. Many countries in the region (including pro-US Japan) potentially remain ambiguous about the 'Responsibility to Protect' concept as this might at times indicate a more interventionist, forcible approach rather than a mediatory, neutral approach towards regional conflicts. After all, the much cited ASEAN Way is often based on the need for building consensus. Indeed, Asian nations have tended to stress the 'neutral' and 'non-forcible' nature of UNPKOs.

Although region-wide acceptance of proactive intervention or use of force especially by member states is unlikely in the near future, it is important to note some nuances. For China, for example, R2P presents an interesting political dynamic. China has always been against interventions and the use of force by the UN, and it still insists that peace operation deployments require consent of the host government. However, China does not rule out the use of force under exceptional circumstances, as long as there is clear monitoring and decision-making by the UN, although it does still hold up consent as a bedrock principle.¹⁴ China also became more pragmatic with regard to peacekeeping practice. For example, since it deployed for the first time a security company to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), its personnel are now involved in security and protection duties. Then, more recently, with its rise, the Chinese position seems to be to support norms to the extent that they fit its central policy tenets. China accepts that R2P applies to counter four international crimes, namely, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, while stressing again that intervention should be a last resort and should be strictly under the authority of the UN Security Council.¹⁵ However, China is

opposed to the (potential) use or abuse of the norm to realize regime change, as it claimed was the case in Libya.¹⁶

The responsibility to protect, and protection of, civilians, remain a weak focus in the region, but there is an indication that more experienced peacekeepers have sufficient levels of pragmatism and relevant experience to at least consider the implications in such situations. Indonesia may have shifted its traditional neo-Westphalian stance with regard to human rights protection in recent years, as Anwar observes in the case of Syria, for example.¹⁷ Recognizing the growing importance of the international doctrine of R2P, Jakarta seems to have relaxed its earlier rigid stance about non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states. Although Indonesia remains generally cautious about interventions without invitation from the target government in question, as long as a mission is sanctioned by the UN, it may well expand its scope of peacekeeping missions.

GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS

As noted, in the Asian region, the UN system is seen not only as a bedrock of a legitimate international system but also as an effective mechanism in managing global and even regional security, to no insignificant degree because they view consent, neutrality and the non-forcible approach as associated with the UN system as a more effective way to manage conflicts. Moreover, many members of ASEAN see the UN as a preferable option of security maintenance to alliances with Great Powers, utilizing the UN as a way to assert positions of non-aligned identity and political agendas.

Most states in Asia, nonetheless, treat peace operations as secondary to their core national security interests. By contrast, in Europe, for example, out-of-area peace support and stability operations have been recognized as among the most important features of military and security policy in the last two and a half decades, propelling further institutionalization in these areas. With the increasing influence of Russia in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and with unilateralist and exceptionalist tendencies strengthening in the United States, some doubt this trend could continue. Even so, European and NATO states in the post-Cold War era have garnered strong collective crisis management experiences, deploying through NATO mainly, but also through the European Union as well.

By contrast, generally, geopolitical factors (or what is often termed in the region 'traditional security agendas') colour Asian nations' calculations towards a potential regional institutional framework for peace support and stability operations. There are festering issues in the Asian region, such as territorial disputes where a multitude of states in the region are mutually involved. Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas have captivated the region. The broader rise of China, not only in military security dimensions but also in economic influence, has given rise to varied and largely uncoordinated responses as well as rivalries in

the region. Asymmetric threats also emanate from the region, most notably North Korea's developing nuclear and missile capabilities.

Many states in the region continue to be plagued by internal security challenges. Although the current president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, is negotiating deals with them, the country is home to two of the world's longest-running insurgencies of both Islamist and Communist natures. Indonesia has also faced down separatist movements stretching across the archipelago from Aceh to Papua. Threats from global jihadist movements, such as Islamic State, are real and mounting, with the formation within IS of a military unit composed of Indonesian and Malaysian fighters called the *Katibah Nusantara* – the Malay Archipelago Combat Unit. There are fears that these fighters could return home and launch attacks or radicalize and train others. The IS seizure of Marawi in 2017 in the southern Philippines is another stark reminder of such domestic security threats. Although mass-based movements towards democratization have been suppressed by most affected governments, this does indicate the fragility of governance in the region. Malaysia and Thailand have experienced significant waves of political protests in recent years. These internal security challenges tend to draw resources and attention away from building regional institutional frameworks for collective peacekeeping.

Moreover, Asian international relations remain laden with historical antagonisms, involving not only territorial disputes but also unresolved tensions from World War II, including issues relating to war crimes. These residual factors have contributed to heightening tides of nationalism in some key nations in the region, including China, ROK and Japan. Past political allegiances vis-à-vis Cold War political alignment, political beliefs and strategic cultures as well as civil–military relations are also diverse in the region.

In this context, alliance relations, especially in relation to the United States remain the key strategic interest in the region. Thailand is a designated 'major-non-NATO ally' and the Philippines maintains mutual defence security commitments from the United States. Core ASEAN nations, such as Singapore, while not being in formal alliance, nonetheless rely on good bilateral relations with the United States to such an extent that it is often labelled a 'quasi-ally'. Malaysia and Singapore both belong to the Five-Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) (with Britain, Australia and New Zealand) but it has so far not developed a significant peacekeeping component. Unlike in Europe, however, Alliance relations in Asia centring on the United States have historically been managed by the United States in a hub-and-spoke manner, and thus tended not to have the unifying impact that a collective defence system has in Europe. The relative importance of relations with other internal and external military partners (such as NATO, Australia and India) has rapidly been on the rise in recent years for many states in the region, particularly as Chinese activities have heightened security concerns. Nonetheless, this emerging focus has yet to crystallize into firmer security relations.

These trends have several implications for potential moves towards a creating regional collective capability for peace operations. Greater concerns with national security would imply that states prefer to keep their military assets closer to home. Even as Asian states tried to carve out their respective roles in peace operations, their capabilities and experiences remained limited and most have also found reasons not to place so much emphasis on expeditionary missions or capabilities to begin with, given ongoing regional tensions and uncertainties.¹⁸ Due to threats nearer home, geopolitical considerations dictate a generally cautious approach towards expeditionary missions that could draw scant military resources away. Given the region's deep political and historical divisions, peace operation participation and long-range expeditionary capabilities tend to be considered by states as secondary in importance. Such divisions and calculations potentially hinder attempts to build a regional peacekeeping force.

Asian states have felt even more acutely the need to support US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade and a half, to demonstrate commitment to alliance with the United States. Relatively inexperienced and lacking in expeditionary capabilities, they also attempted to gain some experience in stability missions. Key US allies in the region, such as Australia, ROK and Japan, increased their involvement in US-led stability operations, to a great degree out of alliance management concerns but they did so on an individual basis, not multilaterally. ROK and Australia contributed significantly to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by sending sizable forces, in step with their historical engagement in US-led conflicts throughout the post-World War II era. The ROK has been considerably more active in supporting both US-led stability missions and UN-led peacekeeping operations, coupled with a strong need for alliance management to cope with direct security threats from Pyongyang. Australia, as noted, seemed to move away from UN-led missions to non-UN led stability missions, either in alignment with the United States or independently in proximate areas such as the Solomon Islands based upon calculation of national interests. Japan, too, bent its traditional pacifist stance to send Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq (although their mandate there did not involve combat) and the Maritime SDF to conduct refuelling missions in the Indian Ocean. Small city-state Singapore predictably supports international institutions such as the UN for the maintenance of general peace and order as theories of small states would suggest, but it has also notably participated in US-led stability missions in Afghanistan and Iraq because it perceives a direct security threat from trans-national terrorism to its national interests in a globalized world. Taken together, the inclinations of these Asian states to look towards the United States for security or alliance management, rather than relying on a regional institution such as ASEAN further puts a damper on region-wide efforts towards peacekeeping.

MORE ACTIVISM? TOWARDS THE FUTURE

Despite the significant obstacles to regional collective peacekeeping forces outlined earlier, the region's interest in collective peacekeeping forces seems to wax and wane. After earlier calls for ASEAN peacekeeping forces in 2004 were rebuffed, recent developments suggest some continuing appetite for ASEAN initiatives geared towards cooperation on regional peacekeeping. The fifth ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) issued a joint declaration in 2011 calling for cooperation on peacekeeping and military procurement. The ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN), inaugurated in 2011, now provides a platform for ASEAN Member States to regularly exchange views and experience in peacekeeping. In a move that might be considered a sign of limited incremental progress, in 2015 a concept paper on an ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, was adopted at the third APCN meeting in Cambodia. The ASEAN ready group is a 'dedicated force comprised of specialists in disaster relief and military medicine from all ASEAN countries under a single banner'.¹⁹ The concept paper stipulates that participation in the Ready Group will be on a voluntary basis, and the contributing ASEAN states' military will remain under the national command. This paper on ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief was also accepted and mentioned by then-Chair of ASEAN, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak at the UN Peacekeeping Summit in New York in 2015.

Further signs of incrementalism are apparent, although expectations of a dramatic breakthrough should be tempered. With the entry into force of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, this could generate momentum for other elements of the ASEAN Charter, including an envisioned ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). A proposed regional peacekeeping force as well as greater discussion of the R2P principle might well be on the cards, which actually bears some resemblance to several characteristics the APSC espouses on conflict prevention.²⁰

The call in 2003 by Indonesia to create an ASEAN peacekeeping force was revisited by Malaysia in 2015 as it assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN. Malaysian defence minister Hishammuddin Hussein called for an ASEAN peacekeeping force which could be deployed within the region to contain conflicts and humanitarian disasters. The Malaysian initiative also appears geared towards what Hussein called 'addressing the threat of trans-border terrorist activities in a unified manner'.²¹ This proposal may well have arisen out of an increasing sense of confidence as ASEAN member states gained more experience in peacekeeping. In addition, the region had experienced dramatic humanitarian and natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami in Aceh that required large-scale regional and global responses. It was also reported in 2015 that Malaysia would highlight the role of ASEAN states' peacekeeping forces during its tenure as

a non-permanent UN Security Council member, in places such as East Timor and Aceh.²² In January 2015, there were 3,845 personnel deployed from seven ASEAN states on UN peace operations, constituting 3.68% of the total peacekeepers in 16 missions around the world.²³

In addition, there is a growing expectation that ASEAN could utilize non-military, civilian capabilities in building peace in post-conflict societies and in helping to strengthen states' capacities to prevent violent conflict.²⁴ ASEAN states' capabilities and experiences in policing and law and order – capabilities in constant demand in UN peacekeeping – may provide for a certain niche. For example, such tasks have been performed by the Singapore Police Force in Timor Leste, or disaster response units of the Philippines and Cambodian demining capabilities. These civilian capacities can provide a platform for generating greater integration and cooperation within and between ASEAN states beginning first on a functional basis, targeting specific issues such as demining or policing.

Political difficulties, however, continue to hinder progress in ASEAN efforts at a regional peacekeeping capability. While some members such as Cambodia and the Philippines appeared supportive, the 2015 Malaysian proposal still met scepticism from some ASEAN members and, in the meantime, individual countries continue to perceive and justify their overseas deployments on their own specific national interests, rather than on a collective basis. Furthermore, countries such as Myanmar and Laos who have never participated in UNPKOs will struggle to contribute to an ASEAN force. There are also unresolved questions about financial contributions, and whether such a putative ASEAN force would accept operating within the territories of ASEAN member states, not just outside ASEAN. While ASEAN moves fitfully towards a regional peacekeeping capability, one must not forget that even among ASEAN member states, there are dynamics at play and national interests that shape regional agendas. This can be seen in the two leading Muslim states, Malaysia and Indonesia, who have also at times chosen other multilateral fora such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to pursue their interests in regional security. For instance, Indonesia's decision to deploy peacekeeping forces to Lebanon in 2006 prompted to some extent Malaysia's sending of its own troops to the region although both deployments were conditional on a ceasefire agreement in place beforehand. Indonesia in general also appears to be taking a more active role in shaping agendas of ASEAN as well as the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) over the issue of the Rohingas in Myanmar, having appointed former vice president Yusuf Kallas as Indonesia's special envoy on the issue. Former Malaysian PM Najib Razak's use of the word 'genocide' in 2016 to call for international action on the Rohingya crisis also suggests greater inclination towards interference in domestic affairs of a fellow ASEAN member and perhaps to push for a stronger voice on the OIC regarding this matter. Kuala Lumpur also summoned Myanmar's ambassador in 2016 to lodge a protest against the treatment of Rohingya. This effectively undermined the long-standing ASEAN tradition of non-intervention in each other's affairs.

When Kuala Lumpur organized a meeting of Muslim governments in January 2017 to discuss the Rohingya plight, this in turn drew criticism from Myanmar, accusing Malaysia of seeking 'to promote a certain political agenda'.²⁵

As the above section demonstrates, ASEAN is not the only potential regional platform that states might utilize for multilateral approaches in managing regional conflicts. Indonesia and Malaysia moved to secure the OIC's final statement on the Rohingya issue. It was Indonesia that pressed most strongly for ASEAN members' support for the OIC statement.²⁶ Similarly, during the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, while Malaysia sent larger contingents of peacekeepers than Indonesia, Jakarta lobbied the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to call for a halt in Serb aggression against the Bosnians. On the deployment of cease-fire monitors to Mindanao in 2007, both countries played brokering roles under OIC auspices. However, they have also brought their own, at times, competing national agendas to the table. It has been said by some that Malaysia provided support to the Moro rebels while at the same time acting as mediator.²⁷ Indeed, Philippine Senator Rodolfo Biazon, Chair of the Senate committee on National Defense and Security, explicitly preferred Indonesia to serve as a more impartial peace facilitator because Malaysia had conflicting interests with the Philippines over territorial claims to Sabah.²⁸ Any effort by Malaysia to move ahead of Indonesia's initiative with regard to regional peacekeeping deployments under either the ASEAN or OIC aegis will be likely to meet with some pushback from Indonesia.²⁹

CONCLUSION

Within the Asia-Pacific region, diplomatic tension is becoming more and more palpable, particularly in light of territorial disputes and the strategic implications of a rising China. The Trump presidency has injected further uncertainty and unpredictability into the strategic calculations of regional states. The focus on regional strategic balances and the potential concomitant loss of interest in expeditionary peace support and stabilization missions is hardly welcome, if demand for peace operations and their variants is to increase in the near future. One possible solution, even to a limited extent, would be to entice these nations to cross-regional and international forums, either in practice through joint operations or through training and education. In this sense, rather than thinking peace operations will sap resources away from preparing for great-power competition, cooperation on peace missions can help promote cooperation and communication. The above findings indicate that international knowledge transfer through education/training (probably from Western nations with ample exposure to protective mandates) may be a starting point for these nations to develop a more mature approach to protective functions and capabilities in peace operations on a regional collective basis. Given the political reticence, however,

gaining first-hand experience in this area remains a hurdle. Most states in the region remain ill-prepared to operate in complex missions such as stabilization and counterinsurgency alongside advanced Western nations, especially since protection of civilians and key infrastructure, together with restrained use of force, is a central feature of these operations. Western militaries engaging with the APCN through an ASEAN-Plus framework may be one potential avenue to develop a region-wide understanding of such issues. Multilateral peacekeeping exercises such as *Khaan Quest* may well provide another alternative forum and platform, even if more formal institutionalization remains a distant prospect. On a relatively more formalized basis, the ADMM-Plus framework has also identified peacekeeping operations as a key area on which to engage external powers. China, which has sponsored the ASEAN-China Peacekeeping Seminar in previous years, can also capitalize on emerging opportunities for joint training and cooperation with the APCN. Several countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam have already established Peacekeeping Training Centres while Japan's Peacekeeping and Training Centre has also hosted many trainees from ASEAN states. The US-led Global Peace Operations Initiative could be another vehicle to engage Beijing's growing interest in peacekeeping missions. China has previously conducted joint peacekeeping exercises with countries such as Mongolia and Gabon. The challenge remains for it to do so more frequently on an institutionalized multilateral basis throughout the Asia-Pacific, preferably incorporating other regional powers such as Japan, Australia and India. Should such cross-national and regional cooperation become a reality, nations in the region will better grasp the relevance and importance of peace and stability missions. Such efforts may well allow states in the region to diversify their security interests and perspectives, and potentially in the future embrace a regional collective framework for peacekeeping.

Notes

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- 3 He Yin, 'China's Doctrine on UN Peacekeeping'. Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi and John Karlsrud eds, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats* (Routledge: Global Institutions Series, 2017).
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- 5 Ibid.
- 6 David Capie, 'Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power: Norm Revisionist or Pragmatic Provider?' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2016), pp. 1–27.

- 7 Alex J. Bellamy, 'Australia and International Peacekeeping: Policies, Institutions, and Doctrines'. Chiyuki Aoi and Yee-Kuang Heng eds., *Asia-Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Operations* (Palgrave: Asia Today Series, 2014).
- 8 Yee-Kuang Heng, 'Confessions of a Small State: Singapore's Evolving Approach to Peace Operations'. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 16, Nos 1–2 (2012), pp. 119–51.
- 9 UNDPKO/DFS, 'UN Peace Operations: Principles and Guidelines', p. 16.
- 10 Bellamy, 'Australia and International Peacekeeping', p. 51.
- 11 For the original formulation of the concept, see United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a critique of the concept, see Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?' *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102.
- 12 Mely Caballero-Anthony and Holly Haywood, *Defining ASEAN's Role in Peace Operations: Helping to Bring Peacebuilding Upstream?*, Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Australian Government, Civil-Military Working Papers 3/2010, published 2011, p. 3.
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- 14 Yin, 'China's Doctrine on UN Peacekeeping', p. 120.
- 15 Ibid., p. 122.
- 16 Zheng Chen, 'China and the Responsibility to Protect'. *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25, No. 101 (2016), pp. 686–700; See also Yin, 'China's Doctrine on UN Peacekeeping'.
- 17 Anwar, 'Indonesia's Peacekeeping Operations'.
- 18 For analysis of Japan's expeditionary capabilities, see Chiyuki Aoi, 'Punching Below its Weight: Japan's Post-Cold War Expeditionary Missions'. Alessio Patalano ed., *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Britain and Japan: From the First Alliance to the Post-9/11 World* (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2012).
- 19 Cited in Capie, 'Indonesia as an Emerging Peacekeeping Power', p. 19.
- 20 Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Political-Security Community', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2012), pp. 135–52.
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Asian Subnational Governments in Foreign Affairs

Purnendra Jain

INTRODUCTION

Subnational governments (SNGs) are one of the many types of actors that have pluralized foreign affairs and now have a place in the conduct of foreign policy. Theirs is a paradoxical position as international actors – from Asia or elsewhere. Their status is government, with the import that entails. But significantly it is not national, freeing them from official regulatory capacity and associated responsibility over sovereign borders that both empower and bind governments at the national level. This hybrid identity positions SNGs distinctively, at times enabling them to do what national government cannot do in international diplomacy, for their national government and for themselves. SNGs are also seen to be closer than national governments to the people they represent, at times making SNGs an attractive conduit for both foreign entities seeking to reach people domestically and, in some instances, people domestically seeking to reach or act internationally on a ‘local’ matter. Inevitably, the relationship SNGs have with their national government – how and how far they are beholden to it, so how they can engage outside their national border – is a core issue for SNGs in international affairs.

These qualities make for considerable diversity among Asian SNGs as international actors. Generally, SNGs in Asia have taken on international roles more recently than their counterparts in Europe and North America that began to venture abroad from the 1950s and 1960s. But with the precedents of counterparts internationally and domestically, SNGs across Asia are now developing new international profiles, pushing boundaries at home and abroad as they

extend not only the narrowly local turf on which they have operated, but also the responsibilities they can fulfil and the scope of autonomy from national government that they may be able to achieve in the process. Indeed, globalization and technological advancement encourage SNGs around the world to be ever more active internationally, especially in their economic role as ‘architects of growth’ (Hutchinson, 2014). SNGs in Asian countries are no exception to this international phenomenon.

This chapter explores the increasing involvement of Asian SNGs in foreign affairs. We explore how these SNGs, acting beyond but mostly with the acceptance of their national government and its agencies, have begun to play crucial roles that give them a place in their nation’s foreign policy. Three countries – Japan, China and India – are the focus here, with references to other Asian countries. Lead questions are: (1) what are Asian SNGs’ actions, strategies and motivations as international actors; (2) what institutions are in place to support these activities; and (3) what do the nature and scale of these SNG activities tell us about Asian diplomacy and foreign affairs early in the 21st century?

The chapter first sets out the international context in which to analyse Asian SNGs, with examples particularly from North America and Europe for the precedents they have established. Second, we look at domestic context: how national political and administrative structures, the SNGs’ constitutional status and relations with national government shape the nature and scope of Asian SNGs’ international activities. The third, substantive section discusses examples of Asian SNGs’ international activity in economics, politics/security and cultural/educational programmes, and considers what propels these activities. The fourth section examines institutional arrangements for Asian SNGs to develop and sustain their international activity. Finally, we consider how the impact of Asian SNGs as international actors influences foreign policy and the conduct of international relations within and beyond Asia.

SNGS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Subnational refers to all levels of government below the national government. Here our focus of analysis is primarily the level just below national: Japanese prefectures, Chinese provinces and Indian states. Because their international interests may synchronize with or depart from those pursued by their national government, these SNGs may work hand-in-hand with or independently of the national government, or occasionally even in opposition to it. From the national perspective, SNGs can be foreign policy supporters or spoilers. The consistency or otherwise of their politics and/or political party with those of the central government, and other domestic loyalties, may influence their international behaviour. SNGs are not ‘sovereignty-bound’ like national governments, but neither are they ‘sovereignty-free’ like non-government and other private actors such as

multi-national corporations. Yet SNGs usually have some policy autonomy, even in foreign affairs. For some SNGs in Asia, as elsewhere, pursuit of autonomy from national government, particularly financial autonomy, has been a – or the – key motivation for international activity.

A few studies are available on some Asian countries such as Japan (Jain, 2012), China (Cheung and Tang, 2001; Chen and Jian, 2009) and India (Sridharan, 2003; Jacob, 2016; Jain and Maini, 2017), but none seek to place Asian nations and their SNGs in comparative perspective while analysing their nascent role in international affairs. Initial studies concerned the international outreach of SNGs in Europe and America (Duchacek, 1986; Shuman, 1986–87). Today an expanding literature examines internationally active SNGs in many national contexts, though still mostly in Western nations where the trend has been longest and strongest. Indeed, within the international relations literature, studies of internationally active SNGs worldwide form part of a rich seam of conceptual and empirical analyses that detail the role in international affairs of many types of actors beyond nation and national-level players. These SNG studies offer conceptual frameworks expressed in terms such as ‘multilayered diplomacy’ (Hocking, 1993), ‘plurinational diplomacy’ (Aldecoa, 1999), ‘proto-diplomacy’ (Duchacek et al., 1988), ‘para-diplomacy’ (Aldecoa and Keating (eds), 1999) and ‘micro diplomacy’ (Duchacek, 1984). They speak of ‘perforated sovereignty’ (Duchacek et al., 1988), ‘foreign policy localization’ (Hocking, 1993) or simply ‘local foreign policy’, denoting the official, government nature of these activities (Criekemans, 2010). Brande (2010: 200) acknowledges ‘sub- or infra-state foreign relations’ and advances the term ‘federated state diplomacy’ where SNGs as subnational state actors become key players in a nation’s foreign affairs including in treaty-making processes, as, for example, SNGs in Belgium.

While American and European SNGs began the move towards independent international engagement even from the 1970s (Shuman, 1994; Fry, 1998; Brande, 2010), this trend is clearly and increasingly evident today in both industrially developed and developing nations. Australian states have become much more active, especially in their approach to Asia (Jain, 2012; Spoehr and Jain, 2012) and even in Brazil, a developing nation, many states and big cities ‘act substantially on the international scene in ways that fit, in one way or another, into the loose categories termed *paradiplomacy*’ (Salomon, 2011: 45). South African provinces now engage actively abroad, pursuing with relative autonomy ‘developmental *paradiplomacy*’ and ‘foreign relations’ to promote their economic interests abroad (Cornelissen, 2003; Nganje, 2014: 123, 131). While motivations and circumstances may differ, especially in the broad division between industrialized nations and those in the so-called ‘global south’, the trend among SNGs to pursue linkages abroad is now solid. SNGs across the globe are aware of their shared goals, interests and capacities, and now seek and accept mutually rewarding opportunities with counterparts abroad. Asian SNGs are part of this trend to ‘go international’, and are now increasingly active in pursuing their ‘local interest’ overseas.

In Europe, regions have opened ‘embassies’ abroad and negotiated their own trade agreements; some have linked together in state-of-the-art transportation networks to attract foreign business, and some SNGs are claiming new ground in EU decision-making (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998). Almost all 50 US states have trade offices abroad, and all have official standing in the World Trade Organization (Hobbs, 1994; Fry, 1998). With national budget cutbacks impacting on most SNGs in industrialized nations, pursuing commercial, cultural, educational and other cooperation programmes internationally has become vital for many SNGs’ self-sustenance. Indeed, one of the strongest motivations for SNGs going international is to pursue economic benefit for their locality, usually through promoting trade and attracting foreign investment and increased tourism.

Sometimes altruism and ethical concerns may motivate the international activities of SNGs. Some SNGs, especially in Europe, have become involved in the delivery of foreign aid, with municipal international cooperation (MIC) providing SNGs of developing countries uninterrupted access to technical assistance and financial support from their partners in the industrialized world (Schep et al., 1995). Some SNGs, especially in North America, take action against abuses of human rights internationally through punitive actions such as economic sanctions and laws banning state agencies from signing contracts with companies doing business with the blacklisted nation. Laws imposed by Massachusetts State against Burma’s dictatorship are a classic example (Guay, 2000). SNG representatives may attend international forums, attesting to the crucial role of their administrations in a range of global issues from combating poverty to promoting sustainable development. Cities are often at the forefront of advocating for comprehensive nuclear test bans, nuclear free zones, sanctuary for refugees and so forth (Hobbs, 1994: 108–21). More recently, SNGs have formed groupings of states and regions to help tackle climate change, for example The Climate Group’s States & Regions Alliance network that shares expertise, demonstrates impact and influences the international climate dialogue.¹

This broad overview provides the international context for analysis of Asian SNGs in foreign affairs. The overall discussion reveals that while Asian SNGs have been influenced by precedents of their counterparts outside Asia, they are very much propelled or constrained by circumstances inside their nation – its constitutional and legal systems, political and economic environment and regional and international standing.

ASIAN SNGS: CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS, POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND NATIONAL–SUBNATIONAL INTERACTION

Japan and China are centralized unitary states but with different political structures; Japan has a democratic framework while China is a single-party authoritarian state ruled by the Communist Party. Local governments in Japan are recognized

constitutionally but their roles and functions are defined through parliamentary acts and legislation. Overall, SNGs in Japan have limited autonomy, in a political system that is strongly centralized (Jain, 1989; Matsui, 2015).

In China, as per the Constitution (Article 3), ‘The division of functions and powers between the central and local State organs is guided by the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.’ In practice, while Chinese provinces have some financial and political power to expand their activities internationally, policy parameters are set firmly by the central government. Even so, provincial leaders can be influential political players because of their role within the Communist Party of China, with bureaucratic rank the same as central government ministers (Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 8). The central government gives provinces both considerable leeway to pursue policies to boost economic growth and encouragement to undertake approved policy experiments (Lawrence and Martin, 2013: 10). Yet compliance with central directions is essential; SNGs that act contrary to national guidelines are promptly reprimanded (Qi, 2010: 70).

In India’s federal polity with democratic institutions, governments are changed periodically through electoral processes, and party politics reign supreme. The Seventh Schedule (Article 246) of the Indian Constitution distinguishes functions of the central and state governments under three Lists: union, state and concurrent.² This federal arrangement is very different from the American and many of the European systems where constituent units have much broader power-sharing arrangements. A comparison by Antholis (2013: 35–6) noted that while on paper China may seem more politically centralized than India, China’s local authorities enjoy considerable autonomy, whereas although India may seem to be politically pluralized, actual centralization limits the autonomy of its states. This is a fair overall assessment; India’s state governments have no constitutional authority to conduct activities concerning foreign affairs, which come under the central government’s exclusive jurisdiction. But autonomy is one thing and capacity to resist control is another. Chinese provinces need to conduct their activities in line with the national government’s priorities, while Indian states have occasionally acted defiantly, with political overtones, in some of their international activities, as later discussion illustrates.

Variation in Scale and Functions of SNGs

While this chapter focuses on the largest SNGs in the three national contexts, in each of these three and in the rest of Asia there are many thousands of SNGs. Here we note variation in both their size and the scale of their activities. In the three national examples, some cities are much larger than some provinces and states. Capital cities such as Tokyo, Beijing and Delhi are obvious, with their special administrative status, but others such as Osaka in Japan, Mumbai in India and Shenzhen in China are similarly big in economic weight and administrative function.

Guangdong in China is very often cited as China's biggest provincial economy – the world's 23rd-largest economy in market exchange rates (comparable to that of Norway or Saudi Arabia) or 14th on purchasing power parity terms (surpassing Australia's economy) (Chen and Jian, 2009: 3). The Indian states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tami Nadu, with a combined population of 250 million and one fifth of India's population, account for nearly one-third of India's GDP and each has more than double the nation's GDP per capita (Antholis, 2013: 109, 31). In Japan, the GDP of the Kanto region (Tokyo and surrounding prefectures) is much larger than that of Brazil, Russia and Italy; Tokyo's GDP was bigger than Indonesia, and Osaka's GDP was bigger than that of Thailand in 2015.³

In China, while provincial leaders such as governors and vice-governors are high-ranking Communist Party officials appointed by the central government, Japanese governors and mayors are directly elected every four years. In India, state chief ministers are appointed on the basis of their party's majority status in the state assembly, similar to the Westminster system of governance at the national level. Each Indian state also has a governor, but governors are essentially political appointees of the central government, for which they serve mainly as agents and with largely ceremonial functions as guardians of the constitution.

Clearly there is wide variation among Indian, Chinese and Japanese SNGs in terms of their size, political and administrative structures, constitutional status and relationship with their national government. Yet all are 'government', not private or semi-private bodies. All are to a great extent tied legally, administratively and financially to the national level; they are not truly autonomous bodies. In their international activities, all SNGs are to serve the interests of those they represent in their administrative unit, and they assume such official and representative status in their international relationships. And as the following discussion reveals, in these relationships they draw both benefits and costs from being associated with their nation.

ECONOMIC LINKAGES

This is the most widely pursued and well-known aspect of SNGs' international engagement, with the path of least resistance. Most economic linkages involve international trade, but attracting foreign investment is also crucial for many. In Europe and North America, localities have long been conducting their own economic activities overseas, mainly independently but also in association with relevant central government agencies. For most Asian nations, however, this is a relatively recent and fast-developing activity (Cheung and Tang, 2001; Arase, 2002). India has been a latecomer, with some observers recommending that Indian states learn from the experiences of Chinese provinces (Bajpai, 2004; Jacob, 2014). To attract foreign investment in their jurisdiction, Asian SNGs have tried to improve infrastructure, offer tax concessions, designate special

economic zones and carry out regulatory reforms. Following standard global practice, Asian SNGs also organize trade missions abroad led by senior ministers or their political leader, and at home receive overseas dignitaries and top business people, as well as holding trade fairs, investment summits and exhibitions to showcase their investment environment and local opportunities or products.

In China, provinces have vigorously launched themselves into the international arena as economic actors, facilitating trade and investment, supporting national economic aims and even contributing to foreign aid provision (Cheung and Tang, 2001; Chen and Jian, 2009). Chinese provinces leaped into the international economic arena soon after the reform process began during the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1989). The decline of central planning and pursuit of marketization made foreign investment a significant source of capital, employment and technology for Chinese provinces, so little wonder that expanding their foreign economic relations became the key aspect of provincial external affairs (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 112). Chinese provinces actively pursue their commercial interests overseas independently and do so with central government encouragement (Zheng, 1994). Coastal provinces in particular have been empowered to make independent decisions in conducting their economic affairs through international linkages for trade and foreign investment.

Noteworthy here is that where unresolved diplomatic tensions at the national level inhibited national-level linkages, the Chinese government encouraged provinces to build and maintain commercial links where possible. For example, Beijing approved special arrangements to facilitate economic contact between Shandong province and South Korea even before diplomatic ties were established in 1992, enabling Shandong to use its friendly ties with South Korea extensively to accelerate its own economic development (Qi, 2010; Qi, 2012). In the 1990s, South Korea replaced Hong Kong as Shandong's second-most important export market and overtook Taiwan as Shandong's second-most significant source of foreign direct investment in 1995 (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 117).

Chinese provinces now have economic ties not only with prosperous industrialized countries such as Japan, the United States and EU members, but also with developing economies. For example, Zhejiang province more than quintupled its trade with Africa within five years from US\$1.31 billion in 2001 to 6.68 billion in 2006, with the investment share of Chinese provinces through provincial and local-level companies accounting for one-quarter of the total (Chen et al., 2010: 344). Shanghai has targeted South Africa as an investment destination, providing capital to its local companies and opening an office with permanent staff to help Shanghai companies operate in South Africa. Guangdong, Tianjin and Zhejiang have adopted similar strategies to encourage local companies to operate in Africa (Chen et al., 2010: 344–6).

India's economic liberalization from the early 1990s has given Indian states the opportunity and motivation to pursue external economic relations through trade and investment. Sridharan's (2003) study offers examples from the southern and

central states showing their increasing efforts to seek commercial opportunities overseas and attract foreign investment in high-tech industry, tourism and even in providing municipal services. In the 21st century, many Indian state leaders have become internationally inclined, as they see little chance of economic growth in their jurisdiction without foreign investment. Narendra Modi as Gujarat's chief minister (2002–2014) and Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh are stand-out performers in forging international linkages for their states to secure economic growth and technological advancement (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2001; Marino, 2014: 178). As prime minister from 2014, Modi has actively encouraged SNGs to establish international connections for the SNGs' economic growth and to promote his 'make in India' campaign (Jain and Maini, 2015).

In recent years Indian states have held trade fairs to promote exports, and world leaders have travelled to Indian state capitals seeking trade opportunities. Indian states are also hosting global summits to attract foreign investment (Maini, 2012), and their leaders have headed investment missions to China, Japan, Singapore, the United States, European nations and elsewhere. Significantly, while pursuing economic matters explicitly, some SNG representatives have also been actively involved in 'diplomacy' with India's neighbouring countries, making strategic use of the opportunity opened by SNGs' pursuit of economic interests to help create goodwill and partnership (Sridharan, 2003; Ghosh, 2012).

In the past, central authorities were highly reluctant to have state governments involved in India's foreign affairs, even economic matters. But now some, such as the Ministry of Finance, encourage state governments to negotiate directly with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. SNGs have used the experience to extend the reach of their voice on foreign economic matters. Today some collaborate with each other to promote and protect the economic interests of their localities through international relationships. Independently and collectively they raise concerns when national governments or international bodies such as the World Trade Organization negotiate bilateral or multilateral treaties that may adversely affect SNGs or their administrative terrain. Overall, however, while some Indian states have become active in pursuing economic interests overseas, this development is at best uneven, with some states still predominantly domestically oriented because of their leadership and/or lack of opportunities.

Japanese SNGs have been active internationally but their role in economic self-promotion, as destinations for foreign investment or as sources of exports, is still rather limited. Japan's regions have mostly depended on the central government for economic development, with investment through domestic savings and private capital. Japanese big corporations rather than SNGs have been the main actors pushing exports in the international arena, and national-level semi-government organizations such as the Japan External and Trade Organization (JETRO) have also represented SNGs. Yet this development pattern does not mean all SNGs do little to promote their own locality internationally for economic benefit.

SNGs on the periphery (such as Hokkaido in the north and Okinawa in the south) and underdeveloped prefectures along the Sea of Japan (Niigata and Tottori, for example) have actively pursued new initiatives to connect economically to their nearby foreign neighbours. For example, Hokkaido has focused on the Russian Far East while Okinawa's focus is through the Pacific, and prefectures and smaller SNGs along the Sea of Japan side focus on China, South Korea and even North Korea (Jain, 2012: 119–29).

Generally, the economic importance of SNGs is not lost on international leaders, who now visit regional cities along with political capitals as part of their foreign visits. Both political and business leaders have come to recognize the importance of subnational units for trade, investment and other economic opportunities. In recent years, for example, US presidents and secretaries of state, Japanese prime ministers and many other world leaders have travelled to state capitals in India where they see potential for business and other commercial linkages. As Denton (2013: 4) has noted regarding the need for export programmes to be locally tailored towards subnational regions rather than nations at large, 'the regional variation of development in India, and the vast range of cultures and operating environments there, make a centrally focused government engagement policy inefficient'. Denton notes the utility of Singapore's subnational strategy towards China, which includes 'sending well-respected former leader Lee Kwan Yew to four different provinces each trip and carefully targeting their message to each' (Denton, 2013: 4).

Very often the role of Guangdong in China's economic growth is compared with that of Gujarat in India because both have distinctive roles in attracting foreign and domestic investments through innovations in their governance structures. Further, while Guangdong successfully solicited investments from Hong Kong and Macao using cultural, linguistic and family connections, Gujarat too used its diaspora to solicit investment, especially through forums such as Vibrant Gujarat summits (Denton, 2013). Yet Chinese provinces are much ahead of Indian states in attracting foreign investment, even though India's diaspora is also quite large, second only to China (Sahoo, 2015). Indian chief ministers, unlike Chinese governors, are less active and are often 'cautious' and 'reactive' rather than proactive (Wyatt, 2017: 118).

Border-region trade can be a key aspect of SNGs' economic linkages. For example, some Chinese provinces have not only promoted bilateral economic links with border regions but have also established economic ties with subregions in neighbouring countries, such as Yunnan's links in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya, 2015). Yunnan has also opened commercial representative offices in Singapore and Cambodia to promote markets and inward investment. Yunnan's GDP is said to have skyrocketed from \$33 billion in 2000 to \$160 billion in 2012, which the province aimed to double by 2017 through even stronger cross-border economic and trade ties. Kunming has a similar strategy, acting as 'the origin and core of economic activities that reach

into the bordering countries of Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and beyond' (Chen and Stone, 2013).

Just as neighbourly goodwill can promote SNGs' international economic links, neighbours' national ill-will can at times discourage them. Japanese SNGs have played a key role in promoting multilateral subregional economic linkages, but Japan's historical baggage with its neighbours such as South Korea and China often impedes their cooperation with Japan's SNGs. Similarly for Indian SNGs, lack of mutual trust makes border-region cooperation problematic between India on the one hand and Pakistan and Bangladesh on the other. Another impediment beyond neighbours' disaffection is neighbours' economic standing. China's neighbourhood has prosperous states such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which have injected much-needed capital into China including through SNGs. India's neighbourhood is not advantageous for India's SNGs, comprising less and least developed nations such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. If anything, as Jacob notes, it is India's border economies that may play some role in improving the economies of the Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan neighbours (Jacob, 2014: 6).

PROMOTING SOFT DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES

Ever more SNGs are engaging in what may be called 'soft diplomacy', generally through cultural, educational and sports exchanges. The most common soft diplomacy vehicle for SNGs is twinning programmes under an official agreement between SNGs with shared geographical, historical or other features to promote between them cultural and commercial ties, and more recently strategic international business links. Japanese SNGs were early takers of the soft route via sister relationships, when Nagasaki city signed an exchange agreement with St Paul in the United States in 1955. The number of these agreements, 768 in 1989, more than doubled to 1,734 in late 2018.⁴ The Japan Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) oversees and reports on the purposes and practices of these sister arrangements, with growth in their numbers even when local economies in Japan are not performing well indicating the utility of sistering for international connections that may facilitate economic links. Japan's largest concentration of sister relations is in the United States (442), followed by China (362); with India, Japan has a meagre five such agreements. These figures for Japan's SNGs also bespeak the active participation of China's SNGs and the apparent disinterest and lack of wherewithal of Indian SNGs in the soft diplomacy that sister programmes promote.

Sister programmes can generate educational opportunities and commercial contacts. Most valuable strategically, the personal connections these programmes generally cultivate can generate goodwill and trust that is invaluable in international diplomacy, at national as well as local level. 'Low politics' ties, while

generally seen as non-controversial and politically benign, can thus be a catalyst for furthering economic ties (Chung and Mascitelli, 2008) and for improving political relationships. Indian SNGs have not realized this potential. Japanese and Chinese SNGs, however, have developed vast sister networks, recognizing the valuable economic and strategic utility of goodwill, friendship, knowledge and cultural understanding that cultural linkages can generate. The numerous sister programmes between Japanese and Taiwanese SNGs do not draw goodwill from China. Beijing sees that such arrangements not only challenge global acceptance of its 'One China' policy (Thomas and Williams, 2016) but also can be used to develop other kinds of relationships with strategic dimensions. South Korean SNGs are also active, conducting 1,394 sister programmes with 1,089 cities in 73 countries, which the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs also regards as useful global links (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015: 379).

Japanese SNGs have also linked themselves internationally through the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching) Program, a joint initiative of the national and subnational governments begun in 1987. Young foreign participants are invited to Japan on a very attractive, usually one-year, package to work with local schools or in international offices of Japan's SNGs. By 2018, the number of countries participating in the JET Program had increased from four to 44, and the number of participants annually from 848 to 5,528, totalling over 68,000 participants from 73 countries. The scale and popularity of the programme has generated considerable goodwill and opportunity – for SNGs and for the national government.⁵

SNG–national cooperation in 'soft diplomacy' has also been undertaken in China. Yunnan province, for example, has created new institutional and cultural ties to the GMS (Greater Mekong Subregion) countries. It has set up commercial offices in Singapore and Cambodia and is pushing to increase the number of Confucius Institutes and Chinese language centres already operating in the GMS countries to boost China's soft power. The province has trained a number of specialists who can speak Thai, Burmese and Vietnamese. The number of international students in Yunnan has also leaped, from 760 in 2001 to roughly 10,000 in 2007 and over 20,000 in 2011, with about 80% primarily from Southeast Asia (Chen and Stone, 2013).

Local Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has usually been a national government activity; SNGs generally have had neither the financial capacity nor strategic motivation to participate in official development assistance (ODA) or foreign aid. Yet for several decades and increasingly while national foreign aid budgets are shrinking, SNGs are seen to have expertise or other capacity that can contribute to national government foreign aid efforts. Japanese SNGs participate in *kokusai kyoryoku* (international cooperation), which the national government initiated around the 1980s at the

height of Japan's economic glory in its search for a non-military international role for Japan (Jain, 2012: 98–109). Local ODA gives Japanese SNGs a niche, micro-level role in the international arena that is parallel to their national government's ODA programme at the bilateral level. Significantly, here Japanese SNGs began to perform a role in an area that had been essentially a central government jurisdiction.

While local ODA is new in Asia, Shuman notes many cases of European SNGs' involvement in north–south assistance programmes through providing money, volunteers and technology to build schools, hospitals, roads and bridges. The German city-state of Bremen is exemplary, providing technical assistance through biogas projects in China, India and Africa that have created local jobs as well as energy for cooking (Shuman, 1994: 26–7). The Japanese and Chinese have learned from these examples.

Some studies suggest that local ODA in Japan is largely a decentralized activity where SNGs do not necessarily follow the national foreign aid policy priorities (Takao, 2014). In some cases Japanese SNGs do act with apparent autonomy to pursue their 'local interest', but their actions are usually not in conflict with national policy, and mostly the SNGs also participate in nationally funded ODA programmes such as technical training and dispatch of technical staff to recipient nations through the national aid agency JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). Local–national partnership can in some cases be more enduring than exclusively national programmes, as the efforts of Kitakyushu city to help China's Dalian tackle environmental degradation attest. Kitakyushu drafted for Dalian an Environmental Master Plan, which the Japanese government accepted as part of its national ODA projects, and Kitakyushu with JICA jointly implemented it in 1996–2000 (Yoshimatsu, 2010: 9–10). Examples of independent cooperation abound. Hiroshima and Chongqing signed a friendship agreement in 1986 and began environmental cooperation from 1990, but as it was not embedded in the national ODA programme, this subnational programme could not last long. Kitakyushu later became able to continue the programme because of cooperation from the national government, suggesting how national assistance can be critical for sustaining the local ODA linkages (Yoshimatsu, 2010: 12).

Chinese SNGs have largely acted as supporters of China's aid programme, for example by providing technical and medical teams to go to Africa as part of the national aid programme. As for Japan's local ODA, studies suggest that in recent years Chinese provinces have begun to deliver aid independently. Local economic and technical aid from Chinese provinces to their counterparts in developing countries still seems to be very small-scale, such as Shanghai donating wheelchairs to a South African province. However, some programmes offered by provincial governments could be more than US\$100,000 each (Chen et al., 2010: 347), with motivations reaching beyond altruism to cultivating goodwill and lubricating economic relations.

HIGH POLITICS: SECURITY, DEFENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

High politics was long assumed to be exclusively the concern of national governments. But for years SNGs have been involved in actions that influence these issues (Pluijm, 2007). Cities and other SNGs have been a key vehicle to express public opposition to their national government on matters of security and defence (the Vietnam War, for example), human rights (apartheid) and oppressive regimes (Myanmar) (Hobbs, 1994: 108–21). Most examples are from SNGs in Europe and North America, but SNGs in some Asian nations have also been active, generally in pursuit of their own ‘local interest’ but also on issues of national or global concern.

Japan has clear examples, mostly of opposition by city SNGs to national government policies. In the early 1970s Mayor Ichio Asukata of Yokohama City refused to grant permission for Japan-based US tanks to pass along the city’s roads on their way to the Vietnam War. The socialist mayor used his ‘city diplomacy’ to communicate his opposition to the Vietnam War to the residents of Yokohama and to the world, embarrassing the national government as he and supporters intended. Okinawa prefecture in southern Japan and some cities within it have consistently opposed the national government’s acceptance of the United States stationing a disproportionately large percentage of its troops in Okinawa and have even made representations in Washington against their national government. Hiroshima city played a pioneering role in the 1982 establishment of the Mayors for Peace movement, aiming to prevent future nuclear attacks, as Hiroshima residents had experienced under the US nuclear bomb. Although largely symbolic and with little policy impact, as of April 2016 the movement had formal support from 7,028 cities in 161 countries and regions.⁶ Because these types of activities are expressions of popular and government opposition, they are not an option for SNGs in an authoritarian regime such as China.

In India, some states have successfully opposed the national government’s stance on international matters. In 2013, Tamil Nadu state forced the Indian government to cast its vote in the United Nations against Sri Lanka because of Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record on the Tamil community. In 2014, for the same reason, the Indian Prime Minister abstained from attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka. The Chief Minister of West Bengal similarly opposed and successfully stopped the national government’s move to sign a treaty with Bangladesh that would have adversely affected West Bengal’s interest through proposed sharing of water with Bangladesh. Realist scholarship has criticized SNGs’ opposition or resistance as ‘local interference in foreign policy’ (Spiro, 1988: 193, 195). Yet these SNGs were representing the interests of their local level constituents, and their capacity to force policy change at national level speaks of the rising importance of SNGs in some foreign policy decisions.

SNGs are not simply ‘spoilers’ on foreign policy matters. Often they are supporters, promoting national interest and working as partners with national agencies to promote shared local/national interests overseas.

In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident when China’s national leaders were unwelcome in national capitals that staunchly criticized China’s clampdown on freedoms of assembly and speech, some Chinese SNG leaders made trips to those countries to cultivate goodwill or least create possible diplomatic bridges. No high-ranking national politicians were invited to Canada, but eight senior local leaders visited Canada in 1991. Then Shanghai Mayor, Zhu Rongji, (later China’s prime minister) visited the United States and a number of European capitals, paving the way for diplomatic breakthroughs between Beijing and Western nations. Similarly, before formal diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and South Africa in 1997, contacts with post-apartheid South Africa were developed mainly at the provincial level (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 105–6).

Tokyo’s governor Ryokichi Minobe (1967–79) was instrumental in engaging North Korea through a number of initiatives that included visiting the country in 1971. The governor was also instrumental in negotiations that led to the normalization of relations between Japan and China. In recent years, when China–Japan relations had deteriorated substantially, Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe visited Beijing to promote city-to-city diplomacy but his aim was also to help thaw bilateral stresses and strains, which Prime Minister Abe acknowledged (Tiezi, 2014).

Even during the 1970s, Japanese SNGs formed ties with counterparts in countries where Japan’s diplomatic relations were estranged because of Cold War ideological differences. The Japan–Soviet Coastal Mayors’ Association (now the Japan–Russia Mayors’ Association of the Sea of Japan Coastal Cities) established in 1970 and the 1972 Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan–North Korea Friendship and Trade Promotion are the two main examples. Here SNGs aimed to demonstrate how governments below the national level could sustain productive ties even while Cold War animosities ruptured ‘official contacts’ at the national level. These actions demonstrated that SNGs could do what the central government, because of diplomatic baggage and concerns for national security, could not. Japanese and Taiwanese connections at the SNG level give a similar message, as do examples of local leaders in Japan standing up against bullying by Beijing (Thomas and Williams, 2016).

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

For SNGs to pursue their international strategies, institutional arrangements are essential to provide consistency and continuity of their international policy designs, objectives and implementation. Some Asian SNGs have more developed institutional arrangements than others. There are two levels of institutionalization:

domestic and international. Many North American and European SNGs have established international affairs offices within their jurisdiction. Some, for instance Canada's Quebec, 'has built a formidable force of trade officers, immigration advisers and quasi-ambassadors around the world'.⁷ These officers/advisors develop and implement international policies, and liaise with a range of stakeholders within their jurisdiction and with their national governments where required. They often establish offices in foreign locations to develop economic, cultural and other linkages. These international offices broadly serve two functions: (1) they act as the ambassadors or first port of call for overseas interlocutors, and (2) they provide inputs from the field to policy development back into their jurisdiction. Some SNGs maintain overseas offices independently of their national governments, as Quebec does, for example, while others share space with their national government.

Chinese provinces have established a well-developed local bureaucracy to manage their external affairs. Two institutional provincial arrangements need mention: Foreign Affairs Offices (FAOs) and Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Commissions (FTECs). Chen notes that as local affairs become increasingly international, most provincial departments become internationally oriented through training and guidance from the provincial FAOs (Chen, n.d.: 11). FAOs work under the dual structure of provincial leaders and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing with responsibilities such as receiving overseas dignitaries, organizing local leaders' overseas visits and coordinating sister exchange programmes (Chen et al., 2010: 336). Commerce and trade activities are mainly channelled through FTECs but bureaucrats in most other functional departments also receive the necessary training and guidance through FAOs, and are also involved variously in promoting the internationalization agenda. Provinces in China also have offices in charge of overseas Chinese and overseeing affairs related to overseas compatriots.⁸

Although not as formalized as Quebec with a minister for international relations, some Japanese SNGs have established their own offices overseas. For example, Aichi and Fukuoka prefectures maintain independent offices in California, staffed by their own employees who act as economic ambassadors. But this is not the only channel Japanese SNGs adopt to represent their interests overseas. The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) is a national body with staff drawn from both the national and subnational governments, representing SNG interests. It has branch offices throughout Japan's 47 prefectures and in six overseas locations – New York, Paris, Singapore, Seoul, Beijing and Sydney – to cover North America, Europe, Southeast Asia, North Asia and Oceania. While top managers are drawn from the central government, many SNG employees work in CLAIR offices inside Japan and overseas, giving SNG employees a valuable overseas experience. Moreover, the Japanese government accepts city and prefectural officials to be seconded to Japanese embassies and consulates overseas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also accepts

SNG employees to work in its Tokyo office and in other agencies such as the JICA, as local officials have expertise and know-how on local issues – ‘*yakusho* technology’ – such as sewerage, water supply and environment management that is very useful in foreign aid delivery.⁹

While China’s institutionalization of international relations at SNG level is essentially embedded in the central government, and Japan’s is also well developed (through and with national government support), Indian SNGs have barely any institutionalized arrangement to facilitate and promote their international activities. Even coordination between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and state governments was lacking, and only in 2014 did the MEA open a new section to coordinate states’ activities overseas. Called ‘Liaison with State Governments’, the division is responsible for coordinating both visiting foreign dignitaries’ trips to Indian states and cities and Indian states’ overseas delegations, and for establishing a database of state-level tie-ups and work on sister cities (Haidar, 2014). Then Foreign Secretary, Sujatha Singh, convened a first-ever meeting of state chief secretaries in March 2014, to clearly identify the important connections between domestic and foreign matters (Rana, 2014). More recently in 2015 a new division of Economic Diplomacy and States was established to deeply involve state governments in the foreign policy process (PNS, 2016). Within the MEA there now appears to be greater acceptance of states’ involvement in foreign affairs, but the attitude overall is still far from inclusive. Resistance still stalls the Ministry’s acceptance of state officials’ bids to work overseas and open state offices, as is typical for many SNGs around the world. And MEA is still extremely reluctant to allow states to act independently. For example, when Kerala proposed to post a tourism promotion official in Singapore, the MEA objected to it (Rana, 2014).

THE SUBNATIONAL–NATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

SNGs’ involvement in foreign affairs often shifts some sources of dependence and interdependence between SNGs and their national government. The nature and extent of the shift depends on the established relationships between government levels under law and on the nature and scale of the international actions, shaped by the SNGs’ size, leadership and geographic location. SNGs remain legally, administratively and financially beholden to their national government, but through their international engagements many are able to reduce their financial dependence and some may acquire a little room for muscle-flexing through the ability to carry out vital diplomacy that the central government, perhaps temporarily, cannot perform. International engagement can give SNGs an international voice and identity. It may equip them with international standing, international connections, and in some cases greater ability to provide services on their own without central guidance. These qualities can challenge their national

governments and impact upon national–subnational relations. We see a variety across the three Asian examples.

Some Chinese provinces have been highly influential on Beijing's national economic decision-making to obtain outcomes favourable to their provinces. Chen (n.d.) explains how Guangdong and Fujian provinces influenced national-level decision-making for approval to establish special economic zones and gained significant autonomy in international affairs, which later spread to other coastal provinces and areas in China. However, it is clear that provincial autonomy in China should not be understood as power for provinces to act independently, as the central government can and will quash any provincial government activity not in tune with central government objectives (Chen, n.d.: 12). Provincial governments in China can be regarded as agents, resource providers and conduits for economic and political connections through the wide-ranging networks they develop via corporate linkages and other subnational links such as sister ties. But they are not autonomous actors.

The national government acknowledges that SNGs can gain and maintain access to foreign nations even if the national government cannot, as a result of diplomatic fallout from the actions of one sovereign state against another. We noted above the example of Zhu Rongji as mayor successfully re-engaging China's critics abroad in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Provinces in China may act somewhat independently as long as they have the go-ahead from the central government, but the centre permanently has the power to require provinces to fall in line with national policy as it sees fit. Thomas and Williams (2016) note that 'Beijing sees subnational governments as part of the state apparatus, an institution of state authority, and it is therefore likely to be less tolerant of perceived infringements of national sovereignty on the part of these actors.' However, other observers have argued that provincial leaders sometimes can ignore central orders (Jacob, 2014: 4). Still others see a reasonable power balance emerging between the centre and provinces, claiming that in China the 1990s was an era of 'strong localities, weak centre', whereas most recently it is a time of 'strong localities and strong centre' (Chen and Jian, 2009: 4).

Japanese SNGs have a much longer history of international linkages and relatively autonomous international action. There is no strong evidence of the national government stopping SNGs in their international engagements or asking them to fall in line with national priorities, even with mayors and governors opposing the US–Japan Security Treaty in the 1960s or the Vietnam War in the 1970s. The central–subnational relationship has generally been smooth on matters of SNGs' international engagement. Indeed, the national government has facilitated SNGs' international connections through various centrally funded organizations such as JICA, JETRO and CLAIR. SNGs in Japan have carved out a niche role for themselves in this area, but by no means have they become independent actors, domestically or internationally.

India is a little different. Like Japan, it is a democratic polity, but its SNGs are relative newcomers as international actors, with their action limited mainly to the economic arena. Even though India's political system has a federal structure, its SNGs operate under significant constitutional and administrative constraints. Only recently has the central government encouraged SNGs to become active internationally in the economic arena. Overall, the centre maintains tight control over foreign affairs. For example, in 2015 when Bihar Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, sought to visit border areas in Nepal where many Bihari migrants live, the central government stopped the chief minister's visit. With no official statements available, one can safely conclude that the centre did not want a state leader to travel abroad as a goodwill ambassador. In a system where states are micro-managed, it is hard to speak of an autonomous role for SNGs in international affairs. Even so, SNGs can serve as agents of influence in a democratic polity such as India, as the cases of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal illustrate. Experience, connections, know-how and strength in numbers may, over time, strengthen the hand of India's SNGs as international actors, as we have seen with their counterparts in China and Japan. Yet systemic constraints will always powerfully shape subnational–national relations.

ASIAN SNGS AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SNGs are potentially multi-purpose quasi-diplomatic entities on the regional and global landscapes. An eminent commentator and writer, Benjamin Barber, in his 2013 book *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*, clearly argued the undeniable and increasing importance of subnational governments when many of the crucial challenges are becoming difficult for nation states to solve. Asian SNGs, like their counterparts elsewhere, generally appear set to have an expanding role in foreign affairs. Increasing numbers of larger SNGs in Asia have knowledge and expertise, connections and experiences not just at the local level, but also through their international engagements. For those outside seeking to connect with people on the ground in Asian countries, and/or with government not at the national level, SNGs offer a valuable platform for linkage-building and dissemination. As they are not national governments, SNGs may be more appealing and accessible as partners to other international actors such as NGOs, businesses and civic groups. SNGs can also serve as a platform for indirect linkages up to the national level. For those at home in Asia seeking to connect abroad, here too SNGs can serve as a conduit or can help give an international voice, depending on local need.

The linkage function that Asian SNGs can perform across local, national and international contexts and among different types of international actors has consequences for international diplomacy. Their status without the official baggage of 'national government', but with official recognition as 'government', uniquely

positions SNGs for increasing action in the international environment. These distinctive qualities give SNGs a fluid position as valuable actors in the foreign policies of Asian nations.

CONCLUSION

In this overview we have considered Asian SNGs as international actors, with a focus on India, China and Japan. We have considered factors that most significantly shape Asia's international SNGs, particularly the relationship with their national government, and the SNGs' leadership, size, experience and geographic location. We have seen economic imperatives as the main motivation to 'go international' for many of the larger SNGs. Some have also been drawn into the 'soft diplomacy' of cultural, educational and aid delivery programmes, and some even into the 'hard diplomacy' of security, defence, nuclear issues and human rights. Indeed, some SNGs in China and Japan have conducted diplomacy that central governments could not carry out. Overall we have seen diversity across the Asian examples; there is no single mode of international action for these SNGs, intra-nationally or inter-nationally.

Today many SNGs in Asian countries, like their counterparts elsewhere, recognize new opportunities on the international landscape. As later starters than most of their Western counterparts, in the second decade of the 21st century they have precedents and motivation to reach beyond their national borders to satisfy needs. They recognize that because local issues are not simply 'local' but 'global' and increasingly shaped by international circumstances, they can no longer function effectively just within domestic confines. This is why SNGs in Asia are gaining ever more international experience, connections and know-how. In some national contexts such as Japan and China, they are encouraged by institutional arrangements through which their national governments provide guidance and support to help maintain alignment with the national foreign policy agenda. The national governments of these Asian SNGs most surely keep a firm hand on national sovereignty and on their SNGs, but they now also recognize the diplomatic and other national benefits of supporting their SNGs in foreign affairs. SNGs in Asia therefore appear set to continue expanding their international profiles, with benefits for the many who are involved.

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Notes

- 1 www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-do/programs/states-and-regions/ (accessed 19 April 2016). Now the group is part of Under2, committed to keeping global temperature rises to under 2 degrees celsius. www.theclimategroup.org/project/under2-coalition (accessed 4 October 2018).
- 2 www.constitution.org/cons/india/shed07.htm
- 3 <http://resources.realestate.co.jp/news/international-comparison-of-gdp-of-japans-prefectures-tokyos-gdp-is-bigger-than-indonesias/>
- 4 www.clair.or.jp/e/exchange/shimai/index.html (accessed 4 October 2018).
- 5 <http://jetprogramme.org/en/about-jet/> (accessed 4 October 2018).
- 6 www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/outlines/index.html
- 7 www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/08/03/quebec_spending_millions_on_diplomatic_offices_around_the_world.html
- 8 www.lnfao.gov.cn
- 9 Interview in Sapporo, 9 April 2002.

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Territorial Disputes in Asia: Colonialism, Cold War and Domestic Politics

Alexander Bukh

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of territorial disputes in today's Asia. The borders of Asia are rather vague. For the purposes of this chapter therefore I will focus only on Northeast, Southeast and South Asia, by this excluding the Middle East as well as the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Territorial disputes in Asia vary greatly in terms of their origins, the scope of the territory in question and the role these disputes play in the bilateral or multilateral relations of the states involved. There are numerous ways territorial disputes can be categorized. For example, in a recently published *Global Encyclopedia of Border Disputes*, Brunet-Jailly (2015) presents three categories of border disputes: territorial, positional and functional. According to this typology, territorial disputes are about land. They are the most complex ones as they undermine the very integrity of states. Positional disputes arise when the parties agree in principle on a border but cannot agree on the exact position of the boundary line. Lastly, functional disputes are neither about territory nor the borderline but about competing understandings of the function that a certain border should perform. Alternatively, it is possible to categorize the disputes by focusing on the factors that cause states to cooperate or to escalate certain territorial disputes (see Huth, 1996; Huth and Allee, 2002; Fravel, 2008). One can also explore the role of power and levels of technology of the rival claimants (Mandel, 1980) or geopolitics (Emmers, 2009) or the role of non-state actors (Bukh, 2020) in understanding the diverging dynamics of such disputes.

While all the above factors and categories are no doubt important, this chapter focuses on the factors that brought about the disputes in question. Among the

numerous disputes that exist in Asia today, the chapter looks at those that play an important role in bilateral or multilateral relations of the concerned states. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter and the ability of the author to examine in detail the dynamics of these disputes. As such, the chapter will mostly describe the origins of these disputes and their present state.

When it comes to the origins of territorial disputes in Asia, historical claims of ownership are among the key arguments advanced by the parties. All of the disputes examined here, however, originated in the post-WWII years. Therefore, rather than a history per se, factors such as colonialism and its legacies, the Cold War struggle between communism and capitalism, and the domestic politics of one or more of the parties involved, are of most importance for our understanding of their origins. All of these factors are obviously interrelated. In most of the disputes examined below, two or all three of these factors account for their emergence as well as for their rise to prominence in the relations of the countries involved. This chapter, therefore, will try to identify the most important of these factors in the disputes discussed and explore the ways they interplayed with each other.

NORTHEAST ASIA

Most important territorial disputes in Northeast Asia today are those between Japan and its neighbors. Japan has a dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories (known as South Kuriles in Russia), with South Korea over Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean or Liancourt Rocks in English) islets and over the Senkaku (Diaoyu or Diaoyutai in Chinese) islands with both China and Taiwan. In the case of the disputes with Russia and South Korea, Japan is the one demanding the return of a territory it argues to be illegally occupied by the two countries. In the case of the Senkakus, Japan administers the islands claimed by both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and officially denies the existence of a dispute.

South Kuriles/Northern Territories

The South Kuriles/Northern Territories are located to the northeast of Japan's Hokkaido. They comprise three islands: Etorofu (Itrup), Kunashiri (Kunashir) and Shikotan, as well as the Habomai archipelago. The overall territory of the disputed islands is about 5,000 sq. km Today, there are over 16,000 Russian residents on these islands who engage mainly in fishing, fish processing, forestry and farming.

The Soviet Union joined the Asia-Pacific War on the 9th of August, 1945 when it unilaterally abolished the USSR–Japan Neutrality Pact and declared war on Japan. In mid August and early September, the Soviet troops occupied the Kurile

(Chishima in Japanese) Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin (Karafuto in Japanese). In February 1946, all of these territories were incorporated into the Sakhalin Oblast region which was under the direct administration of the Russian SFSR. Since the mid 1950s, Japan has claimed the four islands as its own, illegally occupied by the Soviet Union and later Russia.

The disputed islands historically were part of Ainu lands but since the second half of the 19th century have been administered by Japan. None of the three bilateral border demarcation treaties between Japan and Russia ever placed the currently disputed islands under Russian jurisdiction. As such, the Soviet Union has no historical claims to the four islands and the occupation was made based on the February 1945 Yalta Agreement between Stalin and Roosevelt. The most important factors that brought about this dispute were the international politics of the Cold War and domestic politics in Japan and USSR/Russia. One of the most important legal documents related to this dispute is the Peace Treaty with Japan (or San Francisco Peace Treaty) signed on the 8th of September, 1951. In article 2(c) of the treaty, Japan renounced all rights to Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. The article, however, does not specify the exact scope of the Kurile chain. This omission enabled the Japanese government to later interpret this clause as not including the four southernmost islands that came to be known as the Northern Territories. Hara (2006) examined the various drafts that preceded the final text of the peace treaty and persuasively argued that the non-inclusion of the scope of the Kurile Islands, to be denounced by Japan, in the text of the treaty was very much a result of US Cold War strategy.

Japan's domestic politics played an important role in the entrenchment of the dispute in the mid 1950s. As the Soviet Union was not a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, there was a need for a separate treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. During the first round of negotiations in 1955 the two parties were close to reaching an agreement as the Soviet leadership was ready to return Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan. However, Japan's position changed from the initial demand for the return of the two islands to include Kunashiri and Etorofu. Hellmann (1969) and others trace the emergence of the demand for the four islands to the anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiments of the right-leaning faction of the conservatives in Japan who were not enthusiastic about the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As a result of the 1955–6 negotiations, Japan and the USSR restored their diplomatic relations but did not sign a peace treaty. Since then, Japan has persistently demanded the return of the four islands, arguing that they do not constitute part of the territory it renounced in the Peace Treaty. On the other hand, the Soviet and later the Russian leadership argued that it acquired title to the islands as a result of World War II.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, there were numerous bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the dispute. In the early 1990s, certain scholars and policy makers in Russia argued the need to return all of the four islands to Japan, but pressure from other members of the policy-making elite as well as overall

domestic instability prevented President Yeltsin from accepting Japan's demands (for details see Hasegawa, 1998; Kimura, 2000; Kuhrt, 2007; Bukh, 2009). The most recent important development in the dispute has been the announcement of PM Abe to use a 'future oriented, new approach' in the territorial negotiations after his meeting with Russian President Putin on the 6th of May 2016 (Nikkei Shimbun, 2016a). The two leaders were scheduled to meet in December 2016 in Japan to continue negotiations. Meanwhile, the Japanese media have reported that Abe's 'new approach' involves a plan for extensive economic cooperation and assistance with the development of the Russian Far East. In terms of the actual territorial dispute, the media reported that the government is considering a plan for the return of the two small islands and joint administration of the other two as a compromise (Nikkei Shimbun, 2016b). While Japan's government officially rebutted the existence of plans for joint administration and Russia's President Putin stated that he had no plans to 'sell' the Kurile islands (Mano, 2016). Negotiations continued in 2017 and 2018 but with Russia's position hardening, it seems that the two parties are as far as ever from resolving the decades old dispute.

Dokdo/Takeshima

Liancourt rocks, known in Korea as Dokdo and in Japan as Takeshima, are a group of tiny rocky islets located in the Sea of Japan (East Sea). The combined territory of the islets is about 185,000 sq. m. They are located approximately 92 km from Korea's Ulleung Island and about 157 km from Japan's Oki Island. The islets are volcanic rocks with a very thin layer of soil. They have fresh spring water, which is not drinkable due to guano contamination. There are only two permanent Korean residents living on the islets and about 30 Korean coast guards are stationed there. Today the islets have a lighthouse, a helicopter pad, police barracks and even a branch of Korea's National Assembly Library. The islets do not have a significant economic value though the surrounding seabed may contain natural gas and mineral deposits. They were officially incorporated by Japan in 1905 and were part of its Shimane Prefecture until Japan's defeat in World War II. In January 1952, in the midst of the Korean War and three months before the Peace Treaty with Japan came into force, South Korea's Syngman Rhee government issued a 'Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas' that included the Dokdo/Takeshima islets within Korean territory. Since then, the islets have been effectively administered by the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as part of its Ulleung country, North Gyeongsang Province and claimed by Japan as part of its Shimane Prefecture. Today, both Japan and South Korea often refer to numerous ancient texts and maps to legitimize their claims to ownership. However, it is the interplay of colonial legacy, Cold War politics and domestic politics in both Japan and South Korea that accounts for the emergence of the dispute and its relatively recent rise to the fore of bilateral relations.

Similarly to the South Kuriles/Northern Territories, Dokdo/Takeshima is not mentioned in article 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which Japan recognizes the independence of South Korea. In the early drafts of the treaty, however, the ownership over the islets was allocated to Korea. Contrastingly, later drafts either allocated the islets to Japan or did not mention them at all. There were probably numerous reasons for this change but arguably the politics of the Cold War played the decisive role in this transformation and the exclusion of the islets from the final text. In June 1950, North Korea invaded the South, starting the Korean War that lasted until July 1953. Thus in the early 1950s the US officials involved in drafting the Peace Treaty could not be sure that the whole Korean Peninsula and adjacent islands would not fall into the hands of the communist forces. The Korean War also increased the strategic importance of Japan in the ongoing struggle with communism in Asia. Thus the American policy makers believed that it was in the interests of the United States' Cold War policy in Asia to retain potential sources of discord between Japan and its neighbor (Hara, 2006).

This ambiguity of the Treaty enabled the policy makers from both sides to claim ownership based on competing interpretations of the Treaty and Japan's incorporation of the islets in 1905. In discussing the San Francisco Peace Treaty each side refers to documents and drafts that support its position. With regard to Japan's incorporation of the islets in February 1905, the Japanese position states that this was simply an act of confirmation of previous possession, unrelated to Japan's colonization of Korea. It argues that since Korea became Japan's Protectorate only in November 1905 (and a formal colony in 1910), nine months after the incorporation of Dokdo/Takeshima, and due to the fact that the islets were administered by the Shimane Prefecture and not the Governor General of Korea the two issues should be treated separately (Tsukamoto, 2011). Contrastingly, the Korean side construes the 1905 incorporation as Japan's first step in the colonization of the Korean Peninsula (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

The domestic politics played an important role in the entrenchment of the dispute in the 1960s and its escalation in the 2000s. In 1965, after over a decade of negotiations, Japan and South Korea finally normalized their bilateral relations. The issue of ownership over Dokdo/Takeshima was one of the main stumbling blocks in the process that led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Basic Relations. Both sides realized that the economic importance of the islets was negligible. Unconfirmed reports suggest that during the negotiations, representatives from both sides stated that blowing up the islets would have been an ideal solution as it would have eliminated the problem. Due to domestic political reasons, however, neither side was willing or able to yield to the other side's demands. Park Chung Hee's dictatorial rule was perceived as illegitimate by many of his countrymen. Furthermore, his policy of rapprochement with Japan was opposed by many South Koreans where anti-Japanese sentiment rooted in the memory of the recent colonial past continued to be strong. Thus arguably Park did not want to further

provoke his fellow countrymen by making any concessions to Japan's demands. In Japan, the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faced strong criticism from the Socialist Party, the latter being against fostering closer relations with South Korea's military dictatorship. Giving up the claims to the islets would have enhanced the opposition (Hyon, 2006; Bukh, 2015). Thus the final text of the treaty does not touch upon the territorial dispute, but in a tacit agreement the two sides agreed to shelve it so that both governments could continue to hold their respective interpretations regarding the ownership of the islets but avoid escalation of the dispute (Roh, 2008).

Until the mid 1990s, the dispute was in a relatively dormant state. It flared up again in 1996 when both Japan and Korea ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and declared their respective Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In accordance with their claims, both countries included the islets as their sovereign territory. Various issues related to Korea's relations with Japan came to play an important role in the struggle between the conservative and the progressive parties in Korea over voters' support. The territorial dispute gained nationwide recognition and became one of the central issues in South Korea's domestic politics. In 2005, Japan's Shimane Prefecture, which had continuously lobbied the central government to restore Japan's territorial rights to the islets, passed an ordinance that designated the 22nd of February as a prefectural 'Takeshima Day'. There were numerous reasons for this act but arguably Shimane Prefectural elites' frustration with central government's fiscal reforms was the most important one (Bukh, 2020). The ordinance was met with strong protests from the Korean government and civil society groups and resulted in increased tensions in bilateral relations. Today, the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima continues to be one of the main stumbling blocks in Japan–Korea relations.

Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkaku

The Senkaku (PRC name: Diaoyu, ROC name: Diaoyutai) dispute between Japan on the one side and the People's Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the other is about eight islands located in the southern part of the East China Sea. The total territory of the islands is about 6.3 sq. km, and they are located in a very important strategic position approximately 170 km from Japan's Ishigaki Island and from Taiwan. The islands are located in close proximity to shipping lines, surrounded by rich fishing grounds and potentially have oil and gas fields in adjacent waters.

The islands were incorporated by Japan into its Okinawa Prefecture in January 1895 during the Sino–Japanese War. In the first few decades of the 20th century there was some economic activity on the islands but they have been uninhabited since the 1940s. Along with the rest of the Okinawa Prefecture the islands were administered by the United States after Japan's defeat in 1945 and returned to

Japan's administration in 1972. Today they are administered by Japan as part of its Okinawa Prefecture, and since the early 1970s have been claimed by both Beijing and Taipei as being historically part of China. The Japanese position states that the 1895 incorporation of the islands was that of *terra nullius* conducted after a careful examination that produced no evidence of ownership by China (Toyoshita, 2012). Contrastingly, both Chinese governments make claims of historical ownership, arguing the islands to be part of Taiwan and stating that Japan illegally occupied the islands during the 1894–5 Sino-Japanese War (PRC State Council, 2012).

Neither of the two Chinese governments paid much attention to the islands until 1969 when two studies, one by a committee under the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and one sponsored by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, identified potential oil and gas resources in their vicinity (Blanchard, 2000). ROC was the first to bring up claims to the Diaoyu islands in August 1970 and PRC followed suit a few months later.

It may seem that the legacy of Japan's colonial expansion in Asia as well as the struggle over natural resources are the main causes of this dispute. Surely, the importance of both the past in the collective memory of the Chinese people and natural resources cannot be denied but the international politics of Cold War and domestic politics played a decisive role in the emergence of the dispute. For both Chinese governments the struggle over legitimate representation of the whole of China both domestically and internationally was one of the key issues that defined their policies. In 1970, the international environment was turning increasingly unfavorable to the Kuomintang government on Taiwan and arguably raising the claims to the Diaoyutai islands could be seen as an attempt to enhance its legitimacy domestically. The Chinese government, however, had no other choice but to follow suit and make similar claims as it argued Taiwan to be a province of China and itself the sole legitimate representative of the whole Chinese nation (Chen, 2014). Cold War international politics also shaped the United States' position on the dispute which further contributed to its entrenchment. In 1971, as a reflection of the various developments in American Cold War interests vis-à-vis Japan and both Chinas, the Nixon administration decided not to take a position on issues of sovereignty when the United States and Japan reached an agreement on the return of Okinawa (Hara, 2006). It was only in April 2014, during Barak Obama's visit to Tokyo, that a US President clearly stated that the Senkaku islands fell within the scope of the US–Japan Security Treaty, thus explicitly supporting Japan's claims to legitimate ownership.

Japan and China normalized their relations in 1978. It seems that in the process of negotiations the two sides agreed to shelve the dispute (Drifte, 2013) though Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially denies the existence of such agreement. Since 1978 the dispute has been through a number of phases (Wiegand, 2009) but it was after the incidents in 2010 and 2012 that the dispute became a major source of tensions in Japan–China relations (Smith, 2015).

The 7th of September 2010 confrontation between a Chinese fishing trawler that was fishing in the waters near the islands and the Japanese Coast Guard shocked the Japanese public and policy makers alike (Smith, 2015). The captain of the trawler was detained after refusing inspection and ramming two Coast Guard ships. The incident escalated into a major diplomatic crisis after the Japanese authorities decided to prosecute the captain. China demanded immediate release of the captain and applied pressure on Japan through economic sanctions and detention of Japanese citizens. The Japanese government released the captain in late September and the tensions receded (Smith, 2015). The second phase of the crisis started in September 2012 when the government of Japan decided to nationalize three of the Senkaku islands which were privately owned and leased by the government. In China, nationalization was construed as Japan's attempt to strengthen its position in the dispute. Many cities in China saw large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations, attacks against Japanese businesses and individuals and looting and burning of Japanese property (Nakauchi, 2012). Domestic politics in both countries played a major role in the escalation of the dispute and its emergence as one of the potential sources of military conflict in the region. In the case of China, anti-Japanese nationalism is one of the tools used by the Communist Party aimed at enhancing its domestic legitimacy (Liu, 2016). In the case of Japan, the September 2012 nationalization of the three Senkaku islands came as a response to Tokyo's right-leaning Governor Ishihara Shintaro's initiative to purchase the islands and put them under the jurisdiction of Tokyo. As such, the nationalization was actually intended as a measure to prevent further escalation in the dispute rather than induce it. In the aftermath, government officials claimed that it had communicated with the Chinese side and its position was met with understanding (Yoshino, 2016). However, the Japanese government either misunderstood the Chinese response or miscalculated the possible reaction. In 2013, China declared its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone which included airspace over the Senkakus, further escalating the tensions.

Today, Chinese maritime and air intrusions into the territorial waters and airspace near the islands occur on an almost daily basis and Japan is beefing up its military in the south of the country. At this point, it remains to be seen whether both governments will manage to prevent the dispute from leading to an actual military clash between their countries.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Thai–Cambodia Territorial Dispute

Thailand and Cambodia have a number of border demarcation issues but the most important dispute which very recently led to military clashes between the two countries was over the area of land of approximately 4.6 sq. km which

surrounds the ancient Hindu temple of Preah Vihear (Thai name Phra Viharn). The temple is situated on top of a cliff in the Dangrek/Donrak mountain range. It is located in Cambodia's Preah Vihear province and claimed by Thailand as part of its Sisaket Province. The most direct access to the temple is from the Thai side and it was only in 2003 that Cambodia completed the construction of a road enabling access to the temple from the Cambodian side.

In 1954, Thai troops occupied the temple and tensions between the two countries persisted until they decided to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959. In 1962 the ICJ ruling awarded ownership of the temple to Cambodia. Thailand withdrew the troops but at the same time the government refused to accept the verdict. Furthermore, in the following decade the loss of the temple became a symbol of national humiliation in the nationalist discourse in Thailand (Grabowsky and Deth, 2015).

The dispute was revitalized in 2008, after the World Heritage Committee responded to Cambodia's request and decided to list the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site despite objections from Thailand. In July 2008, Thailand started to amass military in the vicinity of the disputed area with some of the soldiers reportedly crossing into Cambodian territory (BBC, 2008). In October of the same year, the troops exchanged fire and armed clashes continued until the end of 2011. In April 2011, Cambodia filed an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) requesting a reinterpretation of its 1962 judgment and a request for an order for provisional measures. Cambodia argued that the 1962 judgment granted sovereignty over the temple and its vicinity to Cambodia. The Thai submission to the ICJ, in response to Cambodia's claims, argued that the ongoing dispute was not over the ownership of the temple subject to the 1962 ruling but a new boundary dispute over the 4.6 sq. km surrounding the temple (Kingdom of Thailand, 2011).

On the 18th of July 2011 the ICJ issued a ruling demanding the withdrawal of military personnel from the disputed area by both sides. It was only in July of the following year, however, that the two sides replaced the soldiers with police and paramilitary border guards (Della-Giacoma, 2012). The three years' conflict resulted in about 30 people dead, many others maimed and tens of thousands temporarily displaced (Della-Giacoma, 2012; Raymond, 2014).

In November 2013, the ICJ issued an interpretation of its 1962 ruling stating that, by way of interpretation, the judgment of 15th of June 1962 decided that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear. However, it did not give sovereignty to Cambodia over all of the disputed territory, stating that it had no jurisdiction to rule over ownership of the nearby hill (ICJ, 2013). Then Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's position on the ruling was somewhat ambiguous and the two governments did little to demarcate the border, but the situation at the border has been relatively stable since (Raymond, 2014). Yingluck was ousted as a result of the May 2014 coup and since then Thailand has been ruled by the military. At this point, however, there are no indications that the military is seeking to reignite the territorial dispute.

The Thai irredentist narrative that became overwhelmingly influential in 2008 and beyond, located the dispute within the broader discourse on the territories Thailand lost to the British and French colonial powers in the late 19th and early 20th century (Pawakapan, 2013). As such it may seem that colonialism and, more specifically, the legacies of colonial powers' policies in Southeast Asia, are the main cause of this dispute. No doubt, to a certain extent, colonialism is a factor in the dispute, as one of the main documents used by the ICJ in the 1962 judgment was a 1907 border treaty between French Indochina and Siam signed as a result of French gunboat diplomacy and a related map (Strate, 2013). Furthermore, in the mid 1930s the Thai government discovered that in the Preah Vihear area the demarcation line diverted from the watershed it was supposed to follow and placed the cliff on which the temple was built on the French side of the border. When the Thai authorities tried to renegotiate the border line, the government of French Indochina refused (Grabowsky and Deth, 2015). The relations between Siam and the French in the late 19th and early 20th century, of course, should not be seen simply through a colonizer/colonized dichotomy, as both sides engaged in a struggle over control of Lao and Cambodian territories (Chachavalpongpun, 2012).

While the present dispute between Thailand and Cambodia does have its roots in the colonial period of the region, the most important factor that led to the escalation of the dispute in 2008 and the subsequent clashes was domestic politics in Thailand. At that time, the issue was reignited and politicized in Thailand in the context of the domestic struggle between the so-called 'royalists' on one side and the supporters of the former Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra on the other. In 2006 Taksin was ousted in a military coup and fled the country, but his party, renamed the People's Power Party, came back to power a year later after the December 2007 elections. The politicization and escalation of the dispute in 2008 was very much a result of a campaign led by the People's Alliance for Democracy activists and the opposition Democratic Party aimed at discrediting the pro-Taksin government and seizing power in Thailand (Chachavalpongpun, 2012; Pawakapan, 2013). As such, colonial history was used as a political tool in the hands of the opposition rather than being the direct cause of the latest cycle in the dispute over Preah Vihear/Phra Viharn.

South China Sea Disputes

The territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea are probably the most complex ones among the various disputes, not only in the region but worldwide. The disputed areas are abundant in natural resources such as gas and oil and also carry strategic importance, as roughly half of the world's commercial shipping passes through them. Today these disputes play an important role not only in the relations among the claimants but also the foreign policies of countries such as Japan and the United States. The disputes involve overlapping

maritime, territorial and fishing rights claims by China, Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The South China Sea disputes are over ownership of the whole or parts of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. Since the military clash between Chinese and South Vietnamese forces in January 1974, the Paracels have been fully under Chinese control. However, different parts of the Spratlies are occupied by the Philippines, China, Taiwan and Vietnam.

The Paracels consist of about 30 islets, with the largest, Woody Island, only slightly more than 2 sq. km in size. The Spratly Islands are an archipelago which consists of approximately 700 islands, atolls and reefs (Lanteigne, in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). There are no indigenous inhabitants on these islands, but there are scattered garrisons of military personnel from a number of claimant states (Hara, 2006). Vietnam, China and Taiwan (both make claims on behalf of one China) are in a dispute over the whole of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao in Chinese, Trường Sa in Vietnamese and Kalayaan in Tagalog). Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei also make claims to part of this territory. China, Taiwan and Vietnam are in a dispute over the sovereignty of the Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao in Chinese and Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese). The Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Dao in Chinese and Panatag in Tagalog) is claimed by both Beijing and Taipei and the Philippines. Indonesia is not a party to these disputes but it does have a dispute with China over fishing rights claimed by China in waters around the Natuna Islands which are under Indonesian administration.

Similar to other territorial disputes discussed here, today all of the parties are making extensive use of historical evidence to support their claims. The disputes in the South China Sea, however, are of relatively recent origin and can be seen as resulting from an interplay of the legacy of colonialism and the international politics of the Cold War. Parts of the Spratly Islands were claimed by the British Empire in the late 19th century but the British did little to exploit the islands or to establish effective administration there. It seems that as of the late 1920s, the Chinese did not view the Spratly Islands as their territory but made a claim of sovereignty in 1933 (Dzurek, 1996). As to the Paracels, the Chinese Empire sent a mission to the islands as early as 1902 and Chinese troops erected sovereignty markers on some of the islands (Dzurek, 1996). Due to the subsequent domestic turmoil and three decades of civil war, and the fight against the Japanese, the Chinese were not in a position to uphold their claims. The Japanese companies on Taiwan which became a colony of Japan in 1895 started to exploit both groups of islands in the 1930s but did not make formal claims of ownership. Fearing Japanese invasion, the French colonial authorities in Indochina claimed the Spratlies and later the Paracels while recognizing the existence of Chinese rival claims to the latter. In 1939, the Japanese established a military presence on both groups of islands. As Japan entered a cooperation agreement with the French Vichy Government, during most of WWII the Japanese and French troops lived side by side both on the Paracels and the Spratlies (Tonnesson, 2002).

As such, the disputes over ownership of the islands already existed in one form or another in pre-WWII years and were very much an integral part of the French, British and later Japanese colonial expansion in the region. Japan's defeat left a power vacuum in the South China Sea, and in the late 1940s, the Kuomintang government, France and the newly independent Philippines engaged in a struggle over the islands (Tonnesson, 2002).

In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, article 2(f), Japan renounced all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands. The treaty, however, did not specify in which country's favor Japan was renouncing the islands. As Hara (2006) has persuasively argued, this omission of the recipient was made in accordance with the French and US Cold War interests. The French claimed the Paracels on behalf of the State of Vietnam which effectively remained its colony, but as the situation in Indochina was unclear, the French feared that the islands might come under communist control. The United States also did not want to approve a treaty that might allow acquisition of the islands by communist China (Hara, 2006). The countries in the region began to intensify their claims during the 1970s, when deep sea oil exploration became possible and when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded in 1982.

As already noted, there were several clashes between the Vietnamese and the Chinese navies over ownership of the islands during the Cold War years but the dispute started to escalate in the 1990s. In 1992, the Chinese government passed the Territorial Waters Law which claimed China's right to essentially all of the South China Sea, and in the following years it started to construct various, mostly military, installations on some of the disputed islands including parts of the Mischief Reef previously controlled by the Philippines (Guan, 2000). Increasingly, the dispute became an integral part of domestic politics in China, Vietnam and the Philippines as claims of ownership and arguments about injustice resonated with the dominant historical narrative in these countries that forced the governments to take a strong position over territorial claims (Huang and Jagtiani, 2015). Since 2010, tensions have continued to escalate. The tensions in the South China Sea became one of the most important issues on ASEAN's agenda and also created a deep division among those members that were parties to the dispute and those that had no direct stake in it (Ba, 2016).

In 2012, a stand-off between Chinese and Filipino ships near Scarborough Reef resulted in China gaining control over the reef (Cronin, 2015). In the following year, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China under Annex VII of UNCLOS. The Philippines claim was supported by Vietnam, while China refused to participate in the arbitration claiming that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) had no jurisdiction in this case. During the same period, tensions between Vietnam and China escalated when China began drilling oil in part of the South China Sea claimed by both countries, with a subsequent series of violent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam (Reuters, 2014). In July 2016, the PCA issued an award in the arbitration case against China in which it accepted most

of the claims made by the Philippines. It did not rule on the ownership of the disputed islands but rejected China's claims to historical rights over large parts of the South China Sea. While the ruling was positively appraised by a number of countries, including the United States and Japan, Beijing declared it to be null and void and refused to accept it (Tiezzi, 2016).

Today the disputes in the South China Sea are not limited to the parties but play an important role in the US–China rivalry in the region. The United States does not officially take a stance on questions of sovereignty but the South China Sea issue became an integral part of its 'rebalancing to Asia' strategy and its attempts to maintain its influence in the region and contain the rise of China (Cronin, 2015). The United States' official position is that the disputes need to be resolved peacefully in compliance with international law and that China needs to respect the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Recently, Japan has also started to play a more active role in the dispute by giving military aid to Vietnam and the Philippines and has declared that its navy will participate in joint patrols with the United States (Jozuka, 2016). Similar to the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, it remains to be seen whether the participants will manage to reach a *modus vivendi* while avoiding an escalation of the dispute to a fully fledged military conflict.

SOUTH ASIA

India–Pakistan Dispute over Jammu and Kashmir

India and Pakistan have a number of territorial disputes but the most important one is over Kashmir. One-third of Kashmir is under Pakistani administration and two-thirds are controlled by India. With a combined population of over 17.5 million (Census India, 2011; AJ&K Government, 2016) and a total territory of over 300,000 sq. km it is probably the largest territorial dispute in the world in terms of the size of the disputed territory and the population that inhabits it.

The dispute over Kashmir resulted in thousands of dead and, being a major source of conflict between two nuclear powers, plays an important role not only in regional relations but also, in various ways, in the policies of major powers such as the United States, China and Russia. At the same time, as Alastair Lamb (1991) noted, the origins of the dispute are very much straightforward, in that the dispute is very much a legacy of the British colonial rule in India and the hasty nature of the British departure from the Indian subcontinent in 1947–8.

At the end of WWII, the United Kingdom was on the verge of financial collapse and embarked on the process of dismantling its extensive empire. In February 1947, the British government announced the end of its rule of the Indian subcontinent. While it had taken the British over 300 years to build their Empire, the process of dismantling it was very swift and took less than three months (Lamb, 1991).

In July 1947, the United Kingdom adopted the Indian Independence Act which partitioned British India into two newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan. It also terminated British suzerainty over the hundred or so princely states which were formally independent but were indirectly ruled by the British. Jammu and Kashmir was among these princely states, and the Act recognized its right to join either of the dominions. Jammu and Kashmir had a predominantly Muslim population but was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. Its geographical location further complicated the situation as it could have joined either Pakistan or India. The main principle of the partition was to divide the British India along the Hindu/Muslim line and, as such, Kashmir should have joined Pakistan but the Maharaja decided to accede to India. Furthermore, the economy of Jammu and Kashmir was bound up with what was about to become Pakistan, and the waters of the rivers which flowed through Jammu and Kashmir were essential for Pakistani agriculture. In light of the above factors, it seems that at least a large part of Jammu and Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan but according to the British plan for the partition it was up to the state to decide on its future (Lamb, 1991).

In early October 1947, a tribal rebellion against the Maharaja got support from Pakistani soldiers. In response, the Maharaja appealed to India for assistance. Before intervening, India's PM Nehru demanded from the Maharaja accession to India. After these conditions were met, India airlifted its soldiers into Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. While the Indian army managed to save the city, the tribesmen had taken over a third of Kashmiri territory. A UN-sponsored ceasefire in 1949 created a *de facto* new border, dividing Kashmir in its large sense into an India-controlled part comprising the regions of Ladakh, Jammu and the valley of Kashmir, and Pakistani-controlled territories, today called Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas (Blarel in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). As such, one-third of the former princely state is administered by Pakistan, while two-thirds are under India's control. The UN issued a number of resolutions recommending a plebiscite in Kashmir as a way to resolve the dispute but this recommendation was never implemented by the parties.

In 1965, the two countries fought for over two weeks after Pakistan launched operation 'Gibraltar' aimed at fomenting a rebellion in Indian-controlled Kashmir. After UN intervention and Soviet mediation, the two governments signed an agreement to return to the status quo and to refrain from using force in the territorial dispute. Nevertheless, only five years later they fought again, this time a war related to Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan. In the late 1980s, insurgency in India-held Kashmir erupted. The insurgency was a rebellion against the political and economic domination of Delhi and, while supported by Pakistan, it was more of a struggle for autonomy and self-determination than a struggle to join Pakistan (Schofield, 2010; Blarel in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015).

The insurgency and Pakistan's support for the militants triggered numerous crises and local clashes between the two countries, including a small-scale war

in 1999. Border skirmishes resulting in loss of life of both soldiers and civilians are frequent. Between 2004 and 2007, the two governments held talks to establish a framework for the resolution of the dispute, but the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks interrupted this process. Both governments officially claim all of Kashmir. However, Pakistan came to recognize the existence of a movement for independence in the valley of Kashmir and the improbability of inclusion of all of Kashmir within its borders. Likewise it seems that India does not expect to include the areas of Kashmir under Pakistani control in its territory. Despite these important changes in the two countries' positions, the prospects for resolution of the dispute in the foreseeable future are rather dim (for a detailed analysis see Schofield, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Blarel and Ebert, 2015).

India–China Territorial Dispute

China and India share the world's longest unmarked border. The territorial dispute between the two Asian giants is over large chunks of territory in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Aksai Chin is approximately 38,000 sq. km in size and is mostly uninhabited. It is controlled by China as part of its Xinjiang Autonomous Region and is claimed by India as part of Jammu and Kashmir. Arunachal Pradesh, referred to as South Tibet in China, is a state in the north-eastern part of India with a population of about 1.2 million. China claims approximately 90,000 sq. km in the eastern section of the border which more or less corresponds to the territory of Arunachal Pradesh (Garver, 2001; Pardesi in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015).

The two disputes are directly related to the question of Tibet, its status and borders and, to a great extent, can be seen as a legacy of colonialism in South Asia. There are probably two key factors that brought about the disputes between China and India. One is related to the nature of the Qing Empire, the changes that occurred during its decline and the post-1949 Chinese attempts to regain control over most of the areas that were considered part of the Qing Empire (Fravel, 2008). Tibet was thus under the Qing suzerainty. It was not under direct control of the Qing but from the late 18th century its foreign relations were under the authority of the Chinese envoy in Lhasa. The 1911 Chinese Revolution overthrew the Qing and led to the collapse of the Chinese Empire. After the revolution, the Chinese forces in Tibet disintegrated. Two years later, the last Chinese left Tibet and it gained *de facto* independence which existed until the Chinese invasion/reunification in 1951 (Van Eekelen, 1967). Importantly, Tibet was recognized only by Mongolia, and none of the Chinese governments ever accepted its independence (Van Eekelen, 1967; Kuzmin, 2010).

The other factor that had a direct impact on the emergence of the dispute was British colonial rule in South Asia and related policies. In the late 19th century, spurred by rumors that the Dalai Lama was negotiating with Russia, the British decided to establish relations with Tibet. According to the Lhasa Treaty of 1904,

Tibet was obligated not to cede or lease territory to any foreign power without British consent, nor to allow any external powers to intervene in Tibetan affairs. In the 1906 Anglo–Chinese Convention, however, Britain tacitly accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The Anglo–Russian Convention concluded in the following guaranteed the territorial integrity of Tibet and also tacitly acknowledged China’s suzerainty (Van Eekelen, 1967).

Tibetan independence was never recognized by Britain. In 1913–4, British India and Tibet concluded a number of agreements including the Simla Accord which defined the border between India and Tibet. The Accord divided Tibet into two parts: Outer and Inner. Outer Tibet was to retain complete autonomy under nominal Chinese suzerainty. Inner Tibet was allowed complete control in all religious matters. While China was a party to the negotiations, Beijing refused to sign the Accord and none of the subsequent Chinese governments have ever acknowledged its validity (Pardesi in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). One of the two bilateral agreements concluded between Britain and Tibet at the same time as the Simla Accord marked the boundary between British India and Tibet to the east of Bhutan. This boundary agreement granted British India control over large portions of what later became India’s Arunachal Pradesh state. Needless to say, China has never acquiesced to this agreement nor to the boundary it established which came to be known as the McMahon Line (Kuzmin, 2010; Pardesi in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015).

The dispute over Aksai Chin relates to the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir discussed in the previous section. When the British ended their rule in the sub-continent, there was no demarcated border in Kashmir. In the years that followed India’s independence, Indian governmental documents had depicted the border between India and China in this region as ‘undefined’. China came into possession of this territory when it occupied/liberated Tibet in 1951. It was only in 1953 that India made claims to Aksai Chin based on the boundary of pre-colonial Dogra rulers of Kashmir (Pardesi in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015).

In 1960 Beijing called India to start negotiating their boundary. India responded by arguing that such a boundary already existed and referred to the 1914 agreement between British India and Tibet. Eventually, New Delhi agreed to start negotiations but, as a precondition, demanded Chinese evacuation from Aksai Chin, which was refused by Beijing. China’s attempt to consolidate its position in Aksai Chin which was made in response to the rebellion in Tibet was perceived by the Indian government as China’s further encroachment into India’s territory (Pardesi in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). In 1962, Nehru ordered Indian forces to clear Chinese forces from the disputed territory but the Chinese army struck back. During a month-long war in October–November 1962, the Indian defenses crumbled and the Chinese forces recaptured Aksai Chin (Garver, 2001).

Sino–Indian relations somewhat improved in the late 1970s. In 1986–7, however, tensions escalated in the Arunachal Pradesh area with countries beefing up their military presence and coming to the brink of war. As a result of negotiations,

however, the tensions receded and both sides de-escalated their deployments (Arpi, 2013).

The territorial dispute between China and India became an important factor in regional international relations. It has played a key role in shaping the emergence of a Sino–Pakistani strategic partnership, which was born in the 1950s and, despite the numerous drastic changes that have happened in the region and in both countries' domestic politics, it continues to exist today (Garver, 2001; Lim, 2016). Today, the Sino–Indian relationship is one of the key factors in regional stability. After the 1987 incident, relations between the two Asian giants transformed into a cold peace and while both sides officially maintain their territorial claims, they came to accept the status quo.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the main factors that led to the emergence of the most important territorial disputes in today's Asia. The list of disputes presented in this chapter is not exclusive and there are numerous other disputes that have not been covered due to lack of space. One such dispute is between North Korea and China. The territory claimed by North Korea concerns 33 sq. km around the peak of Mount Paektu. There were military skirmishes in the region between the North Korean and Chinese forces in the late 1960s but the timing of the dispute's initiation is uncertain (for details see Pinilla and Brown, 2004; Fravel, 2008). Today, it seems that the dispute does not play an important role in North Korea's relations with its neighbor. Another such dispute is the one between South Korea and China over a submerged rock in the Yellow Sea. Known as Ieodo in Korean, Syuan in Chinese and Socotra Rock in English, the rock is located about 150 km from Korea's Marado Island and about 270 km east from China's Chenchianshan Island. It was claimed by South Korea as part of its territory in 1951 but today both countries claim it as part of their respective Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Clashes between Korean coastguards and Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of the rock in 2011–2 as well as China's declaration of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 that included airspace over Socotra caused certain tensions in bilateral relations (for details see Harold, 2012; Global Security, 2016). Both countries, however, managed to prevent further escalation in the dispute and today it does not play an important role in bilateral relations.

Similarly to Northeast Asia there are numerous territorial disputes in the Southeast Asian region that rarely make the headlines. One such example is the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the Ambalat sea block in the Celebes Sea or the dispute between Indonesia and East Timor over the Oecusse District (for details see entries by Gunn and Liow in Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). Thailand also has border demarcation issues with Malaysia, Myanmar and Laos (Tansubhapol, 2012). In South Asia there are also border disputes which are

relatively unknown not only to outside observers but probably to many citizens of the countries involved. For example, probably not many Chinese today know that their country has a territorial dispute with Bhutan that originated during the Tibetan conflict in the 1950s (for details see Mathou, 2004). Another, probably more well-known, dispute in South Asia is the one between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the latter refusing to recognize the British-drawn Durand Line as the international border between the two countries (Grare, 2006).

While all the above disputes have played a certain role in bilateral relations of the claimant states, due to space limitations, this chapter has focused only on those disputes that are of most importance not only for the parties but also for the whole region and beyond. For the same reason, this chapter has not explored disputes that have been successfully resolved such as, for example, the border dispute between Russia and China which was finally resolved in 2004.

This chapter has focused on the relative salience and interplay of three factors that contributed to the emergence of the respective territorial disputes: the legacy of colonialism, Cold War politics and domestic politics. It has shown that the importance of each of these factors varied from one dispute to another. Needless to say, there are multiple other factors, such as geography, natural resources or strategic value which have played a certain role in facilitating the emergence of the dispute in question or in its entrenchment.

Most of the disputes examined here emerged more than six decades ago, during the process of decolonization and various regional and domestic struggles, most of which were absorbed by the global Cold War rivalry between the communist and the capitalist blocs. Many of the disputes discussed here resulted in military clashes between the parties that led to loss of life and affected the lives of thousands, if not millions of people. Despite the end of the Cold War and the drastic regional and global transformations that followed, these disputes continue to play an important role in the claimants' relations with each other and beyond.

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The Conflict in Afghanistan: Interlocking Strategic Challenges as a Barrier to Regional Solution

Ankit Panda and Srinjoy Bose

INTRODUCTION

Many scholars, commentators, and observers have pointed out that the fundamental trigger of Afghanistan's recent and ongoing problems was the Communist coup of 1978, followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Maley, 2009; Barfield, 2010). Between 1979 and 1992, the Communist regime used Soviet assistance to purchase the loyalty of regional powerholders. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, aid stopped. Unable to lean on the generosity of an external patron, the government in Kabul fell. The regional powerholders realigned, largely along ethnic lines, leading also to the disintegration of the Afghan army. Four years of violent civil war followed, with the Pakistani-backed Taliban defeating the warring mujahideen factions and emerging triumphant. In so doing, the Taliban introduced a modicum of order (through violent and brutal coercion), even if their style of governance and government was extremely unsavory and abhorrent in the eyes of the international community. Then, the toppling of the Taliban regime by the United States and its allies renewed violence, precarity and uncertainty. In this sense, the external intervention – and how it was conducted – is responsible for many of the present ills we are witnessing. At the time of writing, that is, in the post-military withdrawal milieu, Afghanistan has once again become a pawn in a 'great game' between rival powers.

Afghanistan, of course, has been a subject of great power rivalry since the early years of the 19th century. Focusing on a renewed 'great game', this chapter seeks to review the perceptions, motives, policies, and strategies of some of the

principal actors that have staked a claim in the resolution, persistence, or evolution of conflict in Afghanistan. While explanations of interference and intervention are beyond the scope of this chapter, we seek to paint a clear picture of the ways in which the Afghan conflicts have shaped foreign relations with Afghanistan. In other words, what follows is a tale about ‘legacy’ – the legacy of decades of external rivalry vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

The review and analysis stress the role of four countries: the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan – all key actors in the internationalized civil war in Afghanistan. Except for China, the other three countries have a long history of direct and indirect engagement in Afghanistan. This focus, however, does not suggest that the roles of other countries – both near and far – such as India, Iran, or European actors with a long history of engagement in Afghanistan (including Great Britain and Germany) are any less significant, only that we acknowledge the limited scope of this review.

INTERLOCKING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES: MULTIPLE ACTORS IN THE SECURITY DILEMMA

Drawing on work by Booth and Wheeler (2008) on the concept of the ‘security dilemma’, Motwani (2015: 108) identifies three factors that impede a regional solution to peace: structural, contextual, and cognitive. Structure constitutes stakeholders’ competing notions of (in)security, regional stability, rival strategic interests, and power ambitions. Context refers to the history of fraught relations, territorial disputes and armed conflict, the role of spoilers, and even nuclear deterrence and how they stymie efforts to build confidence between competitors. And, finally, cognitive factors refer to the uncertainty generated by stakeholders’ threat perceptions (uncertainty arising from military postures, for example), mistrust, and ideological fundamentalism that exacerbates competition and reduces the space and opportunity to build confidence and sue for peace. Notably, Motwani (Ibid.: 136) argues that the interplay between these unique security conditions produces a mutually reinforcing *contagion effect* as multiple points of contact and contest cut across actors’ structural, contextual, and cognitive characteristics. Below, we unpack this interplay of factors, and demonstrate that competing interests and threats engender a contagion effect which impedes regional cooperation on Afghanistan.

US: FROM LIMITED (BUT FOCUSED) ENGAGEMENT TO INCOHERENCE

The US intervention in Afghanistan before the invasion of 2001 was determined by Great Power rivalry. Afghanistan, like many other countries and regions of the

world at the time, was a proxy theatre of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet invasion, the United States provided intelligence and material support to the Afghan *mujahideen* resistance forces. This support was indirect and supplied via their South Asian interlocutor, Pakistan.

Following the September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda on American soil, the United States invaded Afghanistan, ostensibly to obliterate Al Qaeda. As such, this was a counter-terror mission. The mission was complicated by the ruling Afghan regime's support and shelter of Al Qaeda operatives. Thus, a counter-terror mission required regime change. The United States put together a coalition of partners towards twin-ends: (a) to oust the ruling Taliban regime that was sheltering Osama bin Laden and his associates, and (b) to hunt down Al Qaeda and degrade their capabilities to launch terror attacks in the United States (or anywhere else for that matter). And so, what should have been a counter-terror mission and mandate, soon turned into a national building enterprise to realize the desired regime change.

There was never a single approach to the war in Afghanistan. In fact, there were multiple different approaches and overlapping priorities, objectives, and strategies. Were the United States in Afghanistan to perform counter-terror? Or was it to build a new nation? Perhaps build the institutions of state. This lack of strategic certainty was responsible for many of the ills of the invasion. In fact, American priorities constantly changed as Washington tried to balance contradictory imperatives (themselves contingent on the domestic political needs of the moment).

The strategic objective between 2001 and 2003 was the defeat of Al Qaeda. Towards this, the United States and its allies adopted the 'light footprint' approach. The idea was advocated by then UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. The strategy and approach involved partnering with Afghan allies who would do the heavy lifting in the war, freeing up US/NATO forces to focus on hunting down Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. Militarily expedient alliances were entered with Afghan warlords and commanders – many of whom had been accused of war crimes dating back to the civil war era. This suggests that the United States was less concerned with building Afghanistan's political and institutional capabilities. This was particularly evident when the United States announced – following their defeat of the Taliban – that the Afghan army would number only 70,000 personnel. A larger force would require money for its upkeep.

The strategic objective between 2003 and 2008 changed. A resurgent Taliban and an increasingly deteriorating security environment forced the United States to rethink their hitherto narrow mission. The United States now believed that they would need to state-build to provide Afghans with the means to maintain their own security (that is, monopolise coercive force), and thereby contribute to the global anti-terror campaign. State-building became more prominent in policy

discussions, but were never adequately defined. In addition to this, while the United States was advocating state-building in Afghanistan – which would require both political and financial capital – they entered a war in Iraq. Vital military resources, equipment, and development funding meant for the Afghan theatre were diverted to the mission in Iraq. Hence, the United States committed itself to reconstructing the country and fostering representative and accountable government (The White House, 2002). Before long, the US government was engaged in helping draft a new constitution.

The United States' revamped Afghan strategy was met with consternation in Afghanistan. The Afghan administration became increasingly critical of the US strategy and approach, on occasion even voicing their opposition. But the United States failed to appreciate their own shortcomings in strategy, or how they were sending mixed signals to their Afghan partners. The administrations appeared to be talking past each other. This culminated in US frustrations against the Karzai administration whom it blamed for the lack of progress in improving state performance and accountability, among others.

Between 2009 and 2011, the Obama administration redefined the war once again, this time as a 'conflict of necessity'. Obama justified continued US presence in Afghanistan as being vital in securing America's national interests: no longer would Afghanistan be neglected or under-resourced. Obama's military advisors advocated an increase in troop numbers, citing the growing insurgency and insecurity. The belief among the senior military leadership echoed counter-insurgency warfare assumptions and doctrine: little could be achieved politically or economically unless the insurgency was defeated first. It was also hypothesized that enhanced security would lead to a politically negotiated settlement and therefore an end to the war. Soon, the US administration authorised the troop surge to arrest the deteriorating security situation, and help build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In addition, the administration would work towards establishing Afghan governance capacity.

The new approach was marked by tensions with the Afghan administration. The Afghan political elite, and particularly President Karzai, disagreed on the goals and pace of externally led state-building. Again, the United States signaled that their Afghan counterparts were not doing enough to check corruption and improve accountability. The Afghans countered, arguing that US military methods and tactics were responsible for the endless insurgency.

Perhaps more crucially, while ordering a troop increase, US President Obama paradoxically pledged to start bringing American forces home. In his December 2009 remarks at West Point Academy, Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In it, he called for unilateral withdrawal of US forces. This, together with the demand for greater accountability and results from Kabul, led to growing suspicion on both sides. Soon after, the administration announced the transition to Afghan responsibility. This transition process was designed to transfer the responsibility of the security of Afghanistan to Afghan forces, but in

so doing, it changed the meaning and focus of the US strategy in Afghanistan, yet again.

PAKISTAN: ALLY OR FOE?

Pakistan has long suffered the spill-over effects of war in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion had forced several *millions* of Afghan refugees into Pakistan; out of an estimated pre-war Afghan population of 13.05 million people, some 6.2 million were to be found in Pakistan on 1 January 1990 (Colville, 1997). This experience empowered Pakistan as a frontline state, since the Afghan *mujahideen* actors to which the United States wished to transfer weapons had bases and supply chains in Pakistan, and recruited from the refugee camps on Pakistani soil. Unfortunately, Pakistan's generosity in this respect also led it to the conviction that it was entitled to determine the character that the post-communist regime in Afghanistan should take. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Kabul, Afghanistan descended into civil war, with various *mujahid* actors seeking to take control of the capital. In this milieu, Pakistan saw occasion to (a) influence the outcome of the civil war, and in the process (b) attain 'strategic depth' vis-à-vis their greatest geopolitical rival, India.

Initially, the United States viewed Pakistan as an indispensable ally for their missions in Afghanistan. Pakistan was used as a transit supply route for both American and ISAF/NATO supplies (in return for which they received generous amounts of military and economic aid). In 2008, 90% of military supplies bound for ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan arrived at the Pakistani port of Karachi, where they were unloaded and transported by truck to Afghanistan. It was reported, these supplies 'mostly non-combat materials, such as food, water, fuel and construction supplies, are delivered by ground, while military weapons and other "sensitive" equipment are flown in by cargo plane' (Carden, 2009). Unsurprisingly, after 2008, supply convoys and depots in northwest Pakistan increasingly came under attack by elements from or sympathetic to the Pakistani Taliban. In early February 2009, Taliban insurgents successfully cut off the Khyber Pass temporarily by blowing up a key bridge. Recognizing the increasingly unstable situation in northwest Pakistan, the United States and NATO actively sought to broaden supply routes, particularly through Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan).

Sanctuaries for the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Pakistan opposed to the government in Kabul were a 'critical enabling factor' (Abbas, 2014: 116). As Bose and Maley point out, it is ahistorical to suggest that Taliban activity resumed in Afghanistan only in response to political and governance failings on the part of the Afghan government. They argue:

The reality is markedly more complex. The first major Taliban attack came on 27 March 2003 when a Red Cross worker was murdered in Kandahar; at this time, confidence in the transition in Afghanistan remained high. Rather, the resumption of Taliban military activities reflected Pakistan's interest in minimizing the expansion of Indian influence on Afghan territory. This led the Pakistan Army Chief reportedly to describe the leader of the terrorist Haqqani network, an Afghan group behind several attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, as a 'strategic asset' for Pakistan; and ultimately prompted the Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, to describe the Haqqani network as a 'veritable arm' of Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI. (Bose and Maley, 2018: 5–6)

Beginning in 2002, the Taliban and Al Qaeda regrouped along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border in the Pakistani provinces of North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Baluchistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These sanctuaries directly enabled the subsequent insurgency that was to consume the region up to the present. Periodically, first in 2002, and then in 2014, the Pakistani military moved into parts of the FATA in search of militant groups. Some observers, however, have dubbed Pakistan's efforts half-hearted since Islamabad has pursued a dual policy towards Afghanistan (Basit, 2016; Bose, 2016). For example, the Musharraf regime declared support for the government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul but retained involvement with the Taliban who were mounting an insurgency against Karzai's government and its international backers. Thus, Pakistan's failure to coordinate with their operations with Afghanistan allowed militants to cross the Afghanistan–Pakistan border at will and continue to use the sanctuaries for cover.

The role of 'spoilers' has been well documented in war-termination literature (Stedman, 2000). Every peace process creates losers along with winners, and spoilers often derail (or resist) cooperative measures and peace. Examining the conflict in Afghanistan, several analysts have focused on Pakistan's role as spoiler – financier and supporter of, even providing sanctuary to, the Taliban – as a deliberate means of keeping Afghanistan weak (Jones, 2007; Jones, 2011; Waldman, 2010; Waldman, 2014). According to one study,

Pakistan has been actively supporting the Taliban insurgency and their local affiliates, such as the Haqqani Network, which has kept the Afghan conflict simmering; sponsored attacks aimed at diplomatic missions in Afghanistan; undermined peace and reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and those Taliban leaders who were willing to negotiate; and hosted Osama bin Laden (knowingly or not) (Motwani and Bose, 2015: 276).

Hence, many have been blunt in their overall assessments, depicting Pakistan as a 'greedy and total spoiler' (*ibid.*) and have noted that Afghanistan has been the target of an externally fueled insurgency orchestrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of the Pakistan Armed Forces (ISI) (Hussain, 2005; Byman, 2005; Gregory, 2007; Rashid, 2008; Waldman, 2010; Gall, 2014).

War-termination and counter-insurgency theories suggest that if you starve the Taliban insurgency of its sources of (external) support then Taliban leaders will be forced to come to the negotiation table without demanding preconditions.

Successful counter-insurgency generally relies on smothering an insurgency within a closed environment. But, and to date, the United States and its Western allies have been unwilling to compel Pakistan, preferring benign capacity-building to coercive diplomacy with Islamabad. Why? Two factors are worth noting here. First, the United States' dependence on Pakistan for the supply of its forces in Afghanistan meant that Afghan Presidents Karzai and Ghani were unable to leverage Pakistan's activities to strengthen their own position. Second, the United States and its Western allies showed little inclination to increase the pressure on Pakistan despite mounting evidence of radicalization in Pakistan. This was exemplified best by the United Kingdom, which preferred law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan following the July 2005 bombings in London. Similarly, in the United States, and following the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, authorities have been reluctant to jeopardise law enforcement relations with their Pakistani counterparts by pressuring Pakistan too much.

Pakistan's motives for supporting the Taliban are complex (Maley, 2012). Under Pakistan's patronage, Afghanistan became a hub for religious and political extremism. Pakistan's policy objective in Afghanistan – a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul which would sway to Pakistan's wishes; the so-called 'creeping invasion' of Afghanistan – was designed to keep the Afghan state necessarily weak. A weak state, it was assumed, governed not by a legitimate sovereign, but rather by warlords and militias, would not be able to challenge and unsettle Pakistan's long-term strategic objectives.

Commenting on Pakistan's role in fueling insecurity and instability within Afghanistan, several Afghan political and security insiders stated that Afghanistan was in a 'state of war with Pakistan'. Other analysts note that Pakistan has fought three undeclared wars with Afghanistan since 1980 (Khattak, 2016). Thus, the same insiders view Pakistani overtures at offering to broker peace with the Taliban with great suspicion.

RUSSIA: LEVERAGING AFGHANISTAN TO BALANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Both Russia's diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan and the strategic thinking by its elites toward the country remain heavily influenced by Moscow's experience during its own intervention, invasion, and occupation of the country in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Soviet Union, like the United States, found itself mired in a lengthy conflict in Afghanistan in the final decade of the Cold War that killed nearly 15,000 Russian personnel. Similarly, Afghan views of Russia remain influenced by the legacy of that occupation that led to between 850,000 and 2,000,000 civilian deaths (Sliwinski, 1989: 39; Khalidi, 1991).

The United States' own intervention in and invasion of Afghanistan beginning in 2001 won Russia's support. Russian President Vladimir Putin was among

the first world leaders to reach out to US President George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks by al-Qaeda attackers on New York City. By September 24 that year, Putin had announced a five-point plan to assist the US war effort in Afghanistan, which included provisions on sharing intelligence with the Americans, making Russian airspace available for humanitarian assistance delivery, and even support to encourage the former Soviet states of Central Asia to enable US access (McFaul, 2001). By the late 2000s, the United States had formalized these supply lines into Afghanistan in the form of the Northern Distribution Network, which was partially designed to help the United States bypass risky supply routes through Pakistan's northwest frontier region. The Northern Distribution Network was formalized between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (Kuchins and Sanderson, 2009).

Since the declaration of the end of US combat operations in Afghanistan in December 2014, the Russian perspective toward the country has been informed by two primary strategic drivers, one informed by the security situation in Afghanistan itself and another by Moscow's geopolitical distancing from the West following the imposition of sanctions by the United States and Europe over its March 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and alleged meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections. First, with the ascent of the Islamic State as a top non-state actor threat in 2014, when the group seized control of Mosul in Iraq, Moscow was concerned about the potential for the group to foment instability within its borders. Since then, the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) has expanded its activities into Afghanistan, where it competes with both the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan government for influence (Giustozzi, 2018).

Meanwhile, Moscow's broader distancing from Washington and Europe precipitated a comprehensive shift in its strategic thinking about the threat environment in Afghanistan. As Kathryn Stoner has catalogued, 'Russian policy in Afghanistan is at a crossroads, with worsening relations with the West looming against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict' (Stoner, 2015). The 2014 withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, which came in the aftermath of the sharp uptick in tensions between Moscow and Washington following the Crimean annexation, was not entirely welcomed by Russia at the time. In many ways, 2014 marked a turning point in how Russia began to think about Afghanistan. Earlier, in 2013, Russia had been vocal about its support for then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai to swiftly conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization respectively; the agreements would govern the continued presence of Western forces in Afghanistan beyond the end of combat operations (Lang, 2014).

Some commentators have thus used the idea of a 'strategic dichotomy' to describe Russian thinking about the United States' ongoing role following the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission in the

country. Russia, on the one hand, recognizes that the United States is a provider of security in Afghanistan and a bulwark in favor of the government in Kabul and against extremist forces, but, on the other hand, Cold War-era strategic thinking continues to persist in Russia, where Afghanistan is seen as a buffer state. This buffer-state thinking renders an ongoing US security role in Afghanistan unacceptable for Russia in the long-term, but the countervailing effect of the United States' role in the country on overall stability has left decisive Russian action on Afghanistan difficult.

Where 2014 marked the onset of Russia more seriously contemplating the problem posed by this 'strategic dichotomy' in Afghanistan, 2016 helped to somewhat resolve its concerns. In 2016, the Obama administration made two important moves that were perceived in Moscow as signs of the US presence in Afghanistan enduring longer than previously envisioned: Obama, responding to the temporary seizure of Kunduz by Taliban forces in late 2015, loosened rules of engagement for US forces in Afghanistan, and slowed down the scheduled withdrawal of US troops (Stewart, 2016). Both moves responded not only to an intensifying Taliban threat, with the group holding more Afghan territory in 2016 than at any time since the US invasion in 2001 (Nordland and Goldstein, 2015; Roggio, 2016; SIGAR, 2016), but also to the looming threat of the Islamic State group.

The clearest articulation of Russian strategic thinking toward Afghanistan's future following US–NATO withdrawal came in the final days of 2016, when Zamir Kabulov, Russian President Vladimir Putin's special envoy to Afghanistan, gave a remarkably candid interview on the subject to Turkey's Anadolu Agency (Kabulov, 2016). Kabulov had been a long-time agent of Russian influence in Afghanistan, having served as a low-ranking diplomat in the Soviet embassy during the occupation in the 1980s before returning later as ambassador (Panda, 2017). In the mid 1990s, Kabulov additionally met Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban's reclusive founder and first *Amir al-Muminin* (commander of the faithful). Kabulov's comments to Anadolu demonstrate the continuing salience of Afghanistan as a buffer state in Russian strategic thought; when asked if he found the ongoing US military presence in Afghanistan disturbing, Kabulov notes:

Of course ... Why in Afghanistan? Where is Afghanistan and where is America!? If we did something like that in Mexico, would it not be disturbing for America? In Cuba, we have already experienced and we know the outcome. I think it is old fashioned (Kabulov, 2016).

Kabulov had additionally been a driver of two important changes in how Moscow viewed the situation in Afghanistan. First, he was a proponent of more normal Russian relations – and even a degree of cooperation – with the Taliban. Second, he had supported a strong Pakistani role in Afghanistan as the United States departed. Both impulses represented a departure from decades of traditional Russian strategic thought toward Afghanistan.

Regarding the first – possible cooperation with the Taliban – Kabulov noted that the Taliban were ‘predominantly a local force’, with the implication being that cooperation with the group would not invite direct blowback on Russian interests elsewhere in the world or within Russian borders. Kabulov additionally pointed to a lack of ideological homogeneity within the Taliban:

...within the Taliban, you can find very influential groups like the Haqqani network whose ideology is more radical, closer to Daesh (*the Islamic State*). They haven’t given up all the ideas, I would say.

There are a lot of reasons for Taliban not to be homogenous. The tribal reason is also important. Different Pashtun tribes, you know in Afghanistan there are up to 200 tribes and clans. All this animosity, rivalry goes back 300 years ago (Kabulov, 2016).

The Russian envoy additionally pointed to the growth in Afghan cultivation of opium during the US–NATO occupation, suggesting that the group simply used the crop as a pragmatic means to an end of financing its insurgency. ‘America is the godfather of drug production in Afghanistan’, Kabulov said, suggesting that, for Russia, the Taliban’s cultivation of opium was a topic for negotiation.

Kabulov’s views toward Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan also highlight an important component of how Russian strategic thinking had shifted toward the region more broadly as it planned to situate itself favorably in Central and South Asia as the United States gradually withdrew from Afghanistan. In 2014, following the events resulting from the invasion of Crimea, Russia lifted its historic embargo on arms exports to Pakistan. This was in part due to Russia’s constant search for additional customers for its arms, but also an observation by Moscow that Pakistan’s unease over the ongoing US–India rapprochement presented a unique opportunity. In October 2016, Russia and Pakistan – once old Cold War foes – held their first-ever military exercise, to Indian consternation. Kabulov had been instrumental in encouraging this strategic convergence between Russia and Pakistan and communicating Russian intent vis-à-vis Pakistan to India (Press Trust of India, 2016). Remarkably, Kabulov emerged as a voice in support of Pakistan at the 2016 Heart of Asia conference in Amritsar, India, where both Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani strongly condemned Pakistan. Kabulov spoke in Islamabad’s support, commending Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani prime minister’s adviser on foreign affairs, for a constructive role (Geo TV, 2016).

The attention ascribed to Kabulov’s views in this analysis may appear disproportionate, but his lengthy experience in the region in service of Russian interests and high-level influence within the Russian foreign policy bureaucracy suggest that he was central to the post-2014 approach pursued by Russia in Afghanistan. In thinking about the legacy of the Afghan war, the Russian state saw an opportunity to cultivate closer communication with the Taliban, and increase cooperation, while still supporting the internationally supported government in Kabul. Above all, Russia’s primary threat in the country was the Islamic State group.

CHINA: AFGHAN POLICY SUBSERVIENT TO 'GRAND STRATEGY'

With the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country's future may well hinge on its maintenance of good and cordial ties with its most proximal superpower, China. In late 2013 – just over a year before US combat operations in Afghanistan would formally end – Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Astana, Kazakhstan, announced the birth of China's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, part of the broader 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) collection of infrastructure and connectivity projects, which also encompassed the Maritime Silk Road. For Xi Jinping, the mythos of the classical Silk Road has become a central component of diplomatic messaging. China–Afghanistan relations, meanwhile, seized on the Silk Road concept decades ago; Shen-yu Dai, a Chinese scholar, writing in 1966, observed that the China–Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression referred to the two countries' shared heritage along the Silk Road. While Afghanistan is a component of OBOR – as it was of the Silk Road of antiquity – China's strategic objectives are precise and limited.

Unlike the Soviet Union and the United States, China's equities in Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s were limited. In 1983, for instance, four years into the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a US Defense Intelligence Estimate observed that 'Afghanistan is of little importance in China's strategic calculus' (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983). Following the Sino–Soviet split, China sided with the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, finding itself sharing strategic objectives with both Pakistan – its ally – and the United States. Thereafter, in the 1990s, Beijing entered a period of 'strategic retreat' from Afghanistan as the Rabbani government crumbled, giving way to the rise of the Taliban (Ehsan, 2013: 239). In 1998, China sent a delegation to Afghanistan to examine the possibility of cooperation.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the Bush administration's subsequent decision to invade Afghanistan, China was supportive. Jiang Zemin, the Chinese president, expressed his condolences, condemned the terror attacks, and pledged to cooperate with the United States on terrorism (Kan, 2004). On September 20, 2001, Beijing pledged its 'unconditional support' in the fight against terrorism after having voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1368, which condemned the September 11 attacks and called on 'all States to work together urgently to bring to justices the perpetrators' (United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1368, 2001). For China, the prospect of US involvement in the war on Afghanistan represented an important opportunity to make progress in opposing separatist groups that, like al-Qaeda, had used Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a safe haven. Weeks later, in November 2001, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a document highlighting 'terrorist activities committed by "Eastern Turkestan" elements in and outside the Chinese territory', with a special emphasis on Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2001). The document alleged that 'Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan have provided the "Eastern Turkistan" terrorist organizations with equipment and financial resources and trained their personnel' (ibid.).

China has, since at least the 1990s but even earlier, been greatly concerned about the threat of separatism, extremism, and terrorism in its restive western province of Xinjiang (in addition to Tibet and Taiwan, which China views as a part of its own territory) (Scobell, 2015: 330). Accordingly, China had struggled to contain discontentment, particularly among the Muslim-majority Uyghurs in Xinjiang. When the United States invaded Afghanistan, where the Uyghur fighters related to various Turkestan-independence groups had found refuge, Beijing saw an opportunity. In 2001, moreover, China founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would come to focus on the 'three evils' of separatism, extremism, and terrorism in its limited counter-terrorism efforts later in the decade (Bhadrakumar, 2006). In Afghanistan, Beijing's concern was primarily with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). In November 2001, China declared that 'Hasan Mahsum, the ETIM ringleader, is hiding in Kabul, Afghanistan and carries an Afghanistan passport issued by the Taliban' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2001). It added:

The armed elements of the ETIM received training in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan's Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Vardak, Kandahar, Heart, Shibarghan and other places. Some of these camps are directly under the control of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban and some are military bases of the 'Uzbek Islamic Movement'. The 'Central Asian Uygur Hezbollah' is said to have a 1000-strong armed force and have training bases in Afghanistan. The 'Uygur National Army' received battle training in July and August 1999 in the Taliban bases in Afghanistan. They practiced conventional weapons with live ammunition and learned the Taliban guerilla warfare tactics and terrorist skills such as assassination, explosion and poison-doping. After their training, the 'Eastern Turkistan' elements have fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, 2001)

Counter-terrorism concerns and the stemming of Uyghur separatist groups remained a core Chinese interest in Afghanistan through the years of the United States–NATO combat mission there, with Beijing interest diversifying seriously into the realm of economic possibility with the 2013 launch of the OBOR initiative. China had already started modest economic interactions with Afghanistan alongside its loan-based aid programs during the US–NATO combat mission, leading some analysts to express concern that China had become a 'free-rider' in Afghanistan, benefitting from the United States' provision of security (Weitz, 2011). While China was supportive of the US combat mission in Afghanistan and the mission against terrorism, it refused to commit its hard power resources to the fight and did not allow the United States to use its territory for logistical or supply-line purposes. The Chinese Foreign Ministry would explain its decisions by pointing to China's long-standing 'ideational emphasis on "Third

World” solidarity and its [Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,]’ which preclude intervention in the affairs of other countries (Bose and Panda, 2016: 393). At the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in January 2002, which focused on assisting the country’s reconstruction, China pledged a modest ‘\$1 million, in addition to humanitarian goods worth \$3.6 million’. Days later, Jiang himself arrived in Afghanistan, where he met with then-interim leader and future President Hamid Karzai, pledging ‘reconstruction aid of \$150 million spread over four to five years’ (Kan, 2004). Between 2001 and 2013, China delivered approximately \$240 million in development assistance. In 2014, China delivered approximately \$80 million, signaling a sharp increase in interest as the United States’ combat mission wound to a close (Huasheng, 2015).

As the United States has decreased its presence in Afghanistan, China has increased its cooperation and coordination with Russia in the country – as well as becoming a more forward participant in the foundering peace process between the Taliban and the Kabul government in general. For instance, China was one of the four countries, in addition to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States, that was part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group process in 2015 and 2016. However, as is the case with Russia, China has grown increasingly concerned about both the Taliban’s rapid territorial gains as well as the rise of the Islamic State group in Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016, fearing a return to the status quo before the US invasion where Uyghur separatist groups found willing allies and supporters in Afghanistan. The Afghan government, for its part, has been keen to reassure China that its territory would be not be used by groups wishing to foment instability in Xinjiang. Zarar Ahmed Moqbel Osmani, Afghanistan’s foreign minister under the Karzai government, for instance, told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was in Afghanistan for a rare visit in 2014, that Afghanistan ‘would never allow the ETIM [East Turkestan Islamic Movement] to take advantage of the Afghan territory to engage in activities endangering China, and will continuously deepen security cooperation with the Chinese side’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2014). To underwrite this claim and demonstrate that it stood between the Karzai and Ghani governments, Afghan authorities arrested 15 Uyghur militants and transferred them to Beijing in March 2015 (Shalizi, 2015). For Afghanistan, satisfying China’s concerns regarding Uyghur militancy is not only a way to ensure that Chinese capital and investment continues to flow into the country, permitting economic growth, but also a mode of satisfying Pakistan’s most important regional patron. As coordination between China and Afghanistan on Turkestan-independence groups deepened in 2014–2016, for example, so did China’s involvement in the broader transnational diplomatic effort to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table with Pakistan’s complicity (Wong and Jolly, 2016). (The mid-2015 effort notably collapsed due to revelations that the Taliban had suppressed news of Mullah Omar’s death for at least two years, plunging the group into a short-term crisis of leadership succession.)

The future of Chinese involvement in Afghanistan, however, will necessarily feature a larger ambit than the counter-terrorism concerns that loomed large during the 2000s and the first half of the 2010s. The confluence of OBOR along with the United States' withdrawal strongly suggests that China will look to increase its involvement in Afghanistan economically – this is additionally concordant with China's expanding stakes in the Central Asian states. Before OBOR was unveiled, the ideas underpinning China's ongoing expansion of influence westward were perhaps best articulated by prominent Chinese scholar Wang Jisi. Wang described China's approach to Central Asia as primarily being driven by an impulse to 'hedge' against an unfavorable turn of events along its maritime Asian frontier, which is flush with US allies, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines (and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations states), and even India. All these countries enjoy significantly closer strategic – if not economic – ties with the United States, and Chinese military strategic thinking has long been obsessed with the maritime barrier of the so-called 'first island chain', which limits Chinese access to the expanses of the Western Pacific. Wang, thus, described China's 'March West', which would later be refined by Xi Jinping and the Chinese government as the Silk Road Economic Belt component of OBOR. As we have previously described:

By marching west, Beijing intends to integrate the Central Asian heartland up to the Caspian Sea with China – thereby limiting the influence of external powers around China's periphery. As the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan, China is promoting the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative which seeks to revive the historic trade route that integrated the Chinese heartland with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. For Beijing, Central Asian states, including Afghanistan, are slated to play an important role in realizing this vision. (Bose and Panda, 2016: 392–3)

China's westward focus may appear prescient in this regard, especially as the presidency of Donald J. Trump in the United States has presented a threat to good United States–China ties (especially in trade) (Autry, 2018; Dollar et al., 2019), increasing the possibility of both a hot and cold conflict in East Asia.

Within Afghanistan, China continues to expand and diversify its economic stakes, suggesting that its long-term interests in the country's stability will only crystallize further, prompting Beijing to at least seriously consider the possibility of having to rein in Pakistan's historically destabilizing military-intelligence complex and its ambitions to foment instability in Kabul. Chinese economic interests in Afghanistan range from physical resource extraction, such as in the case of the Mes Aynak site, which sits on Afghanistan's largest copper deposit in Logar Province – proximal to areas that have seen high levels of Islamic State activity – to broader investment in local infrastructure, such as a railway project traversing the Wakhan corridor, connecting China to Afghanistan. Chinese analysts have been quick to highlight that despite Afghanistan's part in OBOR and the Silk Road Economic Belt, the country is not yet a central node, owing to

ongoing security risks. Still, there is support for China to centralize Afghanistan within its OBOR plans. Gao Fei and Xiao Yu, two China-based scholars, noted in 2014, for example, that the conclusion of the Wakhan railway would give China ‘the largest direct economic stake in Afghanistan of any country’. Thus, for China, as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the twin pillars of security and economics will drive engagement, but the prioritization will necessarily be security first, then economic engagement. To this end, Beijing will remain concerned at the rapid loss of territory by the Afghan government to the Taliban and the growing presence of the Islamic State group.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the foreign policy motives and strategies of critical nations and administrations towards Afghanistan. Critical of the legacy of foreign intervention, the review highlights the detrimental consequences of foreign strategy and interference. It suggests that despite several attempts at international and regional solutions to the decades-long wars, the inherent complexity and divergence in motivations and behavior makes a pathway toward conflict resolution difficult to envision and implement.

The review suggests that incongruity between external motives and strategies make conflict resolution difficult. Moreover, the individual external actor sometimes may not have a coherent strategy either, the US intervention being an illustrative example. With the United States and international forces likely to either withdraw fully or drastically reduce their presence in Afghanistan beginning in 2020, the country’s prospects for longer-term stability will suffer from competing regional power interests. Even as China, the regional power with the greatest resources in Afghanistan’s immediate region, continues to take an interest in Afghan affairs, it will not take unnecessary risks. Similarly, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Iran – each with their own interests in Afghanistan – will pursue varied ends. Of these actors, only India has a sustained interest in robust and stable Afghan institutions, but New Delhi too might find political stability its top priority in the country.

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PART IV

Domestic Politics



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The Influence of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Asia: The Case of Japan

Paul Midford

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines how and to what extent public opinion influences foreign policy in the democratic nations of Asia, with Japan considered as a case study. It applies two leading approaches to the study of public opinion and its influence on policy: the elitist and pluralist approaches. The elitist school views public opinion as ignorant, incoherent, moody, and unstable, but ultimately moldable by elites and ignorable. The pluralist approach by contrast argues that public opinion is wiser than the sum of individual opinions, coherent, stable, not easily moldable, nor ignorable by elected politicians, except at their peril. This chapter analyzes the attitudes that underpin Japanese public opinion toward security issues and considers whether and how public opinion has influenced Japanese security policy since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was voted out of office by voters for the first time in 2009.¹

This chapter focuses on public opinion toward the dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for non-combat versus combat operations, the debate about recognizing the country's right to exercise 'collective self-defense', and revising the war-renouncing Article 9 of Japan's constitution. It finds that the pluralist model offers a better explanation of Japanese public opinion and its impact on policy, and that the public has a strong and enduring influence on the making of Japan's foreign policy. This finding may have lessons for foreign policy making of other Asian democracies. This chapter is especially timely as the visibly hawkish Abe administration has found itself confronting public opinion opposed to policies that might involve the SDF in overseas combat. It assesses the extent to which the public or the Abe administration are influencing policy on overseas dispatches and possible combat by the SDF.

Finally, this chapter argues² that Japanese public opinion toward military security is determined by what can be described as attitudinal defensive realism. Never pacifist, the Japanese public has always seen military power as having utility for defending national territory. However, it is skeptical about the utility of military power for pursuing foreign policy objectives, including promoting democracy and respect for human rights, suppressing international terrorism and WMD proliferation. The public's attitudinal defensive realism thus places constraints on the ability of elites to use the SDF beyond Japan's shores, especially as geography and the connection to defending national territory grows distant. These limits were tested during the Koizumi administration and the first Abe administration, with the result that Japan pulled back from overseas SDF deployments in support of US military operations, most notably those related to the war on terrorism. Moreover, the confrontation between hawkish elites and the defensive realism of the public contributed to the LDP's historical loss of power, first in the 2007 upper house election, and ultimately in the election for the more powerful lower house in August 2009.

ELITIST AND PLURALIST APPROACHES TO PUBLIC OPINION

The study of public opinion can be largely divided into two schools: the elitists and the pluralists. Elitists argue that public opinion is often unstable, uninformed, moody and even incoherent.³ Public opinion, according to the well-known findings of Philip E. Converse, consists of 'non-attitudes' (Converse, 1970, 1964). Public opinion is a factor, which if allowed to be influential, threatens the rational, consistent and coherent foreign policy of any democracy. The good news for elitists, however, is that public opinion is also malleable and able to be manipulated to such an extent that it usually does not threaten to become influential.⁴

Pluralists, on the other hand, view public opinion as stable and composed of rational and coherent attitudes.⁵ 'The Rational Public', according to Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, because it is a collective phenomenon of large numbers, possesses certain 'emergent properties' that imparts it with something approaching 'wisdom' (Page and Shapiro, 1992). In other words, according to the pluralists, public opinion is more than the sum of its parts. In accessing policies or reacting to events, individuals sometimes make random errors, deviating from their true long-term opinions (or occasionally misunderstanding a poll question). However, at the level of collective opinion these random errors usually cancel each other out, meaning that collective opinions end up having greater coherence and stability, if not wisdom, than opinions measured at the level of the individual.

In the 20th-century American study of public opinion, the elitist view dominated from at least the time that Walter Lippmann's landmark works, *Public Opinion* and *The Phantom Public*, were published in the mid 1920s (Lippmann, 1922, 1925) until the second half of the 1960s. The Vietnam War encouraged

the rise of the pluralist school, as researchers found that collective mass opinion toward the war ended up being more coherent and rational than elite opinion (Jentleson, 1992).⁶

Not surprisingly, this debate between elitists and pluralists has played out not only in the United States and Europe, but in Japan as well. Miyatake Michiko describes in detail the origins and recent applications of the concept of public opinion in Japan, the various Japanese terms used to describe it – *seiron*, *seron*, and *yoron* – and the respective *kanji*, or Chinese characters used when writing these terms (Miyatake, 2003). Miyatake traces the idea back as far as the 1400s, but observes that the expression ‘public opinion’ only became widely used in a political context at the end of the Edo era and early years of the Meiji era (Miyatake, 2003: 59). There was wide variance, however, in how the term public opinion was used. One view saw public opinion, however irrational it might be at times, as legitimizing political decisions, while the other major view saw public opinion as a community’s aggregation of feelings at any one time. Those holding the former perspective generally used the *kanji* that implied the elitist view and used the term ‘yoron’, while the latter, proto-pluralist school used a different *kanji* and read it as ‘seiron’ or ‘seron’. In the post-war reforms of Japanese language and *kanji* usage, the two sets of *kanji* have been dropped in favor of one. Today, ‘yoron’ is the most common reading of the concept, but ‘seron’ is also still heard. In either case, usually the difference in reading is done without any awareness of the origins of its use (Miyatake, 2003: 70).

Irrespective of the term used, in Japan the elitist view has generally dominated, even in western studies of Japanese politics (Hellmann, 1969; Johnson, 1995; Hook, 1996; Garon, 1997). When a foreign observer, for example, proposes that political parties can and should follow public opinion, it is not uncommon to hear political elites dismiss such a notion as ‘mobocracy’, or *shugu seiji*.⁷ Nonetheless, the elitist view has been challenged by scholars with a more pluralist orientation,⁸ even in the field of foreign policy (Midford, 2011).

When and how does measurable public opinion affect policy outcomes, and when does measurable opinion not matter as much? Public opinion will tend to influence policy outcomes in democracies generally, and in the Japanese democratic context in particular, when there are large and stable opinion majorities; in the presence of political competition among parties or party factions; when there is united opposition in the Diet; when the next election is close; when there are recent examples of retrospective voting by the public; where there are divisions in the ruling side and concerns about whether supporting an unpopular measure will harm other policy priorities; when a new policy is proposed or an old one has perceptible costs, and when consensus norms are present.

Another constraint on ruling parties is what Miroslav Nincic calls the politics of opposites. Nincic identified this phenomenon in US public opinion regarding policy toward the Soviet Union. Nincic (1988: 452) observed that ‘while the public typically desires a combination of tough and conciliatory policies, it also

tends to express, at any given moment, particular concern about whichever of the two it feels is most slighted' in policy. In Japanese foreign policy this ambivalence on the part of the public has expressed itself in faulting the left-of-center Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for antagonizing the United States and being weak on defense, but failing to object, and often even notice, when the DPJ adopted policies that reinforced the alliance or moved in a hawkish direction, even when these policies were not popular. On the other hand, the LDP has often been blamed for being too hawkish, too dependent on the United States and too antagonistic toward Japan's Asian neighbors. However, the LDP has had one advantage the DPJ lacked: a smaller coalition partner with an opposite foreign policy orientation. The LDP's long-term coalition partner, Komeito, can help the LDP mitigate its politics of opposites problem by, in perception, and often in policy reality as well, counter-balancing the LDP's hawkish tendencies (Metraux, 2007; Akimoto, 2014).

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY DURING DPJ RULE

The LDP administration of Koizumi Jun'ichirō began dispatching the SDF overseas for the first time to support US military operations, albeit in a non-combat capacity. Although the MSDF/ASDF deployments just after the 9-11 terrorist attacks initially enjoyed some public support (Midford, 2008), this support waned and turned into opposition when the Koizumi administration tried to dispatch the SDF to Iraq (Midford, 2011). This Iraq deployment proved to be unpopular and cost the LDP significantly during the 2004 upper house election, to the benefit of the main opposition party, the DPJ. Although Koizumi withdrew the GSDF from Iraq in summer 2006, the continuation of an ASDF transportation mission there, and the, by then unpopular, MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean weighed down the popularity of the Abe Shinzō administration that succeeded Koizumi. These deployments, plus Abe's call for further such deployments and his push for constitutional reform, especially of the war renouncing Article 9, cost Abe and the LDP dearly at the polls during the 2007 upper house election, as the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, lost their majority in the upper house (their losses in the 2004 upper house election over the Iraq deployment also contributed to this outcome). This loss in turn paved the way for the LDP to be voted out of power for the first time ever in the August 2009 lower house election (Midford, 2011: chpt 9).

The DPJ competed for power in August 2009 by pledging several significant changes in Japanese foreign policy. First, the DPJ promised to end overseas SDF deployments in support of US military operations, most notably the refueling of US and allied naval vessels in the Indian Ocean in connection with continuing counter-terrorism combat operations in Afghanistan that had been ongoing, except for a brief interruption in late 2007 that the DPJ had engineered after it gained effective control of the upper house in July 2007.

Second, although it was not explicitly promised in the DPJ's 2009 lower house election manifesto, DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio personally promised to move the US Marine Corp airbase located in a crowded urban area of Futenma out of Okinawa, thereby effectively scrapping a 2006 agreement between the United States and Japan to relocate this base to the less populated area of Nago in Okinawa. Hatoyama's pledge at least followed the spirit of the DPJ Manifesto's promise to build a more 'equal' alliance.⁹ Moreover, the Manifesto self-confidently called for determining 'the assignment of functions and roles between Japan and the United States' based on Japan's 'autonomous foreign policy strategy' (Democratic Party of Japan, 2009: 29).

Overall, the DPJ's policy positions, including those of Prime Minister Hatoyama were well supported by the public, even his stand on the controversial Futenma base. Nonetheless, the DPJ, and especially Hatoyama, were criticized for poor alliance management and even antagonizing the United States over this issue. Indeed, after several months of tensions with the United States over moving the Futenma base out of Japan, Hatoyama gave up on this plan and had to resign as a result, thereby strengthening public concern about DPJ competence in foreign policy and dismay over the failure to implement a popular campaign promise (Midford, 2013). Hatoyama's successor, Kan Naoto, succeeded in improving Japanese-US relations and strengthening the bilateral alliance, but was not so successful in recovering the DPJ's domestic image regarding foreign policy.

A turning point came in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing boat precipitated a crisis in Sino-Japanese relations that was to have profound consequences for the Kan administration and DPJ rule. On September 7 this boat allegedly rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels that were attempting make the Chinese boat leave Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku (in Chinese Diaoyu) islands, causing minor damage to each. In response the Japanese Coast Guard vessels seized the Chinese boat, and arrested the captain on suspicion of obstructing the official duties of government personnel, a crime carrying a maximum sentence of up to three years in jail. On September 10 an Okinawan court granted Ishigaki island prosecutors' request to extend the captain's detention for 10 days to prepare for possibly filing criminal charges. From there the issue quickly escalated into a bilateral confrontation, with China demanding that the ship's captain be released. China rejected Japan's jurisdiction to indict the captain, citing their own territorial claims to the Senkaku islands, started canceling bilateral meetings, and began deploying fisheries protection vessels near the islands, although outside of Senkaku territorial waters. China appeared to fear that putting the captain on trial would further demonstrate Japan's effective control over the Senkaku islands, thereby weakening Beijing's claim to the islands under international law (Ito, 2010; *Japan Times*, 2010; Kyodo, 2010; Bader, 2012: 106; Kitazawa, 2012: 160).

On September 19 the captain's detention was approved for another 10 days and it appeared that prosecutors were preparing to file charges. Almost immediately after the extended detention was announced, China was reported to have halted rare-earth shipments on which Japanese companies depend for a variety

of high-tech manufacturers. Coincidentally or not, four Japanese were arrested in China for videotaping inside a restricted military zone. On September 25 the prosecutor's office in Ishigaki, citing 'the effects on the people of Japan and the future of Japan–China relations', announced the release of the ship's captain without any charges being filed (Asahi.com, 2010a, 2010b).

The reaction from opposition parties was vociferous, with the Kan administration standing accused of pressuring prosecutors to release the ship's captain. In response to Kan's claim that 'the decision was made by the prosecutor's office' (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2010), Onodera Itsunori of the LDP claimed that the captain's release was 'our nation's biggest foreign policy blunder since the end of World War II' (Asahi.com, 2010a; Martin and Ito, 2010). Meanwhile *Yomiuri* cited a senior disgruntled DPJ member as insisting that neither Kan nor his ministers 'knows anything about diplomacy. They just released the skipper in a flutter after being intimidated by China. China will probably continue to make unreasonable demands on Japan...[because].. of this country's lack of mettle' (*Daily Yomiuri*, 2010).

The public was more convinced by the arguments of DPJ critics than by the claims made by the Kan cabinet. A *Yomiuri* poll conducted shortly after the captain's release found that 72% believed the release to have been 'inappropriate', versus only 19% who thought it 'appropriate'. In a follow-up question for those answering 'inappropriate', 41% said the release created the image that Japan could be intimidated, while 30% cited the severity of the incident and 14% cited the concern that the release would strengthen China's territorial claims. While 83% of all respondents were unconvinced by Kan's explanation that the decision to release the captain had been made by prosecutors, 11% were convinced. Finally, 71% answered that in order to respond to the Senkaku issue Japan needed to strengthen its alliance with the United States, versus 19% who disagreed (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2010).

Similarly, as indicated in Figure 19.1, when asked in a Nippon TV poll how the Kan cabinet should respond to the situation surrounding the Senkaku islands,¹⁰ over 40% supported involving the SDF either through MSDF destroyer patrols (24.4%) or by stationing GSDF personnel on the islands (17.8%), with 30.7% supporting strengthened Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrols. Thus, over 70% supported a physically coercive military or para-military response to China in order to defend Japan's control over the islands. By contrast, only 1.2% supported talking with China about the Senkaku islands, a figure likely within the poll's margin of error.

Kan's successor as Prime Minister, Noda Yoshihiko, tried to overcome the DPJ's reputation for having a 'weak' foreign policy, and continued the hawkish trend in foreign and security policies begun under Kan. In late December 2011 Noda accomplished something that had eluded many previous LDP governments: he relaxed the three principles on the non-export of weapons. Nonetheless, this policy innovation went largely unnoticed in Japanese politics: it did not produce




Figure 19.1 NTV poll on Senkaku policy

Source: NTV (2010).

much backlash, but Noda did not receive much credit for this decision either. In a December 2011 *Asahi Shimbun* poll, 66% of respondents strongly (18%) or somewhat (48%) preferred the LDP's foreign and security policies, versus only 20% who somewhat (17%) or strongly (3%) preferred the DPJ's policies in this area (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2011).

A new Senkaku crisis precipitated by another opposition party would again raise the salience of questions about the competence of the DPJ's foreign and defense policies. In April 2012 nationalist Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō provoked this new crisis, by proposing that the Tokyo prefectural government buy the remaining privately held land on these islands from their Japanese owner and develop this real estate. Ishihara justified this initiative by claiming that the DPJ was not doing enough to ensure effective Japanese control. Ishihara's proposal promised to overturn the status quo of Japanese control coupled with non-occupation of the Senkaku islands, a change that would be exceptionally provocative for China. The Noda cabinet responded by announcing that it was considering purchasing the islands instead. A May NTV poll found that 65% of respondents thought the central government should purchase the islands, versus 17% who thought Tokyo or the city of Ishigaki (the islands are included within its city limits) should buy the islands, and 9% who wanted to maintain the status quo (NTV, 2012a).

In July the Noda cabinet decided to buy the islands. In another NTV poll, 62% of respondents supported this decision, versus nearly 22% who did not (NTV, 2012b). Although the Noda cabinet's decision was well supported by the public, it provoked China, which saw the purchase as another attempt by Japan to overturn the status quo by exercising effective control over the islands. In early September China took the unprecedented step of sending six maritime

patrol vessels beyond the contiguous waters around the island and into the territorial waters of the Senkaku islands, a move Beijing justified by repeating its claim of 'China's jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islets'. After a confrontation with the Japanese Coast Guard lasting several hours the Chinese ships departed (Harlan, 2012; Kyodo, 2012). The next day the largest anti-Japanese protests since bilateral relations were normalized swept through 50 cities in China. For the first time Japanese-owned factories were attacked and damaged (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2012a).

Following these events, *Asahi Shimbun* asked about the Noda cabinet's decision to nationalize the Senkaku islands; 57% approved and 27% disapproved in a poll conducted in early October. In mid October a subsequent *Asahi* poll found almost the same result, with 57% approving and even fewer, 23%, disapproving of the purchase. The same mid-October poll asked whether Japan should pursue a hard-line or flexible policy toward China regarding the Senkaku islands. In response, 50% favored a hard-line policy, versus 39% who favored a flexible policy. Yet, 81% of respondents judged that an overall worsening of Sino-Japanese relations would be a big or somewhat big problem, versus only 15% who judged this would pose little or no problem (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2012b). Clearly, the public was ambivalent about China; there was a strong determination to defend Japan's territorial integrity, combined with a sober realization that worsening relations would be costly. An NTV poll taken the same month showed a majority of respondents favoring a tough line in overall relations, with 59% so choosing, versus 35% who would prefer to improve relations instead (NTV, 2012c).

Although the Noda administration's nationalization decision was well supported by the public, and although governor Ishihara did face some backlash for having done real damage to Japan's national interests through his stunt (Sentaku, 2012), the growing public demand for a hard-line stance toward China again highlighted a major perceived weakness in DPJ rule. Noda received little credit for nationalizing the islands, nor his attempt to strengthen the US-Japan alliance by permitting the stationing of Osprey tilt-rotor planes in Okinawa.¹¹ Instead, the public appeared to be more receptive to the hawkish critique of DPJ weakness regarding the Senkaku issue put forward by Okazaki Hisahiko:

If the Japanese government had promptly carried out measures to strengthen effective control of the Senkakus [following the 2010 confrontation], including the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces, and if it had approved the use of the right to collective self-defense and pursued the path of strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, the Senkaku Islands dispute may have been today a matter of the past. (Okazaki, 2012)

The DPJ's stance on territorial defense was thus seen as weak, with most of the public wanting a stronger stance toward China over the Senkaku Islands dispute. Perceived DPJ weakness in foreign policy contributed significantly to its electoral defeat in the December 2012 lower house election, a defeat that brought the LDP and former Prime Minister Abe roaring back into power (Midford, 2013).

DOES PUBLIC OPINION MATTER UNDER THE ABE ADMINISTRATION?

Looking at Japan's post-2012 political landscape it is easy to make the argument that public opinion, especially regarding foreign policy and security, has not mattered since the LDP returned to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe. Do the string of LDP-led coalition election victories mean that public opinion is no longer a constraint on the Abe administration's security policy? Unlike the situation just after the turn of the century, when, despite Koizumi's popularity, the LDP faced increasing competition from a rising DPJ, following its crushing defeat in the 2012 lower house election the DPJ (renamed the Democratic Party or DP in spring 2016)¹² was slow to recover. Consequently, political competition can be said to have been weak, which would seem to imply that the ruling coalition could by and large ignore public opinion and do as it pleases. Indications of a divided opposition reinforce this conclusion.

Nonetheless, the rest of this chapter argues that public opinion remains a major, indeed perhaps the major, constraint on the hawkish policies of the Abe administration, especially those related to overseas SDF combat deployments. The public's defensive realist attitudes proved to be the key constraint, strongly opposing any move to involve the SDF in overseas combat even while simultaneously endorsing efforts to strengthen Japan's territorial defense.

The Abe administration had the greatest opportunity to entirely overturn the ban on the SDF engaging in overseas combat just after returning to power in late 2012, and especially after the July 2013 upper house election. The public, reacting against what was perceived as having been a weak DPJ foreign policy, was more supportive of hawkish policies (Midford, 2013: 179–95). Since then, the politics of opposites has meant that Abe's more aggressive policies that are not clearly connected to the defense of Japanese territory have provoked growing public opposition.

However, during 2013–4 opposition parties were divided, which potentially endangered Komeito's ability to play its traditional role as a brake, especially in the upper house where the LDP lacked a majority, on LDP security policies, particularly overseas deployments. Abe potentially had the option of ignoring or even dumping Komeito and making a coalition with hawkish opposition parties, most notably the Japan Renaissance Party (Ishintō, JRP) and the Party for Future Generations (Jiseidai no tou), thereby retaining effective control of the upper house and two-thirds of the lower house. Nonetheless, Komeito, backed by public support for its moderate security policies, was able to act as a brake on Abe's ambitions to expand SDF operations overseas to include combat. The tug-of-war between the two parties began in spring 2014, more than nine months after the 2013 upper house election; they began negotiations over Abe's proposal to reinterpret the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, or the right

to use military force to defend allied nations who come under attack. Komeito's opposition to a broad interpretation that would have effectively removed restrictions to using force overseas in support of nations with a 'close connection' with Japan was greatly strengthened by public opposition to overseas combat.

PUBLIC OPINION AND EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Did the public oppose Abe's push to reinterpret the constitution to recognize the right to collective self-defense in general, and SDF participation in overseas combat in particular? Some argue that Japanese public opinion is actually hawkish on defense issues (Catalinac, 2016). Yet, polling data suggest that the public strongly opposed constitutional reinterpretation allowing the SDF to engage in overseas combat, which is the core implication of allowing Japan to exercise the 'right of collective self-defense'. According to an NHK poll conducted a few weeks after the Abe administration decided to change the government's long-standing interpretation of the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense, only 10.6% of respondents thought that using force overseas in cooperation with the United States and other friendly militaries should be an SDF role, which is precisely what recognizing the right to collective self-defense would authorize. By contrast, nearly 58.6% of respondents saw SDF participation in overseas 'international cooperation' without the use of arms as a role the SDF should have, an endorsement of continued SDF involvement in non-combat operations related to UN peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian disaster relief operations (NHK, 2014).

The same poll found that only 37.6% of respondents approved of the Abe cabinet's reinterpretation, versus 54% who opposed, and 8.4% who answered, 'don't know'. Moreover, the balance of opinion intensity was clearly on the side of the opponents, as only 9.2% of respondents to this question 'strongly approved' the reinterpretation, whereas 23.3% 'strongly disapproved'. At the same time, in answer to another question about whether exercising the right of collective self-defense would increase the danger of Japan being entrapped in a war, 43.7% answered that this would increase the danger, versus 11% who answered that it would reduce the danger, and 36.6% who answered that the danger of entrapment would not change (NHK, 2014).

While the results for both poll questions show strong opposition to the Abe cabinet's constitutional reinterpretation, and while a large plurality saw exercising the right of collective self-defense as significantly increasing the risk of war, there also is a large gap between the percentage of those approving of Abe's constitutional reinterpretation and the percentage willing to see the SDF engage in combat overseas. The reason for this gap is that the Abe administration tried to build public support by tying collective self-defense as much as possible with

territorial defense, for which there has consistently been overwhelming public support, and to avoid as much as possible discussion of overseas combat for the SDF, for which there has been overwhelming opposition. The gap between those supporting reinterpretation and those supporting SDF combat overseas shows the partial success of these efforts to fuzz, if not obscure, the core meaning of collective self-defense. This also implies that perhaps more than two-thirds of those approving of Abe's constitutional reinterpretation would oppose actual SDF participation in future overseas combat.

Given the attempts by the Abe administration to include within the concept of collective self-defense much more popular elements that were in fact more closely related to the right to individual self-defense, such as missile defense and the defense of Japan's outlying islands, one must interpret with caution the results of polling questions asking about support for exercising the right of collective self-defense. Especially deserving of caution is a *Yomiuri* poll conducted while the debate about reinterpretation was raging. The poll question, after defining the right of collective self-defense as the right to counter-attack in case a nation with 'close ties' to Japan comes under attack, and noting that the Japanese government had so far not recognized this right as constitutional, gave respondents three options: exercise the right of collective self-defense 'without limitation'; 'exercise as little as possible'; and 'there is no need to use this right at all'. The results of this question, which was asked on three separate dates, appear in Figure 19.2 below.

Although widely cited as supposedly showing public support for exercising the right of collective self-defense, in fact this polling question was methodologically flawed. Instead of giving respondents an equal number of yes and no




Figure 19.2 *Yomiuri Shimbun*: about the right to collective self-defense

Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun* (various dates).

options, it gave two yes answers and only one no answer, thereby biasing the results toward yes. Moreover, one yes answer, namely ‘should use as little as possible’, was worded in such a way as to appear to be a neutral or ‘in the middle answer’, an answer choice that tends to attract respondents, especially in Japan, independently of the contents of the question. In this case the ‘as little as possible’ answer option was designed, perhaps intentionally, to attract respondents who in fact oppose exercising the right to collective self-defense. Consequently, this polling question drastically exaggerated support. Given *Yomiuri*’s editorial support for Japan’s exercising the right of collective self-defense, the bias in this poll question is perhaps not surprising.

Yomiuri’s bias becomes evident when we look at an *Asahi Shimbun* question that had similar wording and was asked several times during the same period. The question asked:

The right to collective self-defense is the right to regard an attack on the United States or another country Japan has a close relationship with as an attack on Japan even though Japan itself has not been attacked, and to fight alongside that country. The government has thus far interpreted the constitution as not allowing for the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Do you support being able to exercise the right to collective self-defense? (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2014, 2013–2015)

This question gave only one support and one oppose option. The results can be seen in Figure 19.3. Although editorially *Asahi* tended to oppose exercising the right of collective self-defense, its polling question was more neutrally worded and, unlike the *Yomiuri* question, methodologically valid




Figure 19.3 *Asahi Shimbun*: do you support exercising the right of collective self-defense?

Source: *Asahi Shimbun* (various dates).

As Figure 19.3 demonstrates, opposition to exercising the right of collective self-defense, no matter how the definition was watered down with elements of popular territorial defense, never fell below 50% in this polling question, while support never exceeded 35%. This, along with the results of the NHK poll, are clear evidence that the *Yomiuri* poll cited above drastically exaggerated support for collective self-defense.

Even more striking is that another question asked by *Yomiuri* that included one support and one oppose answer choice, like the *Asahi* question, produced results that were closer to those of the *Asahi* and NHK polls than *Yomiuri*'s own two-to-one answer choice question depicted in Figure 19.2. This *Yomiuri* question asked:

The Japanese government has reinterpreted the constitution to allow for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense to the smallest extent necessary when the rights of citizens face a clear danger. Do you positively evaluate the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense, or do you negatively evaluate it? (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2014)

The results are depicted in Figure 19.4 below, and show a reasonably close parallel with the *Asahi* results depicted in Figure 19.3.

Finally, the process of reinterpretation itself, versus a proper revision of the constitution, proved to be very problematic for the public. Nearly two-thirds of respondents opposed asserting this right through constitutional reinterpretation instead of by amendment (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2013, 2014).

The overall consequence was a very narrow cabinet resolution that only conditionally expanded the constitutionally permissible operations the SDF could engage in overseas. This reinterpretation even avoided recognizing the right of




Figure 19.4 *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s binary polling question on collective self-defense

Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun* (various dates).

collective self-defense per se, and instead stated that defending other countries with ‘close connections’ to Japan was permissible when those countries came under attack, and that attack posed a clear threat to the continued existence of Japan, the survival and liberty of the Japanese public (Naikaku-fu, 2014). This appeared to be more an expansion of the right of individual (*kobetsu jieiken*) or national defense than an assertion of the right of collective self-defense. Moreover, the large condition placed on defending a country with a close connection, namely that Japan’s survival be at stake, meant that short of a great-power war this right would be practically impossible to invoke. Indeed, what started out in early 2014 as an attempt to reclaim the right to collective self-defense increasingly narrowed to a focus on territorial defense, missile defense, and the right to defend US warships in waters near Japan.

FROM CONSTITUTIONAL REINTERPRETATION TO SECURITY LEGISLATION

Responding to this public opinion environment, Abe avoided controversial overseas deployments of the SDF in support of US overseas military operations, like those pursued a decade earlier by Prime Minister Koizumi, a trend that is contributing to the ‘de-globalization’ of the Japan–US alliance¹³ and a return to its Cold War roots of focusing on the defense of Japanese territory. Although the LDP, as an opposition party, introduced legislation in 2010 to continue the MSDF refueling operation in support of US and allied forces engaged in combat in Afghanistan in the wake of Hatoyama’s decision to end that mission, once back in power Abe quietly let the issue drop. This behavior suggests that the Abe administration sees public opposition as constraining its policies that could involve overseas SDF deployments to support US military operations beyond East Asia.

Another indication of the LDP’s worry about public backlash over its security policies is its use of ‘demobilization tactics’ in an attempt to head off retrospective voting, especially from the July 2014 reinterpretation to the December 2014 lower house election, during which time Abe and the LDP essentially dropped the whole issue and concentrated on economic issues. Demobilization tactics can be defined as measures designed to prevent an opinion majority from consolidating and engaging in retrospective voting in reaction to policies they oppose by reducing the salience of those policies. This often means delaying controversial policies before pending elections, especially those that might impose visible costs. The delayed introduction and debate over security legislation that would, under the new constitutional interpretation legalize the right of collective self-defense and authorize SDF combat operations overseas, succeeded in forestalling the mobilization of many opposition voters in the December 2014 lower house election and kept the voting participation rate down. Strikingly, during the December 2014 election LDP spokesmen even denied that the right of collective self-defense had anything to

do with the SDF engaging overseas combat.¹⁴ The LDP election manifesto, following the wording of the reinterpretation itself, avoided using the term ‘right of collective self-defense’ (Jimintō, 2014).

Although the 2014 lower house election again gave the LDP a large majority, and together with its coalition partner Komeito, a two-thirds majority in the lower house, this election actually reduced Abe’s political leverage for enacting sweeping security legislation. This is because the pre-election option of going around Komeito’s opposition by cooperating with hawkish opposition parties was no longer possible as these parties had been essentially wiped out, and the other opposition parties converged around a position of opposing the LDP’s plans to enact laws allowing for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Moreover, the fact that voters strengthened Komeito while weakening the LDP, albeit only slightly, enhanced Komeito’s credibility in threatening to veto security policies that defied public opposition to overseas combat. In 2015 Komeito leveraged its position to greatly water-down the ‘security legislation’ it devised together with the LDP to limit the cases in which force could be employed overseas.

Nevertheless, the legislation that the coalition partners agreed upon was consistently (with one exception, as depicted below) opposed by pluralities or majorities of respondents. Moreover, the debate caused the opposing plurality/majority to grow over time.

This result can be seen in Figure 19.5, which depicts the results from the *Asahi* question, and Figure 19.6, which shows the results from the *Yomiuri* question. Strikingly, the *Yomiuri* question showed greater movement against the security legislation over time than did the *Asahi* poll. Even aspects of the broad security




Figure 19.5 *Asahi Shimbun*: do you support the security legislation?

Source: *Asahi Shimbun* (various dates).




Figure 19.6 *Yomiuri Shimbun*: do you support the security legislation?

Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun* (various dates).

bill that were only tied to supporting foreign militaries engaged in combat overseas were unable to garner public support. For example, an *Asahi* question from a March 2015 poll asked respondents whether they approved of ‘relaxing restrictions on overseas deployments of the SDF, so that it is easier to provide rear-area support for the US and other countries’ militaries, and expand SDF operations?’ In response, only 33% supported, while 52% opposed (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2015a).

The LDP and Komeito were nonetheless able to ram the watered-down security legislation through the Diet in September 2015. However, the emergence of majority opposition to the legislation by the end of the debate, a majority that backed Komeito’s very cautious stance toward SDF participation in overseas combat, makes it difficult moving forward for the Abe administration to exercise the right of collective self-defense in practice. Indeed, what started out in early 2014 as an attempt to reclaim the right to collective self-defense increasingly narrowed to a focus on territorial defense, missile defense, and the right to defend US warships in waters near Japan. Despite this attempt to refocus on territorial defense, majorities have nonetheless opposed exercising the right to collective self-defense, majorities that would undoubtedly grow if the focus were returned to overseas combat operations. Despite predictions of some observers that constitutional reinterpretation and the newly enacted security legislation would be used to promptly dispatch the MSDF to the South China Sea to participate in joint Freedom of Navigation patrols with the US Navy (Pugliese, 2015), the Abe administration, despite Abe’s personal predilections, made clear its intent not to do so.

Another indicator of the Abe administration’s cautious handling of this issue is its record of avoiding new overseas SDF deployments, not only in support

of US military operations outside of East Asia, which is a continuation of a policy started by the DPJ, but even more generally. This DPJ policy itself was a response to public opposition to non-combat SDF deployments supporting the American war on terrorism initiated after 9-11. However, the Abe administration has even been reluctant to dispatch the SDF in support of UN peacekeeping missions. This later policy represents a break with previous DPJ administrations, who initiated UN peacekeeping deployments to Haiti and South Sudan. Under the Abe administration SDF deployments to UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti and the Golan Heights were ended, and no new peacekeeping missions have been launched, even though there is no shortage of UN peacekeeping operations (16 altogether) needing Japan's contribution of troops. Although the Abe administration proclaims that it is pursuing a policy of 'proactive pacifism', including expanded participation in UN peacekeeping (according to its Security Strategy issued at the end of 2013; GoJ NSC 2013: 1–2, 14, 30) in fact its withdrawal of the SDF from all peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (excepting a few officers dispatched to headquarters) by May 2017 appears rather to represent a policy of 'passive pacifism', especially when compared with the previous DPJ governments (Midford, 2018).

Notably, the Abe administration has passed up several important opportunities to deploy the SDF overseas for meaningful non-combat missions that contribute to global security. First, in 2014 the Kantei passed up an opportunity to deploy the SDF to West Africa to join the US military, several European militaries, and even the Chinese military, in combating the Ebola epidemic then devastating the region and threatening fragile states and regional efforts to combat Islamic extremist terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram (Hornung and Midford, 2014). Second, in the wake of French military operations to free northern Mali from occupation by Islamic extremists Japan could have dispatched the SDF to provide humanitarian relief, and reconstruction and development assistance.

In terms of peace building, the Abe administration has appeared more interested in expanding the Rules of Engagement (RoEs) for SDF units deployed overseas than in maximizing Japan's contributions under the existing legal framework. Specifically, part of the controversial security legislation the Abe administration pushed through the Diet in September 2015 was authorization for the SDF units deployed overseas, including those then deployed to UNMISS in South Sudan, to engage in combat for reasons beyond self-defense of themselves or those in their care. This legislation allows SDF units to defend other units participating in UN peacekeeping when they come under attack. In November 2016 the Abe administration decided, based on this new legislation, to expand the operations of the GSDF unit deployed in South Sudan beyond reconstruction and development missions (engineering work), to include coming to the aid of other UN peacekeepers and UN staffers who come under attack (*kaketsuke keigo*), in response to an urgent request, and joining other UN peacekeepers to defend any UN peacekeeping base that is shared by the GSDF and the militaries

of other countries, even if the GSDF itself is not the direct target of the attack. Nevertheless, these missions were to be performed only 'in very limited cases', such as when South Sudan security authorities or UN peacekeeping troops cannot respond by themselves (Jiji, 2016; Kyodo, 2016b; Mie, 2016).

These conditions were so restrictive that the GSDF faced very little prospect of actually being called on to perform these first-ever overseas combat roles. With public opinion overwhelmingly opposed to the SDF engaging in overseas combat, the Abe administration thus appeared to be seeking to set a new legal precedent without provoking a large public opinion backlash (Jiji, 2016; Kyodo, 2016a, 2016b; Mie, 2016). Indeed, the Abe administration delayed authorizing even this modest expansion in rules of engagement until after the July 2016 upper house election for fear of provoking a voter backlash at the polls (another example of demobilization tactics). This new modest precedent appears to have been the primary reason for Abe's continuation of the South Sudan mission for several years. The Abe administration, by investing significant political capital in setting a new domestic precedent for the SDF neglected other SDF dispatches for peacebuilding that could have resulted in a greater contribution to global security. Moreover, after several months of setting the legal precedent of having the SDF in South Sudan theoretically available to perform combat missions in defense of other UN peacekeepers, the Kantei decided to withdraw the SDF by May 2017, thereby minimizing the risk of actually becoming embroiled in combat. This withdrawal, by ending all 'boots-on-the-ground' SDF participation in UN peacekeeping, put Japan at 'PKO Zero' for essentially the first time since 1992, a quarter of a century earlier.

The Abe administration has also avoided new humanitarian operations where the SDF has great expertise, and could make a real contribution to global stability and enhance Japan's international reputation. Moreover, it has not made any attempt to offer SDF support for ongoing US military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, despite ISIS' public execution of Japanese hostages. This posture reflects the lessons that Abe and the LDP learned from the 2001–2009 period about public opposition to such deployments, along with two other factors: the Obama administration's pivot (rebalancing) to East Asia and the growing perceived threat to Japan's territorial control of the Senkaku islands from China. The latter in turn reflects not just elite perceptions, but also strong public support for using military force to defend national territory, even while opposing the use of force overseas, based on the public's defensive realist attitudes. Consequently, some Tokyo elites now speak of the alliance 'deglobalizing'. Certainly, the focus of the Abe administration over its first five years in office was on extracting ever stronger promises from the United States to defend Japanese control of the Senkaku islands, developments that indicate that the alliance is returning to its Cold War focus: defense of Japanese territory. This is arguably driven by the shifting strategic environment, but also by the defensive realist attitudes of the Japanese public.

A final factor that is arguably driving the Abe administration’s ‘passive pacifism’, namely its reluctance to dispatch the SDF overseas, even for non-combat operations, is Abe’s desire to push for constitutional revision, especially revision of the war-renouncing Article 9 of the constitution. On paper, since the 2016 upper house election, the Abe administration appears to have two-thirds majorities in both the lower and upper houses favoring constitutional revision. In fact, as we have seen, Komeito is very cautious about revising Article 9, and the opposition parties, except for the JRP, are united in opposing revision. Even with JRP support, without Komeito’s support constitutional reform could not achieve a two-thirds majority in the upper or lower houses. Backing the opposition parties’ rejection of constitutional reform is a public that has been ambivalent about the very idea of constitutional revision. Figure 19.7 shows opposition to revision reaching majority status for the first time in nearly a decade in 2016. More decisively, the public remains very much opposed to revising Article 9, with *Asahi Shimbun* polls showing opposition at 64% and 63%, in 2014 and 2015 respectively, versus only 29% supporting revision in both years. This same poll also puts those favoring any kind of constitutional reform in the minority at 43%, with a plurality of 48% opposing constitutional reform (in 2014 support was 44% versus 50% in opposition) (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2015b). While overcoming public opposition remains a daunting challenge, the presence, at least in theory, of two-thirds majorities in both lower and upper houses in favor of revision has given Abe an incentive to create an environment conducive to convincing the public to accept revision of Article 9. An important part of creating such an environment is not




Figure 19.7 *Yomiuri Shimbun*: do you support constitutional revision?*

Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun* (various dates).

*The question reads: ‘Do you think the current constitution should be revised, or do you think it should not be revised?’

engaging in risky SDF overseas deployments that might involve the use of force and the suffering or inflicting of casualties on the part of the SDF, incidents that could turn the public even more sharply against revising Article 9. Thus, Abe's apparent hope that he can revise Article 9 in the short-run (even though based on Komeito's reluctance this seems unrealistic) motivates his administration to be cautious about any overseas deployments.

CONCLUSION

While one might be tempted to conclude that overwhelming upper and lower house LDP-Komeito coalition election victories mean that public opinion either no longer opposes SDF participation in overseas combat, or at least that public opinion does not matter, in fact, a closer look reveals a different picture. There is continued strong public opposition to SDF involvement in overseas combat, opposition driven by its long-standing defensive realist attitudes, and championed by a gradually reconsolidating opposition and by Komeito, the coalition partner that has been key to LDP legislative and electoral success, but which has also championed public opposition to SDF overseas combat and worked to water down Abe's constitutional reinterpretation and the subsequent security legislation. While continued moves to strengthen territorial defense can be expected, in line with the public's attitudinal defensive realism, we are unlikely to see, short of a great-power war, the SDF engaging in overseas combat (including modest and low-intensity uses of force), even in nearby regions such as the South China Sea.

This chapter has demonstrated the continued influence of public opinion in Japan, even in the face of determined efforts by a skilled politician such as Prime Minister Abe to override that opinion. This shows that in at least one Asian democracy, even one characterized by one-party dominance, public opinion has a significant influence on foreign policy. In other Asian democracies, most notably South Korea and Taiwan, which are more advanced democracies than is Japan in the sense that they have more regular turnovers of power between ruling and opposition sides, and more competitive elections generally, the influence of public opinion should be even stronger.¹⁵

Notes

- 1 In this sense this chapter updates the author's book (Midford, 2011).
- 2 This paragraph draws on Midford (2011: 22–6).
- 3 In addition to the landmark works by Lippmann cited below, major works in the elitist tradition include Almond (1950), Bailey (1948), and Crozier et al. (1975).
- 4 The classic study supporting the elitists' conclusion that public opinion does not affect policy is Miller and Stokes (1963). Also see Margolis and Mauser (1989) and Ginsberg (1986).
- 5 Major pluralist works include Verba et al. (1967), Mueller (1973), Holsti (1992), and Jentleson (1992).

- 6 They also showed that public opinion, although not always influential in the short-run, decisively influenced policy toward the Vietnam War over the medium to long term. Also see the discussion of the politics of opposites below.
- 7 A former secretary to a member of the upper house used this expression when Midford suggested that it was natural for political parties to follow public opinion. Similarly, in an interview the author conducted, a mid-level career Japanese diplomat saw public opinion toward foreign policy as being composed primarily of non-attitudes: 'foreign policy issues simply do not register'. Personal interview of March 18, 1994.
- 8 Leading pluralist works on Japanese foreign policy include Watanabe (1977) and Weinstein (1971). For a balanced view of these two tendencies in Japanese conceptions of public opinion, see Miyatake (2003).
- 9 The DPJ manifesto does allude to this by promising to 'move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of the US military forces in Japan and the role of US military bases'. Democratic Party of Japan (2009: 28) and Minshutō (2009: 12, point 51).
- 10 The question asked: 'What measures do you think the Kan cabinet should take to respond to the environment surrounding the Senkaku islands?'
- 11 In its October poll, NTV found only 31% supported Noda's decision to allow the Osprey deployment, versus 55% who opposed the deployment (NTV, 2012c).
- 12 The DPJ merged with the Japan Renaissance Party, and the two parties combined Chinese characters in both their party names. Thus the 民主党 and 維新党 became 民維党 or Minshintō in Japanese, but is simply known as the Democratic Party (DP) in English. Nonetheless, one portion of the JRP did not merge and subsequently reestablished itself under the same name.
- 13 Interview with a GSDF officer, Ministry of Defense, June 30, 2013.
- 14 In an NHK debate on the Sunday before the election, the author saw LDP and Komeito representatives specifically deny that the cabinet decision of July 1 had anything to do with allowing Japanese troops to become involved in overseas combat.
- 15 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the influence of public opinion in these other Asian democracies. Regarding the influence of public opinion in authoritarian China, see Tang (2005), Gries (2004), and Midford (2007).

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Diplomats, Military and Intelligence Officers: From Stovepipes to Integration in Japan's Security Policy

Ken Kotani

INTRODUCTION

There have been very few studies focusing on relations among diplomats, military and intelligence officers in the Japanese government, and most studies usually focus on relations between politicians and bureaucrats in the government.¹ Moreover, those studies mainly refer to Japan's economic policy, not national security/intelligence policy. This is because the Japanese government did not spend time and effort on security policy during the Cold War period and, as a result, a role of military and intelligence officers in the government seems almost forgotten by historians and political scientists. After the end of the Cold War, the more Japan spent time facing her national security issues, the more scholars came to be interested in Japan's security policy.² However, Japan's intelligence field is still hidden in a veil of mystery, and studies on the field remain few.³ Therefore, it is difficult to consider relations among diplomats, military and intelligence officers in the Japanese government based on traditional Japanese studies.

On the other hand, there is a substantial accumulation of research on security/intelligence studies in western nations. For example, Paul Pillar discusses the role of intelligence in US foreign policy after 9.11 in his book and Mark Lowenthal also persuasively writes on the role of the intelligence community in the US government. Philip Davies researched the UK intelligence function in the British government in comparison with the US intelligence community. Even in Chinese studies, Kerry Brown discusses relations between Chinese political leaders and

military and security officers in terms of their influence in the government.⁴ These studies are highly suggestive for discussing the intelligence community in Japan.

This chapter will focus on relations among diplomats, military and intelligence officers in the Japanese government in considering the recent drastic reform in foreign and national security fields, such as the establishment of Japan's National Security Council (NSC), the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS Act) and the Counter-Terrorism Unit Japan (CTU).

BRIEF HISTORY

In Japan, the government system is based on the individual ministries and agencies, with their closed bureaucracy preventing information-sharing and policy-making cooperation among them. This is the system called 'stovepipes', which describes how the intelligence only flows from bottom to top in each ministry/agency, like smoke in a stovepipe.

Before World War II, the Japanese national security policy had been separately formulated by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). They spent a lot of time adjusting their widely different policies, and the adjustment sometimes developed into serious turf battles among ministries. In other words, diplomats, military and intelligence officers lived in different worlds. They did not know what the others were doing in the national security decision-making process.

After the war, the IJA and IJN were dissolved and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Self Defense Forces (SDF) were established around the outbreak of the Korean War. The Japanese policy-makers had learnt lessons from the bitter past in which the IJA and IJN had dominated the Japanese national security policy, and the new government gave authority to the MOFA for Japan's national security policy planning.⁵ On the other hand, the JDA, whose main mission was only to oversee and manage the SDF, was not involved in national security policy planning in the government.

In the field of national intelligence, the National Police Agency (NPA) became the most influential intelligence apparatus in Japan. The role of the SDF was very limited in the Cold War period, and the police took over the role of the military service. For example, when Lieutenant Ivanovich Belenko of the Soviet Air Force flew to Hakodate airport with his MIG-25 fighter jet seeking political asylum in 1976, the Japanese police force tried to keep military officers out of the airport. Morio Sato of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, a specialist in Russian military, recalls that he was blocked by the police just before arriving at the airport and was not allowed to enter. His first report to the Defense Intelligence HQ was 'I am not able to approach the destination'.⁶ It was a typical case of bureaucratic factionalism and a humiliating incident for the military, who were not allowed to check the MIG during the initial phase of the incident.

There had been no integrated apparatus for national security/intelligence in the Japanese government at the beginning of the Cold War. As a result, diplomats, military and intelligence officers came to live in different worlds again. After a long slumber, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone set up the Security Council of Japan in July 1986 which comprised nine cabinet ministers chaired by the Prime Minister. Nakasone's aim was to integrate the security policy planning process in the Cabinet Secretariat, but unfortunately, the Security Council failed to attain success.

The average deliberation time at the Council was only 10 minutes and the average frequency was eight times per year (the maximum was 17 times in 2009 and the minimum was twice in 1988).⁷ Surprisingly, the Council discussed the Japanese national security policy for only 20 minutes throughout 1988. Yoshihide Suga, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, admitted the hollowing-out of the council, saying, 'It is true that the recent Security Council ends in a very short period of time. We only tend to approve reports from bureaucrats without any discussions'.⁸

There were three reasons why the Council did not work effectively in the Japanese national security circle. First, the council was no more than an advisory body due to the constitutional restriction. Article 65 of the Japanese Constitution states, 'Administrative power is vested in the Cabinet'. In other words, the Security Council chaired by the Japanese Prime Minister cannot decide anything without obtaining consent of the other cabinet members because the cabinet is usually managed on unanimity. The Japanese Prime Minister sometimes spends a lot of time trying to persuade the Minister of Education or the Minister of Health on overseas and security matters.

Second, each ministry/agency in *Kasumigasei* (the government and bureaucracy district) is powerful, balkanized and resistant to consolidating the decision-making process in the government. Each of them has its jurisdiction under the law, which prevents political momentum for integration. For instance, the MOFA which is granted the authority to make national security policy, is not willing to cooperate with the JDA or the Security Council in the Cabinet Secretariat. The JDA was not a full-fledged ministry but a sub-cabinet-level agency until 2007, whose mission was only to oversee the SDF. When the US government returned the Okinawa Islands to Japan in 1972, the counterpart of the US Department of Defense was not the JDA but the MOFA.⁹ Conventionally, the JDA bureaucrats and military officers had been undervalued in *Kasumigaseki*, and as a result, the MOFA had been able to dominate Japan's national security policy for most of the post-WWII period. On the other hand, the Cabinet Secretariat does not have any jurisdiction under the law but only has the authority to achieve coordination. As a result, the Security Council could not interfere in the national security policy formulated by the MOFA, and the council members just approved the policy, as Suga stated.

Third, the Security Council did not have a bureaucratic secretariat that could manage the ministry-level meetings regularly. During the Cold War period, the

NPA dominated internal intelligence activities and the MOFA dominated national security policy-making, disregarding the JDA. There was no inter-agency cooperation in those fields. In fact, the Japanese government did not need to consider the security policy seriously because it could just follow the US foreign/security policy under the East–West confrontation. However, the end of the Cold War threw the Japanese government into rough seas. During the Gulf War in 1991, the Japanese government could not participate in the coalition forces due to constitutional limitations. After the war, the JDA tried to send the SDF's minesweepers to the Persian Gulf for international cooperation, while the MOFA opposed the dispatch which was against the constitution.¹⁰ The Kaifu cabinet eagerly supported the JDA policy, and the first SDF overseas operation was realized. This was a turning point for Japanese security policy because the JDA/SDF's role was completely revised in the government.

The Japanese government was required to contribute to stabilizing world affairs after the Gulf War crisis and it legislated the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in June 1992, which allowed the SDF to join PKOs overseas. It was the first time since the end of WWII that Japanese soldiers had been sent outside Japan. The Gulf War crisis brought about two major changes in Japanese security policy: 1) the JDA/SDF became a main player in security policy planning and the MOFA did not hesitate to cooperate with them in the field; 2) Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto came to realize the need for a control tower for national security and integration of national security policy planning in the government.

To achieve such goals, the first effective prescription was to strengthen the authority of the Cabinet Secretariat. In January 2001, an Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for foreign affairs and national security was established to supervise Japan's foreign and national security policy in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition, the Cabinet Act was revised in 2004, which outlined that the Cabinet Secretariat was the supreme coordination body in the government and its authority of coordination was superior to the other ministries.¹¹ Moreover, the JDA was upgraded to a full-fledged ministry, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), in January 2007, standing on equal footing with the MOFA in national security policy planning.

The political momentum to integrate Japan's foreign and security policy in the government was accelerated by expanding threats from China and North Korea in the 21st century. The first North Korean missile launch test over the Sea of Japan was executed in 1993, and the frequency of the testing has dramatically risen since 2006. Provocative Chinese actions around the Senkaku Islands have become a serious matter for Japan since its decision to nationalize the islands in September 2012, which still raises serious concerns between Japan and China. Facing these international tensions, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his plan to establish Japan's National Security Council (NSC) and legislate the Specific Secret Protection Law. These plans were realized by the second Abe administration in December 2013 when the NSC was established and the Act on

the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS) was legislated. That was a historical turning point for Japan's national security.

INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE NSC

The Four-Ministers' Meeting

While the Security Council is managed by the Nine-Ministers' Meeting, the NSC has three-level meetings: the Nine-Ministers' Meeting, the Four-Ministers' Meeting and the Meeting for Crisis Management. The main meeting is the flexible one with the four ministers (Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretariat), whose purpose is to share policy papers and information among the ministers. Suga evaluates the meetings positively, stating, 'From a strategic point of view, the four ministers can discuss national security issues on a daily basis at the NSC. I believe that the meeting managed by strong political leadership can lead Japan's foreign and national security policy now.'¹²

The biggest institutional feature of the NSC is the frequency of the meetings. As mentioned above, the Security Council used to be held around eight times a year, but the NSC meeting is held bi-weekly in principle. As a result, meetings were held 35 times in 2015, 47 times in 2016 and 45 times in 2017 and the average deliberation time was 40–60 minutes.¹³ In other words, the four ministers spend a lot of time discussing foreign and national security policy at the NSC meetings, which makes the matter one of the most important issues for the Japanese government. The meeting is no longer the unmotivated 10-minute discussion of the past.

While the Four-Ministers' Meeting focuses on flexibility, the Nine-Ministers' Meeting focuses on political consensus and civilian control. The Four-Ministers' Meeting sometimes lacks the authority to decide important national agendas, such as the national defense program guidelines and countering armed attack situations. The Nine-Ministers' Meeting which has more political authority compared with the Four Ministers', held on 10 December 2013 discussed the national defense program guidelines.¹⁴

The National Security Secretariat

The integration of diplomats and military officers was realized with the establishment of the National Security Secretariat (NSS) on 7 January 2014. The NSS, which has around 70 staff from various ministries (mainly from the MOFA and MOD) was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat. The staff of the NSS usually draft Japan's foreign and national security policy for the Four Ministers' Meeting by using their authority to coordinate the views of ministries and agencies. This is the first time since the end of WWII that diplomats and military officers have

worked together beyond the 'stovepipes'. The NSS is also authorized to provide secret information to the intelligence community for their policy planning.¹⁵ The Security Council did not have such a bureaucratic secretariat, but now the NSS can regularly support the minister-level meetings by drafting policy papers and obtaining intelligence.

The NSS is led by the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat, who is equivalent to the National Security Advisor (NSA) in the United States and the UK. The first Secretary General was Shotaro Yachi, an ex-vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. While the NSA directly supports the President or Prime Minister, the Secretary General serves the Chief Cabinet Secretary and their authority is limited.¹⁶ However, there has been no position equivalent to the NSA in the Japanese government before, and it is a big step forward that the Secretary General can meet with various nations' security advisors on a one-to-one basis. There are two vice-Secretary Generals from the MOFA and MOD, three Councillor Cabinet Secretariats from the MOFA and MOD, and six Counsellor Cabinet Secretariats from the MOFA, MOD and NPA. Each Counsellor Cabinet Secretariat handles one of the six sections, such as general affairs and coordination, strategy planning, intelligence, the US/EU/ASEAN, North-East Asia/Russia, and the Middle East/Africa/South America.¹⁷ An NSS staff member from the MOFA said that it was the first time he had worked together with military officials and he was impressed by the quality of military intelligence, such as Imaginary Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

Intelligence Requirement

In general, the intelligence community usually needs political guidance on the priorities of the agenda so that its collection and reporting can be as helpful as possible.¹⁸ However, the Japanese intelligence agencies are facing the biggest difficulty on this point, in that they are not given intelligence requirements by the policy-makers. Japanese political leaders usually think more about creating consensus with other political groups rather than carefully examining intelligence in the foreign/security policy decision-making process. In other words, Japanese politicians and policy-makers tend to put political goals ahead of intelligence or thorough information. Richard Betts writes, 'The importance of successful intelligence ultimately varies with the policies it has to support',¹⁹ but Japanese intelligence has been generally forsaken by political leaders for a long time.

In addition to the malfunction of the intelligence cycle, there have been serious turf battles in the Japanese government. 'Stovepipes' among Japanese bureaucracy prevent them from sharing information each other or with the Cabinet Secretariat. A former director of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), Yoshio Omori, wrote that he was not given any information from the MOFA and MOD, even though he was the head of central intelligence.²⁰ He attempted to break down walls between the CIRO and the other ministries/agencies, but failed.

After the establishment of Japan's NSC in 2013, the situation dramatically changed. The new NCS Establishment Act states, 'If the NSC/NSS need information or intelligence on national security, they can require other ministries to support them.'²¹ This article clearly sets out that the NSC/NSS are national level intelligence customers, that is, policy planning and intelligence are now integrated at the national level.

There is still one problem at the operational level. Prior to the NSC period, the CIRO managed national-level intelligence by integrating intelligence from the other ministries/agencies. In principle, the CIRO would integrate national intelligence and supply it to the NSC/NSS. However, the act allows the NSC/NSS to supply intelligence to the other ministries directly and in fact, they can obtain intelligence bypassing the CIRO. Although the CIRO is the central intelligence machinery of Japan, their staff number only around 170, and 100 of them are on loan from other ministries and agencies. The CIRO cannot supply enough intelligence to the NSC/NSS, so consequently they try to pull information from the MOFA, MOD and NPA for their policy planning.

Authority to Decide at the NSC

As already mentioned, Japan's government system is built on the basis of individual ministries and agencies, which have the authority to supply excellent staff and information to the NSC/NSS. During the Security Council period, the different ministries were not willing to cooperate with the Cabinet Secretariat which led to malfunctioning of the council. The biggest reason for the uncooperative attitude of the bureaucrats was the lack of authority of the council. If the new NSC/NSS wants to enforce obedience of the ministries/agencies, authority is necessary. Masafumi Kaneko, a member of the advisory council for establishing the NSC wrote, 'The new NSC should not be a place for chatting about something, but a place for deciding policy.'²²

Unfortunately, the NSC Establishment Act defines the NSC as just an advisory body for the Prime Minister because article 65 of the Japanese Constitution states, 'Administrative power is vested in the Cabinet'.²³ This is the biggest hurdle to clear, if the NSC is to decide policy. To solve this problem, Cabinet Secretariat Councillor Shuich Kitazaki explained at the Diet as follows:

The Cabinet of the time can exercise its authority by a decision of the full cabinet meeting. Any advice of the NSC would not be the Cabinet's formal policy without full Cabinet's consent. However, not every policy is always decided by the full cabinet meeting. According to my understanding, it could be possible that ministries and agencies can exercise their missions by following the advice of the NSC.²⁴

It is a remarkable interpretation. According to Kitazaki's explanation, the NSC's authority is not equal to, but very close to the full Cabinet's authority in foreign and national security policy. In the case of the actual operations of the NSC, such

as deciding 'The National Security Strategy' in December 2013, and 'The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology' in April 2014, the full Cabinet meeting ratified these policies after the NSC's decision. It is conceivable that the full Cabinet would not reject NSC decisions in principle, therefore it could be said that the NSC does not have legal authority but has de facto authority to decide foreign and national security policy.

This authority is a source of superiority over the other ministries/agencies in Kasumigaseki and they try to supply first-class bureaucrats and secret information to the NSC/NSS to participate in the decision-making process.

The Role of the NSS

When 'The National Security Strategy of 2013' is compared with the previous one, 'The Basic Policy for National Defense of 1957', the biggest difference is that the latest version covers various fields, such as national security, foreign relations, cyber security, offshore, and energy problems. The more the NSC deals with cross-sectional issues, the more adjustment among ministries/agencies is necessary. The Security Council, which did not possess a secretariat, could not hold the minister-level meetings regularly nor adjust inter-ministry/agency policy. When the NSC was established, its secretariat, the NSS was also set up in the Cabinet Secretariat which was defined as the supreme coordination body in the government. To strengthen the coordination, the Executive Committee, consisting of the director generals from the various ministries/agencies was set up between the NSS and the NSC. The committee aims to prevent turf battles among ministries and agencies.

The likely subjects to be considered at the NSS are: 1) subjects requiring a political decision by the Four-Ministers' Meeting, 2) subjects related to foreign and security policy requiring an inter-ministry/agency discussion. In the past, when the MOD was going to make a policy on a cross-sectional problem, the MOD officials were obliged to negotiate with the other ministries, such as the MOFA or Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and so on. Now staff from the various ministries can talk to each other at the NSS office and their policy papers can be decided by the Four-Ministers' Meeting. Compared with the past, the process is greatly simplified.

In the case of the Crimean Crisis of 2014, several of the NSS staff unanimously admitted that the NSC/NSS was key to coping with the crisis. After Russia declared the annexation of Crimea, the Japanese government was facing a serious problem. While Japan, as a member of the G-7, should take a rigorous approach to Russia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe regarded relations with Russia as important for solving territorial problems between the two countries. He wanted careful deliberations on economic sanctions against Russia and held the Four-Ministers' Meeting of the NSC six times throughout 2014 to discuss the Crimean problem, as well as sending his advisor, Secretary General Shotaro Yachi to Russia twice.²⁵

It was not the MOFA but the NSS that took the initiative to deliberate the problem at bureaucratic level; officials from the MOFA, MOD, METI and Ministry of Finance discussed the problem at the NSS. Moreover, the NSS had free access to information/intelligence on Ukraine and Russia collected by the MOFA and MOD. An NSS staff member from the MOD said that his military intelligence on Ukraine was important in itself, but after integrating his military intelligence with MOFA's overseas information at the NSS, he could finally understand the whole picture relating to the problem.²⁶ Following the NSC's decision, the Japanese government announced financial aid to Ukraine and economic sanctions against Russia, but the sanctions were moderate, compared with the United States. These specific sanctions by Japan left room for negotiation with Russia and resulted in President Putin's visit to Japan in December 2016.

THE ACT ON THE PROTECTION OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED SECRETS (SDS ACT)

In May 2012, it was widely reported that the Japanese police suspected Li Chunguang, the first secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, of engaging in espionage activities in Japan but Li returned to China when he was requested to appear by the police. It also became clear that four secret documents of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of Japan had been leaked to a Chinese private association with which Li was involved, and he had connections with the Minister and vice-Minister of the MAFF. However, the Japanese police could not arrest him, because the Japanese government did not have anti-spy laws or a security act. As a result, the police were obliged to apply a very light offense of a violation of the Alien Registration Act, but he managed to escape. The scandal made headline news in Japan and the two ministers were dismissed from their post.

In addition to the lack of normal intelligence security systems, there was also a clear lack of a counter-intelligence structure that could prevent enemy spy activities. Before WWII, under the Military Secrets Law and the National Defense Security Law, 'foreigners involved in spy activities or their Japanese agents could be punished with the death penalty or unlimited penal servitude with a minimum of three years'.²⁷ Even in the famous Sorge Incident in 1941²⁸, this was considered sufficient.

However, when these laws were abolished at the end of the war, there was no legislation put in place to cover counter-intelligence. When the Rastvorov Incident came to light in 1954 and some officials of the MOFA were prosecuted for collaboration²⁹, it was shown that the existing legislation was inadequate. A prosecution was brought under the National Public Service Act (NPSA) concerning the duty of civil servants to maintain secrecy, under which the maximum sentence was no more than one year's imprisonment. In fact, Japan was a 'Spy Heaven' for Soviet

spies during the Cold War period. The leniency of the legal system was further demonstrated in the Kononov Incident (1971),³⁰ the Miyanaga Incident (1980),³¹ the Levchenko Incident (1982) and the other incidents concerning the Soviet spying activities.³²

After Levchenko's (an officer of the KGB) asylum to the United States, he testified that there were a number of Soviet spies active in Japan, which caused anti-spy fever in the Japanese government. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tried to create a State Secrets Bill (anti-spy law) in June 1985, but he finally yielded to furious public opposition.³³ This was because Japanese public opinion had been greatly influenced by the liberal tone of the press and the rejection of intelligence matters. People would repeat the cliché, 'We were fed up with the secret state in WWII'. Japanese politicians, who were well aware of the situation, hesitated to openly discuss the legislation of a secret act.

It was these weaknesses in the intelligence security system that acted as a barrier to the promotion of exchanging intelligence with other countries. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage published a famous report in 2000, 'The United States and Japan: Advancing towards a mature partnership', which set the tone for reinforcement of US–Japan security cooperation as well as the promotion of cooperation in the intelligence arena. The report also called for increased intelligence-sharing within the Japanese government, increased participation by the Japanese parliament in intelligence operations, and increased public and political support for legislation concerning a secret act or a similar type of legislation.³⁴

As mentioned above, the main legislation concerning intelligence security was the NPSA which prescribed a maximum penalty of no more than one year's imprisonment for breach of confidence by civil servants. In November 2001, the Self-Defense Forces Act (SDF Act), which covered government institutions as well as private corporations in connection with military secrets, was amended to set the maximum prison sentence at no more than five years. There was no national-level protection law in the government until 2013, and that prevented inter-ministry/agency intelligence-sharing for a long time. The MOD/SDF officers were obliged to treat their military intelligence by following the rules under the SDF Act, but the other ministries/agencies did not have such a rule. If a bureaucrat of the MOFA intentionally leaked military intelligence passed from the MOD/SDF, he/she would be punished by the NPSA rule, that is, no more than one year's imprisonment. As a result, the MOD/SDF were not willing to share military intelligence with the MOFA and NPA.

The insufficiency of the intelligence security system could compromise the control system of the intelligence supplier. Although it signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan in August 2007, the United States expressed the hope that the agreement would lead to the development of a comprehensive intelligence security system, rather than being

limited to military secrets. The NPA also officially warned of Chinese activities in Japan, stating 'the Chinese method of information-gathering is quite slick at hiring Japanese agents, while they are creating friendly Sino-Japanese relations on a superficial level'.³⁵ According to recent expert indications, there are at least 1,000 people involved in activities within Japan on behalf of China.³⁶ An incident which led to the Japanese secrets act legislation was also related to China.

On 4 November 2010, Japanese Coast Guard officer Masaharu Isshiki, known as 'sengoku38', uploaded a video file to YouTube. The Japanese public were surprised because the leaked film was regarded as secret by the Japanese government. The film contains a collision scene between a Japanese Coast Guard's ship and a Chinese poachers' fishing boat near the Senkaku Islands in Japanese waters on 7 September, after which the Coast Guard held the Chinese captain in custody. The Japanese government had kept the film secret out of diplomatic consideration for China, but the file had been leaked by a fairly conscientious coast guard officer, who was frustrated by the government's temporizing policy.

The leak shocked the government, and the leading Democratic Party of Japan started to discuss a secrets act. The Council of Advisers for Legislation on Security Law submitted a legislative proposal for a secrecy law to Prime Minister Naoto Kan on 8 August 2011. However, the Democratic Party finally gave up on enshrining the proposal into law in March 2012. The reason for this is unclear but it is said that the government wanted to assign the highest priority to the consumption tax increase in the Diet session of 2012. In a twist of irony, just a few months later, the Chinese spy incident mentioned above was extensively broadcast.

The incident indirectly caused the Democratic Party's defeat in the general election of 2012, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) inherited the legislation. In December 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe legislated the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS Act), which was enforced on 10 December 2014. The 'Specially Designated Secrets' act was the first-ever law based on top national secrets defined as information on '1) defense, 2) diplomacy, 3) prevention of specified harmful activities, 4) prevention of terrorist activities'. All ministries/agencies of the Japanese government are obliged to handle secret information by obeying the act, and in case of leakage, the maximum penalty is 10 years with five years' imprisonment for instigation.³⁷ The act developed an infrastructure for inter-ministry/agency intelligence-sharing. Now the MOD/SDF officials have no reason to refuse to share intelligence with diplomats and police officers, and vice versa. The act has also contributed to intelligence-sharing between the NSC/NSS and the intelligence community. An NSS official has said that intelligence-sharing in the government dramatically improved after the enforcement of the act. The SDS Act is regarded as indispensable infrastructure for inter-ministry/agency intelligence-sharing in the government.

COUNTER-TERRORISM UNIT JAPAN (CTU)

Japan has not had apparatus for overseas human intelligence (HUMINT) since the end of WWII, and Japanese diplomats have played a central role in overseas information-gathering. They collect information through their diplomatic networks and open sources in the host country, but they are not allowed to engage in covert activities. HUMINT should provide information that is usually unavailable through diplomatic means, but the Japanese government cannot collect overseas information beyond diplomatic information in foreign countries. It is almost impossible for them to collect information from those countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Japan, such as North Korea. The Japanese government realized that there were 17 abducted Japanese citizens in the country, but it was impossible to learn much about their status, which deeply frustrated the government. According to WikiLeaks documents, the Director of the CIRO Hideshi Mitani confessed that Japan's best insights into North Korea came not from a secret source but from Kim Jong-il's Japanese former sushi chef who had published a memoir.³⁸

The National Security Strategy of 2013 stresses strengthening overseas information-gathering for national security, and the need for an overseas intelligence service was shared by the government and the LDP.³⁹ Moreover, overseas terror incidents urged the government to set up a new agency. In January 2013, 10 Japanese were killed by an Islamic extremist group in Algeria, and two years later, two Japanese were abducted and executed by the ISIL in Syria. These terror incidents had a great impact on not only public opinion but also the Japanese government. The LDP had been planning to establish an overseas intelligence service since 2006,⁴⁰ but there was a strong turf battle between the National Police Agency (NPA) and the MOFA for the initiative to set up the new agency.

The NPA is responsible for policing the entire nation and protecting the nation against foreign espionage and terrorism, similar to the FBI in the United States. In fact, the NPA is the most influential intelligence apparatus in the Japanese intelligence community. The NPA shows interest in international cooperation, including increased exchanges with foreign agencies to fight international terrorism. However, the MOFA, which has dominated foreign intelligence collection, is not willing to welcome the NPA in the overseas intelligence field. The Japanese diplomats and police (security) officers have been as incompatible with each other as oil and water in Kasumigaseki. The MOFA has the authority to issue passports, to manage embassies abroad and to use diplomatic official telegram lines, all of which are indispensable for overseas intelligence-gathering operations. The NPA desperately wanted such overseas infrastructures and hoped to cooperate with the MOFA in the fight against international terrorism. After long turf battles, both agreed to a compromise, that is, the Counter-Terrorism Unit Japan (CTU) established in December 2015.

The CTU was set up in the Foreign Policy Bureau of the MOFA, and NPA bureaucrat Hiroaki Takizawa was appointed as head of the unit. The unit organizationally belongs to the MOFA, but operationally belongs to the Cabinet Secretariat.⁴¹ The Chief Cabinet Secretary is the operational minister of the unit. The unit thus has two bosses, the one is the Foreign Minister and the other is the Chief Cabinet Secretary. This is why the unit is sometimes derided as a product of compromise between the NPA and the MOFA. It is too early to evaluate the performance of the hybrid chimeric apparatus, but the government decided to double the unit staff in September 2016 following a terror incident in Bangladesh in July 2016, in which seven Japanese were killed.⁴² The CTU attracted public attention in Junpei Yasuda affair of October 2018. Junpei Yasuda, a Japanese free journalist, who had been imprisoned by a terrorist group in Syria for 3 years, was released in 23 October 2018. It was reported that the CTU contributed to the release and the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihide Suga recognized the contribution next day.⁴³

Now that the diplomats (covering overseas intelligence) and the police officers (covering security intelligence) are working together in collecting information on terrorism in the CTU, the Project Team of Intelligence and Security of the LDP recognizes this as the first step for a full-fledged overseas intelligence service. Takeshi Iwaya, a Diet member of the LDP (now the Minister of Defense), who was head of the project team states, 'The CTU is just a temporary apparatus. I think that we need to set up a full-fledged intelligence service which can regularly collect and analyze overseas information'.⁴⁴ The project team proposed the plan to the government on 27 December 2015.⁴⁵

ISSUES FOR FURTHER INTEGRATION

Relations among the diplomats, military and intelligence officers in the Japanese government have been on the road to integration since the creation of the NSC but there are three major issues for further integration: 1) overseas intelligence, 2) intelligence flows, 3) intelligence estimation. In these fields, the same question is always repeated, 'Which ministry/agency should take the initiative?'

First, Japan has not had any apparatus for overseas human intelligence since the end of WWII. Japanese diplomats have played a central role in overseas information-gathering, collecting information through their diplomatic networks and open sources in the host country, but they are not allowed to engage in covert activities. The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), a counter-intelligence agency of Ministry of Justice, is allowed to investigate specific groups related to terrorism and sabotage in Japan, but the PSIA is not allowed to collect information overseas. The NPA, the PSIA and the MOD also send their staff abroad as secretary or military attaché of the Japanese embassy. One of their duties is to collect political and military information, but their activities are usually controlled by the MOFA, which dominates every issue related to overseas activities. The

NPA officers and military attachés sometimes try to operate human intelligence activities abroad, but they are obliged to use MOFA's diplomatic telegram service to send secret information to Tokyo and to have an official Japanese passport, not a covered passport under a false name. As Paul Pillar discussed, it would be ideal to establish role allotment between diplomats and intelligence officers in the foreign policy process,⁴⁶ but it seems that the MOFA bureaucrats do not think about such allotment. The MOFA is usually intransigent about plans for establishing an overseas intelligence service, and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU) was the maximum concession for the MOFA. There still remain strong turf battles in the field of overseas intelligence.

Second, the flow of intelligence in the Cabinet Secretariat is still far from being arranged. There are three main intelligence flows in the government: from the intelligence community to the Prime Minister's office, to the CIRO, and to the NSC/NSS. The CIRO's main duty is to integrate information from the intelligence community for the CIRO's weekly briefing to the Prime Minister. However, the CIRO is under the influence of the NPA, with many chief positions being held by ex-members of the police force, so there is a strong sense of a police-style detection culture, rather than an intelligence-gathering and assessment culture.⁴⁷ The MOFA, MOD and PSIA are afraid that giving information to the CIRO will mean giving information to the NPA which is well-known in Kasumigaseki for its excessive secrecy. It is said that the NPA has never shared any information with the other ministries. These ministries continue to send their staff as aides to the Prime Minister's office and as personal secretaries to the Prime Minister so that they are able to deliver information personally and directly to the Prime Minister himself, bypassing the CIRO.⁴⁸ Unless this underlying situation changes, it is hard to see the information-gathering problem resolved, however much the CIRO is strengthened.

On the other hand, the creation of the NSC/NSS changed the flow of intelligence. Now the NSC/NSS is the prime customer for the intelligence community rather than the CIRO, and they place more significance on the NSS because the NSC/NSS is a control tower in foreign and security policy decision-making. As a result, the CIRO, the NSS and the Prime Minister's office receive different secret information from the intelligence community. It is possible that no one in the government understands the overall intelligence flow. In other words, the relations between the NSS and the CIRO are still obscure in spite of the fact that both are in the Cabinet Secretariat. In contrast, the US and UK NSCs, models for the NSC, clearly define their relations with the intelligence community as Philip Davies discusses.⁴⁹

Lastly, the Japanese government does not have a national intelligence estimate system in the true sense. There are several cabinet intelligence analysts in the CIRO on loan from other ministries and agencies, and they analyze intelligence in their special fields, such as internal security, military and foreign affairs.

They basically do not share and integrate their analysis and there is no integrated intelligence estimation in the government. Moreover, the cabinet intelligence analysts usually have no experience of writing analysis papers and are not graduates, so their analysis sometimes tends to be self-righteous. This is because each analyst position is strictly allotted to a ministry/agency which is forced to send bureaucrats to the post obligatorily. As a result, analysts in foxholes are not willing to integrate their reports at the level of national intelligence estimates as the US and UK analysts do, and the other ministries/agencies regard the analysis paper as 'the CIRO's arbitrary opinion'. The UK government has an intelligence integration system known as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the US government also has its national intelligence estimate system despite the fact that the US intelligence community is notorious for turf battles. Mark Lowenthal writes, 'The US intelligence community believes in the concept of competitive analysis – having different agencies with different points of view work on the same issue'.⁵⁰ The competitive analysis sometimes develops into a turf battle, but there is no such concept in the Japanese intelligence community when they are in inter-ministry/agency battles.

In conclusion, the MOFA's efforts to take the initiative in overseas intelligence, the CIRO's efforts to take the initiative in intelligence flows, and Balkanized national intelligence estimation still thwart further integration of intelligence in the government.

CONCLUSION

The integration of diplomats, military and intelligence officers in the Japanese government is partly realized at the NSC/NSS and that of diplomats and intelligence officers is realized to a degree at the CTU. The SDS Act is an important infrastructure for inter-ministry/agency information-sharing. The trend of integration has gradually advanced in the government since the second Abe cabinet started in 2012, because international threats, such as North Korean ballistic missiles, Chinese military expansion and international terrorism are becoming serious for Japan as never before. The integration partly enfeebles notorious Japanese 'stovepipes' and 'turf battles' to some extent. It seems that bureaucrats who have experience of working at the NSC/NSS come to have a 'national' point of view rather than sticking to their own ministry's interests. As long as ministries/agencies send their first-class staff and information to the Cabinet Secretariat, the NSC/NSS will remain the control tower of Japan's foreign/national security policy. However, there are still several issues hindering integration, especially at the Cabinet Secretariat level. Turf battles are likely to be repeated on intelligence and policy issues in the government, but it is also believed that there is an overall trend toward integration.




Figure 20.1 Japan's National Security Council and intelligence community

Notes

- 1 There are several studies focusing on relations between politicians and bureaucrats in Japan; Gerald Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Jun Iio, *Nihon no Tochi Kozo* (Government Structure of Japan) (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2007); Tomohito Shinoda, *Seiji Shudo vs Kanryo Shihai* (Political Initiative vs Bureaucratic Domination) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2013).
- 2 Takashi Inoguchi, *Global Change: A Japanese Perspective* (London: Palgrave, 2001); Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007); Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Redwood: Stanford University Press, 2009); Chris Hughes, *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy under the 'Ave Doctrine'* (London: Palgrave, 2015).
- 3 Andrew Oros, 'Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 15 No.1 (2002); Ken Kotani, 'A Reconstruction of Japanese Intelligence', in Philip Davies and Kristian Gustafson (eds.), *Intelligence Elsewhere* (Georgetown University Press, 2013), Chapter 10, pp. 181–198; Yoshiki Kobayashi, 'Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 28 No.4 (2015); Richard Samuels, *Special Duty* (Cornell University Press, 2019).
- 4 Paul Pillar, *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence (7th edition)* (Washington D.C.: C. Q. Press, 2016); Philip Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012); Kerry Brown, *New Emperors* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).
- 5 Article 4, *MOFA Organization Act* (revised in September 2016).
- 6 Morio Sato, *Joho Senso no Kyokun (The Lessons of Intelligence War)* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 2012), pp. 27–8.
- 7 Asagumo Shimbunsha, *Boei Hand Book, Heisei 28 Nen Ban (Handbook of Defense, 2016 version)* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2016), p. 25.
- 8 Explanation of Yoshihide Suga, *Dai 185 Kai Sangiin Kokka Anzen Hoshō ni Kansuru Tokubetsu linkai Kaigiroku, Dai 3 Gou (Special Committee Minutes on National Security, vol.3, The 185th House of Councillors)*, 18 November 2013.
- 9 Chihiro Hosoya, *Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei no Nichibeiki Hikaku (Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making Process in the US and Japan)* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1977), p. 16

- 10 Tomohito Shinoda, *Reisengo no Nihon Gaiko (Japanese Foreign Policy after the Cold War)* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2006), p. 114.
- 11 *Ibid.* pp. 106–9.
- 12 Suga's explanation in the minutes of the Special Committee on National Security, vol. 2, The 185th House of Representatives, 28 October 2013, *Kokkai Gijiroku (Diet Record)*.
- 13 Website of the Prime Minister's Office; www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ anzenhosyoukaigi/kaisai.html
- 14 'The First Nine-Ministers' Meeting', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Newspaper)*, 10 December 2013. www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASF51000C_Q3A211C1EB1000/
- 15 A statement of Shuichi Kitazaki, Councillor Cabinet Secretariat, Special Committee on National Security, vol. 2, The 185th House of Representatives, 13 November 2013, *Kokkai Gijiroku (Diet Record)*.
- 16 Paragraph 4, Article 17, *Act for Establishment of the NSC*.
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- 19 Richard Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 192.
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- 21 Paragraph 2, Article 6, *Act for Establishment of the NSC*.
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- 24 Kitazaki's explanation in the minutes of the Special Committee on National Security, vol. 3, The 185th House of Representatives, 30 October 2013, *Kokkai Gijiroku (Diet Record)*.
- 25 Cabinet Secretariat website; www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhoshoukaigi/kaisai.html
- 26 Ryoichi Oriki and Masafumi Kaneko, 'Kokka Anzen Hoshou Kaigi Hyoka to Teigen' (National Security Council: Estimation and Advice), the PHP research Project, 26 November 2015, p. 53. https://thinktank.php.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/seisaku_teigen20151126.pdf
- 27 Minoo Hidaka, *Gunki Hogo-ho (Military Secrets Act)* (Tokyo: Hata Shoten, 1937).
- 28 Richard Sorge was a famous Soviet military intelligence officer who provided information about Germany and Japan's intention to attack the Soviet Union. He was arrested in October 1941 and hanged in 1944.
- 29 Yuri Rastvorov was a Soviet military intelligence officer of the Soviet Trade Representative in Japan who worked to obtain information about the US military in Japan. He defected to the United States in 1954 and revealed to the CIA that he had had many agents in Japan.
- 30 L. D. Kononov was an assistant military attaché of the Soviet embassy in Japan who tried to obtain US military secret information at the Yokota Base through a Japanese agent. He managed to leave Japan after the Japanese agent was arrested in 1971.
- 31 Ex-Major General of the GSDF, Yukihisa Miyanaga, was an agent for Soviet Colonel Kozlov and provided the SDF's secret information. He was arrested in 1980, while Kozlov returned to the USSR.
- 32 Stanislav Levchenko was a KGB intelligence officer who worked for propaganda operations in Japan and defected to the United States in 1979. Stan Levchenko, *On the Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB* (London: Brassey's, 1988).
Regarding these incidents, see Gaiji Jiken Kenkyu Kai, *Sengo no Gaiji-jiken (Foreign Affairs Incidents after WWII)* (Tokyo Houtei Shuppan, 2007), pp.186–9.
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- 36 PHP Research Institute (ed.), *Nihon no Interijensu Taisei: Henkaku heno Rood Mappu* (Japanese Intelligence: A Roadmap to Transformation), p. 25; https://thinktank.php.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/seisaku01_teigen33_00.pdf
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- 42 MOFA website; www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_003651.html
- 43 NHK website, "Shirarezaru Tero Joho Kikan (Unknown Counter-Terrorism Agency)"; <https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/11174.html>
- 44 Takeshi Iwaya on the web, 12 September 2016; www.t-iwaya.com/message/?action=detail&id=3180c8c5fa8aa90b6885f6b9ff3ebc72
- 45 'LDP's proposal of Japanese "CIA" to government', *Kyodo Tsushin*, 27 December 2015.
- 46 Pillar, *Intelligence and US Foreign Policy*, chapter 13.
- 47 Oros, 'Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability', pp. 6–8.
- 48 PHP Research Institute, (Japanese Intelligence: A Roadmap to Transformation), p. 22.
- 49 Davies, *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States*, pp. 308–9.
- 50 Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p. 135.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Making in China

Kerry Brown

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental characteristic of policy-making processes and patterns in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the dynamic relationship between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the government administration. As one of only five remaining states where a Communist party exercises a monopoly on power (Laos, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba are the others as of 2016) the PRC continues to typify the idiosyncratic nature of policy making in Marxist–Leninist regimes, with the Party having a decisive but often hard to quantify or describe role over how policy is articulated, and then in what ways it is implemented and how these are then evaluated. This works both for domestic and international policy-making issues.

In a multi-party democratic system, competing political parties set out during competitive elections different policy stalls. The one that wins (or the coalition of parties) is then able to hand these over to an apolitical bureaucracy to action. This is never a straightforward process. Sometimes policies prove unworkable (the turmoil after the Referendum over implementing Brexit in the UK from 2016 exemplifies this), or the civil service proves resistant to implementing them. At other times, costs prove prohibitive, or support from the public changes. The most one can say in such a context is that the role of the bureaucracy in initiating and proposing policy should not take precedence over that of the sponsoring political party. Clear boundaries, usually written in constitutions, are set out delineating the role of the parties in policy making, and that of the bureaucracy.

In the PRC, this division between the political and the administrative is unclear. This is illustrated by the fact that it is a nation with two constitutions – a country one (Xinhua, 1982) and a Party one (National People's Congress, 2018 (revised)). Neither mentions the other in great detail. They stand like statements from parallel universes. In a sense, this is what they are. The Party constitution regulates the political role of the CCP. The State constitution describes the role of National People's Congresses (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC). It describes how laws are passed and where different kinds of power and responsibilities lie. Neither document clearly states the relationship with each other.

Chinese leaders in modern times have said little more about what the role of the CCP actually is, presumably because in spelling this out too clearly they might restrict the options and space available to them. As in other Communist Party systems their Party occupies a privileged position, standing almost above and over society, supplying the broad parameters and grand strategic objectives towards which society, under its tutelage and leadership, is driving. In the words of one analyst, 'Serious conflicts [...] are resolved within the Party ... It is the absence of strict authority boundaries or elite boundaries between the Party and non-Party institutions together with the primacy of the Party that gives politics in communist systems its distinctive character'. (Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982). For Liu Yunshan, the Politburo member in charge of ideology at the time, speaking to a group of scholars in Denmark in mid 2014, the CCP is something akin to a repository of Chinese people's aspirations and hopes – a body that is part strategic, part spiritual and part cultural, within which all Chinese people, the CCP believes, can find a home (Brown, 2018). For the Beijing-based academic Wang Hui, the CCP has an 'evaluative role' over society (Wang, 2010: 9). For Xi Jinping, the CCP is the repository of the experiences, lessons and wisdom about reform according to Chinese national conditions undertaken over its decades in governance since 1949 when it came to power. The Party, in this framework, can excuse away its mistakes because, having learned from them, they are the basis on which it can now with confidence create a future (Brown, 2014: 193–5). It figures as an epistemic community, or, in a more down-to-earth description, as the ideational brain lording it over the brawn of the implementing government machinery, whose role is not to think but simply to find ways to carry out and do. In that sense, the bureaucracy in China is as much the servant of the politicians as is the case in the western liberal systems – though with the important difference that there is only one party it ever serves, giving a more monolithic and stable nature to its relationships and role.

While the CCP clearly has far more levers for control over domestic policy, this chapter's arguments apply as much to foreign policy, where the role of the Party as a coordinator and synthesizer, and as a broker of compromise between contending groups and networks of vested interest in society, is still dominant. Through a system at the top of which the Politburo Standing Committee sits,

there is a network of consultation and facilitation mechanisms between state-owned enterprises, non-state companies, local and central government bodies and then stakeholders such as think tanks, universities, the military and other bodies in order to carry out this process of creating consensus, and forging agreement about what to do and how to do it. While the workings between these various bodies are not clear, and the system is often as much informal as formal, there is evidence in some areas of the ways in which themes are discussed and then lead to policy-relevant outcomes. This will be discussed in more detail as it relates to issues such as handling inequality, dealing with demographic issues and environmental problems and handling the South China Sea issue, in the final section (Jakobson and Knox, 2010). These will be looked at because they clearly present dilemmas and alternative pathways for the Party State to travel along, offer some insights into how decisions have been arrived at and then what has been done to carry these out. First though, it is important to look at the evolution of decision making and the development of the Party, the state and the bureaucracy that serves it, over the last seven decades that the CCP has been in power. This gives some idea, at least, of how China came to have the system it has today, and what its characteristics are.

The CCP's Policy-Making History

Scholars of the early decades of the CCP in power described in detail the relationship between the Party and government and the ways this impacted on the formulation and then implementation of policy. A very important part of this was the role of personnel and the arrangement of particular groups of people to have leadership roles and disseminate ideology which could then be used to guide and inform decision making. Doak Barnett (1967) has delivered a comprehensive overview of the function of cadres and the ways in which, from national down to local level, their identities have shifted between political and administrative ones. There was always a tension between these two roles, and between those who occupied specifically party roles, and those in government. Party secretaries and managers were meant, between them, to carve out harmonious relations, and to address some of the very tribal, cliquey nature of Chinese society at this time (something Mao Zedong labelled as 'mountain stronghold mentality'), creating a broader, more generically shared vision of how society should develop and what needed to be done by the state to fulfil the Party's political will (the Party, of course, always acting on behalf of 'the people'). This was often a hard process, leading to clashes over economic policy (during the Great Leap Forward from 1957) and then the very role of the Party in society (Doak Barnett, 1967).

A huge factor in all of this, impacting on the nature of the relationship between the Party and other groups in society, was the role of ideology. For Franz Schurmann (1966), ideology had a major role to play in policy formation within the PRC, and its interpretation and articulation was one of the core sources of influence and

authority of the Party and one of the main issues on which contending groups within it needed to sort out a consensus. The distinctive signified Marxism–Leninism which had been devised by Mao Zedong and those around him from the 1930s led, by a process almost like dialectic materialism, to Maoism, or Mao Zedong Thought, a body of ideas that acknowledged some of the base tenets of Marxist truth and its Soviet interpretation, but then adapted them to the overwhelmingly agrarian conditions in the PRC. The forceful insistence on fidelity to this ideological parameter meant that from 1957 and the Great Leap Forward, through to the Cultural Revolution a decade later, policy needed to be in accordance with and justified by this body of ideas – and this in particular was a source of control by Mao and his allies within the CCP. As Schurmann shows, there were many cases where ideology dictated policy positions that proved deeply challenging and often harmful – not least the drive towards communes as a unit of social and economic organization from the late 1950s, and the almost complete dominance of the state sector and the command economy, with complete repudiation of any market principles. This meant that policy that violated this core set of ideological beliefs carried huge risks for those officials who tried to practise it, and often came to be politically overruled. The most pertinent example of this was the brief resort to limited markets in the Four Modernizations presented under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in 1962 after the implosion from the Great Leap Forward. These were rebutted in the Cultural Revolution four years later, reverting to the more ideological and Utopian tenor which had prevailed before 1962 (Schurmann, 1966). A core lesson one can learn from this period was that those who won the battle for ideological supremacy within the CCP elite (the upper echelons in Beijing) had a good chance of gaining control over other areas of control in the administration.

Deng Xiaoping's ascent after 1978 eroded this fixation with ideology by famously insisting on 'experience being the criterion for truth', with the idea being abandoned of a priori party dogma taking precedence over what people could see with their own eyes and hear with their own ears. In a sense, all this meant was that a more flexible set of ideas was adopted. Ideas however, still mattered, and were the core currency by which the Party communicated with the administrative state. Markets were accepted, foreign capital allowed and private enterprises initially tolerated, then finally nurtured and embraced – all on the basis of a new set of ideas introduced into the country through the mantra of 'liberating thought'. The Four Modernizations were rehabilitated. In this new context, the terms of policy making and divisions between government and party functions resulted in a new kind of contract – one where there was an accommodation where the Party supplied very broad frameworks within which principles for social, economic and political behaviour were allowed to unfold. But in terms of detailed involvement with implementation, it seemingly withdrew and left this to the bureaucrats and a set of other actors, only intervening when the relationship between these grew too turbulent (1989, and the clash between students and the state is a cause célèbre of this).

The Party State Relationship in the Era of Deng

A good example of the new kind of dynamic between party ideological principles and policy making in this era can be found in one of the most important changes made at the time – the dismantling of the commune system and the allowance of agrarian reform through what eventually became known as the Household Responsibility system. One side effect of this was the subsequent rise of the Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Deng himself was to admit some years later that, notwithstanding Wang Hui's comments quoted above about the CCP operating as an evaluative, strategizing body, a great deal of the whole TVE phenomenon had been unplanned. Deng stated:

In the rural reforms our greatest success – and it is one we had by no means anticipated – has been the emergence of a large number of enterprises run by villages and townships. They were like a new force that just came into being spontaneously... The Central Committee [of the Chinese Communist Party] takes no credit for this. (Deng, 1994: 236)

The policy-making framework before 1978, if it could be said to embrace creativity (and in many ways it did), was often highly unpredictable and, at times, destructive. The policy to send so many of China's young down to the countryside from 1968 (Xi Jinping took part in this phenomenon), to take one example, deprived China of a generation of university-educated young, depleting its human capital – although it did achieve other results in nurturing a highly politicized generation. These are now the people who largely run China in 2016. After 1978, policy-making space was refined in some places and, ironically, became much less chaotic and therefore less free. But it also became pragmatic, and in the economic sphere in particular geared to particular measurable outcomes by which consensus was created over what ranked as success and what could be marked down as failure.

The dismantling of the communes typifies this new kind of policy creativity. It involved a highly iterative process, where different elite figures with experience of rural issues returned to Beijing. Figures such as Wang Zhen, formerly a provincial Party Secretary, then appointed to the Politburo and Central Committee, were able to negotiate with figures who had become influential at the time, such as CCP Party Secretary from 1980 to 1987, Hu Yaobang, and his successor from 1987 to 1989, Zhao Ziyang, trying to create a new framework for managing rural affairs. In rural areas in Sichuan and Anhui, famously, risks were being taken by local farmers, loosening themselves from the regulations that had prevailed until then, setting aside small amounts of land to grow crops for their own use and then selling these on something similar to a primitive open market. But as historians of the Maoist and Deng era Warren Sun and Frederick Teiwes, have shown, this was not a simple case of one set of policies being ripped up and neatly replaced by another (Teiwes and Sun, 2015). The vastness of China, the complexity of the situation in different regions and the varying roles of different, often competing individuals meant that a better description for what was happening would

be along the lines of a battle, in which there were skirmishes, moves and counter-moves in different parts of the policy space only slowly moving towards the creation and then acceptance of a new consensus. In some areas, relaxation of policy led to immediate or very quick successes, which could then be used to promote the idea to other areas or higher levels of governance. But there were also areas where there was resistance, often with good reason, and others where failures resulted from the new more liberal policy. In other areas, deep conservatism meant there were impediments even to trying anything new in the first place and, until direct instructions came from Beijing, nothing was ever tried.

Part of this was to do with incentives within the government system. The regime that prevailed up to 1978 meant that while experimentation always existed, the punishment for what was deemed failure was very high and the criterion even more treacherous to interpret. Yesterday's success was often today's disaster. Liu Shaoqi, for instance, in sponsoring relaxation of the command economy system in the early 1960s showed that even right at the top of the Party State system, those deemed to be on the wrong side when the political winds changed direction were dealt with very harshly. Liu was to ultimately pay with his life. For lower-level officials with less impressive patronage networks, being regarded as unorthodox, or pushing for policies that ended up not working, especially if these were innovative and introduced against opposition in the first place, meant often bringing recriminations that could be quick and comprehensive!

Officials did have broader incentives built into the system from 1978, and as time went on these became much better organized and institutionalized. For a successful administrative career, therefore, officials needed to deliver positive GDP growth but also address issues such as attracting foreign investment and, increasingly, ensuring that social stability was maintained. The post-reform framework in the PRC has meant that considerable latitude has been granted to officials to achieve this. But for those working early on in Dengist China, there was clearly a dynamic context in which risk-taking by officials for whom space opened up in the policy arena lower down the bureaucratic and administrative system was met with flexibility and tolerance by those higher up, often reaching right into the top of the party. Far from, therefore, being a top down, highly vertical process, this was more like a 'bottom up, top down' dynamic, where both ends negotiated with each other, and ideological and political parameters were set flexibly and often adapted and recalibrated.

This process of recalibration continued throughout the 1980s. As Barry Naughton has shown, the Town and Village Enterprises were able to create a new growth model and new employment for those who had been freed up from work in the traditional rural sector by greater productivity and efficiency (Naughton, 2007). They took different forms in different places in which they occurred. There was no one model. Policy was simply flexible enough and pragmatic enough to allow different actors to explore ideas and practices without punitive measures being taken against them.

Policy from the 1990s to the Era of Xi Jinping

In the era after 1989, China became a more hybrid and much more complex landscape. Perhaps the strongest binding link over this whole era was the presiding role of the Party, and its strategic importance. But the ways in which it has articulated and then regulated policy have changed markedly. In some ways, the CCP has withdrawn from many areas of social and economic life. It has allowed what Max Weber described as the rise of highly specialist, technically adept administrators (Weber, 2004). They have had responsibility over creating policies in the financial, health and rural realms and issuing policy pronouncements that are far more comprehensive than anything ever issued in the Mao or the early Deng era. The role of the Party as the master of the political realm, however, has not subsided, with any attempts to renegotiate this rebuffed.

The policy-making functions of the Party State in the era of Xi are the result of arguments and adaptations made throughout the era of reform. The dramatic impact of the volte-face committed by Deng and his allies from 1978 onwards has continued to reverberate through the decades in China since. At its heart was a fierce argument over the role of the market and market principles. Even in the hot phase of marketization in the 1980s, figures such as influential Party ideologue Deng Liqun wrote fiercely in resistance of what he saw as the undermining of socialist, collectivist principles and in defence of state ownership of enterprise (Brown and Neuwenhuizen, 2016). This debate has never been completely resolved, with the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 declaring that the market had a decisive role over reform at the same time as it also mandated the state having an irreplaceable role in economics and development.

This only reflects the fact that the renegotiations over the role of the state after 1978 meant that a whole raft of new models and conceptual frameworks were used to try to understand exactly what the relationship between Party, government and society was. For scholars such as Shue, the outcome was simply something that harnessed the energies of the Chinese people for social goals in a more politically and economically efficient way than they had before. But there was no great caesura marking the era before and after 1978. The later era was a natural development of what had been tried but often found failing before (Shue, 1988). The institutional result of so much experimentation and change was a model that finally carried the label 'fragmented authoritarian'. In the words of scholars such as Oksenberg and Lieberthal, the PRC came to practise a model where the Party was able to issue grand directives but where local-level officials were given latitude to pursue their own objectives (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). Fragmented authoritarian was not, however, a description that the Chinese themselves understood as the best language to describe what they had become and what model they were working under.

Policy is inevitably tied up with thinking about objectives and the processes that are best to achieve these goals. A core issue here is to create broad consensus

over which goals are worth a society going for. Creating a broad consensus about the objectives society was going towards, and making sure these were pragmatic and achievable, was the great achievement of the Dengist revolution. The goal was simple: to raise material living standards and to create a better quality of life. The tools adopted to achieve this were market reforms, use of foreign knowledge and capital and incremental opening to the outside world through Special Economic Zones. Ideas were borrowed from those economies in the region which had produced high GDP growth since the Second World War – and in particular South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Singapore. Policy supported manufacturing industries, allowing companies access to capital from state banks, flexible models by which to co-operate with foreign companies and use of technology from partners such as Japan, the United States and others (Huang, 2004).

Creating economic outcomes was the core, overarching objective of policy from the 1980s and this only intensified from the 1990s onwards. Hu Jintao was able to declare at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 that economy was the key issue. This gave high status to economic goals such as production of GDP growth, increase of foreign direct investment and investment into capital fixed assets. These were the things that were offered as the benchmark of success.

Clearly though, there was a whole raft of other areas of policy that mattered but where outcomes were far harder to judge. GDP expansion could be encapsulated in one easy statistic, and indeed, the political importance of this through the years of high reform in the post-Mao era was immeasurable. Double-digit growth was the figure that closed down arguments over whether the country was going in the right direction or not. Dissenters were simply shown China's booming cities and the rise of personal cars, apartments and better quality jobs as evidence for this. But by the mid 2000s, there were other issues, from environmental degradation caused as a result of breakneck industrialization, to rising inequality, inequalities between different areas of China and issues over the provision of healthcare. While all of these to a certain extent had causes and solutions involved with economic development, they demanded far more complex responses. Looking at each of these issues in turn helps us to see the different kinds of worlds in which policy had to operate in China and the different functions it needed to perform.

A final important change is that because of the immense size of the Chinese economy from the 2000s, the impact of changes within China almost always had global import. As the 2008 global financial crisis showed, the world outside was inextricably linked to China's economy and the two had an almost symbiotic relationship where problems in one area quickly spread to problems in the other. Provincial leaders in places such as Guangdong were in charge of economies that were the size of many major countries in terms of their GDP. The link between domestic policy and foreign policy has become stronger, with no clear wall between the two. Even local governments in China now have to consider their relationship with the outside world through investment, enterprise links and other kinds of dialogue. This has given policy calculations in China an

added complexity and involved a group of stakeholders spelt out in more detail in the final section of this chapter, along with ways of thinking and balancing different interests, which introduced a new kind of policy-making calculation within China. In essence, even the most domestic of issues involved some kind of thinking about foreign issues – whether, for instance, healthcare changes should involve foreign partners and, if so, how, whether local economic developments should be open to foreign actors and investors and whether new regulations and rules needed to be in accord with international obligations that China had taken on with entry to the WTO, for instance.

ENVIRONMENT

The impact of development on China's environment has been well documented. Scholars such as Economy and Shapiro have shown the way in which factories, cars and industrial processes have impacted on air quality, water and the Chinese food chain (Economy, 2004; Shapiro, 2012). The Maoist approach to the environment was confrontational. Nature was to be bent to the will of man. The movements that he inspired had a devastating impact, with deforestation, massive irrigation projects which failed and campaigns waged against birdlife and fauna (Shapiro, 2001). Environmentalism in China started late in its journey into modernity. If there was a policy framework in the 1980s, it was that whatever the ill effects on air, water and soil from manufacturing and industrial processes, once China became rich these would be cleared up. And in any case, as became clear in the Chinese response in the 1990s and 2000s to the global environmental movement, China regarded the responsibility on the great clean-up lay more with developed countries which had the resources and wealth to address these, and which had been the earliest, and amongst the largest, contributors to the problem.

This very abstract policy aim was reflected in the institutional structures. The Party produced vague-sounding rhetoric about preserving the environment, but there was no ministry for the environment, but only a State Environmental Protection Office, with a mere 300 officials by the 2000s (Economy, 2004: 107). As policy recognized the importance of the environment, this changed. The terrible smogs that blighted Beijing over late 2012 and into 2013 and which spread to other cities, along with the high awareness of the ill effects of bad air on public health meant that a special Ministry for the Environment was created with the status to at least try to influence public debate. Xi Jinping's words about a 'China Dream' in 2013 included that of having a good quality environment. Laws which existed and had hardly been noticed before started to be enforced with much greater exactness. State companies in particular were taken to task for raising environmental standards. China took a major part in the Paris Climate Change conference in late 2015 and signed an accord with the United States in 2014 capping carbon emissions by 2030 for the first time. Finally, and perhaps most

importantly, officials right down to local level were assessed partly on their ability to deliver environmental outcomes.

China now has the institutional infrastructure, public consensus and an objective that policy is geared towards achieving. The question is whether even this is enough to deliver the immense improvements China needs in the next few years. This is also one of the most tangible ways in which China has to work with the wider world, and with bodies in the UN and elsewhere to assess and achieve its environmental protection targets. In the era of President Donald Trump, who withdrew from the Paris Convention in 2017, it is also an area where, albeit reluctantly, China has needed to take an increasing leadership posture. It has established a broadly consensual language with the outside world on the challenges, and how to best approach them – one of the most impressive areas. Whereas its language about security and other issues is often markedly different from other key partners such as the United States or Europe, on the environment it has adopted a language which is broadly aligned with the global environmental movement.

INEQUALITY

Speaking to a group of scholars in Beijing in September 2015 at the Great Hall of the People, the former Mayor of Beijing, and current member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and chief anti-corruption enforcer, Wang Qishan, stated that the greatest issue in the PRC was how to handle equity and efficiency. Equity was the most vexatious and carried the greatest threat. For a society that, according to the Gini co-efficient, had one of the most equal societies in the early 1980s at the start of the reform era, by the 2000s China had dropped to one of the most unequal. Evidence of this ranged from the many million who were malnourished or living in poverty, trying to survive on less than 2 dollars a day, to the increasing number of billionaires, many of whom sat on China's parliament. Getting rich in China had truly become glorious. Where entrepreneurs had once been regarded as social outcasts, in 2002 they were even allowed to join the Party, their wealth being a badge of success, not failure.

Such inequality produced increasingly fractious outcomes. Social protest rose steeply. Per capita GDP in Shanghai and Beijing rose to levels over USD12,000, more indicative of a middle-income country. But in Gansu, or other provinces in the western regions of the country, the per capita GDP stayed at around 4,000 dollars per annum. Such imbalances were very problematic for a Party whose official ideology was socialist, and who therefore supported development and wealth creation for all. The emergence of a new super-wealthy elite, with expensive cars, clothes and apartments clashed with the sense that, according at least to the 1982 country constitution, the PRC remained a nation where the people were masters of their affairs and owned the means to production.

Addressing inequality and the resentments that it created domestically became a focus of Party work and government policy, particularly in the Hu Jintao era, where the official slogan from 2007 was to ‘take people as the base’ (yi ren wei ben 以人為本) and to strive for a more balanced, harmonious model. ‘Harmonious society’ was written into the constitution, the core ideological contribution of Hu Jintao. In practice, it led to a broadly better deal for rural areas, with taxes on farmers lifted in the middle part of the decade and attempts to direct more wealth creation to less developed parts of the country.

The Chinese government’s policy response to inequality, however, has been no more or less effective than that used in, for instance, the developed economies of the United States or Europe. There too, tax regimes and other political measures have had highly mixed records in trying to deal with the increasing gap between the well off and the less fortunate. Under Xi Jinping, the tactics deployed have only proved more diverse. Striving for balanced, better-distributed development, the Party initially targeted itself, realizing that its officials were involved with vast amounts of illicit commercial activity and were seen as enforcing actions which increased, rather than reduced, inequality. The first task of the CCP under Xi therefore was to launch an anti-corruption struggle, but one which directed itself at the actions of the Party and its poor delivery of more equitable outcomes for people. While the anti-corruption struggle has been widely interpreted as a politically motivated purge, one of its principal focuses has been on slapping down rampant opportunism and exploitative behaviour. State enterprises have been targeted, along with specific entrepreneurs, and officials with an over-comfortable relationship with specific sectors or business areas.

China does not have under Xi a specific policy on inequality. Rather it has a tactical approach supported by the Party which has attempted to balance the need to find new, dynamic sources of growth in an era where GDP has been falling with a greater sharing-out of wealth amongst different social groups. But the market principles underlying this, albeit with the strong direction of the Party State, were asserted unequivocally in the Plenum statement in 2013. There were also strong commitments to completely eradicate poverty by 2025 made at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The main institution by which inequality reduction policy is guided is the National Development and Reform Commission. The core tools that it uses are macro-economic planning, in the Five Year Programmes, the latest of which was introduced in 2016. These contain clear sections on handling inequality and dealing with imbalances in society. This responsibility is then handed down to various levels of government. As with the environment, officials are judged on their ability to address severe inequality.

The one thing this area does illustrate clearly is the real struggle between two often competing imperatives – to maintain high levels of growth, but at the same time to ensure that growth is spread evenly. China needs the entrepreneurial energy and wealth-creation ability of the private sector. Some of these have grown immensely rich. However, it lacks the taxation system to clearly try to redistribute

wealth across society (see below). The tension between allowing laissez-faire measures while maintaining socialist central planning has never disappeared. As with other areas, therefore, policy towards inequality operates within a framework where a number of different options are kept alive. The main issue for this framework is to be flexible and broad. Once more, though, in its adoption of the UN Development Goals over 2000, China has shown that it has adopted a common discourse on the main imperatives for dealing with poverty and addressing inequality, as much of the rest of the world.

REGIONAL ISSUES

The PRC consists of a mixture of provinces, municipalities directly under the central government (of which there are four – Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), autonomous regions (five – Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Guangxi) and special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau). There are five levels of government – central, provincial, prefectural, county and township, with villages regarded as self-governing entities. Each level of government has people's congresses and its own regulatory and governance system. Despite this plethora of regional entities and governance levels, through its fiscal system China is a highly centralized country. Most tax revenue is collected and sent to Beijing, which then redistributes it. The central government also controls policy on defence and on macro-economic planning (Saich, 2015).

The interplay between local and central forces in China is a much studied area. Hillman writes of the very wide-ranging powers given to local officials even in remote areas (Hillman, 2014). The idea that 'Above there are measures, below there are counter-measures' (Shang you zhengce, xia you duice, 上有政策, 下有对策) encapsulates the contractions. This is not a new problem. Tensions have existed throughout imperial history between upper and lower levels of governance in China, with frequent breakdowns and conflicts, some of which carried colossal costs (the Taiping rebellion from 1850 to 1864 is the most studied example).

Differences in population size of provinces (Sichuan has 100 million people, Tibet only 3 million), geographical size (Shanghai has an area of 640 sq. km, Xinjiang makes up an area which constitutes 16% of the whole country) and wealth levels mean that, to many, China figures best as a continental entity, rather than a unified nation state. The challenges of formulating a workable policy that is relevant across all these different regions and that speaks to the complex different groups within each area have proved to be enormous. In some ways, it is a valid question whether the country can have one overall policy framework at all.

With policy anywhere, there is also the calculation of winners and losers and of how to overcome vested interests. A policy change will always create those who gain and those who lose out. The whole reform process since 1978 has clearly been to the benefit of a great many, but has also left many others behind – people

laid off, for instance, from the state enterprises during reforms in the late 1990s under Zhu Rongji, or rural groups who had land appropriated by local government officials due to the need to create new revenue streams. Perhaps the most challenging group for the Xi leadership has been migrant labourers, those who have moved largely from rural or semi-rural areas to work in China's cities and special economic zones. For these people, there has been constant insecurity, due primarily to the still-prevailing 'household registration' (hukou) system, which classifies people according to their place of birth into either rural or urban, and then grants them different kinds of access to public goods. For urban-living holders of rural household registration documents, this can create a major impediment in their lives – ranging from placing barriers on their access to healthcare to getting their children into schools (Loyalka, 2012).

The Xi leadership has lifted some of the restrictions on hukou residency. They have done so because it was a policy that affected so many people who were contributing to growth through their work and enterprise, and therefore could not continue to be disenfranchised. But household registration reform is an issue that involves creating a new compact between local and higher forms of government. In particular, it involves solving the issue of how local government, deprived of many tax-raising powers, can cover the costs in social and health insurance for a large number of people for whom responsibility to provide will fall on their heads if full urban rights are granted to them. That involves pressing for a new fiscal deal with Beijing, something that has partially happened under Xi (Kroeber, 2016). It has entailed facing down the vested interests of local and high forms of government, with the central government ultimately very wary of granting too many powers for fear of being faced with over-mighty and rebellious provincial entities. The imperative still remains to control. Policy initiatives therefore have to go through gruelling negotiations, with the usual ultimate outcome being compromise. In this aspect, the Chinese system for all its particularities is not dissimilar to that found in other environments.

HEALTHCARE

As China has developed over the last four decades, so too has the health profile of its people. People are now living longer, with life expectancy for men and women reaching into the seventies. But changes in diet, in lifestyle and in the environment mean that Chinese people are suffering increasingly from the kinds of disease profile of those in developed countries. Infectious diseases have been overtaken by chronic problems such as cancer and heart disease. Obesity has increased dramatically. And Chinese smoke more than any other country now (Lancet, 2008: 1437).

Despite this, China spent only 5.6% of its GDP on healthcare, compared with almost 18% for the United States in 2014–2015 (World Health Organisation, 2015).

Its provision of healthcare has ranged from universal provision in the Maoist era, to a more variegated approach now. Guo sets out evidence for the increasing disparities between regions, and urban and rural areas, in healthcare provision, so that cities such as Beijing and Shanghai enjoy some of the best care facilities in the country, comparable to those in the United States or Europe, while in other areas, hospitals are run-down, with expertise limited and care provision patchy to non-existent (Guo, 2010: 159–63).

The central government under both Hu and Xi has introduced healthcare reform, attempting to set up a basic medical insurance scheme that now covers over 95% of Chinese people, investing in grass-roots level medical institutions, training more doctors and health professionals and reforming public hospitals. As in other areas of social welfare reform, however, something that matters hugely to the core constituency of the urban middle class whose prosperity will be the future driver of growth in China in the next decade or so, there are challenges about working out who pays, how they pay and what they are paying for. Pension provision, for instance, is important in a country whose population is ageing rapidly. But as Frazier points out, the relatively low age at which people can retire in China, and the expectations of government provision for public services, along with the demographics, have created a massive pension crisis, exacerbated by the clear lack of a national policy and delegation down to local levels to somehow cover the looming crisis (Frazier, 2010).

For policy makers, hammering out some kind of new deal in a China where healthcare, pension and social welfare need more resources and attract higher expectations leads immediately back to fiscal reform, and that involves tax. Of the current revenues of tax, only 10% come from private citizens, compared with more than 50% in a developed economy. As Thomas Paine, the great English reformist, wrote, there can be no taxation without representation. However, in China the Party State is loath to tax more when that might involve political compromise and erosion of the one Party monopoly on power. The issue, however, of how the state at national and local level can sustain the current system without seeking new sources of revenue is a serious one. Increasing productivity, and efficiency, is important. But they answer only part of the problem. Creating policy where more tax revenues are expected from higher earning middle-class Chinese citizens will also involve a framework for some kind of new political deal for them, and greater participation in decision making. This is one of the fundamental challenges of the Xi administration – demonstrating receptiveness and responsiveness to the middle class, but not allowing this to feed into demands for political reform that erode the monopolizing status of the Party (Brown, 2016: 156–60). In healthcare, too, while intrinsically domestic, it does involve considering how foreign partners, from pharmaceutical companies such as GSK, to research partners such as universities in Europe or America, can work with China to face some of its immense looming issues. A challenge here is to identify common ethical principles on which research can be conducted, and clinical trials and

other practical issues achieved. Unlike in the environment area, in this one there is less of a shared language over how best to address challenges such as protection of intellectual property and common understanding of the role of medical trials.

FOREIGN POLICY: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE BELT AND ROAD.

As already stated, as China has risen to greater global prominence, because of the size of its economy and the concomitant geopolitical importance that has given it, foreign policy has become increasingly prominent. Almost all domestic issues in the era of Xi have a global dimension. As shown above, China's attempts to deal with its environmental and healthcare problems, because of their scale and the impact they have on such a large population, have knock-on effects for the Asia Pacific region, and for the wider world. In the era of Mao, foreign policy was largely the preserve of a small elite, with Mao sitting dominant in the centre. It was clear that on issues such as rapprochement with the United States, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, his utterances gave the framework by which the country approached major strategic issues (Macmillan, 2007). Under Deng, there was looser control, but the parameters supplied by the paramount leader were still crucial. Deng, for instance, supplied the idea of the 'One Country, Two Systems' rubric to deal with the issue of Hong Kong, and also dealt with the overall positioning of the country, by deployment of the '24 character' statement – 'keep a low profile, build up capacity, and never seek hegemony'.

In terms of implementation and 'filling out' of these broad directives, a system evolved in which flowing from a Small Leading Group on Foreign Affairs at the apex, bringing together military and civilian, Party and government voices, gave more specific direction over issues such as policy towards North Korea, Japan and the United States. The close involvement of elite figures in the Party such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao on important issues such as the direction of Sino–US relations was crucial. But there were a range of other voices in a move towards multi-vocality from the era of univocalism under Mao (Brown, 2016a).

According to one analysis by Jakobson and Knox (2010), there was a circle of institutions and entities that contributed to the making and then implementation of foreign policy flowing into this central group. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its relatively small number of staff and lack of clout within China, was perhaps one of the least significant, despite its name. In fact, the Finance Ministry, Ministry for Foreign Commerce and National Development and Reform Commission all had key interests abroad which had to be taken into account. In addition to these, there was the People's Liberation Army, in charge of the new naval assets, which was involving itself increasingly in activity beyond China's borders. In 2015, for instance, for the first time ever, China established a naval centre in Djibouti, Eastern Africa.

Beyond government and military institutions, however, there were others who were playing a role. For state-owned enterprises, with increasing numbers of assets and investments abroad, they also needed to have a voice. The massive state energy companies, for instance, had interests running across the Middle East and into Africa and Latin America. Chinese state banks too were playing a role in funding Chinese investments, so also had influence over foreign policy. Non-state companies were appearing, often in the more developed markets such as Europe where Huawei, the telecoms provider, had major interests, as did Geely, a private Chinese automotive company that bought the Swedish Volvo brand from General Motors in 2010. Non-state companies became major leaseholders in Germany and investors in technology companies in the UK. They too therefore wanted to be involved in formulating foreign policy, to preserve the value and stability of their involvements.

Players in foreign policy stretched far beyond Beijing. Regional and sub-regional levels of government undertook campaigns to promote their economic and tourist attributes abroad. Even cities such as Hangzhou held campaigns to attract visitors in London and Paris. Yunnan Copper, a state company in the south-west of China, had investments in Australia. Alibaba, based in Zhejiang, also started to figure across Europe, Australia and North America. Some Chinese provinces had economies which were the equivalent of those of major countries. It was not surprising that they wished to compete against neighbouring provinces in order to raise their international profile and get more interest from foreign investors and business people.

There were also Party entities, such as the Central Committee International Liaison Department, in charge of the CCP's links with foreign political parties, enjoying relations with over 600 across the globe. Beyond these, there were influences on foreign policy from think tanks such as the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) linked to the Ministry of State Security, and the Chinese Institute for Strategic Studies (CISS) which had links with the military. Individual academics in universities such as Beijing or Tsinghua also promoted particular views of the world, with some figures such as Yan Xuetong announcing a more nationalist-style world view he wished to see reflected in foreign policy, and figures such as the late Wu Jianmian offering a more nuanced, collaborative vision.

Finally, there were the views of the people. Chinese people as never before have been able to articulate very clear views on foreign policy through social media, which have had an impact on foreign policy, particularly on matters such as that of Cross Strait relations regarding Taiwan, or the South and East China Sea. Over 100 million Chinese travelled abroad in 2015. Many more had links, through business or contact with tourists coming to China, with foreigners and therefore were able to form ideas about foreign policy. To a certain extent, people's views were reflected in China's stance, sometimes creating tougher nationalist

messages. Even if this was through manipulation by the government and the propaganda bureau, it still testified to the need to at least go through the motions of showing that public views were reflected in formulating foreign policy (Jakobson and Knox, 2010).

Over an important matter like the South China Sea, and China's claims to territory there, policy was not made through grand edicts issuing from the central ministries in Beijing. From what evidence could be gathered from the statements of key actors within China on this issue, policy was shaped partly by historic positions, partly by the input of some of the actors listed above and partly by the imperatives of the CCP under Xi. His statements on the issue were therefore largely abstract and macro-political. It was left to other actors to express more detailed views, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespeople, to People's Liberation Army figures, those working in think tanks and finally individuals in the media in China regarded as having state backing, such as the *Global Times*, for instance, a nationalist-populist outlet. There is little reason to doubt that a similar crowded field of vested interest and players is also involved in policy over domestic issues. And indeed here, as fierce debates about fiscal reform and marketization have shown in the last few years, the clashes can be even more dramatic and harder to reach consensus on.

The Belt and Road Initiative also exemplified this complexity, with a host of different actors in Beijing from the National Development and Reform Commission to the Ministry of Finance working on grand strategic objectives such as creating different forms of connectivity in areas associated with the initiative, for example Central Asia, or in the maritime areas covered by the concept. But into the broad spaces created by these ideas, a number of different actors were brought in, from banks (the China Development Bank has a particularly important role) to provinces with a specific interest in funding certain types of project abroad, to the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with its own specific international bureaucracy in Beijing (it has a number of vice presidents and directors recruited internationally rather than just from China). The Belt and Road exemplifies the highly organic, dynamic way of foreign policy making in the Xi era, creating ideational spaces at a high level which others are then invited to move into from inside and outside China. This might mark a new kind of policy-making formulation and implementation process in the People's Republic, though at present it is too early to say how successful this might prove.

CONCLUSION

While policy making in the Maoist period was largely directed by the instructions, albeit very abstract and often contradictory, or a small party elite, with Mao increasingly at the centre, from 1978 we see a China that is increasingly complex,

and where policy-making figures as a field opened up to the same market forces and creation of internal competition as in the economic realm.

The rise of technocratic leadership in China and the professionalization and specialization of cadres since the early 1980s has meant that policy making has become more evidence-based, at least in social and economic areas, and more inclusive of views from different stakeholders, as the above example of foreign policy makes clear. The relationship between the Party and the government, however, remains as ill-defined as it was back in 1949. The Party under Xi, as it was under Mao and Deng, supplies broad parameters and overarching objectives for society. But the government has to interpret and then implement these. This is the source sometimes of real tension.

Under Xi Jinping, China is a country with an immensely dynamic, ceaselessly changing policy environment. It is also one where different levels of government often have considerable latitude to take ideas sent to them from higher levels and adapt them to local needs. The main criterion since 1978 has been that whatever policy initiatives are introduced, if they succeed, even when they are unorthodox, then they have a good chance of being extended to other parts of the country and higher levels of administration. The issue is that the punishments for failure are very severe, creating an often anti-innovation mindset in officials keen to protect their own interests and careers. Particularly with the anti-corruption struggle under Xi since 2013, this has dampened some of the more dynamic elements of policy making that were seen, for instance, in the 1980s up to the June 4 incident in 1989, and in the era of Hu Jintao from 2002.

Policy making in China works within a context where broad consensus is supplied on political issues by the Party. Prior to 1978, in the era of Mao, this was promoting class struggle, cleansing society of its divisions and implementing a Utopian, highly egalitarian and state-directed vision of society. The main tools to achieve this were the command economy, largely borrowed from the Soviet Union, and mass campaigns, of which there were 16 from 1951, increasing in intensity until the Cultural Revolution. The costs economically and socially of these became extremely high, meaning that after 1978 a new objective was announced – the creation of economic prosperity and of a strong and wealthy China. This has prevailed to 2016 and is likely to continue into the future. It has been delivered through a greater and richer mix of policy tools, ranging from marketization, privatization and the opening up of China to the outside world, along with some fiscal decentralization. More actors have appeared and been given a role in formulating policy. Policies have also become far more detailed and precise. But, as the Belt and Road Initiative proves, the impact of the outside world on China, China on the outside world and the attempt to integrate these two areas, has meant that a new way of formulating policy has emerged in China under Xi, one that is broader and involves a far wider group of stakeholders. The implications of this will be worked out in the years to come.

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An Evidence-Based Typology of Asian Societies: What Do Asian Societies Look Like from the Bottom Up instead of Top Down?

Takashi Inoguchi¹

INTRODUCTION

What is the dominant approach to the study of comparative Asian politics? Academics often employ historical-cultural factors in their analysis. Drawing on a combination of historical narratives and cultural threads which are broad enough to include political culture, this school of investigation focuses on culturally shaped societal norms, rules, and institutions as the key determinants in shaping power and politics. Western bias often influences the design and analysis of research, ultimately impacting the outcome of such research.

The Western classical works of Hegel (2004) (one man's freedom), Marx (1875) (Asiatic mode of production), Weber (2002) (Protestant work ethic), and Karl Wittfogel (1981) (oriental despotism) form the foundation and provide the underlying tenets into scholarship on political culture. One such tenet found in these works and other similar works is Asia's supposed absence of modernity. It is a theme that underlies research and builds on such classics. As modernization theory swept the academic landscape in the third quarter of the 20th century, this school used the above noted classics in Western political thought to create the next generation of research, centered on political culture.

In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba published their research on comparative political culture, titled *Civic Culture: Attitudes and Beliefs of Five*

Nations (Almond and Verba, 1963). Notable as the first study of its kind based on a social survey, the analyses and conclusions reflect the mindset of the time. Almond and Verba's research on citizens' attitudes and beliefs in the United States, UK, Mexico, Germany, and Italy confirmed and strengthened the then dominant world view of Western Europe and North America, that is, democracy as a political system is only truly achievable for northwestern European Protestants. Two decades later, in 1985, Lucian W. Pye published his work on Asian political culture, titled *Asian Power and Politics* (Pye, 1985). Pye's study is not dependent on a social survey and his view of Asian politics reflects a more nuanced understanding of Asian political culture and Asian diversity, which he absorbed from Asian academics with immense knowledge of, and insights into, the diverse and complex history and culture of Asia. Just as Almond and Verba represented the fixed views of their generation toward Asian politics, Pye, perhaps due to the passage of time, represents a new wave of understanding that distinguishes itself from works cited in the past, including the classics. Yet both the 1963 and the 1985 publications belong to the school of modernization theory. They both endorse the thesis that to achieve democratic politics, pre-modern societies must develop and grow a middle class as they pass through the stages of industrialization, urbanization, and democratization.

More recently, Bruce Gilley's book, *The Nature of Asian Politics*, is fresh and well-informed about Asian politics, and employs basic political science concepts that include state and society, development, democracy, governance, and public policy (2015). Gilley's study of comparative Asian politics is exceptional because it steps outside the confines that have dominated his field of scholarship, that is, Western-biased modernization theory and rigid political culture narratives of area specialists who adhere to a description of society and politics that reflects their area of specialization.

My overall assessment of Gilley's book is that it represents a more open and insightful academic endeavor of comparative Asian politics that can be used as a genuine reference for building further research. Yet I struggle with the author's use of a grand theory to explain the nature of Asian politics, a notion that can be traced back to the classical works of Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Wittfogel, arguing that the nature of Asian politics is essentially power-centered. My question is: is politics power-centered as the economy is market-centered? Politics cannot be defined without significant, if latent, elements of power, irrespective of whether it is Asian or non-Asian.

Gilley may respond that the book is the product of a careful and diligent scholarly investigation that followed rigorous empirical and comparative analysis. In turn, I would ask him to add to his state-centric conceptualization, a society-centered conceptualization that would provide a way forward to a new Asian comparative politics that is much less reliant and burdened by the still strong Western bias that permeates other writings. As an example of such research, I refer to the social surveys conducted throughout Asia in the 2000s on

quality of life, culminating in a jointly authored volume by Inoguchi and Fujii (2013). From the 29 societies surveyed in East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, Inoguchi and Fujii construct a citizen-centered society typology. Factor analyses of the survey results yield six society types. The ordering of three key dimensions determines society types. Ordered according to survival, social relations, and public sector dominance, six society types emerge: (1) survival followed by social relations and public sector dominance; (2) survival followed by state dominance and social relations; (3) social relations followed by survival and public sector dominance; (4) social relations followed by public sector dominance and survival; and (5) state dominance followed by survival and social relations; (6) public sector dominance followed by social relations and survival. The impetus of this citizen-centered exercise is to demonstrate that Asian politics viewed from below looks very different from Asian politics viewed from above. In pursuing this approach to Asian comparative politics, the yoke of Western bias may loosen, and in doing so reveal a more genuine understanding of Asian comparative politics.

Before turning to the conceptual work of proposing a typology of Asian societies as people see it from experiences of daily life, I need to briefly describe how I have come to think that way as my views on the varieties of Asian societies have deepened and sharpened.

Since 2003, I have executed a large-scale Asia-wide survey on quality of life called the AsiaBarometer. Here quality of life is defined as the contents and conditions of life as seen by each individual and more broadly by society as a whole (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013). The aim is to register how people live their lives in Asian societies in the early 21st century, focusing on their daily activities in a systematic and comparative manner. Geographically, I have defined Asia as covering 29 societies in East, Southeast, South and Central Asia. In addition, Russia, Australia, and the United States are included in the AsiaBarometer Survey for comparative purposes (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013).²

In analyzing (1) quality of life, (2) trust, and (3) exit, voice, and loyalty, my consistent line of inquiry has been threefold: (1) how people perceive their daily lives and beyond; (2) how people relate to other people and to social institutions with trust or distrust; and (3) how people act when organizations or societies they belong to deteriorate in quality. The questionnaire has been designed to cover some other subjects so that the three subjects can be understood more broadly and comprehensively in the analysis and synthesis.

This chapter is along the same line of inquiry: how people perceive their society's characteristics on the basis of their daily life experiences, and, more significantly, on the basis of their daily life satisfaction. The angle is from the bottom up, in other words, how people portray their own society by registering the degree of satisfaction with life circumstances and aspects (Inoguchi, 2015a). Hence, the title, *What Do Asian Societies Look Like From the Bottom Up Instead of Top Down?*

METAPHORS FOR FIVE TYPES OF ASIAN SOCIETIES

Literature Review of Asian Societies

Types of societies are often deductively derived from semi-frozen concepts of earlier thinkers in the field. Thus, types of societies have been discussed by reference to political regimes. Aristotle uses monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as the characteristics by which societies are more or less determined. Hegel uses freedom to say that freedom for one person is called despotism. Marx uses modes of production to characterize Asiatic feudalism.

Even when types of societies are discussed by reference to some sociological concepts such as family and trust, they do so often in isolation from other components of society. Types of family units have been discussed by reference to such concepts as the matrilineal system, kinship, marriage, residence, and inheritance (Nakane, 1967a, 1967b; Todd, 2011). Types of business sectors have been discussed by reference to how trust can be extended to extra-kinship relationships (Fukuyama, 1995).

Types of society have also been discussed by reference to climatic, geological, and environmental conditions, such as Karl Wittfogel (1981) on the supply and need for large-scale infrastructure building; James Scott (2009) on hill tribes' community formation to avoid tax, war, and administration; Takeshi Matsui (2000) on Pushtuni and Baluchistani aggressively defensive isolated community formation; Shan (2004) on Chinese and Hindus in terms of cultural traditions; and Takashi Kato (2012) on the nature and modes of religions binding and bonding in community formation.

To augment the power of such typologies, I propose new types of Asian societies. I propose types of Asian societies by inductively generalizing Asian societies in terms of daily life satisfaction. In other words, types of societies are drawn from the bottom up or from the angle of people. At the same time, instead of what may be called barefoot empiricism, I use the above ideal-types and metaphors to help imagine types of societies by aggregating individual respondents' satisfaction about daily life activities in various life domains. This approach I call the evidence-based inductive generalization approach.

Use of Metaphors in Conceptualizing Types of Asian Societies

Apart from the above types of Asian societies, with some strong generalizing impulses, there are many revealing and enlightening works examining non-Asian and/or particular Asian societies. The metaphors I employ in conceptualizing types of Asian societies are selected to highlight the nature and modes of inclusiveness and legitimization. By inclusiveness I mean accommodating differences of various kinds, and by legitimization, I mean bestowing self-respect and

providing semi-auto-immunity to minorities of various sorts. The following types of societies are highlighted for the purpose of hinting at some loose ideal-types in the Weberian sense.

- a. Masao Maruyama is a political scientist who invented the concepts of an octopus-cave society (*takotsubo gata*) and a bamboo-made mixing tool society (*sasara gata*) in his endeavor to best characterize Japanese society. The former is inward-looking, narrow in focus, and intensive in digging. The latter is outward-looking, broad-gauging, and extensive in diffusing. An octopus-cave society assembles together without much conversation with each other but in a competitive manner in the search for caves that can accommodate their growing body. This imagery captures Japanese society (Maruyama, 1961).
- b. Arundhati Roy is a novelist from southern India who wrote *The God of Small Things* (1997). Indian society is full of differences and cleavages in terms of religious castes, class distinctions, ethnic differences, linguistic diversities, eating habits, marriage styles, and child-rearing methods and so on. The beauty of Indian society, if it is so called, is that because it exists to protect and respect the tradition of a certain position in caste, class, ethnicity, language, and family practices, one can be the god of small things. Take one example, in national, state, city, and village elections, each caste is often well represented in local party organizations of dominant or emergent dominant parties, locally or nationally. More directly, low caste Jats in Haryana Pradesh, who control the water supply to New Delhi, struck and stopped the water supply before the Governor of Haryana Pradesh agreed to increase their wages (*The Economist*, 2016a).
- c. Guillermo O'Donnell is a political sociologist in Argentina who invented the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism (O'Donnell, 1973). By that he meant that in running societies a certain set of coalitions of sectors bundle together to colonize and control regimes in their entirety. Sometimes during the economic developmental take-offs involving technocracy, the military and business literally control those regimes.
- d. Franz Fanon is a psychiatrist, philosopher, and revolutionary, who writes about Africa. In his work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, he describes the fragmented, feeble, and helpless society of Africa, which lacks an ingenious solution to coping and competing with the ever-penetrating external market and other forces from abroad (Fanon, 2005). At the same time, he describes the inherent strength of Africa with equilibrating dynamics of societies and intense pride in Africa's independence and nationalism.
- e. John Keane is a political philosopher in Australia. *The Life and Death of Democracy* is a tour de force of the theory and practice of democracy 2,000 years before Christ and after Christ (Keane, 2009). When ancient Greek direct democracy ceased to work and when classical English representative democracy revealed the malfunctions, it created a void of both direct and representative democracy (Mair, 2013; Levin, 2016). What has emerged is monitory democracy in tandem with the rise of globalization and digitalization.

Corroborative Narratives of Five Metaphors

As the above loose ideal-types are highlighted to reveal certain natures and modes of accommodation of differences and of legitimizing semi-auto-immunity of minorities of various kinds, I need to provide more contextual narratives that corroborate ideal-types.

Japan: Robert Putnam (1997), in discussing the visible difference between American and Japanese subjects' behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game, notes that the Japanese tend to express their trust more highly than Americans in

face-to-face situations than when they face an anonymous other person. Whether it is in experiments or surveys as well as in normal human interactions, Putnam's observation points to a Japanese particularistic trait of expressing trust. Maruyama's octopus-cave society points to the Japanese bias in treating far more intimately or far more politely those who share the same school, same village, same company than those who do not have a shared common association. Once you are out of your octopus-cave, patterns of expression and behavior change. The relations among those caves are not particularly close or actively interactive.

India: Genron-NPO (2016), a think-tank in Japan, carried out a survey in 2016 on democracy in the three largest democracies in Asia: India, Indonesia, and Japan. Of the survey questions, three are of particular interest: (1) How do you see your country's future prospects? (2) Do you think that your country's democracy is well functioning? (3) Thinking about political parties in your democracy, do you expect political parties to play a positive role? The response of the Indian respondents is very positive to all three questions. In particular, on the third question, Indian respondents registered 85.9% positive responses (accessed on August 20, 2016). This cannot be well understood until one considers that in Indian society, there are gods in small things. This mindset not only accommodates societal differences and cleavages, but also creates respect and protection with honor, thereby making Indian society more positive than other societies.

Thailand: Extreme inequality exists in the five regions of Thailand – Bangkok, Central, Northeast, North, and Southern Thailand. When comparing them in terms of population size, GDP, and general public expenditure, Bangkok almost monopolizes general public expenditure, capturing 75% of it, although it produces only 26% of GDP and sustains 17% of the population. The Bangkok trinity of royalty, military, and bureaucracy colonizes the other four regions from within (*The Economist*, 2016b). An entrepreneurial politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, became prime minister by mobilizing the poor in the Northeast and North regions for a good part of the 2000s. He was overthrown and forbidden from visiting Thailand after a 2006 military *coup d'état*. Although his sister later became prime minister, another military *coup d'état* in 2014 wiped Yingluck Shinawatra and her peasant troops from Bangkok. Furthermore, the southern region is made up of ethnic Malays who are extremely poor but strongly Islamic and have often been defiant and violent. The military held a national referendum in 2016 that secured a state of military emergency for many years to come (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2015).

Pakistan: Similar to Algeria and Africa (see Franz Fanon, 2005), Pakistan keeps its resilience despite seeming fragility, fragmentation, and vulnerability. Keeping Islam as the only unifying flag, Pakistan connects an enormous array of diversities into strength: the army, nuclear weapons, a population of 200 million, agriculture, a sense of honor and pride, excellent scientists, and oratorical capacity (Lieven, 2012).

Singapore: A tiny island with a small population emerged from the mud in the last quarter of the 20th century to become an advanced country over less than three decades (Lee, 2000). What's the secret? Outstanding among many factors is building infrastructure of a knowledge society on an island with astuteness, adroitness, and aggressiveness. Not to be underestimated is the ability of micro-management of governance in a small and yet already densely populated country. Micro-monitoring of the population is said to be far more advanced in Singapore than in a hugely populated big space such as China.

SIX TYPES OF ASIAN SOCIETIES ON THE BASIS OF DAILY LIFE SATISFACTION

Most of these revealing and enlightening works on types of societies have been undertaken in the form of qualitative comparisons or case studies or intense narratives of particular societies. Types of societies should also be examined systematically, comparatively, and quantitatively. Hence, the questionnaire included the following: 'Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life.' Respondents answered on a five-point verbal scale of 'very satisfied', 'somewhat satisfied', 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied', 'somewhat dissatisfied', and 'very dissatisfied', with a 'don't know' category. The 16 specific life aspects included the following:

- housing
- friendship
- marriage
- standard of living
- household income
- health
- education
- job
- neighbors
- public safety
- conditions of the environment
- social welfare system
- democratic system
- family life
- spiritual life
- leisure

Each respondent's level of satisfaction was measured through a corresponding ordinal scale, that is, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1. Factor analysis was carried out with varimax rotation for the matrix of the 16 daily lifestyle aspects of all the respondents, country by country. The number of societies examined was 29. Some may suspect that ecological fallacy might exist in factor analysis of individual responses. Since the scale used for responses is of ordinary scale, factor analyzing

individual responses yields correlation coefficients which are considered as 'normal figures'. Hence, no concerns are necessary on ecological fallacy. Also such labels as materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance are applicable both to societal and individual characterization, and the six societal types may as well be called the six types of individual's attitudinal and behavioral inclinations in Asian societies.

Further analysis results are reported in Inoguchi and Fujii (2013) and Inoguchi (2015a). They are robustly similar to those of Ronald Inglehart (1977) and many other works, including the World Values Survey, in terms of the key dimensions: materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. The appearance of public sector dominance is because people's perception of society contains public institutions and activities by the state. Its weight differs from society to society. Thus, the order of the three dimensions differs from society to society. These statistical differences form the basis of the six societal types I propose for Asia. This is what I may humbly call one of the ingenious aspects of my typology of Asian societies. As you can see from the labels attached to the key dimensions of factor analysis, this typology is universally applicable to non-Asian societies as well.

Eigenvalues show how much variance each dimension explains. In this chapter, only the three key dimensions are presented here to make the typology of Asian societies simple and meaningful. Empirically, six types of Asian societies have emerged (see Table 22.1).

To explain what Table 22.1 means, in the *Abc* type of society, the first dimension of materialism, that is, satisfaction with survival-related daily life aspects, weighs most. The second dimension of post-materialism, that is, satisfaction with social relations-related daily life aspects, weighs second. The third dimension of public sector dominance, satisfaction with state-related daily life aspects, weighs third. In the *Acb* type of society, the first dimension of materialism weighs most. The second dimension of public sector dominance weighs second. The third dimension of post-materialism weighs third.

In the *Bac* type of society, the first dimension of post-materialism, that is, satisfaction with social relations-related daily life aspects, weighs most. The second dimension of materialism, that is, satisfaction with survival-related daily life aspects,

Table 22.1 Six types of Asian societies

	<i>First dimension</i>	<i>Second dimension</i>	<i>Third dimension</i>
<i>Abc</i>	materialism	post-materialism	public sector dominance
<i>Acb</i>	materialism	public sector dominance	post-materialism
<i>Bac</i>	post-materialism	materialism	public sector dominance
<i>Bca</i>	post-materialism	public sector dominance	materialism
<i>Cab</i>	public sector dominance	materialism	post-materialism
<i>Cba</i>	public sector dominance	post-materialism	materialism

Table 22.2 Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments – Japan

	<i>Factors</i>			<i>Uniqueness</i>
	<i>Materialist</i>	<i>Post-materialist</i>	<i>Public</i>	
Housing	0.41			0.70
Standard of living	0.77			0.31
Household income	0.77			0.34
Education	0.44			0.64
Job	0.49			0.60
Friendships		0.47		0.69
Marriage		0.59		0.55
Health		0.36		0.69
Family life		0.67		0.47
Leisure		0.53		0.58
Spiritual life		0.63		0.44
Neighbors			0.38	0.66
Public safety			0.64	0.52
Condition of the environment			0.60	0.51
Social welfare system			0.71	0.44
Democratic system			0.70	0.46

Note: The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

<i>Japan</i>	
<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>
Factor 1	5.640
Factor 2	1.097
Factor 3	0.645
<i>n</i>	1,352

Source: Inoguchi and Fujii (2013)

weighs second and the third dimension of public sector dominance, that is, state-related aspects of daily life, weighs third. One may ask how social relations-related satisfaction with daily life aspects has more weight than survival-related satisfaction with daily life aspects. In Bac or Bca societies, how to handle social relations at high and community levels often makes crucial differences to survival and future well-being. In the Bca type of society, the first dimension of post-materialism weighs most, the second dimension of public sector dominance weighs second, and the third dimension of materialism weighs third. In the Bca type of society, both social relations-related and state-related daily life aspects weigh more than survival-related satisfaction with daily life aspects. The third dimension of materialism, that is, satisfaction with survival-related daily life aspects, weighs third.

In the Cab type of society, the first dimension of public sector dominance weighs most. The second dimension of materialism weighs second, while the third

dimension of post-materialism weighs third. In other words, social relations-related satisfaction with daily life aspects weighs least of the three dimensions. In the Cba type of societies, the first dimension of public sector dominance weighs first. The second dimension of post-materialism weighs second, and the third dimension of materialism, weighs third.

The six patterns of two-dimensional orders are shown with six representative societies: Abc is represented by Japan; Acb is represented by India; Bac is represented by Thailand; Bca is not found among the 29 Asian societies; Cab is represented by Pakistan; Cba is represented by Singapore. All the factor analysis results are shown in the Appendix of Inoguchi and Fujii (2013). Tables 22.2 to 22.6 show the factor analysis results of the five representative societies.

Table 22.3 Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments – India

	<i>Factors</i>			
	<i>Materialist</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Post-materialist</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
Housing	0.62			0.56
Friendships	0.53			0.63
Marriage	0.52			0.62
Standard of living	0.66			0.51
Household income	0.62			0.57
Health	0.55			0.61
Education	0.58			0.62
Job	0.56			0.62
Neighbors	0.43			0.64
Public safety		0.62		0.57
Condition of the environment		0.65		0.58
Social welfare system		0.66		0.54
Democratic system		0.63		0.57
Family life			0.57	0.52
Leisure			0.51	0.62
Spiritual life			0.57	0.56

Note: The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

<i>India</i>	
<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>
Factor 1	4.804
Factor 2	1.430
Factor 3	0.422
<i>n</i>	1,202

Source: Inoguchi and Fujii (2013)

Table 22.4 Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments – Thailand

	<i>Factors</i>			
	<i>Post-materialist</i>	<i>Materialist</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Uniqueness</i>
Housing	0.41			0.70
Friendships	0.42			0.75
Marriage	0.55			0.63
Neighbors	0.56			0.59
Family life	0.65			0.49
Leisure	0.57			0.57
Spiritual life	0.60			0.51
Standard of living		0.53		0.51
Household income		0.65		0.54
Health		0.38		0.72
Education		0.55		0.65
Job		0.65		0.52
Public safety			0.61	0.53
Condition of the environment			0.60	0.53
Social welfare system			0.66	0.51
Democratic system			0.59	0.62

Note: The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

<i>Thailand</i>	
<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>
Factor 1	5.001
Factor 2	0.974
Factor 3	0.659
<i>n</i>	701

Source: Inoguchi and Fujii (2013)

The six patterns of three-dimensional orders are taken as types of Asian societies:

Type Abc includes Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Type Acb includes China, South Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Mongolia.

Type Bac includes Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Kyrgyzstan.

Type Bca is not found among the 29 Asian societies.

Type Cab includes Pakistan, Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan.

Type Cba includes Singapore and Sri Lanka.

Labels attached to each of the five types of Asian societies are as follows:

Abc - octopus-cave society, described by Masao Maruyama (1961)

Table 22.5 Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments – Pakistan

	<i>Factors</i>			<i>Uniqueness</i>
	<i>Public</i>	<i>Materialist</i>	<i>Post-materialist</i>	
Public safety	0.67			0.47
Condition of the environment	0.73			0.43
Social welfare system	0.77			0.39
Democratic system	0.71			0.48
Housing		0.50		0.66
Friendship		0.43		0.66
Standard of living		0.55		0.50
Household income		0.74		0.41
Health		0.59		0.58
Education		0.51		0.66
Job		0.60		0.49
Marriage			0.50	0.62
Neighbors			0.40	0.75
Family life			0.56	0.60
Leisure			0.45	0.60
Spiritual life			0.58	0.64

Note: The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

<i>Pakistan</i>	
<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>
Factor 1	4.745
Factor 2	1.563
Factor 3	0.754
<i>n</i>	579

Source: Inoguchi and Fujii (2013)

An octopus-cave society is composed of a myriad of octopus-occupying caves, each keeping a distance from one another, within each of which different rules and norms prevail.

Acb - god-of-small-things society, named by Arundhati Roy (1997)

In a despotic society, freedom exists only for one person, so says Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In a god-of-small-things society, everyone is king and has freedom in their respective sphere. A god-of-small-things society co-exists side by side with a domineering state.

Bac - society colonized from within, named by Guillermo O'Donnell (1973)

Table 22.6 Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments – Singapore

	<i>Factors</i>			<i>Uniqueness</i>
	<i>Public</i>	<i>Post-materialist</i>	<i>Materialist</i>	
Public safety	0.70			0.46
Condition of the environment	0.71			0.45
Social welfare system	0.73			0.42
Democratic system	0.71			0.45
Housing		0.44		0.71
Friendship		0.56		0.61
Marriage		0.58		0.51
Neighbors		0.34		0.72
Family life		0.65		0.45
Leisure		0.62		0.48
Spiritual life		0.56		0.56
Standard of living			0.44	0.64
Household income			0.67	0.48
Health			0.54	0.54
Education			0.62	0.55
Job			0.57	0.57

Note: The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

<i>Singapore</i>	
<i>Factor</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>
Factor 1	5.420
Factor 2	1.308
Factor 3	0.673
<i>n</i>	578

Source: Inoguchi and Fujii (2013)

In a society colonized from within, a leading sector and its coalition colonize the regime. There is no level playing field, with the rest of society not in a position for participation and recruitment.

Bca - fragmented and fractured society, named by Franz Fanon (2005)

A society composed of those who are disconnected and dispossessed is a fragmented and fractured society. Unlike a society colonized from within, a fragmented and fractured society does not enjoy a high level of compliance. Because of affluence and poverty, coercion and defiance, and oppressive environments, the equilibrium of fragmentation and fluctuation is maintained robustly.

Table 22.7 Top five lifestyle priorities for each of the 27 Asian countries

	<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>4th</i>	<i>5th</i>
Afghanistan	Diet	Health	Home	Being devout	Job
Bangladesh	Health	Medical care	No crime	Being devout	Home
Bhutan	Health	Home	Diet	Job	Work
Brunei	Health	Home	Diet	Family	Job
Cambodia	Diet	Health	Home	Job	Income
China	Health	Home	Job	Medical care	No crime
India	Health	Home	Diet	Job	Family
Indonesia	Health	Diet	Home	Being devout	Job
Japan	Health	Family	Job	Home	Others
Kazakhstan	Health	Job	Home	Medical care	Income
Kyrgyzstan	Health	Diet	Job	Home	Income
Laos	Health	Diet	Home	Job	Family
Malaysia	Health	Home	Diet	Family	Job
Maldives	Diet	Medical care	No crime	Health	Job
Mongolia	Health	Home	Diet	Job	Medical care
Myanmar	Health	Diet	Being devout	Home	Job
Nepal	Health	Diet	Job	Work	No crime
Pakistan	Health	Diet	Home	Being devout	Income
Philippines	Diet	Health	Home	Job	Family
Singapore	Health	Home	Job	Family	Diet
South Korea	Health	Home	Family	Job	Income
Sri Lanka	Health	Diet	Home	Family	Job
Tajikistan	Health	Diet	Home	Job	Income
Thailand	Health	Diet	Home	Job	Family
Turkmenistan	Diet	Health	Income	No crime	Home
Uzbekistan	Health	Home	Income	Job	Diet
Vietnam	Health	Job	Diet	Home	Work
<i>Asia</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Diet</i>	<i>Job</i>	<i>Family</i>

Bca – this society is not found among the 29 Asian societies.

Cab – seeming fractured and fragmented divisions of a society are covered by the sheer force of public sector dominance, whether it is materialized and consolidated by Islam, Buddhism, monarchy, estate elite coalition, mining – foreign capital coalition, or ethnic competition.

Cba - micro-monitory society, named by John Keane (2009)

A society small enough with sufficiently capable regime apparatus keeps the rest of the residents focused on pursuing comfort and compliance.

SIX TYPES OF ASIAN SOCIETIES AND LIFESTYLE PRIORITIES

Some may say that the results of the factor analysis of daily life satisfaction require at least one more piece of corroborative or reinforcing empirical evidence. To meet this request, here are the top five lifestyle priorities, country by country (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013: 96). The question asked was, 'Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select five that are important to you'.

Type Abc materialism (lifestyle priorities are italicized), followed by post-materialism and public sector dominance.

Afghanistan: diet, *health*, home, being devout, and *job*
 Indonesia: *health*, diet, home, being devout, and *job*
 Japan: *health*, family, *job*, and home
 Taiwan: *standard of living*, *income*, *health*, *job*, leisure, and *housing*
 Tajikistan: *health*, diet, home, *job*, and *income*
 Uzbekistan: *health*, home, *income*, *job*, and diet

Those societies with type Abc naturally register many materialist-oriented (or survival or quality-of-life sustaining) lifestyle priorities, followed by many post-materialist oriented (or social relations or quality-of-life enriching) lifestyle priorities, further followed by public sector-related lifestyle priorities.

Type Acb materialism (lifestyle priorities are italicized) followed by public sector dominance.

China: *health*, home, *job*, medical care, and low crime rates
 South Korea: *health*, home, family life, *job*, and *income*
 Cambodia: diet, *health*, home, *job*, and *income*
 Laos: *health*, diet, home, *job*, and family
 Myanmar: *health*, diet, being devout, home, and *job*
 Bangladesh: *health*, medical care, low crime rates, being devout, and home
 India: *health*, home, diet, *job*, and family life
 Nepal: *health*, diet, *job*, and low crime rates
 Mongolia: *health*, home, diet, *job*, and medical care

Again both materialist (survival or quality-of-life sustaining) and public sector dominance (or quality-of-life enabling) lifestyle priorities are most frequently registered.

Type Bac Post-materialism (lifestyle priorities are italicized) followed by materialism, and further followed by public sector dominance.

Hong Kong: *friendships*, *marriage*, health, education, *family life*, *leisure*, and *spiritual life*
 Malaysia: *health*, home, diet, *family life*, and *job*
 Thailand: *health*, diet, home, *job*, and *family life*
 Vietnam: health, *job*, diet, home, and success at work
 Kyrgyzstan: *friendships*, home, living standard, and *spiritual life*

These post-materialist lifestyle priorities are often registered as well as materialist lifestyle priorities.

Type Bca cannot be found among the 29 Asian societies.

Type Cab public sector dominance (lifestyle priorities are italicized) followed by survival and further followed by social relations.

Brunei: health, home, diet, family, and job
 Philippines: diet, health, home, job, and family
 Bhutan: housing, education, spiritual life, and prayer
 Pakistan: health, diet, home, being devout, and income
 Sri Lanka: health, diet, home, family, and job
 Kazakhstan: health, job, home, medical care, and income

Under public sector dominance, lifestyle priorities are often registered with materialism and post-materialism dominance.

Type Cba public sector dominance followed by materialism and further followed by post-materialism.

Singapore: health, home, job, family, and diet
 Sri Lanka: health, diet, home, family, and job

Public sector dominance, lifestyle priorities are often registered together with materialist lifestyle priorities and post-materialist dominance.

Looked at from lifestyle priorities as well, the six types of Asian society, on the basis of everyday life satisfaction registered by people, are validated empirically.

CONCLUSION

Having been heavily influenced by classical authors on Asia such as Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Wittfogel, studies of Asian societies have tended to be viewed from the top down, not the bottom up. However, more recently, the remarkable growth in solid empirical data collected about various aspects of Asian societies has enabled analysis of Asian societies and individuals, broadly bereft of such classical Western biases (Inoguchi, 2015b; Inoguchi and Estes, 2016). The method of looking at societies from the bottom up is applicable to both Asian and non-Asian societies as well as to both societies and individuals. This chapter has attempted to look at Asian societies from the common person's perspective. Having made use of the AsiaBarometer quality-of-life focused Asia-wide survey carried out in the 2000s, I have factor-analyzed people's daily life satisfaction based on 16 aspects, society by society, for 29 Asian societies. The results are strongly similar to the key findings of the World Values Survey, led by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and many others. Materialism, post-materialism, and, since the state is part of people's everyday

life, public sector dominance, have emerged as three key factors. The order of eigenvalues of these three dimensions differs society by society. In other words, Asian societies consist broadly of six types: Abc, Acb, Bac, Bca, Cab, and Cba, depending on the order of the first three key dimensions.

Judging from the method, data, and results, the unique aspect of this analysis is that it generates the types of Asian society from the bottom up systematically and scientifically.

Having been liberated from classical Western bias in characterizing Asian comparative politics, this research conveys an important message. There is neither Western political science nor non-Western political science (Inoguchi, 2016). When the hitherto dominant Abrahamic orientation in social sciences is loosened in terms of conceptualization and theorization and when the Dharmic orientation in social science enriches knowledge of and insights into Asian comparative politics, the prospect for Asian comparative politics to flourish is bright. Abrahamic refers to the standardizing and unifying orientation in concept and theory formation, whereas Dharmic orientation refers to orientation with respect to diversity and digging into further complexity.

Notes

- 1 This represents a revised version of my article, 'An Evidence-Based Typology of Asian Societies: What Do Asian Societies Look Like from the Bottom Up instead of Top Down?', published online on 14 February 2017, in the *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 18 (1), pp. 216–34. The revision has focused on the extension of the two-dimensional typology of society to the three-dimensional typology of society. I gratefully acknowledge permission by Cambridge University Press. Also I gratefully acknowledge permission by Springer to republish Tables 22.2–22.6.
- 2 Publications focus on quality of life, trust, and Hirschman's (1971) concepts on exit, voice, and loyalty. Inoguchi and Fujii authored *The Quality of Life in Asia* (2013). Inoguchi and Yasuharu Tokuda co-edited *Trust with Asian Characteristics* (2017). In 2017, Inoguchi published his latest work *Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Asia* (2017).

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PART V

Transnational Economics



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Geo-economic Contest in Southeast Asia: Great Power Politics through the Prism of Trade, Investments and Aid

Titli Basu

The strategic order in Southeast Asia is evolving. With the arrival of a confident China in the international system and a relative increase in its comprehensive national power, a strategic contest has unfolded as Beijing seeks to displace the core elements of the US-led liberal international order with ‘Chinese wisdom’. Southeast Asia, which for decades has been organized around the US-led rules-based liberal order anchored in American military and economic primacy, is witnessing the emergence of ‘dual hierarchies’.¹ The phenomenon of dual hierarchies signifies the security hierarchy being governed by the United States and the economic hierarchy being commanded by China. The erosion of US primacy and the changing distribution of power in Asia has enabled China to pursue regional hegemony whether in terms of reshaping economic governance or proposing a new security architecture with the Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine. There is a school of thought that argues that any strategic contest between the United States and China ‘is more likely to be geo-economics than military’.² Beijing, with a US\$ 13 trillion economy, is increasingly employing geo-economic instruments such as trade, investments, economic aid and infrastructure financing to pursue its strategic objectives and shape favourable geopolitical outcomes. This is witnessed in the developments shaping the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) discourse on the South China Sea.

As China is ‘returning’, not just rising, to regional pre-eminence, it is investing in reorienting the institutional structures, rules, norms and hierarchies beginning with its immediate neighbourhood.³ Chinese attempts at restructuring the regional order has manifested nowhere as distinctly as in Southeast Asia – increasingly

redefining global economic governance with new institutions, weaving alternative rules and agenda-setting in regional economic integration. Southeast Asia's strategic value as a host for resource-rich emerging economies, major nodes in global value chains, critical energy and trade routes amid the growing militarization of the South China Sea have led major powers to fiercely compete to reconfigure the geostrategic and geo-economic order to their advantage in pursuit of national interest. While most Southeast Asian nations trust the United States for security, increasing Chinese geo-economic clout with well-knit trade and investment networks is altering the power dynamics in the region. Whether it is by employing institutional statecraft with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund and New Development Bank⁴ or agenda-setting by driving competing trade architectures such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), China is expanding its geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia by strategically integrating economic and financial instruments into its foreign policy.

With the objective of claiming equity in international affairs and great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, President Xi Jinping is shaping the narrative with concepts such as a 'new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation' and building a 'community of common destiny'. This is aimed at creating strategic opportunities for Beijing through grand designs such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While Xi Jinping articulates China's geopolitical goals as mutually beneficial, the December 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS) underscores Washington's assessment of China as a revisionist power that has engaged in displacing the United States in the Indo-Pacific and redesigning a favourable global order 'antithetical to US values and interests'. President Trump's National Defence Strategy has articulated that Beijing is employing 'predatory economics to intimidate its neighbours while militarizing features in the South China Sea'.⁵ China is employing trade strategies, economic stimuli and shaping state behaviours that favour its political and security aspirations.⁶

Meanwhile, drawing from Chinese discourse, it is important to note that the perceived strategic encirclement by the United States,⁷ with allies such as Japan and South Korea through the South China Sea and partners such as India, is one of the key variables shaping Beijing's geopolitical and security vision. Southeast Asia is regarded as an 'important breach point for smashing this encirclement'.⁸ In addition to the desire to measure up to the United States in terms of gross national power, China's Southeast Asia strategy is also shaped by its 'Malacca dilemma'⁹ and a possible blockade of critical shipping lanes by the United States including in the South China Sea in case of a military conflict choking the Chinese economic engine.

Southeast Asia is at the centre of gravity where great power rivalry is manifesting, as China attempts to carve out spheres of influence, seeking to alter the status quo in its quest for regional hegemony. However, there is a school of thought that argues while the United States is a multidimensional actor in Southeast Asia,

China remains primarily a single-dimensional power.¹⁰ While the ‘G-2’ arrangement is fiercely contested, the debate on the contours of Xi Jinping’s ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’ suggests that Beijing ‘prematurely puts China on an equal footing with the United States, with an aim to compel Washington to respect China’s core interests and sphere of influence and therefore accommodate China on its own terms’.¹¹ However, this G-2 proposal to avoid a Sino–US strategic competition between the two largest economies and provide global public goods in their respective spheres of influence is naive since it ignores the role of other major powers in shaping the regional order.

Regional stakeholders, Japan, for instance, sharply articulated its primacy when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stressed that ‘Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country’.¹² Abe was responding to question posed by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye: Does Japan desire to continue to be a tier-one nation, or is she content to drift into tier-two status? ¹³ Since Tokyo has long been a beneficiary of a universal value-based liberal order which secured stability in the Asia-Pacific, Japan has stepped up as a guardian of the global commons and a leading promoter of universal norms and rules in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Abe has designed his Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision as Japan has steered its trajectory towards universal value-oriented strategies conceptualized by thinkers such as Nobukatsu Kanehara¹⁴ and Shotaro Yachi.

Power play is unfolding in Southeast Asia as the region serves as the frontline whether it is China’s 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, a key component of BRI; or the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy aimed at sustaining favourable balance of power; or Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision, Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Furthermore, each stakeholder is racing to court the region that hosts some of the fastest growing economies in Asia. This chapter aims to critically analyse how each stakeholder has employed geo-economic instruments including trade, investments, aid and infrastructure financing to further geopolitical ambitions? It also looks at how major powers, including China, the United States and Japan, have positioned their policies in pursuing respective strategic objectives in the Southeast Asian theatre.

The following sections of this chapter briefly outline the profile of Southeast Asia and trace the importance of the region as a major node in the Global Value Chains (GVC). The chapter culls out trends in trade and investments towards the region and the politics of aid, and further analyses agenda-setting and the politics of exclusion in regional economic integration through mega free trade agreements aligning with the larger geopolitical ambitions of the major powers. In addition, the chapter evaluates the fierce contest for infrastructure financing in Southeast Asia and decodes China’s AIIB challenge to the Bretton Woods system. It further unpacks the differences in Chinese and Japanese approaches to infrastructure-building with a special focus on the high speed railway (HSR) and strategic port-building.

This chapter argues that as Southeast Asia is rapidly emerging as a theatre for Sino–US strategic competition, the region is navigating the colossal challenge of how to balance its respective relations with Beijing and Washington and use the Sino–US strategic contest as an opportunity to maximize economic gains and security guarantees. For Southeast Asia, it is not a zero-sum game. Given the fluidity in Southeast Asian geopolitics, the objective should be to design a robust regional order that will support Southeast Asia’s continued prosperity without getting trapped in Sino–US strategic rivalry. As major powers compete in the region with increased trade, investments, development and infrastructure financing, Southeast Asia will benefit considerably from the strategic competition as it will eventually serve the larger goal of empowering these developing economies to advance their national growth and lift the region’s overall ability to compete in the global economy. Southeast Asia would do well to further advance ASEAN economic integration, underpinned by ASEAN centrality, and cultivate deeper economic networks with all the major powers which in turn will allow Southeast Asia some extra strategic latitude amid the geostrategic uncertainty.

PROFILING SOUTHEAST ASIA

Hosting Fastest Growing Asian Economies, Critical Energy and Trade Routes.

While Southeast Asia has emerged as a theatre for great power rivalry, hosting the South China Sea which arguably constitutes one of Beijing’s core interests¹⁵,




Figure 23.1 Real GDP growth in Southeast Asia

Source: prepared by author based on data from OECD*

*OECD, *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2018: Fostering Growth Through Digitalisation*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018, <http://dx.doi.org/9789264286184-en> (accessed on July 2, 2018)

it also offers enormous incentives as the epicentre of global economic growth. As a driver of the global economy, Southeast Asia collectively constitutes the third largest economy in Asia and the sixth largest in the world, providing a market of US\$ 2.6 trillion with a population of over 634.5 million, representing 8.5% of the global population. ASEAN represented 6.2% of the global GDP in 2016. Moreover, the working age population constitutes 67.8% of the demography. The IMF World Economic Outlook Update in January 2018 projects that emerging and developing Asia will continue to grow at 6.5% in 2018–19, catering for over half of world growth, and that ASEAN-5 including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam will grow at 5.3% in 2018–19.¹⁶

Geographically, Southeast Asia is situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, hosting critical trade and energy shipping lanes with vital choke points including the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok-Makassar and Singapore linking the maritime space of the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean. According to assessments made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), nearly 80% of international trade by volume and 70% by value travels by sea. Out of this volume, 60% of maritime trade travels via Asia, and projections claim that the South China Sea carries one-third of international shipping.¹⁷ Some of the largest economies in Asia including China and Japan depend on these vital sea




Figure 23.2 LNG trade flow through South China Sea

Source: created by GIS Lab, IDSA based on data from EIA*

*'Almost 40% of global liquefied natural gas trade moves through the South China Sea', The US Energy Information Administration, November 2, 2017, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33592 (accessed on May 12, 2018)

lanes. While there is a fierce debate over numbers, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that US\$ 3.4 trillion trade passed through the South China Sea in 2016 with around 64% of China's maritime trade passing through it. In addition, 42% and 14% of Japan's and the United States' maritime trade shipped via these waters respectively that year.¹⁸

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 40% or 4.7 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of the international liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade was transported through the South China Sea in 2016. As the world's leading LNG importer, more than 50% of Japan's LNG imports were transported through the South China Sea. Furthermore, EIA data reflect that, in addition to Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan collectively were responsible for 94% of the total LNG volume shipped through the South China Sea in 2016. In addition, EIA projections suggest that there may be 11 billion barrels (bbl) and 190 tcf of oil reserves and natural gas reserves, respectively, in the South China Sea.

Southeast Asia as a Major Node in GVC. One of the key features of the Southeast Asian economy is its integration into the Asian and global production networks across sectors, especially in manufacturing. Following setbacks in the Asian Financial Crisis, when Southeast Asia contracted by 30% in 1998, the region survived and drew lessons; subsequently the Global Financial Crisis reflected that the region had become relatively more resilient to shocks. Following the 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN nations instituted the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) by expanding a previous ASEAN swap arrangement to include China, Japan and South Korea. Following the 2008 crisis, multilateralization of the CMI was carried out to deliver short-term liquidity. However, intensification of the ongoing trade war between the United States and China will once again test the resilience of Southeast Asian economies that are reliant on the export of intermediate goods, deeply embedded into the supply chain that passes through China.¹⁹

GVCs are key drivers of economic development. As production has become more and more fragmented owing to the GVCs, the region has experienced a rapid growth of trade in intermediate goods compared with final goods. According to an IMF assessment, between 1995 and 2013, Asia's trade in intermediate goods increased by a factor of six whereas trade in final goods developed almost four-fold.²⁰ While integrating into the value chains and regional production networks is a worldwide trend, Southeast Asia economies have set an example for other emerging nations to increasingly participate in GVCs.

One enabling variable aiding Southeast Asian economic development is its geographical contiguity vis-à-vis the dynamic Northeast Asian economies. Following the 1980s, trade networks were complemented by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Japan, the United States and Europe. Subsequently, the 1985 Plaza Accord, leading to appreciation of Japanese Yen against the US dollar, triggered a substantial flow of investments into Southeast Asia from Japan to retain their global competitiveness. Southeast Asia appealed to the manufacturers

because of its supply of low-wage labour, macroeconomic stability and relatively stable political systems.²¹ While there were a few political, financial or macroeconomic predicaments including the Asian Financial Crisis, crises are comparatively scarce and recoveries are relatively fast. Besides, a few Southeast Asian economies boast a conducive investment environment. The World Bank 'ease of doing business' ranking featured Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand among the top 25 destinations in the world in 2017.

Meanwhile, the region benefitted from joint ventures with multinational enterprises and technology transfers. With enhanced productivity, investments shifted from labour-intensive to advanced-skilled capital-intensive products including the manufacture of parts and components for electronics and machinery. This region's involvement in global production can be traced way back to the late 1960s when US companies, including National Semiconductors and Texas Instruments, started assembling semiconductor devices in Singapore. Singapore soon developed as an offshore assembly destination for the US and European semiconductor industry. Subsequently, manufacturing bases were diversified beyond Singapore to other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand.

During the 1970s, Singapore emerged as the largest source for semiconductor imports to the United States, and in the following decade Southeast Asia catered for almost 70% of overall US semiconductor device imports. Once the Southeast Asian network of parts and components became entrenched, several multinational enterprises shifted their final assembly plants of electronics and electrical goods to the region. As more and more Southeast Asian economies, such as Vietnam and Cambodia, have embraced market-oriented policies, East Asian production networks including a few Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturing businesses have set up assembly plants in Vietnam. Even though China emerged as a world factory and participated in the regional production network of electrical and electronic products, it has not hollowed out Southeast Asian production centres as they further moved up the value chain, restructuring and diversifying their operations beyond manufacturing to include R&D, corporate and financial planning and sales and marketing.²²

While there are considerable differences between each economy within the region in terms of their capacity to engage in GVC and productivity, Southeast Asia attracts large sums of FDI, and multinational enterprises are drawn by the expanding market, natural resources and a competitive production base for exports. In recent times, Chinese FDI inflows into Southeast Asia have intensified and are largely driven by the mounting demand for raw materials, for instance, Chinese investments in Myanmar. The region witnessed occasional dips in FDI inflows following the Asian Financial Crises and the dotcom bubble, and the subsequent Global Financial Crisis, but in the following years Southeast Asia experienced a robust recovery of investment inflows. In 2014, a UNCTAD report indicated that East and Southeast Asia accounted for roughly 31% of the total world FDI inflows. Following the Plaza Accord, Japan buttressed FDI outflows

to help businesses hold competitiveness, and supported subsidies on low interest loans and assistance through JETRO. In the 1970s, Japan focussed its FDI on Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, but a readjustment of currency with appreciation of the Japanese yen and subsequently currencies from the tiger economies ensured greater FDI inflows to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in later years. With ASEAN economic integration, Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming more attractive for trade and investments.

TRACING THE TRADE AND INVESTMENT TRAJECTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia, comprising 10 economies of ASEAN, has evolved as one of the epicentres of global trade with aggregate goods trade of US\$ 2.2 trillion in 2016 compared with US\$10 billion in 1967. Meanwhile, trade in services amounted to US\$ 681 billion in 2016 compared with US\$ 140 billion in 1999. The ratio of overall goods trade to GDP witnessed a northward movement from 43.1% in 1967 to 87.0% in 2016. Looking at ASEAN's trade partners in 2016, Intra-ASEAN trade accounted for 23.5%, followed by China with 16.1%, the EU with 10.4%, Japan with 10.1% and the United States with 9.7%.²³ As Xi Jinping's China is competing for regional influence as the second-largest economy of the world, Beijing has emerged as the largest trading partner of ASEAN (beyond intra-ASEAN trade) since 2009 following the Financial Crisis and the fourth-largest source of FDI.

China–ASEAN trade in goods has increased more than tenfold since 2000, when trade stood at US\$ 35.3 billion, to US\$ 368 billion in 2016. China emerged as a key player for ASEAN following the 1997 Financial Crisis as it espoused




Figure 23.3 Top trading partners of ASEAN (unit: US\$ million)

Source: prepared by the author based on data from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2016/2017, p. 64.

several proactive policies to stabilize the regional economy such as abstaining from devaluing renminbi, financial assistance to Thailand using an IMF aid programme and export credit to Indonesia. While ASEAN appreciated China's role following the Crisis, there was disappointment with Japan's role as the 'head goose' following its sluggish attempt at instituting the Asian Monetary Fund which projected Japan's inability to pursue regional leadership independent of US approval.²⁴ In addition, due to the domestic recession, ASEAN could not fully access the Japanese market for its exports. In subsequent years, while China's trade with Southeast Asia expanded substantially compared with the United States, the EU and Japan, it is important to note that the trade balance is escalating with China following the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) that came into effect in 2010. Following China's membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China and ASEAN signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation the next year which served as a forerunner to the ACFTA which aims at greater integration and trade facilitation. Subsequently, ASEAN signed FTAs with several countries including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.

China's primacy as 'Factory Asia' has been facilitated by Beijing's numerous policy designs including the open-door policy, the good-neighbour policy aligned with the great western development strategy and the go-global strategy. China's go-out policy complements the ACFTA that aims to support China's investment. China has strategically cultivated Southeast Asian markets through its geographic contiguity, cultural affinity, natural resources, inexpensive workforce and, more importantly, through realizing the need to diversify markets and reducing excessive dependence on the West following the 1989 Tiananmen Square experience of economic sanctions.²⁵ Southeast Asia also presented




Figure 23.4 ASEAN's balance of trade in goods

Source: prepared by the author based on data from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2016/2017, p. 79.




Figure 23.5 Foreign direct investment: inward and outward flows and stock, 1970–2016 (unit: US\$ million)

Source: prepared by author based on UNCTADdata*

*UNCTAD STAT Data Centre, <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740> (accessed on August 2, 2018)

an opportunity to take part in the advanced and dynamic regional division of labour through investments in manufacturing that enabled exports of intermediate goods to developing economies for assembly and helped its industrial advancement.²⁶

The China–ASEAN trade structure has shifted from primary commodities to manufactured products. While intermediate goods, for instance components for producing ICT products, constituted China’s core imports from ASEAN, exports to ASEAN encompassed machinery and electrical appliances. In addition to advancing economic development in central and western provinces of China by way of economic engagement with continental ASEAN, China has employed economic instruments such as the ACFTA to manage some of the Southeast Asian nations’ sensitivity to the ‘China threat’ and support peaceful coexistence.²⁷ Furthermore, China’s economic bonhomie with ASEAN is aimed at shrinking the China containment strategy of the United States and Japan in Southeast Asia.²⁸

Meanwhile, FDI, as a source of capital and technology, has been a positive catalyst in integrating Southeast Asia into the global economy. In the late 1960s, Southeast Asia received nearly 2–4% of global FDI flows focussing on mining and oil extraction. However, ASEAN’s inward FDI stock stood at US\$ 1.9 trillion in 2016, representing 20% of all FDI stock in developing countries and 7% of global FDI stock. The focus has primarily been on the services and manufacturing sectors and the key sources of FDI over the decades have been traced from the EU, ASEAN, Japan and the United States. In the 1980s, Japan and the Newly




Figure 23.6 Structure of inward FDI flows by major economic sectors (percentage)

Source: prepared by the author based on data from 'ASEAN at 50: A Historic Milestone for MNEs and FDI in ASEAN', ASEAN Secretariat, 2017, p. 66.

Industrializing Economies were keen to shift their production bases overseas following the loss of preferential access to many OECD markets and also to escape appreciation of currencies, hence the influx of FDI witnessed.²⁹

Looking at FDI into ASEAN from 2000–16, while two-thirds of Japanese FDI was concentrated in manufacturing, 60% of the US FDI was focussed on financial services. While the top sources for manufacturing FDI came from Japan, the EU, the United States and ASEAN members, gradual divestments by the EU and the United States advanced the shares in total FDI of Japan with 37% and ASEAN with 22% from 2012–16. Since 2000, the top sources of investment in financial services have come from the United States, the EU and ASEAN members. Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand featured as the leading recipients of manufacturing FDI between 2012 and 2016. Meanwhile, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand are the foremost FDI recipients in financial, trade and professional, scientific and technical services. In addition, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar are the leading FDI recipients in the primary sector owing to their natural resources. Substantial FDI in infrastructure was diverted to the CLMV states (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam).³⁰


The United States has directed nearly US\$ 274 billion in cumulative investment in ASEAN, accounting for over a third of US investment into Asia.³¹ Meanwhile, the cumulative FDI between China and ASEAN stands at US\$ 185 billion as per China's Ministry of Commerce statistics. In a decade, Chinese net FDI inward flows into ASEAN increased from 2.5% in 2007 to 9.5% in 2016. Chinese investments reflect a northward trend especially in the CLMV countries. Total investment from China to Cambodia between 1994 and 2016 was about

Table 23.1 Total inward FDI flows into ASEAN by key economic sectors and source country, 2000–16 (unit: US\$ million)

Sectors	Japan	United States	The EU	China	South Korea
Manufacturing	97,962	3,323	42,165	-2,594	17,842
Financial and insurance activities	8,781	87,657	59,774	17,095	4,159
Mining and quarrying	4,592	3,616	18,921	5,371	764
Construction	1,126	-67	1,531	1,042	1,001
Trade, hotels and restaurants	18,712	21,940	56,306	8,745	3,964
Real estate	2,389	4,751	11,340	11,493	3,672

Source: prepared by the author based on data from, ASEAN Secretariat, 2017, 'ASEAN at 50: A Historic Milestone for FDI and MNEs in ASEAN', ASEAN Secretariat, October 2017, p. 81 http://investasean.asean.org/files/upload/2017_ASEAN50Milestone.pdf (accessed on August 2, 2018).

US\$ 14.7 billion. The primacy of trade and FDI as vital engines of economic development cannot be understated but sometimes it can also present some adverse effects in host economies as it may be a drain on their natural resources and degrade environmental quality. China's FDI is motivated by the host nation's natural resource abundance coupled with meagre institutional governance³², for instance, in the case of Chinese investments in Myanmar. Moreover, developing economies can be 'pollution heavens'³³ with relatively weaker environmental regulations compared with developed countries, for instance Japanese FDI towards the region in the 1970s reflects Japanese businesses and the state's calibrated efforts to reposition heavy polluting industry, including petro-chemical industries, intended to shut down anti-pollution protests in Japan.

**Figure 23.7 Net FDI inward flows in ASEAN by source country (unit: US\$ million)**

Source: prepared by the author based on data from ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2016/2017.

GEOPOLITICS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Regional economic integration in Asia through mega free trade agreements – often employed not just as trade instruments but also as strategic tools, gained momentum from the beginning of the 2000s. The key variable behind a ‘noodle bowl’ of free trade networks is major power competition for regional influence. This is witnessed in several structures including China’s East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) among ASEAN+3 and Japan’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) involving ASEAN+6, subsequently culminating in RCEP; ASEAN asserting its centrality with the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); and the United States trying to shape the standards in the pre-Trump era with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In addition to RCEP, China is exploiting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) or the ‘Beijing Roadmap’, underpinned in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to engineer favourable economic designs. As major powers compete to shape favourable global norms in an attempt to demonstrate leadership, mega-FTAs are more than just economic bargains and often encompass security and political connotations. Southeast Asian countries participate in several overlapping and multi-layered trade agreements.³⁴

Southeast Asian economic integration, one of the key objectives of ASEAN, was realized with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) coming into effect in 1993. Subsequently, instituting the AEC in 2015, seeking a single market together with greater movement of capital and labour, advanced the objectives of regional integration. Beyond the region, economic integration has been founded on the principle of ‘ASEAN Plus’ FTAs with Asian nations including China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India. ASEAN is the hub in the hub-and-spoke of FTA structures. As the next step, Southeast Asia is engaged in mega regional free-trade frameworks – the RCEP and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which succeeded the TPP. Four ASEAN countries including Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei are presently part of the CPTPP, with others such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand expressing an interest in joining.

President Trump’s rejection of the TPP presented an opportunity for Japan to demonstrate leadership and pursue regional economic integration within a TPP-11 or CPTPP framework without the United States.³⁵ With the withdrawal of the United States from the TPP, often touted as the economic pillar of Obama’s pivot policy, Japan stepped up into a leadership role. Prime Minister Abe was concerned that if the United States had abstained from playing a constructive role in shaping the regional architecture-building process, China would have an easier path in engineering a Sino-centric order with the RCEP and other frameworks.³⁶ Such a development would be a colossal challenge for Abe as geopolitical and geo-economic

uncertainties intensify the regional complexity.³⁷ Besides, Abe tapped the TPP as an effective instrument to make the most of Asia-Pacific's growth potential and revive the domestic economy, which is key to the success of 'Abenomics'.

RCEP, embedded in the concept of ASEAN centrality,³⁸ is expected to yield favourable economic dividends for the region with greater liberalization commitments for trade in goods, services and rules of origin (ROO). While the intensifying network of FTAs formed a 'noodle bowl' situation thwarting the full use of preferential schemes, RCEP is expected to harmonize various rules and commitments in the ASEAN+1 FTAs. ASEAN is keen on nurturing RCEP primarily for two reasons: (a) the predicament of diluting ASEAN centrality and escaping marginalization in regional economic integration enterprises steered by major powers and (b) the progress made in TPP negotiations.³⁹

Hard realities of power politics design mega trade agreements such as the TPP which is often analysed through the prism of 'securitization of trade policy'⁴⁰ driven by the intention to contain China. The politics of exclusion, while constructing the debate on regional economic architecture, were manifested in the case of the TPP and RCEP. For instance, the salient features of the TPP and RCEP were the exclusion of China and the United States respectively, allowing the leading states to exert exclusive influence in terms of controlling the agenda, rule-setting and membership by barring competitors.⁴¹ The strategic value of the TPP as one of the crucial pillars of the US pivot to Asia before President Trump withdrew from the mega-FTA negotiations made China anxious. Three distinct schools of thought emerged in the Chinese literature including the containment school, the economic competition school and the pro-TPP school. Following President Obama's decision to participate in the TPP, one school of thought in China argued that Sino-US rivalry was the critical variable in comprehending the TPP since Washington's primary objective was to constrain China's rise and influence in the global order.⁴² To counterbalance the strategic connotations of Obama's decision to lead the TPP, the Chinese policy priority was to hasten the development of FTAs with major Asian trading partners since mega-FTAs are just as much about geopolitics as they are about geo-economic interests. The second school of thought analysed the TPP through the economic prism and argued that Obama's key intent was to lift the domestic economy by way of augmented exports to the Asia-Pacific. The third school of thought articulated the case for participating in the TPP as it would present Beijing with some space for norm-making favourable to its economic interests on the one hand and motivate structural reforms in the domestic economy on the other.⁴³

Meanwhile the origins of the RCEP can be traced back to the contest between China and Japan in ASEAN, nurturing differing designs for the regional economic architecture. This is witnessed in the conceptualization of China's EAFTA and Japan's CEPEA. While China, to secure its dominance, argued only in favour of liberalization of trade in goods together with a constricted membership excluding Australia and India, Japan emphasized investment and intellectual property issues and encompassed the ASEAN+6 to dilute Beijing's power. The progress

made in the TPP negotiations raised urgency in China and ASEAN to maintain regional leadership while designing the regional economic architecture. In 2011, Japan and China joined forces to work towards regional economic integration and subsequently RCEP was conceived by merging EAFTA and the CEPEA. Unlike the TPP, RCEP is underpinned by ASEAN centrality and thus open exclusively to ASEAN's FTA partners, which currently excludes the United States. While the TPP is often referred to as the gold standard of FTA, RCEP encompasses trade in goods, services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute settlement, e-commerce, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and other issues. Led by the Global South, RCEP as a 16-nation mega-FTA represents a paradigm shift in Asian regionalism.⁴⁴ While the China-led RCEP founded on ASEAN centrality is expected to generate 32% of global GDP⁴⁵, TPP-11 or CPTPP accounts for 13.5% of global GDP.

As competing frameworks, the RCEP negotiations intensified as the TPP discussions gained momentum under the Obama administration. Each player leveraged their position to maximize their gains. RCEP was smartly employed by both China and Japan to serve their respective strategic interests. China shut out the United States with restricted membership based on an ASEAN Plus formula, serving Beijing's objective of exerting influence in any regional economic integration. Japan meanwhile used the 'China card' with the United States when its participation in TPP was uncertain, but once Japan had secured a position at the negotiations, it employed the 'TPP card' to fortify its RCEP negotiating position with relation to China.⁴⁶

Southeast Asia's integration in the world economy and commitment to the WTO has contributed meaningfully to advancing international trade. While the United States consciously integrated China into the international economic order and supported China's membership of the WTO in 2001, today China under Xi Jinping is becoming the bastion of globalization while Trump is pushing the United States to protectionism. Southeast Asia must continue to support free trade through liberalization and regional integration and oppose protectionism including Trump's 'America First' policy which will have adverse effects on regional production networks. Moving beyond trade war, restructuring the multilateral trade system is contingent on cooperation between China and the US economies.

POLITICS OF AID: CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A fierce contest among major powers is unfolding both in continental and maritime Southeast Asia when it comes to courting the region with economic aid including loans, grant aid and technical assistance, which are often used as strategic tools in pursuit of national interest and expanding regional influence. While aid strategy is often tied to trade and investment priorities of the donors, strategic intents are also deeply entrenched in aid programmes. As Southeast Asia has emerged as a theatre of great-power politics, actors such as Japan have refused

Table 23.2 ODA to Asia by selected DAC donors (unit: US\$ million)

<i>Countries</i>	<i>1970–79</i>	<i>1980–89</i>	<i>1990–99</i>	<i>2000–09</i>	<i>2010–16</i>	<i>2010–16 % of DAC countries</i>	<i>2010–16 Asia as % of each donor's aid</i>
United States	6,131	4,012	2,809	7,788	7,746	34%	39%
The UK	1,280	753	669	1,735	2,726	12%	40%
Japan	2,322	3,489	4,431	3,450	2,634	11%	61%
Germany	1,256	1,539	1,620	1,988	3,153	14%	42%
Australia	341	437	583	886	1,242	5%	55%

Source: prepared by the author based on data from 'Development Aid at a Glance – Statistics by Region', OECD, 2018, p. 5.

to accept Chinese economic primacy in the region as a given, and have demonstrated the resolve to engage in the contest for influence. In the long term, Southeast Asia will benefit considerably from the strategic competition between the two Asian economies as it will eventually serve the goal of empowering these developing economies to advance their national growth and lift the region's overall ability to compete in the global economy.⁴⁷

Comparing Japanese and Chinese aid strategy towards Southeast Asia reflects that while Japan underscores compliance with the OECD-DAC aid strategy, furthering ASEAN centrality and promoting universal value-based order and governance standards, China's aid policy is underpinned on South–South cooperation and Beijing's identity of a 'developing country'.⁴⁸ The guiding principles for China's foreign aid is the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance outlined by Premier Chou Enlai in 1964. China's post-Cold War aid strategy in Southeast Asia is defined by its policies of good neighbourliness, its going out strategy and western development strategy. Studies have underscored that in Southeast Asia, predominantly in CLMV countries, Japanese aid focusses on economic and social infrastructure while Chinese aid is concentrated on infrastructure and the energy sector.⁴⁹

While Japanese donor assistance to Asia has gone southward over the years, Asia still received 52.8% of Japanese ODA in 2015, of which 27.3% went to Southeast Asia and 20.6% to South Asia. Moreover, sectoral analysis reflects that Japanese ODA in 2015 focussed mostly on economic infrastructure and services (52.86%), social infrastructure and services (18.05%) and the production sector (7.35%).⁵⁰ Japan features as one of the key donors for the CLMV countries except for Myanmar situated along the Mekong region.⁵¹ Myanmar was deprived of Japanese ODA loans (except in the form of technical assistance and grand aid) following diplomatic isolation after 1988 but as democratic reforms unfolded, Myanmar featured as the top ODA recipient among ASEAN in 2013 for the first




Figure 23.8 Gross disbursements of Japanese ODA (unit: US\$ million)

Source: prepared by author based on data from ODA White Papers, MOFA Japan.

time. Meanwhile, as China positioned itself as one of the leading aid providers, ambiguity surrounding its development spending shaped the narrative of Beijing as a rogue donor. The 2014 White Paper on China's foreign aid captured the geo-strategic importance of Southeast Asia and urged cooperation under its regional cooperation mechanism.

While President Trump's focus on hard military power led to a proposed 28% cut (US\$ 26.6 billion) in spending for the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), China is fast catching up in international aid politics. Between 2000 and 2014, China lent approximately US\$ 350 billion in foreign aid and other forms of state financing. Even though China and the United States have comparable overseas project portfolios in terms of scale and scope including US\$ 394.6 billion in US aid and US\$ 354.3 billion in Chinese aid, 93% of US spending was in the form of ODA while China extends only 23% of its financial support in the form of ODA and a significant ratio of its financial support comes as export credits and market rate loans.⁵² Western donors and lenders, on the other hand, generally provide development finance on highly concessional terms and have less aggressive export credit programmes. Moreover, in the case of projects executed by multilateral banks, 41% of the work is allocated to domestic contractors compared with 8% in China-funded projects.⁵³ Transparency and cautious management of financing conditions are important.

China's emphasis on infrastructure marks a departure from the Western donors who have reduced their involvement in the infrastructure sector. China has further captured investment opportunities in the infrastructure, energy and natural resources sector in Southeast Asia with the institution of the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (CAF), a quasi-sovereign equity fund supported by the Export-Import Bank of China and approved by the National




Figure 23.9 Japanese ODA net disbursement to CLMV nations (unit: US\$ million)

Source: prepared based on data from ODA Annual White Papers, MOFA Japan.

Development and Reform Commission, which intends to raise US\$ 3 billion primarily from Chinese state-owned enterprises.⁵⁴ Beyond the rhetoric of South–South Cooperation, China is investing in expanding influence in Southeast Asia owing to its politico-economic and strategic interests. While China’s foreign aid is difficult to quantify, its key objectives are access to natural resources, markets for Chinese goods, leveraging strategic interests and reaping support in international organizations such as the United Nations. Beyond the larger strategic goals of BRI, China’s key focus in the least-developed economies of Southeast Asia including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar has been in natural resources including energy, raw materials and mining and infrastructure. It is mainly focussed on the hydropower, mining, agriculture and forestry sectors. One of the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance outlined in 1964 underscores the importance of respecting the sovereignty of the recipient countries and never tying conditions to the aid, but, in practice, China has manipulated its core interests with aid. For instance, Cambodia had to toe Beijing’s One China policy before substantial aid was diverted to Phnom Penh.⁵⁵

In development financing, the infrastructure sector is often accorded priority. A 2017 Asian Development Bank (ADB) assessment underscored that developing Asia will need US\$ 26 trillion for infrastructure investment from 2016 to 2030 or US\$ 1.7 trillion annually. While Southeast Asian nations have increased infrastructure expenditure in their national budgets, there are funds flowing from BRI and EPQI. Tapping the opportunity, China and Japan are competing to advance their regional influence by providing for the enormous infrastructure needs of developing Asian economies. Moreover, Southeast Asia is at the fulcrum of China’s BRI and the United States’ and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Infrastructure projects are conceived in keeping with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity

2025 (MPAC 2025), whose objective is to improve connectivity with the aim of developing regional market integration. The Vientiane Declaration on Promoting Infrastructure Development Cooperation in East Asia was adopted in 2016 which underscored the need to access financial resources and technical assistance presented by financing mechanisms such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), AIIB, a US\$ 200 billion commitment from Japan under EPQI and India's Credit Line of US\$ 1 billion to conceive and undertake cooperative infrastructure projects. In this respect, prospects of co-financing among multilateral and regional development banks, including the World Bank (WB), ADB and AIIB to push infrastructure projects supporting regional connectivity and enabling inclusive economic development are prioritised.

BATTLE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING AND REIMAGINING CONNECTIVITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As China is increasingly engaging as a confident power in redefining the established international order to its advantage, Xi Jinping has pursued alternative ideas aimed at reshaping global governance that echo Chinese values and interests and its status as a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker. China is using its geo-economic and geopolitical grand strategy to design a Sino-centric order with projects such as the BRI and institutions such as the AIIB. While the rest of the emerging powers are rising within the established rules of a liberal international order reflected in the enduring Bretton Woods system including the IMF, WB and ADB, Beijing has tried to reshape the distribution of power, as the West is unwilling to accommodate rising powers within the US-led institutions. As Washington has refused to address the concerns of developing economies and the interests of China in the prevailing global financial institutions, Beijing has chosen to respond to the US call to be a 'responsible stakeholder'⁵⁶ and floated the AIIB to attain greater influence in the global economic governance system.

The AIIB Challenge to the Bretton Woods System. While the idea of the AIIB was being conceived, the Obama administration was investing diplomatic and political capital in influencing its allies to distance from the China-led bank, citing diluted governance standards and transparency issues. However, key US allies except for Japan joined the AIIB. While all the ten countries of ASEAN are members of the IMF and ADB, they are also founding members of AIIB. President Xi Jinping proposed the institution of the AIIB during his trip to Southeast Asia in October 2013 and Indonesia was among the first recipients of AIIB loans. The United States never permitted Japan to institute the Asian Monetary Fund after the Asian Financial Crisis when Tokyo offered a US\$ 100 billion contribution towards the Fund, but China has successfully demonstrated its ability to pursue institutional statecraft with the AIIB. While there is a school of thought in Washington arguing that China should learn to comply with the existing international rules and

institutions, voting rights and quota allocations in the IMF and the World Bank, experience in the WTO reflects that the United States is reluctant to accord space to China commensurate with its economic status in these institutions.⁵⁷

Fierce debate unfolded on two fronts with the institution of a multilateral development bank such as the AIIB with an exclusive focus on infrastructure. First, China's success as an institution-builder stressed the urgent need for reforms in the US-led international financial order underpinned in the Bretton Woods system. The emerging Asian economies have argued their concerns for decades, stressing the need to increase global financial institutions' loan capabilities, reassess the quota and voting rights and rationalize their operations. ADB reforms got a renewed momentum and, in May 2015, the ADB pledged to increase its lending capacity to \$20 billion; it agreed to combine the Asian Development Fund and Ordinary Capital Resources by 2017; it boosted public-private partnership investments by working in partnership with governments and private banks; and it decreased ADB's internal processing time.⁵⁸ There is a school of thought in Japan which reasons that unless the existing institutions reflect the influence of emerging powerful economies and permit them more space, the relevance of these institutions will be debated.⁵⁹ Takehiko Nakao articulates that with the institution of the AIIB and the BRICS bank, governance reforms need to be pursued industriously and that the inability of the existing international organizations to embrace reforms will affect their influence in the international community.⁶⁰

Second, Japan has witnessed an intensified debate⁶¹ on its possible AIIB membership following the diplomatic failure of the United States⁶² to dissuade its traditional allies from joining the China-led bank. Some argue the case for joining the AIIB so that Japan can contribute from inside in shaping its development trajectory instead of disapproving of the AIIB altogether.⁶³ Membership would offer an opportunity to influence the governance structure from within, in addition to helping Japanese infrastructure business by gaining information from within the AIIB.⁶⁴ Weighing the scenario of Japan joining the AIIB, Tokyo in turn would have shrunk China's share⁶⁵ in the bank. Japan and European nations together would have a larger share compared with China and later if the United States also joined, then the Chinese influence would be diluted. As the China-led AIIB has joined the development financing race, the Japan-led ADB, the US-led World Bank and the EU-led IMF will no longer be the only key players in Asia's financial architecture. As the AIIB took shape and became institutionalized, ADB President Takehiko Nakao argued the case for co-financing with the AIIB to pursue the objective of infrastructure funding in Asia.⁶⁶ As several advanced European economies have joined the AIIB, it will be an opportunity to shape Chinese behaviour by mutual efforts and explore 'how China's ambitions can be accommodated without overturning the existing international order'.⁶⁷

Reimagining Infrastructure, Connectivity and Economic Corridors. Whether it is China's BRI or the Japanese EPQI and AAGC, Southeast Asia is at the heart

Table 23.3 AIIB co-financed projects in Southeast Asia

<i>Country</i>	<i>Co-financing partner</i>	<i>Projects</i>	<i>Allocation (\$US million)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>
<i>Indonesia</i>	World Bank	Strategic Irrigation Modernization and Urgent Rehabilitation Project	AIIB 250.00 World Bank 250.00 Borrower 78.00	June 24, 2018
<i>Philippines</i>	World Bank	Metro Manila Flood Management Project	AIIB 207.60 World Bank 207.60	September 27, 2017
<i>Indonesia</i>	World Bank	Dam Operational Improvement and Safety Project Phase II	AIIB 125.00 World Bank 125.00 Borrower 50.00	March 22, 2017
<i>Indonesia</i>	World Bank	Regional Infrastructure Development Fund Project	AIIB 100.00 World Bank 103.00	March 22, 2017
<i>Myanmar</i>	IFC ADB	Myingyan 225 MW Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) Power Plant Project	AIIB 20.00 IFC ADB	September 27, 2016
<i>Indonesia</i>	World Bank	National Slum Upgrading Project	AIIB 216.50 World Bank 216.50 Borrower 1310.00	June 24, 2016
<i>Indonesia</i>		Mandalika Urban and Tourism Infrastructure Project	AIIB 260.00	Proposed
<i>Laos PDR</i>	World Bank Nordic Development Fund	National Road 13 Improvement and Maintenance Project	AIIB Loan 40.00 World Bank IDA Credit 40.00 Nordic Development Fund 9.5 Borrower 38.5	Proposed

Source: AIIB website.

of competing infrastructure designs, and aligns with MPAC 2025. The joint communique of the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in May 2017 underscored the potential of cooperation with MPAC 2025. While BRI's objectives are to stimulate linkages in connectivity, trade, financial integration, policy coordination and people-to-people exchanges, MPAC 2025 aims to attain a seamlessly connected ASEAN by augmenting physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity. While the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF), instituted by ADB and ASEAN,

has an initial equity of US\$ 485.3 million supported by the ASEAN nations (US\$ 335 million) and the ADB (US\$ 150 million), the challenge is financing the deficit given the huge appetite for infrastructure in Asia. There are opportunities for China to finance a few MPAC 2025 projects. Meanwhile, Japan has pursued quality infrastructure investment as its global agenda which is in keeping with one of the key strategic objectives of MPAC 2025, namely sustainable infrastructure. Moreover, it aligns with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment.

While the United States failed to stop China pursuing its regional leadership aspirations as witnessed in the case of AIIB, Japan has stepped up its game with EPQI, a US\$ 200 billion commitment with the objective of advancing regional influence by catering to the voracious infrastructure appetite of the developing economies. EPQI is an elevated version of the 2015 PQI 'Partnership for Quality Infrastructure'.⁶⁸ Beyond geopolitical gains, it is important to note that just as in the case of China, one of the key variables shaping BRI is easing the overcapacity conundrum besides focussing on developing its western regions, Japan's EPQI is critical to attaining the targets of Japan's national growth strategy. Japan's objective is to encourage high quality infrastructure export, expedite expansion into developing Asian economies and empower a revolution in productivity by investment in the future.⁶⁹ Before conceptualizing PQI, the June 2013 Japan Revitalization Strategy⁷⁰ enunciated the importance of building new frontiers for growth by seizing the global infrastructure market and outlined the target of tripling infrastructure sales by 2020. Keidanren, Japan's Business Federation, has identified Asia, and particularly Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Myanmar, as the priority markets for infrastructure export including sectors such as railways, airports, harbours, telecommunications and power plants.

With infrastructure export, Japan is pursuing the twin objectives of fuelling its growth engine to revive its national economy on the one hand and consolidating strategic linkages with Asian partners to balance China's regional influence on the other.⁷¹ The contest for infrastructure financing between the Chinese BRI and Japanese EPQI is unfolding in Southeast and South Asia. Prime Minister Abe has aggressively campaigned Japan's quality quotient rationalizing cost-effectiveness in the long run and has underscored the benefits of public-private partnership as opposed to BRI projects underpinned by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The AIIB conundrum also led to reshaping of policy. With regard to ODA loans, Japan expedited the timeline required for government-related procedures to 1.5 years (compared with 3 years) for key projects and collaborated with the ADB to (i) support private infrastructure projects through PPP and to institute the JICA Trust Fund with the objective of investing US\$ 1.5 billion, (ii) support public infrastructure development where the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and ADB will co-finance US\$ 10 billion and (iii) increase funding through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for projects with comparatively high-risk profiles. Japan has also exempted government



Figure 23.10 Key economic corridors in the Greater Mekong sub-region

Source: prepared by IDSA GIS Lab based on data from ADB Review of Configuration of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Corridors, 21st GMS Ministerial Conference, Asian Development Bank, November 2016.

guarantees on a case-by-case basis for sub-sovereign entities of developing states if certain conditions are met.⁷²

Comparing the Japanese and Chinese vision for infrastructure and connectivity in Southeast Asia, Tokyo primarily focusses on East–West connectivity while China emphasizes the North–South network. Japan’s priority for infrastructure connectivity in Southeast Asia is determined by the objective of establishing cross-regional and inter-regional hard and soft connectivity across production nodes and constructing economic corridors to support regional industrialization and build robust value chains advancing Japan’s manufacturing scale. To this end, Tokyo has focussed on:

- the East–West Economic Corridor connecting the Danang port situated in Vietnam to Mawlamyine port located in Southeast Myanmar through Laos and Thailand;

- the Southern Economic Corridor connecting Ho Chi Minh City and Vung Tau, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, to the Dawei port in southern Myanmar and beyond;
- Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor connecting Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.

For Beijing, the China–Indochina Economic Corridor, one of the six key economic corridors outlined in BRI, extending from China’s Pearl River Delta along the Nanchong–Guang’an Expressway and the Nanning–Guangzhou High-speed Railway via Nanning and Pingxiang to Hanoi and Singapore constitutes the priority. Furthermore, to integrate with Southeast Asia, China is pursuing its ambitious Pan-Asia Railway Network via the western route through Myanmar, the eastern route through Vietnam and Cambodia and the central route through Laos. Moreover, these routes will share the same line to Malaysia and Singapore. Several networks, including the China–Laos railway and China–Thailand railway, are key to China’s Pan-Asia Railway Network.

The China–Japan contest for infrastructure development is visibly manifested in the High Speed Railway (HSR) market of emerging economies in Southeast Asia. HSR projects including the Jakarta–Bandung (China), Bangkok–Phitsanulok–Chiang Mai Kuala (Japan), Bangkok–Nakhon Ratchasima–Nong




Figure 23.11 Infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia with Chinese involvement

Source: prepared by GIS Lab, IDSA.

Khai (China), Kuala Lumpur–Singapore (until recently before Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad postponed the project)⁷³ among several others have captured international attention. Japan has the competitive edge in terms of experience, safety, technology and social responsibility, but Tokyo lost the US\$ 5.5 billion Jakarta–Bandung HSR project to China despite Prime Minister Abe’s intense diplomatic campaign pitched on quality infrastructure. A closer look at the Jakarta–Bandung HSR project reveals that the Chinese proposal projected an estimated cost of US\$ 5.5 billion for a speed of 350–80 km/hour and the project to be operational in 2019 with a financing arrangement that did not necessitate any government guarantees, while the Japanese proposal projected an estimated cost of US\$ 6.2 billion for a speed of 320 km/hour and the project to be operational in 2021 with a financing arrangement that required government guarantee and financing from the state budget. China’s Jakarta–Bandung HSR project witnessed some delays due to land acquisition problems despite the issuance of the construction permit in July 2016, which put Indonesia under financial stress as the cost escalates with any delay and a fresh loan is conditional on land acquisition and several legal frameworks.⁷⁴

Another key area of the China–Japan contest in Southeast Asia is strategic port building/upgradation/modernization and industrial zones (Figures 23.11 and 23.12). To manage the Malacca dilemma and as a part of MSR, the Chinese have invested in constructing a new deep sea port as a part of the Melaka Gateway Project which is a joint venture between KAJ Development Sdn. Bhd. and Power China International. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s first national park, the Malaysia–China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) is focussed on steel, aluminium and palm oil production. Beibu Gulf Holding’s equity in the Kuantan Port Consortium Sdn. Bhd. reflects the Chinese footprint in critical infrastructure in Malaysia. Between the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is the strategically significant Bay of Bengal where China has expanded influence with key projects such as the Kyaukphu port in Myanmar, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and Chittagong port in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, as China has invested in Kyaukphu, Japan has invested in Dawei port and the SEZ project besides the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in Myanmar. In Cambodia, Chinese involvement in Kampot port and growing investments in the port city of Sihanoukville, even though Japan has extended a loan at 0.01%⁷⁵ for a new container terminal development for Sihanoukville port, reflects the regional powers’ interest in what is likely to become one of the logistics transfer hubs for ASEAN. In Singapore, Chinese COSCO has a 49% stake in COSCO-PSA Terminal projects. As China–Philippines relations saw a marked shift with President Duterte, Beijing is keen to invest in port development in the Philippines. While Philippine’s International Container Terminal Services Inc. in cooperation with China Harbour Engineering Co. is developing a container terminal in Puerto Cortes, the China Development Bank is deliberating on the prospects of investment in Manila, Cebu and Davao.⁷⁶




Figure 23.12 Infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia with Japanese involvement

Source: prepared by GIS Lab, IDSA, based on data from Mission of Japan to ASEAN*

*Kazuo Sunaga, 'Japan's assistance to ASEAN Connectivity in line with MPAC2025', Mission of Japan to ASEAN, October 2016 www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/documents/20161102.pdf (accessed August 17, 2018)

With regard to infrastructure development under BRI and EPQI, while Chinese projects are pursued by SOEs with financing through its state banks, Japanese projects accord space to the private sector as well as government entities and support from JICA, JBIC and multilateral banks such as the ADB and the WB. One key difference between the Japanese and Chinese approaches to Southeast Asia is that the Japanese have cultivated a transparent, equitable and mutually beneficial model of engagement which has consciously avoided the opaque 'debtbook diplomacy'⁷⁷ model that China has designed to leverage its strategic ambitions. While Japan has pursued mercantile realism, it has been more focussed on repairing its damaged image following the war and has employed tools such as ODA with the Fukuda Doctrine, Takeshita Doctrine and Hashimoto Doctrine. More recently, as Southeast Asia constitutes a critical component of both China and Japan's grand strategy, Japan has pitched for quality infrastructure, upholding global governance standards underpinned by liberal values of open, free, transparent procurement and economically sustainable projects conceived through consultative mechanisms. Meanwhile China's BRI, founded on the pillars of policy coordination on connectivity, unhindered trade and financial integration, operates through non-transparent contracting and financing arrangements with high interest rates and underwhelming returns with

budget overruns, modest construction quality and slack safety principles with SOEs playing a central role.

However, the Sino–Japanese contest for infrastructure building is not absolute.⁷⁸ This is evident as China and Japan have agreed to cooperate in Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor following Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan in May 2018 where the leaders agreed on cooperation in third countries taking forward the outcomes of the Japan–China High-Level Economic Dialogue held earlier in April.⁷⁹ The JBIC has reportedly offered to constitute a Japan–China conglomerate to construct HSR in Thailand linking Don Mueang International Airport in Bangkok, Suvarnabhumi Airport in Samut Prakan and U-Tapao Rayong-Pattaya International Airport in Rayong.⁸⁰ Exploring prospects of bilateral cooperation in third countries is not just restricted to Southeast Asia. The Japanese media reported that Japan is weighing the possibility of inviting China to participate in Japan-funded projects in Africa such as the Growth Ring project, the International Corridor project, and projects in Rwanda and Kenya.⁸¹ As Asia’s two leading economies, constructive engagement in the infrastructure sector is welcome as it will eventually empower developing nations to compete in the international economy.

While Prime Minister Abe, an ardent supporter of US-led universal value-based global order, initially expressed reservations regarding the Chinese BRI, Japan’s posture in 2017 in the BRF and subsequently the Future of Asia Conference led to intense debate in the region regarding the marked departure in Japan’s strategy. Since then Prime Minister Abe has articulated Japan’s approach in several policy speeches including in the National Diet and at several regional forums such as Da Nang on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting where Abe extended conditional support to BRI, firmly stressing the significance of keeping infrastructure open and transparent, and the economic viability of projects without compromising the debtor nation’s finances. This position is also endorsed by Keidanren which encourages strategic promotion of infrastructure exports but echoed that participation in BRI projects is conditional on internationally practised norms. Critical analysis suggests that Japan’s approach towards BRI has not altered but what has changed is its tactics which have become more sophisticated.⁸² Earlier apprehensions over global governance standards were cited as deterrents to Japanese involvement in Chinese BRI projects. Now Japan is using the same set of variables as prerequisites for its engagement in BRI. Situating Japan’s strategy in the larger geostrategic landscape indicates that Tokyo is investing in a carefully deliberated endeavour to abandon the narrow approach pursued in the case of AIIB membership, and to engage with China with the aim of shaping it as a responsible major power – one that respects global governance standards consistent with universal values and norms.⁸³

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia is increasingly featuring as an important pole in Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. With the BUILD Act, a new International Development Finance Corporation is instituted that doubles Washington’s

development finance capacity to US\$ 60 billion. The International Development Finance Corporation will collaborate with Singapore's Infrastructure Asia initiative to promote sustainable infrastructure development. In an attempt to maintain US supremacy, it has been underscored that since the United States leaves much to be desired when it comes to infrastructure building overseas, it is imperative to 'coordinate better with global partners' including Japan and Europe in this regard.⁸⁴ In addition, in July 2018 the United States, together with Australia and Japan, agreed to jointly invest in Indo-Pacific infrastructure involving the United States' Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Australian Foreign Affairs Department (DFAT) and the JBIC. In addition, the United States and Japan offered high-quality infrastructure investment alternatives in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2017, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the US government's development finance institution, signed an MoU with JBIC and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) with the aim of boosting investment in infrastructure, energy and several other sectors across the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, another MoU was signed between the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) and Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to facilitate high-quality energy infrastructure solutions in the region. At a time when President Trump has prioritized rebuilding and investing in American infrastructure, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in August 2018 made a commitment of US\$ 113 million to further develop Southeast Asia's digital connectivity, infrastructure and energy resources.⁸⁵ Moreover, there are some reports indicating that the State Department is weighing the prospects of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor linking South Asia with Southeast Asia.

SUMMING UP: STRATEGIC CONTEST THROUGH ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A Sino-US strategic contest is unfolding with the arrival of China as a major actor in the international system and Beijing increasingly engaging in moulding the existing structures of the US-led regional order, with the aim of reflecting its own national interests. With a relative dilution of US primacy in the region, the intensifying Sino-US strategic competition is being shaped not only by the traditional dynamics of power politics where both the established hegemon and the rising challenger are bent on designing a favourable international order but also profound departures in their respective values. With the emergence of a confident China pursuing its grand strategy, founded on the civilizational creed of being the Middle Kingdom, and reclaiming its rightful place by providing 'China solutions' to global governance, Beijing is positioning itself as a 'revisionist' stakeholder to advance China's status as a rule-maker and expand its influence in the hierarchy.

Geo-economics, employing economic instruments to attain geopolitical goals, is a vital component of this great power rivalry. As discussed in this chapter,

major powers including China, the United States and Japan often employ instruments of economic statecraft to translate wealth into power and regional influence. In recent years, Southeast Asia's asymmetric economic interdependence on China has enabled Beijing to encash economic leverage to further its strategic objectives. This was demonstrated when the ASEAN way of consensus-building on the South China Sea was diluted by pro-China nations such as Cambodia. Given that China's primacy in Southeast Asian trade is comparatively higher than the United States, the EU and Japan, Beijing will not hesitate to use its dominance by way of economic inducement and coercion to advance its strategic agenda of situating China at 'centre stage'. Moreover, expanding the Chinese footprint in the region is making Southeast Asian economies worry that Beijing will use these investments as an opportunity to acquire strategic assets as witnessed in the case of Sri Lanka.⁸⁶ Hence, Southeast Asia would do well to further intensify the ASEAN economic integration founded on ASEAN centrality and nurture deeper economic linkages with all the major economies which will offer Southeast Asia some extra strategic latitude amid the geostrategic uncertainty.

As Southeast Asia is rapidly emerging as a theatre for the Sino-US strategic contest, managing relationships with the competing great powers is no simple task. The key conundrum for Southeast Asia is how to adjust and balance respective relations with Beijing and Washington and exploit the Sino-US strategic contest as an opportunity to maximize economic advantages and security guarantees. Southeast Asia fears that sustained access to China's capital and markets might be conditional on political alignment with Xi Jinping's grand designs and thus tries to multilateralize China's economic engagement with the region.⁸⁷ Meanwhile President Trump's withdrawal from the TPP has hindered US economic interests in the region at a time when Chinese economic predominance is being established, as Beijing has not only emerged as the largest trading partner in the past decade but also an important source of FDI. At a time when the United States is pursuing protectionism and a transactional approach, becoming inward-looking with the America First policy, China is defending globalization and free trade, and intensification of the ongoing trade war, possibly paving the way towards a global recession – for Southeast Asia it is not a zero-sum game. Asia favours a balance between cooperation and constructive competition and 'shared economic leadership in the region'⁸⁸ as against either Washington or Beijing's submission to the other's claim of unrivalled influence. Given the fluidity in Southeast Asian geopolitics, the aim should be to engineer a potent regional order that will advance Southeast Asia's sustained prosperity without getting trapped in Sino-US strategic competition. As major powers compete in the region with augmented trade, investments, development and infrastructure financing, Southeast Asia will benefit significantly from the strategic competition as it will eventually advance the greater objective of empowering these developing economies to pursue their national growth and boost the region's overall ability to compete in the global economy.

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Foreign Aid and Asian Donors

Brittany L. Morreale and Purnendra Jain

INTRODUCTION

In the second decade of the 21st century, the global foreign aid landscape has changed significantly as emerging Asian donor nations continue to challenge the norms established by the Western bloc donors of the post-war period. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) still dominates the foreign aid space in terms of gross value and international recognition. This post-WWII organization comprises Western industrialized nations as well as Japan and, more recently, South Korea. However, the rise of new non-DAC donors in Asia, specifically China and India, is beginning to shift the prevailing aid paradigms. These emerging donors – while still developing societies and aid recipients – together with the two DAC-Asian donors, have the potential to redefine the 21st-century development aid agenda.

This chapter explores the growing significance of the Asian donors and their potential to shape the future of development aid and financing. Until South Korea's admission in 2009, Japan was OECD's only Asian DAC member. Japan and Korea now navigate a delicate diplomatic course alongside (and sometimes in juxtaposition to) the new and increasingly important non-DAC donors, China and India. Of these two emerging donors, China has been by far the more dominant, sparking global interest in its broad-reaching development cooperation profile.

Despite having a shared continent, these Asian nations each exhibit varying donor profiles. Founded on a proud historic base and contemporary prominence, Japan stands apart as the pre-eminent Asian donor. Within Asia, Japan maintains

its status as a high-ranking donor and regional aid leader, sustaining a multi-decadal commitment to Asian development. Although Asia is still its main concern, over the last several years, Japan has diversified its profile of aid recipients, shifting towards Africa and elsewhere. China's rapid rise as an aid donor has seen Africa, Asia, and Latin America as major beneficiaries, and the implications of Beijing's focus on international development politics and foreign policy requires consideration. India's aid program has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on technical and non-monetary assistance within its direct neighborhood. However, India has now begun to expand both its budgetary commitment and geographical focus. Once again, Africa has received a strong increase in development financing from its Indian Ocean neighbor, becoming a testing ground for the emerging Indian donor state.

While acknowledging the differences between the profiles of Japan, China, and India, several similarities are noteworthy. Each has defined donor–recipient models with unique characteristics that differentiate them from the norms of Western DAC members. Most notably, Asian donors have leveraged a new aid language and alternative cooperative narratives designed to build horizontal partnerships between donors and recipients. Although Japan is a DAC member and the longest serving Asian member state, it exhibits certain distinctive features that differentiate it from other industrialized donors. Moreover, it can be argued that the emerging Asian donors have strategically adapted some of the features of Japan's development assistance model (Stallings and Kim, 2017: 130). While Japan is considered a 'traditional DAC donor' in comparison with China and India, the distinctive features of Japan's aid model will be highlighted as a key point of reference in discussing Asian aid paradigms.

As Asian foreign aid programs have expanded, Africa has clearly featured as a focal point. Aid engagement in Africa represents a deliberate extra-regional effort on the part of Asian nations to define themselves as global aid powers and exhibit distinct aid paradigms. If the 21st century is to be an 'African century', as declared by the African Union, it will be financed by these donors (UN-News, 2013), hence Africa as a case study for this paper. While Japan has engaged with Africa for several decades, China and India have recently received much academic and media attention for their growing stature as emerging aid powers, and their engagement with Africa (Cheru and Obi, 2010; Naidu, 2010; Carmody, 2013; Chaturvedi and Mulakala, 2016).

To understand the development of aid programs, objectives, policy and models of Asian donors, this chapter has five parts. For an understanding of the aid paradigms, a brief background on the origin of Asian nations' foreign aid programs and policy development will first be considered. The second part provides an analysis of policy drivers and institutional frameworks to provide insights into the concentration and budgetary priorities of Asian development programs, presented in the third part. In part four, prevailing development models will be compared through a closer examination of Asian engagement with Africa – where all

three Asian donors have become major players – and a review of how Asian states have actively cultivated their relationship with the developing world. Finally, the chapter will close with a consideration of the future implications of Asia's growing role in global aid financing, showing its increasing influence and offering competition in the aid landscape.

BEGINNINGS OF AID: JAPAN, CHINA, AND INDIA

Japan

Japan's aid began in 1954 in the form of war reparations to Burma and subsequently to other Southeast Asian nations, as per the terms of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.¹ In the same year, and while itself a recipient of World Bank aid, Tokyo joined the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific. Although a modest aid donor in the 1950s and early 1960s, as its own economy was recovering from the war, Japan became a founding member of the DAC in 1961 (and its predecessor the DAG (Development Assistance Group), established in 1960). Japan later joined the OECD in 1964, thus grounding itself firmly in the Western donor camp of industrialized nations. By the late 1980s, Japan had become the world's largest aid donor earning 'Aid Great Power' status, as Tokyo formulated a 'new kind of superpower' (Yasutomo, 1989–1990: 490; Pharr, 1994: 159–80).

In the past 63 years since Japan began giving aid, there have been many transformative changes in Japan's aid policy and institutions (Jain, 2016). In 2008, Japan created the world's largest bilateral aid agency – the new JICA – and since 1992 has issued 'charters' setting out the aims and goals of its foreign aid. Japan's geographic focus of aid has been and still remains primarily Asia, but over the last few decades, Tokyo has diversified its geographic reach and Asia's share has dropped substantially from 98% in the early years to 70% in 1980 and to 54.8% in 2000 (Soderberg, 2011: 41) with a slight rise to Asia in the 2010s with 65% in 2015 (see Figure 24.3). The reach of this aid now spans the Middle East, the Pacific region, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, some 150 countries.

The African continent, as is detailed in this chapter, makes up a large share of the latest geographic focus, with Japan's expanding aid making it the second highest recipient region after Asia. Within Asia, there has been a geographical shift from the northeast (mainly China) to South Asia (mainly India). Within Southeast Asia, Tokyo has focused on selected countries – Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in particular. In 2014, for example, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines were the four top recipients of Japan's loan aid (Pollman, 2015; MOFA-Japan, 2016: 211). While Southeast Asia continues to be a key region, Tokyo's foreign aid in other parts of Asia has seen a major shift. In 2008, Japan ceased its yen loans and general grants to China – the largest and most preferred

recipient for many years – and directed a much greater proportion of its aid to India (Takamine, 2006; Drifte, 2008; Jain, 2016: 63–7; Jain, 2017).

China

China's history as a donor nation stretches back to the mid-20th century with a strong focus on the developing world. In the genesis of its development program in the 1950s, Chinese aid targeted diplomatic and political goals with a heavy emphasis on fostering ideological principles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Kim and Potter, 2012; Shimomura and Ohashi, 2013). China's own status as a developing country and large recipient of aid limited the financial commitments of its early projects. Thus, during the first few decades, China's foreign aid program was characterized by loans for small-scale infrastructure projects. China's solidarity with developing states in Asia and Africa served key political objectives, namely ensuring the One China Policy and advancing Beijing's representation in the United Nations. Both Taiwan and Beijing actively courted developing states with attractive aid packages (Copper, 2016). Taiwan, a significant 20th-century non-DAC donor that leveraged aid as a diplomatic instrument, was outmaneuvered by Beijing's successful aid diplomacy with developing states². From 1950 to 1970, Beijing achieved diplomatic recognition from 23 African states that severed ties with Taipei in favor of the People's Republic of China. These African states played a pivotal role in securing Beijing's position in the UN in 1971. China's growing relationship with development partners has proved to be invaluable in bolstering its diplomatic status. In fact, following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, development partners insulated Beijing amid international sanctions within the UN (Taylor, 2004: 84–9).

In the post-Cold War era, China's development assistance shifted to embrace economic goals over the ideological ambitions of the previous era. During this phase, the principles of non-conditional assistance, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation came to the fore. While the One China Policy remained a non-negotiable precondition, Beijing's rapid economic growth enabled it to pursue a vigorous economic cooperation program. This cultivated a Chinese brand of 'South-South Cooperation' in pursuit of international recognition as a regional and global power. With its emergence as a significant donor, Beijing touted its economic cooperation as an alternative aid-paradigm to the traditional DAC models. Beijing scorned 'aid' or 'ODA' due to OECD/Western connotations of a vertical donor-recipient relationship, in favor of 'foreign economic cooperation'. Beijing's packages comprised a combination of loans, official and private financing, and assistance. China advanced a new type of strategic cooperation characterized by political solidarity, pragmatic cooperation, and pursuit of common prosperity.

Post 2008, and following a remarkable soft-power display through the Beijing Olympics, China moved into a new era of development cooperation with a focus

on actively defining norms. This modern phase was marked by Beijing's attempt to set global economic and diplomatic rules through bold development cooperation programs, most notably the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). President Xi Jinping's opening speech at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum heralded China's vision as the defining endeavor of the 21st century, with promises to reimagine international economic, development, and security norms to achieve a 'new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation' (Xi, 2017). Economic and political goals have aligned in this new grand vision of broad-based development cooperation.

India

Much like China, India's status as a major recipient of aid defined its early relationship with the developing world as an ideological partner. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, led the newly independent nation to become the face and voice of the developing world with the establishment of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), the formulation of 'Third World' identity, and advancement of 'South-South Cooperation'. As the spokesperson of the developing world (an area of contemporary competition with China), India led a principled opposition to the inequities of the Western-led world order and international institutions that favored the North at the expense of the South. Built upon anti-colonial solidarity, India achieved an international status disproportionate to its material power. Furthering its soft-power advantage, India launched the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program (ITEC) in 1964. The ITEC program served as the principle thrust of India's contribution to South-South Cooperation by providing scholarships, training, and technical assistance to developing countries in its local neighborhood (South Asia) (Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013: 111–12).

With the end of the Cold War, India moved into a new phase of engagement with the developing world. In the shadow of China's rapidly rising stature, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao asserted India's new 'Look East' orientation, signaling a move towards increasing engagement with Asian powers (Baru, 2015). This new posture emanated from a perceived necessity to move away from Nehruvian political principles towards a more pragmatic engagement with Asia and Africa. Furthermore, this also marked an inflection point in Indian aid diplomacy with a critical reevaluation of India's power status in the global order. In pursuit of broader global power ambitions, development assistance was leveraged to open new markets and secure resources for a burgeoning Indian industrial base (Mawdsley and McCann, 2010).

In the early 21st century, India repaid and ceased all other aid flows in a determined effort to redefine its status from an *aid recipient* to an *aid donor*³. With this pivotal change, India advanced development cooperation and increased its leadership roles in multilateral institutions across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Aspirations to become a regional and global power resulted in the further

institutionalization of economic, political, and cultural ties with Asia and Africa in a multi-dimensional engagement. During this period, India's 'neighborhood' expanded to include Africa in addition to Southeast Asia, making the broader IOR the 'main focus of development assistance' efforts (MEA, 2017a: 182). Furthermore, new development partnership tools, including Lines of Credit (LOCs), grants, and development projects, complemented India's traditional training and capacity-building efforts. The ITEC program became a significant provider of loans, training, and scholarships to South Asian and African states. Beginning in 2003, India's EXIM Bank provided government-supported funding for a broadening range of development partnerships in the IOR. In recent years, these concessional LOCs have become the chief instrument of India's development assistance, with more than US\$24.2 billion, in over 60 developing countries (Mitra, 2017). The expansion of development scope and the addition of financial tools postured India to compete with other Asian powers as an emerging donor state. For India, development partnerships became a diplomatic tool in its rising stature, advancing 'India's abiding geo-political, strategic and economic interests' (MEA, 2017a: 182).

POLICY DRIVERS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Aid and development programs are fundamentally linked to national interests. While altruistic principles are publicly associated with these programs, at their core, the use of taxpayers' money and national resources for international aid requires domestic justification. Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy called for the 'active and strategic utilization of ODA' (MOFA–Japan, 2013: 31) while the 2015 Official Development Charter noted that in addition to serving the global good, development 'cooperation will also lead to ensuring Japan's national interests' (MOFA–Japan, 2015: 3). In the case of China and India, still developing countries themselves, the linkage between economic cooperation and domestic economic and political goals is fundamental. One study has confirmed how South Korea has followed Japan's path in linking its ODA program with foreign direct investment, thus creating business opportunities through its ODA program (Kang et al., 2011). The language of win–win cooperation, mutual benefit, and development partnership underlines the linkages to domestic agendas for emerging Asian donors. Accordingly, Chinese and Indian assistance is directly tied to the advancement of their own domestic industry, a point often criticized by DAC and some Western donors. For all these three Asian donors, development cooperation is driven largely by goals of improving resource security, communicating strategic international agenda, and increasing international status (in terms of UN representation and global image).

The development of national aid institutions is closely linked to the maturity of national aid programs and policy. Among Asian donors, Japan's long history

as a major donor and its international status has precipitated the consolidation of aid structures. Through a massive administrative restructuring in 2008, Japan consolidated most of its aid administration in the 'New JICA'. In its new reincarnation, JICA has emerged as a single predominant aid organization, appropriately labeled as a 'super JICA' (Tsunekawa, 2013: 173–4). With an annual budget in excess of US\$10bn, this is the world's largest single bilateral aid agency. South Korea's status as an economically advanced nation and newly minted DAC member has necessitated the reform and consolidation of its aid program in a form that closely mirrors Japan's JICA. In 1991, South Korea established the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) with a charge to administer Korea's aid program. In 2010, the Korean government adopted the Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation, providing policy guidance and a preliminary ODA framework. In 2006, it also established the Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) with the prime minister as chair of the committee, and representation from all ODA-related ministries and civilian groups (Stallings and Kim, 2017: 102).

In contrast, China and India exhibit more fragmented institutions, lacking transparency and consistency in their reporting. China's stage of aid institutionalization reflects a level of decentralized structures reminiscent of earlier stages of Japan's aid program when its aid administration was spread across numerous ministries and agencies (Rix, 1980: 21–5). China's development assistance is handled by a vast number of ministries, from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to the Ministries of Public Health, Education, Foreign Affairs, and beyond. MOFCOM holds the official responsibility for formulating mid- and long-term aid strategies and brokering aid with development partners (Kim and Potter, 2012; Kitano, 2016). However, competition between ministries and lack of effective coordinating mechanisms leave Beijing's emerging institutional apparatus compartmentalized and opaque (Brautigam, 2009). Even so, drivers for development assistance can be tracked through stated principles and official development visions.

By comparison, India reflects a new and still emerging aid program that is grappling with the early machinations of institutional organization. India, like China, does not have a dedicated aid agency. While coordination is provided by the Ministry of External Affairs, many other ministries have their own 'aid' programs and the Ministry of Finance plays a major role in budgetary allocations. Around 2007–2008, the government proposed to create a unified aid agency called the India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA)⁴, but this proposal has yet to mature.

Until the early 1990s, scholars and analysts commented that Japan lacked an aid philosophy resulting in an aid program essentially driven by commercial interests with some humanitarian and development concerns (Rix, 1993: 14). The first ODA Charter of 1992 identified some principles and attached political conditions. For example, it prohibited the use of aid money for military development

in recipient nations. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and changing domestic circumstances, such as the ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation, Tokyo issued a revised charter in 2003. The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter strengthened the 2003 ODA revisions to assert that ‘Japan must strongly lead the international community, as a nation that contributes even more proactively to securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace”’. (MOFA–Japan, 2015: 1) Japan has achieved a higher level of institutional consolidation with the reform of the Development Cooperation charter and the formation of the New-JICA. Japan’s level of institutional maturity has inspired emulation by South Korea, as discussed above.

The earliest set of principles, still foundational for both the Chinese and Indian aid programs, are the ‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’ (UN, 1954). Signed between the Chinese and Indian governments in 1954, these principles of respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, mutual benefit, and coexistence, provided a roadmap for future programs. They still feature in China’s major development cooperation declarations and vision statements. Building upon these foundations, in 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai announced in Ghana the ‘Eight Principles for Development Cooperation’. This declaration added the principles of non-conditionality and self-reliance while mandating skill transfer, quality materials, and equality in working conditions (Zhou, 1964). These principles are often cited as distinguishing features of China’s contemporary foreign assistance program and praised by recipients. In 2011 and 2014, China’s Information Office of the State Council published two White Papers entitled ‘China’s Foreign Aid’ (PRC, 2011; 2014). These Papers provided vague sketches of Beijing’s aid philosophy and broad reach; however, they lacked detailed statistics or comprehensive aid figures. The 2011 White Paper assessed that ‘China has a long way to go in providing foreign aid’, noting the need to develop foreign aid structures and improve quality and effectiveness to achieve a common prosperity (PRC, 2011). The 2014 Paper noted positive achievements but stressed a continued need for optimization of aid structures. While these White Papers provided little substantive data, they highlighted an increasingly cohesive Chinese aid narrative built around the realization of a ‘Chinese Dream’ of national prosperity and renewal, in line with the objective of common prosperity (PRC, 2014: 17).

Building upon this narrative, the 2015 Belt and Road Vision statement has served as the new face of Beijing’s development program. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides a unifying purpose for China’s broad-based foreign assistance projects. In a re-imagining of the legendary Silk Road, the BRI promotes infrastructure development and connectivity along land and sea routes through Central and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. For Beijing, the BRI offers access to resources, an outlet for domestic overcapacity, economic policy control, and political legitimacy. The May 2017 Belt and Road Initiative Forum reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to the grand development vision and

aimed to showcase widespread international support for the new paradigm⁵. In total, more than 60 nations sent delegations to attend the forum, including 29 foreign heads of state (Tiezzi, 2017). The forum was attended by US and Japanese delegations, and leaders from the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, which is indicative of the growing significance of China as a development leader. The 2019 BRI Forum boasted 36 foreign heads of state, including leaders from 5 African nations – Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique – which are strategic players in Beijing’s vision. At the BRI Forum, President Xi Jinping pledged to boost Beijing’s commitment to US\$124bn with infrastructure investments across more than 60 countries along the Belt and Road (Xi, 2017). This commitment offered significant promise for developing nations in Asia and Africa where billions in infrastructure development can supplement Chinese-financed roads, railroads, and ports to improve connectivity.

In the case of India, the strategy and structure of its aid program is in the development state. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) formulates India’s foreign policy objectives and coordinates international cooperation efforts to achieve national aspirations and secure national interests. Since India’s transition to an aid donor, the MEA has managed an increasing aid budget and wider regional distribution. To this point, development cooperation has occurred haphazardly with a growing recognition of India’s need for effective management and structure. Under the MEA, the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) was established in 2012 to monitor and execute India’s growing development assistance portfolio. The DPA is charged with handling LOCs, training, grants, humanitarian relief, and strategic partnerships. In its first three years, from 2013 to 2015, the DPA reported the administration of about US\$220mn in development assistance, representing just a small percentage of India’s total reported foreign assistance (MEA, 2016a). India’s technical assistance is also largely administered through the Export–Import Bank of India (EXIM) which extends both concessional and conventional loans to development partners. The reported MEA 2015–16 technical assistance outlay of US\$1.3bn (₹8443.49crores) was complemented by an additional \$3.36bn in LOCs approved by India’s EXIM Bank (EXIM-India, 2016; MEA, 2016a). LOCs have become a chief mechanism of India’s recent development partnership program. Still in its infancy, these institutions for foreign cooperation are developing the expertise required to manage and execute projects that span the Indian Ocean region. While India’s institutionalization of development partnership lags behind Japan and China, the growth of New Delhi’s cooperation budget and international agenda has implications in the IOR and beyond.

AID CONCENTRATION

When assessing aid concentration from Asian DAC donors (Japan and Korea) and re-emerging aid powers (India and China), comparing definitions of ODA

with economic cooperation or technical assistance can present a challenge. Japan and Korea adhere to DAC definitions of aid and annual reporting requirements. OECD-DAC aid comparisons are a fertile ground for academic study due to the consistency and availability of data. However, foreign aid from China and India is notoriously difficult to quantify (Brautigam, 2009; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013; Kitano, 2016). For example, in addition to what the OECD would categorize as 'ODA', China and India include such items as LOCs, official financial flows, and private investments in foreign economic cooperation. Aid and loan estimates for emerging donors vary dramatically. Deborah Brautigam and the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) have shown vast variations in estimated Chinese loan figures, ranging from US\$73.1bn (CARI estimate) to US\$175bn (RAND estimate) over the period from 2000 to 2013 (Hwang et al., 2016). Similarly, estimating Chinese foreign aid proves challenging as government budget reports are disaggregated across various departments and often include financing commitments and agreements rather than disbursed aid (Kitano, 2016). The OECD estimated China's 2014 gross development financing at US\$3.4bn in comparison with Kitano's estimate of US\$5.4bn (Kitano, 2016; OECD, 2016). Due to a lack of standardized definitions and reporting, aid values are presented for qualitative comparison rather than quantitative analysis. The percentage of aid budgets allocated to Africa and official pronouncements at multilateral forums can be valuable indicators of the regional emphasis of development cooperation for Asian donors.

In Figure 24.1, aid disbursements are used for comparison over a six-year period from 2010 to 2015 (most current available dataset at the time of writing). Data for Korean and Japanese gross ODA disbursements are compiled from the OECD-DAC annual ODA database. Chinese values reflect estimates calculated by the SAIS-CARI institute (2017) and Naohiro Kitano (2016) for global foreign aid output. Indian values represent 'technical assistance' as reported in the annual MEA Budget Outcomes (2011-2017). Japan's dominance among the Asian powers is evident from the graph, with an ODA outlay two to five times greater than China's estimated foreign aid values (depending on which estimates are used). While the gap appears to be shrinking, Japan's role as Asia's most significant aid donor is undisputable. Nonetheless, China's increasingly important role as a major donor within the region is evident.⁶ Already, even conservative estimates show that China outlays twice as much aid as Korea. In fact, using Kitano's estimates for total gross foreign aid, China would rank 6th among the current 29 OECD-DAC member states in 2014. In that same year, India would have ranked 15th among DAC donors with Japan at 3rd and Korea in 14th (see Figure 24.2).

In terms of regional distribution of aid, the Asian region receives the largest proportion of total ODA from Asian donor states followed by the African region. The percentage of aid and economic cooperation flows to Asia by China, Japan, and Korea have decreased significantly over the past few decades (Kim and Potter, 2012: 140-41). The most recent data show that all four donors still favor their

Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Korean Global Gross Disbursed Aid from 2010 to 2015 (US \$10 Million)




Figure 24.1 Estimated annual totals of global gross 'aid' disbursed by China, Japan, India, and Korea from 2010 to 2015 in US\$10mn

Two estimates for Chinese foreign aid values are presented. The first, lower estimates, are compiled by the China Africa Research Institute (2017). The second, higher estimates denoted by an asterisk, are calculated by Naohiro Kitano (2016) and do not include 2015 estimates. The Japanese and Korean values represent gross annual disbursement of ODA as reported by the OECD–DAC online database (2017). Indian values are the total disbursed 'technical assistance' as reported by the annual MEA Budget Outcome (2011–2016).




Figure 24.2 Total gross ODA OECD–DAC member rankings in 2014 (latest Chinese estimates available) in comparison with Chinese and Indian estimated foreign aid values

Source: MEA 2016b; Chinese total gross foreign aid estimates; MEA (2016) Annual Outcome Budget – total technical assistance (2016).




Figure 24.3 Regional distribution of Japanese and Korean gross ODA disbursements in 2015

Source: OECD–DAC online database (2017)

home region, with Africa emerging as another key region (see Figures 24.3 and 24.4). In fact, Africa's regional significance seems to be on the rise. China's 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid displayed a regional distribution of aid funds in 2009 that favored Africa (45.7%) over Asia (32.8%) (PRC, 2011). In the 2016 Korea–Africa Forum in Addis Ababa, South Korea's Foreign Minister declared that the percentage of bilateral ODA to Africa would increase to 35% by 2020 (Yun, 2016). Furthermore, in 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that since 2014 his government had 'made Africa a top priority for India's foreign and economic policy' (Modi, 2017).




Figure 24.4 Regional distribution of Chinese and Indian development cooperation in 2015

Sources: China: foreign economic cooperation, China Statistical Yearbook (2016). India: technical assistance, MEA reports (2016a) and Lines of Credit (LOC) statistics, India's EXIM Bank (2016)

In comparison with other extra-regional developing countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East or Latin America, Africa attracts the vast majority of aid and economic cooperation financing from Asian donors. For example, Africa received three times more ODA from Japan and China than did the next most significant regions, Middle East and Latin America (Figures 24.3 and 24.4). The prioritization of Africa signifies the importance of resource security, political goals, and diplomatic objectives associated with their development cooperation programs. Due to the parallel emphasis, Asian donors have cumulatively become Africa's third-most important source of aid, after the United States and the United Kingdom. China's role as Africa's most important trading partner only further accentuates the relative importance of Asian states to the development of the continent. The current trajectory of Asian donors stands to have a significant impact on Africa's development and economic prosperity in the 21st century.⁷

AFRICAN CASE STUDY

In the late 20th century, Western DAC donors experienced aid-fatigue and their interest in Africa waned (Hiltzik, 1991). As a result, Japan's increasing aid budget earned it the distinction as the world's leading bilateral aid donor from 1989 to 2001. In 1993, in an effort to reinvigorate multilateral aid efforts to developing countries, Japan forged a bold new relationship with Africa via the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Since TICAD's inception, Japan has co-hosted seven conferences with African states and international partners under this emerging framework. Over TICAD's last 26 years, Japan has witnessed Africa's transformation from a neglected area in the 20th century to one that is ardently contested in the new millennium. In 2000, China followed Japan in institutionalizing forum diplomacy with Africa through the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Since its inception, FOCAC has also convened seven times, building intensity across the African continent with each successive occurrence. Korean diplomacy with Africa was formalized in 2006 with the Korea–Africa Forum (KAF), which has convened four times since its initiation. Just two years later in 2008, modeled closely after its Asian counterparts, India launched its own Africa-oriented forum, the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS). New Delhi took an active role in institutionalizing African engagement and has incrementally increased the scale and inclusivity of the Summit with each subsequent occurrence.

The notable use of forum diplomacy in Asia–Africa engagement has enabled traditional and emerging Asian aid powers to achieve a platform in development discourse while advancing cooperative models of aid. The forum setting has become a medium for declaring substantial aid packages, communicating development priorities, and fostering political alignment (Morreale and Jain, 2016). At the 2015 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Chinese President Xi

Jinping boldly committed US\$60bn in various forms of loans, grants and investments to Africa over an unspecified period. The same year, at IAFS, India pledged more than \$10bn in loans and \$600mn in grants, in addition to commitments for institution-building and human development initiatives. The 2016 Korea–Africa Forum highlighted a commitment of \$5bn in development assistance and over \$400mn in health and education initiatives. In Nairobi, at TICAD VI, Abe similarly committed \$30bn over the next three years in addition to fulfilling the outstanding commitments from the Yokohama Declaration that extended through to 2017 (TICAD, 2013; 2016). In response to the increasing gravity of the partnerships from the highest levels of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian governments, the recent forums have attracted heads of state from across the African continent and leaders of international organizations.

For Japan, two foundational tenets, self-reliance and partnership, underline the Africa relationship and serve as the bedrock of the TICAD process. Early iterations of TICAD highlighted Japan's role as an international ODA leader and supporter of developing countries. By 2003, in line with ODA charter revisions, the 10th anniversary of the TICAD Conference reflected a decided shift in the development paradigm with 'human security' at its core. The human security focus complemented Japan's traditional focus on infrastructure financing and aligned Tokyo's development goals with DAC ideals. As the international flag-bearer of human security, TICAD sought to position Japan at the core of the Asia–Africa cooperative space. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe, Tokyo aimed to 'utilize Japan's system and experiences in Africa' to promote a uniquely Japanese brand across the continent (Abe, 2013). Starting in 2013, the 'Japanese Brand' came to represent a responsive and proactive partnership promoting African agency along with international reform. With the increasing valiance of China and India on the continent, Tokyo signaled the strategic importance of courting African support. Simultaneously, Japan's development philosophy in Africa shaped international agendas of human security and partnership within the DAC. Recognizing 'Africa's growing strategic relevance within the ever-evolving global context' and 'in response to the evolving global context ... the TICAD process [became] more action- and results-oriented' (TICAD, 2013).

Building upon China's identity as an alternative to Western models and the status quo, Beijing used FOCAC as a means of 'consolidating solidarity among developing countries and facilitating the establishment of a new international order' (FOCAC, 2000). The early iterations of FOCAC only exhibited a vague notion of an alternative international order that leveraged South–South Cooperation. However, Africa served as a sounding board for an increasingly bold strategy. In line with Chinese policy objectives, from 2003 onward, FOCAC prioritized infrastructure that expanded access to the seas, an early forerunner of China's transcontinental ambitions that would later be incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative. As highlighted in the FOCAC VI Declaration, (FOCAC, 2015) the emphasis on transportation infrastructure and port development served as a key input into

the African arm of the Belt and Road (BRI) vision. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the FOCAC VI conference moved beyond a cooperative framework to serve as the mechanism for orchestrating the BRI in the African arena. Many of the transport and infrastructure projects financed by Chinese economic cooperation, such as the Kenyan standard gauge railroad, the Sudanese oil pipeline, and the Djibouti military facility, became likely candidates for incorporation into the BRI framework. Kenya is officially named on the 'New Silk Road' map and the maritime route indicates that Egypt's Suez Canal, Djibouti and East Africa will be an integral part of this vision (Tiezzi, 2014). Advancing this ambition, the Kenyan President and Ethiopian Prime Minister attended the 2017 BRI Forum to conduct round-table discussions and sign cooperation agreements. Africa stands to benefit from a portion of China's US\$124bn BRI investment in infrastructure and development cooperation. The FOCAC VII Declaration affirmed Africa as an important participant in the BRI, noting 'synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations, Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU), as well as the development strategies of African countries' (FOCAC, 2018: 4.2). In 2018, FOCAC was designated a major coordination mechanism for China–Africa cooperation under the BRI (FOCAC, 2018: 5.2).

The India–Africa Forum Summit, inaugurated in 2008, achieved a meteoric rise, resulting in the historic attendance by all 54 African states at the 2015 Summit in New Delhi. Like China, India leverages its status as a developing country to emphasize a partnership with Africa built upon a shared development struggle. Early editions of the IAFS emphasized capacity-building, training, and technical assistance overseen by ITEC. Since 2007, India's ITEC program has awarded 33,000 scholarships to African students, developing a cadre of African leaders and high-level official training in India. Upon this foundation, New Delhi advanced new instruments of its aid program in the African sphere. In coordination with IAFS, India's EXIM Bank extended US\$9 billion in development financing, leveraging India's large diaspora population and private-sector investment as a soft-power advantage on the African continent. Building upon the cadre of Indian-trained African leaders, India's Pan-Africa e-network chartered continent-wide virtual health and education resources while also boosting direct connectivity between African governments and New Delhi. Prime Minister Modi's elevation of Africa in India's foreign and economic policy is evident in the government's increasingly ambitious commitments and development schemes on the continent. While India's IAFS assistance packages are only a fraction of Japan and China's commitments, India has advanced discussions with Japan and the United States for joint development initiatives in skills, health, infrastructure, manufacturing, and connectivity. In 2017, a joint India–Japan vision document outlined development collaboration between the two Asian powers along an 'Asia–Africa Growth Corridor' (Modi, 2017). India's collaboration with Japan in the foreign aid space will potentially bolster its framework for development

partnership in Africa and offer a viable alternative in response to China's grand BRI strategic vision.

The Korea–Africa relationship remains small in comparison with Japan, China, and India in terms of budgetary commitment and foreign policy prioritization. Korea's fourth African Forum in 2016 was only attended by 14 African states (no heads of state) and 150 total attendees in comparison with the comprehensive African attendance achieved by the Japanese, Chinese, and Indian forums. However, there are signs of Africa's increasing prioritization as Korea's foreign aid structures complete a reorganization and assimilate with DAC requirements.

In conclusion, as China identifies African hubs along its grand 'Belt and Road', Japan and India offer alternative development visions for Africa, leveraging powerful cooperation between the DAC and emerging donors. Japan has clearly signaled its willingness to go head-to-head with China in the African aid space. Furthermore, India offers Africa a softer third way, an alternative to traditional DAC donors and the perceived threat of the Chinese-dominated Belt and Road. In Korea's reinvention of development agencies and engagement, Africa is becoming an increasingly significant region to engage in the foreign assistance space.

FUTURE OF FOREIGN AID: ASIA'S ROLE

While OECD–DAC nations will remain significant aid donors in the future, the role of Japan as a DAC member and other non-DAC Asian donors has changed the aid landscape. The magnitude of investment and scale of development objectives among Asian donors stands to shape norms and development agendas.

The maturation of Japan's aid program has had a twofold impact on foreign aid, guiding the narratives of both the DAC and emerging donors. Japan's alternative aid paradigm, prioritizing self-help and inclusive assistance programs, has shifted international discourses. In contrast to the Western-led vertical donor–recipient relationships of the 20th century, Japanese ideals of horizontal development cooperation have now been given a tick within the OECD–DAC sphere (OECD/UNDP, 2014; Asplund and Soderberg, 2017). Furthermore, the language of aid has converged around the narratives of 'cooperation' and 'partnership', advanced by Asian donors. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN in 2015 represented a distinct shift towards greater inclusivity and ownership for aid recipients (UNGA, 2015). The SDGs' involvement of government, private sector, and civil society indicates an embracing of Japanese philosophy. Furthermore, Japan's human security agenda has been institutionalized within the UN, shaping the aid objectives of international development cooperation. Japan's development cooperation program, once criticized as 'reactive' and lacking philosophical basis, has become a driver for modern norms within the 21st-century development finance system (Calder, 1988; OECD, 2014: 14–15, 63).

Simultaneously, as a major donor to Korea, China, and India, Japan played a prominent role in the formation of Asian development assistance paradigms. In the transition from aid recipients to aid donors, the emerging Asian donor models are based largely on their own development experiences as beneficiaries of Japanese ODA. Japan's insistence upon self-help and ownership has replicated itself in the emerging Asian donors' aid philosophies. Many of these emerging aid paradigms are now being played out in the African development space.

Japan serves as the pivotal Asian player in the development arena, a conduit between emerging aid donors and traditional DAC donors. Japan's continued distinction as a major donor power has endowed influence on international aid norms and emerging paradigms. Scholars have argued that while the DAC norms primarily focus on aid as charity, the Japanese bilateral aid policy and non-DAC donor cooperation models have a lot in common and stand in contrast to the DAC framework (Fukuda-Parr and Shiga, 2016). These areas of commonality include an emphasis on mutual benefits, equal partnership and respect for donor–recipient sovereignty relationships. Some recent studies have highlighted how Japan's framework of foreign aid (for example, infrastructure development and public–private partnership) is gradually gaining acceptance within the DAC (Soderberg, 2017). With Asia's growing geopolitical importance, Japan's position among emerging Asian donors has long-reaching implications. China's bold development strategy is challenging to disrupt the international order. At the same time, Korea's ascension into the DAC and growing collaboration between Japan and India will be strong factors in shaping the narrative of Asian development cooperation into the future (Jain, 2017). Japan can act as a bridge between traditional aid paradigms and emerging donors. With shared philosophical underpinnings across Asian development cooperation programs, Japan's pivotal position in the global aid system allows the cross-pollination of new development norms and ideals between donor groups that often appear at odds in the foreign aid space.

Notes

- 1 Under Chapter V, Article 14 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan was obliged to 'pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war'. The Treaty required Japan to negotiate with Allied Powers to compensate those countries whose territories were occupied and damaged during the war.
- 2 Taiwan was a significant donor in the 20th century but was outplayed by China in foreign aid diplomacy. After the loss of diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016 and Panama in 2017, Taiwan is left with only 20 states who have formal relations. Accordingly, Taiwan's aid program has shifted towards greater alignment with OECD/DAC donors and international aid principles (see Tubilewicz, 2016: 55–9 and Atkinson, 2014: 422–5). See Copper (2016) for further discussions on Beijing and Taipei's aid diplomacy.

- 3 India still receives aid from a selected few DAC donors. It receives bilateral aid from Japan, Germany, France, the UK, and the United States apart from the European Union, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Global Fund, to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Recently, South Korea also pledged to provide US\$1bn in ODA to India in addition to \$9bn in concessional credit (IANS, 2017). Although not sufficiently supported, according to one report, India has now become a net aid donor (Sharma, 2017).
- 4 www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/india.php
- 5 Beijing aimed to show growing consensus for the Belt and Road Initiative. However, many nations harbor reservations and hesitancy (see Le Corre, 2017 and Johnson et al., 2017). Most notably, India protested about the BRI forum citing the violation of sovereignty with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (see MEA, 2017b).
- 6 Other non-DAC Asian donors include Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand.
- 7 For an overview of Japan–Africa relations, see Kato (2017); For India–Africa, see DeFreese (2016), for China–Africa, see Haifang (2010).

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BRICS: Towards Institutionalization

Oliver Stuenkel

CAPTURING THE SPIRIT OF A DECADE (2001–2006)

In 2001, Jim O’Neill, head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs (Johnson and Baer, 2010), sought to create a category for the large, fast-growing developing countries that he thought would be instrumental for the current global economic transformation. As an economist, O’Neill did not take many political aspects into account, and devised the group based on economic indicators, focusing on GDP growth rates, GDP per capita and population size. Seeking to attract investors, in his 2001 GS Global Economics Paper No. 66, ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’, O’Neill predicted that ‘over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs and especially China in world GDP will grow, raising important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in the BRICs’ (O’Neill, 2001). Yet while O’Neill did not expect the grouping to develop politically, he created the BRIC term with the momentous political developments at the time in mind. Initially, the term’s impact was limited to the financial world. Rather than the rise of the BRICS, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the subsequent US military mobilization and invasion of Afghanistan dominated the geopolitical debate in the years after September 11, 2001. The United States’ initial success supported the general assumption that global order was best defined by stable US-led unipolarity (Tett, 2010).

Only two years earlier, William Wohlforth (1999) had written

The system is unambiguously unipolar. The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined

than any leading state in the last two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical.

He also argued

(...) the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable. It is already a decade old, and (...) it may last as long as bipolarity. For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power. (Wohlforth, 1999: 384)

This notion of US-American dominance was not significantly affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To many, the ease with which the United States was able to deploy its troops in a region far away from its borders strengthened, rather than diminished, the impression of unipolarity (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002). Brooks and Wohlforth (2002: 21) wrote that 'if today's US primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will last'.

At the same time, few expected China to turn into a serious regional, let alone global, power. As Brooks and Wohlforth argued in 2002,

Fifty percent of China's labor force is employed in agriculture, and relatively little of its economy is geared towards high technology. In the 1990s, U.S. spending on technological development was more than 20 times China's. Most of China's weapons are decades old. And nothing China can do will allow it to escape its geography, which leaves it surrounded by countries that have the motivation and ability to engage in balancing of their own should China start to build up an expansive military force. (Ibid.: 26)

Somewhat contrary to this consensus, in October 2003, Goldman Sachs published another paper, entitled 'Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050'. This paper made more specific and far-reaching predictions. It foresaw that, by 2050, the BRIC economies would be larger in US dollar terms than the G-6, which consists of the United States, Germany, Japan, the UK, France and Italy (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003). This paper's impact on investors and bankers was considerably higher than that of the first one. Yet, more importantly, the paper's influence surpassed the limits of the financial world, helping the BRICs term turn, in the following years, into a buzzword in international politics (Cheng et al., 2007: 143). So much stronger was the impact of the 2003 paper that most observers heard of the BRIC term for the first time in 2003. Since then, analysts have often wrongly cited 2003 as the year in which the BRIC term was created (Xinhua News, 2009).

In 2005, Goldman Sachs argued that the BRICs would rise even faster than predicted in 2003 (O'Neill et al., 2005). By the time the BRICs' leaders met for the first time for an official BRIC Summit, in 2009, the general media routinely referred to 'the BRICs' without an explanatory addendum.¹ In 2010, Goldman Sachs called the first 10 years of the 21st century the 'BRICS Decade' (Wilson

et al., 2010). During that period of time, China for the first time became the world's greatest contributor to global growth, followed by the United States and Brazil.

Over the course of the decade, a growing number of analysts came to support the notion that US dominance was only temporary; emerging market economies were growing at consistently higher rates than in the developed world during the second half of the decade. In contrast, the United States' hitherto unlimited power seemed to reach its limits in costly and potentially ill-conceived military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and a challenging 'war on terror', which reduced US legitimacy, opening a window of opportunity for emerging countries to gain greater visibility (O'Neill, cited in Kowitz, 2009). Unipolarity's demise, according to Amitav Acharya, 'was hastened not by isolationism but by adventurism' (Acharya, 2014: 112).

As Randall Schweller and Xiayou Pu argue 'unipolarity, which seemed strangely durable only a few years ago, appears today as a "passing moment"'. They continue that the United States 'is no longer a hyperpower towering over potential contenders. The rest of the world is catching up' (Schweller and Pu, 2011: 41). With increased frequency, Western newspapers began to refer to the fact that 'there are roughly four times as many Chinese as Americans meaning that – even allowing for a sharp slowdown in Chinese growth – at some point, China will become "number one"' (Rachman, 2011).

In the same way, Philip Stephens aptly summarized the general surprise when he argued that

... for those who grew up with the assumption that the world belonged to a small group of nations sitting on either side of the North Atlantic, two things are striking. The first is the breathtaking speed of the turnaround – to look back to 2000 is to see a century compressed into a decade. The other is the vigor with which the west has colluded in its own demise. (Stephens, 2012)

Finally, the increased prominence of genuinely global challenges, ranging from climate change, failed states, poverty reduction and nuclear proliferation contributed to a growing consensus that emerging countries such as Brazil, India and China were indispensable in the effort to develop meaningful solutions (Hurrell, 2006: 3). Global summits could no longer claim legitimacy and inclusiveness without inviting Brazil, Russia, India and China (Castañeda, 2010). The transition from the G8 to the G20 is one of the most powerful symbols of this shift towards a more multipolar order. Aside from making up 43.3% of the global population and a quarter of the earth's territory, the BRICs had been responsible for 27.8% of world GDP growth in nominal terms (or 36.6% in purchasing power parity (PPP)) during the first decade of the century (Wilson et al., 2010).

While Jim O'Neill received a lot of praise for having coined the BRIC term, the idea of creating a grouping of large developing countries with significant

potential for economic growth was not new. Terms such as ‘monster countries’² (Kennan, 1994), ‘whale countries’ (Sachs, cited in Sinha and Dutra, 1999), ‘pivotal states’ (Garten, 1997: 25) and the ‘big ten’ (Chase et al., 1999: 165) were coined in the 1990s, all pointing out that the rise of countries with large territories and significant economic potential would, in the long term, profoundly alter the global distribution of power. Diplomats in emerging countries began to identify each other as potential future economic partners (Reis, 2012: 33). At the time, however, unipolarity seemed to be the dominant characteristic of the global system, and few expected rising powers such as China and India to play any significant international role in the near future (Krauthammer, 1990: 23). In addition to the G7’s economic and geopolitical dominance, today’s BRICs countries faced severe internal challenges. High poverty and illiteracy rates in India, economic instability, urban violence and inequality in Brazil, growing political unrest in China and economic turmoil in Russia did not suggest that these countries were ready to assume a more prominent role in the global economy or international political affairs.

The BRICs grouping thus did not turn into a household name because of its conceptual novelty, but rather because it powerfully symbolized a narrative that seemed distant in the 1990s but appeared to make sense in the mid-2000s: a momentous shift of power from the United States and Europe towards emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. This shift was taking place rapidly, making the world less Western and more ideologically diverse (Schweller, 2011: 285). The BRIC acronym both captured and enhanced this changing distribution of power in the global order. The term seemed to be a useful shorthand for a complex scenario marked by the redistribution of global power (Stephens, 2011), the emergence of non-established actors and the advent of a ‘Post-American World’ (Zakaria, 2008), a ‘Post-Western World’ (Serfaty, 2011) or, as Amitav Acharya would put it in 2014, ‘the end of American world order’ (Acharya, 2014). In retrospect, expectations about Brazil and Russia were exaggerated, largely because many analysts presented long-term predictions based on extrapolations on the unusually high growth rates in the emerging world at the time. Regarding India and China, however, the predictions turned out to be conservative, and 15 years after having created the BRICS concept, Jim O’Neill pointed out that in their entirety, the countries had grown faster than he had expected.

The international order, however, proved slow to adapt to new realities. The continued centrality of the G8, which included Canada and Italy, but not China and India, generated growing discontent among policy makers in Brasília, Beijing and New Delhi. During the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005, therefore, Tony Blair decided to initiate a G8 + 5 ‘outreach’ process, but failed to integrate any of the emerging powers permanently. Maria Edileuza Reis, Brazil’s Sherpa at several BRICS summits, points out that, at the time, emerging powers were merely invited to ‘be informed’ by the group’s core, rather than actively participate in

the debates (Reis, 2012: 34). The same applied to the lack of reform among the Bretton Woods institutions. As *The Economist* pointed out in 2006:

it is absurd that Brazil, China and India have 20% less clout within the fund than the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, although the emerging economies are four times the size of the European ones, once you adjust for currency differences. (The Economist, 2006)

In 2003, three emerging powers³ created the 'India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum'. It was established following negotiations among India (Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee), Brazil (President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) and South Africa (President Thabo Mbeki) during the 2003 Group of Eight (G8) summit in Evian, France. The three had been invited to the summit as observers, yet they felt that the invitation had been merely symbolic. 'What is the use of being invited for dessert at the banquet of the powerful?' Lula later said: 'We do not want to participate only to eat the dessert; we want to eat the main course, dessert and then coffee' (Kurtz, 2013).

Only three days later, India's Minister of External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha, Brazil's Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, and South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, met in Brasília, in what they called a 'pioneer meeting', and formalized the IBSA Dialogue Forum through the adoption of the 'Brasília Declaration' (IBSA, 2003). As Celso Amorim argued several years later, when IBSA had institutionalized the grouping, it was 'time to start reorganizing the world in the direction that the overwhelming majority of mankind expects and needs' (Amorim, 2008). Although the IBSA grouping never gained as much international visibility as the BRICS grouping, its creation symbolized emerging powers' growing willingness to explore commonalities and areas for cooperation.

The financial crisis was a key element not only in strengthening the narrative of multipolarization, but also in transforming the BRICs into a political grouping that attempted to develop common positions in several areas, starting with global financial governance.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONTESTED LEGITIMACY AND THE GENESIS OF INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION

Two factors explain the birth of the BRICS as a political group. First, an unprecedented combination in 2008 – a profound financial crisis among developed countries paired with relative economic stability among emerging powers – caused a legitimacy crisis of the international financial order, which led to equally unprecedented cooperation between rising powers in the context of the BRICs grouping.⁴ The Group of Twenty (G20) Leaders' endorsement at the London Summit of almost all of the substantive recommendations put forward by the BRIC countries' Finance Ministers also shows that the BRICs were able

to use their temporarily increased bargaining power to turn into ‘agenda setters’ at the time, culminating in the IMF quota reforms agreed upon in 2010. This shows that even short periods of reduced legitimacy in global governance can quickly lead to the rise of alternative institutions. In the case of the crisis that began in 2008, the BRICs platform now forms part of the landscape of global governance. Current structures may thus be far less stable than is usually assumed – and future financial crises may very well reduce their legitimacy further and lead to additional, more profound alterations. Second, intra-BRIC cooperation in the area of international finance was the starting point of a broader type of cooperation in many other areas, suggesting the occurrence of spillover effects of cooperation. In addition to confidence-building between the BRICS countries, the fact that the BRICS began setting up institutionalized structures – such as a BRICS currency contingency fund and a BRICS Development Bank in 2013 – help explain why institutionalized cooperation between the BRICS continues even though the initially propitious conditions to do so are no longer present (Wallander, 1998).

It was Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (with the support of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin) who first had the idea, in 2006, to set up a grouping that would turn Jim O’Neill’s idea into a political reality. Yet Russia’s initiative to organize a BRICs meeting was initially met with skepticism from the Indian and Chinese side. What, both wondered, could Brazil, a country far removed from the intricate security issues in Asia, contribute to the debate?⁵ Doubts about Brazil’s place among the BRICs were by no means restricted to China and India. Jim O’Neill recalls that in the first years after the creation of the term in 2001, observers and investors were quite unconvinced about the ‘B’ in BRICs. In what ultimately turned out to be quite prescient, John Lloyd and Alex Turkeltaub, for example, wrote in 2006 that Brazil

(...) could repeat the boom-and-bust cycle that has marked South American economies unless it utilizes the current period of high commodity prices to restructure its economy, improve governance and invest in infrastructure. Given the economy’s dependence on commodity exports - these account for about 40 per cent of all exports – a substantial correction in metal prices could also destroy the political consensus in favor of pro-market policies. (Lloyd and Turkeltaub, 2006)

Regarding Brazil’s BRIC membership, they wrote that ‘to consider Brazil as one of the pillars of an emerging global order – which membership of the Bric fraternity implies – underestimates these risks’ (Ibid., 2006).

Russia’s attempt to create the group began in an informal context, without any particular foreign policy challenge in mind. Brazil, Russian foreign policy makers believed, could become a partner in a more multipolar world order. On September 20, 2006, at the margins of the 61st UN General Assembly, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim – long-term friends who had served together as diplomats in New York in the mid

1990s – decided to organize an informal meeting for the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China at the Brazilian mission to the United Nations in New York. While the lunch took place at the Brazilian mission, it can be seen as a Russian initiative (Reis, 2012: 36). The discussion dealt with the political and global challenges at the time, largely dominated by the 2006 Lebanon War. The Foreign Ministers commented on a theme that had slowly emerged as a unifying factor among the BRICs: the growing discontent about the distribution of power in the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the continued unwillingness of the G8 to include emerging powers. The meeting ended without any specific agreement, and went unreported by the media (Reis, 2012). Still, the participants reiterated their commitment to jointly push for further reform of global financial structures. This issue came to the fore again when the G8 convened in Heiligendamm (Germany) in June 2007.

The Heiligendamm Process

Despite initiatives in the 1990s to invite other countries on an ad hoc basis, the G8 was still a Western ‘elite club’ that had not changed fundamentally since the 1970s, and that was increasingly unable to reflect the global shift of power in the first decade of the 21st century. Aimed at addressing questions of legitimacy, the process of ‘outreach’ began in 2003 at the Evian summit (Masters, 2008). Brazil, India and South Africa had been invited to the summit as observers, yet they felt that the invitation had been merely symbolic. In 2005, Tony Blair decided to invite Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa to the summit at Gleneagles. Launched at the 2007 G8 summit in Germany, the so-called Heiligendamm Dialogue Process (HDP) represented a move towards developing a more structured interaction between the G8 and the emerging economic and regional powers of the ‘Outreach 5’ – the same countries that had participated in Gleneagles. Yet it was made clear by the hosts from the start that being part of the Outreach 5 did not mean having candidate status to an enlarged G8 – the Outreach concept was seen largely negatively by the emerging powers as it did not symbolize real inclusion in the decision-making process.⁶ The attempt to institutionalize the G8’s outreach ended when the G20 assumed a more prominent role in global affairs after the financial crisis erupted. Since then, the G8 has only occasionally invited other leaders, such as in 2011, when the French hosts invited a group of African leaders (The White House, 2011).

In September 2007, on the sidelines of the 62nd General Assembly, it was Brazil that assumed the initiative. It was in this moment that the Brazilian participants stated their interest in deepening the dialogue, arguing for the possibility of organizing a stand-alone summit and dedicating more time and energy towards exploring opportunities to cooperate. Russia, in response, offered to organize a stand-alone meeting for the foreign ministers in 2008, a proposal that was promptly accepted by the other participants.

By the time of the meeting, the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States had already begun to dominate the global conversation. In February and March, more than 25 subprime lenders had filed for bankruptcy, and in April, New Century Financial followed suit. Northern Rock, a British bank, had to approach the Bank of England for emergency funding due to a liquidity problem. A growing number of international investors and economists had started to turn their eyes to emerging powers such as the BRICs, providing an important window of opportunity for the grouping. After the meeting in New York in September 2007, several other events symbolized the ever more visible trend of multipolarization. In December 2007, China overtook Germany as the world's third largest economy (Dyer, 2009). Commentators at the time predicted that it would only take a year or two before China would also overtake Japan, which occurred in the second trimester of 2010 (Associated Press, 2010).

2008

After the two informal meetings in September 2006 and September 2007, 2008 saw the beginning of more frequent meetings – the first formal meeting between BRIC foreign ministers took place on May 16, 2008 in Yekaterinburg – yet again an initiative of Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. One month after the encounter, Celso Amorim commented, in an article titled 'The BRICs and the Reorganization of the World' that 'the meeting says more about multipolarity than any words could' (Amorim, 2008).

This first stand-alone meeting can be seen as the decisive moment that marked the BRIC's transformation from an investment category to a political entity in global affairs. In the communiqué, the BRICs called for reform of international structures – a theme that would appear in all declarations of the coming years. By the end of 2008, the BRIC countries had established a working relationship that allowed them to develop a common agenda, especially in the realm of international finance.

Why did the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers of four seemingly disparate countries with diverging interests decide to meet in Brazil and issue a joint communiqué at the height of the crisis, a week prior to the first G20 summit in Washington DC? And how were these four countries able to turn into such an influential grouping only several months later, during the G20 Summit in London in April 2009?

When the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers of the BRIC countries met on November 7, 2008 in Brazil, less than two months had passed since the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy. The financial crisis seemed to make political dynamics so unpredictable that the Brazilian government had decided, at the last minute, to change the location of the summit from Brasília to São Paulo, close to the international airport, to allow the participants to quickly return to their home countries to monitor the crisis. In times of globalization, the financial crisis at the heart of

the global economic core was widely thought to have profound consequences for all countries that participated in the international market.

Yet as *The Economist* wrote at the time, the largest emerging markets were ‘recovering fast and starting to think the recession may mark another milestone in a worldwide shift of economic power away from the West’.⁷ As the BRICS Finance Ministers stated, ‘we recognized that the crisis has to some extent affected all of our countries. We stress however, that BRIC countries have shown significant resilience’ (BRICS Finance Ministers Meeting, 2008). As the meeting in São Paulo made clear, the BRIC countries had not only discussed ways to protect themselves against the crisis, but also how they could use this opportunity to adapt global structures in their favor. Within the following four months, BRIC Finance Ministers and Central Bankers met four times – starkly contrasting their weak ties prior to the crisis. The results were palpable; prior to the G20 Summit in London in April 2009, the BRIC countries were able to act as agenda setters and considerably influence the final G20 declaration (Aldrichi, 2009) – all this by making use of the BRICs, a vehicle that had, in its political dimension, barely existed before the crisis.

The economic crisis in the United States provided the emerging powers with a unique opportunity to rally around an issue of great importance: the necessity to reform the international financial order.

The G20 seemed to be the ideal platform for this endeavor – a powerful grouping that included the four BRIC countries. A Brazilian policy maker went so far as to say that the ‘BRICS platform was a child of the G20 – which, in turn, is a child of the crisis’.⁸ It is thus no coincidence that intra-BRICS cooperation began in earnest in the realm of international finance – an area that seemed particularly ripe for change during the first two years of the crisis. The decision to cooperate in a more structured way was taken when the BRICs heads of government met on the sidelines of the G8 summit on July 9, 2008.

Celso Amorim captured the spirit of the time when he argued that ‘the BRICS have contributed to keeping the global economy on track ... now, they seek to strengthen themselves as a bloc that helps balance and democratize the international order at the beginning of the century’ (Amorim, 2008). Touching on a theme that would eventually become the rallying cry for the BRIC countries, Amorim argued that ‘we should continue to promote reform (...) of the international financial institutions, a topic we will discuss in November, when the Ministers of Finance of the BRIC countries will meet in São Paulo’.

Four months later, the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers came together in Brazil, in a move that gave further impetus to intra-BRICs cooperation (Russia beyond the Headlines, 2008). In the very first paragraph of their communiqué, after a brief mention of the international crisis, the BRIC countries reported that ‘we ... discussed proposals put forward by the countries on reforming the global financial architecture’ (BRICS Finance Ministers Meeting, 2008).

Yet far more important than the actual content of the communiqué was the fact that Brazil, Russia, India and China used the BRICs platform to initiate

preparatory meetings prior to the G20 – reflecting their strong belief in the benefits of cooperation between them. The São Paulo communiqué thus made clear that the BRICs platform was more than a mere ad hoc grouping.

In late November, during a bilateral meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that the heads of state of the BRICs countries would hold their first ever summit in Russia in 2009 (Grudgings, 2008). After the meeting, Brazil's President Lula argued that the financial crisis offered opportunities for the emerging powers to strengthen cooperation between themselves and their position in global affairs as a whole (Agência Brasil, 2008). According to a Brazilian policy maker, 'cooperation in the field of international finance would generate trust between the BRICs' governments, allowing for broader cooperation further down the road'.⁹

The BRICs Finance Ministers and Central Bankers, for their part, announced in São Paulo that they would hold their next meeting in Washington DC in late April 2009 (IMF, 2013). Yet rather than wait for five months, they gathered again on March 13, 2009, a day before the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers met there (Liyu, 2009), and two weeks prior to the next G20 leaders' summit in London, on April 2.

In Horsham, UK, the BRICs' commitment to governance reform was reiterated. The BRICs asked for 'the speeding up of the second phase of voice and representation reform in the World Bank Group, which should be completed by April 2010' and called it 'imperative' that the next heads of the IMF and the World Bank be selected through 'open merit-based' processes, irrespective of nationality or regional considerations (Liyu, 2009).

While the idea that the BRIC grouping could align some of their positions was met with profound skepticism from the very beginning, the Group of 20 Leaders' endorsement at the London Summit in 2009 of several of the substantive recommendations put forward previously by BRIC countries' Finance Ministers in Horsham shows that the BRIC grouping significantly increased emerging powers' bargaining power at the time (Aldrichi, 2009: 1).

Specifically, the BRICs' recommendations made in their communiqué in Horsham found their way into the G20 declaration at various levels. For example, the leaders of the G20 supported the threefold increase of resources available to the IMF and allowed the issuance of new special drawing rights (SDRs). They also announced that the heads of international financial institutions 'should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based selection process' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). All of these demands had been articulated by the BRICs' Finance Ministers and Central Bankers prior to the G20. In the same way, the term 'reform' appears over 10 times in the G20 Declaration, reflecting pressure from the emerging powers to provide them with more space¹⁰ (Stuenkel, 2012).

The BRICs' push for reform culminated in 2010, when a significant quota reform was agreed upon, including a quota shift by more than 6% in favor of

large emerging countries. China became the third-largest shareholder and overtook Germany, while Russia, India and Brazil entered the list of the 10 most important shareholders. The IMF hailed these steps as ‘historic’ and pointed out that they represented ‘a major realignment in the ranking of quota shares that better reflects global economic realities, and a strengthening in the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). It can thus be argued that in the realm of international finance, the BRIC countries were briefly able to act as ‘agenda-setters’.

The meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers in São Paulo in November 2008 and Horsham in March 2009 can be seen as the starting point of far broader cooperation; from then on, intra-BRIC cooperation expanded to other areas, several of which were unrelated to international finance.

Shortly after the G20 Summit in London, the BRICs’ National Security Advisors met for the first time, reflecting a dramatic expansion in the scope of their activities. At the meeting, participants discussed possibilities to join forces in the combat against terrorism, illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking. In addition to the ties between the BRIC countries’ Central Banks and Finance Ministries, this encounter established a common platform for each country’s security communities. Since 2009, the BRIC countries’ National Security Advisors have met regularly (Sharma, 2013).

Around that time, Brazil, India, Russia and China’s heads of state and government began to refer to themselves as ‘BRIC members’ and agreed that they needed to strengthen ‘intra-BRIC’ ties (Lula da Silva, 2008). According to the policy makers involved in the process, the frequent meetings improved government-to-government relations and helped national interests during the economic crisis. This was the case with Brazil, whose ties to China, Russia and India had been weak prior to the formation of the group. Yet while Brazil had seemed like the weakest and least adequate member of the grouping, President Lula’s capacity to articulate the BRIC’s position during the crisis in international fora proved to be an important asset. Many officials pointed to the Brazilian president and his foreign ministers’ adroitness and ability to build a common BRICs-narrative.¹¹

After having identified a common interest, the BRICs began to cooperate and jointly pressed for change – and quite successfully so, as the results of the G20 Summit in London in 2009 attest. According to realist thought, however, this issue-based cooperation should have ended after the most intense period of the crisis, in the same way that realists at the end of the Cold War had expected NATO to disband.

Yet while early intra-BRICS cooperation was strongly tied to the theme of the international financial crisis until 2009, it then moved into areas that were not necessarily related to financial issues. Rather, close cooperation in the area of finance had created the trust that allowed ties to expand into fields such as education, science and technology and defense.

Why did this extended cooperative behavior take place? Used by scholars who have studied the phenomenon of regional integration in Europe, the concept of spillover has some relevance in explaining the growth of intra-BRICS cooperation.¹² According to Lindberg, a spillover implies that political cooperation, once initiated, is extended over time in a way that it was not necessarily intended at the outset (Lindberg, 1963).¹³

Intra-BRICS cooperation, of course, differs strongly from that seen in the early days of European integration, and the BRIC grouping is most unlikely to ever develop into anything similar to the European Union. The BRICs platform does not yet involve binding decisions or jointly managing any aspect of countries' economic or political affairs, nor is their sovereignty pooled. However, intra-BRICS cooperation has developed to a degree that requires a more sophisticated answer than merely pointing to increased bargaining power during the financial crisis.

Rather than functional spillover, which describes the effects of advanced economic integration, the spillover seen among BRICs nations is of a more simple and incipient type. It relates to the effects of confidence-building between government bureaucracies, which – after a positive experience in one area – decide to cooperate in additional, not necessarily related fields. Contrary to functional or political spillover effects seen in Europe, the potential spillover effects seen among the BRICs countries do not involve interest groups outside of government, but relate entirely to intra-governmental activities. Intra-BRICS cooperation remains, still, a state-driven process, so one could also liken it to 'elite socialization' among BRICs governments.

A natural by-product of growing intra-BRICS ties were stronger bilateral ties among BRICs members. For example, a visa-free travel agreement between Russia and Brazil came into effect in 2010. Easing visa rules was part of a more far-reaching attempt by both governments to strengthen ties, which included high-level deals to build up cooperation in areas such as energy, space and military technologies. It will also contribute to increasing not only business contacts, but also tourism, which should help broaden the BRICs' mutual understanding on a societal level – a vital element to reducing the 'trust deficit' between the BRICs (Stuenkel, 2010).

Compared with 2008, when the financial crisis began, subsequent years turned out to be far more difficult for emerging powers. Brazil symbolizes this best. It grew at very low rates in the period 2011–2014, and since then Brazil's performance has been abysmal and can no longer be compared to that of the past decade. While Europe still struggled five years after the outbreak of the crisis, the US economy slowly began to recover, not growing much slower than Brazil in 2013. A more confident United States, no longer tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan did not provide the rising powers with the space the BRICs had so skillfully used over previous years. In addition to lower growth, Brazil's forays into the world's top league – marked by Lula's attempt to negotiate with Iran in 2010 and its stint as a non-permanent UN Security Council member – were far from

smooth, and his successor Dilma Rousseff, who would be impeached in 2016, seemed much less inclined to engage internationally (Spektor, 2014). And yet, the BRICs grouping not only continued to exist, but deepened and broadened its cooperation, even under the Temer government, which had initially been critical of South–South cooperation in general.

TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALIZATION

After the presidential summits of 2009 in Russia, 2010 in Brazil and the successful inclusion of South Africa in 2011, the BRICS grouping continued to slowly institutionalize and expand intra-BRICS cooperation. As Manmohan Singh points out, after South Africa's inclusion, 'the agenda of BRICS has gone beyond the purely economic to include issues such as international terrorism, climate change and food and energy security' (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2011).

Yet to many observers, the grouping remained an oddity, a grouping 'in search of common positions', as a commentator pointed out prior to the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi (Esselborn, 2012). Many analysts do not believe the BRICS can work together in the way the G7 have done over the past decades, even though the 10th BRICS Summit in 2018 produced a remarkable communiqué, listing many areas of cooperation, while the G7 Summit in the same year ended without a final declaration. The most common criticism remains that BRICS is not a coherent group since its members' positions in the global political order differ strongly. Individually, some of the BRICS may be tomorrow's leaders who are destined to shape global political affairs. Yet while countries such as India are pushing for a more fundamental redistribution of institutional power in today's global governance structures, Russia and China – both permanent members of the UN Security Council – are essentially status quo powers, reluctant to change a system that has served them well over the past decades. More importantly still, there was an unresolved border conflict between China and India – which included a tense standoff in 2017, immediately before the 9th BRICS Summit in Xiamen, China. In the same way, overlapping spheres of interest in the Indian Ocean are often cited as proof that the BRICS are an impossible alliance. Summarizing such doubts, the *Financial Times*' Philip Stephens declared in 2011, 'It's time to bid farewell to the Brics' (Stephens, 2011). In the same way, the *Financial Times*' Martin Wolf argued that

The BRICS are not a group. The BRICS were invented by Jim O'Neill [of Goldman Sachs, in 2001]. They added South Africa to the BRICS [...], which wasn't originally there, to give some representation of Africa. These countries have basically nothing in common whatsoever, except that they are called BRICS and they are quite important. But in all other respects, their interests and values, political systems, and objectives are substantially diverse. So there's no reason whatsoever to expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world, except that the existing dominating powers should cede some of their influence and power. (Wolf, 2012)

A final point of criticism is that bilateral ties between some of the BRICS – for example, between Russia and Brazil – remain relatively insignificant, even though bilateral trade increased after many Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Moscow over its annexation of Crimea in 2014. In sum, for most observers the BRICS remain too disparate to be a significant category; in the international media, the BRICS have therefore, over the past decade, been routinely described as ‘a disparate quartet’ (*The Economist*, 2009), a ‘motley crew’ (Saran and Sharan, 2012) or as an ‘odd grouping’ (El-Shenawi, 2011), descriptions that still reflect mainstream opinion today. The idea of the BRICS as a bloc, according to this narrative, was deeply flawed and the BRICS member countries were too diverse to ever form a coherent group.

Yet contradicting such criticism, during the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2012, leaders for the first time declared they would study the viability of a BRICS Development Bank, which at the time was seen as a significant step towards institutionalizing the BRICS grouping. The number of issues debated at the summit increased yet again, ranging from geopolitics and the crisis in Syria to the economic crisis and domestic challenges such as education and health care (Government of India, 2012).

In addition to the yearly summits, numerous working groups and regular ministry-level meetings in areas such as defense, health, education, finance, trade, agriculture, science and technology were established after 2011, creating an unprecedented degree of interaction – more than 50 official meetings – between the BRICS countries. Furthermore, BRICS Competition Authorities, Summit Sherpas, Central Bank heads, urbanization experts, think tank representatives and business people began to convene regularly.

The BRICS thus established a system that Joseph Nye calls ‘transgovernmentalism’, which implies that groups make contact with similar groups in other countries and departments of state to forge links with their counterparts in other states (Bache et al., 2011: 9). And yet, the *Times of India* wrote that the summit’s final declaration ‘failed to go beyond motherhood statements and give the bloc a meaningful push’ (Bagchi, cited in Stuenkel, 2015). In the same way, the *New York Times* wrote that the BRICS members ‘struggled to find the common ground necessary to act as a unified geopolitical alliance’ (Yardley, 2012).

However, despite this criticism, the BRICS grouping served as an important vehicle and channel to strengthen the so-called ‘South–South dialogue’. By slowly institutionalizing the grouping, BRICS countries assumed ownership of the concept and transformed it into something much more political than Jim O’Neill had intended it to be. Yet despite the frequency of encounters on multiple levels of government, the BRICS still did not constitute an international organization, even though it was, by then, often referred to as a ‘club’. It does not possess a physical secretariat or staff or any charter. More importantly, its leaders’ summits and ministerial meetings produced declarations and agreements, but

no binding decisions that limited its participants' behavior. Still, considering how recent these diplomatic activities are, the scope of issues debated and the large number of actors involved on multiple levels of government was notable (BBC, 2012).

To promote trade in local currencies, the BRICS signed two agreements to provide lines of credit to the business community and decided to examine the possibility of setting up a development bank. 'The agreements signed today by development banks of BRICS countries will boost trade by offering credit in our local currency', Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated after the meeting (Sreeja, 2012).

Like previous summits, the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban – the first on African soil – was met with widespread skepticism in the international media. Opinion articles in *The Atlantic* and *The Telegraph* argued that the idea of the BRICS 'had run its course' and that it was 'time to invent a new acronym' (Allison, 2013). Yet while these analyses focused on growth rates alone – Jim O'Neill's initial criterion for inventing the group – they failed to recognize that the BRICS grouping had long turned into a political project. After all, if market size and growth rates were all that mattered, the BRIC grouping would have invited Indonesia and not South Africa in late 2010. Giving the BRICS advice about its membership structure, an Indian diplomat argued at the time, was 'like telling NATO that it should exclude Bulgaria because the country is too far away from the North Atlantic'.¹⁴ More than any previous summit, the summit underlined that the BRICS were serious in their endeavor to slowly but surely reform global order to better reflect the global shift of power away from Europe and the United States towards the emerging world.

Five years after the presidential summit in 2009, the BRICS grouping gained, in 2014, an institutional dimension. The creation of the BRICS Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) had been discussed for several years, and yet it still came as a surprise to most Western analysts who consistently argued that the BRICS countries were too different from each other to ever agree on much.

Finally, the large quantity of issues mentioned in the Fortaleza Declaration, along with the so-called Action Plan is notable. Parts of the document were roundly criticized. Alan Alexandroff, a Canadian scholar, wrote of the grouping's 'almost breathtaking chutzpah' when condemning unilateral action, arguing that 'no State should strengthen its security at the expense of the security of others', yet not mentioning Russia's annexation of Crimea (Alexandroff, 2014). It may not have been a coincidence that the US administration announced a new round of economic sanctions against Russia while President Putin was still in Brazil. The BRICS are no anti-American grouping, but they profoundly differ with the West when it comes to dealing with Russia.

The above analysis shows that the BRICS grouping took significant steps towards institutionalization during the 4th, 5th and 6th BRICS Summits in New Delhi, Durban

and Fortaleza, respectively (Polgreen, 2013). Over these three encounters, BRICS leaders first discussed and then decided to set up a BRICS Development Bank (BDB) and a Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), both of which will establish unprecedented government-to-government ties between the five member states.

CONCLUSION

The underlying narrative that made the rise of the BRICS concept possible – the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity – is irreversible. By 2030, the OECD has projected, China and India will grow to be as large as 28% and 11% of global GDP, while the United States and Euro area will decline to 18% and 12% (OECD, 2014). Long-term predictions are little more than estimated guesses, and economic multipolarization may take longer than expected.

Still, the question is not whether US hegemony will end, but how it will happen and what will take its place.¹⁵ Rather than assessing this question directly, this chapter has sought to shed light on the growing and little-understood degree of cooperation between emerging powers. One lesson may be that, contrary to a consensus among US policy makers and many US-based scholars, the rise of the BRICS may not be bad news – rather, it will help democratize global decision-making and involve large emerging powers that have traditionally not always been represented at the table of the powerful.

Yet many observers somberly predict that the rising powers will not ‘play by the West’s rules’ (Stephens, 2010). They generally expect rising powers to use their ‘newfound status to pursue alternative visions of world order’ (Narlikar, 2008) and challenge the status quo, for example by joining hands with other rising powers and mounting a counter-hegemonic coalition (Sikri, 2007). Rising powers could create a parallel system with, as Weber puts it, ‘its own distinctive set of rules, institutions, and currencies of power, rejecting key tenets of liberal internationalism and particularly any notion of global civil society justifying political or military intervention’ (Barma et al., 2007). In the same way, Krasner expects that once the balance of power moves against the West, emerging powers will create different principles (Krasner, 1985), for example by introducing countervailing power against the US-led Bretton Woods institutions (Messner and Humphrey, 2006). Critics thus point out that the BRICS have frequently questioned the foundations that underlie liberal order, expressing diverging opinions on the scope of cooperation, the location of rules and the allocation of authority. All the BRICS, according to this view, have thus voiced fundamental disagreements over substantive policies of the post-war liberal consensus. The result has been a critical challenge to the liberal internationalist project in substantive areas as distinct as trade, human rights, R2P and nuclear non-proliferation. As a consequence, analysts have argued that emerging powers are

‘not ready for prime time’ (Castañeda, 2010) or indeed, that they may become an ‘irresponsible’ stakeholder in the global order (Patrick, 2010). The critique implicitly raises important questions about where emerging powers’ different perspective on the liberal norms regime seems likely to push the normative structures undergirding global governance. As Amitav Acharya points out, ‘not being able to challenge American power frontally does not mean accepting American (...) leadership’ (Acharya, 2014: 48). He continues by saying that it would be ‘a fallacy to assume that just because China, India and other rising powers have benefitted from the liberal hegemonic order, they would abide by its norms and institutions’ (Ibid.: 48).

The truth is that while emerging powers agree with fundamental issues such as international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, collective problem-solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law, they consider, to differing degrees, today’s order as flawed and frequently undermined by the system’s creators. Brazil, South Africa and India in particular oppose the implicit and explicit hierarchies of international institutions and the many privileges often enjoyed by great powers in international deliberations. Thus, rather than questioning the broad precepts that underlie international order *per se*, emerging powers are deeply concerned about whether the system’s dominant actors are willing to live in a multilateral system in which everyone is subject to the same rules. BRICS countries regard reciprocity as a key pillar of international order, and the equality of states needs to be represented not only in international rules, but also in the way they are applied (Tourinho and Stuenkel, 2014). It is thus skepticism about the operationalization of liberal norms, rather than the goals and values that guide them that shapes the BRICS’ relationship to today’s global order. This explains why liberal internationalism continues to be, at times, interpreted by emerging powers as a form of liberal imperialism, and the power of the United States at the center of the liberal order has been portrayed by them as a menace.

At the same time, they consider liberal order to be highly imperfect due to its creators’ transgressions that frequently undermine the system. As Richard Betts points out, ‘hegemony is never entirely constrained, benefitting from exceptions, escape clauses, veto rights and other mechanisms that allow the most powerful countries to use institutions as instruments of political control’ (Betts, 2011).

Thus, rather than questioning the intellectual precepts that undergird international order, emerging powers say they are seeking to create a multilateral system in which the same rules apply to all – even though, as seen in the case of the Crimean crisis, some BRICS themselves are increasingly seeking special treatment. As soon as the BRICS are thus able to, they will seek greater privileges within the existing global governance regime, which will allow them to shape the agenda and its application to issues they care about, both through adjustments in the formal rules and via enhanced informal influence (Armijo and Roberts,

2014: 10). This is already the case on the regional level, where BRICS countries increasingly enjoy privileges, and some neighbors describe them as regional hegemons.

Today's order is 'hierarchical order with liberal characteristics' as Ikenberry (2012) argues. Emerging powers accept the liberal characteristics and will maintain them, but they will seek to change the hierarchy that undergirds the system. From their perspective, what has been euphemistically called 'strategic restraint' can also be understood as a substantial and systematic effort to formalize hegemony and legalize power-based hierarchies. While the aspects of contemporary international order that Ikenberry calls 'liberal' (for example, institutions, rule of law) are essentially welcomed by the BRICS, they consistently reject and resist the hegemonic practices that so often have accompanied them (Tourinho, cited in Stuenkel and Taylor, 2014).

Still, none of the BRICS countries are currently capable of challenging the United States' global leadership directly – nor, as this analysis has sought to make clear, are they trying to do so openly for now. Yet, by systematically enhancing their cooperation, be it between the BRICS or other emerging powers, they are slowly laying the foundations for a multipolar order that will allow them to shape global order according to their interests.

Despite their agreement with global rules and norms (and, for the purpose of this analysis, it is largely irrelevant whether this is due to pragmatism or genuine support), emerging powers have engaged in an unprecedented wave of institutional entrepreneurship, as the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB), the BRICS' Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) attest. As Cynthia Roberts argues, the BRICS 'contest the West's pretensions to permanent stewardship of the existing system', a move that has generated confusion and ill-conceived reactions from Washington, symbolized by the decision to oppose the AIIB (Roberts, 2015). Washington's attempt to keep others from joining the new bank has exposed that while the United States has indeed done much to build a liberal order based on rules and norms, it is deeply uncomfortable with the thought of not being in charge. The problem is that this angst alone will not be enough to rouse traditional US allies into action to contain China and other emerging powers. Countries such as Germany or the UK, for example, may not be particularly interested in helping perpetuate US global leadership at all costs if doing so negatively affects their economies. This is particularly so because the structures set up by the BRICS do not undermine the rules and norms that undergird today's order. China's decision to create the AIIB protects it from future accusations of being an 'irresponsible stakeholder' that does not provide any global public goods. Claims that China seeks to 'demolish global order from within' amount, to many observers, to little more than US attempts to prolong US hegemony for US hegemony's sake (Mirski, 2014).

It would therefore be wrong to assume that the new institutions – ranging from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to the New Development Bank – will articulate or promote any fundamentally new norms according to which international affairs should be organized in a post-Western world. Rather, by creating new institutions and leading them, China seeks to emulate US-style leadership: rules-based but with built-in additional influence and with the right to occasionally act without asking for a ‘permission slip’, that is, the right to break the rules if deemed necessary by decision makers in Beijing. Other rising powers such as Brazil and India are doing the same, but on a regional level. This is symbolized by Brazil’s decision to simply ignore a request by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS) to halt the construction of a dam in the Amazon forest because the government had failed to properly consult with indigenous populations. Many powers have enjoyed ‘regional exceptionalism’ in the past, but under today’s order, only the United States enjoys ‘global exceptionalism’, symbolized by its freedom to frequently violate international law and intervene militarily in geographically distant countries since World War II without being punished by the international community.

Aside from the right to act without asking for a ‘permission slip’ when national interest is at stake, the United States enjoys additional influence through a series of explicit or implicit agreements. China and others will seek to emulate those same privileges in the institutions they create. While the US government can appoint the President of the World Bank, the Chinese government will play an outsized role in choosing the leadership structures of institutions such as the AIIB, even though it may initially try to appear less imposing. The importance of controlling the leadership selection process cannot be underestimated. In the case of the World Bank and the IMF, it implies the ability to favor some governments over others based on strategic interests, and the United States and Europe have, over past decades, made ample use of this privilege.

More important, as pointed out above, the BRICS will be careful to balance their exceptionalism with the provision of global public goods and the stability they need to protect their vital interests. Beijing is fully aware of the fact that its hard power sources can only translate into political influence when they are bound by agreed-upon rules and norms. China cannot afford to be regarded as a global rule-breaker that cares little about the rest of the world. It was this very understanding that Chinese power should be embedded in a network of rules and norms to be considered legitimate that made policy makers in Beijing create the many institutions described in the previous chapters. While power shifts require the bargains that great powers agree to with the rest of the world to be constantly renegotiated, they are not necessarily bad news for the future of global rules and norms.

Notes

- 1 'Not just straw men: The biggest emerging economies are rebounding, even without recovery in the West'.
- 2 In 'Around the Cragged Hill', Kennan identified the United States, the former Soviet Union, China, India and Brazil as 'monster countries', including all members of the BRIC grouping Jim O'Neill would create a decade later.
- 3 There is no consensus on what constitutes an emerging power or a rising power. While China, for example, is at times called a rising power (see, for example, G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 56–68; and Ann Florini, 'Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance', *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (2011): 24–33), others argue that it is well-established within today's institutions such as the UN Security Council (Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56). Brazil and India are at times called 'middle powers' (Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, 'The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism', *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7 (2005): 1077–95), 'rising powers' (see, for example, Andrew Hurrell, 'Lula's Brazil: a Rising Power, but Going Where?' *Current History* 107 (2008): 51–7) or emerging powers (Stephen Philip Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), the latter two of which will be used interchangeably here, as is commonly done. See, for example: Randall Schweller, 'Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder', *Global Governance* 17, no. 3 (2011): 285–97. Countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico are also at times described as emerging powers (Jack Goldstone, 'Rise of the TIMBIs', *Foreign Policy*, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/02/rise_of_the_timbis).
- 4 Even though the first meeting of BRIC foreign ministers took place in 2006, this chapter argues that it only turned into a more institutionalized grouping because of the global financial crisis that would begin two years later.
- 5 Conversations with Indian diplomats, Delhi, 2012–2013.
- 6 Conversation with Indian and Brazilian diplomats, 2011–2013.
- 7 'Not just straw men: The biggest emerging economies are rebounding, even without recovery in the West'.
- 8 Interview with a Brazilian policy maker, Brasília, April 1, 2013.
- 9 Interview with Brazilian diplomat in Brasília, April, 2013.
- 10 This does not mean, of course, that the BRICs' influence on the G20 was all-encompassing. Some of their positions were too heterogeneous to speak with one voice. For a more detailed analysis, see: Oliver Stuenkel, 'Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil', *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Occasional Paper 123, December 2012.
- 11 Interviews with Russian, Chinese and Indian policy makers, 2012 and 2013.
- 12 The BRICS, it must be stated here, are not an example of political integration because there is no mechanism that limits sovereignty or imposes binding decisions. Haas defines political integration as 'the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states'. See: Carsten Stroyby-Jensen, 'Neo-functionalism', in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89.
- 13 Schmitter writes 'Spillover refers another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment), or both'. (Philippe ... to the process whereby members of an integration scheme – agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but [are] unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals – [they] attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in C. Schmitter, 'Three Neofunctional Hypotheses about international integration', *International Organization* 23, no. 1 (1969): 161–6).

- 14 Conversation with an Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 2013
 15 See, for example: Acharya. *The end of American World Order*, 19.

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Asia and the United Nations

Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone
and Anthony Yazaki

INTRODUCTION¹

Asia has undergone a massive transformation in recent decades, from a region stricken by poverty to a driver of global economic growth with rapidly increasing geopolitical weight. At least until recently, this rise has not been matched by concomitant political engagement in international institutions on matters of global security, particularly at the United Nations (UN). This should be a cause of concern for the UN because its role, relevance, and legitimacy in international security depend on the buy-in of great powers and the main middle powers into its collective security arrangements.

This chapter will examine why this is the case by exploring Asian countries' views and policies toward the UN. Following a brief section highlighting key historical and geopolitical factors shaping Asian attitudes toward multilateralism, the chapter is then organized along its three main sub-regions – Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia – analyzing in greater detail their respective perceptions of and approaches to the UN. In order to keep the scope of the chapter manageable and to enable analysis without exhausting the reader's patience, we address the UN's economic and social activities only tangentially, instead focusing mainly on its political and security-related preoccupations and activities. We also limit our scope geographically, and exclude the Middle East (or West Asia, as South Asians think of it), where the UN has a long and often frustrating history of peacekeeping, development, and refugee programming, which has been well analyzed elsewhere.² The chapter concludes that, overall, Asian relations with the UN are on a positive trajectory, with growing engagement and investment by key countries in the organization.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Considering the geographical, cultural, and political diversity of Asia, it should not come as a surprise that its countries differ significantly in their foreign policy outlooks. Nevertheless, there are also some historical similarities between these countries that create convergences in their worldviews. Chief among these is arguably the fact that much of Asia was long subjected to colonialism and other forms of foreign interference, which fostered a strong attachment in the region to the notions of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Concerned that engagement in international institutions may compromise sovereignty, many Asian countries have consequently entertained a degree of skepticism toward multilateral institutions, including the UN. International legal scholar Simon Chesterman has argued that, due to their historical experiences with foreign interference, 'Asian states have consistently been the slowest to form regional institutions, the most reticent about acceding to major international treaties, the least likely to have a voice in proportion to their relative size and power, and the wariest about availing themselves of international dispute settlement procedures.'³

Although Asia is hardly unique in terms of its colonial past, a number of factors have driven its higher degree of hesitance toward multilateral engagement, compared with other post-colonial regions. For instance, sustained and potentially intensifying intra-regional rivalries (such as between China and Japan, China and India, and India and Pakistan) have led Asia to be economically and politically more fragmented than most other regions. Whereas organizations such as the African Union, European Union, and Organization of American States provide frameworks for regional order in their respective continents, the closest equivalent in Asia is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which only encompasses a subset of Asian countries and remains comparatively weakly institutionalized, although at times it is more effective than widely thought in the West. Its closest cousin, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which emerged during the 1980s, has been almost wholly disappointing, and other regional groupings such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have remained seriously underpowered. Jetschke and Katada argue that Asia's weak institutionalization of regional cooperation is rooted in the 'dominance of developmental states in the region with clear preferences toward intergovernmental cooperation instead of delegation'.⁴

Rather than relying on a regional political and security architecture, Asia, more than other continents, has long relied on balance of power arrangements underpinned by a US network of bilateral alliances in the region and increasingly on patronage relationships fostered by China. For the first decade and a half of the 21st century, Washington has sought to strengthen its alliances (with countries

such as Japan and South Korea) and cultivate new partnerships (for instance with India) in response to China's rapid rise. More recently, the administration of US President Trump has sent mixed signals regarding its commitment to US military alliances in Asia, and has withdrawn from the Transpacific Partnership, a free-trade agreement that took a decade to negotiate and was seen by many capitals in the region as an effort to counter the Sino-centric economic order in the region. In response, US allies in the region seem to be moving toward a 'dual hedging' approach, both relying more on self-help while seeking accommodation and closer ties with China.

Current geostrategic shifts notwithstanding, historically, the prioritization of state sovereignty, a lukewarm attitude toward multilateralism, and the persistence of great power rivalries within Asia have constrained the UN's political space on the continent and weakened the influence of Asia within the UN.

However, as this chapter will show, there have been incremental shifts in recent years, with key countries in all three sub-regions becoming more open to broadening and deepening their UN engagement in a range of areas. This has been the product of their growing political and economic confidence, a realization that the organization can serve to advance national interests, and an increasing comfort level with multilateral engagement as a result of growing intra-regional integration.

NORTHEAST ASIA

China

In Asia, no country's attitudes toward the UN will have greater impact on the future role and relevance of the organization than those of China. This emerging superpower is expected to supersede the United States as the world's largest economy sometime between 2020 and 2030, although levels of individual prosperity will likely continue to lag behind those of the West for many decades (gaping inequalities highlighted by a growing class of the super-rich aside).

When the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) as a UN member state in 1971, Beijing shifted from being a self-isolating outcast to much of the world to suddenly being thrust into the privileged club of the five countries (P5) holding a permanent seat and veto power in the UN Security Council. Still mired in widespread poverty and its disastrous Cultural Revolution at the time, China has since grown into the world's second-largest economy with historically unprecedented speed, enabling the rapid growth of its political and military power and making it today the dominant geopolitical player in Asia. This new reality is increasingly reflected within the UN.

Having been subjected to a 'century of humiliation' under unequal treaties imposed by European powers and subsequently excluded from the UN in favor

of Taiwan for more than a quarter century, the PRC originally viewed the organization with deep skepticism.⁵ Initial Chinese distrust manifested itself largely through an unwillingness to be an active participant in UN activities, for instance by refusing to vote on resolutions related to peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the Security Council.⁶ However, it became clear during the 1980s that China had been hard at work studying and assessing the UN system from within.

Over time, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has significantly warmed to the UN. It has grown increasingly attached to its veto power-related ability to shape Security Council outcomes and defend its interests, while also coming to appreciate the fact that its strong identification with state sovereignty is buttressed by the text of the UN Charter and shared by a voting majority in the General Assembly. As one leading US scholar on China recently noted, 'the Chinese government and scholars have become some of the world's strongest advocates of the United Nations'.⁷ Interestingly, however, this positive view does not seem to be shared by the general Chinese population, among whom the UN experiences some of its lowest approval ratings in all of Asia.⁸

Despite its attachment to sovereignty and non-interference, China has not prevented the emergence of an increasingly activist Security Council following the end of the Cold War. Since the 1990–91 Iraq–Kuwait crisis, Beijing has repeatedly allowed the authorization of coercive measures against certain countries. Most recently, Beijing permitted the use of force in Libya in 2011, where it initially shared the West's humanitarian concerns, notwithstanding subsequent controversies around NATO's implementation of the Security Council mandate. China has mostly described such decisions as exceptional, allowing it to leave its non-intervention credentials at least formally intact. Between 1990 and 2017 Beijing has also consented to the adoption of 25 sanctions regimes, as well as the deployment of peacekeeping operations within over 30 different countries and territories.

For the first decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, China used its veto power in the Security Council sparingly and primarily as a means to enforce its 'One China' policy in relation to Taiwan.⁹ More recently, Beijing has become increasingly assertive and ready to defend its interests in the Council. Demonstrated by a rise in joint vetoes with Russia since 2007 (one on Myanmar, one on Zimbabwe, six on Syria, and one on Venezuela as of July 2019), China has also fostered a closer relationship with Moscow at the UN in the pursuit of common goals.¹⁰ These include efforts to soft-balance¹¹ through the Security Council what both countries see as largely unfettered US power, and in particular to push back against what they perceive as a US-led assault on global order manifested in the repeated and, in their eyes, illegal use of force to pursue a regime change agenda under the cover of humanitarian or non-proliferation norms as in Libya, Iraq, and Kosovo.¹²

Nevertheless, China continues to display a desire to maintain the Security Council as a functioning, indeed central, international organ to address challenges

on which its interests converge with the other members of the P5, including on nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and conflict management in Africa.

On nuclear non-proliferation, China shares with its fellow P5 a desire to prevent any expansion of the small club of nuclear-armed states. This is apparent in China's constructive approach to negotiating a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, leading to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was made possible in part thanks to Beijing's assent to a strengthened UN sanctions regime in 2009. On North Korea, too, China supports a degree of coercion through UN sanctions, which were significantly tightened as recently as 2017, to mitigate Pyongyang's often unpredictably aggressive behavior, while refraining from taking steps that might destabilize the regime of Chairman Kim Jong-un.¹³

On terrorism, throughout the 1990s China only reluctantly went along with robust Security Council action in response to acts of state-sponsored terrorism carried out by the regimes in Sudan and Libya. However, China was far more inclined to support sanctions against the Taliban in 1999, by which point it had long faced (and characterized as 'terrorist') separatist ethnic violence in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang province, and had become increasingly concerned about the spread of radical Islamist groups and ideologies in the wider region.¹⁴ In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, China agreed to a series of remarkably robust counter-terrorism resolutions.¹⁵ Since then, China has shown continued support – albeit through little initiative of its own – for further strengthening the Security Council's counter-terrorism measures set up in 2001 and 2002.

The constructive Chinese approach toward the UN is most evident in its fast-evolving attitude toward UN peacekeeping. Beijing has progressively increased its participation in Security Council-mandated peacekeeping missions, including robust operations with 'protection of civilians' mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As of fall 2018, China was the eleventh-largest troop contributor to UN PKOs and by far the largest contributor among the P5. These contributions also make China a primary driver of East Asia's rising region-wide participation in PKOs over the past decade.

In September 2015, Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged a variety of resources for peacekeeping, including a standby force of 8,000 peacekeepers and a \$100 million contribution to African Union (AU) PKOs, as well as \$1 billion for a 10-year China–UN peace and development fund to support the UN's work in both of these fields. One Chinese scholar has characterized this growing engagement as 'a turning point of a transforming UN diplomacy – paying more attention to agenda setting, leading role, and value shaping'.¹⁶ While the defense of its rapidly growing economic and energy interests on the African continent is a driver, an equally important factor explaining the expanding Chinese role in peacekeeping has been an effort to burnish its soft-power credentials and 'to raise its profile in the international community as a constructive and responsible power'.¹⁷

China has also long backed UN peacebuilding efforts, including by contributing financially to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), albeit at a modest level of

\$8 million between 2006 and 2018. In contrast to its rejection of externally driven democracy promotion efforts by individual powers, China has largely supported Security Council-mandated democracy promotion activities in other countries, not least because it is cognizant of the fact that the establishment of legitimate governments through national elections remains the most promising exit strategy for UN PKOs from troubled countries.

Regarding UN reform, China has rhetorically supported the expansion of non-permanent Security Council seats, but has been actively unenthusiastic about measures that would expand permanent membership of the Security Council, not least in light of Japan's candidacy.¹⁸ Leveraging its growing influence among African member states, China has also actively lobbied against any efforts to reform the Security Council's working methods, especially with respect to proposals that may constrain the use of the veto.¹⁹

Overall, China's confidence in its engagement with the UN has grown in tandem with its political and economic standing, making Beijing more willing to exercise its veto power in the Security Council, as evidenced by the fact that eight of its twelve vetoes (as of November 2018) have been cast since 2007. As China's economic primacy continues to grow, together with its network of overseas relationships, Beijing is likely to become increasingly outspoken at the UN on matters where it clashes with the West, but also more energetic in supporting UN activities that defend or advance its interests.

Japan

Since the adoption of its constitution following the devastating end to World War II, Japan has been constitutionally precluded from possessing a military establishment for anything other than defensive purposes. Forsaking its coercive military capacity has had the twofold effect of forcing Japan to rely on its alliance with Washington and the US nuclear umbrella for its security, while making diplomacy the tool of choice to pursue its interests in the international arena. As such, engagement at the UN has been a key element of Japan's foreign policy ever since it became a member state in 1956.²⁰ Indeed, Japan's first diplomatic bluebook published in 1957 lists 'UN-centered diplomacy' as the first of its three pillars of foreign policy, together with cooperation with the free world and active participation in the Asian community.²¹ Japan's emphasis on the UN is underscored by its claim for a permanent seat on the Security Council as well as the fact that it has served more often as an elected Security Council member than any other country, with a total of 11 terms, including the one in 2016–17.

However, as a result of constitutional and other legal restrictions, Japan's peace and security engagement at the UN faces important constraints, most evidently in its ability to participate in PKOs.²² The country's UN Peacekeeping Law of 1992 states that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) may only participate in UN PKOs when a ceasefire is in place, when host country consent has been obtained, operations

are impartial, and the use of force is limited to self-defense.²³ Although Japan has deployed over 10,000 personnel cumulatively to peacekeeping missions since the passage of the law,²⁴ these principles have combined with constitutional restrictions to prevent Japanese forces from operating on the front lines of missions and to limit them to non-combat activities such as engineering and logistics.

With UN PKOs increasingly deploying in hostile theaters and routinely equipped with robust mandates for the protection of civilians (which Tokyo tends to support), Japan's peacekeeping principles have become increasingly anachronistic. This tension has contributed – in combination with worries over sharp maritime boundary and territorial disagreements with China and efforts to enhance Japan's value as a US ally – to the Abe government's decision to push for a constitutional reinterpretation that would broaden Japan's scope to engage in collective self-defense activities, including in the peacekeeping sphere.²⁵ New security laws adopted in the fall of 2015 loosened the restrictions of the country's peacekeeping principles, allowing Japanese troops to be more active in defending a UN mission's mandate. The new laws permit an expanded use of their weaponry, shifting from the use of weapons strictly for the purpose of self-defense toward 'the purpose of execution of missions', which can, for instance, encompass defending fellow peacekeepers from other countries that have come under attack.²⁶ However, the new legal framework has yet to translate into greater readiness to deploy Japanese blue helmets in hostile theaters, reflecting the country's reluctance to place its troops in harm's way, in light of the Japanese public's aversion to Japanese casualties abroad ever since the Second World War.²⁷ Indeed, in 2017, Tokyo decided to withdraw its only peacekeeping contingent deployed at that point, a 272-strong engineering unit attached to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, in light of ongoing instability in that country.

Japan's pacifist ethos also partly explains why Tokyo officialdom has become a leading promoter of the concept of 'human security', which it has used since the 1990s to try to shift security-related discourse away from the military aspects of state security toward a more development-oriented approach. Originally proposed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report, Japan adopted the concept in the late 1990s before subsequently enshrining it in its Official Development Assistance Charter²⁸ and institutionalizing it at the UN through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, which continues to rely heavily on funding from Tokyo.²⁹ However, because of a reluctance to ruffle any feathers domestically and internationally, the concept remains ill-defined beyond equating economic development with human security and has failed either to reshape debate at the UN – which since the 1999 Kosovo intervention has revolved more around the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – or to meaningfully influence the UN operationally.

Tokyo has in recent years increasingly focused on Africa – the UN's primary theater of PKOs – partly in an effort to counter growing Chinese investment and influence on the continent. Since 2013, Abe has committed over \$60 billion in

aid and investment to the continent aimed at initiatives in fields ranging from infrastructure development to peace and security.³⁰ Japan has also increased the frequency of the meetings of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) with African leaders, which is organized jointly with UNDP, and was held for the first time in Africa in August 2016. In addition, Japan has been an active proponent of UN peacebuilding efforts, which align well with the country's focus on non-military post-conflict activities. These various factors point to a likely growth in Japan's interest in the UN, given the organization's strong focus on the African continent.

Although the country's economy has been largely stagnant since the early 1990s and the national debt is now more than double Japan's GDP, Tokyo, as of 2018, has remained the second-largest contributor to the UN's regular budget (behind the United States) and has only recently been overtaken by China as the second-largest financial contributor to the UN's peacekeeping budget, for which a different scale of assessments is used. Consequently, issues related to UN financing are an ongoing priority and Japan places great emphasis on 'financial sustainability' and 'efficiency'.³¹ These considerations have, for instance, led Japan to encourage the timely shutdown of international tribunals;³² slow down its funding for the PBF;³³ push back against efforts to increase the reimbursement rate for PKO troop contributions; and promote more timely drawdowns ('right-sizing') and closures of UN missions.³⁴ As such, it is evident that although Japan has long been a strong supporter of the UN's activities, Tokyo is not prepared to write a blank check and offer indefinite support to all UN undertakings. However, like other countries, Japan is sensitive to the election or appointment of its citizens to senior UN offices, and often invests considerably in their endeavors.

Indeed, a major factor influencing Japan's diplomacy at the UN is the country's tenuous relationships with its two most significant neighbors, China and South Korea. Both countries in recent years have made increasing efforts, including at the UN, to stigmatize Japan for the conduct of its military and civilian administrators and combatants during its colonizing ventures in the run-up to and during the Second World War. These reactions, at times remarkably heated, have proved distressing for Japan, which believed itself to have made ample amends to both countries through its policies and economic assistance in decades past. Nevertheless, it has been criticized sharply by these two East Asian neighbors at times for some political interpretations of 20th-century history that China and South Korea perceive as Japan ducking its responsibility for a range of crimes. Within the UN context, this has manifested in recent disputes over the UNESCO designations of various historical documents and landmarks, which have highlighted the differing interpretations of history among these three countries.³⁵

Regular surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center on global attitudes and trends reveal a worrying decline of public support for the UN over the past two decades, with the share of Japanese citizens who held favorable attitudes to the UN declining from 77% in 2000 to 45% in 2016.³⁶ A different set of annual

surveys conducted by the Japanese government shows that over the same period, the share of the population that believes Japan should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council increased from 77% to 87%, suggesting that the declining support for the UN may be rooted in the current permanent composition of the Security Council and their veto power, as well as in worries about accountability with respect to Japan's substantial financial contributions to the organization.³⁷ Yet, Japanese influence within the UN could come under pressure from the decline of Japan's share of UN budgets. The decline, which is due to the country's economic near-stagnation since 1990, undermines the potency of Tokyo's bilateral and multilateral yen diplomacy.

South Korea

Despite only being a UN member state since 1991,³⁸ South Korea's relationship with the UN is distinctly rooted in its history, as a result of the Security Council authorizing the use of force in 1950 to repel the North Korean invasion of its southern neighbor. Aided in part by significant international donor assistance for reconstruction and economic development after the war, South Korea has since embarked on a remarkable economic and political transformation. The experience of owing its sovereignty to a UN-authorized military coalition and its economic rise – at least partly – to international aid has contributed to an overwhelmingly positive perception of the UN among both the South Korean public and the country's elites. This has only grown since Ban Ki-Moon, a South Korean national, was elected as UN Secretary-General in 2006.³⁹ In fact, South Korean leaders have referred to the country as a 'child of the UN'.⁴⁰ Less attached, as a consequence, to notions of national sovereignty than many of its Asian peers, South Korea is strongly supportive of the UN taking an active role in preventing and managing conflicts around the world.

In spite of South Korea having a strong desire to contribute to the UN at a level commensurate with the country's status as an emerging power, being a relative newcomer at the UN, Seoul remains in an extended exploratory phase during which it is still determining how it can best contribute to the UN and achieve domestic and international impact in doing so. Indeed, one South Korean government official described the country's two terms in the Security Council (1996–97 and 2013–14) as 'learning experiences', during which it was able to engage on a wider range of international issues than it had been accustomed to before.⁴¹

Nevertheless, South Korea has long demonstrated interest in participating in UN PKOs. This has been driven by a desire to repay the country's debt to the international community,⁴² a growing sense of responsibility to make positive contributions at a level matching the country's rising status, and the practical consideration that participation in UN PKOs can provide valuable field training to South Korean military personnel.⁴³ However, these positive drivers are partly counteracted by the ever-present risk of renewed hostilities with North Korea

and a resulting hesitancy in Seoul to deploy its troops to far-away peacekeeping missions, because they could be needed urgently on the country's northern border at any time. Also, as with Japan, South Korean public opinion remains highly averse to the idea of military casualties overseas,⁴⁴ and one government official noted in an interview that even a single South Korean casualty in a UN mission would likely spark public outrage and potentially cause South Korean withdrawal from the mission in question.⁴⁵

South Korea's views on Security Council reform are significantly shaped by its fraught relations with Tokyo, with the South Korean public and elites continuing to harbor strong resentment against Japan's colonial behavior on the Korean Peninsula during the first half of the 20th century. As a middle power without a credible claim to a permanent seat on the Security Council, South Korea therefore opposes reform proposals that foresee expansion in the permanent category, which could likely lead to an international elevation of Japan and thus, in Seoul's eyes, a relative qualification of its own international profile and status.

SOUTH ASIA

India

The style and substance of India's engagement with the UN reflects its history and evolving status in the international order. Consequently, Delhi's outlook on the UN has undergone important shifts since independence.

Although the country was still under British rule when the UN was established in 1945, India was actually among the organization's 51 founding member states. At this incipient stage, Indian diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, sister of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, played an influential role in embedding decolonization into the UN's founding document in the form of the now-dormant Trusteeship Council.⁴⁶ With this initial victory in hand, and believing that the organization would act as a force for peace that would facilitate India's economic development, Prime Minister Nehru originally adhered to a semi-utopian internationalist vision of the UN as a vehicle for a 'post-sovereign-nation-state-dominated reality'.⁴⁷ However, when Nehru referred the 1948 Kashmir crisis to the Security Council, he was disappointed with its equivocal response, failing to rule in India's favor. This episode led to a more skeptical attitude toward the UN in Delhi, which, since that time, has emphasized national sovereignty and worked to steer the UN clear of issues in which India has a direct interest.

In the early 1950s, India developed its policy of non-alignment relative to the two blocs on either side of the Cold War, in part as a measure to preserve the country's new-found autonomy and independence. Subsequently, as global decolonization progressed, India began to define itself as the leader of the newly independent countries that also began adhering to the non-alignment principle.

This grouping of countries eventually established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, which included Nehru among its founding fathers. India's association with the NAM has since remained a feature of its foreign policy ethos in multilateral forums such as the UN. However, India's enthusiasm for the NAM has waned notably in recent years, with the former's emergence as a meaningful power in its own right while the latter has remained largely a captive of ideas of the past.⁴⁸

In the post-Cold War years, not least driven by its own economic development efforts, India began to pursue a larger role in international affairs, including at the UN. This shift was underpinned by a series of nuclear tests in 1998, which, short-lived criticism notwithstanding, cemented the country's status as a rising nuclear power, albeit one not recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which India is not a party.

India's pursuit of greater influence has in part been reflected in the country's effort to keep the UN from becoming overly active in its immediate vicinity because 'achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India's ability to manage its own immediate neighbourhood'.⁴⁹ For instance, following the 2006 peace agreement to end a civil war in Nepal, India reluctantly supported the establishment of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), but worked to circumscribe the scope of its activities.⁵⁰

Outside of its region, Delhi has also consistently pushed back against the UN's growing activism, 'generally plac[ing] state sovereignty and territorial integrity above considerations of human rights and state-sponsored atrocities'.⁵¹ Consequently, India has approached the R2P norm cautiously, unsuccessfully trying to prevent its adoption at the World Summit in 2005, and viewing it with skepticism ever since. India was eventually forced to take a stance on R2P during the country's most recent term in the Security Council in 2011–12, when the body needed to respond to internal conflicts arising from the Arab Spring. In April 2011, India, along with China and Russia, abstained from voting on a resolution authorizing the use of force to protect civilians threatened by Libyan government forces. Despite not explicitly standing in the way of the intervention, Delhi became a strong critic of what it (and many others) saw as NATO overstepping the mandate granted to it by the Security Council by pursuing a regime change agenda, rather than focusing solely on the protection of civilians.

In October 2011, with the Libya controversy fresh in mind, Delhi withheld its support from a draft resolution on Syria, even though that draft stopped short of threatening coercive measures against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.⁵² While India's abstention was inconsequential because the draft was vetoed by Moscow and Beijing, Delhi was strongly criticized in the West for providing a degree of legitimacy to the Chinese–Russian double veto, which set the Council on a path of deadlock in the escalating civil war. Even though Delhi subsequently switched gears and in 2012 voted in favor of two further draft resolutions on Syria that were also met with double vetoes, India's initial abstention placed it between

the P5's anti-Assad Western members and sovereignty-conscious Eastern members.⁵³ This ultimately left India geo-strategically isolated and without a clear constituency in the Council.⁵⁴

A major pillar of India's policy at the UN has been its troop contributions to PKOs; over the 60 years since the inception of UN peacekeeping, no country has deployed more blue helmets than India.⁵⁵ As of September 2018, it had nearly 6,700 peacekeeping troops serving under the UN flag, making it the fourth-largest contributor in the world, down from second place in 2016.⁵⁶ However, Delhi has been a strong critic of robust peacekeeping mandates, arguing that they unnecessarily place troops in harm's way and violate the basic peacekeeping principles of impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense.⁵⁷ Yet, Delhi's continued participation demonstrates that, despite reservations, it still sees troop contributions as beneficial to its interests, by projecting an image of India as a force for global peace and a leader of the global South.⁵⁸ However, with its hefty contributions to UN peacekeeping missions having failed to translate into commensurate political influence at the UN, India may well, in years ahead, more carefully tailor its approach to peacekeeping to align more with its strategic interests.⁵⁹

Another important facet of India's pursuit of greater influence in international affairs has been the country's campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Delhi's strategy in advancing this claim has followed a dual track approach.⁶⁰ On one track, it joined forces with Germany, Japan and Brazil (the so-called 'Group of Four' or G4), to claim a seat based on their status as major middle powers and contributions to the UN.⁶¹ On a second track, within the so-called 'L69 Group' of developing countries (named after a UN document), India's argument has been that the global South should be given a larger voice within the organization. However, none of these efforts have to date yielded any results. The P5 have been unhelpful, and the UN membership at large is unconvinced that adding new permanent seats in any way advances their own interests, thus making Security Council reform appear unlikely in the near future.

Pakistan

Ever since the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, Islamabad's primary foreign policy concern has been national security. Pakistan's worries have been accentuated by its geographic location abutting several major global and regional powers, as well as its relative weakness compared with its larger neighbors (with one of whom, China, it has been allied consistently since the mid 1950s).⁶² Pakistan has long viewed India as its primary threat and the ensuing sense of vulnerability is a key driver of its foreign policy. These two rivals have fought several wars, oftentimes over the ever-sensitive territorial dispute over Kashmir. At these times, Islamabad has sought the UN's support, leveraging its membership in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as a diplomatic force multiplier within the world forum.

The Kashmir issue was first raised by India in the UN in 1948 and the Security Council subsequently passed a series of resolutions that failed to resolve the dispute. While Delhi has since shifted its preference to strictly bilateral negotiations, Islamabad has continued to want to ‘internationalize’ the issue and keep it on the UN agenda. Both approaches have yielded only modest compromises by either side.

The dispute over Kashmir aside, many elements of Islamabad’s UN policies have ironically mirrored those of Delhi. Most importantly, like India, Pakistan is a vocal member of the NAM and a staunch defender at the UN of the principle of non-interference. This sovereignty-conscious attitude has also fueled a skeptical attitude toward R2P, even though its original hostile stance⁶³ has since given way to a more nuanced position that calls for R2P to be undertaken ‘according to the rule of law and agreed parameters’.⁶⁴ In part, Pakistan’s cautious outlook on R2P may be rooted in a desire to shield itself from criticism or even the possibility of intervention related to its own ongoing internal strains, which the government is careful to frame in terms of terrorism, rather than as ‘conflict’.

As in the case of India, a major element of Pakistan’s engagement with the UN has been its troop contributions to PKOs, which Islamabad sees as enhancing its international standing.⁶⁵ As of September 2018, Pakistan was the sixth-largest troop contributor, with over 5,300 troops and police deployed in the field. And, again in line with Delhi, Pakistan has emerged as a critic of increasingly robust peacekeeping mandates, stating for instance, that ‘the use of force in peacekeeping under the garb of civilian protection is not helpful’.⁶⁶

On terrorism, Pakistan has accrued a poor global reputation in large part due to the government’s support for extremist groups in Afghanistan and refusal to prosecute the planners of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Perhaps in an effort to counter this narrative, Islamabad has emphasized that Pakistan itself faces a major terrorist threat, and has accordingly prioritized counter-terrorism in its engagement at the UN. This, however, has led to a number of contradictions between Pakistan’s words at the UN and its actions. For instance, although Islamabad used its most recent Security Council presidency in 2013 to convene an open debate on the subject,⁶⁷ it has taken little action to implement sanctions on the Taliban, which were imposed in 1999 through Security Council Resolution 1267.⁶⁸ Further, while the country has stated that the UN should focus more on the non-military aspects of counter-terrorism,⁶⁹ Islamabad’s own strategy has been criticized on the grounds that its ‘[r]eliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good’.⁷⁰

Similarly, in terms of nuclear non-proliferation, Islamabad has worked at the UN in order to counter reputational damage driven by its growing nuclear arsenal. As in the case of India, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons that it obtained outside of the framework of the NPT, which it has refused to sign due to its ‘discriminatory’ nature.⁷¹ This has led to a widespread negative perception of Pakistan’s nuclear policies, which has been exacerbated by the fact that Pakistani

scientist A. Q. Khan allegedly facilitated nuclear proliferation to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya. To rectify this image, Pakistan has tried to make clear that it is committed to non-proliferation, for instance by voting for the passage of Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in 2004 in response to the discovery of the A. Q. Khan network, which aims to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state groups.⁷² However, as in the case of counter-terrorism, the widespread concern regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal suggests a gap between the country's words at the UN and its ability to implement them at home.⁷³

Finally, regarding UN reform, much like South Korea vis-à-vis Japan, Pakistan has sought to counter India's campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council by supporting proposals calling for the expansion of the Council's non-permanent membership instead.⁷⁴

Overall, Pakistan's policies at the UN have been driven by the country's bilateral relations with India. Islamabad's focus on issues such as the Kashmir dispute, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation, and Security Council reform are all rooted in its ongoing rivalry with Delhi. Interestingly, however, the two countries' shared history and Pakistan's desire to counteract India's influence in the UN have at times created some convergence in their interests.⁷⁵ For instance, due to their large troop contributions to PKOs, which is arguably a product of their competition for influence, both sides have an interest in gaining a larger voice for troop contributing countries (TCC). Meanwhile, their status as nuclear powers outside of the NPT framework, again a product of their linked security concerns, makes them unlikely bedfellows in their shared desire to open up the global non-proliferation regime. Lastly, their prioritization of state sovereignty, partially arising from their shared history under British rule, underpins their calls for restraint when debating the merits of UN interventionism.

Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

Although many South Asian countries have seen strong development gains in recent years under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) framework, they generally remain underdeveloped and in need of external assistance and investment in order to continue on this positive trajectory. Accordingly, a top priority for the governments of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in recent years has been to maintain positive relations with the two rapidly rising giants in their neighborhood, India and China, in order to reap the benefits of their growing competition for economic and geo-strategic influence in and around the Indian Ocean.⁷⁶ As Chinese investments in South Asia have grown, particularly in infrastructure, India has sought to counter with various projects and aid packages of its own.

Unsurprisingly, this foreign policy agenda of prioritizing economics and development permeates their UN policies as well, particularly in terms of the

growing threat of global climate change. Sri Lanka has indicated that within the framework of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), climate change will be a top national priority.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, Bangladesh, also recognizing that it faces one of the most severe climate threats in the world due to its low elevation, numerous rivers, and consequently frequent, devastating floods, has acted as a lead advocate on behalf of the least developed countries (LDCs) in order to secure climate funding.⁷⁸ Notwithstanding these priorities, both countries face questions about their domestic political situations (Sri Lanka having recently emerged from a civil war, subsequently experiencing domestic political turmoil; Bangladesh facing internal political divisions that occasionally result in violence and may spur terrorism), raising concerns about whether their development achievements of recent decades can be sustained and enhanced in the future.

Similar to their larger South Asian neighbors, troop contributions to peacekeeping missions form an important pillar of Bangladesh and Nepal's engagements with the UN. As of September 2018, Bangladesh had over 6,900 blue helmets deployed in the field, and Nepal had close to 5,500, making them the third and fifth largest contributors in the world respectively. While Dhaka and Kathmandu's contributions are partly motivated by a desire to improve their international standing, both countries also benefit financially from the UN's reimbursements for troop contributions, which comprise an important revenue stream for their security services.⁷⁹

Sri Lanka and Nepal have emerged from lengthy civil wars in the course of the past decade, resulting in very different modes of engagement with the UN that significantly shaped both capitals' views of the organization. Sri Lanka, a state that had achieved steady development progress since independence in 1948, fell victim to an increasingly intractable and vicious civil war between 1983 and 2009, pitting a fanatical Tamil liberation movement's leadership against the central government, and, by extension, the Sinhalese majority community. This enduring struggle at one time disastrously pulled in Indian peacekeepers (not mandated by the UN), but never made it onto the agenda of the Security Council. The war reached a horrendous climax in May 2009, when government forces wiped out the Tamil leadership and many of its fighters, along with tens of thousands of Tamil civilians.⁸⁰

The UN was subsequently sharply criticized in an internal review for its 'systematic failure' to adequately respond to and take a strong and public stand against Colombo's indiscriminate use of force and the ensuing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.⁸¹ This led to a new UN policy advocated by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon called 'Human Rights Up Front', which has been met with a mix of hope and skepticism.⁸² In the years following the end of the war, the Sri Lankan government's hostility toward any UN efforts to ensure accountability for abuses during the civil war poisoned Colombo's relationship with the organization. However, Colombo's attitude toward the UN improved dramatically following a change in government in 2015, which led to

newly constructive engagement with the UN on human rights issues and post-war accountability.⁸³

In contrast to its relative inaction in Sri Lanka, the UN played an important role in bringing the Nepalese civil war to a close. Following the completion of a peace agreement between the government and Maoist rebels in 2006, the UN was called upon to support the implementation of the agreement. This led to the establishment of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), a civilian mission which was tasked with monitoring the disarmament of the rebels according to the peace agreement, and supporting the country's constituent assembly election of 2008. Although Nepal has experienced considerable political turbulence since the Mission's departure in 2011 due to disputes over the country's new constitution, the UN mission has been viewed as a success, at least within the confines of its narrow mandate.⁸⁴ And Nepal, since UNMIN's departure, has continued to practice democracy vigorously if fractiously.

As members of the NAM, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka all place a strong emphasis on the UN's principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Combined with the Indian desire to maintain regional influence and to keep the UN from becoming overly politically active in its backyard, it is hardly surprising that the organization has been constrained in playing a robust role in South Asia outside of its development programming. Looking ahead, there are mixed signals on whether Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka will deepen their engagement with the UN. All three countries have pledged to boost their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, and Colombo's hostilities toward the organization appear to have begun to subside. Yet, at the same time, it remains possible that the competition for regional influence between India and China may narrow the space for future engagement by the UN.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Factors Shaping Regional Attitudes to the UN

Unlike Northeast and South Asia, which are both home to a number of major political or economic powers (China, Japan, and India), the 11 Southeast Asian countries are predominantly low- and middle-income countries. However, their combined status as the world's seventh-largest economy and eighth-largest consumer market,⁸⁵ along with their growing political weight and habit of close consultation within the ASEAN framework, make them an important member state group within the UN.

Southeast Asian relationships with, engagement in, and perceptions of the UN are a function of a number of factors. These include the region-wide affinity for sovereignty and reticence to participate robustly in international institutions, Asian geopolitics, the record of the UN's activities in the region, the foreign

policy outlook of individual governments, and these governments' calculations of the degree to which the UN is expected to be a helpful forum within which to pursue their interests on any given issue. For instance, Southeast Asia is less deeply invested in the collective UN security system than some other regions, due in part to ASEAN countries' limited, albeit growing, political relations with and economic interests in Africa, where much of the UN's peace and security engagement is concentrated.⁸⁶

As a result of the experience of colonialism, the doctrine of non-intervention in countries' internal affairs remains paramount for many countries in the sub-region. The prominence of non-interference as a central precept in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 and the adoption of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 are associated in regional capitals with spreading peace and stability in the region.⁸⁷ This largely explains their strong resistance to UN involvement in conflicts in their neighborhood, as well as a general wariness of UN activism globally.

Growing Engagement with the UN

However, notwithstanding the countervailing factors listed above, Southeast Asian engagement with the UN is generally growing. The more powerful countries in the region see the UN as a useful forum to further enhance their prestige and promote their foreign policy interests regionally and globally. Indonesia, for instance, uses its active engagement in the UN to underpin its aspirations to regional leadership, manifested, among other things, in its claim to recurrent non-permanent membership on the Security Council every 10 years. Indonesia also uses the UN to highlight its democratic progress and, together with Malaysia, to position itself as the representative of moderate Islam. However, a reassessment of the UN seems to have taken place with the change in government in Jakarta in 2014. While former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono defined his foreign policy goals as 'advancing multilateralism through the United Nations and creating harmony among countries',⁸⁸ his successor, President Joko Widodo, may be instinctively less drawn toward the UN, having criticized it for cementing an 'imbalance of economic and world power'.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, smaller countries such as Singapore highlight the value of the UN as a 'force-multiplier' and as a provider of a rules-based framework for international relations, countering a world where 'might makes right'.⁹⁰ Consequently, reform initiatives spearheaded by Singapore tend to be geared toward enhancing the participation of less powerful countries in UN decision-making (as in the case of the 'S5 Initiative' for reforming Security Council working methods)⁹¹ and in enhancing the rule of law (as in the case of its long-standing efforts to promote the Law of the Sea).⁹² At the same time, Singapore is keen to limit its exposure at the UN, showing no interest in running for another term in the Security Council and declining to field a candidate for Secretary-General in 2006, despite encouragement from the United States, China, and Europe to do so.⁹³

Vietnam, following its progressive economic integration into the international system since the 1990s, is now increasingly seeking international political engagement, in particular at the UN, in line with the new policy of 'international integration' set at the 2011 Communist Party Congress. It has long been campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2020–21, comparatively soon after its last (and first) term in 2008–09.⁹⁴ And Myanmar, following the landslide win of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections, has made overtures to achieve a closer relationship with the UN, with Ban Ki-moon being invited by NLD leader and long-time democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi to an August 2016 peace conference aimed at bringing the country's internal conflict to a close.⁹⁵ Myanmar has been strongly connected with the UN in the past, with U Thant, the organization's third Secretary-General and the first Asian to hold that title, being a Burmese national. More recently, however, the country's relations with the UN have become increasingly contentious as Naypyidaw's political and military leadership faced accusations of involvement in atrocity crimes against the Muslim Rohingya minority, causing a refugee crisis that landed the country on the agenda of the Security Council.

Southeast Asian countries' interest in the UN's conflict-resolution role may increase as a result of growing economic interests in Africa and due to security vulnerabilities arising from instability in the Middle East. Indeed, Southeast Asian trade with Africa has risen from \$2.8 billion in 1990 to \$42 billion in 2012, with the largest traders being Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore.⁹⁶ Growing economic relations are mirrored by efforts to foster closer political ties, as reflected in enhanced ASEAN–AU cooperation starting in 2012, and the 2015 Asia–Africa Summit that took place in Jakarta. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries may be increasingly affected by instability in the Middle East, in light of the significant numbers of foreign fighters (predominantly from Indonesia) who have joined the Islamic State (IS) and the threat they may pose on their return.⁹⁷ The IS-inspired attack in Jakarta in January 2016 has heightened concern in the region, and international counter-terrorism cooperation is a top Indonesian priority.⁹⁸

Asian geopolitics, and, in particular, concern in the region about the rise of China and its maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea (clashing with the counter-claims of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam), are likely to heighten Southeast Asian appreciation of maritime dispute settlement mechanisms under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁹⁹ In 2014 both Vietnam and the Philippines used the UN in an effort to enlist international support for their respective claims in the South China Sea, sending letters to the Secretary-General for distribution in the General Assembly stating their legal case for sovereignty over disputed islands, protesting about Chinese actions and calling on the UN to engage in 'conflict prevention'.¹⁰⁰ China, on the other hand, has adamantly rejected any international involvement (whether through arbitration, mediation or adjudication), insisting instead on bilateral

negotiations between claimants and going as far as to argue that adjudication and arbitration would no longer fall within its understanding of ‘peaceful dispute settlement’.¹⁰¹ Regardless, the Philippines’ case was eventually heard by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which in July 2016 ruled that China’s claims in the South China Sea were in contradiction to the provisions of UNCLOS.¹⁰² The PCA has no mechanism to enforce its decision and Beijing has characterized the judgment as ‘a political farce under the pretext of law’, but the verdict nevertheless is a milestone in the dispute that could potentially impact the standing of international institutions in Asia in years ahead.¹⁰³

The UN’s development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding record in the region has also influenced Southeast Asian views of the organization. There is widespread appreciation for UN development work and high regard for the UNDP among elites and the general population alike (even though some NGO members interviewed for this chapter have commented critically on UNDP’s tendency to bend over backwards in efforts not to offend its host governments).

Furthermore, the two UN PKOs that had been deployed to the region, to Cambodia and East Timor, provided an opportunity for regional militaries to engage with the UN and each other, and are generally viewed as success stories. Driven by French diplomacy and backed by a broad and multidimensional mandate, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) helped in 1992–93 to bring a 20-year civil war to a close, and briefly administered the country before returning sovereignty to a newly formed Cambodian government. Although the country faced various setbacks during and following the UN mission, the successful completion of elections has on balance been viewed positively.¹⁰⁴

In East Timor, a lengthy UN presence spanning five different missions over the course of 14 years (1999–2012) helped to reverse the Indonesian annexation of the territory in 1976 and subsequently aided in its stabilization and its transition to being a fully independent state. The UN missions were provided with broad mandates ranging from the organization of a referendum on the territory’s independence to the provision of security and temporary administration before providing support for the newly formed government. With these tasks generally having been carried out successfully, the mission in East Timor has even been characterized by some as ‘an ideal showcase for UN capabilities’.¹⁰⁵

Informed by its direct experience with the UN during this time, Timor-Leste has emerged as an important voice in UN peace and security debates. It has advocated for issues such as the inclusion of a ‘peace and justice goal’ as part of the Sustainable Development Goals, the elaboration of principles of international engagement in conflict-affected states in discussions on the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’, and the High-Level Independent Panel for the Reform of Peace Operations, which was chaired by former Timorese president and later senior UN official José Ramos Horta.

UN–ASEAN Relations

In spite of the relatively successful history of PKOs in Southeast Asia, ASEAN countries remain extremely reluctant to grant any meaningful role to the UN in addressing conflicts in its region, including with respect to conflicts in Mindanao (the Philippines),¹⁰⁶ southern Thailand and Myanmar,¹⁰⁷ as well as the Thai–Cambodian border dispute.¹⁰⁸ Against this background, the UN has increasingly endeavored in recent years to engage countries in the region through ASEAN in an effort to gain some political space and in recognition of the gradual growth of ASEAN cohesion (manifested through its 2007 Charter and its goal of creating the ASEAN Community, which came into force in 2015). Consequently, UN–ASEAN relations have become increasingly institutionalized in recent years, including a series of now-annual UN–ASEAN Summits initiated in 2000, the granting of UN observer status to ASEAN in 2007, and the 2011 signing of a Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership by the secretaries-general of the two organizations.

However, the potential of the UN–ASEAN relationship to serve as a gateway for an enhanced UN role in the region faces important limitations. First, member states deliberately keep the ASEAN Secretariat weak, granting it only negligible resources (its annual budget is \$17 million, around 0.3% of that of the UN Secretariat) and circumscribing its policy autonomy by denying it the authority to speak on their behalf.¹⁰⁹ Second, mirroring a trend that has also been observed with respect to Africa and Latin America, as Southeast Asian cohesion slowly intensifies, ASEAN members increasingly believe (and sometimes assert) that they do not need the UN to solve their problems.¹¹⁰ Indeed, over the years, countries in the region have engaged constructively in efforts to mediate in one another's internal conflicts, including Thailand in Aceh; Malaysia and Indonesia in southern Thailand and Mindanao; and Indonesia in Myanmar and the 2011 Thai–Cambodian border conflict.

Peacekeeping

Among the most noteworthy developments with respect to ASEAN engagement at the UN is the region's growing participation in UN PKOs. By comparison with South Asia or Africa, the Southeast Asian role in peacekeeping is still modest. Indonesia, with close to 3,000 blue helmets in the field – by far the region's largest provider of UN troops – is ranked the ninth-largest contributor globally as of September 2018, followed by Malaysia (27th), Cambodia (29th), Thailand (85th) and the Philippines (88th). Nevertheless, Southeast Asian contributions to UN PKOs have increased significantly over the past decade, both in absolute and relative terms, with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia being the key drivers of this growth.

A continuation of this trend is likely. At the September 2015 New York Peacekeeping Summit, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and – notably – Vietnam

all made commitments to increase their contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, mostly in the form of engineering units.¹¹¹ Vietnam's new engagement is particularly noteworthy, both because it represents a very recent break with its historical opposition to participating in UN operations and also because of its potential to contribute, given that it possesses one of the 10 largest ground forces in the world.¹¹²

The motivations of individual countries for participating in peacekeeping missions are remarkably similar across the region. Most importantly, they see engagement in these missions as a means of enhancing their respective countries' prestige on the international stage and as an opportunity to increase the professionalism and operational experience of their troops. Militaries in the region also tend to welcome participation in peacekeeping as a way to strengthen their domestic legitimacy. Some countries highlight their troop-contributing role in an effort to strengthen upcoming candidatures for a seat on the Security Council (for example, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam). The significant contributions of Indonesia and Malaysia to the UN mission in Lebanon have been explained in terms of Muslim solidarity and their support for the Palestinian cause (the former also explaining both countries' significant roles in the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s). For Indonesia, participation in UN peacekeeping missions is also seen as an opportunity to promote its fledgling defense industry, in particular to showcase a new domestically produced armored personnel carrier for potential purchase by other troop contributors. Meanwhile, Vietnam sees its peacekeeping contribution as central to its new 'international integration' agenda.

However, a number of factors limit the region's greater engagement in UN peacekeeping missions. For instance, Southeast Asian troop contributors are strongly attached to the three peacekeeping principles that have guided UN operations since the 1950s (host country consent, impartiality, and the limitation of the use of force to self-defense) and have thus viewed the trend toward robust peacekeeping with some skepticism. However, they realize that UN peacekeepers are increasingly deployed to situations where there is no peace to keep, acknowledge that a degree of robustness is therefore unavoidable, and accept the legitimacy of protection-of-civilians mandates. Skepticism toward robust mandates, therefore, appears to be less ideologically motivated and more a reflection of the limited capacities of militaries in the region to participate in robust – let alone offensive – operations far from home. This in turn places a premium on enhanced consultation with TCCs in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates, for which countries in the region strongly advocate.¹¹³

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

In parallel with closer cooperation among Southeast Asian countries on peacekeeping, over the past decade there has also been closer regional integration on

the issue of disaster response, leading to growing cooperation with the UN. Closer regional cooperation was largely triggered by ASEAN's inadequate response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which led Singapore to spearhead an initiative that resulted in the development of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, which entered into force in 2009 and constitutes not only one of the few legally binding ASEAN agreements, but also the first legally binding agreement on disaster response globally.¹¹⁴

Developing regional integration in disaster management was followed by increasing cooperation between ASEAN and the UN in the aftermath of coordinated responses to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Although the responses were cobbled together on an ad hoc basis, they revealed both the necessity and potential of closer coordination and strengthening of operational ties in this area.¹¹⁵ This led to the announcement of the ASEAN–UN Strategic Plan of Action on Disaster Management 2010–15 at the 2010 ASEAN–UN Summit, with a second iteration of the plan covering 2016–20 having been released in 2016.

Interestingly, humanitarian assistance, in particular with respect to refugees, is an area in which Southeast Asia has a long track record of cooperation with the UN. For instance, during the Cambodian civil war and ensuing refugee crisis in the 1970s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) played an instrumental role in administering camps for displaced people along the Thai–Cambodian border. Indeed, one such camp grew to a population of 140,000 and was seen as 'the most elaborately serviced refugee camp in the world'.¹¹⁶ This history of robust UN action in the region may in part explain ASEAN's willingness to work with the UN on humanitarian issues to this day and the high esteem in which UNHCR is held throughout the region.

Human Rights and R2P

Until fairly recently, ASEAN countries rejected the notion of universal human rights, arguing that they were not compatible with Asian values. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Singapore warned that 'universal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity'.¹¹⁷

Since then there has been a significant reorientation and embracing of rights-related discourse in the region, which is in large part a result of successful democratization in Indonesia (inspired by the disruptive role of the fading Suharto dictatorship and that of its weak civilian successor in the run-up to East Timor's independence in 2009). In the wake of its own successful democratic transition, Jakarta spearheaded initiatives to anchor human rights and democracy promotion within the ASEAN framework, resulting in the inclusion of human rights principles in the 2007 Charter, as well as the establishment in 2009 of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the establishment in 2008 of the Bali Democracy Forum.¹¹⁸

However, the human rights discourse in the region remains influenced by the larger doctrine of non-interference in domestic affairs and the new mechanisms do not offer recourse channels or punitive measures in cases of non-compliance. Also, ASEAN countries remain averse to collective regional action in response to human rights abuses in their region and can be thin-skinned with respect to UN criticism of their individual human rights records. At the same time, countries in the region now engage proactively and confidently in human rights debates at the UN in ways that would have been difficult to imagine just a decade ago.

One area in which the promotion of human rights by ASEAN countries has been particularly vocal is the protection and advancement of the rights of women. ASEAN countries tend to highlight the importance of the inclusion and empowerment of women in peace processes and peacebuilding activities during open thematic debates in the Security Council. Yet 'none of [ASEAN] regional commitments or institutions expressly take up the core concern of the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325'.¹¹⁹ Indeed, as of 2014, ASEAN was one of the few regional organizations that had thus far failed to adopt a Resolution 1325 regional action plan, and the Philippines was the only ASEAN state that had drawn up such a plan at the national level.¹²⁰ This arguably reflects a preference in ASEAN policy making to confine the promotion of women's rights to sociocultural or economic (instead of political) policy and debate.

Remarkably, the region as a whole has also embraced the R2P concept in recent years and is more accepting of it than is generally suggested.¹²¹ Indeed, the Philippines has been a strong supporter of the concept since its adoption at the World Summit in 2005. Thailand endorsed (but subsequently failed to further act on) the concept in 2005, not least because the blue ribbon panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change that placed R2P on the agenda of the World Summit was chaired by former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun. Singapore has become a member of the New York-based Group of Friends of R2P. Indonesia has spoken up in support of R2P in the General Assembly and even Vietnam, which just a few years ago was one of the concept's strongest critics, has softened its opposition to it.

More recently, the debate on ASEAN's R2P stance has been revived further to the publication of the 2014 Report of the High-Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia, chaired by former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan. The report argued that ASEAN should proactively embrace R2P, not least in an effort to shape it in ways compatible with ASEAN norms and principles. While countries in the sub-region constructively engage in the UN General Assembly's annual R2P dialogues (for example, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia),¹²² they remain reluctant to discuss R2P officially in an ASEAN framework, with the controversy around NATO's implementation of the Security Council's R2P mandate in Libya only reinforcing sub-regional concerns.

CONCLUSION

Ever since the establishment of the UN following the end of World War II, Asian countries have pursued policies at the organization that are as diverse as the continent itself. For instance, since gaining admission into the organization, China has been surprisingly accommodating of the growth of UN interventionism, but has also become increasingly assertive in defending its national interests. Meanwhile, Beijing's two largest East Asian neighbors have somewhat contrasting profiles at the UN. Whereas Japan has long emphasized the UN as a core pillar of its foreign policy and has a lengthy history of engagement with and support for the organization, South Korea remains a relative newcomer and is still in the process of searching for its niche. In South Asia, although India and Pakistan have competed for influence within the UN, they have also found common ground in their desire to protect the sanctity of national sovereignty and moderate the interventionist tendencies of some member states. At the same time, the smaller countries in South and Southeast Asia have tried to use the UN as a vehicle to advance their development-oriented foreign policies. And lastly, Southeast Asia has long viewed international organizations with skepticism but has recently begun to realize the benefits of multilateral engagement, in part due to the region's growing cohesion under the ASEAN umbrella, and has accordingly begun to warm up to the UN.

All told, the trend in Asia has been one of growing engagement in the UN. While this is most evident in the fact that the largest countries in the region have committed to increase their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, it is also apparent that some countries have become more willing to engage on a wider range of issues than before, including on matters that were once considered off-limits, such as human rights. In part, this stems from growing confidence on the part of countries experiencing economic development, as well as an increasing recognition of the value that the UN can provide in helping a country raise its international standing and pursue its national interests. While optimism should be tempered considering that the region-wide shift described in this chapter took decades to develop, it appears likely that the UN will continue to become a more important facet of Asian foreign policy, given the continent's continuing economic development, its growing portfolio of overseas interests, and a widespread desire to respond to China's rising power.

For now, the UN has not been drawn much into Asian security challenges, with the exception of the North Korea file, on which the heavy lifting is carried out within the Six Party Talks framework with Security Council validation. But with tensions rising in the South China Sea and elsewhere in Asia as China's rise reverberates among its neighbors, this may not remain the case. China's veto, of which it has made only limited use in the past, protects it in the Security Council. Yet, vetoes do not apply in the General Assembly, as Moscow could attest after it

was condemned for its annexation of Crimea by that most universal of UN bodies. Beyond the need for natural resources to power its mighty industrial sector, this may explain why China is so systematically and, to date, successfully, cultivating relationships with African, Central and South American, Caribbean, and Arab states through its diplomacy and assistance programs.

China's privileged position within the UN as a P5 member, the only Asian country so blessed, disconcerts and worries India, Japan, and some other Asian powers, notably those with which China is engaged in maritime boundary and other disputes. Despite this climate, the UN may not become a major theater for arguments over China's inevitably growing role in international relations, but it would be surprising if it was sheltered from them altogether. Thus the UN may in the future come to seem much more central to inter-Asian politics than it has in the past.

Notes

- 1 Some sections of this chapter draw from Einsiedel, S. and A. Yazaki. 2016. *East Asian Perceptions of the UN and its Role in Peace and Security*. Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
- 2 See, for example, Makdisi, K. and V. Prashad. 2016. *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World*, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- 3 Chesterman, S. 2015. 'Asia's ambivalence about international law & institutions: past, present, and futures'. NUS Law Working Paper no. 2015/014. Singapore: National University of Singapore, p. 18.
- 4 Jetschke, A. and S. Katada. 2016. 'Asia'. In T. Börzel and T. Risse, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225–48.
- 5 Wuthnow, J. 2011. 'Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy at the UN'. PhD thesis. Columbia University.
- 6 Zhu, W. and X. Len. 2015. 'China in the Security Council'. In S. von Einsiedel, D. Malone and B. Stagno Ugarte, eds. *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 91.
- 7 Shambaugh, D. 2013. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 24–5.
- 8 Pew Research Center. 2013. 'UN Retains Strong Global Image: Robust Support in America, Especially Among Democrats'. September 17. www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong-global-image/
- 9 Zhu, W. and X. Len. 2015. 'China in the Security Council'. In S. von Einsiedel, D. Malone and B. Stagno Ugarte, eds., *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 90–91.
- 10 These joint vetoes attract attention, but China does not always join Russia in its voting. It abstained rather than join Russia in vetoing resolutions in 2009 on Georgia and in 2014 on Crimea.
- 11 The term refers to non-military forms of power balancing.
- 12 Von Einsiedel, S., Malone, D. and Stagno Ugarte, B. 2015. 'Conclusion: the Security Council and a World in Crisis'. In S. von Einsiedel, D. Malone and B. Stagno Ugarte, eds. *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 840–43.
- 13 Albert, E. and X. Beina. 2016. 'The China–North Korea Relationship'. Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097; Lewis, J., Hanham, M., and Lee, A., 2014. 'That Ain't My Truck: Where North Korea Assembled its Chinese Transporter-Erector-Launchers'. 38 North. <http://38north.org/2014/02/jlewis020314/>
- 14 Gill, B. and M. Murphy. 2005. 'China's Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism'. CSIS Analysis. <http://csis.org/press/csis-in-the-news/chinas-evolving-approach-counterterrorism>

- 15 In particular: (1) the issuance of a *carte blanche* for US military action in Afghanistan through Resolution 1368 (2001); (2) the imposition of far-reaching counter-terrorism obligations binding on all UN member states through Resolution 1373 (2001); and (3) the strengthening of the existing Resolution 1267 regime through Resolution 1390 (2002), which made indefinite the financial sanctions, travel ban, and arms embargo, while also extending their reach beyond Afghanistan, targeting Taliban and al-Qa'ida associates anywhere in the world.
- 16 Author interview with Chinese academic, January 2016.
- 17 Saferworld. 2011. *China's Growing Role in African Peace and Security*. London: Saferworld, p. 76.
- 18 Kitaoka, S. and N. Kumagai. 2016. 'Japan–India Relations from the Perspectives of Global Governance and International Institutions'. In R. Mukherjee and A. Yazaki eds. *Poised for Partnership: Deepening India–Japan Relations in the Asian Century*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 218. And by adopting a negative stance toward Japan's aspirations, China also handily stymies those of its only other major rival in Asia, India, given that Delhi and Tokyo are allied in the G4 grouping with Brasilia and Berlin in a diplomatic push to secure permanent seats for themselves and for two African nations. On this, see Chitalkar, P. and D. M. Malone. 2015. 'India and Global Governance'. In D. M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and S. Raghavan eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 585–6.
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PART VIA

Foreign Policies of Asian States – East Asia



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Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping

Kerry Brown

INTRODUCTION

Since the symbolic moment when China overtook the Japanese economy to be ranked the world's second largest in 2010, the country has entered into an era of what can only be called that of 'great expectations'. The leadership style of Xi Jinping, Party secretary since November 2012, and President from 2013, in tone and manner seem to capture this. Since 2013, up to 2017, he travelled overseas 27 times, to 56 countries.¹ This is unprecedented for any Chinese leader, at any period in the country's history. That the national leader has taken so much time and effort on matters outside their own country is indicative not only of just how intimately domestic and international issues are linked for the People's Republic now, but also a sign of its rising status and importance. This chapter will outline what broadly these foreign journeys tell us about the foreign policy posture of a country which has travelled from being a marginal and isolated geopolitical and economic force half a century ago to being at the heart of most issues concerning international affairs in 2018. In order to do this, the chapter will first give a broad outline of Chinese foreign policy in an historic context. It will then focus on four contemporary issues – the one great mission that guides all foreign and domestic policy, the two major narrative landmarks towards which matters are being driven, the three unique structural issues of China in the 21st century for the outside world, and the four major sets of relationships that matter to the People's Republic.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY – HISTORIC CONTEXT

As a newly established country in 1949, the People's Republic had the power to outline its own unique perspective on what relations it had with the wider world, and how it wanted to conduct its diplomacy. In the early era, the 1950s, the country was bereft of diplomatic partners. A few western nations, such as Great Britain, conferred diplomatic recognition on the PRC because it suited their own particular interests – in this specific case the continuation of colonial rule in Hong Kong. But for the United States, the choice of a one party Marxist Leninist political model meant that the PRC was regarded as a competitor and, in the McCarthy era of American politics, an outright enemy. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 did little to expel this idea, pitting many in Europe, and the United States, as part of a UN force, against a China fighting on the side of the North Koreans that was yet to be admitted to the most important multilateral club in existence. In the middle part of the decade, the then Foreign Minister, and subsequent long term Premier to his death in 1976 Zhou Enlai, while attending the Bandung Conference in Indonesia famously adopted the language of the Indian premier Nehru in calling for a foreign policy outlook based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. These were mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.² China's self-determination and sovereign power had been hard won, as had many other countries in the region. This kind of framework therefore made sense, and continues to be invoked to this day as the core diplomatic viewpoint of the country.

China's most important ally till the end of the 1950s was the USSR. But with the death of Stalin and the process of destalinisation undertaken by his successor Khrushchev in 1956, stresses appeared between the two nations. This developed into all out antagonism by the following decade, even seeing a brief war on the border in 1969. China's era of isolation, while brief, left a powerful memory stain. Even under Mao, rapprochement with the United States from 1972 was crucial to balance against the consistent threat from its vast northern land neighbour. With the death of Mao, and the rise of a more pragmatic leadership around Deng Xiaoping, the new mantra became from 1990 the 24 character statement – 'Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.' The success for reforms since 1978 meant that China's economy was increasingly powerful, but as the USSR, which collapsed a year later, showed, such ostensive liberalisation carried political risks – and ones that the added burden of seeming to be an aspiring global power offered few attractions to a country still focused on building up its own capacity and working on its internal developmental issues. This became a persistent message of leaders over this period.

In the late 1990s, Deng's successor as the so-called 'Third Generation of Leadership' in the country, Jiang Zemin, talked of an era of strategic opportunity which would last about two decades, and be a period in which the United States and the rest of the world would be preoccupied with issues other than China, and

allow the country to develop and grow with a reasonably amount of autonomy and few major multilateral demands. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, China had been pushed into a situation of being politically isolated – with many expecting it to follow the same trajectory as its former patron and experience domestic unrest and then political reform and some form of democratisation. Engagement by powers like the United States and Europe over this era, with China entering the World Trade Organization in 2001, and then hosting the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was often predicated on an assumption that through this route the country would start to transform so it became more like others around it in the international network of multi-party democracies. But through a complex set of different reasons, some down to the turbulence that democracies started to go through from the Great Financial Crisis from 2008 on, and some due to the loss of appetite for widespread, risky and complex reforms within China that ranged beyond the realm of the economic, this did not happen. The iteration therefore of a set of ‘core interests’ by State Councillor Dai Bingguo in 2009 exemplified this – stressing that the country had three fundamental aims: to maintain its political system and state security, to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the stable development of the economy and society.³ The assertion of the primacy of maintaining the unified rule of the Party was important, and has remained in place in the era of Xi since 2012.

Since the 1950s, therefore, the PRC has maintained a remarkably stable set of core principles for its diplomacy. But it has done this at the same time as the country has dramatically changed in terms of its alliances, and its role in the world. The question is whether this historic recrudescence of different ideas, most of them placing a primacy on self-determination and autonomy, informed by China’s modern historic experience of colonisation and war at the hands of other nations, is fit for purpose in an era in which the country is transformed beyond recognition in terms of its vast military and economic and geopolitical assets.⁴

THE ONE HISTORIC MISSION

What is the issue that drives China today, in the era of Xi Jinping? What is the source of coherent motivation behind its domestic and foreign policy, and the matter that unites its political elite with the rest of society that seeks to answer this question of how to be both a great economic power, but one that does not seek hegemony and dominance, and stays true to the principles it had enunciated for its foreign policy in the 1950s? We can see the most concise answer to this in the speech that Xi gave in October 2017 at the 19th Party Congress. Talking of the historic mission that the country he leads is facing, he stated:

[T]he Party has united and led all the Chinese people in a tireless struggle, propelling China into a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense capabilities, and composite national strength. China’s international standing has risen as never before. Our Party, our country, our people, our forces, and our nation have changed in ways without precedent. The Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East.⁵

Such lofty language was maintained throughout the epic speech. The mission of the country is to become great, wealthy and strong – something that reached back to the ambition at the end of the Qing from the 1890s to its demise in 1911, when the reformers around figures like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao spoke of modernisation in their country leading to a ‘wealthy, strong, great nation’ (*fuqiang guojia*). Unlike in the past, however, the aspirations China has today are not simply distant dreams. Xi’s language about the realisation of a historic mission of great nation status is backed up by the economic achievements since 1978 that have led to the People’s Republic today being in such a dominant position in terms of export, import, GDP and other material indicators. Xi’s reference to these is to something that is real in the lives and imaginations of his listeners within the country. And the role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in being the body which supplies the unity and coherence across the country’s complexity and diversity to steer this ambition to a final successful conclusion is also clearly signalled, in this and many other speeches, and not just from this generation of leaders, but reaching back to the earliest era, under Mao, when Communism already had a large dose of nationalism in its content. Thus the stress on preserving and defending this in Dai Bingguo’s 2009 ‘core interests’ listed in the section above.

Xi’s mission with China therefore is one great aim – the rejuvenation and resurrection of the country after what was called its modern history of humiliation and victimisation at the hands of foreign aggressors and colonisers, to a status where it is once more a globally central great state – delivered by the achievement of sustainable one party rule. The intimate connection between the first and the second goals hardly needs emphasising. Party and state have always existed in a complex, holistic state of wholeness in China. Under Xi, the tightness and the links between them have never been deeper and more close. While not explicitly stated anywhere, the logic of Xi-ism is clear enough – at a moment when finally, after so much harrowing and harsh modern historic experience, China is about to experience its moment of just resurrection and regeneration, nothing can put this at risk, and the Party, it is implied very strongly, is the only body that is able to achieve this moment. Jeopardising and showing disloyalty to it means showing dissent from the grand national aim it so intimately and deeply commits to and is trying to bring about. It is this more than any other message that it promoted in many guises to key groups such as the emerging Chinese middle class, to members of the political elite, the military, even journalists and intellectuals. All of them have to work in a new united front with the Party to bring about the fulfilment of the historic mission.

It is also important to remember that with the slowing of GDP growth since 2012, the CPC has been seeking new sources of legitimacy to bolster its position rather than just producing better material wellbeing to its emerging middle class. The nationalism implicit in this historic mission, and the ways in which the Party is so closely linked to this, is important. It invigorates the CPC with the spiritual

aim of achieving this great nation status. Through Patriotic Education Campaigns from the 1990s onwards, this powerful sense of the nation being almost like a state religion has strengthened. Achieving the renaissance of China is therefore a core function of the CPC, and also at the heart of its appeal to society for having a monopoly on power and being the country's legitimate ruler. Without democratic elections, this legitimisation is important. It is not surprising therefore that it appears so strongly in Chinese elite and public discourse in the 21st century.

THE TWO HISTORIC GOALS

This historic mission is bolstered by the vision Chinese under Communism have of history. As good Marxist Leninists, the current leaders of the Communist Party around Xi continue to subscribe to a dialectic vision of history – one where there is a teleology, and where things are forever processing through thesis to antithesis and then a synthesis which in its turn serves as the basis for another triadic move forward. Like Marx, they still observe the faith that there will be a resolution of history one day in an outcome where class struggle, and the exploitation of one group against another, comes to an end. This happening far into the distance means that politicians say little, if anything, about the final destination of this history in their speeches in China. But the teleological view of history and of the need for an ever forward pressing direction is something that serves as a bedrock of their ideas and faith system.

Such a view of history is best evidenced under Xi by the structuring of the future with two major landmark dates. These map out the mission referred to above – the creation of a great nation, under sustainable one party rule. The first, that of 2021, marks the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party. Like most communist systems, anniversaries are hugely important for Party life, propaganda and mass mobilisations. For Xi's China, 2021 therefore offers a symbolic moment, one which is now being presented not just as the marking up of a hundred years in existence for the CPC, but also the achievement of a real historic goal – middle income status. Attaining GDP per capita per annum of USD13,000, which in effect is what this target means in contemporary China, would be a massive achievement – one that the leadership under Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s felt would need at least another few decades to achieve when it was first talked of as reform and opening up really got momentum. Far earlier than expected, Chinese people are now able to claim that they have achieved this goal. That means reaching a major benchmark of modernity – a level of wealth and prosperity that would put most in the global middle class.

While aiming for 2021 structures the near term future, and is a very tangible and specific political goal for Xi, further out there is the date that marks the hundredth anniversary of the creation of the People's Republic itself – 2049. This has been called, since 2013, the Second Centennial Goal, offering as it does the

moment when the country achieves ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’ – and when people will be wealthy, modernity will have reached even the most isolated and rural of places in the country, and the CPC will be able to finally state that it has kept its promise, delivered back in the 1940s before it came to power, of restoring greatness and stable, tranquil power to the country after a modern history characterised by instability and war.

Both attempting to achieve these temporal landmarks will have profound domestic and international implications. They will see a China wealthier, more influential and more economically and therefore geopolitically central than at any time in the modern era. So while the CPC’s vision of the positive direction of its history and or progress might seem like a purely internal issue, the way that it impacts on and structures the future direction of China will have international impact.

THE THREE STRUCTURAL ISSUES

What are the things about the People’s Republic of China today that make it different from the ways in which it figured in international affairs before? We know lots about its importance economically, and for management of global issues like the environment, or security. But how does China differ now as an actor from ways it operated before, and what might be an adequate response to these changes?

The first clear difference which has become increasing evident under Xi is that in modern history, broadly from the first encounter the Qing experienced with western military superiority at the time of the First Opium War in 1839–41 the outside world has never had to manage, and engage with a China that was strong. From the mid 19th century to the 21st, China was largely a marginal, and small, actor – one that was frequently dismissed before the 1980s as ‘the sick man of Asia’ – a country that was prone, even in the Maoist era from 1949 to 1976, to natural and manmade disasters – events like the tragic famines in the early 1960s that may have led to the deaths of over 40 million Chinese people, or the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 which afflicted a wide segment of society for almost a decade. For the outside world, up to and for some time beyond the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it was not a matter of if, but when China would need to radically change its political system and reform so that it became more like the democratic outside world. China was often talked of as a place prone to divisions, fragmentation and endemic instability, one that would be eventually overwhelmed by its huge domestic imbalances and which was intrinsically unsustainable. Australia scholar Roger Irvine refers to the many such predictions made about China over this period, where the assumption was that at some point it would either fall part as a unified sovereign entity, or need to undergo radical change.⁶

The habit of seeing China as weak and indeed as a place that needed help in order to surmount its immense challenges has been a constant feature of much western thinking about the country to very recently. But under Xi, and particularly as a result of the Trump presidency retrenchment since 2017, for the first time the country he leads looks, and sounds, strong and confident. The mindset of seeing China as an object of charity, an underdog, or a victim, sits utterly at odds with a country that is becoming the largest emerging overseas investor, a major military power, one with more dollar billionaires than any other country except America, and one that now has influence and scope that stretches across the rest of the world. Seeing such player now as weak and an underdog grows daily more incongruous. We are living in the era of strong China. That is the issue that everyone is trying to work out the implications and real meaning of.

The second structural issue the outside world is needing to contemplate is the rise of China as a naval power. Throughout its modern history, either in the Qing, or the Republican or Communist era, China has never been a maritime power. As Robert S. Ross pointed out, it has predominantly figured as a land power.⁷ The work of M. Taylor Fravel makes clear that the main insecurities of the People's Republic after its foundation derived from its disputed land borders, and it was into the resolution of these (most of which, apart from that with India and Bhutan, had been resolved by 2018) that it has put most diplomatic effort from the 1950s to the 2000s.⁸ The preoccupation with land issues is understandable in view of the complex and risk laden geography that China inhabits. With 14 land borders, these include countries that it has had a long history of antagonism with (Vietnam), or cultural misunderstanding and competition (India), or periods of close alignment followed by deep disagreement (the USSR and then Russia). By 2018, four (India, Pakistan, Russia and the DPRK) were nuclear powers. Only two ostensibly shared the same political system of the PRC (Vietnam and the DPRK), though it was debatable whether this gave them much commonality. Countries bordering China like Afghanistan and Pakistan offered perpetual security threats and concerns. Historically, too, Inner Asia has been the source of many of the largest problems – one reason for the construction of the great walls, and their symbolic importance as a bulwark against the different groups from this vast, often hostile territory over the last two millennia.

For only one brief period in the history from the Tang dynasty onwards in the 7th to 9th centuries did imperial China possess any viable naval capacity – and that was during the era of the eunuch admiral Zheng He in the early decades of the 15th century, during the Ming. This phase ended as abruptly as it had begun, possibly because the costs associated with having such a large sea force were insupportable. Until the 1980s, China reverted to concentration on land military capacity only. Naval power for Republican China did not figure in the Second World War, nor in the Maoist era. But under the leadership of General Liu Huaqing in the 1980s, the notion of China needing a naval capacity as it

became an increasingly important importer and exporter only intensified. With the approval of the Central Military Commission chaired by Deng Xiaoping on which he sat, Liu created the foundation of a modern sea capacity which has seen its fruition in a navy today with more vessels than the United States, even if their technological capacity falls far short. China has a visible power projection capacity now that reaches far into the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean. It even had vessels visit the UK in 2018.

How the outside world interprets this is crucial. Is this a real power projection show or something that is more important for its symbolism? Will the wars of the future be fought on the sea or in cyberspace? What is indisputable is that China's power is now tangible to people in the region in ways which were never the case when it was largely confined to being an actor solely in its own space, or merely on its closest borders. China as a naval power is a new phenomenon and one that gives Chinese power a new dimension.

The third issue is the most complex one, and potentially the most far reaching. No one, not least those in charge of China at the moment in Beijing, really know what a region or a world for that matter run on Chinese values looks like. We know what a world built on American or European (and broadly Enlightenment) values looks like because that was the one that was created after the Second World War through the Bretton Woods system. It is broadly the world we live in today. But no one knows what one run on Chinese values of harmony, multipolarity, and principles of non-interference and non-alliance resembles. And yet, as China has a larger global role, and increasing prominence, this issue of what values it might want to promote becomes more important to understand. In the era of Xi, we know the kinds of things that China does not align with. Domestically, elite leaders have resisted what they call 'Western universalism'. They have rejected a whole series of ideas and practices associated with Enlightenment western ideas – federalism, constitutionalism, rule of law, freedom of speech, of expression, etc. In place of these they have asserted a complex set of ideas associated with traditional Chinese values but married to the mission of modernity articulated by the Communist Party using Marxism Leninism and the various localised iterations of that ideology up to Xi Jinping Thought (the latter formally written into the Party Constitution in 2017).

One thing that is striking about these ideas is their hybridity. China exists in an intellectual tradition where, in the words of the historian of Imperial China F. W. Mote, there was no commitment to some overarching vision of 'the truth', a singular and unifying notion of reality and how the world was ordered.⁹ Instead there was an accommodation between the three great teachings, Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, which existed largely in mutually tolerant balance for centuries. The Communists brought a new set of ideas to China, and it is true that in the Maoist era particularly during the Cultural Revolution, there was a brief, intense era of almost universal, fervent and intense commitment to one set of ideas – that of Mao Zedong Thought. But this passed as quickly as it had come,

leaving China to revert with ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ to a period of hybridity once more. Under Xi Jinping, the Party can call on the resources of what is called ‘traditional Chinese culture’ even as it continues the commitment to trying to achieve ‘the primary stage of socialism’.

Whatever the outside world might think of the values China is espousing, it is clear that they are complex, and hard to easily pin down. In any case, there is plenty of evidence that China’s current leaders do not just regard these ideas as exclusive, but also excluding. Apart from the brief attempt in the Maoist era to export radical Maoist ideology to the outside world, the China of today labels its thinking as local, indigenous and seems to put little effort into trying to persuade the wider world of sinified Marxism being a viable set of ideas that they can adopt and carry into practice. The language used by Xi in October 2017 in his speech at the 19th Party Congress (referred to above) of the China model being one the rest of the world might like to emulate refers to economic practices – building infrastructure, for instance, or concentrating on creating a viable middle class. It does not seem to extend to using the eclectic, and often highly culturally conditioned political system that the country has adopted in the last seventy years.

This third issue impacts on how China views the global system. There is wider acknowledgement that China since the late 1970s has benefited from a rules based, global order largely run on the American, Enlightenment values. From what leaders like Xi say, it is clear that they do not on the whole subscribe to these values. But they have benefited from the fact that other people do. On the basis of utility therefore, China has engaged with organisations like the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the UN. But for the philosophy underpinning many of these of rule of law, free expression, it clearly dissents. And while China was a relatively marginal player this somewhat parasitical attitude was fine. The challenge now is to accept a world in which China is increasingly being placed in a leadership position and one where because of the failures of the other systems, it has the opportunity – an opportunity that it might be very much in its interests to exploit – to create more sympathy for its position, and to have others join to its vision of the role of specific values and what function they should have in the new order. Like it or not, China is now at the heart of a move either towards a world of bipolarity, where it sits at the centre of its values and basks in exclusivity and aloofness, while the rest of the world continue with their restricted universalism, or one where there is a clash and persistent tensions between two very starkly different visions.

THE FOUR MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS – THE RINGS AROUND CHINA

Around modern Beijing are a series of ring roads. These partially map out the modern growth of the city, though the second runs where the ancient city walls

once stood before being swept away by Mao Zedong's modernising zeal. In many ways, Chinese foreign policy is run on a similar spatial arrangement. Close to the centre is a set of the country's most important relationships. These span further out. Under Xi there are two major characteristics of this organisation of the outside world. First, the inside space – that of domestic China – and that of the outside world have never been more intimately connected. We are living in the era of global China, one where the country's domestic matters – issues such as environmental sustainability, growth, security and stability – have an impact like never before on the rest of the world because of the centrality of the country economically and in other realms. Second, like it or not, the whole of the rest of the world figures now in China's space because of this global impact. Countries can try to close their doors on China's influence – but they do so after much thought, aware that there are plenty of issues on which China exercises massive input, and where they will be effected by the People's Republic whether they like it or not.

The great driver of China's global influence now is its economy. That much is uncontentious. Through supply routes, for commodities, energy and other goods, to export of manufactured products, and now, increasingly, through flows of aid, investment and of goods and people, China has links that stretch across the world and deep into other territories. This gives it a common language for engagement. It means that almost all the core statements of Chinese leaders to the outside world mention the importance of this economic interconnectivity. On the surface, China has learned to speak the language of global capitalism fluently. But as argued above in the section about values, a lot of this language is mimicked. 'Market' and 'capital' in the Chinese domestic context have a markedly different meaning to that of the use of these words outside. For Xi and his peers it is all about finding tools to make one party rule sustainable, and by this route, the only one they consider viable, to make a great, strong country that will never be victimised again. Deng talked of the Hong Kong arrangement after 1997 and reversion of sovereignty to China as being 'One country, two systems'. We now have a global order where there is one language, that of capitalism, and two meanings – Chinese or non-Chinese style.

When Xi Jinping assumed the position as Party secretary and then president over 2012 into 2013, he spoke to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China's diplomatic service and asked that they adopt a more proactive stance on speaking about China's vision of its relationship to the rest of the world. He also demanded they speak of the 'China story' – and move away from the often silent stance adopted by his predecessor Hu Jintao. The Xi era is increasingly one of telling stories – something attested to by a book issued by Xinhua in 2017 simply called 'Xi Jinping Tells Stories'. These are to engage with the world, and to arouse the emotions of Chinese people as they travel towards achieving their centenary goal mentioned above.

Zone One: The United States – ‘A New Model of Major Power Relations’

The United States is the core relationship for China, and the one in which it has invested most political and intellectual capital over the last four decades since reform started in 1978. According to Deng, keeping close to the United States was a key task for Chinese foreign policy – never arriving in a position where, like the Soviet Union, it could be figured as a strategic competitor. On every level, China–US relations matter to each other, and to the rest of the world. In 2017 alone the two undertook 700 billion USD of trade, two thirds of it to China’s favour. The combination of their economies makes up almost 40 per cent of global GDP. Militarily, they are the first and second largest spending in the world – despite the fact that the United States remains far ahead with an approximately USD600 billion budget each year, compared to China’s USD200 billion. The two have dense geopolitical links, with over 90 strategic dialogues. Uniquely, over 350,000 Chinese overseas students are in the United States in any year, with many from the elite – the daughters of both Xi Jinping and his premier Li Keqiang were educated at American universities.

The magnitude of this relationship means it is a hard one to correctly capture. Scholars like Graham Allison have described it as the classic Thucydides trap dynamic, with an aspiring dominant power facing off the current one, and the two trapped in an inevitable conflict. Others have called it a relationship of ‘frenemies’ – neither stark enemies as the USSR and United States were in the era of the Cold War, nor allies, because of their immense political differences.¹⁰ Within China figures like the Beijing academic Wang Hui complain of the United States forever encroaching on China’s legitimate strategic space. As he elegantly says, the moment a Chinese person leaves China’s borders they seem to cross into territory where the United States is present.¹¹ Much of this is about the way in which the whole Asia Pacific is dominated by treaty alliances involving the United States and other players in the region. These range from those established at the end of the Second World War with Japan, to military compacts with Singapore, and the hugely important Australia–New Zealand–US Treaty. When China looks to its eastern seaboard territory, and out over the Pacific, it sees a great wall of US based alliances. These press upon its own strategic territory, and are reinforced by the immense reach of the US Seventh Fleet, and the 19 armoured aircraft carriers that give it such unparalleled power projection capacity.

The United States poses immense strategic conundrums for China. Still militarily far too weak compared to the United States to ever directly confront it, even if it were to wish to do so, on the other hand as its economy has grown, China’s frustration has become increasingly palpable. It is almost as though it has grown out of a space once granted to it, and desperately wants to have a more appropriate one in which to live. The South China and East China seas have become the territory in which this rise in friction between China and the space of the United States have become most visible. And while some argue that China’s main aim

has been to test and question the alliance system around it and see how deep and enduring it actually is, part of the recent rise in tensions is the natural outcome of a country having so much more economic influence now and wanting to translate that into geopolitical returns.¹²

Capturing the US–China relationship for the Xi leadership has proved challenging. Parity needs to be asserted for a China in an era of great aspirations, trying to reclaim its global status, something it feels is legitimate and natural for a great sovereign nation. On the other hand, it knows that miscalculation is easy, and that the United States jealously preserves its global status. In 2013, while visiting Sunnylands in California, therefore, Xi declared that the Pacific was big enough for both powers, and that they were best conceptualised as a ‘new model of major power relations’.¹³

Under Trump, as the speech made by Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018 made clear, the demand for reciprocity on behalf of Washington, and the waging of an increasingly fractious trade war, has only made clear how difficult the relationship is between the two. America in the end most objects to the ways in which through its values the People’s Republic contests the global order, asserting an alternative to the universalising vision of the United States. There is no easy way of managing this tension. China cannot deny its aspirations, and indeed, as argued above, they have become a core part of the Communist Party’s legitimacy. But nor can it easily carve out a space where the United States does not encroach upon its desire for more strategic territory. This in a sense has been one of the aims behind the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) from 2015, which the United States is not a member of, or the Belt and Road Initiative, where again the United States is absent. Despite this attempt to build a China-centric global system where America is finally no longer there – the same could also be said of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – as Wang Hui so presciently stated, somehow the United States always ends up back in the room. This dilemma has only intensified under Trump and looks no closer to an easier resolution.

Zone Two: China’s Region and the Belt and Road

In the era of storytelling, where China wants to take a more proactive role in world affairs commensurate with the size and importance of its economy, it is not surprising that its story in the region is the most important. The complex geopolitical territory China is located in lies at the heart of this, with neighbours who are united solely in their diversity – the world’s largest democracy, India, to the west of the People’s Republic, over the Himalayas, and the last authentic Stalinist state, the DPRK, directly to its east over the Yalu river. The levels of distrust among these accrued over many centuries of conflict and war have left a profound memory stain. With Vietnam, China has in one form or another been contesting and competing for pre-eminence in the south east Asian region for over two millennia. With Pakistan it enjoys a complex almost over-ardent relationship – at least on the Pakistani side.¹⁴ And while, as the USSR, China’s

vast northern neighbour with which it shares the world's longest land border there were early years of co-operation and partnership, by 1969 they were almost at war. Even today, the Sino-Russian relationship can best be described as one of harsh, unsentimental calculation of self-interest and pragmatism.¹⁵ With Japan, the issues of competition and distrust are so long-standing they have become a discrete area of study of their own.¹⁶

In such an environment, and with a domestic space so prone to natural and human disasters (even as late as 1976 the city of Tangshan near Beijing suffered over a quarter of a million fatalities after an earthquake) it is unsurprising that the mindset of modern Chinese leaders is an almost hyper-realist, Hobbesian one. Diplomatic life can be 'nasty, brutish and short' without practising the dark arts of self-preservation. For this reason, dealing with the misgivings and worries of its land and sea neighbours has been important, even as the country's intentions militarily and geopolitically has figured more and more in the thinking of countries across the region. Xi has been attentive to trying to address this idea of what China's Asian message might be. At Boao Forums held in the southern island of Hainan over the last few years since 2012 the message has been increasingly about 'Asian destiny' and of China's rise being good for its neighbours in raising the profile of the region. China has built on to the existing infrastructure of ASEAN by inserting itself, arranging a free trade agreement, and then establishing its own initiatives, like the already mentioned Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). But it has also staked out through construction and other means island type formations which give it greater strategic hold over the South China Sea.

The story that China tells its land and maritime region is that of the New Silk Road, which after its first announcement by Xi while in Central Asia and then Jakarta in Indonesia in 2013 became the One Belt One Road and finally the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since 2015, the BRI has become one of the key linchpins of the Xi era in terms of foreign policy. According to the one official document with any claims to be comprehensive and competitive about this concept, that issued in mid 2015 by the National Development and Reform Commission and other central ministries in Beijing, it seeks to create deeper connectivity in terms of investment, finance, logistics, people to people links and cultural understanding. This has been backed up by entities like the Silk Road Fund, and investment through the China Development Bank and others.¹⁷

BRI has two broad strategic underpinning logics. The first is to diversify China's supply and trade links by expanding not just into its maritime space, but also into the western vast landmass. Building high speed train links and ports like that in Pakistan's Gwadar make sense here, lessening the country's reliance on the Malacca straits and the dominance at the moment of the US naval presences there. The second is to simply use China's greatest asset as it tries to craft a more consensual narrative for the region – its economy and the potential benefits that partners can enjoy if they help in raising consumption levels for China's

great emerging middle class. This focus on the least contentious part of China's identity internationally means that it can avoid being named as a disruptive influence, and can appeal to the self-interest of others. Despite this, as reports in the *Financial Times* and elsewhere make clear, the BRI has been criticised for loading smaller countries with debts, and for being too focused on China's priorities, or too nebulous and lacking in content. What it does testify to is the immense importance of China's relations with the countries that share its region. For negative and positive reasons, they have the most ability to influence China, and the most exposure to its aspirations and growth.¹⁸

Zone Three: Europe – Civilisational Partners

Europe matters both as the European Union (EU), with its currently 28 members (27 after the UK exits in 2019), and as Europe the continent with over 40 separate countries. Most obviously, it figures as a market, one that is the world's wealthiest in terms of gross size, and which is second only to the United States as a trading partner to the People's Republic. Since their formal recognition in 1975, when the EU existed as the European Economic Community (EEC) and then from the evolution into the EU in the 1990s, as an economic actor with high levels of technology and a developed consumer market to sell into, Europe makes absolute sense to China. But the appearance of a whole set of other propositions, from social to political values, and of an EU more assertive about trying to promote its political model on to others, the EU has been a less welcome partner. Relations have see-sawed between periods of harmony and hope, such as when China produced its first White Paper on the EU in 2004, and looked forward to the Union being a counterweight to American influence, and then the shock of Brussels refusing to lift the Arms Embargo in 2005 because of US pressure, a moment heavy with symbolism because it showed where real allegiances lay.

Conceptualising the EU has proved hard for China, as it has to many others. On many levels the convenience of having a single market with common standards appeals to China. But they are not averse to trying to create divisions, with the Central and Eastern Europe group of 16 plus one, set up in the 2010s, with 11 EU members and five non-EU, being a particular bone of contention to Brussels. The ways in which through investment and other inducements Beijing has been able to recruit member states so that they vote down human rights declarations critical of China at the UN and other bodies, as happened when Greece with its port investments from China vetoed a statement in June 2018, is well known. The depth and extent of involvement with China has been a divisive topic for many years. China's frustrations with the EU are also well known. It does not take the EU or Europe remotely seriously as a hard power, except through its close alliance (despite Trump's scepticism over 2017 into 2018) through NATO.

At heart, Beijing does recognise two great assets that the EU has however. It is both a cultural superpower and an intellectual and technological one. These things

attract Chinese students, tourists and businesses – core groups in the country currently. And in terms of technology transfer, the EU has been a hugely important partner for China since reform and opening up started in 1978. The immensely impressive high speed train system, of which there is now over 20,000 kilometres across the country, would not have been possible without Maglev technology pioneered by Germany. Nor would areas of automotive, or aviation, development, where partnerships with companies like Volkswagen from Germany, or Siemens, or Airbus, were key.

Recognising this aspect of the EU and Europe's appeal, when Xi Jinping became the first head of state from China to visit the headquarters of the Union, Brussels, in 2014, he accorded the relationship the description of 'civilisation partners'. This recognised that as a unitary sovereign state, China would never have an easy framework by which to recognise the EU, but that within this more abstract rubric at least there was recognition of commonality and common interest.¹⁹

Zone Four: The Rest of the World

This is the era of Global China. Unlike any other nation except the United States, issues that happen within China, as argued above, have a global set of implications and meanings. But the converse side of this is that there is no place on the planet now where China does not seem to reach and have an influence over. China is in Latin America, either as a major user of commodities from countries like Brazil or Argentina, or through being a set of emerging economies that offer export and investment opportunities. Huawei for instance has some of its best international business there. Some countries in the region still recognise the Republic of China on Taiwan, meaning that under Xi there has been a much more concerted attempt to win over new allies, reducing Taiwan's international space. In 2017, Panama cut ties with Taipei after many decades and recognised Beijing. El Salvador followed in 2018. But as of November 2018, five states in the region still give diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. An added complication is the ways in which this region is so closely related to the interests of the United States, meaning whatever China does there is the cause of scrutiny and close interest.

In Africa, China has a little more leeway, building on a relationship there which was active through aid and revolutionary support in the 1960s, and which entered a new period of energisation in the 2000s. Almost 1 million Chinese now live and work in the African continent. Chinese state companies, particularly in the energy and telecoms sector, have been very large investors and project supporters. Chinese aid has been welcomed by countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia. But from 2007, with claimed involvement in selling arms to the Mugabe government, and then in being supportive of actions that led to claimed ethnic cleansings and human rights violations in Sudan, China's involvement in the continent became more circumspect and cautious. Through the Forum on China–Africa

Cooperation (FOCAC), Beijing has been able to assemble almost every head of state across the African continent every two years, to talk about mutual co-operation and win–win outcomes. But the rhetoric, which is almost always friendly and positive, is set against the complexity of the different environments and the different demands of different countries across the region that they place on China. In 2015, the Chinese opened a military installation in Djibouti, on the eastern coast of the continent. This was ostensibly to help in protecting its shipping lanes and trade routes from piracy, in the nearby maritime waters. But plenty at the time in the United States and elsewhere suspected this of being the first of more bold moves by China to start operating as a military actor in the wider world.

In the Middle East too, China has had increasing impact, operating as a major investor in Iran, and being a part of the nuclear freeze deal undertaking along with the United States and the EU in 2015, before Trump withdrew from this three years later. With Saudi Arabia, China imports much of the oil that it needs from international markets, making up about 5 per cent of its overall energy needs. Beijing has been able to balance its increasingly strong relations with Israel against its alliances across the region, resisting efforts under Obama to intervene more in Syria, and building up deeper investment and trade links with parties like Iraq. The Middle East does figure in the Belt and Road Initiative, as a potential trade and economic partner. BRI also laps up against the shores of Africa and Latin America, not explicitly targets of the grand scheme, but areas which are tied into its vision of a vast area of economic commonality.

This diversity of China's interests in the Xi era of global reach and more proactive foreign policy reaches its apogee in places as remote as the Antarctic and Arctic. Even in Polar territory, China has a stake, with research stations in the South Pole and an observer status on the Arctic Council in the North. The energy and other resources in these places are one natural focus for Beijing. But so too is having a voice on the sustainable development of places so crucial for the future of the global natural environment.

CONCLUSION

China, and the need to think about China, has become an almost omnipresent issue in the 21st century. Part of this is just the natural justice of factoring in a fifth of humanity in calculations about the way the world needs to develop in the coming decades. Any plans that do not include a partner like China will simply be irrelevant. Added to this is the issue of the immense prominence of China's economy, and the ways that forty years of rapid growth and development have now given the country and its leaders a new asset to deploy – the influence and leverage that their vast markets and the growth potential that comes from them gives to others. Then there is the simple fact that the United States and the EU, after a period of economic and geopolitical leadership, have entered into a period

of confusion and internal divisions. This too had given a China under Xi Jinping even greater space, and brought about a convergence between a rising sense domestically of power and national destiny, and a world around where there are increasing areas where from self-interest alone China needs to be involved.

How to conceptualise China amidst all these changes is proving difficult. For as many who see it as a revisionist power, there are those who feel it is much more accurately seen as a status quo one that simply focuses on its own domestic challenges and wants an international environment that assists with this. Under Xi, assertiveness in the South China and East China seas, and with Taiwan, runs alongside a more consensual and co-operative language on environmental and free trade issues. For some, the model of China is a very unique, culturally and politically exclusive, and excluding one, where the world is moving towards an almost bipolar outcome, where the Chinese zone and that of the rest of the world somehow co-exist, standing by their different sets of values, and ushering in an era of mutual toleration with no real attempt to change each other. For others, the inevitability of a clash for domination between the two – the United States and its allies on one side, and China on the other – is a given. It is just a matter of time, and in some ways, under Trump, has already happened.

China's own attempts to proactively spell out narratives for its relations with the wider world, from the 'new model of major power relations' for the United States, 'Belt and Road Initiative' for the region, and 'civilisational powers' for Europe has proved often frustrating and at times contentious. The simple fact is that, perhaps more quickly than its leaders ever expected, China is now occupying an increasingly central role in the governance of the world, and in major global debates, one which only brings the difference of its political system with most others into stark contrast.

In the Confucian doctrine of the names, the key idea is that before dealing with an issue, one needs to find the appropriate term for it. In the case of China, and what sort of power it is, that is the problem the world is now faced with. It cannot decide clearly whether China is one thing, or another – a threat, or an opportunity; an enemy, or a friend; an economic competitor, or a potential ally in unlocking new sources of growth. Part of this may well be wholly about perceptions – that despite what the world sees, it still adheres to old frameworks and models that it cannot easily shift on from. The Communist China trope for these is a hard thing to see by, to a country that may have many common aims and objectives to everyone else. But to others the evidence of hostile intent is already clear – from the maritime conflicts and disputes China is now so heavily embroiled in, to the way it operates as a mercantilist power – witness the list of grievances against it by Vice President Mike Pence made in late 2018.²⁰ One thing is certain. If we do still subscribe to a view of reality where truth is important and has a basis, then getting the most accurate and right term about what kind of a power China is, and one that is backed up by evidence, will be crucial. Mis-seeing or misunderstanding China will be a catastrophic mistake and one that needs urgent, and immense attention to ensure it never happens.

Notes

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Overviews of Japanese Foreign Policy through Three Lenses: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism

Tomohito Shinoda

INTRODUCTION

There are uncountable possible interpretations for a country's foreign policy. This chapter attempts to present different interpretations of the history of Japanese foreign policy through the three most popular approaches of international relations theory: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Nye (Nye and Welch, 2016: 11) tells us that these analytical tools are useful for practical foreign policy making:

When I was working in Washington and helping formulate American foreign policies as an assistant secretary in the State Department and the Pentagon, I found myself borrowing elements from all three types of thinking: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. I found all of them helpful, though in different ways and in different circumstances.

While the three approaches agree to focus on states as the main actors in international politics, they emphasize different aspects.

Realism has been the traditional way to interpret international relations for centuries. Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 66) summarize the basic elements of realism into four points: (1) a pessimistic view of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are conflictual and the conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; (3) a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; and

(4) a basic skepticism against progress in international politics which is comparable to that in domestic political life. In realist thinking, humans are egoistic being preoccupied with their well-being and have conflictual relations with each other. States seek their own survival at any cost, and it is their national interest to maximize their military, economic, political and technological power even on the sacrifice of other states if necessary. Key concepts of realism include survival, power, alliance, war and conflicts, balancing (against threats), sphere of influence, and hegemony.

Liberalism was presented as a counter-argument to realism, focusing on a positive view of human nature. While individuals can be egoistic, they share many interests and can engage in collaborative and cooperative social action. In addition, a global society provides incentives for such action as transnational trade and international institutions including the United Nations. While national security is important for states, they can enjoy benefits from collaborative transnational activities in the international community. Rosecrance (1985), for example, wrote that states can more efficiently increase their power peacefully through trade than by territorial expansion with military aggression. Liberals emphasize the importance of interdependence and cooperation in the stable international order. They seek compromise through discussion and negotiation, and promote universal norms and values such as democracy and human rights. Key concepts of liberalism include enlightenment and progress, peace, commercial liberalism, international cooperation, democracy and freedom, transnational relations, and international public opinion.

Realists and liberals argue that states rationally seek to promote their national interests through either international competition or cooperation. They, however, ignore how those interests are formed or change over time. In contrast, constructivism focuses on how the social structure shapes national interests. According to Wendt (1992), social structure has three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices. These elements are defined by ideas such as shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge. Constructivists believe that ideology and thoughts are important variables, and that national interests and identity are socially constructed, and can change with the preferences of national leaders, the public and a changing culture and norm. Nations pursue keeping identity, by emphasizing the value of social, cultural and religious backgrounds, and have no inclination to either conflict or cooperate to achieve their goals. Key concepts of constructivism include identity, race, nationalism, pacifism, culture, intersubjectivity and norm.

These three approaches with different emphasis bring different interpretations of the overview of Japanese foreign policies since the Meiji Restoration, but they do not necessarily cover the same set of events in this chapter. Let us first examine these policies through the lens of realism as it forms the basis on which the other two approaches are layered.

THROUGH A REALIST LENS

The leaders of the Meiji government saw international relations through a realist lens. Prince Tomomi Iwakura who was in the number two position in the government, for example, wrote a memorandum on foreign affairs in which he described all foreign countries as enemies: 'Why are they our enemies? Day by day those countries develop their arts and their technology with a view to growing in wealth and power. Every foreign country tries to become another country's superior' (Jansen, 1968: 158). Iwakura must have strengthened this realistic view after he visited Germany in 1873. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck told the members of the Iwakura mission that international law would not safeguard the rights of small countries when large countries pursue their advantage, and that the only course for small countries to survive was to develop national strength and to cultivate patriotism among the populace.

Meiji leaders took this advice very seriously, and planned to establish Japan's sovereignty in order to be recognized as a modern state by Western powers. One of the most important goals for Meiji Japan was to revise the unequal treaties concluded between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Western states, which represented 'an infringement of Japanese sovereignty' (Pyle, 1989: 689). During the Iwakura mission's visit to the United States and European nations, the Meiji leaders suggested treaty revisions. However, they were told that Japan must first 'reform its institutions to meet the standards of civilization' (Pyle, 2007: 79). Among the most important institutions for civilization was Japan's own constitution. Thus, Constitutional Government became an essential aspect of the treaty revision.

One of the members of the Iwakura mission, Hirobumi Ito, was assigned to draft the constitution. During their visit to European nations, the Meiji leaders were most impressed by the Prussian Constitution, as American and British constitutions seemed too progressive. Ito and his mission departed for Europe, and learned more about the Prussian Constitution in 1882–83. After more than five years of work, the Meiji Constitution was promulgated in February 1889 (Pyle, 1978: 93–6).

In the process of establishing the constitution as well as other political and legal institutions, Western powers were impressed with Japan's speedy reform of the nation. Americans took initiatives by restoring Japan's tariff autonomy in 1878 and terminating extraterritoriality outside the treaty ports in 1889. In 1894, Britain finally negotiated a revised treaty to grant Japan tariff autonomy and end extraterritoriality. Japan's goal to be accepted as an equal state by the Western powers was achieved by revising unequal treaties.

While the Meiji leaders tried to revise the unequal treaties, Japan was forming its security strategy. After the 1880s, European countries entered a 'phase of colonial expansion and imperialist rivalries' (Iriye, 1989: 747). By the mid

1890s, most of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific had fallen under the control of the Western powers. China and Korea as well as Japan were among the few non-colonized Asian states. But the governments in China and Korea were undermined by revolutionary movements. If they had collapsed and been replaced by Western control, it would put Japan's security into serious jeopardy. Meiji leaders believed that Japan needed to establish its dominant influence in the areas beyond the territorial limits of the nation in order to maintain its own sovereignty (Pyle, 2007: 90–1).

The biggest problem for Japan at this time was Korea. Koreans maintained a special relationship with China, and refused to get out of the old tributary system. In 1875, Japan employed gunboat diplomacy after Koreans had fired on a Japanese navy vessel which entered Korean waters. Under pressure, Korea agreed to sign a treaty with Japan, which opened three ports for trade and declared Korea's full independence from Chinese hegemony.

Even after this treaty was concluded, the Korean court asked for Chinese protection. On the other hand, Japan sought allies with young Korean reformers who saw Japan as a model for Korean modernization. For two decades, Japan and China competed to strengthen their influence on Korea. In June 1894, when revolts by anti-Western, traditional groups took place, the Korean king called for China's help to suppress them. Japan also sent troops to Korea, and refused to withdraw them until Korea would substitute Japanese for Chinese influence. Both Japan and China faced domestic pressures which drove them to a point of no return from the start of war.

The formal declaration of war came in early August, and within two months the Japanese army controlled most of Korea. By February 1895, when a Japanese victory became obvious, China had to come to terms with Japan. In April 1895, the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed by the two governments which included the demands for indemnity, the cession of Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula, and the opening of several ports for trade with Japan. As a result, Japan joined the ranks of imperialist states by establishing a sphere of dominance over Korea, Taiwan, and parts of China.

Russia saw Japan's control of Liaodong as a threat to Russia's access to China, and demanded Japan return the peninsula to China with the support of France and Germany. Humiliated, Japan had to submit to this triple intervention as it was not strong enough to fight against Russia and its allies. In 1896–98, the three Western powers thus claimed their debts, with France carving out China's southern provinces bordering Indochina, Germany taking Shantung, and Russia claiming Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula. Meanwhile, Japan was engaged in rearmament in order to avoid another international humiliation.

In 1902, Japan signed a treaty with Britain, allying against pressure from Russia. In this arrangement, the two countries would fight together only if either party was attacked by two or more countries – otherwise, the other party would remain neutral. This ensured British military support for another possible triple

intervention. With this alliance, Japan approached Russia for the arrangement of their respective sphere of influence – Japan in Korea and Russia in Manchuria. The two countries, however, did not come to terms with each other, leading to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

To the surprise not only of Russia, but also of the world, Japan won both land battles and a major naval battle in the Japan Sea which marked a decisive defeat for Russia. However, Japan could no longer continue the war financially and logistically. When US president Theodore Roosevelt offered mediation, Japan happily accepted a truce. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 provided Japan with Russian recognition of Japan's control of Korea, transfer of the rights over Liaodong and the South Manchuria Railway, and the cession of the southern half of Sakhalin. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan concluded entente agreements to respect each other's sphere of influence with Russia, the United States, and France. As a result, Japan became the most influential power in Asia, and annexed Korea five years later to establish its sphere of sovereignty in the peninsula (Conroy, 1960).

After the First World War broke out in 1914, Japan entered the war as an ally of Britain in order to take advantage of the opportunity to extend its Asian interests. Japan declared war against Germany, and quickly took over German interests in Shandong, including Kiaochow Bay, port city of Tsingtao, and the railroad between Tsingtao and Tsinan. In the Pacific front, the Japanese Navy captured the German-possessed Micronesian islands north of the equator, including Jaluit, Ponape, Truk, Palau, Yap and Saipan. This led to Japan's de facto colonization of these islands until 1945.

In January 1915, Japan presented the Twenty-One Demands to China. The Demands included the confirmation of Japanese rights in Shandong and southern Manchuria, the promotion of industrial activity in the central Yangtze valley, and the non-alienation of Chinese coastal territory near Taiwan. The most notorious demands were in the final section which consisted of the hiring of Japanese advisers into the government, the granting of interior lands to Japanese interests, and China's purchase of arms from Japan. As the final section met with strong international criticism, Japan dropped it but forced China to accept the rest of the demands.

After the First World War, Japan joined the entente powers in dispatching troops to Siberia in order to support non-Bolshevik Russians against Soviet Russia during the Russian Civil War. The Japanese army continued to occupy Siberia even after other entente powers withdrew in 1920. Japan hoped to establish Japanese hegemony in China, Manchuria, and eastern Siberia and 'forestall the probable postwar resurgence of Western dominance in Asia' (Iriye, 1965: 7).

The Japanese military leaders wanted to achieve a condition of self-sufficiency by establishing control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The resource of Manchuria and Mongolia became even more important for Japan's defense strategy after the 1929 world-wide Great Depression (Iriye, 1997: 58–60). After China began rights recovery and anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria,

Japanese officers in the local Kwantung Army began acting independently from both the military and civilian authorities in Tokyo. They resorted to assassinating Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, in 1928, and started to fight against Chinese troops in order to achieve its ambition to bring the region under Japanese control in 1931.

The Kwantung Army took control over all of Manchuria, and in early 1932 established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Kanji Ishihara was one of the key Kwantung Army officers who masterminded this Mukden Incident. He was influenced by German geopolitical thought and believed that the world would be divided into several blocks, each under a dominant imperialist power. Therefore, according to Ishihara, in order for Japan to survive as a great power, it was crucial to turn Manchuria and Inner Mongolia into Japanese territory, and drive out other nations' political and economic influences from the region (Iriye, 1997: 64–5).

The international community strongly reacted against Japan's aggression. The League of Nations dispatched a commission to investigate the events, and the commission criticized Japan's conduct and refused to recognize Manchukuo. In March 1933 when the League accepted the findings of the commission, Japan walked out of the international organization to isolate itself from the community of imperialist powers.

While the imperial powers did not seriously challenge Japan's control over Manchuria, the Nanking government tried to recover the northern region. This eventually led to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in which Japanese and Chinese forces clashed in July 1937. The United States, which had initially maintained neutrality in the Japan–China conflict, began providing military and economic support to the Nanking government. The US government also abrogated the 1911 commerce treaty with Japan to prepare for trade sanctions against Japan. In September 1940, Japan formed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, which was directed against the United States. In an effort to expand the Tripartite Pact to include the Soviet Union and balance the United States, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka signed the Soviet–Japan Neutrality Pact in April 1941.

Not only in China, but also in Southeast Asia, Japan was heading on a collision course with the United States. Japan's quest for self-sufficiency was not achieved with its control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Japan had to rely on American imports for most of the strategically important resources, such as iron and petroleum. In order for Japan to achieve self-sufficiency, it would have to control European colonies in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government developed the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including Southeast Asian countries under Japanese leadership.

As the European powers control over their Asian colonies weakened with the Second World War, the United States was the only major obstacle for Japan to establish a new international order in East Asia. In July 1941, Japan took military action to occupy the entirety of Indochina. The United States immediately froze Japanese assets, and imposed an embargo on petroleum exports to Japan. This

American retaliation led Japanese leaders to conclude that war with the United States was inevitable, which led to the Pacific War.

The bilateral negotiation meetings between Tokyo and Washington were held in April–November 1941. On November 26, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded the complete withdrawal of all Japanese military and police troops from French Indochina and China, basically resetting Japan's position to the pre-1931 status. Japanese military and political leaders took this as an ultimatum. At the Imperial Conference on December 1, the Emperor approved attacks against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. A week later when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the imperial proclamation of war announced that Japan began war for 'self-preservation and self-defense', more specifically in order to protect the special interests which Japan had acquired since 1931.

The result of Japan's war to protect the post-1931 gains ended with the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which stripped Japan of Korea, Taiwan, and the Pacific islands, setting the Japanese position even further back to the pre-1895 status. After the dropping of two atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese leaders decided to accept the defeat in order to avoid 'the final blows' by the allied powers. Japanese leaders strongly hoped that they could maintain Japan's national polity with the emperor.

After the war, Japan lost autonomy and came under American occupation. The occupation policy planners in Washington viewed Japan as forming two groups: the elites who had benefitted from militarism on the one hand and the suppressed masses on the other. They strongly promoted democratization and demilitarization. They introduced bold *zaibatsu* deconcentration measures even knowing that would weaken the Japanese economy. The initial radical occupation policy took a reverse course when America's policy changed to containment in 1948–49. According to the designer of US containment policy, George Kennan, there were only five regions of the world – the United States, the United Kingdom, Central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan – where 'the sinews of modern military strength could be produced in quantity'. The main task of containment was to keep the four non-Soviet regions from falling under Communist control (Kennan, 1967: 359). Therefore, the occupation policy of Japan was shifted from reform to economic recovery in order to make a stronger Japan.

The change in the occupation policy also came in the area of national security when the Korean War turned from a cold war in Asia to a hot war in June 1950. Under the American Occupation, 'domestic cold war' had already developed after the legalization of the Communist Party in 1945 (Sakamoto, 1963). If the American forces in Japan were mobilized, Japan's domestic public safety would be threatened with the current limited police power. In July 1950, MacArthur instructed Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to establish the National Police Reserve with 75,000 troops. Although it was a police force to secure domestic safety, the equipment and structure were modeled on military lines. This became the first step in Japan's rearmament.

The Yoshida government wanted an early independence. Although the leftist political parties and scholars strongly appealed for sweeping peace, including with the Soviet Union and the newly established People's Republic of China, Yoshida committed Japan to the side of the free world and began individual negotiations for a separate peace treaty with the United States. One of the most important issues was how to protect Japan after receiving its independence. Yoshida refused a major scale of rearmament, and sent Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda to Washington in order to secretly offer the US government the continued use of bases in Japan (Miyazawa, 1999). The peace treaty was concluded in San Francisco with the presence of 52 countries in September 1951. Japan was to refrain from the use of force as a sovereign right, but Japan's right of both individual and collective self-defense was recognized. All occupation forces were to be withdrawn, but the treaty allowed special agreements for US forces to remain in Japan. This arrangement made Japan's safety possible with the minimum necessary armament of its own.

The United States put pressure on Japan for further armament after its independence. In mid 1952, the National Police Reserve was expanded to the National Safety Force with 110,000 troops, and the Coastal Safety Force was transferred to the National Safety Agency. In July 1954, these establishments came under the newly created Defense Agency and reorganized as the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces to play a more important role in the defense of Japan.

In 1957, two incidents shook the Japan-US security arrangement. In January, an American soldier killed a Japanese house wife who was collecting scrap metal on a US Army shooting range in the Gunma Prefecture. This incident created strong anti-US base sentiment in Japan and became a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. In October, the Russian-made satellite, Sputnik was successfully launched into orbit, ahead of the American space project. Many in Japan questioned if Japan's choice to side with the United States was a good decision, and the Japan Socialist Party called for the end to the Japan-US Security Treaty (Sakamoto, 2000: 204).

Nobusuke Kishi, who became Prime Minister in February that year, determined that he would put the highest priority on revising the 1952 Japan-US Security Treaty. During his July trip to Washington, he met President Dwight D. Eisenhower on the topic of revising the unequal treaty. The treaty had no US obligation to defend Japan, while permitting Americans to use their bases in Japan without limitation. The Prime Minister and the President agreed to set up a bilateral committee to seek ways to revise the treaty. In January 1960, after the negotiations, the two countries signed the revised security treaty, which provided a clear US obligation to defend Japan, while exempting Japan to defend the US forces outside of Japanese territory. The newly revised treaty reconfirmed the asymmetrical nature of the bilateral alliance.

In the late 1970s, as the tension of the Cold War escalated, Washington pressured the Japanese government to play a more important role in the bilateral

alliance. In 1976, the Japanese government formulated the National Defense Program Outline for the first time to identify defense objectives and develop its defense capability. In 1978, Japan signed the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense which provided a comprehensive framework for bilateral defense cooperation. Under the government of Zenko Suzuki, the two governments negotiated ‘the roles and missions’ for a division of defense responsibilities between the two countries. Washington promised to provide Japan nuclear protection and offensive projection power, and to protect Japan’s lifeline to Middle East oil in the Southwest Pacific and Indian oceans. In return, Japan pledged to protect not only its own territory and the seas and skies immediately surrounding Japan, but also the sea lanes of the Northwest Pacific, north of the Philippines and west of Guam. Suzuki’s successor, Yasuhiro Nakasone, volunteered Japan to serve as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ against Soviet expansion, and approved a defense buildup spending that exceeded the 1 percent of GNP ceiling on military expenditures. During his administration, Japan significantly improved its anti-submarine warfare capability, which detected virtually every Soviet nuclear and conventional submarine that departed from Vladivostok for the Pacific.

When the Cold War was over, Japan was asked to go beyond the old framework of the asymmetric alliance. During the Cold War era, the arms race and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union was justification enough for America to maintain such an arrangement with Japan. But with the end of the Cold War virtually removing the Soviet military threat, US Congress began questioning the value of the asymmetric alliance with Japan.

The 1990 Gulf Crisis happened under this political climate. The US officials had high expectations that Japan would be able to show the Congress that it was a very reliable ally. Knowing Japan’s constitutional restriction, they requested Tokyo make a personnel contribution to the multinational forces in the region. The Toshiki Kaifu government failed to pass the legislation which would send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas, but provided 13 billion dollars in financial contributions. Although Japan was one of the two largest donors to the war along with Saudi Arabia, its effort was criticized as ‘checkbook diplomacy’.

In order to overcome this criticism, the Japanese government developed a series of national security policies in the 1990s to increase Japan’s contribution. In 1991, Tokyo dispatched SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in a show of contributing manpower after the Gulf War. As this effort was greatly appreciated by the international community, the Kiichi Miyazawa cabinet successfully enacted legislation which would dispatch the SDF for peacekeeping operations under the UN command, and in 1992, the SDF began the PKO activities in Cambodia. Motivated by the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis, Japan agreed to create new defense cooperation guidelines with the United States for regional crises such as ones in the Korean Peninsula, which were enacted in 1999.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan’s national security policy making was very active, and three major pieces of legislation were

initiated and enacted as the United States launched its 'war on terror' after the 9/11 incident in which the United States experienced attacks by Islamic terrorists. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation enabled Japan to provide rear echelon support for multinational forces by the SDF to the Indian Ocean area, and expanded legitimate activity areas of the SDF to territories and seas between the Indian Ocean and Japan. The 2003 Emergency legislation provided a legal framework for dealing with a contingency in case of military attack on Japan. The 2003 Iraq legislation allowed the SDF to offer humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in postwar Iraq, and ground SDF troops were sent to Iraq in February 2004. Koizumi stepped up Japan's national security policy to actively contribute to international security with manpower (Shinoda, 2007).

The second administration of Shinzo Abe took further steps in this trend, this time in responding to the rise of a revisionist China and the nuclear threats posed by North Korea. The Abe government for the first time created the National Security Strategy, and identified Japan's goal to pursue 'proactive contribution to peace'. In 2015, Abe successfully enacted the new security legislation and revised the defense guidelines with the United States. The new set of legislation enabled Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, and to provide defense support to foreign forces in the case of a contingency. The new defense guidelines set out improved steps of security cooperation between Japan and the United States. The realist approach of Abe and Koizumi promoted Japan's increased role in international security alongside others.

THROUGH A LIBERALIST LENS

The liberal view in the aspect of modern Japanese foreign policy first emerged in the early Meiji era. Japan became one of the few Asian nations, along with Korea and China, which maintained independence. While Japan avoided Western colonization by transforming itself into a modern state, China and Korea wanted to maintain the old Asian regional order of tribute system. When Japan saw China as too weak to protect Korea from Russian threat, it advocated Korean independence from the Chinese protectorate which led to the Sino-Japanese War. After the war, the Japanese established themselves above other Asian nations, and developed a sense of mission to bring about enlightenment and progress in Asia. Japan felt that it had an obligation to 'awaken and reform Asians by providing them with law and order and introducing them to the benefits of modern civilization' (Iriye, 1989: 772).

This sense of obligation is described as an 'Asian Monroe Doctrine' by Ogura (2013: 43–6). In the 1904 Japan-Korea treaty just before the Russo-Japanese War, Article I stipulated that Korea shall place 'full confidence' in Japan and adopt Japanese advice 'in regard to improvements in administration', and in Article III Japan guaranteed 'the independence and territorial integrity of the

Korean empire'. These articles showed that it was Japan's sense of responsibility to remove Western imperialist threats from Asian nations. After the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, the Meiji emperor wrote a letter to the Korean emperor, stating that he declared war in order to establish 'eternal peace of the Orient' (MOFA, 1904).

After the First World War was over, as a newly rising power in the Pacific, the United States wanted to establish a new international order in East Asia, prompting the Washington Conference held in 1921–22. Among the treaties concluded at that was the Four Power Treaty among Japan, Britain, France and the United States which replaced the 1902 Anglo-Japanese treaty to engage in new security cooperation. The Five Power Naval Treaty maintained its status quo of a naval power balance to prevent an arms race. The Nine Power Treaty introduced a new concept to guide the powers in their conduct in China, condemning its sphere of influence, upholding the principle of equal opportunity, and respecting China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. These new security arrangements were designed to remove the imperialistic nature of the regional order and to provide a framework for international cooperation.

In the beginning, the United States, Britain and Japan pledged to keep the spirit of the Washington Conference by not intervening in China's internal affairs of conflicts among the warlords. Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara actively pursued good relations with Britain and the United States, and attempted to maintain a non-interventionist policy toward China. The spirit, however, disappeared when Japan refused to allow China to raise a tariff on Japanese exports at the 1925 Peking Tariff Conference. Akira Iriye describes this conference as 'the last occasion when the Washington powers conferred jointly with China to bring about a constructive order in the Far East' (Iriye, 1965: 86). After this conference, the three countries lost interest in cooperative policy, and ceased to function as a group.

After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the Washington System no longer functioned, and Asianism became the basis of Japanese foreign policy to include the reform of Chinese domestic institutions as Japan's responsibility. In March 1932, the government declared 'our international relations have been transformed completely since the Manchurian incident'. When the League of Nations rejected Japan's action to establish Manchukuo, Japan withdrew from the League due to the different conceptions of 'the fundamental principles for establishing peace in East Asia' (Iriye, 1997: 68–9).

In July 1941 when Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe announced the Great East Asian Co-Prospersity Sphere, Japan's Asianism expanded to include Southeast Asia. Earlier, in 1939, Hotsumi Ozaki, one of the prime minister's advisers, had written in a magazine that Japan had the task of becoming 'a liberator of Asia from its agony' and that the formation of an East Asian community with 'regional, racial, cultural, economic, and defensive combinations of Asians against the general world order' would free Asia from the Western domination (Ozaki, 1939).

This vision provided theoretical support to Japan's southward expansion for which the Japanese leaders were prepared to fight with the United States.

The result of the Second World War was disastrous. Between 1937 and 1945, over three million Japanese were killed. Even many survivors suffered from their war experience after the air raid on Tokyo and two atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Economic damage also was tremendous with 25 percent of national wealth lost. Real national income dropped to 59 percent of the prewar level, and the average real income per capita plummeted to 29 percent. After the war, most Japanese suffered from poverty and hunger (Kanamori, 1990: 12–14).

Under the American Occupation, MacArthur had a mission to create a new utopia out of Japan. A group of policy planners in Washington came up with a highly liberal occupation plan to destroy the military power, build a representative government, enfranchise women, free political prisoners, liberate farmers, abolish police repression, liberate the press, liberalize education and decentralize political power. Economically, it promoted a high degree of wealth redistribution, with dismantling *zaibatsu* and promoting labor activities and agricultural reform (Cohen, 1987).

While MacArthur implemented these liberal social policies, he was hesitant to abolish the emperor against the will of the other allies and some officials in Washington. It came from his realistic calculation. Instead of destabilizing the Japanese society by removing the emperor, MacArthur chose to utilize the emperor and the existing government to assist with his rule of Japan (MacArthur, 1964: 288). In order to appease those in Washington who believed the emperor had been the cause of Japanese militarism, MacArthur instead included the renouncement of war as one of the three principles he chose for Japan's Constitution. Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara, who believed no military power was better than inadequate military power, supported this liberal proposal (Shidehara, 1951: 214).

Shidehara's successor, Shigeru Yoshida, enacted the peace Constitution in August 1946. Yoshida originally hoped that the collective security system under the United Nations would work in the near future, and that peace-loving nations would be obliged to defend Japan. Even in the face of the 1950 Korean War, Yoshida maintained a liberal view that collective security under the United Nations would function in the near future. The Japanese government produced a draft of a US-Japan Security Treaty, in which the US-Japan alliance would only function as a part of the UN collective self-defense framework (Igarashi, 1999). The US government did not share such a liberal view, and demanded Japan's rearmament as a condition for Japan's independence and the peace treaty.

In response to this demand, in January 1951 Yoshida handed a document to John Foster Dulles stating that 'immediate rearmament was impossible for Japan', and raising three reasons for it: (1) public reservation against rearmament; (2) the lack of economic resources; and (3) fears by neighboring states and

domestic concerns against Japan's remilitarization (Yoshida, 1951). Yoshida's strong priority of economic reconstruction over rearmament was later labeled the 'Yoshida Doctrine'.

Even after its independence, Japan managed to maintain the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan's rise as an economic power in the 1960s and 1970s invited the 'free ride' argument especially among conservative members of the US Congress. Japanese people under American military protection, without having to fight themselves, were accused of getting a free ride. While Washington continued to pressure Tokyo for rearmament, the Japanese government repeatedly increased the host nation support to American bases in Japan, instead of significantly strengthening its own defense capability. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese government pursued a series of liberal national security policies.

For example, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda abandoned the Liberal Democratic Party's goal to revise the Constitution, and advanced further the Yoshida line of diplomacy by promoting economy-first foreign policy. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato set his top priority policy goal of ending the US occupation of Okinawa. In order to pursue this goal, he appeased the opposition parties by introducing peace-oriented policies, such as the three-point arms export ban in 1967 and the non-nuclear principles in 1971. In 1973, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka emphasized Japan's energy security even against American opposition, and promoted pro-Arab policy over UN General Assembly Resolution 3236. Tanaka's successor, Takeo Miki, further extended the existing arms export ban to prohibit the export of virtually all military technologies to any nations, and made the 1 percent ceiling of defense expenditure in proportion to the GNP an official government policy. During his 1977 trip to Southeast Asian nations, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda made a speech to declare that Japan would not become a great military power. Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira introduced the idea of comprehensive security, not simply relying on the military alliance with the United States, but also needing to extend diplomatic efforts for Japan's economic and energy security.

Through these liberal national security policies, Japan could maintain the policy of minimum defense spending, which contributed to Japan's growth as a trading state. Japanese GNP reached 15 percent of the world share in 1990, compared with less than 3 percent in 1950. As Japanese exports of textiles, steel, electronics, machine tools, automobiles and semiconductors increased, Japan's trade surplus significantly expanded in the 1980s. Japan had an annual average of 13.8 billion dollars of current account surplus during the 1980-84 period. The annual average swelled to 71.8 billion dollars in 1985-89. As Rosecrance (1985: 138-9) notes, Japan tried to increase its national power by military aggression in the 1930s which led to its defeat in the Second World War, but in the postwar era Japan succeeded to do so by peaceful international trade.

As Japan's economic power increased, it was willing to take leadership in the Asian region, this time in the form of the Pacific Community. In the late 1970s,

Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira led nine study groups. One of the groups came up with an idea of developing the Pacific Community. In September 1980, the Pacific Community Seminar was held at the initiative of Ohira and the Australian prime minister, which was attended by 11 economies and Pacific island states. This seminar called for a regional forum to promote economic cooperation and market-driven integration, which led to the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. This council's community-building efforts developed into the official Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process in 1989.

In addition to APEC, Japan has demonstrated its leadership role in several other regional community-building initiatives. Japan had built close relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and formed the ASEAN Plus Three with South Korea and China. The East Asia Summit emerged in 2005, expanding the notion of the region to include Australia, New Zealand, and India. Japan also played a major part in opening up new multilateral relations with Europe and East Asia by being one of the establishing partners of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. More recently in 2018, Japan played an instrumental role in the successful negotiation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (so-called TPP11) after the United States withdrew from the original TPP agreement. Japan's role in these regional institutions facilitated international cooperation and development, and earned respect from other nations in the community.

THROUGH A CONSTRUCTIVIST LENS

In the early 17th century, the Tokugawa rulers decided to discontinue relations with Europeans as they might form a military alliance with local lords against the Shogunate, and might promote the idea of Christianity into Japan. The self-imposed isolation stifled the normal social and economic development of feudal Japan, and left the country far behind Europe in scientific and industrial achievement for more than two centuries. By the early 19th century, however, Japanese leaders were well aware that Westerners had stretched their imperialism in Southeast Asia, India and Africa. As Britain and Russia renewed their interests in Japan with some approaches, Japan began feeling the external threat with the possibility of colonization.

During the period of isolationism, the Tokugawa patronage of Confucianism encouraged the study of Japanese history. An important school of historians was created by the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family. After studying the myths and legends of Japanese history, they emphasized the importance of imperial rule. When considering the Western threat, a Mito scholar, Seishisai Aizawa identified that imperial rule be Japan's national polity, and stressed that it was necessary to unite Japan under the highest level of loyalty to the emperor in order to expel the foreigners.

After the opening of Japan in 1854, two powerful clans, Satsuma and Choshu, tried to expel the foreigners only to learn that it was impossible to do so as they were far more technologically advanced. As the imperialists' legitimacy for the colonization was to educate and civilize 'barbarians', it was important for Japan to establish a new identity as a modern state. These two powerful clans successfully achieved the 1868 Meiji Restoration to form a new modern state under the leadership of the emperor.

The kind of modern state Japan was aiming to form was expressed by Tetsujiro Inoue, who was chosen by the Ministry of Education to explain the Imperial Rescript on Education. Inoue described international relations as a game of survival of the fittest. Many Asian and African nations had lost their independence or dropped out in the race of civilization. A small nation, Japan was surrounded by enemies. Inoue argued, therefore, that Japan needed to strengthen its unity with strong loyalty to the emperor, and this loyalty was comparable to a family relationship between father and sons. As family members obeyed the orders from the father, obedience to the emperor was natural for Japanese people. The emperor, in return, like a benevolent father would look after the well-being of his family members (Inoue, 1891). A postwar philosopher, Takeshi Ishida, called this notion 'family-state' ideology (Ishida, 1954).

Under the leadership of the emperor, the five-article Charter Oath was announced in April 1868, to set the legal stage for Japan's modernization as a constitutional monarchy. Meiji leaders were determined to put an end to the legacy of the Tokugawa feudalism, and they identified the Western civilization as the norm (Beasley, 1989: 619). They imported Western political and economic institutions as 'the ingredients of a modern state' (Iriye, 1989: 729). They tried to establish a newly reorganized nation in terms of international law so that they could relocate Japan's place in the world and redefine its power in Asia (Dudden, 2005: 27). 'Civilization and enlightenment' (*bunmei kaika*) was a slogan used to promote the modernization and Westernization of the Japanese society.

In order for Japan to be recognized as an equal partner by Western powers, the unequal treaties had to be revised. In order to revise the existing treaties with Western powers, Japan needed to install a series of modern political, economic and legal institutions to meet the standard of those set by European powers. When a British diplomat complained that Japan had no 'club', the sort of which was available in any civilized nation, Foreign Minister Kaoru Inouye decided to build the Rokumeikan, a gaudy Victorian hall in order to show Japan was a civilized society. The Meiji leaders entertained foreign residents in Tokyo with Western music and dancing, and lobbied for their support of treaty revision (Beasley, 1989: 689). As Japan was successful in speedy reform, with Western-style institutions, Western powers by 1894 revised their treaties to accept Japan as a modern state.

By changing into a modern state and gaining equal status, Japan hoped to avoid possible colonization by Western powers. The next goal for Japan was to gain status as a great power. The Meiji leaders held up the central objective of

‘enrich the nation, strengthen the army and encourage industry’ (*fukoku kyohei shokusan kogyo*) to catch up with the Western powers. The government directly developed business infrastructure and controlled certain services. It constructed the first railway between Tokyo and Yokohama, established the universal postal service and the network of telegraph service, and constructed paper mills, cotton spinning plants and other light industrial complexes. Modeled after the Prussian army, the government created the Japanese army, by recruiting farmers. In 1869, Tokyo established naval training facilities with British advisers. The Meiji government played the central role in making Japan a rich and strong nation.

In 1874, Japan began establishing its identity as an imperialist nation by dispatching a force to Taiwan three years after 54 shipwrecked Ryukyuan were massacred by the Taiwanese. In return for the expedition, China had to agree to pay an indemnity and give up its claims to the Ryukyus. One year later, when a Japanese surveillance gunboat was fired on by Koreans, Tokyo sent a naval fleet to Korea. Frightened by the Japanese demonstration, Korea signed a treaty with Japan to claim its independence from the Chinese protectorate, to open two additional ports for trade and to provide extraterritorial privileges to Japan. In order to counter Japan’s imperialistic move to Korea, China tried to strengthen its influence over the Korean court. The two decades of strong rivalry over the control of Korea led the two countries to war in 1894. After victory in the war, Japan became ‘the first non-Western state [to join] the ranks of the militarily strong, imperialistic powers’. With the cession of Taiwan and Liaodong Peninsula as well as the stronger control over Korea, Japan’s confidence as an expanding nation was building (Iriye, 1989: 764–5). Japan enjoyed the first step to establish its Asian empire.

Japan’s confidence, however, was seriously challenged by the triple intervention by Russia, Germany and France, which demanded the retrocession of Liaodong. ‘It showed the Japanese that their achievement of great-power status had not changed the situation’ (Iriye, 1989: 769). Instead of giving up their dream of an Asian empire, the Japanese leaders took this as a temporary setback and began planning to regain its foothold. With the indemnity from China, the Japanese government accelerated investing capital for industrialization. It created the Yawata Iron Works, and provided subsidies to the shipbuilding industry to become a wealthier and stronger power.

Japan’s status in the world significantly changed after the 1900–01 Boxer uprising in China. Japan dispatched its biggest troop deployment of 10,000 soldiers to protect Western interests, which led to Japan for the first time being invited as a full-fledged member to the international peace conference. Impressed by Japan’s action in the incident, Britain agreed to sign a security treaty with Japan in 1902. Intersubjectivity on Japan’s status as a major power was finally established (Nish, 1966).

In Korea, the new rivalry between Japan and Russia increased, as the Korean court sought Russian support after the 1895 triple intervention. Japan tried to

negotiate with Russia to seek some understanding of Japan's special position in Korea in return for Japanese recognition of Russian control over Manchuria. When Russia refused this proposal, the Meiji leaders decided to fight because they did not want to submit to Russian pressure again and reduce its status to a second-rate nation. After the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was recognized as 'a major power, even the key power in Asia'. It was 'the moment of glory the Japanese had dreamed of since the humiliating days half a century earlier' (Iriye, 1989: 775–7).

Japan entered the First World War as an ally of Britain, and participated in the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference as a victor. While Japan gained German possession of Shandong and Pacific islands, it also challenged the postwar international order as a non-Western power. Japan requested a declaration of racial equality as a basic principle of the League of Nations. Due to the white-only immigration policy of Australia, Britain rejected the Japanese proposal. The United States also refused the racial equality clause because of some state laws which prohibited landownership by Asian immigrants. In 1924, the US Congress passed the immigration law, which effectively prohibited Japanese immigrants to America. In the Japanese perspective, the immigrants were 'the spearhead of an expanding nation, a bridge between the two countries. But the Americans rejected such expansionism and began talking of war on racial grounds' (Iriye, 1989: 779). The American immigration law became a symbol of Western prejudice to keep the Japanese as a second-rate race and helped promote anti-Western nationalism in Japan.

The 1929 Great Depression triggered trade wars by raising tariffs, and led to the collapse of the free international trade system. Japan decided to establish its own international order by expanding its Asian empire. Japan increased its immigrants to Manchuria, and opened fire to control the region and establish the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. When the newly established state was denied by the League of Nations, Japan walked out of the international organization, and attempted to establish itself as a leader of East Asia. Scholars in the Kyoto School, led by Kitaro Nishida, formulated a new conceptual way of organizing a new regional order centering on Japan in East Asia to replace the Western order which represented 'an excessive triumph of the ego and the power' (Williams, 2014: 355).

Japan explored further expansion in China after total war started with the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In November 1938, the Japanese government declared to aim for 'the establishment of a new order for a durable stability in East Asia' (Iriye, 1997: 76). This original concept for the new order comprised only of Japan, Manchukuo and China. The 1941 concept of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere included Southeast Asia, which led to Japan's southward expansion and the war with the United States.

Japan's decision to go against a by-far more resourceful nation can be explained through constructivist analysis. The Japanese military leaders overestimated

Japanese moral superiority, which was often described as *yamato damashii* or Japanese spirits, and underestimated US commitment to the war. Although isolationism was very strong among Americans, Japan's Pearl Harbor attack promptly swept that away. Emperor Hirohito provided his analysis on Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, 'Because our people had too strong of confidence in the Empire, they underestimated the British and Americans. Our military officers had too much emphasis on spirituality and they forgot science' (Showa Emperor, 1945).

Japan's ambition to establish a new Asian order was crushed not only because of American military superiority but also of the lack of support from other Asian nations. Some Asians had strong hopes for Japan's actions to emancipate them from imperialistic dominance by the Western nations. However, their expectation was soon betrayed by the invasive nature of Japanese military conduct and even severer colonial rule. Although Japan tried to become the leader of the Asian order, there were no followers. In his testament before his death, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo analyzed that Japan lost the war because it could not gain 'cooperation from other East Asian people' (Tojo, 2000). For many Asians, Japan was not seen as 'a liberator of Asia', but a military aggressor.

After the war, Japan had a new constitution which prohibited its belligerency, and tried to create its new identity as 'a pacifist nation'. Throughout the post-war period, pacifism has been widely and deeply rooted among the Japanese (Katzenstein, 1998; Berger, 2003). The new identity was well established domestically. However, the continuation of the Emperor system confused other Asians. For many Asians who suffered from Japan's military invasion, the Emperor was 'the symbol of Japanese militarism' (Soeya, 2005: 37). As a result, there was suspicion about Japan's pacifism within the Asian community.

Throughout the Cold War era, Japan's pacifism was very strong, which limited Japan's role in international security and defense spending. Once the Cold War ended, however, Japanese pacifists were marginalized by three factors, according to Richard Samuels. First, the regional instability in Northeast Asia, including North Korea's adventurous attempt for nuclear development, shifted the balance of power in dangerous ways. Second the Japanese public became more realistic about national security. Third, the Socialist Party, which called for 'unarmed neutrality', was significantly weakened (Samuels, 2007: 118).

Japanese conservatives criticized Japanese pacifists who opposed Japan's role in international security. Ichiro Ozawa, for example, argued that Japan should become a 'normal nation', and tried and failed to send SDF to participate in the 1991 Gulf War (Ozawa, 1994). These conservatives worked hard to transform Japan's national security policy. As a result, Japan enacted two major laws in the 1990s, the 1992 PKO legislation, the 1999 Regional Crisis legislation, under the Koizumi government the 2001 Anti-Terrorism legislation, the 2003 Emergency legislation and Iraq legislation, and under the second Abe administration the 2015 national security legislation, leading Japan to become a 'normal nation'.

CONCLUSION

We have seen three different interpretations of Japan's foreign policy. The realist approach justified Japan's prewar history as its survival: escaping from the threat of being colonized by the Western imperialists, and transforming itself to an imperialist through military aggressions. As an imperialist, the status of Korea was essential to Japan's own survival. Therefore, Japan fought two wars with China and Russia in order to keep the peninsula under its influence, and finally annexed it. After the Great Depression, Japan decided to secure the source of natural resources by controlling Manchuria, and later Southeast Asia in order to achieve self-sufficiency, which led to the war with the United States.

The liberal approach offers a different explanation to Japan's war aim. In the Meiji era, there emerged the sense of Asianism in Japan. After the Sino-Japanese war, Japanese leaders felt that it was their obligation to reform Asians to benefit from modern civilization. By annexing Korea, the Japanese government promoted the modernization of Korea. After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Japan expanded its responsibility to reform Chinese domestic institutions. The area of Japan's responsibility further extended to include Southeast Asia in the concept of the East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere.

These approaches also differ in interpreting the postwar Japanese foreign policies. The realist approach focuses on the developments of national security. After the Cold War started, Japan was requested by the United States to rearm, and organized the National Police Reserve, which was later reorganized into the Self-Defense Forces. After the 1952 independence, Japan concluded the security treaty with the United States to secure its safety. As Japan grew as an economic power in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan was under pressure for further armament. With the escalated tension of the Cold War in the late 1970s, Japan pledged to protect its sea lanes, and in the early 1980s Japan improved anti-submarine capability.

In the post-Cold War era, Japan was expected to play a more important role in international security. After Japan's failure to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, Japan gradually but steadily transformed its national security policy with the 1992 PKO legislation and the 1999 Regional Crisis legislation. In the 2000s, the Japanese government strengthened the alliance with the United States with the support to anti-terrorism activities in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Prime Minister Abe successfully introduced a set of new national security legislation to contribute more for international security.

In contrast, the liberalist approach emphasizes Japan's reluctance in the defense aspect. Most Japanese suffered from the disastrous experience in the Pacific War, and were willing to accept demilitarization and the peace constitution as well as extremely liberal occupation reforms. Prime Minister Yoshida took advantage of the peace constitution to avoid American demands of large-scale rearmament. Even after independence, the Japanese government maintained the

Yoshida Doctrine by responding to rearmament demands with a minimal increase of defense capability, and the prime ministers in the 1960s and 1970s promoted a series of liberal national security policies.

With the limited amount of defense spending of less than 1 percent of GNP, Japan successfully reconstructed its economy. With its economic power, Japan tried to take leadership in the international cooperation institutions of the Asia Pacific region, such as APEC, the ASEAN plus 3, ASEM and TPP.

On the other hand, the constructivism approach explores the different identities of Japan. In order to survive as an independent nation, Japan tried to change its identity from a feudalist state to a modern state. In order to promote the transformation, the Meiji government tried to identify Japan's national polity under the leadership of the emperor, and to strengthen the national unity with the family-state ideology. In order to become a modern state, the Meiji government was rapidly importing Western political, social and economic institutions. After achieving a modern state status, Japan tried to be equal to other first-class nations in the world, and became an imperialist power. During wartime, Japan tried to become a liberator of Asia. However, the invasive nature of Japanese military actions and colonial rules did not gain the support from the Asian nations.

In the postwar era, Japan tried to establish a new identity as a pacifist state. In the post-Cold War period, Japan was expected to come out of the self-imposed cage to play a more important role for international security. Under the Abe administration, Japan introduced yet another new identity of a nation to proactively contribute to international peace.

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South Korea's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Jong-Yun Bae

INTRODUCTION: SOUTH KOREA'S SECURITY VULNERABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Unique security situations concerning the Korean peninsula have caused diverse dilemmas and difficult situations in South Korea's current foreign policies. Environmental barriers as well as a long and complicated history have been contributing factors to South Korea's precarious security situation. However, several specific factors are involved in South Korea's security vulnerability and foreign policy dilemma. First, although (as of 2016) South Korea ranks 11th in economic trade and 10th in national defense expenditure and military capability globally,¹ it is still a small and weak country in the Northeast Asian region, compared to its geopolitically strong neighbors, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Since the turn of the 21st century, South Korea's geographical and geopolitical neighbors have been promising a revival of their own greatness and glory, exemplified by the 'Make America Great Again' campaign of US President Donald Trump, 'Chinese Dream for the Revival of Great China' of Chinese President Xi Jinping, 'Make Russia Great Again' campaign of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and 'Restoration of the Glorious Japan' campaign of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Despite its economic development and expansion of military capabilities, South Korea still must concern itself with its political independence and diplomatic autonomy from the influences of powerful neighbors, a complicated situation because of its limited diplomatic leverage and resources.

The second reason for South Korea's foreign policy dilemmas and vulnerability lies in the troubled history of the Korean peninsula. Since 1950, South Korea has remained in 'the state of war' and under severe security threats from a clear enemy, North Korea. Regardless of the dismantlement of the Cold War structure in international society and the political democratization and economic development of South Korean society, the armistice system has continued on the Korean peninsula since 1953 without a peace treaty ever being signed, which has oppressed South Korea's foreign policy with severe security concerns. Furthermore, the large-scale deployment of conventional weapons along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear development program, and medium- and long-range missiles that use the advanced technology of the transporter erector launchers (TEL) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), contribute to the deterioration of South Korea's security and raise military tensions on the Korean peninsula. Eventually, North Korea's security threat to South Korea has restricted its policy options and exacerbated the dilemmas of South Korean foreign policy.

Third, South Korea's geopolitical situation has led to further crises in its foreign policy. Historically, whenever there were military or political conflicts between its neighbors, the Korean peninsula often fell victim due to its geopolitical value. Besides the cases of the late 16th and early 20th centuries, whenever there was a power shift between the continental power and the maritime power, the Korean peninsula became the site of military collision. During the Cold War, for example, the Korean peninsula became a front line in the confrontation between the socialist trilateral – the USSR, China, and North Korea – and the capitalist trilateral – the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Even after the end of the Cold War, for the reason of a 'rising China' or the 'Chinese threat', the conflict between China as a continental power and Japan and the United States as maritime powers has been reignited. Among these powerful and often conflicting regional actors, South Korea must concern itself with the possibility of losing autonomy in its foreign policy and once again becoming the victim of its neighbors' confrontations, in which South Korea lacks the diplomatic leverage to moderate or coordinate their conflicting strategic interests.

In light of these factors, South Korea's foreign policy must respond to different challenges at both the peninsular and regional levels, which are sometimes intertwined and often aggravated by one another. South Korea must solve these dual challenges and develop multiple solutions, which require special devotion and significant investment of South Korea's diverse resources. However, the real problem facing South Korea is that it does not have enough policy leverage or sufficient resources to allocate to the resolution of these challenges. Furthermore, these limitations have created a vicious cycle in South Korean foreign policy: dilemmas and tough choices lead to yet more vulnerability and insecurity. That is, South Korea's foreign policy limitations and resource restrictions have worsened its foreign policy environment and exacerbated the level of impact that

these challenges have. In 2017, North Korea's repeated nuclear tests – including a thermonuclear weapon (hydrogen bomb) test in September 2017 and several intercontinental ballistic missile level test launches – and the regional countries' divergent and disharmonious responses to them clearly demonstrate South Korea's foreign policy dilemma and vulnerability, which does not have any meaningful influence on its powerful neighbors, to say nothing of North Korea.

INTERNAL FACTORS OF SOUTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Impact of Democratization and Diversified Values on National Interests

The democratization of South Korea in 1987 and the consolidation of democracy afterward through normalized, peaceful regime changes led the South Korean public to change their understanding and attitude toward national interests and security. This has, in turn, diversified the public's ideological values and political attitudes toward South Korea's foreign policy. These changes have invited fundamentally different situations and influences into South Korea's foreign policy decision-making process. Unlike during the periods of authoritarian regimes in South Korea, currently, the decision-making processes concerning key policies are transparent and open to public debate, regardless of the sensitivity of the policy in concern. Furthermore, the public has been inclined toward participation in the process and the exercising of its influence over final policy decisions, in hopes of an outcome that reflects their values and political views or at least prevents the realization of opposite values. If incompatible ideological values and conflicting political interests in Korean society collide during the policy-making process, this has a strong impact even on foreign policies related to national interests. For example, the South Korean public's strong resistance to the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016, the government's agreement on the 'comfort women' issue with Japan in December 2015, the beef market opening issue in 2008, and the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq in 2003, represent the influence of public opinion on government decision-making in South Korea.

The scope and level of the public's direct or indirect involvement has expanded and the official or non-official participants have increased in South Korea's foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, the related values have multiplied and sometimes collided, and the establishment of a final foreign policy in South Korea requires much time and debate. Not to mention that issues concerning North Korea, and South Korea's policy toward the United States, China, Japan, and other neighbors have incited much dispute between the conservative and the progressive factions of South Korean society. Though these are not strange

phenomena in democratic countries, in analyzing South Korea's foreign policies, these new and slightly unaccustomed unfolding scenarios provide new perspectives and academic angles. These controversial situations make it difficult for the South Korean government to adopt and implement a solid foreign policy with bipartisan political support.

Development of Inter-Korean Relations and Ideological Conflicts in South Korean Society

In South Korea, inter-Korean issues do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Ministry of Unification, whose only responsibility is the bilateral relations of the two Koreas. This is because the two Koreas do not recognize each other as sovereign nations, and they are still in the state of war. The official relationship, which was accepted by both Koreas in December 1991, was described as 'Recognizing that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process toward reunification',² which is neither an international nor a domestic relationship. For this uniqueness, South Korea makes a distinction between foreign policy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and unification or North Korean policy under the Ministry of Unification. Despite this distinction, in many cases, South Korea's foreign policy and North Korean policy are mutually influenced and connected, both directly and indirectly. This means that inter-Korean relations and North Korea's military provocations against South Korea have heavily impacted South Korea's foreign and security policies toward the United States, China, and Northeast Asia. And, South Korea's policy toward North Korea has been severely influenced by political and ideological conflicts between the conservative and the progressive factions of South Korean society. The problem is that the domestic tensions and conflicts in South Korean society contribute to its vulnerability to North Korea's military provocations, especially regarding its nuclear and missile programs.

Ironically, this ideological conflict in South Korean society has been embodied as a sort of byproduct consequence of the development of inter-Korean relations, especially after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. After the summit, favorable perceptions of Kim Jong-il and North Korea spread rapidly throughout South Korean society. However, negative and hostile perceptions of Kim Jong-il and North Korea spread to an equal extent. Whenever a military provocation from North Korea occurs or tensions increase in the peninsula, in relation to the South Korean government's chosen response, the level of conflict and tension between conservatives and progressives in South Korean society dramatically increases. For example, North Korea's repeated nuclear tests since October 2006, the shooting of a South Korean civilian tourist at Mount Kumgang by a North Korean soldier in July 2008, the torpedo attack on the naval ship *Cheonan* on March 26,

2010, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, and the multiple launches of ballistic missiles using TEL and SLBM systems all, unexceptionally, exacerbated the conflicts between them. South Korean conservatives, who prefer to consider North Korea as an enemy rather than as kin, emphasize a hawkish, military-based response to North Korea's provocations. South Korean progressives, who underline the strategic importance of reconciliation with North Korea, display a dovish attitude toward North Korea, while emphasizing the unavoidable truth of North Korea as a unification partner and as an estranged part of the same nation.

These different perceptions toward North Korea and the resulting ideological conflicts within South Korean politics and society are reflected in the state's foreign policy. South Korea's foreign policy must find a useful and achievable solution to these security threats. However, these groups also hold different attitudes concerning the alliance with the United States and relations with China, toward North Korea and propose distinctive solutions for North Korean issues. Moreover, South Korea's conservatives – who emphasize harsh retaliation for North Korea's misdeeds – and progressives – who argue for the necessity of North Korea's reform and opening through economic aid and inter-Korean cooperation – have rarely reached agreement on the issue. Consequently, South Korea, who has limited foreign policy leverage and resources, finds itself in a difficult situation to respond effectively to North Korea, which represents a continual and constant threat to South Korean security.

Decision-making Process and Policy Coordination

Corresponding to these internal environmental changes, South Korea's foreign policy decision-making process has also been undergoing changes. Besides the opening and institutionalization of the decision-making process and the increasing number of participants in it, a more critical issue is coordinating the diverse values and interests, and finally reaching an accordable conclusion. However, the multiple branches of central government who have different organizational interests and values, and the conflicting ideological groups in South Korean society who all want to influence the decision-making process, are in fact preventing an effective decision-making process from occurring in South Korean foreign and security policy. To overcome this disturbance, the South Korean government has relied on the National Security Council (NSC) as a special advisory committee for the president. The Roh Moo-hyun government (February 2003–February 2008) gave the NSC additional powers to improve policy coordination in foreign and security affairs, and heavily depended on the NSC to effectively respond to North Korea's nuclear provocations and Northeast Asian regional issues. Since then, Korean presidents have convened NSC meetings to coordinate policies whenever there are North Korean military provocations or nuclear and missile tests, as well as regional disorder.

Despite South Korea's multiple regime changes between conservative and progressive factions, diverse policy attempts have been made, including sanctions against North Korea and the engagement policy. Repeated policy changes, both hawkish and dovish, however, have thus far failed to provide a fundamental solution to the security threat posed by North Korea. Rather, the current situation surrounding North Korean nuclear and missile issues is worsening, which only confirms that South Korea's policies have been ineffective attempts to dissuade North Korea from developing WMD programs. These continuous failures in developing successful foreign policy toward South Korea's security threats have caused the level of foreign policy conflicts in South Korean society to further deteriorate, and its ability to coordinate foreign policy among neighboring countries has been poor. In this context, South Korea's current foreign and security policies require considerable time to coordinate and sometimes become lost amidst confusion and a lack of solidarity. Not to mention the policy fluctuations toward North Korea, agreement and withdrawal from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan in June 2012, controversy following the agreement on the 'comfort women' issue with Japan in December 2015, and disputes concerning the deployment of the US THAAD system in South Korea in 2016 and 2017, are all indicative of the severe difficulty of coordinating South Korea's foreign policy decisions with domestic political factions.

EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SOUTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Increase in Diplomatic Relations and South Korea's Foreign Policy Dilemma

Since the mid 1970s, South Korea has pursued an official relationship with socialist countries, as a means of reducing security tensions in the Korean peninsula and as an indirect approach to improving relations with North Korea. With the United States's proposal at the UN General Assembly in September 1975, South Korea understood the importance of the mutual recognition of the two nations in the Korean peninsula – normalizing all official relations among the two Koreas, the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan – might help to lessen the tension in the peninsula. In the 1980s, the South Korean government developed the foreign policy of *Nordpolitik* (Northern Policy), which represented South Korea's diplomatic approach to the soviet socialist countries, including North Korea, who are geographically located to the north of South Korea. Through the normalization of diplomatic relations with these countries, South Korea intended to create a fertile environment for Korean unification as a final policy goal. Around the time of the dismantlement of the Cold War structure in international society, South Korea

was able to successfully establish diplomatic relations with most of the former socialist countries, such as Hungary in February 1989, Poland in November 1989, the USSR in September 1990, and China in August 1992. At that time, the successful results of *Nordpolitik* were seen as the achievements of South Korea's diplomatic policies and a positive sign of the enhanced diplomatic status of South Korea in international society. With these achievements, especially South Korea's successful bid for membership in the UN in 1991, South Korea could use these new diplomatic relationships effectively for its own national strategic interests.

However, South Korea's foreign policy has had to face unexpected policy challenges, and its foreign policy dilemma has worsened as a result of *Nordpolitik*'s success, ironically. Before the 1990s, South Korea's foreign and security policies were focused on its relationship with the United States, who was practically its sole strategic diplomatic partner. Thus, South Korea could produce foreign and security policies easily and simply. However, with the success of *Nordpolitik*, the number of South Korea's diplomatic ties rapidly increased, and many of these ties were with powerful countries who had national strategic interests and objectives of their own. The real problem for South Korea is thus its insufficient policy capacities and resources to satisfy these multiple countries' various diplomatic demands and prevent the collision of their political interests at the same time. For example, in 2015, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a new multi-lateral financial institution for the development of the Asia-Pacific region, to which the United States expressed its disapproval. China asked South Korea to participate in the launching of this new financial institution. However, at almost the same time, the United States proposed the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile defense system on South Korean soil to defend the Korean peninsula and the US forces stationed there. However, China, a close neighbor, was deeply concerned about the threats that the THAAD system posed to its own national security. The AIIB-THAAD case in 2015 presented a serious policy dilemma to South Korea, who had to make a choice that would inevitably damage its relations with either the United States or China. In 2017, related to the responses of international society to North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, South Korea also faced a severe policy dilemma between the United States, who emphasized a punishing military response to North Korea, and China, who emphasized a diplomatic response of dialogue and compromise. From South Korea's perspective, good relationships with both the United States and China are paramount, but pleasing both nations is a continual dilemma of South Korean foreign policy.

Despite South Korea's foreign policy dilemmas, South Korea must develop a meaningful solution to the security threat posed by North Korea. On September 7, 2017, in his address at the Third Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, President Moon Jae-in emphasized the 'new *Nordpolitik*', which will strengthen strategic relations and economic cooperation with Russia, and showed his strategic expectations concerning the development of inter-Korean relations.³

Ironically, South Korea has decided to include one more nation in the resolution of its foreign policy dilemmas, instead of reducing the number of states concerned.

Expanded Sectors of South Korea's Foreign Policy and the Policy Priority Dilemma

Due to globalization and the dismantlement of the Cold War structure in international society, the level of interdependence among nations has deepened and the concepts and values of security have been altered. Although these factors appear to be common phenomena in international society, to South Korea's foreign policy, they bring about more difficulties and dilemmas concerning its policy choices. After the end of the Cold War, most countries were able to alter their core national interests from a focus on military security to one on diverse, non-military securities. Now, they have relatively few restrictions concerning military security compared with the Cold War period. Furthermore, international society has begun to emphasize more advanced concepts of security, such as human security, common security, and environmental security, among others. However, South Korea is still bounded by military security concerns, and the use of its limited strategic resources are restricted by the condition of remaining in the state of war. In South Korea's annual budget, almost 15% of total government expenditure is allotted to defense.⁴ Thus, in setting foreign policy priorities, sometimes during times of security crises, South Korea has suffered from a discordance with other countries' policy priorities, and must bear the blame and misunderstanding of its neighbors.

Complying with the trend in international society, South Korea also wants to focus its interests on the issues of global human rights, climate change and other ecological issues, global poverty, sustainable development, and disarmament, among others. Even the Lee Myung-bak government (February 2008–February 2013) showed interest in 'green development'. However, these attempts of South Korea have clear limitations. In the security crisis, South Korea must prioritize its military security at the expense of other national interests. In normal situations, South Korea has strategic interests with both the United States and China, and does not want to sabotage relations with either nation. However, as South Korea's pivotal national interests with the United States and China are different, this creates another foreign policy dilemma for South Korea. The pivotal purpose of South Korea's relationship with the United States is security and its military alliance. However, South Korea's pivotal purpose in its relationship with China is not military security first, but economic interests. For these reasons, in response to North Korea's nuclear provocations and missile launches, the South Korean government decided to accept the deployment of the United States' THAAD system in South Korea, despite China's deep opposition to the decision and subsequent intimidation. Although this decision had worsened bilateral political and economic relations with China, South Korea must maintain its relationship with the United States, the only nation capable of saving South Korea in dire military crises, such as the Korean War in 1950.

However, even with the unyielding value of its national security, South Korea does not always support the decisions of the United States, which could lead to another security crisis in the peninsula. For example, US President Clinton's preemptive strike plan against North Korea's nuclear facility area in 1994 was strongly opposed by South Korean President Kim Young-sam. In 2017, President Trump's menacing attitude and verbal intimidation in response to North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches were not fully welcomed by South Korea, who must bear the brunt of any military confrontation on the peninsula. In the eyes of international society, South Korea's foreign and security policies may not be easily understood by common strategic viewpoints, and could be evaluated as deficient policies in policy solidarity and confidence. However, without solving the dilemma of South Korea's foreign policy, which stems from its military insecurity, disagreements and misunderstandings with other nations concerning South Korea's foreign policy decisions may continue in the future.

Heightened Regional Tensions in Northeast Asia and the Policy Dilemma of South Korea

Another paradoxical aspect of South Korea's foreign policy has continued at the regional level. As a relatively small country in Northeast Asia, South Korea has preferred multilateralism to bilateralism in the settlement of regional problems. Like the Six-Party Talks (SPT) for North Korea's nuclear crisis, which spanned from August 2003 to December 2008, South Korea supports multilateral talks among the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, and tries to find solutions through multilateral regional cooperation. Moreover, in reducing the tension in the peninsula and promoting a positive environment for Korean unification, South Korea views its neighbors' endorsement and multilateral support as necessary. In this regard, South Korea has tried to maintain favorable relations with all its neighbor countries, who could be critical actors in the process of Korean unification. South Korea's history with *Nordpolitik*, as mentioned above, has also influenced this perception of regional relations.

However, another dilemma in South Korean foreign policy was created through this strategic intention. The real problem is that despite this strong intention, South Korea cannot initiate and establish favorable relations with all neighbors on its own. Especially when there is a conflict among its neighbors, South Korea's diplomatic capacity and position are insufficient to moderate conflict and produce harmonious solutions. After the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia, diverse conflicts on maritime borders among countries of the region have presented new security issues. For example, there is a sovereignty dispute concerning the Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan. There is another sovereignty dispute concerning Dokdo/Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks) between South Korea and Japan. In addition, there is a sovereignty dispute over Ieodo (Socotra Rock) between South Korea and China. In the event of renewed disputes over

the Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan, Korea has no choice but to remain neutral. Even concerning the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal on China's 'nine-dash line' territorial claim over the South China Sea on July 12, 2016, South Korea did not officially criticize China's rejection of the ruling, which was overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines. Despite the United States and Japan's criticism of China's nine-dash line claim, South Korea's foreign department only emphasized 'peaceful and creative diplomatic efforts to settle the dispute between China and the Philippines'.⁵ At that time, South Korea, who had only decided to accept the deployment of the THAAD system on its soil four days prior to July 12, could not praise nor censure the PCA's decision on the nine-dash line case. South Korea needed to maintain favorable relations and collaboration with all neighboring countries to achieve successful results from the sanctions imposed on North Korea by UN Security Council resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016.⁶

In this context, South Korea supports regional multilateral security cooperation regarding North Korea, but does not want to support nor participate in any regional multilateral security operations against any one regional member in Northeast Asia. This is because South Korea, already having a powerful and hostile enemy at its borders, strategically cannot afford any more hostile relations in the region. In response to the 'China threat', as well as the issues surrounding North Korea, the United States and Japan have expressed the desire to establish trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with the eventual goal of developing this security cooperation into a formal trilateral regional alliance. However, in terms of South Korea's strategic interests, maintaining the bilateral alliance with the United States against the clear enemy of North Korea and newly establishing a trilateral alliance targeting China are entirely different matters: South Korea must make a clear distinction between them. In addition, with a deteriorating security situation, South Korea must minimize the target countries of the enemy, and maximize its favorable relations with all neighbors, despite its old allies' denunciations. This strategic intention of South Korea could be applied to Japan and other neighbors, as much as it can to China. South Korea desires to focus its strategic resources on North Korean and unification issues in a peaceful and supportive regional environment. However, the reality of the current regional situation in Northeast Asia is not always favorable to South Korea's strategic intentions and designs, and has thus created a difficult dilemma in South Korean foreign policy.

CURRENT ISSUES IN SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY

North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

North Korea's nuclear development program was launched in the 1950s and has been continually developed until the present day, to the level of posing a

significant threat to international society. To denuclearize the entire Korean peninsula, the two Koreas agreed to dismantle their nuclear-weapons development programs and restrict their nuclear programs to the peaceful use of nuclear power in December 1991.⁷ The two Koreas exchanged the domestically approved agreement in January 1992 to make the agreement binding on the two nations. North Korea complied with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime until 1993. However, North Korea's dissatisfaction with the IAEA system and its relations with the United States brought about the first nuclear crisis in 1993. The official reason for North Korea's dissatisfaction in the first nuclear crisis was an energy issue stemming from a shortage in North Korea's electric power. Thus, the conclusion of the US-North Korean Agreed Framework at Geneva in October 1994 to solve North Korea's energy shortage and to substitute for North Korea's graphite nuclear reactors was made possible. However, this agreement lasted only until 2002, and it did not solve North Korea's dissatisfaction concerning its energy problem and bilateral relations with the United States. North Korea's second nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002, and North Korea presented an additional security issue in relation to the United States as another key reason for its provocations. North Korea had watched the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraq war started by the US-led coalition's invasion in March 2003. As a member of President Bush's 'axis of evil', comprising Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, first mentioned by the President in January 2002, North Korea felt a severe security threat from the United States, believing that it could be the next country after Iraq to be invaded by the United States. Despite the US denial of a planned invasion of North Korea and the SPT dialogue (August 2003–December 2008), North Korea claimed its security issues as the primary justification for its nuclear development program, and carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Despite the agreements listed in the SPT's 'September 19 Joint Declaration' of 2005, the 'February 13 Agreement' of 2007, and the 'October 3 Agreement' of 2007, five years of SPT activities had failed in solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. After the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, a new era in North Korean politics began with the young and volatile new leader, Kim Jong-un. Since then, in defiance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions,⁸ North Korea has continued testing long-range missiles, even using the TEL technology and SLBM system. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly conducted nuclear tests, including a hydrogen bomb tested in the sixth nuclear test of September 3, 2017. With the Kim Jong-un regime, Pyongyang has appeared to be acting out of a desire to display the power and greatness of North Korea, rather than out of legitimate concerns over its national security. Now, due to the worrisome scale and development of North Korea's nuclear and missile technology, it has become even more difficult for international society including the United States to respond effectively to North Korea's demands and find practical solutions to the crises it is provoking.

Against the backdrop of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korea participated in the Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project (March 1995–January 2006) to solve North Korea's power shortage and to replace the graphite nuclear reactors. Until 2002, South Korea had unfolded diverse engagement policies toward North Korea, including the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, Mount Kumgang tourism since November 1998, and the Gaesung Industrial Complex project since 2000, to relieve North Korea's economic crisis and encourage openness and reform of its system. In the wake of the second crisis, South Korea tried to organize multilateral talks, such as three-party talks among North Korea, China, and the United States in April 2003, and an SPT attempt to assuage North Korea's fears regarding the security threat from the United States. However, in the wake of a new crisis and since the beginning of Kim Jong-un's rule, South Korea has taken stronger measures against North Korea, such as the closing of the Gaesung Industrial Complex in January 2017, the suspension of Mount Kumgang tourism, and the halting of economic collaboration between the two Koreas since May 2010. At the same time, South Korea depends on international cooperation to freeze and dismantle North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, such as the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN. However, the fundamental problem related to North Korea's nuclear and missile crises is that South Korea does not have any useful and decisive diplomatic tools to use against North Korea. Even worse, North Korea desires to talk exclusively with the United States, without the involvement of South Korea. From South Korea's perspective, who deeply desires to actively participate in inter-Korean issues and play a decisive role in solving the crises, this has led to frustration and the creation of yet another foreign policy dilemma.

Foreign Relations with Large Neighbors

Because of the North Korean issue, which has taken priority over South Korea's other national interests and consistently threatened its core national interests, South Korea wants to hold favorable and cooperative relations with all its neighbors. This cooperation means that, first, South Korea could concentrate on North Korean issues without the dispersion of its energy and policy resources. Second, South Korea could use its cooperative bilateral relations with neighbors to persuade North Korea into opening and reforming its political and economic systems. Third, South Korea requires the support of other countries for Korean unification and endorsement of a unified Korea within the liberal democratic political and economic system. Finally, South Korea believes that these relations will be helpful to its political security and economic development, as it is a relatively small country in Northeast Asia.

However, the reality of South Korea's bilateral relations with its large neighbors is not always cooperative and satisfactory for South Korea. In addition to the coordination of the different interests of its neighbors, managing bilateral

relations with these nations is also quite difficult for South Korea. In its relations with Japan, multiple historical issues present great barriers to the development of bilateral relations. The sovereignty dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima, maritime border issues, the comfort women issue, the Japanese history textbook issue, and the dispute over the naming of the East Sea/Sea of Japan have continued without any compromise for mutually agreeable solutions. In addition, South Korea's bilateral relations with China suffer from problems rooted in the nations' respective relationships with North Korea. Recently, South Korea's decision concerning the deployment of THAAD in reaction to North Korea's missile launch tests met with severe disapproval from China, and had made bilateral political and economic relations worsen. Furthermore, related to international countermeasures against North Korea's nuclear program, China, who emphasizes the danger of military actions against North Korea, does not always show a supportive attitude toward South Korea and the United States, who have begun emphasizing more hawkish policies in response to continued nuclear and missile tests by North Korea. China and South Korea's repeated disagreements over responses to North Korean issues have sometimes made the two countries' relations awkward and uneasy. Though the United States is a close ally of South Korea, in the process of adjusting themselves to the changed status, the two countries also have conflicting opinions in the sectors of military security, economic trade, and approaches to North Korea. In the case of economic trade, the two countries had difficulties during their 12-year dialogue concerning the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KOR-US FTA). Even after the finalization of the agreement in 2012, the conflicts of interests have continued with the argument of the revision or the denouncement of the KOR-US FTA in 2017. Furthermore, in their policy toward North Korea, the United States, who understands it as only one aspect of its global strategic interests, cannot always coordinate with and support the strategic interests of South Korea, who sets North Korean issues as the top priority of its foreign policy.

'Middle Power Diplomacy' and MIKTA

Since the turn of the 21st century, South Korea, fatigued by the military security conflicts and power politics of international society, has designed a new concept and frame of its diplomacy and organized the multilateral community to realize it. In consideration of South Korea's position in the Northeast Asian region and the current security situation in the peninsula, South Korea designed and proposed 'middle power diplomacy' (MPD) as a new style of niche diplomacy and the future direction of South Korean foreign policy. South Korea's MPD has strategic interests in the concepts of cooperation, harmony, co-existence, and non-power-oriented values in international society. Though the reality of its situation in the Korean peninsula and international society presents clear problems for an idealistic approach, MPD represents a reaction to the South Korea's traditional approach based on competition, conflict, confrontation, and the balance of

power, which South Korea has to inevitably pursue against North Korea. Thus, despite the feasibility problems of such a diplomatic approach in international society, South Korea has emphasized MPD as its long-term diplomatic intention.

Since September 2013, South Korea has gathered several other 'middle power' nations and successfully organized a community, the 'MIKTA' (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) partnership.⁹ Although the concept of a middle power nation is disputed by academics,¹⁰ and the typical diplomatic behavior of a middle power has not yet been agreed upon in international society,¹¹ the five MIKTA countries have agreed to share the same strategic interests and behaviors. MIKTA emphasizes the values of agreement, consent, and cooperation instead of conflict and confrontation, mediating a conflict instead of joining one, open multilateralism instead of closed bilateralism, and forming a policy coalition in times of international crises, which could be understood as the normal preferences of middle powers in international society.¹² MIKTA countries, who are not part of the G7 (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada) or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), want to advance their strategic interests on the issues of health security, gender equality, sustainable development, climate change, and global terrorism, issues that are often overlooked in power politics. In addition, MIKTA wishes to serve as a mediator or arbitrator in international conflicts between advanced countries and underdeveloped countries, that is, between the strong and the weak. Though MIKTA is a newly launched organization and has not yet achieved a meaningful or powerful status as an international actor, South Korea wants to show its intended strategic preference to act through MIKTA activities, which represents the norms of international behavior for middle power countries.

South Korea's Public Diplomacy

In 2010, the South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) declared 'the first year of South Korea's public diplomacy' and established the Korean Wave Research Institute as a research and implementation organ for its new public diplomacy. Officially, its three pillars of action, 'cultural public diplomacy', 'knowledge public diplomacy', and 'policy public diplomacy', formed the basis of its action plan of middle power diplomacy. In September 2011, MOFA established the new position of 'Ambassador for Public Diplomacy', who oversees diplomatic issues in public diplomacy. In January 2012, in the Cultural Affairs Bureau of MOFA, MOFA organized the new sub-branch of public diplomacy, the 'Public Diplomacy Division', who determines and carries out official government policies. The South Korean government enacted the Public Diplomacy Act in August 2016 to legally support the diverse domestic government and non-government actors in public diplomacy, and to induce effective policy results. According to the Public Diplomacy Act, in August 2017, MOFA launched the

'Committee on Public Diplomacy' as a high-level advisory and decision-making body, to coordinate and integrate the diverse conduct of relevant government agencies and semi-government organizations. The Committee on Public Diplomacy finalized and approved 'The Republic of Korea's First Basic Plan on Public Diplomacy (2017–2021)', which is to serve as a guideline for South Korea's public diplomacy.¹³

Although the concept of public diplomacy has existed since the 1960s and thus is not new to international society, South Korea's strategic interest in public diplomacy did not begin until 2010 due to its troubled history. As such, South Korea's intentions concerning the use of public diplomacy differ significantly from those of many hegemonic states, who might use public diplomacy to manipulate public opinion in target countries. The current levels of economic development and political democratization in South Korea could be evaluated as being on par with the advanced countries of international society. However, international society's actual perception and understanding of South Korea are not always consistent with the current reality and South Korea's expectations. South Korea is still considered to be an underdeveloped country by many, due to persistent negative memories of the South Korea of the 1950s and 1960s, when war, severe food shortages, a low gross national income, a less industrialized economy, a disorganized and unstable society, and frequent political disturbances occurred. This history has tended to reproduce distorted views and biases concerning South Korea and to solidify negative, stereotypical images of the country. Moreover, limited information on South Korea and lack of communication have worsened these misunderstandings and distorted images of South Korea. South Korea has attempted to dramatically change these negative images and persistent biases through the positive approach of the 'Korean Wave', that is, the influence of the Korean entertainment industry on international society, since 2000. The South Korean government expects its new public diplomacy to have a positive effect on increasing the international demand for Korean culture and products. In this context, South Korea's public diplomacy has unfolded as one significant part of its major foreign policies since 2010.

CONCLUSION

Despite the changes in the internal and external environments of South Korea's foreign policy in the 21st century, the security issues stemming from the 1950s have continued to dominate its strategic interests and foreign and security policies without reaching any fundamental solution. Rather, these changes make foreign policy decision-making difficult, create multiple policy dilemmas in security issues, increase the burden of decision-making, and restrict its policy choices. Within these policy limits, South Korea has continuously tried to develop effective ideas and policies to overcome its military security issues and

become a peaceful society. South Korea's unification policy, its policy toward North Korea, and its foreign policy toward the rest of Northeast Asia have been influenced by diverse strategic interests and geopolitical circumstances. However, currently in 2017, North Korea's nuclear and missile crises continue to aggravate the security situation while increasing political and military tensions in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region. South Korea's foreign and security policies must respond to these security crises to prevent catastrophe in the Korean peninsula, despite the nation's limited resources and policy inconsistency and fluctuation.

Despite security crises on the peninsula, however, South Korea cannot neglect the non-power and non-military security issues facing international society. Using the concepts of middle power diplomacy and public diplomacy, South Korea's foreign policy strives to maintain its strategic interests and enhance its prestige and position in the international arena. South Korea, who understands the strategic importance of non-military security as much as military security, will conduct foreign policies on common security through multilateral cooperation and international collaboration, like other nations in international society.

Notes

- 1 Refer to the Press Launch of *The Military Balance, 2017*, by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2017-b47b> (accessed date: October 30, 2017).
- 2 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea', on December 13, 1991. Refer to the agreement text at the webpage of UN Peacemaker's Document Retrieval. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_911213_Agreement%20on%20reconciliation%20non%20aggression%20and%20exchanges.pdf (accessed date: October 10, 2017).
- 3 <http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=149834&pageIndex=1> (accessed date: October 1, 2017).
- 4 Refer to the webpage of South Korean government's official index (in Korean). http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1699 (accessed date: October 3, 2017).
- 5 'Press Release' of South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 13, 2016 (in Korean). http://www.mofa.go.kr/news/pressinformation/index.jsp?mofat=001&menu=m_20_30 (accessed date: November 1, 2017).
- 6 Refer to the webpage of UN Security Council. [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2270\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2270(2016)) (accessed date: June 23, 2019).
- 7 Refer to the agreement text in English. http://media.nti.org/documents/korea_denuclearization.pdf (accessed date: June 23, 2019).
- 8 Refer to the Resolution No. 2375 (September 11, 2017) of the Security Council of the UN against North Korea's sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017. [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2375\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2375(2017)) (accessed date: June 23, 2019).
- 9 Refer to the webpage of MIKTA. <http://www.mikta.org/index.php> (accessed date: October 7, 2017).

- 10 James Wurst, 'Leveraging Soft Power Currency against Hard Power Weapons: The Role of Middle Powers in the International Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation', *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, September 2009, p. 68.
- 11 David Cooper, 'Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for "Middle Power Theory"', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 7, no. 3 (2011), p. 319.
- 12 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal (eds.), *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993); Christine Ingebritsen, 'Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 11–23.
- 13 Refer to the webpage of South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.publicdiplomacy.go.kr/engpage/mofaPublicDiplomacy.jsp> (accessed date: October 7, 2017).

North Korea's Foreign Policy: A Non-Isolated Country with Expanding Relations¹

Satoru Miyamoto

INTRODUCTION: STAGES IN NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY

It is generally said that North Korea, formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is isolated in the world. In a way, this is not true. Surprisingly, North Korea has diplomatic relations with many foreign countries. The exact number is not known because it had not been reported by North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as of the end of 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has reported that, as of the end of 2018, North Korea has diplomatic relations with 161 countries, including non-members of the UN. Based on the *Korean Central Yearbook 2018*, published in North Korea, North Korea has diplomatic relations with 166 countries, including non-members of the UN (164 countries are in the UN). However, both would be wrong. South Korea's report excluded the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) and the European Union (EU). *The Korean Central Yearbook 2018* also excluded the EU, however, it included Jordan, Estonia, Botswana, and Eswatini who all had broken off relations with North Korea. According to my survey, North Korea had diplomatic relations with 163 countries at the end of 2018 (160 of which are in the UN) (Table 30.1). If we consider that the People's Republic of China (China) had diplomatic relations with 178 countries, South Korea with 190 countries, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) with 17 countries including non-members of the UN in 2018, we can understand that North Korea's numbers are not negligible.

Table 30.1 Dates diplomatic relations established (in chronological order)¹

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>
Russia ²	October 12, 1948	Syria	July 25, 1966	Benin	February 5, 1973
Mongolia	October 15, 1948	Burundi	March 11, 1967	Gambia	March 2, 1973
Poland	October 16, 1948	Somalia	April 12, 1967	Mauritius	March 16, 1973
Czechoslovakia ³	October 21, 1948	Iraq ¹⁰	January 30, 1968	Sweden	April 7, 1973
Romania	October 26, 1948	South Yemen ¹¹	February 7, 1968	Iran	April 15, 1973
Serbia ⁴	October 30, 1948	Equatorial Guinea	January 30, 1969	Argentina ¹⁴	June 1, 1973
Hungary	November 11, 1948	Zambia	April 12, 1969	Finland	June 1, 1973
Bulgaria	November 29, 1948	Chad	May 8, 1969	Norway	June 22, 1973
Albania	May 17, 1949	Sudan	June 21, 1969	Malaysia	June 30, 1973
China	October 6, 1949	Central African Republic	September 5, 1969	Denmark	July 17, 1973
East Germany ⁵	November 7, 1949	Maldives	June 14, 1970	Iceland	July 27, 1973
Vietnam ⁶	January 31, 1950	Sri Lanka ¹²	July 15, 1970	Bangladesh	December 9, 1973
Algeria ⁷	September 25, 1958	Sierra Leone	October 14, 1971	India	December 10, 1973
Guinea	October 8, 1958	Malta	December 20, 1971	Afghanistan	December 26, 1973
Cuba	August 29, 1960	Cameroon	March 3, 1972	Libya	January 23, 1974
Mali	October 31, 1960	Rwanda	April 22, 1972	Gabon	January 29, 1974
Yemen	March 9, 1963	Chile ¹³	June 1, 1972	Costa Rica ¹⁵	February 10, 1974
Egypt	August 24, 1963	Uganda	August 2, 1972	Guinea-Bissau	March 16, 1974
Indonesia	April 16, 1964	Senegal	September 8, 1972	Nepal	May 15, 1974
Mauritania ⁸	November 12, 1964	Burkina Faso	October 11, 1972	Guyana	May 18, 1974
Cambodia	December 20, 1964	Pakistan	November 9, 1972	Laos	June 24, 1974
Congo Republic	December 24, 1964	Madagascar	November 16, 1972	Jordan ¹⁶	July 5, 1974
Ghana	December 28, 1964	Democratic Republic of Congo	December 15, 1972	Australia ¹⁷	July 31, 1974
Tanzania	January 13, 1965	Togo	January 31, 1973	Niger	September 6, 1974
Palestine ⁹	April 13, 1966			Jamaica	October 9, 1974

(Continued)

Table 30.1 Dates diplomatic relations established (in chronological order)¹ (Continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date diplomatic relations established</i>
Venezuela	October 28, 1974	Nicaragua	August 21, 1979	Saint Kitts and Nevis	December 13, 1991
Botswana ¹⁸	November 27, 1974	Saint Lucia	September 13, 1979	Cyprus	December 23, 1991
Austria	December 17, 1974	Dominica	September 18, 1979	Ukraine	January 9, 1992
Switzerland	December 20, 1974	Zimbabwe	April 18, 1980	Turkmenistan	January 10, 1992
Liechtenstein	December 20, 1974	Lesotho ²⁴	July 19, 1980	Kyrgyzstan	January 21, 1992
Fiji ¹⁹	April 14, 1975	Mexico	September 4, 1980	Kazakhstan	January 28, 1992
Portugal	April 15, 1975	Lebanon	February 12, 1981	Azerbaijan	January 30, 1992
Thailand	May 8, 1975	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	April 3, 1981	Moldova	January 30, 1992
Kenya ²⁰	May 12, 1975	Vanuatu	October 1, 1981	Belarus	February 3, 1992
Myanmar ²¹	May 19, 1975	Nauru	February 25, 1982	Tajikistan	February 5, 1992
Ethiopia	June 5, 1975	Malawi	June 25, 1982	Uzbekistan	February 7, 1992
Mozambique	June 25, 1975	Suriname	October 11, 1982	Armenia	February 13, 1992
Liberia	July 3, 1975	Bolivia ²⁵	December 21, 1982	Oman	May 20, 1992
Tunisia	July 16, 1975	Côte d'Ivoire	October 9, 1984	Slovenia	September 8, 1992
São Tomé and Príncipe	August 9, 1975	Trinidad and Tobago	January 22, 1986	Croatia	November 30, 1992
Cape Verde	August 18, 1975	Colombia	October 24, 1988	Czech Republic	January 1, 1993
Singapore	November 8, 1975	Peru	December 15, 1988	Slovakia	January 1, 1993
Comoros	November 13, 1975	Morocco	February 13, 1990	Qatar	January 11, 1993
Angola	November 16, 1975	Namibia	March 22, 1990	Eritrea	May 25, 1993
Western Sahara ²²	March 15, 1976	Antigua and Barbuda	November 27, 1990	Djibouti	June 14, 1993
Nigeria	May 25, 1976	Bahamas	May 16, 1991	Macedonia	November 2, 1993
Papua New Guinea	June 1, 1976	Belize	June 20, 1991	Estonia	May 7, 1994
Seychelles	August 24, 1976	Lithuania	September 25, 1991	Georgia	November 3, 1994
Barbados	December 5, 1977	Latvia	September 26, 1991	Bosnia and Herzegovina	January 19, 1996
Grenada ²³	May 9, 1979			South Africa	August 10, 1998

Brunei	January 7, 1999	Germany	March 1, 2001	Ireland	December 10, 2003
Italy	January 4, 2000	Luxembourg	March 5, 2001	San Marino	May 13, 2004
Philippines	July 12, 2000	Greece	March 8, 2001	Montenegro	July 16, 2007
United Kingdom	December 12, 2000	Brazil	March 9, 2001	United Arab Emirates	September 17, 2007
Netherlands	January 15, 2001	New Zealand	March 26, 2001	Eswatini (Swaziland) ²⁷	September 20, 2007
Turkey	January 15, 2001	Kuwait	April 4, 2001	Dominican Republic	September 24, 2007
Belgium	January 23, 2001	European Union ²⁶	May 14, 2001	Guatemala	September 26, 2007
Canada	February 1, 2001	Bahrain	May 23, 2001	South Sudan	November 16, 2011
Spain	February 7, 2001	East Timor	November 5, 2002		

Notes: Countries shaded grey broke off relations with North Korea. Countries shaded black are defunct countries or unions of states.

¹ Created by author, who referred to Korean Central News Agency, *Korean Central Yearbook*, (Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency), 1949–2016, and Daniel Wertz, J.J. Oh, and Kim Insung, 'DPRK Diplomatic Relations', The National Committee on North Korea (NCNK), August 2016.

² Assumed diplomatic relations from the Soviet Union.

³ Split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on January 1, 1993.

⁴ Assumed diplomatic relations from Yugoslavia.

⁵ United as the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.

⁶ Relations initially established with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the French Indochina War.

⁷ Relations initially established with National Liberation Front, prior to Algeria winning independence.

⁸ Relations suspended from June 1977 to March 1980.

⁹ The State of Palestine has limited international diplomatic recognition.

¹⁰ Relations broken off in October 1980.

¹¹ United as the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990.

¹² Relations suspended from March 1971 to March 1975.

¹³ Relations suspended in September 1973; later resumed.

¹⁴ Relations broken off in June 1977.

¹⁵ Relations broken off, date unclear.

¹⁶ Relations broken off on February 1, 2018.

¹⁷ Relations suspended from November 1975 to May 2000.

¹⁸ Relations broken off on February 19, 2014.

¹⁹ Relations suspended from 1987 to 2002. Relations broken off, date unclear.

²⁰ Relations suspended, date unclear; September 26, 2008 resumed.

²¹ Relations suspended from November 1983 to April 25, 2007.

²² The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the government declared by the Polisario Front, has limited international diplomatic recognition.

²³ Relations suspended January 1985; later resumed.

²⁴ Relations suspended in August 1986; later resumed.

²⁵ Relations broken off, date unclear.

²⁶ Union of states.

²⁷ Relations broken off, date unclear.

If this is the case, then, why is it seen by the United States and Europe as an isolated country? North Korea is sometimes viewed as extreme or fanatic; we think of it almost as the last mysterious land, like an unexplored and uncivilised kingdom – the perfect setting for adventure movies. Although some people in the United States and Europe understand that North Korea is not isolated, such people are scarce.

Most books on North Korea's foreign policy are focused on the US policy or the Six-Party Talks on the nuclear issue. These works yield much commentary regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, but they often mislead readers into the understanding that North Korea's foreign policy is only towards the United States or members of the Six-Party Talks.

The only members of the Six-Party Talks with which North Korea has diplomatic relations are China and Russia, and some find it remarkable that North Korea does not have diplomatic relations with the United States, Japan, or South Korea. Many authors suggest that the countries with which North Korea does not have diplomatic relations are those most important for North Korea's foreign policy. I find this thinking rather curious. No one thinks that Syria is the most important country for US foreign policy because there are no diplomatic relations between them.

Naturally, countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea should be more important to North Korea than countries that do not. Therefore, to understand the whole picture of North Korea's foreign policy, I would like to explain its history, focusing on the process of expanding diplomatic relations and the countries involved.

North Korea had diplomatic relations with only eight countries in 1948, the year it was established. Since then, North Korea has expanded its diplomatic relations in order to increase the number of countries friendly to them over and against South Korea because the purpose of their foreign policy is to triumph over South Korea with the goal of unification on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, a policy for South Korea is not included in North Korea's foreign policy. We can safely say that expanding diplomatic relations has historically been the goal of North Korea's foreign policy.

North Korea's foreign policy has been marked by several stages since its establishment in 1948. North Korea kept centred on strong diplomatic ties with the Communist Bloc in the 1950s and 1960s. However, amid an increasingly fierce conflict between China and the Soviet Union, North Korea began to shift the pillar of foreign policy from the Communist Bloc to the Third World in the 1970s. North Korea rapidly began to expand diplomatic relations to Third World countries and became an observer of the UN and a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. During the 1980s, North Korea then began an omnidirectional diplomacy for normalising diplomatic relations with all countries. It began to resume relations with the Communist Bloc and tried to look for new talks with the United States and South Korea. After the collapse of the Communist Bloc, lacking foreign currency and facing food shortages, North Korea began to enter into diplomatic relations

with Western countries. However, in sharp conflict with the United States over the nuclear issue, they began to develop nuclear weapons. Although there have been opportunities to talk with the United States in the Six-Party Talks since 2003, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed sanctions against North Korea because of this nuclear development. Therefore, North Korea came to use diplomatic relations with Third World countries to get foreign currency to cover the losses incurred by sanctions since around 2006. North Korea announced the completion of nuclear development at the end of 2017, began to talk with the United States, and attended the US-North Korea Summit in 2018 for security and lifting sanctions; however, this attempt did not work well.

For the reason mentioned above, I would like to explain the history of North Korea's foreign policy in four stages: (1) Communist Bloc diplomacy: 1948–1971, (2) Third World diplomacy: 1971–1980, (3) Omnidirectional diplomacy: 1980–2003, and (4) Six-Party Talks and diplomacy against sanctions: 2003–2018. These stages show us that there has been no consistency in how its foreign policy has sought to triumph over South Korea.

COMMUNIST BLOC DIPLOMACY: 1948–1971

North Korea was founded on September 9, 1948. After Japan's surrender in 1945, the Red Army of the Soviet Union occupied the area north of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula. Under the influence of the Soviet Union, pro-communist Korean groups won power and established a government in opposition to South Korea on August 15, 1948.

North Korea had strong ties with the Communist Bloc from the beginning. Leaders of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the ruling party of North Korea, also had strong friendships with leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). Until the mid 1960s, North Korea entered diplomatic relations only with Communist Bloc or pro-communist countries. North Korea was supported by the Communist Bloc during the Korean War, which broke out when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950. After the ceasefire in 1953, the Communist Bloc sent much aid to North Korea for reconstruction. A number of units of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force also remained in North Korea after the ceasefire for reconstruction.

However, de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union brought a large-scale struggle into North Korea. Nikita Khrushchev, supreme leader of the CPSU, made a speech about de-Stalinisation on February 25, 1956. Kim Il-Sung, supreme leader of the WPK, also faced the August Faction Incident (August 30–31) in 1956, which was an attempted criticism against him by the Soviet (Russian-Korean group) and the Yanan (Korean group by virtue of the strength of China) factions. Their attempt failed due to a counterattack by Kim Il-Sung's group, and four members of the Yanan faction escaped to China. Furthermore, some members of these groups

were purged from the WPK. This incident led to the intervention of the CPC and the CPSU into the WPK.

On September 23, 1956, Kim Il-Sung accepted the demands of the CPC and the CPSU to cease all purges and to rehabilitate the leaders of the Yanan and Soviet factions. Of course, he was not hospitable when he faced these demands. Seven years later, the WPK confessed that the demands were a 'bitter experience'.²

Relations between North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union became unstable after the August Faction Incident. Kim Il-Sung, as a result, restarted the purge of the Yanan and Soviet factions at the end of 1956. The withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force from North Korea in 1958 further worsened North Korea–China relations.

In addition, the WPK was involved in the conflicts that had been going on between the Soviet Union and China since the late 1950s. On a tightrope between them, North Korea was victorious in concluding treaties of military alliance with both countries in July 1961 for national defence against the United States and South Korea.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, in which the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba, revealed the treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union to be a waste of paper. After the WPK established a new self-defence policy at the end of 1962, the WPK began to criticise the CPSU, the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev as revisionists since the beginning of 1963. At the same time, North Korea strengthened brotherly relations with China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which rebelled against the Soviet Union. The WPK remained aligned with China until 1965 amid the conflict between China and the Soviet Union.

Relations between North Korea and China hit a tipping point in 1965. When Khrushchev lost his position as supreme leader of the CPSU and the Soviet Union in October 1964, North Korea, China, and North Vietnam instantly tried to resume brotherly relations with the Soviet Union. Aleksei Kosygin, the new first deputy premier of the Soviet Union, visited North Korea, China, and North Vietnam in February 1965 to mend relationships. North Korea and North Vietnam succeeded in declaring brotherly relations with the Soviet Union through Kosygin's visit. In addition, North Korea declared its support for North Vietnam, which was fighting against the United States. However, China failed to mend its relationship with the Soviet Union. Even though North Korea succeeded in restoring the relationship with the Soviet Union, it had to back up on the tightrope between the Soviet Union and China.

To sidestep the conflict between the two powers, Kim Il-Sung declared '*Juche* (self-reliance) in ideology, independence in politics, self-support in the economy, and self-defence in national defence' as the WPK's stand on April 14, 1965 in Indonesia.³ This meant that North Korea did not intend to participate in the Sino-Soviet split. In addition, North Korea began to expand diplomatic relations with anti-communist countries in the Third World.

This attitude provoked China to criticise North Korea as revisionist, whereupon North Korea crossly criticised China as dogmatist. However, North Korea

did not side with the Soviet Union. The article 'Defence Independence' in *Rodong Sinmun* on August 12, 1966 declared that North Korea would not take sides between the Soviet Union and China.

North Korea, in conflict with the United States, needed military assistance from the Communist Bloc. However, the Communist Bloc was about to collapse due to the Sino-Soviet split. A united Communist Bloc was desirable for North Korea in its conflict with the United States. Therefore, North Korea decided to dispatch auxiliary troops to support North Vietnam in the Vietnam War as a member of the Communist Bloc. Both China and the Soviet Union dispatched auxiliary troops and sent considerable aid to North Vietnam. Kim Il-Sung thought that this participation in the Vietnam War on the side of North Vietnam was symbolic of a solid Communist Bloc.

On October 5, 1966 at the WPK conference, Kim Il-Sung declared the need to dispatch North Korean troops to North Vietnam and the need for an increased show of power in South Korea. He thought that forming a united front against 'American imperialism' would make the Communist Bloc solid. North Korea tried to fight against 'American imperialism' and its South Korean 'puppet' in Vietnam and tried to create a new front line in this struggle.

North Korea dispatched its Air Force 203rd Unit in October 1966 to North Vietnam. The 203rd Unit consisted of around 150 members, including 24 pilots, and 14 of them died in the war. It then changed its name to the 923rd Regiment under the North Vietnamese Air Force commander and shot down 26 US Air Force planes during the war.

North Korea sent operatives to South Korea to engage in the violent struggles. Many terrorist incidents and small-scale military clashes had occurred there. North Korea endorsed not only the small-scale military clashes but also bold strikes against South Korea and the US Army. North Korean guerrilla units tried to attack the South Korean presidential house on January 21, 1968. Two days later, the North Korean Navy attacked and captured the US Navy ship *Pueblo*. Then on April 15, 1969, the North Korean Air Force shot down an EC-121, a US Navy plane, over the Sea of Japan.

North Korea fought against 'American imperialism' and its 'puppet' in a vain effort to solidify the Communist Bloc. Despite Kim Il-Sung's desire, the Communist Bloc could not renew their past ties. In March 1969, the Soviet Union and China clashed militarily on Damansky Island on the border between the Soviet Union and China. The leaders in North Korea were shaken as we can see from the fact that this incident was not reported within North Korea.

After the clash, North Korea put forth an effort to heal relationships with China. In September 1969, Choe Yong-Gon, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, visited China to talk with Premier Zhou Enlai. Kim Il-Sung also visited China to talk with Supreme Leader Mao Zedong in October 1970.

North Korea restored its friendly relationship with China; therefore, they held a ten-year anniversary celebration of the conclusion of military alliance treaties

with both the Soviet Union and China. The celebration for the Soviet Union was held on July 6, 1971 and that for China on July 11. North Korea seemed to have regained its friendship with both countries. However, an incident that would fundamentally upset North Korea's policy against South Korea and the United States was quietly underway in Beijing at that exact moment.

During its 23-year Communist Bloc diplomacy, North Korea established diplomatic relations with 37 countries, including Communist Bloc and pro-communist countries (Table 30.1: from Russia to Sri Lanka). After 1965, North Korea began to have diplomatic relations with anti-communist countries; however, there were just 13 of them, including Palestine. Following the Sino-American rapprochement, North Korea found it necessary to enter into diplomatic relations with more anti-communist countries.

THIRD WORLD DIPLOMACY: 1971–1980

Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor for the United States, visited Beijing and talked with Zhou Enlai from July 9–11, 1971, opening a channel of communication with China. Four days later, on July 15, Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang to explain the purpose and process of Kissinger's visit and their agreement regarding US President Richard Nixon's visit to China. North Korean leaders seemed hesitant to agree with Zhou Enlai for a while; however, they finally conveyed their agreement to China on July 30.

The Sino-American rapprochement changed North Korea's foreign policy, and combat against the United States and South Korea was halted. On August 6, 1971, Kim Il-Sung, who determined to turn in a new direction, declared that North Korea would be able to talk to the South Korean administration. After exchanging correspondence, a preliminary meeting between the South and North Korean Red Crosses was held on September 20. It was the beginning of talks between the South and the North.

China's accession to become a member of the UN also fundamentally upset North Korea's foreign policy. On October 25, 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which recognised the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN. At the same time, the People's Republic of China also received permanent membership in the UNSC. Kim Il-Sung, who had always criticised the UN before, changed his principle from abstention from the UN to participation in the UN as an observer. As he said on January 4, 1967, 'The UN has neither the qualifications nor the right to meddle in the Korean question, and moreover, in our country it is being used as an instrument to justify invasion by the US imperialists'⁴. However, his valuation of the UN changed, and on June 1, 1972, he said that if the UN invited delegates of North Korea with no strings attached, they would send their delegates to the UN General Assembly⁵. For UN diplomacy, North Korea began diplomatic relations

with many Third World countries after 1972. North Korea had begun relations with only two countries in 1971; however, this increased with nine more countries in 1972 and a further fifteen in 1973.

North Korea pursued North-South talks and UN diplomacy in parallel. The North-South talks advanced further after the Red Cross talks. After secret mutual visits of high-class agents, both Koreas announced a joint communiqué on July 4, 1972 which agreed that the unification of the Korean Peninsula should be achieved independently through peaceful means, along with other matters. At the UN, Algeria and twelve other countries proposed on July 17 to discuss the Korean issue with the North Korean representative. South Korea, however, opposed this due to the success of the North-South talks. In fact, the North-South Governmental Talks began as the North-South Coordinating Committee on November 30. However, North Korea failed to delegate its representative to the UN General Assembly due to South Korea's opposition and the lack of advocates in that year.

North Korea had to choose between North-South talks or UN diplomacy, and after 1973, North Korea prioritised promoting UN diplomacy. A number of high-class chiefs from North Korea began to visit Third World countries to request support for North Korea at the UN in exchange for assistance to those countries.

In addition, North Korea decided on April 6, 1973 to send a 'letter addressed to parliaments and governments all over the world' requesting a discussion of the Korean issue with the North Korean representative at the UN. In joining the World Health Organization on May 17, North Korea qualified to establish an office for its representative observers at the UN headquarters in New York.

A difference between the two Koreas in UN policy surfaced shortly thereafter. Park Chung-Hee, president of South Korea, declared on June 23 that South Korea was willing to join the UN rather than oppose the accession of North Korea. On the same day, rejecting the idea that the two Koreas individually join the UN, Kim Il-Sung claimed that the two should join the UN as one nation after their unification had been achieved.

North Korea cancelled the North-South talks and advocated discussing Korean issues in the UN in order to countervail the United States and South Korea. On August 28, 1973, North Korea announced the cancellation of the North-South Coordinating Committee due to an incident in which the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency abducted Kim Dae-Jung, a South Korean politician, in Tokyo on August 8. On the other hand, North Korea was able to initiate discussion on Korean issues at the UN General Assembly due to the attendance of the North Korean observer. North Korea opened a resident office for its representative observers at the UN headquarters on September 5. In addition, during the 28th UN General Assembly that began on September 18, member countries decided on September 21 to hold discussions on Korean issues and on October 1 to invite the North Korean observers to the Assembly. North Korean observers succeeded in participating in discussions on Korean issues at the UN General Assembly's first

committee meeting on November 14. It was the debut of North Korea at the UN, and as a result, they obtained the decision to dismantle the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on November 21, as Kim Il-Sung requested.

At the UN General Assembly, North Korea received support from many countries in the Third World and sent assistance to some of those countries. For example, North Korea dispatched Air Force units to Egypt and Syria to fight against Israel during the October War in 1973. The unit in Egypt consisted of 20 to 30 pilots, 8 flight controllers, 5 interpreters, 3 administrative men, a doctor, and a cook. It was a small unit, but in appreciation, Egypt sent ballistic missiles to North Korea for the first time in the 1970s. This marked the beginning of North Korea's development of ballistic missiles⁶.

North Korea's next objective was the conclusion of a peace treaty in the Korean War between North Korea and the United States; however, they failed to talk directly with the United States on this issue, neither did they pass a resolution on the issue at the UN General Assembly in 1974. To fix the situation, Kim Il-Sung suggested joining the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (CNAC) to get more Third World support at the UN. North Korea succeeded in joining the CNAC on August 25, 1975. At the same time, South Korea was refused entry into the CNAC. North Korea, supported by the Third World countries, succeeded in passing its resolution at the UN General Assembly on November 18, 1975. However, South Korea also succeeded in passing its resolution which did not request the conclusion of a peace treaty. Therefore, the North Korean resolution became meaningless.

North Korea tried to pass its resolution in the UN again, blocking the passage of the South Korean resolution in 1976. The resolution was then passed at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit on August 19 before the UN General Assembly. However, the previous day, a serious incident which shook North Korea's foreign policy had occurred between the North Korean Army and the US Army.

North Korean soldiers killed two US army officers who were pruning a poplar tree with an axe in the Joint Security Area located in the Korean Demilitarized Zone on August 18, 1976. This incident hit North Korea with enormous impact. North Korea mobilised all armed forces for defence against a possible counterattack from the United States and South Korea the next day. The United States and South Korea also mobilised armed forces to prepare for a second attack from North Korea. On August 21, the United States and South Korea logged the poplar tree which caused this incident. North Korea, however, avoided any battle with them. The same day, Kim Il-Sung sent a letter to the US Army that expressed regret. The situation was diffused because the US Army accepted Kim Il-Sung's regrets.

After the situation was stabilised, North Korea abandoned UN diplomacy. A representative in the North Korean observers' resident office at the UN retracted a resolution concerning Korean issues that had been submitted to the 31st UN General Assembly on September 21, 1976. Kim Il-Sung did not again attempt to discuss resolutions concerning Korean issues at the UN General Assembly.

Nevertheless, North Korea continued to participate actively in the CNAC because they could win support from more countries in international society in this way, even after withdrawing from UN diplomacy. The reason for this participation seemed to have been to acquire foreign currency through the promotion of trade. On March 11, 1978, Kim Il-Sung suggested promoting trade not only with communist countries but also with many other countries, given that depressed trade was obstructing economic development in North Korea. His interest in promoting trade might also have been prompted by burgeoning foreign debts that worsened the North Korean foreign currency reserves, by a rapid increase in crude oil prices that worsened North Korean imports, and by the depression of the export of nonferrous metal that worsened North Korean exports. Particularly, debt default by North Korea to Western countries had harmed the world's trust in North Korea. It could be said that North Korea had to enhance its relationships with Third World countries to promote trade and economic growth.

While continuing Third World diplomacy, North Korea showed that they had maintained a good relationship with China, even after the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death. To demonstrate the good relation between the two countries, Hua Guofeng, president of China, visited North Korea in May 1978.

During the nine years of Third World diplomacy, North Korea had diplomatic relations with 65 countries (Table 30.1: from Sierra Leone to Dominica). They were almost all Third World countries, including Northern Europe and a part of Western Europe. North Korea had failed in its UN diplomacy. However, forming many diplomatic relations in a short period of time was a significant achievement for the advancement of North Korea in the international society. North Korea grew apart from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during its UN diplomacy and did not have diplomatic relations with many Western countries, including the United States and Japan. North Korea would face these issues in the next era.

OMNIDIRECTIONAL DIPLOMACY: 1980–2003

In 1980, Kim Il-Sung had the chance to open a path to improved relations with the United States. Stephen J. Solarz, a member of the US House of Representatives, met Kim Il-Sung on July 18 as the first US public official to visit North Korea since the Korean War ceasefire. Kim Il-Sung hoped to improve North Korea's relations with the United States in the meeting with Solarz.

Kim Il-Sung also had the chance to open a path to improved relations with the Soviet Union in 1980. He met Soviet Union supreme leader Leonid Brezhnev on May 8 at the funeral of Josip Broz Tito, president of Yugoslavia. It was the first time since 1961 that Kim Il-Sung had met the supreme leader of the Soviet Union.

However, North Korea could not take advantage of the opportunity to improve relations with the United States. On January 10, 1984, North Korea proposed talks between them, with South Korea as an observer. The North Korean Ministry of Foreign

Affairs also proposed a triangle foreign ministerial conference between North Korea, the United States, and South Korea on August 6, 1986. The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea proposed that the US Congress hold a conference between the two Congresses on July 20, 1988 as well. However, even after Solarz's visit, the United States had not changed its policy that prevented them from negotiating directly with North Korea.

Although North Korea failed to talk directly with the United States, owing to the new Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union brought on in 1979 by the Soviet-Afghan War, relations with the Soviet Union improved dramatically following the Kim-Brezhnev meeting, even though Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982. In May 1984, Kim Il-Sung visited the Soviet Union for the first time since 1961 to improve relations between the two countries. Then, on August 15, 1985, North Korea invited an enormous delegation from the Soviet Union to the 40th Anniversary Ceremony of Korean Liberation. North Korea and the Soviet Union declared on December 27 in a joint communiqué that a military alliance between the two countries was possible. Before the joint communiqué, North Korea had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 12 as requested by the Soviet Union in return for obtaining nuclear support.

However, North Korea was being driven into a corner in the world through a diplomatic blind alley. In 1981, when South Korea was chosen to host the 1988 Summer Olympics, North Korea insisted that both Koreas co-host the Olympics, but South Korea declined. North Korea stymied the Olympics by consensus-building through diplomatic activities and terrorist attacks against South Korea. However, 159 countries, including those of the Communist Bloc and the Third World which had been considered as pro-North Korea participated in the 1988 Summer Olympics. North Korea had too many expectations, not only on the Communist Bloc but also the Third World. North Korea hosted the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students on July 1–8, 1989, competing against the Olympics, and reported that 177 countries participated. This number was greater than that for the Olympics, but its international influence was lower.

The Communist Bloc was also no longer reliable for North Korea. After the Olympics in 1988, Communist Bloc countries began to have diplomatic relations with South Korea. First, Hungary opened diplomatic relations with South Korea on February 1, 1989. North Korea angrily downgraded the North Korean ambassador in Hungary to acting ambassador. However, country after country in Eastern Europe opened diplomatic relations with South Korea, and finally, the Soviet Union did so as well on September 30, 1990. Therefore, although North Korea had recovered its alliance and friendship with the Communist Bloc, its efforts were wasted.

North Korea also made efforts to improve relations with Western countries. North Korea began its secret contact with the United States in Beijing on December 6, 1988. Kim Il-Sung mentioned the possibility of a US-North Korea Summit for the first time on January 29, 1989. The end of the Cold War had also created an environment to improve relations with Western countries. The Cold War between the

United States and the Soviet Union ended with the Malta Summit held on December 2–3, 1989. To improve relations with South Korea, North and South high-level talks were held for the first time in Seoul on September 4, 1990, and both joined the UN as full members at the same time on September 17, 1991. North Korea began negotiations to normalise diplomatic relations with Japan on January 30, 1991.

To dispel the United States's and South Korea's suspicion of nuclear development, North Korea signed the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on January 20, 1992. Two days later, the United States held high-level talks with North Korea in New York. The United States and South Korea aborted their joint military exercises, and North Korea signed the protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accepted nuclear inspection on January 30.

However, North Korea's vicissitudes continued. With the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, North Korea had to enter diplomatic relations with each former Union Republic of the Soviet Union in 1992. The now worthless military alliance with the Soviet Union was nullified in 1996. China also opened diplomatic relations with South Korea on August 24, 1992. On November 5, North Korea failed to normalise diplomatic relations with Japan due to the breakdown of negotiations over the suspicion that North Korea had abducted Japanese people. North Korea clashed again with the United States and South Korea over nuclear inspections and denied a special inspection demanded by the IAEA on February 25, 1993.

The United States and South Korea resumed joint military exercises on March 9, 1993. Kim Jong-Il, successor to Kim Il-Sung and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, ordered mobilisation for all North Korean armed forces on the same day and announced withdrawal from the NPT on March 12. The withdrawal was stopped by talks between the United States and North Korea on June 11; however, the conflict continued.

Former US President Jimmy Carter's visit to North Korea in June 1994 offered an opportunity for accommodation between the two countries. Even after Kim Il-Sung's death on July 8, North Korea succeeded in concluding the Agreed Framework with the United States on October 21, 1994. The North Korean reactor would be shut down and replaced with light water reactors provided by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). North Korea was then provided 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year until completion of the first light water reactors.

North Korean omnidirectional diplomacy began to go well at that time. In the next year, North Korea became a famine-stricken country due to the economic loss suffered from the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the failure of economic policy. However, North Korea received much aid not only from former/present socialist countries and the Third World but also Western countries and the UN. North Korea was also able to conclude the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourly Relations, and Cooperation with Russia on February 9, 2000, replacing the abandoned treaty for military alliance.

The Inter-Korean summits (North-South Leaders Meeting) held on June 13–15, 2000 took North Korean omnidirectional diplomacy another stride towards a new diplomatic horizon. Kim Jong-Il sent a special envoy, Jo Myong-Rok, to the United States for a meeting with US President Bill Clinton at the White House. To prepare for the US president's visit to Pyongyang and the US-North Korea Summit, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright paid a visit to North Korea for the first time to meet Kim Jong-Il in October 2000. The attempt at a summit failed because Clinton's term as US President had expired; however, North Korea continued its omnidirectional diplomacy and began diplomatic relations with 13 countries, including many Western countries and the EU in 2001.

North Korea extended their condolences to the United States for the attack on September 11, 2001. However, US President George W. Bush criticised North Korea as one of the axes of evil powers on January 29, 2002. North Korea rebelled against the United States. This symbolised that the relation between the United States and North Korea had already deteriorated.

North Korea tried again to negotiate with Japan to normalise diplomatic relations. After numerous meetings between the two sides, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-Il on September 17, 2002. Kim Jong-Il admitted for the first time that North Korean agents had abducted many Japanese people over several decades, which, for many years, North Korea had insisted was a trumped-up history and had criticised Japan as a dissembler. However, North Korea's report that most of the abducted Japanese had died made the Japanese public angry. They did not want to normalise diplomatic relations but to impose sanctions against North Korea. North Korea began negotiations with Japan, but they soon stalled.

Relations between the United States and North Korea also began to come to an end at about this point. James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited North Korea on October 3–5, 2002 to discuss the nuclear issue. After he left, North Korea criticised his high-handed, arrogant attitude. Kelly also reported that North Korea admitted they had a program to highly enrich uranium, in violation of the Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea refuted this allegation as being based on no evidence but emphasised that it was entitled to possess nuclear weapons against the United States to defend their sovereignty.

The KEDO announced on November 14, 2002 that they would stop supplying heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea also announced on December 12 that it reopened nuclear facilities which had been closed by the Agreed Framework. They unsealed the nuclear facilities on December 22, and decided to dismiss the IAEA inspectors from North Korea.

North Korea eventually steered its destiny in the direction to possess nuclear weapons, announcing its withdrawal from the NPT again on January 10, 2003. Therefore, the Agreement Framework between the United States and North Korea collapsed. China encouraged North Korea and the United States to talk in Beijing, and triangle talks between the United States, North Korea, and China were held on April 23, 2003. However, they could not produce any results.

North Korea announced on April 30 that it would acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence against the United States. However, many intellectuals in the United States and South Korea thought North Korea was just bluffing to get assistance from other countries as a brinkmanship diplomacy. This misperception gave North Korea time to develop nuclear weapons. International society would face a nuclearised North Korea in the next era.

During its 23 years of omnidirectional diplomacy, North Korea tried to improve relations with all countries in the world, particularly those in the Communist Bloc, and Western countries including the United States and Japan against which North Korea had adopted hostile policies. In fact, North Korea had diplomatic relations with 64 countries including Third World, former socialistic, and Western countries during this time (Table 30.1: from Zimbabwe to East Timor). Moreover, they improved relations with South Korea through the Inter-Korean summits. In the end, however, North Korea failed to improve relations with the United States and Japan. These two countries also had opportunities to talk with North Korea after the collapse of the Agreement Framework, but North Korea took a different route over the long run.

SIX-PARTY TALKS AND DIPLOMACY AGAINST SANCTIONS: 2003–2018

To resolve the North Korean issue, China hosted the Six-Party Talks for the first time in August 2003. Not only North Korea, the United States, and China but also Japan, Russia, and South Korea participated. However, the first round of talks did not produce any results. North Korea continued to discuss the nuclear issue with the United States while developing nuclear weapons.

The second round of the Six-Party Talks in February 2004 and the third in June 2004 also produced no results. The United States demanded a 'Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)' of North Korea's nuclear program, while North Korea demanded the conclusion of a peace treaty for the Korean War and the withdrawal of the US Army from South Korea. The non-negotiable attitudes of both countries impeded compromise on the nuclear issue.

Accordingly, the Six-Party Talks failed to prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons. On February 10, 2005, North Korea made the solemn announcement that it finally possessed nuclear weapons and would suspend North Korean participation in the talks.

The situation improved when President Bush used the title 'Mr' for Kim Jong-Il on May 31, 2005. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said that Bush's remarks would help create an atmosphere supportive of the Six-Party Talks on July 3. When Kim Jong-Il met Chung Dong-Young, Minister of Unification of South Korea, on July 17, he said that if the United States would firmly recognise North Korea as a respected partner, North Korea could return to the Six-Party Talks.

The Six-Party Talks resumed in the first round of their fourth phase on July 26 and closed without result on August 7. However, the second phase that began on September 13 achieved agreement on a joint statement on September 19. North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and programs and return to the NPT as soon as possible, while the United States affirmed it had no intention of attacking or invading North Korea and would provide a security guarantee to this effect.

However, North Korea clashed with the United States again over the Banco Delta Asia issue which had frozen accounts concerning North Korea as part of sanctions placed by the US Department of the Treasury. North Korea insisted that it was sanctions against North Korea and declared that they would take tough measures against the United States. The United States refuted the claim. The first phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks in November 2005 concluded without any result.

On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles over the Japan Sea. All participants in the Six-Party talks except North Korea and the UNSC criticised this action. On October 3, North Korea announced that it would soon conduct a nuclear test, and this was achieved on October 9. Clearly, North Korea was showing their possession of real ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as a deterrence against the United States.

The UNSC adapted the first sanction resolution against North Korea under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter on October 14, 2006. The United States, however, contacted North Korea to resume the Six-Party Talks on October 31. The talks resumed for the second phase of the fifth round in December, and the third phase in achieved the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on February 13, 2007. North Korea would shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facilities for the purpose of eventual abandonment, and in return, the other parties would provide North Korea with emergency energy assistance.

The sixth round of the Six-Party Talks began in March 2007 and continued to be productive for some time. This round also issued the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on October 2. In accordance with this, North Korea shut down and sealed its nuclear facilities and declared the details of its nuclear program. The United States also lifted part of its sanctions against North Korea, and the United States and other parties provided heavy oil to North Korea. However, the United States and North Korea conflicted over the validation process for the declaration of the details of the North Korean nuclear program.

The Six-Party Talks concluded when North Korea launched a missile on April 9, 2009. The United States and the UNSC criticised North Korea over the launch, and North Korea declared that it would withdraw from the Six-Party Talks and develop more nuclear weapons. Although talks between North Korea and the United States, Japan, and South Korea have continued intermittently, the Six-Party Talks have not resumed.

North Korea then publicly resumed nuclear weapon development. A second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009, and the UNSC adopted a second sanctions resolution against North Korea on June 13. After the death of Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011, the present supreme leader, Kim Jong-Un, has carried on

nuclear weapon development. By the end of 2018, North Korea had conducted a total of six nuclear tests. The UNSC has adopted sanctions against North Korea based on Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter a total of nine times.

North Korean missile development is also a serious issue for the United States, Japan, and South Korea. North Korea developed its own missiles based on missiles from Egypt by reverse engineering and has exported missiles to Middle East countries opposing Israel since the 1980s. This is considered a distinct threat to Israeli national defence, with North Korean missiles spread from the East Asia to Middle East. North Korea has developed new, bigger ballistic missiles since the 1990s, and it is estimated to have many missiles which can attack neighbouring countries. Now it is thought that they have succeeded in developing better performance nuclear warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which can attack the US mainland as deterrence. Thus, North Korean missiles have developed parallel to the development of nuclear weapons.

The UNSC has adopted resolutions for sanctions against North Korea aimed at stopping its nuclear and missile development. These resolutions have embargoed, for example, all arms and related materials, financial transactions, and technical training. In 2017, the UNSC adopted four resolutions to restrict North Korea's foreign currency earnings. Now some civilian goods, for example, some minerals, coals, statues, textiles, and vessel and aircraft crewing services, are also prohibited from being imported from North Korea.

It was estimated, however, that the North Korean economy was still developing at the end of 2018, even under sanctions. Mass starvation has become a thing of the past. It looks likely that the UNSC resolutions will not work. It is not always right that UN members comply with UNSC resolutions. Although all members of the UN were called upon to report concrete sanction measures to the UNSC, only 124 countries of 193 reported from 2006 to 2018. The countries that do not report do not comply.

We can easily understand what type of countries have not reported if they are categorised by UN regional groups. All 28 in the Western European and Others Group, 22 of 23 in the Eastern European Group, and 34 of 53 in the Asia-Pacific Group, excluding North Korea, have reported. The United States and Kiribati are not included in any groups, and of the two, only the United States has reported. Half or more than half of the members have reported in the above groups. However, fewer than half of the members have reported in the Latin American and Caribbean Group (16 of 33) and in the African Group (23 of 54).

All members of the Six-Party Talks, excluding North Korea, have reported. Thus, China and Russia have done as the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Almost all countries that have reported are not Third World countries like the African, Latin American, and Caribbean Groups. This could mean that North Korea's foreign policy towards Third World countries has had a partial effect in evading the UNSC sanctions. North Korea has built good relations with Third World countries since the 1970s for UN diplomacy, as noted above. After the UNSC

sanctions that began in 2006, North Korea has used Third World diplomacy to evade those sanctions.

Donald Trump, who assumed the US presidency in January 2017, snapped and snarled at Kim Jong-Un at first; however, he started to hold the US-North Korea Summit for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in 2018. Kim Jong-Un attended the US-North Korea Summit for the sake of security and lifting sanctions, but their talks have not accomplished the goal yet. North Korea still needs to make an effort in diplomacy against sanctions.

From the beginning of the Six-Party Talks to the end of 2018, about 14 years, North Korea entered into diplomatic relations with only eight countries (Table 30.1: from Ireland to South Sudan). This indicates that North Korea's expanding diplomatic relations have quietened down. Thirty-three countries in the UN did not have diplomatic relations with North Korea at the end of 2018, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, France, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Of course, North Korea cannot plan to conclude diplomatic relations with South Korea because it is the target of unification. However, North Korea has not opened diplomatic relations with any country since South Sudan on November 16, 2011. Furthermore, Botswana and Jordan have broken off diplomatic relations with North Korea since then, so it seems that expanding diplomatic relations have hit a peak. However, their continuous diplomatic efforts towards Third World countries have brought significant benefits to North Korea under the UNSC sanctions. I can safely say that the efforts to expand diplomatic relations have been worthwhile for present-day North Korea.

CONCLUSION

North Korea has expanded its diplomatic relations since its foundation. Initially, it had diplomatic relations with only Communist Bloc and pro-communist countries. However, diplomatic relations with many Third World countries began in the early 1970s for the purpose of UN diplomacy. Furthermore, North Korea has tried to form diplomatic relations with all countries since the 1980s and has succeeded in forming relations with many Western countries as well. However, it has failed to establish relations with the United States. Thus, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and missiles as deterrence against the United States.

Because of nuclear and missile development, the UNSC has imposed sanctions on North Korea. This may give the impression that North Korea is a more isolated country than before. In reality, it is difficult to say that North Korea is isolated because it has diplomatic relations with many countries in the world. In addition, these broader North Korean diplomatic relations have hurt the effectiveness of the UNSC-imposed sanctions.

North Korea continues the effort to lift sanctions and maintain security by talks with the United States; however, this attempt has not worked well. In addition, the

expansion of North Korea's diplomatic relations has reached a peak. Therefore, to evade those sanctions, North Korea will try to maintain its diplomatic relations. Although the countries that are making efforts to dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles would seek to counter this, I can safely say that the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea depends on whether North Korea can maintain its diplomatic relations or not.

Notes

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Taiwan's Foreign Policy: Evolution, Challenges and Opportunities

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Alan Hao Yang
and Liang-Chi Russell Hsiao

INTRODUCTION: PARADIGM SHIFT OF TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Since the Second World War (1939–1945), Taiwan's foreign policy has been constrained by an international environment shaped by great power politics. When the Kuomintang (KMT) government relocated to Taiwan, cross-strait relations was the only focus of decision-makers and became the key driver for Taiwan's foreign policy. This triggered a longstanding diplomatic competition between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, in which the former remains a communistic government while the latter became a democratic government.

Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), had 67 diplomatic allies in 1969 and now it only has 15 diplomatic allies in 2019 due to the constraint imposed by the PRC for decades and its intensifying pressure campaign. However, most countries nevertheless keep close albeit unofficial relations with Taiwan; there are currently 118 Taiwanese representative offices in 80 countries and regions. In 2019, the Taiwanese passport enjoys visa-free status in 149 countries, which makes it one of the most convenient passports in the globe.

Since the Cold War era (1947–1991), Taiwan's foreign policy has undergone a paradigm shift that is moving away from a 'Cross-Strait Paradigm' to an 'International Relations Paradigm', a new paradigm based upon Taiwanese identities and values. The former is represented by the ideological and diplomatic orientation influenced by the KMT's 'One China' foreign policy mentality. During the period of one-party authoritarian rule, Taiwan's leaders were consumed by the debate of which side of the Taiwan Strait represented 'China'. Due to the

cross-Strait policy manifested in Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's dictum: 'Han people and the thieves cannot both stand',¹ diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China was zero-sum. The 'International Relations Paradigm', on the other hand, centers on pragmatic international engagement that is based on the values and importance of Taiwan in its own right.

The impetus behind the paradigm shift came at international and domestic levels. At the international level, Taiwan benefitted from a transformation in the Cold War political structure to a more globalized world, from bi-polarity to the international system of multi-polarity centered on a superpower, the United States.

The rise of Asia contributed to greater international exposure and engagements for Taiwan. For instance, in the late 1980s, thanks to the development of open regionalism in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan participated in Indo-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and issued its first ever Southbound Policy. Afterwards, as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) became the key features of international political economy, Taiwan actively promoted its Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) with Singapore and New Zealand respectively.

The most decisive element for the paradigm shift is Taiwan's democratization. The political process started with democratic transformation and then consolidation. After three peaceful transitions of power – in 2000, 2008, and 2016 – Taiwan's new democracy, along with its many practices and values, consolidated in the society. As democracy and civil society gradually matured, the 'One China' mentality is gradually being supplemented by a Taiwanese identity and consciousness.

EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES OF TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Evolution of Taiwan's Foreign Policy (1945–2016)

One-party Authoritarian Rule of KMT (1945–1988): Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo

Japanese colonization of Taiwan ended in 1945 with Japan's defeat in the Second World War. After the Chinese Civil War fought on China (1927–1950), between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT, the ROC government relocated to Taiwan in 1949. For the KMT, 'this island [Taiwan] was not the homeland but a place of exile.'² Taiwan became the base for the ROC to retake China from the CCP. Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan was used to continue the political legitimacy of the ROC and as the vanguard of Sun Yat-sen's nationalist ideology.

During KMT authoritarian rule, Taiwanese society was restrained by martial law, which lasted from 1949 to 1987. A planned and centralized economy in which the KMT dictated economic reforms became the key feature of the Chiang

regimes. In terms of political and social control, the KMT strictly reshaped the local education system by implementing Mandarin language programs and Chinese cultural elements into the programs. The purpose of which is to secure the legitimacy of the KMT and strengthen the 'One China' ideology among Taiwanese localities.

The continuity of the civil war ideology weighed heavily on Taiwan's foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Three features could be highlighted in that period.

First, the KMT's foreign policy was based on a singular goal of retaking China from the CCP. Beyond the diplomatic struggle, military tensions and confrontations were pervasive. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, also known as the 823 Artillery Bombardment, was a major confrontation. Although the conflict centered on the offshore island of Kinmen, the event overwhelmingly shook Taiwan's national defense and security.

Second, the existence of coercive diplomacy represented a continuation of the 'One China' civil war ideologies. The KMT fought the CCP through diplomatic warfare on the argument of the incompatibility between Chiang's and Mao's China. Countries in the world could only be diplomatic allies with either the ROC or the PRC. Taiwan's leverage in waging coercive diplomacy ended in 1970. One year later, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, stating that the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China. With speechless disappointment, the KMT government could do nothing but quit the UN and its related institutions.

Third, great power matters. During the Cold War, the United States gave Taiwan vital support. The Korean War (1950–1953) changed the attitude of Washington and made the United States realize the importance of Taiwan as a fortress against the spread of communism in Asia. The United States demonstrated its support to the KMT government by signing the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955 (1955–1979), aimed at containing communism but also to avoid being entrapped by Chiang's dream of defeating the CCP.

In the 1970s, however, President Richard Nixon, advised by his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, decided to improve bilateral relations with the PRC. While the United States still supported Taiwan's participation in the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2758 ultimately sabotaged Taiwan's international space. The Taiwan (ROC) representative to the UN walked out of the meeting by the order of President Chiang to prevent further humiliation.³ After Taiwan quit the UN, a wave of major powers in the world began to break off diplomatic ties with the island country, including the United States in 1979. In quick succession, the US Congress passed the 'Taiwan Relations Act', which governs US – Taiwan relations as a domestic law.⁴ Since then, the interaction between Taipei and Washington has relied upon the act to preserve and promote US – Taiwan relations.

Taiwan's diplomatic allies dropped precipitously from 67 in 1969 to around 30 in the 1980s. With Resolution 2758, the international community in effect chose

a side in the Chinese civil war. However, the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo (1978–1988) opened a new page for the KMT's internal politics. In 1972, Taiwan began to think about the promotion of 'flexible diplomacy', and how to improve or advance the relations with countries that have no diplomatic ties with Taiwan in a pragmatic way.

Chiang still emphasized the legitimacy of the ROC. Yet, he applied a relatively flexible and dynamic foreign policy strategy that was continued by his successor. Undeniably, Chiang Ching-kuo's diplomatic legacy is the vital adjustment of the civil war ideology that brought about the diplomatic confrontation between the ROC and the PRC. Flexible diplomacy led to the expansion of Taiwan's international presence and economic and social reforms so that the island country could adapt itself to the changes of international relations.

The Democratization of the KMT (1988–2000): Lee Teng-hui

The KMT moved to a new stage of political evolution with the ascendance of Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000).⁵ In May 1990, President Lee Teng-Hui officially ended the 'One China' civil war ideology and replaced it with 'pragmatic diplomacy'.⁶ Taipei even implicitly accepted 'dual recognition'.⁷ In contrast, Beijing could not accept dual recognition and imposed more pressure upon Taiwan's international space.

With pragmatic diplomacy as the guideline for Taiwan's international engagement, Taipei employed five methods to overcome the challenges: aid diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, party-to-party diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, and academic diplomacy.

Since the 1950s, Taiwan has applied foreign aid to compete with Beijing for international recognition. During the 1960s, Taipei conducted more than 100 agricultural technical missions in 24 African countries for promoting capacity-building projects at various localities.⁸ Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs established the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) to provide economic and financial assistance to developing partners. The next year, the government-funded International Disaster Humanitarian Fund particularly focused on major areas, for example, Latin America and Southeast Asia, to engage in localities. In 1996, Taiwan's foreign aid institution, the International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF) was established and played a key part in foreign aid programs and its economic diplomacy.

As to parliamentary diplomacy and party-to-party diplomacy, Taiwan established the Groupe d'études à vocation internationale sur les problèmes liés à Taiwan in 1989. In 1991, the Australia-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group and European Parliament-Taiwan Friendship Group were established respectively. The next year, the Parlamentarischer Freundeskreis Berlin-Taipeh and Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group were successfully set up as well. In 1996, the Korea-Taiwan Parliamentarian Friendship Association was established. A year

later, the Japan-ROC Diet Members' Consultative Council was installed and expanded as a trans-party platform. After that, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan and its Speaker received permanent membership of the Parlamento Centroamericano and the Foro de Presidentes y Presidentas de Poderes Legislativos de Centroamérica y la Cuenca del Caribe (FOPREL) in 1999.

On the other hand, when it comes to academic diplomacy, the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at National Chengchi University was the platform for Taiwan to engage in international think tanks and strategic dialogues. The flagship programs such as the Sino-American Conferences (later renamed to Taiwan-American Conference on Contemporary China), Sino-European Conferences (later renamed to Taiwan-European Conference), Sino-Japanese Conference, Taipei-Seoul Forum, and ASEAN-ISIS-IIR Dialogues have been the bilateral and multilateral platforms for epistemic communities of Taiwan and their international counterparts to exchange ideas and information on critical issues.⁹

During Lee's administration, Taiwan did not forsake its own existence as a 'political entity' while trying to participate in international governmental organizations.¹⁰ With the cultivation of open regionalism in the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the name of 'Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu'. In the following year, Taiwan even accepted 'Chinese Taipei' as the modality of international engagement for being qualified as a member of Indo-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

In fact, the most significant issue is that in June 1991, the Legislative Yuan proposed that Taiwan should rejoin the UN in the name of 'the Republic of China'. Two years later, the Executive Yuan embarked on the plan of rejoining the UN through the efforts made by high-level decision-makers of participating in the UN and the ad hoc group of participating in the UN.¹¹ Taiwan won international support and positive responses from not only diplomatic allies but also the US Congress and the European Parliament.¹² In 1997, Taiwan actively sought international support in order to join the World Health Organization (WHO).

Apart from maintaining and gaining diplomatic allies, pragmatic diplomacy helped expand Taiwan's relations with other international counterparts. Besides establishing representative offices in countries without diplomatic ties, Taiwan even actively tried to enhance relations with its neighbors in Southeast Asia. President Lee launched the first Southbound Policy in 1994. Based on the Guideline of Strengthening Economic and Trade Cooperation with Southeast Asia, he led Taiwanese businessmen to invest in Southeast Asia and even brought the state-owned enterprises to locate in key Southeast Asia countries. In that time, Southbound Policy focused on Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei.

Through enhancing bilateral trade and investment, Taiwan has established a Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam. Bilateral agreements including Agreements on the Promotion and

Protection of Investments (Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand), Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation (Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand), ATA Carnet Agreements (Singapore and the Philippines), Quality Assurance Cooperative Agreements (Singapore and Malaysia) and Agreement on Agriculture and Fisheries Cooperation (Vietnam) had been signed successfully.

In 1997, the Southbound Policy was enlarged to include Australia and New Zealand. The regional strategy strengthened the pragmatic relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries through exchange visits among leaders, dialogues among ministers, and other official interactions. The policy was the highlight in President Lee's strategy of pragmatic diplomacy. Meanwhile, it also opened the door for a democratizing Taiwan to develop diverse interactions and cooperative relations with its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific. During President Lee's administration (1988–2000), the number of diplomatic allies varied from 24 to 30. When Lee stepped down, Taiwan had 29 diplomatic allies.¹³

The Rise of Taiwan-centered Identity (2000–2008): Chen Shui-bian

Taiwan's democratic experiment experienced its first political party transition in 2000. The electoral victory of the opposition party reinforced Beijing's fear about the *de facto* independence of Taiwan.¹⁴ The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election and made Chen Shui-bian the first President from the DPP. Formed in 1986, the DPP – a localized political party – was dedicated to the issues of democracy, human rights, social welfare, and local development. With rising Taiwanese resentment towards the KMT regime, Chen Shui-bian, a former mayor of Taipei (1994–1998), was regarded as the poster child of political reform. Moreover, the emergence of the DPP reflected the political manifestation of a Taiwan-centered identity and national consciousness.¹⁵

At the outset of his first term in office (2000–2004), President Chen adopted a cautious approach towards cross-Strait relations. Under political and economic pressure from Beijing and Washington, Chen issued 'the Four Noes and One Without' in his inauguration speech on May 20, 2000 to manage cross-Strait relations and international expectations. Yet, as a Taiwan-centered identity grew in society, President Chen's position gradually shifted to a 'One China, One Taiwan' approach.

By promoting a new national textbook centered on Taiwanese localities and culture, adding 'Taiwan' on the cover of government-issued passports, and changing the names of state-owned enterprises to include Taiwan, Chen challenged the 'One China' principle and resisted China's cultural influence on the island country.¹⁶ Indeed, the legacy of the Chinese civil war and 'One China' ideology were getting more and more ambiguous in Taiwan's democratizing society, and Beijing decided to take more aggressive actions and policies on cross-Strait relations and rein in Taiwan's international space in a more radical way.

During that period, Chen continued Lee's pragmatic diplomacy, and applied more diverse ways to enhance Taiwan's diplomacy and expand opportunities for Taiwan to get involved in international affairs. There were three main features of Chen's approach to Taiwan's foreign policies.

First, Chen's foreign policies emphasized Taiwan's core values. In his first term, the DPP-government stressed the promulgation of 'Taiwanese values' in the government's foreign policy, which turned to Taiwan's experience with democracy, human rights and freedom as principles for engagement with the international society. The peaceful transition of political power pushed Taiwan to move from the process of 'democratic transformation' to 'democratic consolidation', and paved the way for people-centered advocates, agents, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that helped to promote Taiwan on the international stage.

As a result of this shift, approaches such as 'people-to-people diplomacy' and 'human rights diplomacy' emerged as a reflection of Taiwan's desire and capacity for more engaged participation in international affairs. The practices of so-called 'democratic diplomacy' contributed to President Chen's leadership of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD) in 2004, which bridged Taiwan's experience and Asia's experience with democratic politics.¹⁷

Second, Taiwan's foreign policies under President Chen tended to be more diverse and proactive. Chen continued his predecessor's foreign policies and stressed more on DPP's political ideas and demands. Some examples include the 'president-transfer diplomacy', the development of aid diplomacy, and the ambitious strategy for participation in the UN. As for president-transfer diplomacy, President Chen transferred in the United States during his state visit to Latin America to demonstrate its close relations with the US government. Regarding aid diplomacy, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD) was founded in 2003 and aimed at promoting Taiwan's democratic transformation experiences. Taiwan's ambitious strategy for participation in the UN unfortunately ended up as a domestic political struggle.¹⁸ While initiating the referendum proposal, the DPP argued that Taiwan should 'join the UN in the name of Taiwan' while the KMT disputed the DPP by claiming that Taiwan should 'rejoin the UN in the name of the ROC'. The turbulent and polarized political atmosphere sacrificed Taiwan's prospect of international participation.

The third feature of Chen's foreign policy was that he continued President Lee's Southbound Policy, especially for enhancing Taiwan's relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries. When engaging Southeast Asian countries, Chen put more emphasis on enhancing trade and investment projects. As the Pacific Island countries were getting important, especially in Chen's second administration, the agricultural and medical missions were deployed to assist local development. Compared with his predecessor, President Chen's Southbound Policy was more diverse to include Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and stressed Taiwanese contribution to international society.¹⁹

In 2002, the Chen administration oversaw the most significant diplomatic breakthrough in decades by facilitating Taiwan's entry into the World Trade

Organization (WTO). The government's membership represented an important achievement in the connection between Taiwan and the international economic and trading system. For Taiwan, it symbolized that the government had carried out its promises of market liberalization by eliminating numerous trade barriers. Most importantly, by getting involved in the WTO, Taiwan's international space could be further expanded.

President Chen attempted to set aside the 'One China' ideology of the Chinese civil war and promoted a 'Taiwan First' foreign policy. At that time, different diplomatic slogans were created to symbolize distinct policy tools, directions, values and issues based upon internationalism and diplomatic normalization.²⁰ Moreover, those slogans reflected the fact that Taiwan, regarded as a small power, thrived under the pressure of big power. The rise of Taiwanese identity involved the process of promoting democracy and liberal values.

Other than the decrease of diplomatic allies from 29 in 2000 to 23 in 2008, President Chen and Vice President Annette Lu encountered many challenges during their visits to Latin America and Southeast Asia. The more severe crisis was that Taiwan's aid diplomacy was dragged into an embezzlement scandal that stained its reputation and effectiveness. These scandals tarnished the public perception towards the objective of diplomacy and increasing Taiwan's international space, and an adjustment of the existing policies was needed.

KMT and the Revival of One China Mentality (2008–2016): Ma Ying-jeou

In 2008, the KMT's candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, won the presidential election and marked the second political party transition in Taiwan. The KMT learned its lesson from losing two consecutive elections in 2000 and 2004 and focused on stabilizing cross-strait relations. Indeed, President Ma's personal belief of 'One China' had pushed the '1992 Consensus' and the continuous practice of 'KMT-CCP platform' became a constant bilateral mechanism of China-Taiwan negotiation. Ma argued that the replacement of President Chen's 'edgy and provocative' approach with 'reassurance and cooperation' between Taiwan and China was critical for Taiwan's foreign policy. China welcomed this 'return' to the so-called 'One China' principle and provided economic concessions.²¹ The political consent between the CCP and the KMT on the '1992 Consensus' during the Ma administration is somewhat correspondent to the civil war legacy of the 'One China' ideology, yet Ma Ying-jeou emphasized 'face reality, start a new future, set aside disputes, and create a win-win situation'.

There are four significant features of Ma's foreign policy. First, 'diplomatic truce' meant the freezing of Taiwan's diplomatic offensive and diplomatic warfare between Beijing and Taipei.²² In other words, there would be no less (or more) diplomatic allies for Taiwan. Particularly, 'no less' refers to the implication that Beijing would not undermine Taiwan's diplomatic relations, which seems to be consistent with Taiwan's national interest. However, on the other hand, it also

limited Taiwan's international space. Based on the diplomatic truce, cross-Strait relations are more stable compared with Chen's administration so that Taiwan and Beijing could spend less resources on the defensive and offensive diplomatic warfare.

Ma's conciliatory approach solicited Beijing's tacit permission for the World Health Assembly (WHA) to invite Taiwan to participate in its annual conferences as an observer with the title 'Chinese Taipei'. In 2013, Taiwan was invited to participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a guest of the president of the ICAO Council. The political connotation behind the diplomatic truce is that the key determinant of Taiwan's international space will be Beijing. In other words, Beijing decides how much international space Taiwan can and should have. Critics stated that Ma's diplomatic truce may end up becoming a 'diplomatic shock' and contribute to a vicious cycle of over-relying on China.

The second feature is the deployment of viable diplomacy. President Ma understood that a diplomatic truce would constrain Taiwan's diplomatic network in numbers. Therefore, the Ma administration embarked on the promotion of peaceful diplomacy in a flexible way, showing its determination to rejoin the international society. Under the employment of viable diplomacy, Taiwan successfully enhanced bilateral cooperation with the United States, Japan, India, European Union and its neighboring countries. The United States increased arms sales to Taiwan and concluded the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) with the island country. The GCTF is a joint framework to include and elevate Taiwan's contribution as well as regional and global leadership on issues as democracy and human rights, human trafficking, youth engagement, indigenous rights, women's empowerment, and public health.²³

As to Japan, Tokyo signed the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement and other 28 agreements with Taipei. Taiwan and the Philippines have even signed the Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters. More than that, President Ma urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to actively carry out the visa-free and working holiday project, which made the Taiwanese passport visa-free in 137 countries. According to Henley & Partners 2016 Visa Restrictions Index, Taiwan's passport ranks as the 29th best in the world for accessing other countries around the globe.²⁴ Therefore, more Taiwanese young people are willing to go abroad for internships. This is considered one of the most significant legacies of the Ma administration.

Third, Ma emphasized the reinforcement of the ROC government's South China Sea territorial claim. Particularly within Ma's administration, the South China Sea dispute came to a head. Examples are the dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the dispute over China's oil rig in 2014, the arbitration case submitted by the Philippines against China over the South China Sea dispute from 2013 to 2016, and China's land reclamation in the South China Sea. These actions aroused international attention. The arbitration case over the South China Sea in particular became a critical challenge regarding the legitimacy of Taiwan's territorial claim and its *de facto* existence. To overcome the challenge, President

Ma visited Taiping Island to protect and prove that it is an 'island', not a 'rock'.²⁵ Nevertheless, the Ma government's claim over-emphasized Taiwan's historical rights in the South China Sea and had overlapped with China's claim.²⁶ This approach harkened the 'One China' ideology and triggered the international society's anxiety about Taiwan's position in the dispute.

Fourth, Taiwan devoted itself to regional integration especially in pursuit of economic partnerships. The Economic Cooperation Agreements (ECAs) are regarded as the most imperative regional participation of the Ma administration. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed between Taipei and Beijing in 2010, for instance, is believed to be Taiwan's bridge to both China and then to the world. The KMT regime believed that the agreement would make Taiwan 'prosper again'.²⁷ Based on the so-called '1992 Consensus', Taiwan and China signed the ECFA and other 22 agreements. The intensive bilateral interaction however made Taiwan over-rely on China in economic and agricultural industries. Over 50 percent of trade volumes depended on China. The produce from middle and southern Taiwan turned out to be China's bargaining chip regarding its access to Taiwan's society. With China's tacit permission, Taipei concluded the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP) with Singapore and signed the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) with New Zealand respectively.

During the Ma administration, China issued the 'One Belt, One Road Strategic Initiative', and established The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is the multilateral platform for China to deepen and broaden its investment plan over infrastructure. With this regard, Taiwan also expressed its willingness to join AIIB and delivered the application yet was turned down by China due to the membership limitation written in the AIIB charter.²⁸

While Ma's legacy was marked by a 'substantial enhancement' of cross-Strait political relations, the military balance tilted ever more so in China's favor.²⁹ Notably, Ma hoped to make a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations and international relations. In 2015, the sudden Ma-Xi meeting was the very first face-to-face meeting between the top leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Though it ended up with no concrete political commitments, the cross-Strait summit had symbolic political significance. From ECFA to the Ma-Xi meeting, it is obvious that Ma's foreign policy was based on the 'Cross-Strait Paradigm'. Through stable and peaceful cross-Strait relations, Ma attempted to connect Taiwan with the globe.

Maintaining the Status Quo (2016–): Tsai Ing-wen

In January 2016, the DPP won the presidential and legislative elections by a landslide. With Tsai Ing-wen's election, Taiwan entered the stage of democratic

deepening. During the campaign, Tsai emphasized Taiwan's domestic development as her administration's first priority. Domestic issues such as the domestic economy and social development were elevated over the 'China factor'. While China distrusts the DPP administration, and thus cross-Strait relations has entered into a period of cold peace, Tsai has expressed her 'status quo' position, attempting to sustain the current cross-Strait situation. The 'status quo' here means maintaining the pragmatic strategies developed from the existing frameworks of Taiwanese politics, society and constitutional system.

To respond to these strategies, President Tsai has adopted 'steadfast diplomacy' as her core foreign policy, a way 'to walk moderately and cautiously to ensure Taiwan's safety'.³⁰ Steadfast diplomacy stressed on deepening the relations with like-minded states such as the United States, Japan and EU countries and propelling Taiwan's participation in international organizations practically. More importantly, through the launch of the New Southbound Policy, the DPP government hopes Taiwan could get involved in the regional communities built by ASEAN, East Asian countries, New Zealand and Australia and focus on developing people-centered relations and other pragmatic strategies.

Affected by the cold peace of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan's international space is now being squeezed by China. Taiwan did not receive the invitation of the ICAO meeting regardless of its attendance previously. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It reflects the fact that China intends to deal with Taiwan's foreign relations with the Cold War mentality. Taiwan's 'diplomatic truce' policy since the Ma administration, which depended on China's favor was over.

Challenges to Taiwan's Foreign Policy

As Donald Trump became the 45th president of the United States, relations between Washington and Taipei appear on the upswing. A phone call between the two world leaders in early December set the precedent for a dignified protocol between two democracies and key security partners.

Since Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, however, Beijing has ratcheted up political pressure on Taiwan's international space by attempting to limit the democratically elected leader's contact with foreign leaders and peeling off the nation's remaining diplomatic allies. The small African nation of São Tomé and Príncipe³¹ switched diplomatic recognition in December 2016, followed by Panama, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador in 2018, and Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. Taiwan now has 15 diplomatic allies compared to more than 170 that recognize the PRC.

Beijing's assault on Taiwan's international space is nothing new. Instead, it represents the latest in a series of escalatory steps in PRC's enhanced pressure tactics that have included economic threats, military exercises, and a pattern of diplomatic coercion that marks a return to an old playbook that Beijing used during the previous DPP government.

In 2007, when Costa Rica broke ties with Taiwan after establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, then President Oscar Arias said the switch was based on ‘an act of elemental realism’.³² In other words: money. Over the course of eight years between 2000–2008, Beijing bought off nine countries³³ that had diplomatic ties with Taiwan, including: Macedonia, Liberia, Dominica, Vanuatu, Grenada, Senegal, Chad, and Malawi.

Beijing’s most recent salvos appear to be an attempt to bait the Tsai government into engaging in checkbook diplomacy, in which the two sides offered foreign aid in exchange for diplomatic recognition. Beijing’s desired effect³⁴ would be to delegitimize the Taiwan government and lower the confidence of the US government on the ruling party’s ability to maintain stable cross-Strait relations. If so, the Tsai administration is not taking the bait, in response to questions about the diplomatic switch by São Tomé, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister David Lee stated that: ‘Taiwan is unwilling to play money games.’³⁵

During the Ma Ying-jeou administration, Taipei and Beijing reached a diplomatic *détente*. Taipei did not gain any new diplomatic allies, but as a result of the so-called ‘diplomatic truce’, Beijing reportedly refused offers of official recognition from four countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Panama,³⁶ and Gambia. In the absence of a definitive and imminent resolution in the longstanding cross-Strait stalemate, it was probably only a matter of time before smaller nations would be captured by Arias’ so-called ‘elemental realism’.

The Dominican Republic has been courting Beijing as early as 2013. That year,³⁷ Economy Minister Temistocles Montas visited Beijing touting a talk on ‘Prospects for Cooperation in the Caribbean Region’ at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) – a think tank affiliated with the PRC’s intelligence agency Ministry of State Security (MSS).

After President-elect Trump broke with old conventions and spoke with President Tsai over the phone in early December 2016, the international community’s eyes were on Beijing to see how it would respond. While it would be analytically convenient to characterize Beijing’s actions simply as a response to the Trump-Tsai phone call – which Beijing blames on Tsai’s ‘petty trick’³⁸ – this overly simplistic assertion belies the PRC’s longstanding Taiwan policy, which has remained obstinately unchanged since 1981.

Indeed, Beijing was already engaging in a full court diplomatic press on Taiwan before Tsai even gave her inaugural speech³⁹ – in which she laid out the basis of her cross-Strait policies and pledges to maintain the ‘status quo’ – and involved a blitzkrieg of extraditions of Taiwan nationals to the PRC. In each of these instances, Beijing asserted that the extradition of Taiwan nationals to China is in accordance with its ‘One China’ principle and implied that any country with a ‘One China’ policy must therefore recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and its people.

Despite Beijing’s ever-growing pressure, US–Taiwan relations appear on a positive trajectory. Part of it has to do with Tsai’s low-key approach; some of it

because of President-elect Trump's unconventional ways; and most of it because of Beijing's penchant for shooting itself in its own foot by either acting too aggressively or prematurely, or both. An example of Beijing's overzealousness is Gambia. Although Gambia broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2013, Beijing only normalized relations with Banjul in March 2016 – before Tsai was even inaugurated and laid out her cross-Strait policy. This was done arguably to use as diplomatic pressure against the then-incoming Tsai administration.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Democratic Alliances

The emergence of new democracies in the Indo-Pacific testifies to the importance and success of democracy promotion over the past 60 years.⁴⁰ But democratization is not a permanent end-state and does not follow a linear process. Democracies are subject to both internal and external influences that create an ebb and flow effect that impacts the quality and viability of the democracy.

As a democratic nation, Taiwan has an interest in the preservation of its democracy at home and the promotion of freedom for people in other countries as well, particularly of its neighbors. A central tenet of the 'Freedom Agenda' – a concerted foreign policy implemented during President George W. Bush's administration – was that 'liberty at home now depends on liberty abroad'.⁴¹ This logic applies to Taiwan as well.

Asia is home to 4 billion people and according to the non-governmental organization Freedom House only 38 percent of people are free.⁴² One of the largest and most powerful non-democratic states in the world is the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing has yet to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has maintained an impressive military modernization program that remains primarily directed at Taiwan.⁴³ The military might of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also has a psychological effect of deterring people in smaller countries from standing up against its bullying or encourages businesses to lobby their governments to sideline issues such as human rights in dealing with the Chinese government.

In Taiwan and in China's neighboring countries, the psychological effect of the PLA's growing military might can have a coercive effect on leaders' decisions and voters' political orientation. Beijing's unrelenting threat to invade Taiwan if necessary to achieve its ultimate goal of political unification can influence the voter preference. Particularly if voters believe the rhetoric of Beijing's leaders that some actions taken by Taiwan's elected representatives may lead them to war or confrontation. Moreover, businesses in democratic countries that have significant interests in or with China also serve as an effective lobby against policies that inure against those interests. Thus the military threat can have the effect of degrading freedom of action in democracies.

Citizens of once non-democratic countries that have politically transformed to democracies understand that change is not a one-way street and the specter of democratic recession still hangs over the region's future.⁴⁴ Fledgling new democracies such as Myanmar still remain far from consolidated and there are real dangers of backsliding. Therefore more mature democracies in the region such as Taiwan, India, South Korea, and Japan have a responsibility to help these nations as they move towards democracy.

Regional institutions can shape the executive and legislative actions of its participating members. It is imperative that democracies' foreign policies are more aligned within these institutions so that the standards and norms established by such institutions are consistent with the norms and values of democratic governance.

Increasingly, as authoritarian governments such as China become stronger economically, militarily, and politically, it is necessary for democratic countries to work together to ensure that the former does not dominate institutions.

The domination of authoritarianism would lead to the dilution of standards and good governance. Therefore, the goal of democracy promotion cannot be just about assisting transitioning societies to transform from authoritarian rule but consolidating democracies through alliance building.

While the post-Second World War US alliance system was built on a hub and spokes model in which democracy promotion was not the central focus, it is not by coincidence that democracies emerged from these alliances in Asia and their role is more important than ever in building up a global institution of norms and values that support greater freedom at home and in the region.

Prospects for Bilateral Relations: United States, Japan, and India

United States

The United States and Taiwan maintain robust unofficial relations. It remains the single most bilateral relationship for Taiwan. Forty years after the abrogation of the mutual defense treaty and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Taiwan emerged as a vibrant democracy, robust free market economy, responsible regional and global actor, and steadfast partner of the United States.

The United States played a critical role in ensuring Taiwan's security in the early stages of the bilateral relationship through the mutual defense treaty that committed the US military to defend Taiwan in the event of the PRC invasion. After the normalization of relations with the PRC, US relations with Taiwan shifted focus to preserving its democracy and balancing China's growing power while the two sides try to resolve their differences peacefully.

Despite the absence of a mutual defense treaty – which was abrogated in 1979 – the United States remains the principal security guarantor of Taiwan.

Through the policy of 'strategic ambiguity', Washington has withheld an explicit guarantee to come to Taiwan's defense. This strategy of dual deterrence has held the PLA at bay and dissuaded Taiwan from pursuing actions Washington considered provocative. Yet, against these restraints, Taiwan emerged to become a vibrant democracy while the PLA has enjoyed two decades of double-digit budget growth.⁴⁵

The strength and importance of the US–Taiwan relationship cannot be measured by military terms alone. The strength of economic as well as political ties with Taiwan have grown to symbolize American credibility within the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, US support for Taiwan's democracy and its defense has served as a visible symbol of US commitment to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan is currently the United States' 11th largest goods trading partner, and US goods and services trade with Taiwan totaled an estimated \$86.2 billion in 2017.⁴⁶ Perhaps more importantly, Taiwan is a democracy and in the current liberal international world order, shared values have currency in aligning in how rules and norms are shaped in existing and emerging institutions. In turn, these institutions can have an effect on how the laws of its participating members are formulated.

The US–Taiwan relationship transformed from one of donor-aid recipient to now partners under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF).⁴⁷ The GCTF, signed in 2015, serves as a vehicle for

the United States and Taiwan conduct training programs for experts from throughout the region to assist them with building their own capacities to tackle issues where Taiwan has proven expertise and advantages. These include, but are not limited to, women's rights, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, democratization, global health, and energy security.

The GCTF symbolizes the significant progress that the two sides have made under the 'status quo'.

On December 2, 2016 President-elect Donald Trump received a phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen. In what was widely referred to in the mainstream media as a significant policy shift, the two world leaders spoke on the phone for a little over ten minutes, during which President Tsai congratulated the president-elect on his election victory and exchanged views about the economy and regional issues.

While no US president or president-elect has reportedly had either a face-to-face or telephone conversation with the leader of Taiwan since 1979, nothing in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 – which legally governs both the content and conduct of unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan – or the three Joint Communiqués prohibit the president-elect from receiving a congratulatory phone call from the democratically elected leader of Taiwan.

The former senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council in the Obama administration, Jeff Bader⁴⁸, underscores the implicit and self-imposed nature of the restrictions by pointing out that '[t]here have been quiet, non-visible

written communications between the top leaders of the United States (including presidents and presidents-elect) and Taiwan, but it has always been understood that direct conversations would cross a line not worth challenging'. So the concern is not that the two top leaders communicated but how they communicated.

After news about President-elect Trump's telephone call with Tsai broke, the White House correctly noted that there was 'no change' to the United States' longstanding 'One China' policy. This is an obvious statement of fact because the phone call changed nothing in terms of content prescribed by law in unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan. Of course, this has not restrained Beijing's leaders from taking the opportunity to define the United States 'One China' policy by asserting that the 'One China policy is the cornerstone of the sound development of Sino-US relations and we don't want this political basis to be interfered with or damaged in any way.'⁴⁹

Yet, in the clearest articulation of the United States' 'One China policy' to date, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly⁵⁰ made US policy explicitly clear at a hearing in 2004:

I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One China policy or the One China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long time.

While the long-term impact of the Trump-Tsai phone call remains to be seen, on its own, the phone call changes little to nothing about the content of unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan. In terms of conduct, however, the call was meaningful and represents a positive trajectory in future relations between United States and Taiwan.

The calibrated responses from the PRC are better understood in the context of Beijing's longstanding efforts to shape and define the US 'One China' policy through political warfare. The objective is to undermine US commitment to Taiwan under the TRA and align US 'One China' policy more closely with Beijing's 'One China' principle. Towards that end, Beijing utilizes diplomatic, economic, and military tools of statecraft to influence Washington, and Taipei, from taking policy positions that Beijing sees as detracting from its 'One China' principle.

An example of this false equivalency is found in the TAO's response⁵¹ to the phone call, which stated: 'We [China] have firm will, full confidence and sufficient ability to curb any form of "Taiwan independence" and will continue to advance the progress of national reunification.' In this case, Beijing appears to be attempting to characterize the phone call as a 'trick' by Taiwanese leaders to get Washington to recognize Taiwan independence. Yet, any reasonable inference would never suggest that accepting a phone call could be considered an indicator of such a radical political signal.

In a sign of escalation, Chinese military aircraft and navy vessels conducted exercises around Taiwan. According to Taiwan's Ministry of Defense, the

December 10, 2016 exercise was a deliberate act. While Beijing's motive to intimidate Taiwan's leaders seems plausible given past practices, why and how it expects to achieve its objectives are less clear.

The PRC has a history of trying to use military tactics to achieve political results. An obvious demonstration can be found in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, in which Beijing fired three sets of missiles over the Taiwan Strait in an effort to intimidate and coerce voters within Taiwan in the lead up to the country's first direct presidential election. However, the tests had the opposite intended effect of rallying Taiwan's electorate behind Lee Teng-hui; and, in the greatest show of force since the Vietnam War, the United States deployed two carrier strike groups near the Taiwan Strait.

Beginning even before her inauguration in May, Beijing has been trying to pin the cooling down of cross-Strait relations on the incoming Tsai administration. If Beijing continues to escalate its pressure tactics on Taiwan in light of the call with President-elect Trump, it will probably elicit more support for President Tsai since the phone call enjoys overwhelming support within Taiwan.⁵²

Japan

As a sign of improving ties, Japan announced in early 2017 that it is changing the name of its *de facto* embassy in Taiwan from the obscure Interchange Association, Japan to Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.⁵³ A small but meaningful upgrade, the name change also represents the maturation of a longstanding relationship between the two nations.

The importance of Japan is second only to the United States for Taiwan's security. The US-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of US military posture in the Indo-Pacific and thus critical for the security of Taiwan and its maritime periphery. Likewise, the security of Taiwan is of the utmost importance for the US-Japan alliance and Japan.

The importance of Japan for Taiwan cannot be understated and is intrinsically tied to the US-Japan alliance. While the strength of the relationship cannot be measured in terms of the alliance alone, the 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines, which set out the parameters for cooperation, act as the key framework for security cooperation. The 1997 Defense Guidelines covered a Taiwan contingency.⁵⁴

Sporadic discussions within the United States about the abandonment of Taiwan in order to get Beijing to cooperate grossly overlooks the regional effects of such a decision. From a strategic perspective, if Taiwan were controlled by the PRC, Tokyo would be cut off the sea line of communications and it would ultimately jeopardize its national security. Just as Japan is important for Taiwan, so is Taiwan for Japan. Japanese grand strategy would be unsustainable if Taiwan was controlled by a hostile, assertive China.⁵⁵

China's military power continues to grow, its navy is increasingly exercising farther from its shores and beyond the first island chain. Beijing's power projection

in the Western Pacific depends on controlling maritime space around Taiwan. As tensions in the East China Sea cause greater tension between Japan and the United States, Tokyo will rely more upon Taiwan to maintain its autonomy from China to ensure its freedom of navigation along its southern maritime peripheries.

In the case of Japan, starting in the early 2000s Tokyo has increasingly emphasized values-based diplomacy. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Japanese government has made support for democracy a centerpiece of its public statements and official documents on foreign policy.⁵⁶ This shift in Japan's foreign policy represents an important transformational stage in the region's geopolitics.

India

Taiwan's interests in engaging with India and vice versa are increasingly strategic. For Taipei, the primary goal would be to reduce its degree of economic dependency on the PRC and develop closer relations with a fellow Asian democracy. India's emergence as one of the widely heralded BRIC economies with a competitive global economy is also creating the incentives necessary for helping Taiwan's government policy of 'looking beyond' China's slowing market.

Although India has maintained a non-aligned foreign policy for much of its history, this orientation is slowly shifting towards one of closer cooperation with the United States due largely because of concerns with the PRC. Indeed, India's policy of 'Looking East' has progressively moved towards one of 'Act East'. This change is complementary with Taiwan's renewed emphasis in the broader region through its 'New Southbound Policy'.

Taiwan has been keen to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India as it is an ideal springboard for Taiwan to enter the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) trade network and develop relations with other countries in the region. Since Taiwan is not a party to any free trade agreements with countries in the region or trade zone, it can enter other markets via India and Bangladesh. Although the current trade in terms of investment made by Taiwan in India pales in comparison with the amount of investment by Taiwan in China.

The scale of Taiwan-India relations cannot be weighed on economics alone. There are increasing numbers of private visits made by politicians and former officials from political parties and government agencies from both sides. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who previously served as the secretary-general of the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), visited Taiwan. These high-level exchanges were reciprocated by visits made to India by high-ranking officials from Taiwan.

As noted by an Indian observer:

India's Taiwan policy is undergoing a change and the political elite in New Delhi increasingly see the island as an important economic and political partner. The PRC has to understand that a rising India is exploring newer partners and could readily switch its interpretation of the 'One China' policy to reflect a new India-Taiwan partnership.⁵⁷

TAIWAN'S 2018 LOCAL ELECTIONS

The DPP suffered a landslide defeat in the island's 2018 local elections. The TAO – which is the state agency in charge of implementing the CCP-directed policy towards Taiwan – heralded the election results that saw the opposition Nationalist Party (KMT) claim 15 of the 22 seats that were on the ballots. This is a significant increase from only six that the opposition party retained after the 2014 local elections – the non-party-affiliated incumbent mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, held his seat with a razor-thin margin in a race largely against the KMT opponent. In a press statement, the TAO called the overall election results a confirmation of the Taiwan people's preference for the 'peaceful development dividend' in cross-Straits relations and opposition to the so-called 'independence activities' of President Tsai Ing-wen.⁵⁸

The ruling party lost nine of the seats that it held and now controls only six of 22 seats – a precipitous drop from 15 after 2014. In a development that some DPP members feared, the ruling party lost control of two important cities – most notably, it lost in its traditional stronghold in the south, Kaohsiung, and the central city of Taichung, which the DPP wrestled out from KMT control in 2014 in the 'green wave' that swept the country following the student-led 'sunflower movement' in the spring of 2014. Interestingly, the student protests back in 2014 were directed at the then KMT-led central government for concerns over its handling of cross-Straits relations; now, both Beijing and the KMT appear to be framing these 'blue wave' elections as redemption of the former government's more conciliatory policies towards China.

Perhaps the most important implication of the election results is on the PRC's approach to cross-Straits relations, which, in the past two years, has been characterized by a significant increase of diplomatic, military, and political pressure as well as interference. China views its coercive measures as responses to Tsai's 'independence activities', and the fact that voters in Taiwan voted for KMT candidates in the local elections may signal to Beijing that they agreed with the CCP – even if the issues in the local elections often do not involve cross-Straits issues. It should be noted that President Tsai has maintained a consistent policy of preserving the 'status quo' while prioritizing substantial, if not incredibly difficult albeit controversial social and political reforms from the very outset of her administration, such as the pension reforms, labor reforms, same-sex marriage, economic restructuring, and transitional justice measures that have been met with a great deal of social and political angst and agitation.

According to the TAO statement, the election results were also a sign that economics was a motivating factor for the electoral defeat of the DPP. Indeed, according to the official-Xinhua News Agency⁵⁹, 'the results reflected the strong will of the public in Taiwan in sharing the benefits of the peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait, and desires to improve the island's economy and

people's wellbeing'. Earlier this year, Beijing announced a raft of incentives called the '31 Measures' meant to entice Taiwanese people and businesses with equal and sometimes even preferential treatment to work and set up shop in China.

As the KMT nearly regained all the seats that it lost from 2014, Beijing has indicated that it is willing to engage in more city-to-city exchanges to promote cross-strait relations on the basis of the so-called '1992 Consensus'. It seems clear that Beijing sees the city-level exchanges, now firmly back in the control of the KMT, as channels to pressure the central government to compromise on the so-called '1992 Consensus' and the 'One China Principle'. For instance, the newly elected mayor of Kaohsiung has already indicated that he endorsed the '1992 Consensus' and will immediately set up a 'cross-strait working group' to engage China.

Beijing views the election results as a validation of its dual-handed 'soft-hard' approach of coercion and enticement. The CCP will likely feel emboldened by the results of the local elections, which it sees as affirmation that its tactics are working and consequently, there will likely be an intensification of CCP's influence operations over the next two years as Taiwan's general elections are scheduled to take place in 2020. Rather than compromise on the so-called '1992 Consensus' or the 'One China Principle', President Tsai will likely take a tougher stance against Beijing.

CONCLUSION

Taiwan's foreign policy faces many challenges. Beyond uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, challenges include growing resource constraints and an increasingly assertive and capable PRC.

With the straightforward agreements in cross-strait negotiations concluded under the previous Ma administration and Beijing's distrust of the DPP, tensions in the Taiwan Strait are once again beginning to rise. In order to promote stability and restore balance, the United States should emphasize the benefits of soft balancing. The key is a more accurate representation of the status quo based on objective reality by Washington.

China's refusal to renounce the use of military force to compel unification, and acts to continually subjugate Taiwan under the PRC through political warfare are sources of instability in the Taiwan Strait.⁶⁰ China is likely to increasingly rely upon military and political coercion to compel concessions from Taiwan on sovereignty. US support in terms of Taiwan's defense, economic, and political are critical to maintaining balance in cross-strait negotiations.

With Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States, relations between Washington and Taipei appear on the upswing. The phone call between the two world leaders in early December 2016 set the precedent for a dignified protocol between two democracies and key security partners.

Since Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, Beijing has ratcheted up political pressure on Taiwan's international space by attempting to limit the democratically elected leader's contact with foreign leaders and peeling off the nation's remaining diplomatic allies. Taiwan now has 15 diplomatic allies compared to more than 170 that recognize the PRC.

Beijing's assault on Taiwan's international space represents a continuation of escalatory steps in PRC's enhanced pressure tactics that have included economic threats, military exercises, and a pattern of diplomatic coercion that marks a return to an old playbook that Beijing used during the previous DPP government.

Indeed, Beijing was already engaging in a full court diplomatic press on Taiwan before Tsai even gave her inaugural speech⁶¹ – in which she laid out the basis of her cross-Strait policies and pledged to maintain the 'status quo' – and involved a blitzkrieg of extraditions of Taiwan nationals to the PRC. In each of these instances, Beijing asserted that the extradition of Taiwan nationals to China is in accordance with its 'One China' principle and implied that any country with a 'One China' policy must therefore recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and its people.

Despite Beijing's ever-growing pressure, US–Taiwan relations are on a positive trajectory. Part of it has to do with Tsai's low-key approach; some of it because of Trump's unconventional ways; and most of it because of Beijing's penchant for shooting itself in its own foot by either acting too aggressively or prematurely, or both. An example of Beijing's overzealousness is Gambia.

Stronger ties between the United States and Taiwan, as well as with India and Japan are now more important than ever as Beijing reverts to its old ways. The PRC's relentless efforts to curtail Taiwan's international space by curtailing Tsai's transit stops and buying off Taiwan's diplomatic allies serve as important reminders of Beijing's longstanding strategy against Taiwan.

In the first major policy speech after Taiwan's local elections in late November 2018, which saw the opposition-Nationalist Party regain control of a majority of local governments, CCP chairman and PRC president Xi Jinping sounded confident and tough as he laid out his vision for the future of cross-Strait relations. In a speech that signaled no new policy direction, Xi's thirty-three-minute-long soliloquy at the fortieth anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan' was an unapologetic endorsement of Beijing's longstanding and failed policy that reaffirmed the current soft–hard approach towards Taiwan.⁶²

Apparently buoyed by the results of the November elections in Taiwan that saw the resurgence of the Nationalist Party – which favors a more conciliatory policy towards China – Xi waxed poetically about the 'spiritual harmony' of the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and how unification was 'a historical conclusion drawn over the 70 years of the development of cross-Strait relations, and a must for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era'. In particular, Xi's speech – which consisted of five key points, coupled threats of military force to Taiwan's compliance and doubled down on the 'one country,

two systems' as the formula for unification – reflects a Chinese leadership whose vision for cross-Strait relations is increasingly out of touch with the mainstream of people in Taiwan.

The five points were: First, Xi called on the two sides to work together to promote national rejuvenation and achieve the goal of peaceful unification. Second, Xi held up peaceful unification under the 'one country, two systems' model as the best way to achieve national unification. Third, Xi called on leaders in Taipei to adhere to the 'One China' principle to maintain the prospect of peaceful unification. Fourth, Xi called on the two sides to deepen the development of cross-Strait integration and consolidate the foundation of peaceful unification through the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic cooperation. Fifth, Xi called on compatriots on the two sides to achieve 'spiritual harmony' and a unified identity. Specifically, Xi said that compatriots on both sides of the strait must jointly uphold traditional Chinese culture and promote its creative transformation and innovative development.

Forty years ago, the 1979 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan' issued by Marshal Ye Jianying, who was then the head of state as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, signaled the CCP's 'abandonment' of its pledge for the 'armed liberation' of Taiwan to the island's 'peaceful liberation'. The 1979 message, following the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, was the CCP's first public appeal to the Nationalist Party to end hostile confrontation and tension across the Taiwan Strait, and marked the beginning of Beijing's so-called 'peaceful unification strategy'.

For instance, only a decade earlier on the eve of 2009, Xi's predecessor and then CCP chairman and PRC president, Hu Jintao, delivered the speech commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan'. In a widely covered remark, Hu issued a six-point proposal, which included: first, firm adherence to the 'One China' principle; second, strengthening commercial ties, including negotiating an economic cooperation agreement; third, promoting personnel exchanges; fourth, stressing common cultural links between the two sides; fifth, allowing Taiwan's 'reasonable' participation in global organizations; and sixth, negotiating a peace agreement.

It's worth noting that Hu's speech was the first public attempt by the Chinese leadership to directly appeal to the Democratic Progressive Party – which was then in opposition after being in power from 2000 to 2008. Hu called on the DPP to accept the 'One China' principle and 'change' its pro-independence stance. Interestingly, even in Hu's speech there was no mention of the KMT's oft-stated position that the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations should be based on the so-called '1992 Consensus', a tacit agreement where the two sides agreed that there is 'One China' with each side having different interpretation of what 'One China' means. In Hu's speech, there was only reference to 'One China' and no 'different interpretation'. Moreover, Hu's speech resuscitated an old slogan: 'The Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affairs. No foreign country is allowed to interfere.'

For the most part, Xi's speech hewed closely to Hu's line. He reaffirmed many of the Chinese leadership's longstanding positions on Taiwan, but the speech reflected an approach that was clearly narrowing after Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen's election. While acknowledging the '1992 consensus', Xi did not concede the position that the two sides may differ in their interpretations of 'One China', much less that it could mean the Republic of China.

Moreover, Xi once again associated the unification of Taiwan to the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation', and Beijing's formula for unification, as clearly spelled out in his speech for the fortieth anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan', is the 'one country, two systems' formula. Xi's linking of the 'one country, two systems' formula to the so-called '1992 consensus' is a political misstep by Beijing. On the one hand, it appears to be an attempt to get supporters of the Nationalist Party, which endorses the '1992 consensus', to support the 'one country, two systems' formula by associating the two. On the other hand, it also seems to be a warning to the leaders of the Nationalist Party to not stray far from Beijing's line as Taiwan gears up for the 2020 general elections.

While never renouncing the use of force, in a commemorative event usually used to highlight the 'peaceful' aspects of the PRC's approach towards Taiwan, Xi instead struck an uncompromising stance. In an audience full of military officers, Xi declared, 'We make no promise to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures targeting external interference and a very small number of "Taiwan independence" separatists and their separatist activities, not against Taiwan compatriots.'

If there were any conciliatory signals found in Hu's speech, they appear to be gone in Xi's. What is left is the visible escalation in CCP political warfare and United Front tactics. Also, it's perhaps worth noting that all the speakers in the lead up to Xi's keynote speech were personnel in the CCP's propaganda/United Front system.

This is consistent with China's intensifying political warfare campaign that is aimed at isolating Taiwan by suppressing the island's international space so that all roads in and out must go through Beijing, while directly interfering with the island's political process by manipulating social and political tensions to subvert its democratic system. In 2017, the CCP's United Front Strategy was expanded to include 10 constituencies: grassroots villages, youth, students, Chinese spouses, aboriginals, pro-China political parties and groups, religious organizations, distant relatives, fishermen associations and retired generals.

The implications of Xi's recent speech are made more pronounced by another important anniversary: the fortieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This year marks the fortieth anniversary of this remarkable domestic law, which was enacted to legally govern the informal relationship between the United States and Taiwan, following the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). After forty years, the TRA continues to play a critical role as the cornerstone of managing relations between the United States and Taiwan, and shapes Washington's relations with China.

As former Congressman Lester Wolff⁶³, who served as a principal author of the TRA, wrote: the '[TRA] states that the status of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means, and that nonpeaceful means to do so are a threat to the region and of grave concern to the United States.'

Beijing's continued refusal to renounce the use of military force against Taiwan is jeopardizing peace and stability in the Western Pacific. A core connotation in the legislative mandate of the TRA is that the Taiwan question must be resolved by peaceful means and US normalization of relations with the PRC established a bilateral relationship with obligations on both sides. Beijing's saber-rattling raises the question of whether it has held up its end of the deal.

Equally important, Taiwan and the global geopolitical environment have changed substantially since 1979. As Congressman Ted Yoho⁶⁴ unequivocally stated in an opinion-editorial:

Taiwan exists today as a sovereign state, a status it has earned through the mandate of its people, its democratic institutions and its stewardship of personal freedoms and human rights ... Taiwan has risen from a backwater controlled by an authoritarian, exiled military regime to become a model democracy. After 40 years, it is time we updated our policy – making it consistent with present-day reality would be a good place to start.

Reflecting in her new year speech, President Tsai stated:

I am calling on China that it must face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan); it must respect the commitment of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and democracy; it must handle cross-Strait differences peacefully, on a basis of equality; and it must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in negotiations. These 'four musts' are the most basic and crucial foundations that will determine whether cross-Strait relations develop in a positive direction.

Senior officials in the US government seem to get the importance of Taiwan's democracy. Most notably, Vice President Mike Pence⁶⁵ made explicitly clear that preserving Taiwan's democracy is an interest of the United States. As he stated in the Trump administration's first major policy speech on China, 'America will always believe Taiwan's embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people.' On the one hand, the vice president's statement reflects the enduring and evolving relationship between the United States and Taiwan. On the other hand, Xi's speech reflects a growing disconnect with the people of Taiwan. Specifically, Xi's pledge that the 'one country, two systems' framework would respect the Taiwanese social system and way of life and guarantee their property rights, religious beliefs and other rights belies the repression of people's rights playing out in Hong Kong under that formula. When Xi's vision and the TRA are juxtaposed, they paint two very different pictures for Taiwan's future.

Beijing's use of associating the '1992 consensus' with the 'one country, two systems' will make cross-Strait dialogue more difficult for both the major political parties in Taiwan. A Taiwanese version of 'one country, two systems' will be politically restrictive, even for the Nationalist Party, since there is no

public support for 'one country, two systems' in Taiwan. As President Tsai⁶⁶ noted: 'Taiwan absolutely will not accept "one country, two systems". The vast majority of Taiwanese also resolutely oppose "one country, two systems", and this opposition is also a "Taiwan consensus".'

Xi's statement not renouncing the use of force against Taiwan coupled by China's destabilizing actions over the past three years, which are unilaterally changing the status quo, plainly show the international community that Beijing is now the provocateur in the Taiwan Strait. As the Taiwan Relations Act makes clear, it is US policy 'to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States'.

After forty years, US policy towards Taiwan should be recalibrated to better reflect objective reality. At the very least, a recalibrated policy must extend greater legitimacy to democracy and not support an outcome that does not enjoy the support among the majority of the free people of Taiwan. As several US senators⁶⁷, concerned over China's alleged interference in Taiwan's elections, noted: 'CCP attempts to erode democratic processes and norms around the world threaten U.S. partnerships and prosperity.'

When the TRA was enacted in 1979, the United States and Taiwan could have afforded to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt, continuing to do so would militate against the mounting evidence of Beijing's apparent intent to change the existing order and ignore the remarkable achievements and importance of Taiwan's democracy for the United States.

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PART VIB

Foreign Policies of Asian States – Southeast Asia



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Thailand's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: From Potentials to Disarrays

Pongphisoot Busbarat

INTRODUCTION

The most important approach when we know that great powers always compete for power is, we must fall into nobody's arms but maintain the policy of equidistance. That is, we should not lean too much towards anyone who will tie us so tightly that we cannot breathe comfortably. This is the policy that I always followed when I was responsible for Thai foreign affairs.¹

The above statement by the former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman neatly captures a conventional view of Thai foreign policy that cherishes flexibility and pragmatism. This flexible nature of policy behavior gives a famous label to Thai diplomacy as *bamboo bending with the wind*. This label represents a legacy of Thailand's diplomatic successes in its ability to manage external security threats and preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite the continuation of the flexibility which connotes a reactive policy behavior, Thailand's foreign policy has transformed to be more assertive in the post-Cold War period. The development towards assertiveness in Thai foreign policy is arguably based on its embracement of democratic identity and its confidence to assert its regional leadership due mainly to its success in democratization and economic development at the end of the 1980s and the 1990s. In turn, these developments resulted in Thailand being able to manage its relations with regional great powers in effective manners. However, critics posit that since the turn of the 21st century Thailand has lost these qualities, hence affected its national interests and its potential for regional leadership.

This chapter demonstrates in detail three important features in Thai foreign policy that are guided by flexibility, democratic principle, and regional aspirations. The chapter also assesses these features in the latter half of the chapter in that they are harder to sustain since the latter half of the 2000s. Domestic factors since the end of the 1990s, particularly the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and Thailand's decade-long political turmoil became important constraints to achieve policy goals. Consequently, Thailand has lost its ability to maintain its role in regional affairs.

THREE FEATURES IN THAILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

Three distinctive features in Thai foreign policy can be generally observed throughout its modern diplomatic history: flexibility and pragmatism, principle, and regional aspirations. These features have been developed through Thailand's historical interactions with great powers as well as its neighboring countries.

Conventional Wisdom: Flexibility And Pragmatism

The well-known analogy to describe Thailand's flexible foreign policy behavior is 'bamboo bending with the wind'. It outlines a policy that is 'always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend whichever way the wind blows in order to survive'.² Thai policy elites define Thailand's survival as the continuation of its national 'holy trinity' including the nation, region (Buddhism), and monarchy. A flexible and pragmatic approach to foreign policy implementation is thus regarded by Thai policymakers as the suitable option to achieve this goal. It is not impossible for Thai policy elites to change their foreign policy posture when the situation changes as long as the change maintains the stability of the 'holy trinity'.

Unlike other Southeast Asian nations that had bitter experience with suppressive colonial powers, Thailand's perception of the role of external powers is relatively positive. Therefore, embracing them to guarantee sovereignty and regional stability is not unfamiliar to Thailand. In the Cold War, Thailand saw the need for the United States to give a security assurance throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the communist threat was perceived as vital to state survival.³ The convergence of security and the economic interests of the United States and Thailand deepened their close ties. As a result, Thailand became a key US ally in Asia to anchor American military operations in the subsequent conflicts in Indochina including the Vietnam War. Economically, Thailand also offered natural resources and market for the post-war reconstruction of Japan under the American leadership.⁴ In return, the American presence in Thailand also helped the Thai establishment, especially the military to secure their ruling vis-à-vis

other opposing domestic forces.⁵ Thailand received a significant assistance package from the United States since the early 1950s including access to foreign capital through international financial institutions.⁶ The fear of communism and the US recognition of the military rule prompted Thailand to form a bilateral security alliance with the United States in 1962 based on the Thanat–Rusk Joint Communiqué. This resulted in another significant increase in US military assistance to Thailand since the Korean War, including military and civilian training, the procurement of military supplies, the construction of airports and road networks to remote areas where communist movements were gaining ground.⁷ Many of these facilities especially airports were used by the United States Air Force (USAF) during the Vietnam War and its operation in Laos and Cambodia.

Thailand's security syndrome and its reliance on the US defense and security umbrella remained intact until the 1970s when the regional and global environments faced a wind change. The tensions within the communist bloc, the *détente* between Beijing and Washington, the withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam followed by the fall of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane within the same year in 1975, alarmed Thai policy elites to adjust its foreign policy. Thailand then sought peaceful coexistence with both China and Indochinese neighbors. Discussions between Thai and Chinese officials about diplomatic normalization continued during 1972–1974, which was finally signed on 1 July 1975. Initially, Thailand also attempted to cement its relations with Vietnam to reflect this geopolitical reality, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976 under the civilian government of Seni Pramoj. However, the fear of Vietnamese threats remained strong among the conservative elites. The backlash against a growing leftist student movement and Seni's appeasement with the socialist countries, eventually, brought about a military coup that replaced him with a right-wing leader, Thanin Kraivixien. This domestic change led to a break in the foreign policy of peaceful coexistence briefly implemented during 1976–1977.

The Vietnam threat perception in Thailand escalated when the Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1978, resulting in the installation of a pro-Hanoi regime in Cambodia in place of the suppressive Khmer Rouge regime.⁸ This event rose to significance due to the combination of both domestic and regional factors. Considering a continuation of communist insurgency in Thailand, Vietnam was viewed as another potential source of moral and tactical support to the revolutionaries.⁹ The Cambodia issue, therefore, occupied Thailand's foreign policy throughout the 1980s until the early 1990s. Thailand's active role in the entire episode of this regional conflict resolution was grounded in its fear of the security threat and power imbalance in continental Southeast Asia. Due to the relaxing international environment, Thailand diversified support from various major powers across ideological camps, including the United States, ASEAN, the Free World, including China and the Soviet Union. Due to the retreat of American troops from Vietnam in the late 1970s, Thailand turned to China for political and military assistance. This resulted in China's involvement in the conflict by

supplying weapons to both the Thai armed forces and Cambodian resistance groups through Thailand.¹⁰

However, Thai foreign policy had a significant turnaround in the final course of the Cold War. Thailand in the late 1980s had built strong confidence in its economic development and saw opportunities in Indochina's rich resources. Bangkok, therefore, initiated a policy of 'turning the battlefields into market-places' to pave the way for peaceful resolution of the Cambodia Conflict. Since the comprehensive withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, traditional security threats seem to have disappeared or no longer challenge Thailand's security.¹¹ Other non-traditional and human security issues such as economic wellbeing, transnational crimes, and human rights have become more relevant to current security concerns, especially since the 1990s. Moreover, the international recognition of Thai sovereignty remains relatively stable despite the renewed political upheavals and insurgency in the Muslim-dominated areas of the southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia since 2003. In addition, although border disputes between Thailand and its neighboring countries are still unresolved in many parts, they do not act as a direct threat to the country's sovereignty, nor to its survival. In this changing environment, Thailand has diversified its venues to manage these challenges. Thailand still keeps close ties with its traditional partners especially the United States, Japan, the EU, and China while expanding its relations with other new powers such as Russia, India, and other emerging nations. Thailand also supports the admission of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam into ASEAN as well as strengthening the group's institutionalization. Therefore, it can be seen that flexibility and pragmatism have been core principles of Thailand to adjust its policy to that which is suitable for the changing environment, hence enabling Thailand to survive and improve its national interest.

Foreign Policy Guided By Liberal Principles

Despite the prominence of flexibility in Thai foreign policy since the Cold War, other contending features have started to emerge in the post-Cold War period. One of the important features, though short-lived, was Thailand's attachment to the principle of democracy and human rights. This development in Thai foreign policy occurred within the change of international and domestic environments. The triumph of the Free World at the end of the Cold War gave rise to the significance of democracy and human rights. Human rights and democratization became a mantra for the UN and other aid agencies and supported by great powers under the 'New World Order'. Thailand was by no means able to avoid this global trend and, in fact, saw the same change at home. Thailand had experienced democratization since the late 1980s which culminated in the successful May 1992 uprising against the attempt of the military to reconstitute its power in politics. Consequently, the military role declined, while other social groups

especially the urban middle class and the businesses gained greater opportunities to participate directly in politics.¹²

Therefore, not only did Thai foreign policy shift from security to economic orientation but also integrated other universal principles particularly human rights and democracy into its implementation. Thailand found that adherence to the principles of democracy and human rights enabled Thailand to position itself in the new international system after the Cold War. This foreign policy orientation towards universal norms was clearly and repeatedly pronounced in several governments in the 1990s particularly during the Chuan Leekpai administrations (1992–1994 and 1997–2001). This policy doctrine was further elaborated during Chuan's second term, notably through his Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan. Surin argued that foreign policy was an extension of domestic policy; therefore, it was not peculiar that democratic values would be in Thailand's interest considering the country's democratic consolidation since 1992.¹³

Two examples in the Chuan government demonstrate this foreign policy orientation towards democratic principles. One is the issuance of entry visas to a delegation of Nobel Peace Prize laureates in 1993 including the Dalai Lama, to participate in a conference on Myanmar's democracy. Despite political pressure from China and Myanmar and the likelihood of the impact on Thai businessmen in those countries, the Chuan government insisted that Thailand granted visas to the participants. The other example is seen in Thailand's proposal of 'Flexible Engagement' in 1998 within ASEAN that recommended changes in the group's non-interference principle.¹⁴ However, the proposal was rejected by the majority of ASEAN countries except for the Philippines. The proposal of Flexible Engagement mirrored Thailand's view of the value of democracy as an effective tool to help overcome emerging challenges in the interdependent world. On the other hand, it also shows Thailand's confidence in its ability to advance this idea in the region. This corresponded to ASEAN's master plan that envisages a concert of Southeast Asian nations in which its members espouse the values of 'outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, [and]... a community of caring societies'.¹⁵ Considering Thailand's political context during both times, the promotion of democracy can be seen as Chuan's policy tool to improve the country's image after the military suppression of the popular demonstration in May 1992 and as a strategy to restore foreign investors' confidence on Thailand's economic restoration amid the 1997 financial crisis.

However, the adherence to universal principles is short-lived. Thai governments after Chuan did not have a strong record on promoting human rights and democracy. The Thaksin government's hawkish approach to narcotics, the local mafia, and the violence in the South¹⁶ in the early 2000s did not streamline Thailand into this liberal standard. Furthermore, the resumption of the military role in Thai politics after the *coup d'état* in September 2006 and May 2014 certainly points to the failure of military professionalism and its likely implications for foreign and security policy direction. The military regimes' approach towards

some universal principles was criticized, particularly concerning the freedom of speech and expression, which directly challenged the notion of the country's adherence to democratic norms and human rights.

Foreign Policy with Regional Aspirations

Thailand's regional aspiration is another core feature in Thailand's foreign policy. Thailand's foreign policy elites, in fact, have had a perception that their country is a regional leader in its own right. Thailand was regarded as a regional hegemon in mainland Southeast Asia before the arrival of the European nations. At its apex, its sphere of influence extended to most of today's Laos and Cambodia and part of Southern Burma and northern Malay sultanates under the tributary system. With the emergence of the Thai modern state and nationalism, Thailand's official history has taken these ancient polities as part of its geobody. This idea spreads through mass education and is imprinted in the nation's psyche that influences many episodes of Thailand's policy especially in the region. This regional ambition is embedded in Thailand's foreign policy calculation and was again clearly pronounced since the end of the Cold War, particularly, during the outspoken and ambitious leadership of such as Chatichai Choonhavan, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Thaksin Shinawatra.

The expression of Thailand's regional leadership ambition in the post-Cold War era is mostly seen in the form of its attempt to promote its version of regional initiatives in which Bangkok plays a central role.¹⁷ This regional vision for Thai foreign policy is supported overwhelmingly across the board as it strikes a deep chord among the Thai public. One common feature within these various regional initiatives is that they all aim to tap into Thailand's neighbors with rich resources and cheap labor through the promotion of export processing zones (EPZs) around Thailand and regional economic cooperation at the regional level. This is based on the fact that since the end of the 1980s Thailand became an economic powerhouse, especially in mainland Southeast Asia, benefiting from its more advanced economic and political conditions compared to its neighbors.¹⁸ This policy direction is clearly seen in the Chatichai government (1988–1991) when he proposed the policy of 'turning the battlefields into the marketplace'. Chatichai saw Thailand's strong economic position as a vehicle for expediting this idea and then adopted the strategy of promoting Thailand's regional gravity to link Indochina countries into a new phase of regional interaction. Since Chatichai, different regional initiatives were constantly proposed by Thailand such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, Quadrangle Economic Growth in 1992, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) (1997), Flexible Engagement (1998). The regional ambition was at its zenith during the Thaksin administration (2001–2006), when Thaksin further elaborated the regional vision into different layers of regional schemes. These include the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the Ayeyawady-Chao

Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). In its essence, Chatichai's and Thaksin's foreign policy shared similar characteristics. It became assertive, unconventional and sought to exercise Thailand's preponderance and sphere of influence particularly in Indochina, as well as to extend Thailand's role in regional and international affairs.¹⁹ It departed from the simple 'reactive and pragmatic' notion that had dominated Thai foreign policy-making.

Even though the personal interest of some Thai leaders plays a part in Thailand's re-emerging regional ambitions since the Chatichai government, it is quite inadequate to ascribe Thailand's regional vision solely to this factor. Thailand's regional aspirations stem from the influence of ideational factors in Thai policymakers – self-perception – within the context of the internationalization of the Thai economy in the post-Cold War era. The interaction between these elements has become another important part in forming and strengthening the idea of regional leadership in Thai foreign policy after the Cold War. Therefore, this aspect of Thai foreign policy represents the fact that Thailand's foreign policymakers in the post-Cold War era no longer think their country is small. The regional aspirations expressed throughout this period signify their confidence to reassert its influence in the region. The shift of this self-perception has affected the primary focus in Thai foreign policy from preserving its territorial integrity and security towards exercising regional leadership. This characteristic has become another important feature that has shifted the nature of Thai foreign policy behavior towards proaction as evidenced by its rigorous support and involvement in regionalist schemes.

From the above discussion, it can be seen that Thai foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold War period has revolved around three objectives that aim for maintaining a balanced position between regional powers, utilizing democratic values as a policy tool, and advancing its regional leadership aspirations. The combination of these features has offered Thailand different venues to fulfill its national interests depending on changing contexts. However, some domestic developments since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 have gradually shaken Thailand's ability to do so. The next section will elaborate two important domestic elements – the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and a decade of political turmoil – and their influences in Thai foreign policy, particularly in the 2000s.

THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY DISARRAYS

In the final days of the Cold War conflict in Southeast Asia marked by the resolution of the Cambodian issue, Thailand's search for a balanced position within the new post-Cold War order started to form a clear direction. The regional context enabled Thailand to exercise its autonomy in foreign policy without political ideological constraints. This period witnessed Thailand's enthusiasm in support of opening up Indochina's economies. As Thailand experienced economic

growth throughout the late 1980s until the first half of the 1990s, stability and growth in this region as a whole would be beneficial to Thailand. At the same time, due to its success in democratization in the early 1990s Thailand was also in a position to be at the forefront of democracy in the region. Therefore, we can observe these two patterns dominating Thailand's foreign policy during this period as detailed in the previous section.

In a parallel development in the region, the last withdrawal of the American troops from the Philippines in 1992 suggests that Southeast Asia no longer constituted a core interest in US foreign policy. This situation posted a warning in the region that they would have to manage security challenges on their own. In general, Southeast Asian policymakers agree that the United States is a benign hegemon and a strategic balancer in the region. Without the active American role, Southeast Asia could have fallen into a fierce power competition, expectedly from increasing China's influence and tensions over hot spots in Asia especially the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. While the region was likely to benefit from China's economic development, policymakers in the region agreed that the role of the United States was still highly relevant.

The policy response to this environment manifested itself in the regional states seeking engagement with multiple powers, including not only the United States and China but also Japan, Russia, India, Australia, and the European Union. In addition, Southeast Asia strengthened its regional institutions to play a central role in shaping the Asia-Pacific order both in economic and security areas. This attempt is seen from the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the establishment of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the early 1990s.²⁰ Within this regional context, Thailand's foreign policy arguably maintained its balanced position and could achieve the three features it upheld in the early post-Cold War era. However, Thailand's foreign policy has experienced significant constraints domestically that have challenged its ability to maintain the three features in its foreign posture. These include the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and its decade-long political contention since the mid 2000s.

The Asian Financial Crisis and Thailand's Policy Shift

An important turning point in Thailand's foreign policy direction in the post-Cold War era is found in its changing attitude towards US-led order. Despite being their longstanding security ally in Asia, America's lukewarm response to Thailand's economic difficulties during the financial crisis in the late 1990s disappointed many Thai policymakers and the public. Against the expectation from the Thai counterpart, the US-backed International Monetary Fund's (IMF) austerity program failed to offer additional help beyond the IMF bailout package of \$US17.2 billion.²¹ Unlike the minimal response to Thailand, South Korea received swift actions and substantial assistance from the United States to quickly stabilize the Korean economy.²² In contrast, other Asian nations

showed their eagerness to offer more generous assistance to the kingdom, particularly, China.

China contributed an additional US\$1 billion to the IMF rescue fund and did not devalue the Chinese Yuan. In addition, China joined ASEAN member countries and the other 'Plus Three' counterparts to establish the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000 for a currency swap mechanism. While the United States was viewed with the admonition, China gained public admiration for its leadership in helping the affected neighboring economies. Considering the fact that Thailand is the United States' oldest ally in Asia, the lack of enthusiasm and support in the crisis upset the Thais and triggered a new wave of Thai nationalism and anti-Americanism. In contrast, China's role in this situation was greatly appreciated by Thai policymakers²³ and helped strengthen the Sino–Thai relationship. Thai policymakers viewed that China was a 'true friend' who did not abandon Thailand during the tough time.

As a result, the Thai governments after the Financial Crisis redirected its foreign policy more towards Thailand's Asian strategic partners, especially China. The government of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006) was at the forefront of this policy shift under the Forward Engagement Strategy. The strategy comprised several major regional initiatives, including the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the renewal of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). This foreign policy strategy was based on the belief that Thailand could act as a bridge that connects different sub-regions in Asia in order to mobilize Asia's abundant resources to stimulate economic growth.²⁴ For instance, Thailand envisioned the ACD to become an open forum for Asian countries to build mutual confidence, to search for solutions to poverty, and to stimulate further cooperation for regional development based on skills, knowledge, and resources in Asia. Thaksin viewed the ACD as a complement to existing dialogues and ventures in Asia and predicted it would create synergy among bilateral, multilateral, subregional and regional strategic partnerships in the areas of common interests. Through this perspective, increasing interdependence in Asia would be a proper counterbalance against regional uncertainty in the economic and strategic realms.

Considering the attractiveness of the Chinese economy, Thailand made greater efforts to court Beijing both at bilateral and regional levels. Prime Minister Thaksin visited China frequently to campaign for his bilateral and regional initiatives in which he successfully secured China's support and hosting of the 3rd ACD Retreat in June 2004. At the same time, Thailand rushed to conclude the early harvest free trade agreement (FTA) on agricultural trade with China in June 2003. This scheme advanced Thailand's economic relations with China before the ASEAN-China FTA started in 2010. Both countries also started to discuss the Thailand-China Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership plan in mid 2005,²⁵ which was finalized in 2012. At home, Thaksin also benefited from

a close relationship with China. His heavy-handed policies against drug trafficking and Southern insurgencies received strong criticisms from rights groups and Western nations. However, Beijing's uncritical stance reassured and legitimized Thaksin's policies, which in turn helped deepen bilateral ties.

Thailand's Contentious Politics

Thailand's political polarization and the intervention of the Thai military in politics since 2006 is another important domestic factor that has impacted Thailand's foreign policy in the recent decade. In a nutshell, the decade-long political turmoil in the country reveals the power struggle between the traditional establishments and the emerging political forces developed around the rise of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thai politics. Thaksin came to power through his broad-based popularity. The poor and lower middle class in the North and Northeast were attracted to his policy aiming for wealth distribution; Thaksin's social and economic welfare schemes benefited these groups through universal healthcare access, village funds, and other grass-root stimulus packages. The urban middle class population liked him based mainly on their economic nationalism, a consequence of the anti-Western sentiment after the Asian Financial Crisis. Thaksin carried a strong leadership style and outspoken personality; he was not reluctant to criticize the West and promised the voters that he would free Thailand from the IMF's conditionality.

However, there was a growing dissatisfaction with Thaksin in his second term, especially among the urban population and particularly in Bangkok and the South. Since then, Thai politics faced instability with frequent government turnovers and a series of street protests and counter-protests. Thaksin faced a series of moral and legal accusations of corruption and cronyism within his cabinet and his party, including disloyalty to the royal family which is a very sensitive issue within Thai society. Against this backdrop, Thaksin called for an early general election to be scheduled in 2006, but was boycotted by the major opposition party. Moreover, the anti-Thaksin movement successfully mobilized urban sentiment against him, which led to the military coup in September 2006; Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was also dissolved. However, despite the coup and his unpopularity in the urban area, the pro-Thaksin parties always came into power due to a larger pool of supporters in the rural area, which frustrated the anti-Thaksin political parties and their constituencies as they never won a majority in the election. Again in the 2007 election, the pro-Thaksin People Power Party (PPP) gained the victory.

Notwithstanding popular support, the pro-Thaksin governments after 2007 were relatively unstable. Thailand had three prime ministers in 2007; two of which were from the PPP, who also faced urban public protests (or the Yellow Shirt) and a series of judicial activism.²⁶ The Constitutional Court disqualified PPP leaders, barred many PPP politicians from politics for five years, and

eventually dissolved the party. In December 2007, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva became the Prime Minister, which gave birth to the pro-Thaksin mass protest, the so-called Red Shirt. The Red Shirt launched its campaign at the end of 2009 for a new election and had a large demonstration in central Bangkok in May 2010. The Abhisit government suppressed the Red Shirt protest by force between 13 and 19 May 2010 resulting in the death of at least 90 people and the injury of more than 2,000 people.²⁷

The new election held in July 2011 brought the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party (PTP) back to power led by his sister Yingluck Shinawatra. However, the Yingluck government also faced criticisms as she had no previous political experience and was viewed as Thaksin's puppet. The turning point in her government took place in mid 2013 when the government tabled the Amnesty Bill to parliament. Another anti-government protest – from the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) – formed in October 2013 against the draft that would free Thaksin from any allegations he was facing, if passed. The protest expanded to regular street rallies that frequently occupied public offices and streets in the Bangkok business area for almost six months, and called for the resignation of Yingluck. Yingluck dissolved the parliament in December 2013 and scheduled a new election in February 2014. Yet the election did not solve the political turmoil, as the opposition groups and PDRC did not welcome it but instead called for another round of political reform. The opposition perceived that they would never win the election if the system continued; the new election in February would just bring Yingluck back and continue pro-Thaksin leadership with more legitimacy. The election was boycotted and obstructed by the PDRC, some of which involved using force and violence. Considering this political deadlock, the military intervened in May and subsequently took power on 20 May 2016.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISARRAY

Viewing the aforementioned foreign policy plans Thailand has aimed to maintain, a series of domestic developments since the end of the 1990s have shaken current Thai foreign policy in several ways. First, Thailand has struggled to maintain its flexible and balanced foreign policy; and second, the values of democracy and human rights can no longer be Bangkok's foreign policy tool; and, finally, Thailand has lost its regional leadership.

Thailand's Foreign Policy Imbalance

Thailand's strategic culture has long cherished the value of having a room for maneuvering as mentioned in the first section. In practice, however, the Thai leadership, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, has directed the kingdom's foreign policy stance away from such strategic culture.

Thailand is viewed as being increasingly unable to maintain a fine balance between great powers. This imbalance in Thai foreign policy posture is critical in the context of regional power competition, especially between the United States and China. Despite the fact that the Thai-American security alliance continues, the dynamic wanes. As a result of the failure of the United States and the West to demonstrate their willingness to provide additional assistance to Thailand, Bangkok has realigned its interest more with Asian counterparts. In this scenario, China has become an alternative to American power for Thailand not only in economic terms but also in political and security arenas.

At the same time, China's growing economic clout has increasingly factored into Thai foreign policy-making. A number of positions taken by Thailand in the ongoing adjustment of the regional architecture demonstrate the swing of Thailand towards China. In the economic sphere, Thailand has refocused its strategy towards Asia, especially China, in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis as discussed in the previous section. This economic reorientation can be seen clearly amid the US attempt to engage with Asia during the Obama administration through the promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Thailand refused to join the TPP from the start, even though it was approached by the US counterparts on many occasions. The main concerns included not only strict measures within the TPP framework but also the potential of the TPP to overshadow ASEAN's centrality in the regional economic order.²⁸ Despite former Prime Minister Yingluck's public announcement supporting the TPP during Obama's visit in late 2012, Thailand made slow progress towards the accession. In contrast, Thailand strongly supports the ASEAN process of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in which China plays a significant role. This case shows that Thailand's policymakers prefer regional economic arrangements centered on Asia to the US-led ones. Certainly, China is eyed as the engine of dynamic Asian-centric arrangements.

Regarding the security area, Bangkok has been increasingly reluctant to facilitate American security policy in the post-Cold War period. This can be seen in two important issues: the denial of US access to Thai military facilities and Thailand's initial unwillingness to support the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Although the United States withdrew its troops from Thailand in 1976 at the end of the Vietnam War, their security cooperation and alliance continues. The United States has been an important source of military technology, weapons, and training for the Thai armed forces. The joint military exercise coded Cobra Gold started in 1982 and continues to be the largest military exercise in the Asia-Pacific region. Importantly, the United States has generally been granted access to the Thai military facilities, especially U-Tapao naval airfield in Thailand's eastern seaboard. However, Thailand has denied US access to U-Tapao several times since the early 1990s; in 1994 the Thai government did so even though it had just signed a new bilateral agreement to provide logistic support to American troops in 1993.²⁹ It was reported that the denial was a direct response to American

pressure on trade issues and the concerns of China. Another rejection took place in 2012 over the request by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct a scientific study on climate change. Despite the initial positive response by the government, the domestic conflict in Thailand changed the outcome of the decision-making. Notwithstanding the benefits for Thailand of a more accurate weather forecast for agricultural purposes and technological transfer, the opposition forces protested against the NASA project. They claimed that the project would support US encirclement of China, and by allowing the United States to carry out this project could destroy Beijing's trust and affect economic benefits from China.³⁰ Eventually, the government delayed the decision, and the project was canceled.

Thailand's ambivalence to accommodate the US policy can also be seen in the early stage of its position on the GWOT. After the September 11 terrorist attack, the Thaksin government pledged its support to the US-led campaign against terrorism. However, after being stormed by public criticism due to concerns over Thailand's Muslim population and its good relations with Muslim countries, the government toned down its position to support counter-terrorism measures within the UN frameworks. Some critics also worried that full support of the US-led campaign might also have been seen as part of the overall strategic encirclement of the rise of China. Considering Thailand's close ties with Beijing and the latter's generous assistance during the financial crisis in the late 1990s, a big part of the Thai policymaking circle thought Thailand should remain neutral. The change of Thailand's position frustrated the US counterpart during its international campaign because Thailand as a US security ally could be a major actor in Southeast Asia against the terrorist network, as well as providing logistic support for American military operations in the Middle East. It was not until the end of 2001 when Thailand pledged its full backing to the GWOT after US President George W. Bush pressured countries with tacit support to show a clear position as echoed in his famous quote, 'You are either with us or against us in the war on terror.'³¹

Although US-Thai politico-security relations continued especially through counter-terrorism cooperation, Bangkok still tried to keep its low profile. The cooperation, however, was interrupted after the military coup in Thailand in 2014. As a result, Washington downgraded its bilateral ties with Thailand due to US law, including the suspension of high-level military contacts and arms sales. It also criticized the junta on its violation of human rights and democracy and put pressures on the junta to return to civilian rule. This tension significantly drove Bangkok further away from Washington and towards Beijing. US pressure has aggravated the bitterness within the Thai junta towards the United States. The junta and its supporters claimed that the United States and other Western countries did not recognize the complexity of Thai politics.³²

However, China and many other Asian countries viewed this as a domestic issue and mostly adopted a flexible approach in dealing with the current regime.

Therefore, the Thai military government has sought sympathy and legitimacy from its Asian friends. In this context, Beijing was one of the first nations to endorse the military rule and also criticized Washington for interfering in Thailand's internal affairs. Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has courted China further to consolidate its political legitimacy internationally and to act as a counterbalance to the United States and Western countries.³³ As a result, Thailand has accommodated China on many issues. For instance, Thailand deported Chinese Uighurs and political dissidents on China's request regardless of human rights and international legal concerns. Thai-Chinese military cooperation has also strengthened during this time as seen in the first comprehensive Blue Strike military exercise in 2016 and the agreement to purchase Chinese submarines and tanks in 2017.

The Disappearance of Principled Foreign Policy

Thailand was at the forefront of Asian democracies, especially in the 1990s. As a result of a socio-economic change in Thailand in the 1980s, other actors found their interest to partake in politics. Despite the military continuing its role in the 1980s, Thai politics witnessed the hybrid democratic system where elections were held regularly, but the premiership and key cabinet posts were reserved to fill military quotas. However, this political structure could not resist the pressure of democratization. Thailand in 1988 had the first elected civilian government since 1974 led by General Chatichai Choonhavan, a retired military man turned businessman. Chatichai was ousted by the military coup in 1991 due to the allegation of corruption within his cabinet, but that did not stop the thirst for democracy within the middle class. Despite the junta's initial promise not to hold political power after the coup, the junta leader General Suchinda Kraprayoon agreed to take up the portfolio of Prime Minister after the March 1992 election. This was followed by public protest calling for the military to honor their word, led by progressive politicians and joined by the Bangkok middle class. In this protest, Thai politics witnessed for the first time the use and impacts of communications technology to gain information and mobilize public support. Mobile phones and fax machines were used widely to mobilize people participation. Also, foreign news channels, such as CNN and the BBC, broadcasting via the cable network became alternative sources for information about the protest. The demonstration reached its peak during 17–20 May, when clashes between protesters and government forces took place. The tension came to an end by royal intervention on 20 May, leaving around 50 people dead and hundreds of injuries and disappearances.

Against this background, Thailand after the May 1992 incident became an exemplar of democratization in Southeast Asia. The new election in September 1992 brought about a civilian government that incorporated the promotion of human rights and democracy as one of Thailand's foreign policy strategies.

As mentioned earlier, the granting of entry visas to Nobel Peace Prize laureates, including the Dalai Lama, in 1993 to participate in a conference in support of Aung San Suu Kyi shows Thailand's ability to insist on its democratic position and autonomous foreign policy stance. The proposal of 'Flexible Engagement' within ASEAN in 1998, though failing to be adopted by ASEAN, also opened a new chapter for the group to be aware of borderless challenges that impeded the member countries' peace and prosperity. The 'Flexible Engagement' idea paved the way towards a more adjusted practice of Enhanced Interaction that promotes incremental change and allows ASEAN member states to suggest solutions to other members' domestic issues that seem to have cross-boundary effects. This principle is also a foundation of ASEAN's attempt to build the ASEAN Community in 2020.

However, since the Thaksin administration, the promotion of human rights and democracy has been toned down in Thai foreign policy. During his leadership, Thaksin always claimed that democracy was at the core of his policy as he came to power through a popular election, however, a number of his policies suggest otherwise. Nationalistic sentiment played an important part as a consequence of the rise of nationalism after the financial crisis. This can be seen in his policy on the insurgencies in the South that emphasized confrontation rather than negotiation in the name of protecting Thailand's national integrity. As a result, a period of violence took place involving both killings and torture carried out by the security authorities. Coupled with another policy of the war on drugs, Thailand's human right records were severely marred. The estimated numbers of deaths during the Thaksin government connected to the Southern unrest and the war on drugs are approximately 2,000³⁴ and 3,000,³⁵ respectively. Thaksin was also not reluctant to rebuke criticisms from the international community. He once commented on the UN criticism on his human rights violation, for example, that the organization was not his father.³⁶ Thailand's cooperation in the US-led GWOT also did not improve its human rights records. Instead, joining the US-led counter-terrorism not only legitimized Thaksin's hawkish approach to his domestic security policy but also allowed its involvement in more violations of human rights under the GWOT to take place at home. Under counter-terrorism cooperation, Thailand also became a CIA secret site for interrogating international terrorist suspects.³⁷

Human rights and democracy after the military coup in 2014 also deteriorated, particularly, in the areas of freedom of speech and law enforcement. This worsening human rights situation can be seen from an increasing number of people persecuted under the *lèse-majesté* law. The cases rose nine-fold after the 2014 coup until early 2016 and typically were tried in the military court. Statistically, only six percent of the defendants were released on bail.³⁸ Moreover, more than nine hundred people, most of which were politicians, Red Shirt leaders, academics, students, and members of the media, were harassed and summoned by soldiers for the purpose of so-called 'attitude adjustment'. Moreover, the junta's human

right records have also been further tarnished by its accommodation of Beijing as evidenced in the case of forced repatriation of Uighur refugees and other political dissidents to China.³⁹

Thailand's loss of image at the Asian democratic forefront can be seen simply through the decline of ranking in the Freedom of the World Index. Thailand was categorized as a free country in the same group along with the United States, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan in the 1990s. However, it was ranked in the category of 'not free' along with other authoritarian regimes in mainland Southeast Asia and China in 2015.⁴⁰ Therefore, current Thai foreign policy faces difficulties in claiming or adopting democracy and human rights as a guiding principle and tool to enhance Thailand's national interest.

Weakening Thailand's Regional Leadership

Thailand's aspirations to be a leading actor in Southeast Asia have contributed to the regional political economy, especially in continental Southeast Asia. Its foreign policy shift towards peaceful coexistence with Indochina, 'turning the battlefields into marketplaces', in the early post-Cold War period was a turning point. It facilitated Southeast Asia to change its mode of interaction from confrontation to cooperation. It is undeniable that Thailand's subsequent regional focus on building subregional initiatives throughout post-Cold War Southeast Asia has also helped Indochina integrate into the regional and the world economy at large. At the broader regional level, Thailand's active participation in ASEAN regional affairs also institutionalized and strengthened the group's ability to be in the driver's seat in regional order. This can be seen in its push for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the early 1990s.

However, the conflict between two major political groups during the past decade has weakened Thailand's political stability, and hence its regional leadership. Since the September 2006 coup until mid 2011 Thailand had four prime ministers. As a result, this frequent change of government affected the continuity and focus of Thai foreign policy. It lost its priority within the administration amid the attempt of each government to survive. The main foreign policy apparatus, particularly the Foreign Ministry, was occupied with short-term objectives, most of which were about how to explain the country's political hiccups to the international community. Therefore, despite the continuity of Thailand's regional aspirations within the policy elites, it lacked a long-term strategy and plan as well as the capability to execute its goals.

Thailand's inability to maintain its regional leadership can be seen on several occasions, especially since the military coup in 2006. Thailand could no longer sustain its leadership in promoting regional peace and stability but, instead, became a source of regional conflict or problem. The activation of nationalism as a tool of political elements in domestic conflict brought about

tensions between Thailand and its neighbors, especially Cambodia. The Thai-Cambodian tension was reignited around the issue of land ownership surrounding the ancient ruin of Preah Vihear temple. The anti-Thaksin group was fuming over the pro-Thaksin government's support of the registration of the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2008, submitted by Cambodia. The anti-Thaksin group viewed the pro-Thaksin Samak Sundaravej government support for Cambodia as a return of favor for Cambodia's assistance to former Prime Minister Thaksin during his exile. The anti-Thaksin group believed that Thailand's acknowledgment of Cambodia's UNESCO registration would have legal implications over the disputed area of 4.6 square kilometers, which was still under the border demarcation negotiation. The Samak government did not last long and the succeeding Abhisit government, which also subscribed to the anti-Thaksin sentiment, later took a hard-line approach on this issue.⁴¹ The armed clashes took place from early February until May 2011 and expanded to other disputed areas around other ancient ruins killing a number of civilians on both sides. Although there were earlier attempts to hold a regional mediation, Thailand insisted the conflict should be solved bilaterally. However, since the tension escalated in 2011, Thailand accepted ASEAN's intervention as an observer in bilateral negotiation. At the same time, Cambodia also sought the clarification of the ICJ's 1962 ruling over the temple, which helped provide a temporary military withdrawal and ceasefire along the disputed area.

Thailand's regional leadership was also crippled by the internal conflict seen between 2008 and 2009 during its role as ASEAN Chairman. Due to the political situation and frequent demonstrations in Bangkok, the Abhisit government moved major events of the 14th ASEAN Summit to different times and venues to avoid disruption. While the ASEAN Summit was held in Hua Hin in February 2009, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 summits took place in Pattaya in mid April that year. It was unprecedented for the two series of meetings to be organized in separation. Moreover, the summits in Pattaya were eventually canceled when the anti-government rally broke into the venue and fifteen leaders were evacuated. Thailand's leadership in the region was seriously in doubt in the middle of this political crisis.⁴²

Moreover, Thailand has also lost its ability to be a spearhead of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in many aspects. A series of military interventions through both the coups in 2006 and 2014 brought Thailand back to both political instability and authoritarian rule. As discussed earlier, democracy and human rights issues have lost its significance in Thailand's foreign policy and can no longer become a foreign policy tool. The junta faced international criticism on its violation of basic human rights and freedom of speech throughout its five-year ruling. Despite the fact that the general election was held in March 2019, the same military elites have continued to dominate Thai politics under the civilian jacket provided under the military-written constitution. In this situation, Thailand has lost its international attractiveness as a regional hub for democracy

and human rights promotion. Thailand also took a leading role in promoting regional initiatives for economic development and cooperation from the early post-Cold War period. In the current situation, Thailand could not effectively utilize this strategy to restore proactive foreign policy. Many important regional initiatives lack attention from policymakers, especially political leaders, whose main concerns are domestic. While the civilian governments after the 2006 coup focused on their survival amid mass protests, the junta, since 2016, paid attention to maintaining public order and silencing opposition forces. The focus of the Foreign Ministry were attempts to justify the necessity for military intervention to foreign countries rather than initiating any proactive policy.⁴³

Thailand's inability to restore its active role in regional affairs, in turn leaves a leadership vacuum in mainland Southeast Asia. It allows other great powers, especially China to deepen its influence in the region. There is an indication that China has advanced its role in the Mekong subregion. In March 2016, China initiated Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). This cooperative framework demonstrates China's strong desire to directly play its role in water resource management in this area.⁴⁴ Significantly, its attempt to further institutionalize the LMC shows that Beijing wants to write its own rules and further consolidate its influence and leadership in mainland Southeast Asia.⁴⁵ China's move at this time has challenged the existing regional arrangements. Previously, Thailand led the mainland Southeast Asia states to build a regional mechanism for river resource management in the Mekong subregion under the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in which any proposals that change and affect the riparian states would be discussed within the MRC. Although China was reluctant to join the MRC, Thailand successfully led the MRC to convince China to agree with some arrangements such as the Lancang-Upper Mekong River Commercial Navigation Agreement in 2001.⁴⁶ The agreement included that the party would discuss further development for heavier vessels running in the river within the ADB, GMS, ASEAN, and the MRC frameworks. Therefore, the establishment of LMC will compete with and may sideline the role previously played by the MRC, Thailand, and other regional powers such as Japan in the subregion.⁴⁷

In addition, Thailand's role as the coordinator between ASEAN and China during 2012–2015 is also debatable. Despite being able to move forwards the ASEAN-China discussion on the Code of Conduct of the South China Sea in 2013,⁴⁸ the tension in the South China Sea escalated. In January 2013 the Philippines initiated the international arbitration process, and in 2014 there were clashes between China and the ASEAN claimant states, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, in the disputed areas over fishing rights, passage rights, and Chinese oil rigs. Thailand is also viewed as showing sympathy to China's position in the dispute. The military government even shows its accommodation to China as Beijing practically endorsed the coup in the first place. Therefore, Thailand's inability to resist China's negative pressures and influence in the region has created doubt among ASEAN states and observers

about whether Bangkok can maintain neutrality and contribute its role in conflict management.⁴⁹

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated three important features of Thailand's foreign policy. That is, it ultimately aims to maintain a balanced position between great powers. Therefore, Bangkok will adjust its foreign policy to accommodate great powers as far as its national interest and integrity remain intact. Thai policymakers understand that Thailand will be worse off if it has to choose sides. As a small power within the international hierarchy, flexibility and pragmatism serve national interest best. However, Thailand also attempted to build its regional leadership throughout the post-Cold War era based on its growing confidence in the economic power and democratic values within the region since the latter half of the 1980s. Thailand's regional leadership aspirations have materialized into two aspects: first, it promotes regional or subregional initiatives focusing on economic development; and second, it supports democracy and human rights in the region.

As domestic politics plays a major role in shaping foreign policy direction,⁵⁰ the case of Thailand shows that its politics in the past two decades has greatly influenced the course of Thai foreign policy negatively. As discussed in the previous section, the rise of Thai nationalism in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and the military intervention since 2006 onwards have essentially weakened three major features of Thai foreign policy. This situation has several regional implications, particularly, in the current context of the rise of China and regional power competition.

First, Thailand's inability to maintain a balanced foreign policy is affecting the credibility of Thai diplomacy itself. As a founding member state of ASEAN and a major ASEAN country, Thailand's policy repositioning will exacerbate the regional power competition between China and other great powers, especially the United States and Japan. By moving in favor of Beijing, Thailand creates a concern or discomfort among Southeast Asian countries that Thailand is now entering Beijing's orbit. Second, this policy imbalance affects Thailand's regional leading role, especially in mainland Southeast Asia. As a spearhead in the subregional cooperation since the end of the Cold War, now Thailand is losing this position to Beijing who is exerting a strong influence in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. By positioning itself closer to China, moreover, Thailand is increasingly losing its strategic leverage in US security strategy. Coupled with the political tension between Thailand and the United States after the 2014 coup, Washington may need to diversify its access to military facilities in the region in the long term. The US military has increasingly depended on Singapore bases and recently renewed interest to access a base in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.⁵¹

This trend might be further accelerated with the changing attitude of the Philippines towards Washington and Beijing.

Lastly and importantly, Thailand's changing policy direction triggers the recent concern of regional drift between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia.⁵² The former is seen as a pro-China group of countries, whereas the latter is relatively pro-American. If this trend continues, it will affect ASEAN in maintaining its unified position as a major driver in the Asia-Pacific regional architecture. Its role in maintaining peace and stability in the region will be strained. When the group can no longer offer effective political resolutions to conflicts, it may accentuate the ongoing arms race in Southeast Asia as uncertainties will loom large. Therefore, Thailand's foreign policy disarrays may contribute to the long-term geostrategic change in the Asia Pacific region.

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Vietnam's Foreign Policy

Carlyle Thayer

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an analysis of Socialist Republic of Vietnam's foreign policy from 1991, when Vietnam's decade-long international isolation was lifted following a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, to 2016.

The framework and strategy for Vietnam's overall foreign relations is set at five yearly national congresses of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). This policy is implemented through resolutions of the VCP Central Committee and VCP Politburo. Vietnam's foreign minister is normally a member of and answerable to the Politburo. The five yearly cycle of national party congresses shapes the structure of this chapter.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one examines Vietnam's adoption and implementation of the foreign policy of 'multilateralizing and diversifying' its external relations up to 2005. The year 1995 was pivotal, Vietnam normalized its relations with the United States and became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Section two explores Vietnam's pursuit of strategic and comprehensive partnerships with Russia, Japan, India, China, European states and Australia, as well as Vietnam's engagement with multilateral institutions in the period from 2006 to 2010. Section three assesses Vietnam's consolidation of relations with the major powers, new strategic partnerships, and the South China Sea issue in the period from 2011 to 2016. Section four, concludes that Vietnam's policy of 'multilateralizing and diversifying' its external relations was largely successful but the maritime dispute with China over the

South China Sea poses major challenges to Vietnam's attempt to maintain its autonomy and independent foreign policy.

VIETNAM'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1991–2005

From the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945 until the end of the Cold War four and a half decades later Vietnam pursued a foreign policy of alignment with the Soviet Union as a loyal member of the socialist camp (Thakur and Thayer, 1992: 53–62; Palmujoki, 1997). Two major developments prompted Vietnam to radically alter its foreign policy framework – a decade-long period of international isolation and domestic economic stagnation following its invasion of Cambodia and the disintegration of socialism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Two major turning points mark Vietnam's remarkable reorientation of its foreign relations. In December 1986, Vietnam adopted a bold new policy of renovation or *doi moi* at the Vietnam Communist Party's (VCP) Sixth National Congress aimed at overcoming the domestic socio-economic crisis (Thayer, 1987). The Political Report to the congress by VCP Secretary General Truong Chinh called for the expansion and heightening of the effectiveness of external economic relations as one of the means of addressing the domestic economic crisis (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 659–64). The second turning point came in May 1988 when the VCP Political Bureau adopted Resolution No. 13 entitled, 'On the Tasks and Foreign Policy in the New Situation'. This resolution codified Vietnam's foreign policy objectives by giving priority to economic development and calling for a 'multi-directional foreign policy' orientation with the goal of making 'more friends, fewer enemies' (Porter, 1990; Chu Van Chuc, 2004; Luu Doan Huynh, 2004; Nguyen Dy Nien, 2005: 31–7).

Seventh National Party Congress. In mid 1991 the VCP's Seventh National Party Congress endorsed a 'multi-directional foreign policy' for Vietnam (Vu Khoan, 1995: 75). The Seventh Congress adopted the *Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism*. The *Platform* declared that Vietnam would by-pass the capitalist stage of development and embark on a prolonged transition to socialism 'involving many stages' of which the present was just the 'initial stage' (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1991: 49–50).

The Seventh Congress also adopted an important modification to Politburo Resolution No. 13. Vietnam would now 'diversify and multilateralize economic relations with all countries and economic organizations'. In short, 'Vietnam wants to become the friend of all countries in the world community, and struggle for peace, independence and development.' According to the Political Report, 'We stand for equal and mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries regardless of different socio-political systems and on the basis of the principle of peaceful co-existence' (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1991: 134).

The Political Report, however, gave priority to relations with the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, China, Cuba, other 'communist and workers' parties', the 'forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress', India, and the Non-Aligned Movement. It was only at the end of this list that 'new friends' were mentioned:

To develop relations of friendship with other countries in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, and to strive for a South-East Asia of peace, friendship and co-operation. To expand equal and mutually beneficial co-operation with northern and Western European countries, Japan and other developed countries. To promote the process of normalization of relations with the United States. (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1991: 135)

Vietnam reaped substantial foreign policy dividends following the Cambodian peace agreements in October 1991 as trade and aid sanctions imposed by the international community were lifted. Vietnam succeeded in diversifying its foreign relations by moving from dependency on the Soviet Union to a more diverse and balanced set of external relations. For example, in 1989, Vietnam had diplomatic relations with only twenty-three non-communist states; by 1995 this number had expanded to 163. During this period, Vietnam normalized its relations with all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), acceded to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and normalized relations with China in November 1991 (Thayer, 1992: 55–62; 1996: 78 to 88). In July 1995 Vietnam became ASEAN's seventh member and in 1998 Vietnam joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Not all was smooth sailing. In February 1992, China's National People's Congress passed the Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone that claimed all islands in the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. China's law now put it on a collision course with Vietnam regarding sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. This took the form of a series of maritime incidents in the 1990s precipitated by China's grant of an oil license to a US oil company to explore in waters falling within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ (Hayton, 2014: 123–30).

Mid-Term Party Conference. In January 1994, the VCP convened its first Mid-Term Party Conference. Secretary General Do Muoi delivered the Political Report that reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment to the broad outlines of economic and political renovation that emerged since the seventh congress. The major policy theme to emerge from the Mid-Term Conference was that priority would be given to industrialization and modernization and that mobilizing domestic and foreign capital was crucial to meet this objective. The Political Report therefore listed the expansion of Vietnam's external relations as one of its essential tasks (Political Report of the Seventh Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee delivered by General Secretary Do Muoi at the Opening of the Midterm National Party Conference, 1994: 60) *Nhan Dan*, 21 January 1994.

After the mid-term conference the official Vietnamese media highlighted what it termed the ‘four dangers’ facing Vietnam: the danger of being left behind economically by regional countries; the danger of peaceful evolution against socialism; the danger of corruption; and the danger of the breakdown of social order and security (Party conference delegates’ discussions 22nd January; ‘four challenging dangers’, 1994: B/5) (Voice of Vietnam, 22 January 1994).

In the period from the mid-term conference and the convening of the Eighth National Congress in mid 1996, Vietnam continued to pursue an open door foreign policy designed ‘to make friends with all countries’ (Vo Van Kiet, 1995). These efforts paid handsome dividends. In 1993–94, the United States ended its long-standing objections to the provision of developmental assistance to Vietnam by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and gradually lifted restrictions on trade and investment with Vietnam. Vietnam thus became eligible for a variety of aid, credits and commercial loans to finance its development plans.

In July 1995, Vietnam made a major breakthrough on the foreign policy front; it normalized relations with the United States, became ASEAN’s seventh member, and signed a framework cooperation agreement with the European Union that restored development assistance suspended after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. For the first time, Vietnam had diplomatic relations with all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and, equally important, with the world’s three major economic centres – Europe, North America and East Asia.

Eighth National Party Congress. The next turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy came at the Eighth National Party Congress held in late June/early July 1996. For the first time delegates from non-communist ruling parties in Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore were included.

The foreign policy section of the Political Report, entitled ‘characteristics of the world situation’, noted that ‘the revolution in science and technology continues to develop at an increasingly higher level, rapidly increasing productive forces while accelerating the process of shifting the world economic structures and the internationalization of the economy and social life’ (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 887). According to Vu Khoan, ‘this was the first time we had spoken of globalisation and assessed that it was an objective trend’ (Vu Khoan, 2006).

The Political Report also juxtaposed the potential for conflict arising from competition in the areas of economics, science and technology with the potential for cooperation arising from peaceful co-existence between ‘socialist countries, communist and workers parties and revolutionary and progressive forces’ and ‘nations under different political regimes’.

The Political Report stated:

To do our utmost to increase our relations with neighbouring countries and ASEAN member countries and other ASEAN members, constantly consolidate relations with traditional friendly countries, attach importance to relations with developed countries and economic-political centres of the world, at the same time upholding all the time the spirit of fraternal

solidarity with developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and with Non-Aligned Movement. (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 917)

Traditional Friends – Russia. In March 2001, Vietnam consolidated its ties with the Russian Federation, a ‘traditional friendly state’, by signing its first strategic partnership agreement during the course of a visit by President Vladimir Putin to Hanoi (Thayer, 2012a: 206–8). This agreement set out broad-ranging cooperation in eight major areas: political-diplomatic, military equipment and technology, oil and gas cooperation, energy cooperation for hydro and nuclear power, trade and investment, science and technology, education and training, and culture and tourism. Russian arms sales to Vietnam soon became the largest and most significant component of the strategic partnership (Thayer, 2011a, 2012b, and 2013b).

Ninth National Congress. Between the Eighth National Congress in 1996 and the Ninth National Congress in 2001, Vietnam and the United States painstakingly negotiated the terms of the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (Manyin, 2003: 5–6). It was clear that Vietnam’s policy elite was divided on the terms of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) and the risks of overexposing Vietnam’s economy to the forces of globalization.

Consensus to move forward was reached at the tenth plenum of the VCP’s Central Committee held in June–July 2000. The plenum concluded that in order to achieve the objective of industrializing and modernizing Vietnam by 2020, Vietnam had no choice but to step up the rate of economic growth, attract more foreign investment, and continue regional and global integration. The tenth plenum gave its approval for the new trade minister, Vu Khoan, to go to Washington to sign the BTA. Key clauses in this agreement were phased in over a period from three to nine years. At the same time the United States granted Vietnam temporary normal trade relations status on a year-by-year basis. The BTA was a necessary step that Vietnam had to undertake in order to secure US support to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).

At the Ninth National Congress, held in April 2001, the VCP reaffirmed that ‘Vietnam is prepared to be a friend and reliable partner of all countries’ by diversifying and multilateralizing its international relations. Priority was placed on developing relations with ‘socialist, neighboring and traditional friendly states’ (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 1032).

The Ninth Congress set the goals of overcoming underdevelopment by the year 2010 and accelerating industrialization and modernization in order to become a modern industrialized state by 2020 (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 1014 and Thayer, 2002). According to Vu Khoan (2006), the Ninth Congress resolution identified two main measures to attain this goal:

First, perfect the regime of a market economy with socialist characteristics, and second, integrate deeper and more fully into the various global economic regimes. Integration into the global economy will tie our economy into the regional and global economies on the basis of common rules of the game.

A Politburo resolution adopted in November 2001 outlined Vietnam's diplomatic strategy as follows:

continue to strengthen relations with Vietnam's neighbours and countries that have been traditional friends; give importance to relations with big countries, developing countries, and the political and economic centers of the world; raise the level of solidarity with developing countries and the non-aligned movement; increase activities in international organizations; and develop relations with Communist and Workers' parties, with progressive forces, while at the same time expanding relations with ruling parties and other parties. Pay attention to people's diplomacy. (Vu Duong Ninh, 2002:110)

In sum, since the Ninth Congress Vietnam has pursued the objective of integrating Vietnam's economy with the global economy.

Partners of Cooperation and Struggle. In mid 2003, the VCP Central Committee's eighth plenum provided an important interpretation of two ideological concepts – 'partners of cooperation' (*doi tac*) and 'objects of struggle' (*doi tuong*) in foreign relations. According to the eighth plenum's resolution, 'any force that plans and acts against the objectives we hold in the course of national construction and defense is the object of struggle'. And, 'anyone who respects our independence and sovereignty, establishes and expands friendly, equal, and mutually beneficial relations with Vietnam is our partner' (quoted in Thayer, 2008: 27).

The eighth plenum resolution argued for a more nuanced dialectical application of these concepts:

with the objects of struggle, we can find areas for cooperation; with the partners, there exist interests that are contradictory and different from those of ours. We should be aware of these, thus overcoming the two tendencies, namely lacking vigilance and showing rigidity in our perception, design, and implementation of specific policies. (quoted in Thayer, 2008: 27)

The eighth plenum resolution thus provided the policy rationale for Vietnam to step up its relations with the United States, including security and defence cooperation (Thayer, 2005: 26–30).

VIETNAM'S FOREIGN POLICY, 2006–2010

This section reviews Vietnam's pursuit of strategic partnerships in the period following the Tenth National Party Congress in 2006.

Tenth National Congress. The VCP convened its Tenth National Party Congress in April 2006 (Thayer, 2007: 381–97). According to the Political Report, Vietnam will 'carry out the foreign policy of openness, multilateralization and diversification of international relations. To proactively integrate into the international economy and, at the same time, expand international co-operation in other domains' (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 1195). During this period, Vietnam successfully forged strategic partnerships with the major powers, East Asian and European states and ASEAN members.

Japan: Strategic Partner. On 19 October 2006, Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Nguyen Tan Dung issued a Joint Statement Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia (Thayer, 2012a: 207). This document called for frequent high-level visits and exchanges of views and the establishment of a ministerial-level Joint Cooperation Committee.

In November 2007, Nguyen Minh Triet became the first Vietnamese president to make an official visit to Japan. President Triet and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda issued a Joint Statement that included a forty-four point Agenda Toward a Strategic Partnership, this agenda was divided into seven substantive areas: exchanges, cooperation in policy dialogue, security and defence; comprehensive economic partnership; improvement of the legal system and administrative reforms; science and technology; climate change, environment, natural resources and technology; mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries; and cooperation in the international arena.

Point four of the Agenda addressed defence cooperation including exchanges of military delegations, high-level defence officials' visits, and goodwill ship port calls by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). In October 2011, the defence ministers from Japan and Vietnam met in Tokyo and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that included defence exchanges at ministerial, chief of staff and service chief level; naval goodwill visits; annual defence policy dialogue at the deputy defence minister level; cooperation in military aviation, air defence, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and personnel training including scholarships for defence personnel to study and train in Japan.

In November 2011, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Japan to reaffirm bilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power and to initiate a defence dialogue. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a reciprocal visit to Hanoi in January 2013. This was Abe's first overseas visit since taking office.

India: Strategic Partner. In July 2007, India and Vietnam adopted a 33-point Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership that mapped out cooperation in five major areas: political, defence and security cooperation; closer economic cooperation and commercial engagement; science and technology cooperation; cultural and technical cooperation; and multilateral and regional cooperation (Thayer, 2012a: 208–9).

The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership set out six areas for political, defence and security cooperation: strategic dialogue at vice ministerial level; defence supplies, joint projects, training cooperation and intelligence exchanges; exchange visits between their defence and security establishments; capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing with particular attention to security of sea lanes, anti-piracy, prevention of pollution and search and rescue; counter terrorism and cyber security; and non-traditional security (Thayer, 2012a: 208–9).

In October 2011, President Truong Tan Sang made a state visit to India to solicit diplomatic support and military assistance, including submarine and

pilot conversion training, modernization of Nha Trang port, and the transfer of medium-sized warships. During Sang's visit it was announced that Vietnam had awarded an oil-exploration contract to India's Oil and Natural Gas Company. In November 2013, VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong also visited India (Thayer, 2013e, 2014b and 2014h).

China: From Strategic Partner to Comprehensive Strategic Partner. In June 2008, following a summit of party leaders in Beijing, China-Vietnam bilateral relations were raised to that of strategic partners (Thayer, 2012a: 210). A year later this was upgraded to a strategic cooperative partnership. As strategic partners China and Vietnam have developed a dense network of party, state, defence and multilateral mechanisms to manage their bilateral relations including a Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level (Thayer, 2011b: 348–69).

Republic of Korea: Strategic Cooperative Partnership. In 1997, Presidents Nguyen Minh Triet and Lee Myung-bak met in Hanoi and raised their bilateral relations to a Strategic Cooperative Partnership. Under this agreement the two sides agreed to cooperate in politics and security, judicial and consular relations, economics, trade, investment, development cooperation, science and technology, environment and culture and education (Thayer, 2012a: 211). The two countries regularly exchange high-level visits, hold an annual strategic and national defence dialogue and conduct naval port visits. In September 2013 Vietnam hosted a visit by South Korean President Park Geun-hye.

Australia: Comprehensive Partner. In September 2009, the VCP Secretary General Nong Duc Manh visited Canberra (Thayer, 2012a: 212) and witnessed the signing of an agreement by Deputy Prime Ministers Julia Gillard and Pham Gia Khiem raising bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Partnership. This agreement highlighted six major areas of cooperation: political ties and public policy exchanges; economic growth and trade development; development assistance and technical cooperation; defence and security ties; people-to-people links; and global and regional agenda (Australia-Viet Nam Comprehensive Partnership, 2009). In October 2010, Australia and Vietnam agreed to a three-year Plan of Action to implement their comprehensive partnership.

Between 2009 and 2010 Vietnam concluded strategic partnership agreements with two European countries. The first agreement was reached with Spain in December 2009, during the course of an official visit to Madrid by President Nguyen Minh Triet (Vietnam News Agency, 2009). In September the following year Spain and Vietnam signed a MOU on defence cooperation between national defence industries and military education and training. Subsequently, the Vietnam-Spain strategic partnership languished due to Spain's economic woes.

Vietnam's second European strategic partnership was reached with the UK in September 2010. The agreement was signed in London by Foreign Secretary William Hague and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem. This agreement included seven priority areas: political-diplomatic, regional and global issues, trade and investment, sustainable socio-economic

development, education, training, science and technology, security and defence, and people-to-people exchange (Diplomat highlights significance of VN-UK strategic partnership, 2010). Ministries from both countries were tasked with coordinating specific Action Plans for each priority area.

Vietnam and the UK held their first Strategic Dialogue in London on 26 October 2010. The following year, Vietnam and the UK signed a MOU on defence cooperation covering political-defence cooperation, research, and military equipment supply. On 28 March 2012, Vietnam and the UK signed the Action Plan to further their Strategic Partnership. The Action Plan included a provision for stepping up defence cooperation in training, defence trade and peace support operations.

Multilateral Institutions. During the period from 2006–2010, Vietnam made determined efforts to proactively integrate with the global system. Former Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien offered the assessment that Vietnam's foreign policy reached three peaks in 2006 – hosting the APEC summit, gaining membership in the WTO, and unanimous nomination by the Asia bloc for non-permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (quoted in *Vietnam Economy*, 14 November 2006). In 2007, Vietnam was overwhelmingly elected by the UN General Assembly as a non-permanent member on the Security Council for a two-year period 2008–9. Vietnam served as ASEAN Chair and host for the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus in 2010. Vietnam also entered into negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

VIETNAM'S FOREIGN POLICY, 2011–2016

In January 2011, the VCP convened its Eleventh National Party Congress. The congress adopted, inter alia, two major documents, the *Political Program for National Construction During the Period of Transition to Socialism* (Amended, Developed in 2011) and the Political Report of the party's Secretary General.

The Political Program called on Vietnam to

[C]onsistently implement a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development; diversify relations and actively integrate into the international community; enhance the country's position; strive for a prosperous and powerful socialist Viet Nam; be a reliable friend and partner and a responsible member of the international community, contribute to peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in the world. (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015:1226)

The Secretary General's Political Report highlighted the following strengths and weaknesses in national defence, security and foreign relations. Vietnam's strengths included paying

more attention [to] the co-ordination of national defense, security and external affairs... External relations have been broadened and further developed creating a new position of

strength for the country. This is demonstrated through the development of relations with neighboring countries and the establishment of relations frameworks [sic] with important partners. (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015:1263)

Vietnam's weaknesses included:

Socio-economic development has not been closely combined with strengthening national defense and security, especially in strategic regions such as seas and islands. Defence and security industry have not met the armed forces' needs.

Strategic research and forecasting on external relations has shown weaknesses in certain aspects. Coordination among the Party's external relations sphere, State diplomacy and people's diplomacy and among external politics, economy and culture have not been properly synchronized. (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015:1271–2)

The Political Report also set out the 'objectives and tasks' for the period from 2011–15. These included: 'increase external activities... [and] create foundations for our country to become a modernity-orientated [sic] industrial country by 2020'. The Political Report listed among its key tasks for the next five years: 'strengthen national defense and security potentials... [and] expand and raise the efficiency of external activities, actively and proactively engage in international integration' (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015: 1281).

Part nine of the Political Report was entirely devoted to foreign relations and proactive international integration. It repeated the same formulations in the Political Program. With respect to Southeast Asia, the Political Report called on Vietnam to

be proactive and responsible, and work together with other countries to build a strong ASEAN community, strengthen relations with partners, and continue to maintain an important role within the framework of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region ... [and] expand participation in multilateral mechanisms and forums in the region and the world. (*Eighty-five Years of The Communist Party of Viet Nam*, 2015:1305)

Over the next five years Vietnam upgraded its strategic partnerships with Russia, Japan, India and Australia, reached agreement on comprehensive partnership with the United States, and negotiated seven new strategic partnerships with European and Southeast Asian states.

Russia: Comprehensive Strategic Partner. In July 2012, Vietnam and Russia raised their strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership on the occasion of a state visit by President Truong Tan Sang to Moscow as a guest of his counterpart Vladimir Putin (Thayer, 2012c). Putin paid a return visit to Vietnam in November 2013 (Thayer, 2013d).

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Vietnam in April 2015 and witnessed the signing of eight cooperation agreements in the fields of energy (oil, gas, and nuclear), investment, banking (use of national currencies to promote bilateral trade), health care, transport (aviation and rail) and agriculture. Russia's Gazprom Neft signed a framework agreement to purchase 49 per cent of shares in Binh Son Refining and Petrochemical's Dung Quat refinery in central Vietnam.

Gazprom Neft and PetroVietnam (Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group) also signed a MOU on exploration and exploitation of oil and gas on Vietnam's continental shelf. Agreement was reached to proceed with the construction of the Ninh Thuan 1 Nuclear Power Plant with Russian participation (this was cancelled in 2016). In August 2016, Vietnam joined the Eurasian Economic Union comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. President Sang visited Moscow on 9 May 2015 to participate in activities commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Japan: Extensive Strategic Partner. In March 2014, during President Truong Tan Sang's state visit to Japan the two sides raised their bilateral relations to an Extensive Strategic Partnership in an agreement running to sixty-nine paragraphs. As a follow up, Nguyen Phu Trong, Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party, made his first official visit to Japan at the invitation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in September 2015. At the end of their talks the two leaders issued a thirty-one point Joint Vision Statement.

Under the Extensive Strategic Partnership Japan's MSDF has provided assistance to Vietnam to build up its maritime law enforcement capacity, including the gifting of patrol boats for the Vietnam Coast Guard (Thayer, 2014e).

India: Strengthening Defence Relations. In September 2014, India's President Pranab Mukherjee visited Vietnam and offered a US\$100 million line of credit for defence purchases. The following month Prime Minister Dung met his counterpart in New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, where it was announced that India would give priority to modernizing Vietnam's armed forces. India also offered a US\$300 million line of credit for Vietnam to purchase Indian goods. ONGC Videsh, India's state-owned oil company, took up Vietnam's offer of an additional oil exploration block in the South China Sea (Thayer, 2014b, 2014g, 2014h).

Australia: Enhanced Comprehensive Partner. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made an official visit to Australia in March 2015 to meet with his counterpart Prime Minister Tony Abbott (Thayer, 2015b, 2015c). The two leaders witnessed the signing of the Declaration on Enhancing the Australia-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership and agreed to establish a Strategic Partnership at a later date. Under the Declaration the two sides agreed to step up cooperation in five areas: bilateral political and diplomatic relations; regional and international cooperation; economic growth, trade and industry development; development assistance and defence, law enforcement and security ties.

United States: Comprehensive Partner. In 2013, Vietnam and the United States issued a joint statement raising their bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Partnership. This agreement was announced in July during the state visit by President Truong Tan Sang to Washington (Thayer, 2013a). The joint statement on Comprehensive Partnership included nine major points most of which reiterated existing mechanisms for cooperation. These included: the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council; the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation; the Defense Policy Dialogue; and the Political,

Security, and Defense Dialogue. Nonetheless, the Comprehensive Partnership created a new political and diplomatic dialogue mechanism between the US Secretary of State and Vietnam's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The joint statement on Comprehensive Partnership made no mention of a Plan of Action that accompanied many of Vietnam's other strategic partnership agreements. Instead, the Joint Statement noted that the two governments would create new mechanisms for each of the nine areas of cooperation: political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, science and technology, education and training, environment and health, war legacy issues, defence and security, protection and promotion of human rights, and culture, sports, and tourism.

Maritime security issues featured prominently in Vietnam–US relations, particularly as a result of tensions arising from China's deployment of the HD-981 oil platform in Vietnam's EEZ, discussed below (Thayer, 2014c). In short order, in October 2013, Vietnam and the United States reached agreement on cooperation between the two Coast Guards and cooperation on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Thayer, 2013c). In December 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States would provide Vietnam with US\$18 million to assist the capacity of the Vietnam Coast Guard to conduct search and rescue, disaster and other maritime security missions.

In 2014, during a major crisis in Vietnam–China relations (discussed below), Vietnam dispatched two members of its Politburo to the United States. In July, Pham Quang Nghi travelled to Washington for discussions with senior Obama Administration officials. Nghi was followed in October by Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh who conferred with Secretary of State John Kerry. During Minh's visit Kerry announced that the United States had lifted the restriction on the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis to assist in maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities (Thayer, 2014d). In March 2015, Minister for Public Security and Politburo member, Tran Dai Quang met with a range of senior officials in the Obama Administration.

In June 2015, bilateral defence cooperation witnessed a major advance when the defence ministers of Vietnam and the United States, Phung Quang Thanh and Ashton Carter, adopted the Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations. A month later US–Vietnam political relations were raised to a new level with the adoption of a Joint Vision Statement on 7 July by President Obama and VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. This was the first visit by the leader of the Vietnam Communist Party to the United States.

New European Strategic Partners. In October 2011, President Tran Dai Quang and Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel reached an agreement on strategic partnership during her state visit to Hanoi. This was Vietnam's third strategic partnership with a European country. The two sides agreed to increase the exchange of high-ranking delegations including government and parliamentary agencies, political parties and scientific and strategic research institutes (Vietnam News Agency, 2011).

Vietnam's fourth strategic partnership with a European country was reached with Italy during the course of a visit by VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong in January 2013. The agreement contained six areas of cooperation: political-diplomatic; global and regional issues; economic relations; development assistance; cultural, education and training, scientific and technological cooperation; and defence and security (Vietnam News Agency, 2013).

Vietnam's fifth strategic partnership with a European country was reached with France during the official visit of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Paris in September 2013. This agreement provided for cooperation in the following areas: diplomacy; national defence and security; economic relations, trade and investment; development assistance; and culture, education and training, scientific research, and law and justice (Vietnam Plus, 26 December 2013).

Strategic Partners in Southeast Asia. During 2013–15 Vietnam negotiated strategic partnership agreements with four ASEAN members: Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.

In June 2013, Vietnam and Thailand agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a strategic partnership following a meeting between Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. This marked Vietnam's first strategic partnership with an ASEAN member. The agreement included five areas: political cooperation (high-level visits and strategic political dialogues); defence and security cooperation (traditional and non-traditional security challenges and consular affairs); economic cooperation (trade, investment, agriculture, energy, telecommunications, information technology and transport); social, cultural, people-to-people cooperation; and regional and international cooperation (particularly ASEAN centrality, ASEAN Community, and the Mekong Forum). Vietnam and Thailand also agreed on a Plan of Action to implement the strategic partnership; the first meeting of their Joint Commission was held in November 2013.

In June 2013, immediately after Secretary General Trong's trip to Thailand, President Truong Tan Sang made a state visit to Indonesia for discussions with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The two leaders agreed to raise bilateral relations to a strategic partnership and to exchange high-level visits and cooperate in the following areas: defence and security; trade and investment; sustainable food and energy; fisheries and aquaculture; people-to-people links; ASEAN Community-building; and the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes.

In September 2013, Vietnam and Singapore raised their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership during the course of an official visit to Hanoi by Prime Minister Lee Hisen Loong. The agreement covered five major areas: deepening mutual trust in political relations; boosting economic cooperation; increasing cooperation in security–defence; promoting bilateral ties in education, law, health, culture, art and sports; and intensifying cooperation at regional and international forums.

In May 2014, Vietnam and the Philippines set up a Joint Working Committee charged with drawing up a road map for an agreement on a strategic partnership after discussions in Manila between President Benigno Aquino and his guest, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. In November 2014, when Presidents Aquino and Sang met on the sidelines of the 22nd APEC Leaders' Summit in Beijing, they agreed to convene the first meeting of the Joint Commission on Concluding a Strategic Partnership. The inaugural meeting of the Joint Commission was held in Manila on 30 January 2015 between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and his Vietnamese counterpart Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. In November 2015, del Rosario and Minh signed an agreement on strategic partnership on behalf of their respective governments on the sidelines of a bilateral meeting between Presidents Aquino and Truong Tan Sang at the APEC Summit in Manila.

SOUTH CHINA SEA: LOSS OF STRATEGIC TRUST

A major maritime confrontation erupted between China and Vietnam from 2 May to 16 July 2014 when China deployed a mega oil exploration platform, Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD 981), in Vietnam's EEZ. Bilateral relations plunged to their lowest level since the 1979 border war. Throughout May all Vietnamese attempts to make contact with their counterparts in China, either through hot lines or direct contact by the agencies concerned, were rebuffed.

The VCP Central Committee convened its previously scheduled ninth plenum from 8–14 May 2014. This meeting witnessed heated discussions behind closed doors. After the meeting it was reported that the Central Committee called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute and resolved to closely monitor the maritime standoff. On 18 June 2014 China dispatched State Councilor Yang Jiechi to Hanoi for testy consultations with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh at a 'leaders meeting' of the Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation.

In early July 2014, the VCP Politburo reportedly voted overwhelmingly to hold a meeting of the Central Committee in August to endorse international legal action against China. A group of Central Committee members, responding to anti-China public pressure, sought to include on the meeting's agenda a resolution calling on Vietnam to 'exit China's orbit' and abandon Vietnam's 'three no's' defence policy. However, before the Central Committee could convene, China brought an abrupt end to the crisis by withdrawing the HD 981. Nonetheless, on 28 July sixty-one leading Vietnamese personalities signed an open letter criticizing the government for its handling of relations with Beijing and called for legal action and a lessening of Vietnam's dependence on China.

In August 2014, Vietnam dispatched Le Hong Anh, a special envoy of the VCP Secretary General and member of the Politburo, to Beijing where he was

received by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Anh presented an invitation to Secretary General/President Xi to visit Vietnam. The following month a high-powered Vietnamese military delegation led by Minister of National Defence and member of the Politburo General Phung Quang Thanh visited Beijing (Thayer, 2014f, 2015a). Shortly after these visits Councilor Yang returned to Vietnam to co-chair the seventh Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation where both sides agreed to reset their relations (Thayer, 2014h). Nonetheless, in December 2014, Vietnam filed a statement of interest with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague requesting that Vietnam's interests be taken into account during deliberations by the Arbitral Tribunal on the case brought by the Philippines against China (Thayer, 2014i).

On 7 April 2015, Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong flew to Beijing to meet with General Secretary Xi and other high-level Chinese leaders. After the Xi-Trong meeting a joint communiqué stated that the leaders 'reached broad common perceptions on intensifying ties between the two Parties and countries in the new context'. The joint communiqué further stated:

They [China and Vietnam] need to consistently respect each other, hold sincere consultations and manage differences; As political trust is a foundation for the healthy and stable development of bilateral ties, both sides need to increase visits and exchanges, from the strategic heights, carrying the bilateral ties forward; win-win cooperation between Vietnam and China brings practical benefits to people in both countries and contributing to peace, development and prosperity in the region, which should be enhanced and deepened across sectors. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015)

The two leaders decided to reset the clock back to October 2013 and understandings reached on the vexed issue of the South China Sea dispute during the visit of Premier Le Keqiang to Hanoi (Thayer, 2014a). Xi and Trong agreed to comply with and seriously implement the 'Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Vietnam-China Sea-related Issues' through the already established government-level negotiation mechanism on Vietnam-China boundary and territorial issues. The leaders further agreed to 'manage disputes at sea' and 'fully and effectively' implement the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and to reach agreement on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Twelfth National Party Congress. In January 2016, on the eve of the VCP's Twelfth National Congress, Vietnam's Cabinet approved the *Overall Strategy for International Integration Through 2020, Vision to 2030* [Chiến lược tổng thể hội nhập quốc tế đến năm 2020, tầm nhìn 2030] (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2016). This document reviewed Vietnam's bilateral strategic and comprehensive partnerships with twenty-five countries. It concluded that Vietnam had to make greater efforts to implement political commitments and to deepen cooperation under these agreements, with a special emphasis on defence and security cooperation.

Later that month, the Political Report tabled at the Twelfth National Congress stated, 'To ensure successful implementation of foreign policy and international

integration ... consistently carry out the foreign policy of independence, autonomy, peace, cooperation and development ... [and] diversify and multilateralize external relations' (Nguyen Phu Trong, 2016).

In the year following the twelfth congress Vietnam's top leaders visited Russia and China and hosted visits by the presidents of the United States and France and the prime minister of India. Vietnam also utilized ASEAN and APEC summit meetings to hold discussions with their counterparts on the sidelines. In 2016, Vietnam also exchanged visits by defence ministers with Russia, China and India and hosted a visit by the French defence minister.

From 23–25 May 2016, President Barack Obama made an official visit to Vietnam at the invitation of President Tran Dai Quang. In Hanoi Obama announced the lifting of all restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. In their joint statement on 23 May, the two presidents set out six areas for future defence cooperation: humanitarian cooperation (recovery of the remains of soldiers missing in action); war legacy (unexploded ordnance, dioxin remediation); maritime security; UN peacekeeping; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and securing and defence cooperation.

In early September 2016, Prime Minister Modi made an official visit to Vietnam. After discussions with his counterpart Prime Minister Phuc, the two leaders announced that they were raising their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Modi offered Vietnam a US\$500 million Line of Credit for unspecified defence purchases and US\$5 million to set up a military information technology software park in Nha Trang. During Modi's visit Vietnam's Border Guard and India's Larson & Toubro Ltd signed a contract for the construction and delivery for four Ocean Patrol Vessels under a US\$100 million Line of Credit offered in 2014.

From 5–7 September, President Francois Hollande made an official visit to Vietnam for discussions with his counterpart, President Tran Dai Quang. On 6 September Quang and Hollande held a joint press conference where they announced agreement 'to develop a long-term vision for cooperation that could ensure their common interests. To do that, political connections [*sic*] need first to be tightened'.

In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency of the Philippines. He paid an official visit to Hanoi in September at the invitation of President Quang. After discussions Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay announced that the Philippines and Vietnam agreed on a six-year strategic partnership that would include rice trade, agricultural information exchanges, construction, and oil and gas exploration among others.

Relations between Vietnam and China intensified after the twelfth congress, especially in defence and security cooperation. For example, defence ministers from Vietnam and China co-hosted the third Border Defence Friendship Exchange in March. This involved an exchange of visits by each defence minister. During the visit of China's defence minister to Hanoi the two sides signed an MOU on

cooperation in UN peacekeeping operations. In August, Vietnam's new Defence Minister, General Ngo Xuan Lich led a high-level defence delegation on his first official visit to China at the invitation of his counterpart, Sr Lt General Chang.

In September, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc made an official visit to Beijing and then attended the 13th China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning. During his stop in Beijing, Phuc met with Premier Le Keqiang. The two government leaders issued a joint communiqué that spelled out cooperation in a wide variety of areas. In January 2017 VCP Secretary General Trong made an official visit to Beijing for discussions with his counterpart Xi Jinping. The two party leaders agreed that their bilateral relations should not be held hostage to their territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The joint communiqué issued after their discussions listed five areas of cooperation: implementation of a five-year cooperation plan, 2016–20; strengthening of exchanges in diplomacy, defence, security and law enforcement; promote results-orientated trade and commerce; promote people-to-people links; and the use of already established government-level mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes peacefully (Vietnam News Agency, 2017). During Trong's visit representatives of the two sides signed fifteen cooperation agreements including economic relations, transportation, defence, health care, tourism and education and training.

Vietnam also availed itself of the opportunities offered by multilateral summits to meet the leaders of strategic partners. In September 2016, Prime Ministers Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Shinzo Abe met on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Vientiane. In November, President Tran Dai Quang met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Lima, Peru.

CONCLUSION

This chapter analysed Vietnam's foreign policy over the last four and a half decades following Vietnam's extrication from the conflict in Cambodia in 1991 until 2016. In 1991 Vietnam jettisoned the view that the world was divided into hostile socialist and capitalist camps and replaced this with a view that there was one global economy. Vietnam now began to adopt a more positive outlook on developing relations with non-socialist states and global economic integration.

Nevertheless, a leitmotif of 'old political thinking' continues to dog Vietnam's pursuit of relations with the major powers and proactive integration. There are two recurrent themes: the United States seeks to undermine Vietnam's socialist system through 'peaceful evolution', and socialist ideology is a link that binds China and Vietnam.

This chapter analysed Vietnam's foreign policy in three distinct periods. In the first period, from 1991–2005, Vietnam sought to multilateralize and diversify its foreign relations by normalizing its relations with China and Southeast Asian states. The year 1995 was pivotal as Vietnam succeeded in normalizing

relations with the United States and becoming ASEAN's seventh member. In 1998 Vietnam became a member of APEC. Finally, in 2001, Vietnam and Russia revived bilateral relations in the form of a strategic partnership and Vietnam and the United States signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement.

During the second period, from 2006–10, Vietnam pursued the diversification and multilateralization of its external relations in the form of strategic partnerships and by proactively pursuing international integration. Vietnam's new strategic/comprehensive partners included Japan, India, China (upgraded to comprehensive strategic partner and then comprehensive strategic cooperative partner), South Korea, Spain, the UK and Australia. A crowning success for Vietnam in this period was its election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

During the third period, from 2011–16, Vietnam upgraded its strategic/comprehensive partnerships with Russia, Japan, India and Australia and proactively forged new strategic partnerships with Germany, Italy, France, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. After the twelfth national party congress, Vietnam sought to address shortcomings in several of its strategic partnerships that it felt were not living up to expectations. At the same time, Vietnam stepped up defence diplomacy with its strategic partners. The purpose of Vietnam's strategic partnerships is to give each partner equity in Vietnam to prevent Vietnam from being pulled into a rival's orbit and thus enable Vietnam to maintain its strategic autonomy.

In summary, Vietnam's foreign policy is aimed at bolstering its independence in external affairs and avoid being caught in the strategic rivalry of China and the United States. When taken as a whole, Vietnam's web of strategic and comprehensive partnerships serves to insulate Vietnam from Sino-US competition and provide Vietnam with the means to manoeuvre among the major powers in order to protect its independence and self-reliance.

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Philippine Foreign Policy: Back to Square One?

Carolina Hernandez

INTRODUCTION

This chapter on Philippine foreign policy provides a brief historical overview of Philippine external relations from 1946 to 2016, the years that mark Philippine independence from the United States to the assumption to office as the 16th Philippine President of Rodrigo Roa Duterte. It explains the domestic and external factors that helped shape Philippine foreign policy as well as the principles behind it during this period including the three pillars that became the framework of Philippine foreign policy from 1991.

Particular attention is paid to the major challenges faced by the Philippines in the 21st century especially the shifts in the global distribution of power and global mega trends affecting every state on planet Earth. Major challenges include territorial disputes and related issues shaping the country's ability to handle them as effectively as feasible given the country's historical, geostrategic, and other defining contexts. It concludes with an analysis of the country's plausible future foreign policy prospects.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until the assumption to office on June 30, 2016 of the country's 16th president, former Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the Philippines had been closely aligned with the United States in both foreign and security policies. Alignment with

the United States has been the story of Philippine external relations since the grant of independence by Washington on July 4, 1946 and captured in the inaugural speech on May 28, 1946 of the country's first post-independence president, Manuel Roxas. He said:

We will maintain ... friendly and honorable relations with all our neighbors and look forward to the day when peace and security will be maintained by the collective conscience of mankind.

But until that happy day dawns upon us, we can much more securely repose our fate in the understanding and comradeship which exist between the Philippines and the United States.... We are fortunate to have as the guarantor of our security the United States of America, which is today the bulwark and support of all small nations everywhere in the world.¹

These statements became the basis of Philippine foreign policy from 1946 until President Duterte's election in 2016.

American colonization of the Philippines is an outcome of the Spanish-American War of 1896. However, differing interpretations of the aftermath of this war by Filipino and American leaders and historians clouded the country's American colonial experience.² From the Philippine perspective, the country should have gained independence upon Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War, an unfulfilled expectation that led to the Philippine-American War, a war that lasted from 1899 to 1906. This perspective claims that Admiral George Dewey did not have physical control over the Philippines beyond Manila and Cavite at the time he received Spanish capitulation and concluded the 1898 Treaty of Paris ceding to the United States all of the territories under Spain for US\$20 million.³

From the US perspective, President William McKinley's decision to keep the country as a US colony was a product not only of US strategic interest in the so-called 'Far East', but also of God's message to McKinley to educate the Filipinos and make Christians out of them, perhaps unmindful of the fact that the '*principalia*'⁴ (Filipino governing elites) had been converted into Roman Catholicism during almost 400 years of Spanish rule.⁵ In effect, McKinley's policy of 'benevolent assimilation'⁶ enabled the spread of Christianity in its Protestant form in the Philippines and the introduction of public education. Public education, brought to the country through the Thomasites⁷ had very important foreign policy and cultural implications. These can be seen in the pro-US orientation of Filipino elites, whether in government, in the private sector, or in the broader civil society then⁸ and now.

Detailed accounts of the Philippine-American War and US occupation of the Philippines as seen through Filipino lenses were not generally known by Filipinos until the 1960s when Filipino historical accounts became popularized in the country's educational institutions, particularly in the University of the Philippines and the Philippine College of Commerce with the works of Renato Constantino⁹. Since then, further research had been done by other scholars.¹⁰ US colonization was made possible by the 'pacification policy', a euphemism for the conquest of the

country by US occupation forces using tactics learned from the US expansion to its West.¹¹ Yet it was also marked by public education as already noted above, and public health in addition to the training in self-government¹² particularly during the 10-year period that preceded the outbreak of Second World War in the Pacific. This period known as the Commonwealth Era (1935–1945)¹³ saw Filipinos learning how to govern themselves under a liberal democratic constitution, much like the United States except for the fact that the division of powers between the central and the local government units was unitary and centralized in the Philippine case, elections were conducted directly, and the Philippine president had more powers than the US president. The American occupation of its colony, however, did not extend to the Muslim communities in contemporary Southern Philippines,¹⁴ a serious historical lapse that must have begun during Spanish colonial times, but has continued to challenge both domestic and foreign policy since then.

When Second World War came to an end without the full benefit of self-government, the United States nevertheless granted independence to the Philippines, an independence won by politicians and not by the military,¹⁵ although the country's external defense has been outsourced to the United States since then.

The most important outcome of this post-colonial security relationship is Philippine membership in the US-led 'hub and spokes' system of military alliances that included its membership in the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),¹⁶ the forging of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA), and 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), and successor agreements when the MBA came to an end and no successor agreement replaced it.¹⁷

The alliance with the United States continued beyond the expiration in 1991 of the two allies' basing relationship.¹⁸ Succeeding Philippine presidents such as Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Erap) and Benigno S. Aquino III (PNoy), negotiated and put in place the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)¹⁹ and Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA),²⁰ respectively, to enable US military presence in the Philippines despite an explicit 1987 constitutional prohibition against the presence of foreign military bases in the country. This provision reads:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.²¹

Precisely due to the MDT, the country's military alliance with the United States survived the end of the basing relationship and annual military exercises (*Balikatan* or shoulder-to-shoulder) for interoperability and other security-related purposes also continued.

Colonial ties to the United States enabled the Philippines to become a founding member of the United Nations organization (UN) even before it gained its

independence. Like India, Manila became one of the founding members of the UN when Second World War ended in 1945. In fact, its top career diplomat, the late Carlos P. Romulo was the country's first head of its Permanent UN Mission in New York, became President of the UN General Assembly and later, the country's Minister for Foreign Affairs during late president Ferdinand E. Marcos's authoritarian rule.²²

Seeking to multilateralize its external relations with countries with which it was not able to develop bilateral relations due to its US orientation, the late president Marcos not only normalized relations with the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1975 following the US lead, but also opened up relations with other socialist countries in Central Europe, and in various countries in the oil-rich Middle East then caught in the throes of infrastructure development. This opened up opportunities for Filipino construction companies and workers to undertake gainful employment there. Unfortunately, it also led to the present phenomenon of Filipino migrant workers in practically every corner of the world. While they brought in much needed foreign currency that provided for the financial needs of their families and boosted the country's foreign exchange earnings and economic growth during domestic, regional, and global economic and financial crises,²³ the social costs borne by Filipino migrant workers are legendary.²⁴

As regards the normalization of relations with China after then US President Richard Nixon opened ties with Beijing, the Philippines followed suit in 1975 with only Malaysia among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) founding members preceding it in this process. Manila voted to replace Taiwan in the UN seat for the Republic of China (ROC) with Beijing, the winner in the Chinese civil war between the contending forces of Mao Tse Tung's Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) army. Since then, Beijing has considered Taiwan a renegade province and neighbors in ASEAN and elsewhere have adopted a 'one-China policy' maintaining political and diplomatic relations with the PRC but cultural and economic ties with Taiwan.²⁵ The Philippines maintains a Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) in Taiwan, while Taiwan maintains a Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Manila. As in most countries with official ties to Beijing, this arrangement has seen the rise and fall of relations with the two contending forces across the Taiwan Strait, particularly since the democratization of Taiwan in the 1980s.²⁶ Taiwan controls *Itu Aba* or *Taiping*, the largest feature in the contested South China Sea (SCS) in which Beijing and Taipei, as well as four ASEAN member states (i.e., Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) are party claimants as discussed below.

In search of better relations with its immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia with whom it had territorial disputes such as Malaysia over Sabah, or cross-border issues such as Indonesia, the Philippines joined in organizing the failed Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and Malaysia and Indonesia in MAPHILINDO.²⁷ These failed attempts to mitigate challenging relations with its immediate neighbors did not deter the country

from seeking the same goals. On August 8, 1967 the Philippines joined these neighbors, including a newly independent Republic of Singapore to become a founding member of ASEAN, at present seen as the world's most successful attempt at community building among small and middle-sized countries in the so-called Global South, even as ASEAN faces numerous serious challenges as seen below.

The origins of ASEAN continue to be contested especially as regards the role played by the United States in its creation.²⁸ ASEAN's founding fathers, particularly Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Koman provided present-at-the-creation testimonies on the factors behind ASEAN's establishment,²⁹ even as some US foreign policy analysts and practitioners claim ASEAN's American roots. In this regard, it is noteworthy to recall how the late Ambassador Reyes, the first Philippine Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat, viewed ASEAN: 'now widely regarded as a model of harmony, [it] was in reality a child of adversity – it was born of conflict... [and]... an Association of five Asian nations which had an almost visceral aversion against becoming a military alliance'.³⁰ ASEAN aversion to military alliance is not lost even among US analysts when they view ASEAN dispassionately.³¹

From various studies conducted by non-US and non-ASEAN scholars,³² it appears that the small and medium-sized countries that established ASEAN in 1967 wanted to address their common domestic problems of poverty and underdevelopment and communist insurgency. They sought to be insulated from the Cold War's super-power competition and not be their surrogates to insulate Southeast Asia from being the battleground of super-power rivalry. They needed the cooperation and resources of all countries that could help redress their domestic problems and for this reason, they developed equidistant relations with all relevant powers by being non-partisan in super-power rivalry. They also did not want to be seen as forming a military alliance, such that the Bangkok Declaration establishing ASEAN stressed economic cooperation for stability rather than putting military security as paramount. To this end, they developed (like Japan) the concept of comprehensive security³³ in which external defense joins equally important and inter-related dimensions of economic, political, social, cultural, ecological security, and where levels of governance are similarly interconnected.

Aware of the dynamic character of world politics and that two of its founding members are military allies of the United States, ASEAN regarded military alliances as merely temporary. Beyond the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, this idea can be found in its Declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).³⁴ From the above, it is not too far-fetched to view ASEAN as independent from the United States in its origins (and further evolution). What might be conceded is ASEAN's original non-communist orientation, as seen by scholars friendly to ASEAN-based analysts who teased about ASEAN being 'neutral, but tilting towards the West'.³⁵ In practice, however, ASEAN as a single actor has pursued a non-partisan external policy, being a friend of all relevant countries,

and enemy of none. As such it believes in the temporary character of military alliances.

At present, ASEAN, now comprised of 10 independent Southeast Asian countries³⁶ is in the process of regional integration in accordance with its vision, originally known as the 1997 Vision 2020,³⁷ (metamorphosing according to the norms and principles collectively known as the ASEAN Way³⁸ to its current ASEAN 2025³⁹), of ASEAN as a political-security, economic, and socio-cultural community that is people oriented and people centered. Prior to the ASEAN leaders' adoption of the April 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on A People Oriented/People Centered ASEAN, the only official document on a 'people-centered ASEAN' was in the Blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) adopted on March 1, 2009. This blueprint, and the blueprints for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and the Initiative for ASEAN Investments (IAI) Work Plan II for 2009–2015 constituted the 'Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009–2015)'. This roadmap was replaced by the ASEAN 2025 document. While the ASEAN Community especially the AEC was declared as having been achieved on December 31, 2015, the ASEAN 2025 document remains open for implementation until 2025. In short, ASEAN officials, particularly the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) look at ASEAN community building as work in progress.

The rise of China and the related disputes in the SCS, have implicated external relations of the United States and its allies in East Asia including the Philippines and Japan, and tended to divide ASEAN member states,⁴⁰ such that the issue of ASEAN centrality commonly sought by ASEAN and its officials has been perceived as being weakened. A leading ASEAN scholar and practitioner recently asked if ASEAN could maintain its 'centrality' as seen for example in the ASEAN-initiated regional security architecture (RSA), without unity?⁴¹ Be that as it may, the fact is ASEAN remains a 'project' shaped by its elites in government, business, epistemic communities and academe, media, among other groups. The idea of a 'people-centered' ASEAN that was proposed by the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter composed of retired heads of state, ranking ambassadors, and others was reduced to a 'people-oriented' community by the High Level Task Force (HLTF) – consisting of active duty and retired ASEAN officials – that finally drafted the ASEAN Charter.⁴² The April 2015 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN Declaration on a People Oriented/People Centered ASEAN might be considered a step toward a people-centered ASEAN. However, a people-oriented ASEAN could mean a top-down approach while a people-centered ASEAN, a bottom-up process to community building, a fact not lost on ASEAN's broad civil society that had been grappling to be heard by their governing elites/leaders. And at the end of the day, it must be borne in mind that a community is not willed by elites, but is about people!⁴³

As ASEAN marks its 50th anniversary during Manila's Chairmanship in 2017, the most important and common concern by observers and practitioners is a

review of the 2007–2009 ASEAN Charter, particularly strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat, using new ASEAN mechanisms introduced by the Charter including the Committee of Permanent Representatives of ASEAN member states' ambassadors to ASEAN (CPR) and various coordinating bodies, and improving its effectiveness through clarifying its decision-making process (consensus is not the same as unanimity, for example) and a new budgetary allocation that recognizes the differentiated economic capacity of member states.⁴⁴ However, a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is the incongruence between the requirements of a community without borders that is implied by ASEAN 2025 and the survival of the international system of independent and sovereign states in the ASEAN area (and beyond!). On a larger scale, might it not be the case that the main reason behind the 21st century's inability to address effectively the multiple challenges requiring new ways of thinking and other measures lie in the fact that the processes behind globalization and other global trends have removed physical and other borders in an international system still based on national boundaries?

FACTORS AND PRINCIPLES THAT SHAPE PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY

Like in other states, Philippine foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum. It is shaped by the context in which it is formulated. The context comes from domestic and external sources and varies in their content. As noted above, the post-colonial historical context is a key determinant of Philippine foreign policy. By dint of having been a former US colony, the Philippines became firmly in the US alliance system. Its foreign policy was rooted within the US/Western side of the global distribution of power, from the Second World War shift from Europe to the United States, and from the United States to Asia centered on China – or from the West to the East⁴⁵ in the present century.

Other key factors that formed the context of its foreign policy since 1946 were its geographical location, the role of domestic politics, including the role of the country's presidents, as well as global developments, particularly global mega trends. The Philippines' geographic location in Southeast Asia, its 'maritime heartland'⁴⁶ that is also a major sea line of communication (SLOC) for military and commercial purposes has helped shape Philippine foreign policy as illustrated in the importance of the SCS as part of this critical SLOC to party claimants and users.⁴⁷

Moreover, the country's geography puts it near major powers in Northeast Asia like China and Japan whose power rivalry is classic. Consequently, Philippine dependence on the United States particularly for external defense and trade has put it squarely on the side of the United States/West in the geostrategic and ideological East/West divide of the Cold War, the ending of which in Europe did not touch the East/West divide in East Asia. Its remnants in the divided nations of China

and Korea are a chilling reminder of super-power rivalry that appeared to have persisted into the 21st century in East Asia.

Domestic political developments including the role played by past Philippine presidents also shaped the country's foreign policy. Agrarian unrest that centered on the HUK insurgency of the 1940s to the 1950s and looked to the former Soviet Union for ideological inspiration⁴⁸ metamorphosed during late president Marcos's martial law and authoritarian rule (1972–1981; 1981–1986) into the world's longest communist insurgency under the National Democratic Front/Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (NDF/ CPP/NPA). US support, even for domestic conflict was needed as chronicled in counterinsurgency operations against the HUKs during the incumbency of US-supported Ramon Magsaysay in the 1950s, and assistance against the NDF/ CPP/NPA during the Marcos through the PNoy presidencies.

On account of the fact that Philippine politics has been shaped by its political elite (that was a product of changing economic developments),⁴⁹ various Philippine presidents adopted different slogans and pillars to guide the country's foreign policy, still dominated by its dependence on the United States, whose few exceptions were naturally 'nipped in the bud' by the United States.⁵⁰ The late president Carlos P. Garcia, who succeeded Magsaysay after the latter's death in 1957, adopted the 'Filipino First Policy' seeking the protection of Philippine-made products in the international market under the economic policy of import substitution. The late President Marcos pursued 'development diplomacy' perhaps in reaction to the continued foundation of dependence on the United States that increasingly were seen as 'inimical to political self-reliance and economic initiative'.⁵¹ During his time, economic development was central to Philippine foreign policy and as a consequence, the seven postulates of foreign policy adopted during Marcos's first term of office saw an opportunity for implementation during martial law. These postulates were: the promotion of the national interest, resistance to domestic communist insurgency, respect for the rule of law, support for the UN, friendship with all peace-loving states, increased economic cooperation with other countries, and economic development.

Although martial law and authoritarianism have negative political implications, Marcos's development diplomatic thrust saw Philippine accession to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) that preferential ties until 1974 to the US market inhibited, improved trade relations with Japan including the entry of Japanese foreign direct investments (FDIs), increased development and military assistance from the United States despite regime-type differences, and penetration of new markets in socialist countries including Beijing, and the Middle East. These economic gains under Marcos's foreign policy thrusts seeking a self-reliant foreign policy were sidelined in the Filipino civil society and public discourses that opposed the abuses normally associated with authoritarian rule and continued into the Duterte administration.

Since 1991 and as a consequence of the 1986 people power revolt that brought an end to Marcos's authoritarian – never mind if also constitutional – era⁵² and installed the late Corazon (Cory) Aquino as the country's president, Philippine foreign policy has been framed under the three following pillars: (1) the preservation and enhancement of national security, (2) the promotion and attainment of economic security, and (3) the protection of the rights and the promotion of the welfare and interest of Filipinos overseas.⁵³ The third pillar has blurred the traditional distinction between the diplomatic and consular functions as recognized in state practice prior to their codification in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.⁵⁴

Other global mega trends like rising social inequality amid economic growth, global warming and climate change, natural disasters and resource scarcities also shape Philippine foreign policy as seen below.

PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY AMID THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The 21st century is marked by global developments affecting all human associations whether they are independent nation states, territories, regions, or societies. Globalization, a process including in general (1) the erosion of physical boundaries that in the past separated sovereign and independent nation states, (2) the free movement of the 'factors of production' including migrant labor within and across national boundaries, as well as (3) the facilitation of this process by the phenomenal improvements in information and communication technologies (ICT) ensuring the erosion of national boundaries and (4) the consequent rise of interconnectedness and therefore, mutual sensitivity and vulnerability to events beyond the active participation of governments. An important example of this process is the Asian financial crisis of 1997⁵⁵ and the phenomenon of the rise of regional/global economies.⁵⁶ In this regard, the Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand affected East Asian economies that were integrated into the global market even if these economies did not have a hand in its making. The process of globalization is also often viewed as global economic integration, much as the world has seen in smaller scale in the cases of the European Union (EU) and ASEAN.

Yet, this century is also witness to the shifting distribution of power in the world, or power shifts alluded to earlier. Now it is a shift from the West – led by the United States and its friends and allies in the hub and spoke system – to the East, symbolized by China and its partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), among others. The power shift is seen as a consequence of the rise of China as the world's second largest economy even as it remains part of the developing world. Economic rise is also seen as accompanied by military rise and therefore, a cause for the classic security dilemma in a realist

world.⁵⁷ Moreover, power shifts are often seen as rather politically unstable and a cause for uncertainty in the world. In the case of China's rise, there is also the accompanying concern about the history of having been marginalized by Western powers including Japan. Thus, in East Asia, one often hears about the paradox of economic integration and globalization on the one hand, and geostrategic rivalry on the other. Since the rivalry is between the reigning center of power (the United States), and the rising or risen power (China), the issue raised is whether the two powers can avoid the 'Thucydides trap'.⁵⁸ Efforts to ameliorate the security environment in East Asia have not been wanting, particularly through some of the multilateral mechanisms ASEAN developed. However, apparently, there is some thinking of a likely condominium between China and the United States in the coming years that will implicate the Philippines as a member of ASEAN, especially as it chairs the latter in its 50th year in 2017. It might be the case that in East Asia, some form of condominium between China and the United States under President-elect Donald Trump is likely, an arrangement that had been virulently objected to by China and the United States prior to the 2016 US elections.⁵⁹ Trump's election and his actions during the transition from his electoral victory on November 9, 2016 to his formal assumption to the Oval Office on January 20, 2017 indicate some kind of mutual accommodation of Chinese national interests and US interests as Trump sees them, with the possible exception of cross-strait relations where the 'one-China policy' applies even in spite of the US Taiwan Relations Act and annual arms sales to Taiwan. The December 2016 Chinese 'capture' of a US underwater drone in the SCS near the former Philippine naval base in Subic Bay that used to host US military forces is a case in point. Usually used for naval surveillance that in the past was a sore point in China-US relations related to the use of new regimes in the oceans created by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China reportedly declared that it would return the drone to the United States, an offer President-elect Trump reportedly declined. These amicable relations between them are indeed unprecedented since the end of the Cold War and China's rise!

The maritime disputes in the waters surrounding East Asia between Japan and China in the Diaoyu Dao or Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea⁶⁰ already alluded to earlier can be seen as the site of these power rivalries between China, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan on the other. The intense geostrategic rivalry between China and Japan, exacerbated by the issues of history and the visits by Japan's leaders including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine is not likely to go away anytime soon,⁶¹ particularly with Japan's current policy of reinterpreting its 'peace constitution' under Prime Minister Abe and having moved too closely to the United States whose 'pivot to Asia' including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had appeared to have divided East Asia until Trump's election as the next US President. While the TPP is as good as dead with a Republican Senate, the future of the system of alliances the United States set up during the

Cold War appears on the brink of fundamental change. The latter is indicated by the pronouncements and actions of Philippine President Duterte who has moved closer to China and Russia, even as his rhetoric and behavior vis-à-vis the United States have remained enigmatic. The huge investments made by the owner of Japan's SoftBank in the United States following Prime Minister Abe's November 2016 US visit could also indicate an attempt by Japan to craft better relations with the incoming US President who vehemently opposed during the campaign the US system of alliances. Similarly, President Duterte has also shown his distaste for the country's alliance with the United States since assuming office.

Indeed, the role of 'agency' (in this case, President Duterte), as some constructivists in International Relations have posited,⁶² is critical in defining a country's foreign policy. As extensively shown above, the country's colonial history ensured Manila's dependence on Washington, not only for its external security, but also in the diplomatic and economic aspects of its external relations. However, the Duterte presidency is showing more than a thawing of relations with China on the SCS disputes and overall relations,⁶³ the forging of closer relations with countries in ASEAN such as Cambodia⁶⁴ and Singapore⁶⁵ whose relations with China are close though different, distancing the Philippines from the United States, and moving closer to Russia in the latter's 'turn to the East' policy.⁶⁶

The goal of addressing the socio-economic welfare of the Philippine marginalized sectors drives President Duterte's turn to China⁶⁷ since assuming office through preferential treatment for them in cutting bureaucratic red tape, improving livelihood, and making them safe including the much criticized and divisive war on illegal drugs and extra-judicial killings (EJKs).⁶⁸ Without addressing the viability of improving their finances, he seeks increases in retirement benefits for the elderly, free tertiary education in state-run universities for students, improving affordability and personal safety in public transport, policies that favor those left behind by past administrations.

Aware that global warming and climate change including associated crises they cause in worsening natural disasters and raising resource scarcities severely impact the marginalized, he has adopted policies to prioritize economic growth and development finding partners even in the country's traditional 'enemies' like China and Russia and supporting a Trump-led United States. For instance, he announced his rejection of the Paris COP21 agreement to reduce CO₂ emissions through continuous use of coal as an energy source.⁶⁹ All of these policies evidently indicate fundamental change in future Philippine foreign policy, in combination with acts and declarations against the United States in the recent past including on the MDT, EDCA, VFA and joint military *Balikatan* exercises.

His popularity with Filipino migrant workers evidenced in the election results⁷⁰ and in social media⁷¹ is almost legendary. Thus, critics include him among the world's populist leaders, even as liberal democratic values to which Filipinos are accustomed could be undermined.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Having described and discussed Philippine foreign policy starting with a historical background, providing key factors that shaped it over time, and identifying some of the most important global trends that are likely to affect Philippine external relations, it is now important to hazard an educated guess about the future prospects of the country's foreign policy.

The power shift⁷² from the West to the East led by the United States on the one hand and China on the other is likely to be fueled by the process of globalization made quicker and easier by the fourth Industrial Revolution and Artificial Intelligence (AI), the proclivity of governing elites to undertake rapid economic growth and development often as a path to performance legitimization, and failure of traditional elites and institutions to deliver on the expectations of ordinary people through exclusive policies particularly on their socio-economic needs. In this regard, since power shifts tend to be uncertain and unstable and as power takes many forms,⁷³ there is no guarantee that the world as we now know it will persist into the foreseeable future. The calls for post-Western international relations have been at the forefront of constructivist thinking for decades.⁷⁴ In addition, there are other works that apply to Asian practices in particular,⁷⁵ as well as actual forms of reconciliation between states that used to be 'enemies' such as Turkey and Russia.⁷⁶

As a small power lacking a credible external defense capability, the Philippines might be able to achieve short-term goals in the contested SCS now dominated by China as a result of vast financial and military resources Beijing has deployed in the contested features of this ocean since its occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. These short-term gains can be in the form of the ability of small Filipino fisherfolk to fish in their perceived traditional fishing grounds such as in the waters of the Scarborough Shoal (*Bajo de Masinloc*). However, these gains are only due to China's willingness to allow them to fish there. According to the head of China's National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) at the 2016 Xiangshan Forum held in Beijing on October 10–12, Beijing will continue its reclamation projects in the contested features of the South China Sea and will not give up even an inch of the territories it controls there. And reliance on the MDT with the United States is no guarantee for Philippine military security if only for the fact that Filipinos continue to doubt its automaticity as a collective security treaty where an attack on the Philippines would be considered an attack on the United States. In retrospect, the Marcos approach of developing a self-reliant defense capability could have helped reduce defense dependence on the United States, in combination with the promised military modernization program during the Ramos presidency.⁷⁷

Thus, the country would still remain the proverbial grass that elephants trample upon whether they quarrel or make love! President Duterte hopes to forge peaceful and friendly relations with Beijing (even to favor initially in his government left-leaning groups) to ensure a stable and peaceful region as the environmental condition

for economic development, to obtain Chinese foreign direct investments to generate jobs for unemployed Filipinos, to attract Chinese tourists to boost the country's foreign currency holding, to get China to help build critical transportation and communication infrastructures in the Philippines, among other foreign policy goals. Perhaps President Duterte also hopes to elicit China's cooperation in mitigating the country's illegal drugs trade allegedly involving the Chinese triads.

In conclusion, forging closer relations with Beijing, Moscow, and the United States under a Trump Presidency is certain to alter the region's security architecture that has been led by the United States since the end of Second World War as US hegemonic position yields to a multiplicity of actors. These include China, Russia, the United States, Japan, India, and ASEAN as a group. The impact of this redistribution of power on ASEAN is to reduce the importance of Cambodia and Myanmar to China in its bid for regional leadership in East Asia and to reduce tension centered on the competition for power between China and the United States in East Asian waters especially the SCS. Whether it will contribute to regional stability is uncertain because multi-polarity is not necessarily conducive to stability.

Notes

- 1 As cited by the late Salvador P. Lopez who was then University Professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, in 'New Directions in Philippine Foreign Policy', a lecture delivered at the university's Law Center, June 10, 1975. Emphasis is mine. Lopez became the University's President.
- 2 On Philippine history broadly, see Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Milagros C. Guerrero, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Press, 5th Edition, 1977); on the Philippine Revolution against Spain, see Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses* (Quezon City: University of the Philippine Press, 1950). For differing interpretations of American colonization of the Philippines, see O.D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, Volume II (Quezon City: Aklahi Foundation, Inc., 1989), pp. 403–505 on the Filipino perspective. An American perspective might be gleaned from Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989).
- 3 See Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), especially chapter 2: 'The Historical Background', pp. 21–64.
- 4 See *ibid.*, pp. 27–29.
- 5 In writing about bilateral relations, US journalists Fred Poole and Max Vanzi devoted a chapter to this period in Philippine–US relations. See their *Revolution in the Philippines: The United States in a Hall of Cracked Mirrors* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984), chapter 9: 'America's Forgotten War', pp. 167–188.
- 6 See, among others, Stuart Creighton Miller, *'Benevolent Assimilation': The American Colonization of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (San Francisco, CA: University of San Francisco Press, 1982).
- 7 The term refers to the first American educators that arrived in the country on board the steamship *USS Thomas*. For the effect of US colonialism including education on Filipinos until the 1960s, see Chapter 3 Corpuz, *The Philippines*, pp. 68–71.
- 8 See for example, Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the US Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960).

- 9 In the 1960s, the only state university was the University of the Philippines and the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) was a state college. The latter became the present Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), also a state university. See among the works of Renato Constantino, *A History of the Philippines From The Spanish Colonization to the Second World War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). A penetrating account of the effects of US occupation on Filipino consciousness including nationalism may be found in Corpuz, *The Philippines*, chapter 3.
- 10 For the US perspective, see various reports of the Philippine Commission and other US sources as cited in Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, Volume II, found in the notes for chapter 19, pp. 626–635; chapter 20, pp. 636–650, and chapter 21, pp. 650–660. Subsequent research on the history of American colonialism can be found among others in Corpuz, *The Philippines*; John R.M. Taylor, compiler, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction*, 5 volumes (Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971–1973); Renato Constantino, foreword, *Symposium on Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines: Trends and Implications* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1982); Stephen R. Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986); David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Amando Doronila, *The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines: 1946–1972* (Oxford, New York, and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992); Frank Golay, *Face of Empire: United States–Philippine Relations, 1898–1946* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998); Paul D. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, ‘Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines’, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003): 259–292; and Michael Cullinane, *Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898–1908* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2004).
- 11 See Poole and Vanzi, *Revolution in the Philippines*, especially chapter 9: ‘America’s Forgotten War’ in which they cited Stuart Creighton Miller’s, ‘Benevolent Assimilation’ on p. 171. See also, John R. White, *Bullet and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: The Century Company, 1928).
- 12 On self-government, see Maximo M. Kalaw, *Self-Government in the Philippines* (New York: Century Company, 1916).
- 13 On this period, see George A. Malcolm, *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936).
- 14 See Cesar A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), for an authoritative account of this subject. A brief overview of successive colonization of the *Moros*, as referred to by Spanish colonial administration and preferred by Muslim secessionist groups since the 1970s may be found in Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines: 1946–1976’, an unpublished doctoral dissertation at the State University of New York at Buffalo, September 1979, pp. 55–61. On Moro secessionism in the 1970s, see Eliseo R. Mercado, ‘Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separation’, in Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani, editors, *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 151–175.
- 15 The fact that independence was won not by the country’s army unlike in Indonesia must have been a factor in the Philippines’ history of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military at all times. See Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘The Military in Philippine Politics: Retrospect and Prospects’, in Rodolfo C. Severino and Lorraine Carlos Salazar, editors, *Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?* (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 78–99. On civil–military relations in Asia, see Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Asian Civil–Military Relations: Key Developments, Explanations, and Trajectories’, concluding chapter in Muthiah Alagappa, editor, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 433–498.

- 16 On the Philippines in SEATO, see an insider account by Narciso G. Reyes, *Memories of Diplomacy: A Life in the Philippine Foreign Service* (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1995), pp. 25–27.
- 17 For an account of the negotiation for a successor treaty to the MBA, see Jovito R. Salonga, *The Senate That Said No: A Four-Year Record of the First Post-EDSA Senate* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995).
- 18 For background on the bilateral relations regarding the military bases, see Eduardo Z. Romuáldez, *A Question of Sovereignty: The Military Bases and Philippine–American Relations, 1944–1979* (Manila: Eduardo Z. Romuáldez, 1980), and Roland G. Simbulan, *The Bases of Our Insecurity: A Study of the US Military Bases in the Philippines* (Quezon City: BALAI Fellowship, Inc., 1983). Prior to the end of the MBA, in 1989 talks about the expiration of the MBA in 1991 started between the Philippines and the United States and are chronicled in Carlos P. Garcia, ‘RP-US Military Bases: Chronology of Events’, *Philippine Foreign Relations, Bi-annual Publication of the Research Development Center, Foreign Service Institute*, Vol 1, No. 1 (November 1990): 49–72. The regional importance of US military presence in North and Southeast Asia can be seen in this chronology as well as the actions taken by non-treaty allies of the United States in ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to enable the continuing military presence of the United States in the region.
- 19 The Task Force on the VFA’s primer recalls the origin of the bilateral security relations going back to the MDT and highlights the importance of the alliance as ‘essential for regional peace and stability’ in East Asia that has ‘serious regional tensions and potential security flashpoints’, a key consideration why the alliance needed to be strengthened as both parties face the 21st century. See Task Force on the Visiting Forces Agreement-Department of Foreign Affairs, *The Visiting Forces Agreement (A Primer)* (Pasay City: The Task Force on the VFA-DFA, undated), 19 pages.
- 20 EDCA was challenged in the Philippine Supreme Court on account of its violation of the 1987 constitutional provision in Article 18, section 3 cited below. The Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality prior to President Duterte’s assumption to office, saying EDCA was not a treaty but merely an executive agreement.
- 21 Article 18, section 25, *1987 Philippine Constitution*.
- 22 For some of the highlights of Romulo’s diplomatic career and glimpses of Philippine foreign policy during Ferdinand E. Marcos’s authoritarian period, see Beth Day Romulo, *Perspective of a Diplomat’s Wife* (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1981), especially the chapters titled ‘Old Friends in a Changing Scene’, ‘Turning the Corner to the New Decade’, ‘The Changing Face of RP–US Relations’, ‘No Country is an Island’, and ‘A Bank for Asia’.
- 23 These crises include the post-Marcos economic decline, the oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the global economic and financial crises of 2008–2009. Domestic policies include the recognition of migrant workers as the country’s ‘*bagong bayani*’ or new heroes, the establishment of government agencies dedicated to migrant workers, such as labor attachés in the country’s diplomatic posts abroad, while external policies at various levels include bilateral agreements to protect migrant labor (i.e., with Singapore following the celebrated case of Flor Contemplacion), regional policy like spearheading and pushing for the ASEAN Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers, as well as joining global agreements at the UN to protect the rights of migrant workers. Studies on the issue of migrant workers may be found in the works of Jorge V. Tigno, Maruja Asis, Jean Encinas-Franco, Minda I. Cabilao, the Scalabrini Migration Center, among others. See, Minda I. Cabilao, *Labor Migration: Issues for DFA Personnel in Servicing Migrant Workers* (Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies Paper No. 7, reprinted in October 1995).
- 24 See for example, the Singapore-produced movie *Iloilo* that documents the critical role a Filipino domestic helper in Singapore played in the life of her young ward.

- 25 On cross-strait relations, see among others, Jing Huang and Xiaoting Li, *Inseparable Separation: The Making of China's Taiwan Policy* (Singapore and London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2010).
- 26 On the South China Sea disputes, see the publications of the Working Group on Managing Conflict in the South China Sea, a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)-supported project during the 1990s led by Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault; various articles published by *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Pacific Affairs*; journals of the foreign ministries of party claimants; and publications by academics/analysts such as Ji Gouxing, Li Mingjiang, Wu Shicun, You Ji, Cheng-yi Lin, Yann-huei Song, B.A. Hamzah, Aileen Baviera, Jay Batongbakal, Alberto A. Encomienda, J. Perpetuo (Popo) Lotilla, Herman Joseph S. Kraft, Tran Troung Thuy, Nguyen Hung Son, Sam Bateman, Robert C. Beckman, Erik Beukel, Peter Dutton, Ralf Emmers, Koichi Sato, Ian Storey, Carlyle A. Thayer, Mark J. Valencia, Jusuf Wanandi, among others.
- 27 An insider account of these efforts at regional cooperation among Southeast Asian countries may be found in Reyes, *Memories of Diplomacy*, especially on his tour of duty in Indonesia, pp. 32–48.
- 28 This author is firmly on the side of the argument that ASEAN is not an American creation.
- 29 See for example, Thanat Koman, 'ASEAN in a Regional and Global Context', an overview article together with those of the late Robert A. Scalapino of UC Berkeley and the late K.S. Sandhu of Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), in Karl D. Jackson, Suhumbhand Paribatra and J. Soedjati Djwandono, editors, *ASEAN in Regional and Global Context* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC at Berkeley, 1986), pp. 9–14.
- 30 Reyes, *Memories of Diplomacy*, pp. 100 and xiv.
- 31 See for instance, Evelyn Colbert, 'ASEAN as a Regional Organization: Economics, Politics, and Security', in Jackson et al., editors, *ASEAN in Regional and Global Context*, pp. 194–210.
- 32 These would include those conducted by the late Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics, Japanese studies associated with or under the auspices of Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), Paul Evans, currently at the University of British Columbia, Amitav Acharya, currently in Washington, DC, Canadian scholar Shaun Narine, German scholars Hanns Maul, Jürgen Rüländ and Jürgen Haacke, among others.
- 33 It is not accurate to talk about ASEAN views on 'security' without putting comprehensive security as a core concept. Cooperative security is a post-Cold War notion that came in the late 1990s rather than in the late 1960s and early 1970s when ASEAN was still developing the concepts of 'national and regional resilience' to demonstrate how comprehensive security worked in the ASEAN context. See among others, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Memorandum No. 3, 'The Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security', December 1995; and David Dewitt, 'Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1999): 1–16.
- 34 See Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991); also, Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 63–64.
- 35 UC Berkeley's late Robert (Bob) A. Scalapino often teased ASEAN-ISIS founders about this.
- 36 ASEAN enlarged from the five original founding members in 1967 to include Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Vietnam in 1996, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The last four countries are collectively known as the CLMV countries.
- 37 Adopted in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, the ASEAN Vision 2020 sought to make ASEAN into a single actor in world affairs described as 'a concert of Southeast Asian nations, a partnership in dynamic development, a community of caring societies, and an outward-looking ASEAN' according to the *ASEAN Vision 2020* document signed by the ASEAN leaders on December 15, 1997 in Kuala Lumpur.
- 38 On the 'ASEAN Way', see among others, Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*; Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*

- (London and New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003); and Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
- 39 The *ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together* was adopted by ASEAN leaders at their 27th Summit in Kuala Lumpur on November 2, 2015 and includes the ASEAN Community Blueprints 2025 for the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), the Initiative for ASEAN Investments (AIA) Work Plan III and the ASEAN Connectivity 2025.
 - 40 See for example, Carolina G. Hernandez, 'ASEAN Community Building and the South China Sea Issue: Implications for ASEAN "Centrality"', *National Security Review: Policy and Practice of National Security Administration, National Defense College of the Philippines* (December 2014): 7–29.
 - 41 The remark was made by Rizal Sukma, Indonesia's current Ambassador to the UK, at the International Conference commemorating the 45th Anniversary of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Indonesia) in Jakarta on September 1, 2016. He was the Executive Director of CSIS and President Widodo's principal foreign policy adviser until his departure for London.
 - 42 On the ASEAN Charter, see Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon, editors, *The Making of the ASEAN Charter* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. for the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, 2009).
 - 43 See Carolina G. Hernandez and Motoko Shuto, 'ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Socio-cultural Pillar', in Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, editors, *Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2013), pp. 58–73, also Carolina G. Hernandez, 'The Peoples' Pillar in the ASEAN Community', a paper prepared for the 45th Anniversary Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Indonesia), Jakarta, Indonesia, September 1, 2016.
 - 44 Some of these ideas may be found in the set of recommendations made by ASEAN-ISIS to the EPG on the ASEAN Charter during 2006.
 - 45 The notion of this particular power shift based on China's rise as the second largest economy in the world is from Joseph S. Nye's 'Global Power Shifts', a view Nye and others like Fareed Zakaria had not supported fully.
 - 46 The term was first used in Southeast Asia by former president Fidel V. Ramos's National Security Adviser, retired General Jose T. Almonte, 'The Rise of China and its Impact on the Asia Pacific', in a compilation of his speeches on security issues, *Toward One Southeast Asia* (Quezon City: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc., 2004), p. 72.
 - 47 The literature on the SLOCs as well as the concern over freedom of navigation and over flight in new maritime regimes introduced by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea associated with China–US rivalry and power shift can be seen in examples such as, Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Asia Pacific* (New York: Random House, 2014) and ISIS Malaysia, *The 29th Asia-Pacific Roundtable: Conference Report* (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 2015), summarizing presentations on Asia-Pacific security by security specialists including Kishore Mahbubani, Ken Jimbo, Jusuf Wanandi, Mohamad Jawhar Hassan, Paul Evans, Zha Peixin, Madhu Bhalla, Aileen Baviera, and others.
 - 48 HUK refers to the Hukbong Mapagpalaya laban sa Hapon, a guerilla group formed at the end of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines (1941–1944). See among others, Hernandez, 'The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines', especially pp. 186–201; Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The HUK Rebellion* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1977); and Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971).
 - 49 See for examples, Eric Gutierrez, *The Ties That Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the 9th House of Representatives* (Pasig City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1994); Doronila, *The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the*

- Philippines*; Constantino, Rivera et al., *Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines*; and David Wurfel, 'Elites of Wealth and Elites of Power, the Changing Dynamic: A Case Study of the Philippines', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 1979 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979), pp. 233–245.
- 50 For a detailed illustration of domestic politics and US dependence, see Carolina G. Hernandez, 'Domestic Politics and Philippine Foreign Policy', in Jackson et al., editors, *ASEAN in Regional and Global Context*, pp. 110–130, especially pp. 121–130 on 'development diplomacy' under the late President Marcos.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 52 Martial Law ended formally in 1981 with the controversial Marcos constitution adopted and parliamentary elections held, 'constitutional authoritarianism' in a French-style government structure became the country's political regime until the 1986 people power revolt.
- 53 These pillars were established in law through the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. They continued to be observed through various administrations since then.
- 54 See Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, Fifth edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter XVII: 'Diplomatic and Consular Relations', pp. 349–368.
- 55 See for example, H.W. Arndt and Hal Hill, editors, *Southeast Asia's Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and the Way Forward* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
- 56 The process of globalization has captivated both academic and practitioners of foreign policy and related fields. See among others, Charles E. Morrison and Hadi Soesastro, editors, *Domestic Adjustments to Globalization* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998); Ipei Yamazawa, editor, *The Developing Economies in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Globalization* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 2000); and Keinichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: Free Press, 1995).
- 57 See among others, Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, 'China's Response to the United States' Asia-Pacific Strategy', *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, Policy Paper No. 41 (October 2012): 1–7; Anne-Marie Brady, 'Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns', *The Diplomat*, March 17, 2014. <http://the.diplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns/>; John J. Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2010): 381–396.
- 58 On the 'Asian Paradox', see for example, Robert A. Manning, 'The Asian Paradox: Toward a New Architecture', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 1993): 55–64; and on the Thucydides Trap, see among others, Graham Allison, 'The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for a War?', *The Atlantic*, September 24, 2015: 16 pages.
- 59 Writing after the 2016 US elections that saw the victory of Donald Trump, Joseph S. Nye continued to ignore any sign of either China or Russia posing a real threat to the liberal model of global governance the United States built in 1945 and nurtured since then, although he argues in favor of accommodating China's growing power within this liberal world order. He rejects the idea that the United States is in decline. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Donald Trump's Foreign-Policy Challenges', *Project Syndicate*, November 9, 2016.
- 60 See among others, Koichi Sato, 'China and the Maritime Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Spratlys and the Senkaku Islands', *Oberlin Review of International Studies*, No. 19 (2008): 43–64; Go Ito, 'The Senkaku/Diaoyudao Territorial Dispute: Legal, Historical, and Political Perspectives', in David Walton and Emilian Kavalski, editors, *Power Transition in Asia* (London: Routledge, 2016), chapter 8; Li Mingjiang, 'China's South China Sea Policy: Claims and Changing Contexts', pp. 195–211, and Shen Hongfang, 'South China Sea Issue in China–ASEAN Relations: An Alternative Approach to Ease the Tension', both in *The South China Sea Reader, A Special Edition of the National Security Review* (2011): 221–233.
- 61 For a background on the issue of history and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan's relations with China and South Korea, see, Victor D. Cha, 'Hypotheses on History and Hate in Asia: Japan and

- the Korean Peninsula', pp. 37–60, and Daqing Yang, 'Reconciliation between Japan and China: Problems and Prospects', both in Yoichi Funabashi, editor, with foreword by Ezra Vogel, *Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004), pp. 61–89. Also, Carolina G. Hernandez, 'The Role of History in East Asian Relations: A Philippine Perspective', *Gaiko* (Diplomacy), Vol. 32 (July 2015): 56–65.
- 62 See for examples, Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', in Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen, editors, *Theory and Structure in International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), pp. 76–109; Ian Hurd, 'Constructivism', in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 298–316; and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Constructivism', in Scott Burchill et al., editors, *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 188–212.
- 63 See for example, the rhetoric and action in regard to the SCS territorial dispute, especially the Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in favor of the Philippines, in selected speeches, Forum on 'Upholding the Law of the Sea Convention and the Post-Arbitration Philippine Challenge' co-sponsored by the UP Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, and Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies, UP College of Law, Diliman, July 15, 2016; and The Second Manila Conference on the South China Sea: 'Managing Tensions, Revisiting Regional Efforts, and Fostering Cooperation', jointly sponsored/organized by The Asia Foundation, Foreign Service Institute (Department of Foreign Affairs), and Griffith Asia Institute (Griffith University), The Manila Hotel, August 3–4, 2016.
- 64 Cambodia was pilloried for its failure to ensure the issuance of a Joint Statement of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2012 during its ASEAN Chairmanship, the first time it happened in ASEAN's history, prompting 'shuttle diplomacy' by then Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Marty Natelagawa leading to the adoption by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN 6 Points on the SCS. See Hernandez, 'ASEAN Community Building and the South China Sea Issue'.
- 65 Singapore is perceived as almost like a treaty ally of the United States in the absence of a formal treaty, having granted access to its Changi Naval Base to US forces and is with the US-led Pluralist Security Initiative (PSI) of the US Global War on Terror (GWOT) following 9/11 and TPP, and has forged a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Taiwan, though bound by the 'one-China policy', yet it is also part of the notion of 'Greater China' in addition to economic ties to Beijing.
- 66 The rhetoric and actions of President Duterte are covered extensively by Philippine and foreign mainstream and social media and do not need documentation for now. On Russia's turn to the East policy, see among others, Sergei Karaganov, 'A Turn to Asia: The History of the Political Idea', *Russia in Global Affairs*, January 13, 2016; Timofei Bordachev, 'Russia's Turn to the East: Just the Beginning', *Valdai Business Club*, May 30, 2016; I.A. Makarov, editor, *The Turn to the East: The Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East during the Strengthening of the Asian Direction of Russian Foreign Policy* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2016).
- 67 See attempts to explain Duterte to understand his role in shaping Philippine foreign policy in Nick Bisley, 'What Will Duterte Mean for Philippine Foreign Policy?', *The Diplomat*, July 19, 2016; UP Diliman Political Scientist Aries A. Arugay's works, including 'The 2016 Philippine Elections: Democracy's Discontents and Aspirations', *Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada*, June 24, 2016; 'Duterte's Crusade for Peace in the Philippines', *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, September 14, 2016; and 'Duterte's Pivot to China; Realities and Interest', *Jeju Peace Institute*, November 1, 2016.
- 68 An attempt to explain Duterte's behavior including on the war on illegal drugs and the associated extra-judicial killings (EJKs) may be found in an article by Carolina G. Hernandez, a Philippine Year Ender for *Asian Survey*, published as 'The Philippines in 2016: The Year that Shook the World', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2017): 135–141.

- 69 See among others, Walden Bello, 'Is the Philippines Squandering its Moral Authority on Climate Change?', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, January 15, 2015; Kristyn Nika M. Lazo, 'High Costs a Barrier to PH Climate Change Investments', *McClatchy-Tribune Business News*, May 23, 2016; and Angelica Ballesteros and Jefferson Antiporda, 'PH Far from Ratifying Paris Climate Pact', *McClatchy-Tribune Business News*, November 4, 2016.
- 70 As absentee voters, Filipino migrant workers gave Duterte a landslide victory with voter turnout the highest in 10 years. See, Paterno Esmaguél II, 'Overseas Absentee Voting: Duterte, Marcos Win', *Rappler*, May 14, 2016.
- 71 See for example, Aim Sinpeng, 'How Duterte Won the Election on Facebook', *New Mandala*, May 12, 2016, in which the author, a lecturer at the University of Sydney with a PhD and co-founder of the Sydney Cyber Security Network, analyzed Duterte's social media comparative value, saying he outperformed all the other candidates by having the most number of 'shares' on Facebook, 'an act of social endorsement through networks'.
- 72 See how this is seen from various countries and theoretical lenses in Asia in Walton and Kavalski, editors, *Power Transition in Asia*. See also, Ian Hall and Frank Smith, 'The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition', *Asian Security*, Vol. 1, No. 9 (2013):1–18.
- 73 In the 21st century, it is common to look at power either as hard, soft, or smart or a combination of these forms of power. For insights on the notion of power in this century, besides Joseph S. Nye's works, see Matteo Pallaver, 'Power Shift and its Forms: Hard, Soft, and Smart', a Master of Philosophy thesis, London School of Economics, October 2011.
- 74 See endnote 61 above, and also, Pierre P. Lizée, *A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for the Post-Western World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
- 75 See for example, Amitav Acharya, 'Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia', in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, editors, *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), pp. 57–82.
- 76 I'm grateful to my graduate student in International Studies, Joseph Fabian who wrote his research paper on the subject. See also, Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, 'Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?', *Survival* (2006): 81–92; and Eşref Yalınkılıçlı, 'Turkish-Russian Energy Rapprochement: What it Means for Ukraine – A Realistic Look from within Turkey', *European Focus* (2012): 2–9.
- 77 Rex Robles, a member of the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission that investigated the 2003 Oakwood Mutiny led by the Magdalo group including Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, had lamented the inability by the Ramos government to deliver on this piece of legislation.

Singapore as a Small State: Surmounting Vulnerability

Lam Peng Er

INTRODUCTION

Singapore is probably one of the most successful small states in the world. Diminutive in size and lacking in natural resources, the city-state has safeguarded its sovereignty and attained a First World level of affluence within a single generation since its independence in 1965. A key reason for Singapore's success is its diplomatic skill in keeping good relations with all the great powers by making itself useful to them and peacefully co-existing with its immediate neighbours as a fellow ASEAN founding member and a key driver of ASEAN-centred multilateralism in East Asia.

Singapore's shrewd Founding Fathers adroitly walked the strategic tightrope during the Cold War. A younger set of political leaders are doing likewise amidst the power transition in the post-Cold War era. A leitmotif of Singapore's foreign policy is a small state coping with vulnerability (Leifer, 2000). Indeed, the quality of its top leaders and professional diplomatic corps, and the capabilities of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) make an enormous difference in the successful pursuit of foreign policy. Besides nimbly navigating the turbulence of geo-politics in East Asia, Singapore has also taken advantage of a liberal post-Second World War order in which it has excelled as a competitive trading state and a global city (Ganesan, 2005). Two sides of the same coin may analogously explain Singapore's relentless quest for survival, security and success. One side reflects the imperative of a small state in being sensitive to the harsh reality of geo-politics; the other reflects the necessity for a small state to remain relevant in a globalizing and

interdependent world linked by region-building, institutions, trade and technology (Acharya, 2007).

This chapter will first examine the immutable factors of size, geography, demography, ethnicity and history which have profoundly shaped Singapore's world view and foreign policy. Next will be an analysis of the domestic sources of its foreign policy, especially its top leaders, the People's Action Party (PAP) (the perennial party-in-power) and other institutions. Following that is an assessment of the important external actors (especially the US superpower, rising Chinese power, Japan, India and the city-state's immediate neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia) and their influence on its foreign policy. The final section will examine Singapore's contribution in international affairs and the challenges it is likely to face in the near future.

ANATOMY AND ANOMALY OF A SMALL STATE: VULNERABLE YET SUCCESSFUL

That Singapore is physically tiny, lacking in strategic depth, located in a turbulent neighbourhood and imbued with the historical memory of an acrimonious separation from Malaysia has given the city-state an acute sense of vulnerability which sometimes borders on siege mentality. To many Singaporeans, it is self-evident that their country is small and vulnerable. The PAP, which has led the island since its self-governance from British colonial rule in 1959, often harps on the country's vulnerability to galvanize national solidarity and purpose, hard work and excellence to avoid feckless complacency among Singaporeans. Undeniably, the ruling PAP's national narrative of its good political stewardship amidst vulnerability has resonance with many Singaporeans. It can also be interpreted that the mantra of vulnerability articulated by the PAP government can be used to justify the trade-off between the strong and tested leadership of the PAP to manage success and its authoritarian style of governance. Education Minister Ong Ye Kung noted that that a multi-party system could slow down decision-making and nimbleness while navigating an 'ever-changing world and environment' (Ong, 2017).

The tropical island of Singapore has a land area of only 719.1 square kilometres located at the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula. Singapore's nominal GDP in 2014 was US\$308 billion. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the city-state was the 7th richest country in the world in terms of per capita nominal GDP (US\$52,888) in 2015. The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) noted: 'Singapore's HDI value for 2018 is 0.932 – which puts the country in the very high human development category – ranking it 9th out of 189 countries and territories' (UNDP Human Development Reports, 2018 Statistical Update). Despite its inherent vulnerability in an anarchical world with a hierarchy of power, Singapore has clearly been an economic and developmental success story thus far.

As of 2017, the city-state's population stood at 5.61 million. Though a multi-racial and culturally plural society, 76.2% of its citizen population are of ethnic Chinese descent. Indigenous Malays (15%), ethnic Indians (7.4%), Eurasians and 'others' (1.4%) make up the rest of its citizenry. That many elites of Mainland China, Malaysia and Indonesia perceive Singapore as a predominantly 'Chinese' society poses a potential problem for the city-state's diplomacy. The city-state's political leadership has been very careful to maintain equality and fairness among the races in its public policy, and scrupulously avoids the impression that it is a 'Third China' in Southeast Asia. Indeed, its political identity is as an independent and multi-cultural country anchored in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Singapore's acute sense of vulnerability also stems from the reality that it is sandwiched between two larger Malay neighbours (Malaysia and Indonesia) ambivalent of their own Malaysian and Indonesian Chinese citizens often stereotyped as economically rapacious and interlopers of Mainland China. Singapore's strategic nightmare is its two Malay neighbours ganging up against it and externalizing their racial prejudices to Singapore.¹ Equally alarming is the extreme scenario of its immediate neighbours, led by radical Islamic political parties and 'mad mullahs' who castigate and threaten the city-state for its good relations with the United States and Israel and 'oppression' towards Singaporean Malay-Muslims, labelling the island a bastion of infidels.

The strategic location of Singapore as a maritime hub between the crossroads of East and West is a necessary but not a sufficient reason for its success. The city-state might not have prospered if it had been physically located in the Caribbean or the South Pacific region distant from global maritime routes. But its prosperity and independence are not guaranteed simply because of its strategic location. Constantly upgrading itself as an efficient maritime, aerial and financial hub and bracing itself for competition has ensured its international appeal as a travel, commercial, entertainment, medical and foreign direct investment destination.

Singapore, established by Britain in 1819 as a tax-free port, has always considered trade and the freedom of navigation to be its maritime lifeline. Arguably, free trade is a part of its DNA. It is therefore not surprising for the city-state today to be most supportive of a liberal global order based on free trade, freedom of navigation and international law for a safer and more predictable environment necessary for it to thrive. In this regard, it has enthusiastically promoted many bilateral and multilateral free trade arrangements regionally and globally.

The city-state is also supportive of a rule-based system such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) at the global level. Singapore supports ASEAN as a regional organization in Southeast Asia whose norms are decision-making by consensus, non-interference in the domestic politics of member states and the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflict between members. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has affirmed the importance of international law and norms for small states. The media paraphrased him: 'If "the law

of the jungle” prevails instead, he cautioned, small nations are bound to fall under the control of bigger, more powerful states’ (Iwamoto, 2016).

Historical memories transmitted by Singapore’s national education and the pro-government media have also engendered a sense of vulnerability among its citizens. During the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* where President Sukarno openly opposed the formation of Malaysia, Indonesian saboteurs unleashed a total of 37 bombings from 1963 to 1966 in Singapore. The failure of merger between Singapore and Malaysia between 1963 and 1965 as a single country cast Singapore adrift in 1965 without its traditional economic hinterland, leaving it alone and vulnerable. The city-state lacked a military deterrence then and had to rapidly build up its armed forces through national conscription and initial help from Israeli officers. An independent Singapore in its early years was acutely vulnerable because the British forces based there were to be withdrawn by 1971 and the military conflict in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was escalating against the backdrop of the Cold War. Singapore then and now has no formal military alliances with any protective great powers. Singaporeans are aware that the city-state is dependent on Malaysia for its water supply, and has to import most of its food from abroad. Many are also cognizant of the bloody anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia on 13 May 1969 and in Indonesia in May 1998.

Some Singaporeans are also fearful that their country’s material success and excellence may trigger jealousy and resentment among its neighbours. Ironically, success does not necessarily assuage a sense of vulnerability in Singapore. There appears to be an inherent paradox in the city-state’s relations with its neighbours;² it strives to do better than them in order to survive. Then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew candidly said: ‘We knew that if we were just like our neighbours, we would die. Because we’ve got nothing to offer against what they have to offer. So we had to produce something which is different and better than what they have. It’s incorrupt. It’s efficient. It’s meritocratic. It works’ (Apcar et al., 2007). But that Singaporean attitude which is hubristic, condescending and annoying to its neighbours may trigger resentment which in turn feeds into a sense of vulnerability among Singaporeans. Unfortunately, this vicious cycle is perhaps inescapable from the logic of Singapore seeking to surmount its vulnerability.

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF SINGAPORE’S FOREIGN POLICY

Singapore’s Founding Fathers have had a profound influence on its foreign policy, especially Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam and Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee. That Lee Kuan Yew had left an indelible mark on the city-state’s foreign policy is not only because of his geo-strategic acumen and success as a nation-builder but also due to his political longevity in office. Lee was Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990 and then remained in the Cabinet from 1990 till 2011 as Senior Minister and then Minister Mentor. He was

a pragmatist who cultivated good personal relations with the top leaders of the United States, Europe, China, Taiwan and Indonesia. Harvard Professor Graham Allison has lauded Lee as a geo-political ‘grandmaster’ (Allison, 2013).

A key reason why Singapore’s foreign policy enjoys consistency, continuity and clarity is because of the remarkable political longevity and foresight of Lee. He was always mindful of his country being a small state and sensitive to the vagaries of great power politics. Leaders in Singapore were fond of using the analogy of a poison shrimp – Singapore may be small but anyone seeking to swallow it surely will be poisoned (Huxley, 2003 [2000], 2012).

The city-state’s strategy of survival is to rely on an eclectic mix of diplomacy, deterrence, international law, interdependence and the balance of power. Lee remarked:

If there were no international law and order, and big fish eat small fish and small fish eat shrimps, we wouldn’t exist. Our armed forces can withstand an attack and inflict damage for two weeks, three weeks, but a siege? (laughs) ... Control of sea lanes? We’ll just starve. So, it depends on whether there is an international environment which says that borders are sacrosanct and there is the rule of law. It’s not just [a matter for the] United Nations Security Council. There’s the U.S. Seventh Fleet, a Japanese interest in the Straits of Malacca, and later Chinese and Indian interests in the region, and therefore a balance. (Apcar et al., 2007)

Earlier, Lee noted that the existence of small states is precarious whether great powers clash or reconcile. At the 1973 Ottawa Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Lee ruminated: ‘The fact is ... when elephants fight, the grass suffers. The thought occurred to me that when elephants flirt, the grass also suffers. And when they make love, it is disastrous’ (National Archives of Singapore, 1973).

Lee’s trusted lieutenant S. Rajaratnam was Singapore’s first foreign minister between 1965 and 1980 who led its fledgling Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rajaratnam then remained in the Singapore cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister (1980–1985) and as Senior Minister (1985–1988). Rajaratnam was both a pragmatic diplomat and an erudite visionary who blended realism and interdependency in his strategic thinking. He noted the pernicious impact of great power politics on small states: ‘Even an indifferent student of history will tell you the meek far from inheriting anything have invariably disappeared from the earth’ (National Archives of Singapore, 1981). However, Rajaratnam also envisaged the necessity of Singapore embedded in an interdependent world for its survival and prosperity. In his seminal speech titled ‘Singapore: Global City’ delivered in February 1972, Rajaratnam outlined the strategy for transforming his country into a global city (National Archives of Singapore, 1972). He cautioned that the traditional role of the city-state as a key trading hub in Southeast Asia and as a marketplace of the region would gradually diminish in importance. The country must therefore become part of the world and its global economic system.

Another comrade of Lee was Dr Goh Keng Swee who established the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Dr Goh is best known as the economic doyen of the young city-state but he was also the man who built its deterrence. In a parliamentary speech in 1967, then Minister of Defence Goh said:

Where a small state is strategically situated, as Singapore is, it is important that it should maintain adequate defence forces. It goes without saying that the real security, which we want, can be found not by our unaided efforts alone, but in alliance with others. In the long term, Singapore should work towards the establishment of some kind of regional defence arrangement, possibly within a larger international framework. (National Archives of Singapore, 1967)

In 1971, Singapore, Australia, Britain, Malaysia and New Zealand established the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) as a forum for mutual consultations.

While Singapore eschewed any formal defence alliance with other powers, it sought partners in its defence diplomacy including Israel and Taiwan. The latter would provide extensive military training grounds for the SAF (which suffers from space constraint in the city-state) since 1975. Through its defence diplomacy, the SAF has secured military training grounds in at least a dozen countries today including the United States and Australia.

The Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) cut its teeth in the Cambodian conflict during the Cold War. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and withdrew in September 1989. As a small state, Singapore could not countenance the precedent of a bigger state swallowing a weaker state in Southeast Asia. During that era, MFA officials, many of whom were young and inexperienced then, quickly learned their trade of cooperating and coordinating with other ASEAN members (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) to lobby in the United Nations and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to deny any international legitimacy to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

In summary, the three most important institutions which spearhead Singapore's foreign policy are the ruling PAP, the SAF and the MFA, while the country's Ministry of Trade and Industry has an important voice in its economic diplomacy such as the pursuit of Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs). Due to the one-party dominant system of Singapore, political parties in permanent opposition have virtually no influence on foreign policy; their voices are very faint in parliamentary debates on diplomacy. Nor do opposition parties lead any social movements, trade unions or other interest groups. Civil society groups are also weak, and the press, which does not behave like the 'Fourth Estate' in advocating policy preferences, exercises little influence on the country's foreign policy. Academic think tanks in Singapore do provide information and knowledge on the domestic politics and international relations of East Asian countries but they tend to avoid policy recommendations and adopt a partisan approach in their reports.

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND EXTERNAL ACTORS

Strategic Ties with the US Superpower

Even though the ruling PAP crushed suspected communist opponents and leftist sympathizers in the domestic politics of the 1960s, Singapore adopted a pragmatic foreign policy during the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet superpower. Although the city-state supported the American presence in Vietnam and repaired US naval vessels, it also serviced Soviet merchant ships in its shipyards (Goh and Chua, 2015: 26). Singapore also actively traded with the communist bloc (Yahya, 2015).

In the post-Cold War era, Singapore continues to support the US presence in Southeast Asia to underpin the regional balance of power. Following the closure of US bases in the Philippines in 1991, the city-state offered more facilities to the US military to avoid a power vacuum in Southeast Asia. These include: access to its Changi Naval Base for US aircraft carriers and other naval vessels in transit, basing up to four littoral combat ships (LCS), and the rotational deployments of US F-15, F-16 fighter planes and the P-8 Poseidon surveillance plane for operations in the South China Sea. The city-state has also deployed the SAF to assist US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US-led Global Coalition to counter ISIS but not in a combat role. Singapore has purchased some of its sophisticated weapon systems, especially fighter planes and helicopters from the United States. It supported the Obama Administration's grand strategy of 'rebalancing to Asia' to the chagrin of China. Conversely, Singapore joined Beijing's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), even though Washington was against the scheme as a potential challenger to the US-led World Bank.

Relations with a Rising China

While Singapore has forged a close strategic alignment with the US superpower, it has also deepened and broadened its political and economic relationship with a rising China. It is quite astonishing that the affluent city-state has become the largest foreign investor in the Chinese Mainland. The local media noted: 'Singapore was China's largest foreign investor with investments amounting to US\$5.8 billion in over 700 projects last year. At the same time, Singapore is China's largest investment destination in Asia, and one of the top investment destinations for Chinese companies investing abroad' (Aggarwal, 2015). By the end of 2014, Singapore's cumulative foreign direct investment in China totalled US\$72.3 billion (Sim, 2015).

Some analysts perceive that there is a 'special relationship' between China and the city-state for at least three reasons: a cultural and ethnic 'affinity', that Singapore was a model for China's modernization, and that both countries have cooperated closely in three government-to-government projects, namely,

the Suzhou Industrial Project, the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City and the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (Wong and Teng, 2007; Zheng and Lim, 2016). Singapore has trained more than 55,000 Chinese officials on its mode of governance including the rule of law and anti-corruption measures; such an undertaking is unparalleled in the world. Between 2009 and 2019, the SAF and People Liberation's Army (PLA) conducted four bilateral exercises. Beijing and the city-state also have a unique forum for an annual exchange known as the Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) headed by Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean and People's Republic of China Vice Premier and Politburo Standing Committee member of the Chinese Communist Party Zhang Gaoli.

Relations with Great Regional Powers: India and Japan

The city-state's relations with the two great regional powers of India and Japan are very good. Lee Kuan Yew is an enthusiastic supporter of India joining the East Asian Summit (EAS), stating: 'India would be a useful balance to China's heft' in the EAS (Elliot et al., 2005). The Singapore and Indian armies have also conducted joint armoured and artillery exercises while their navies hold an annual Singapore-Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). Singapore is also planning and building from scratch the new state capital of Andhra Pradesh, and, as with China, it will train Indian government officials in urban development and governance. As a sign of mutual respect and high regard for Lee Kuan Yew and his country, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended Lee's official funeral service in March 2015, declaring a day of national mourning with its flag flown at half-mast. While some Indians from other South Asian countries are amazed that Singaporean Indians do not experience the 'glass ceiling' in state or society, in fact, the Indian community has contributed a number of distinguished public servants: two presidents (Devan Nair and S.R. Nathan), four foreign ministers (S. Rajaratnam, S. Dhanabalan, S. Jayakumar and K. Shanmugam), two Chiefs of Army (Col Mancharan Singh Gill and Maj Gen Ravinder Singh) and a Chief Justice (Sundares Menon).

Singapore's relations with Tokyo are excellent. Unlike China and South Korea, the city-state made a pragmatic decision to bury the hatchet with Japan even though its imperial forces invaded and brutally occupied Singapore between 1942 and 1945. In 1966, Tokyo reciprocated with S\$50 million in reparations and loans. The PAP government needed Japanese investments and management skills to create jobs and to boost the local economy deemed necessary for domestic political stability. Good bilateral relations were also due to Japan's conscious policy to improve diplomatic relations with Singapore and Southeast Asia beyond mercantilism after the articulation of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine. In the 1980s, the Singapore studied various aspects of the Japanese state-led model of economic development – Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* was required reading for the Singapore cabinet.³ Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew was a

great admirer of the Japanese economic miracle, work ethic and group solidarity⁴ (Lee, 2000).

In the 21st century, both countries have nurtured a cordial and trusting relationship. In May 2014, then Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said that a strong US-Japan alliance is ‘good for China and [the] world’ (Au-Yong, 2014). This outlook is consistent with the city-state’s strategic outlook that a balance of power is desirable in East Asia. Singapore and Tokyo also share a common outlook towards the disputed South China Sea: the rule of law, freedom of navigation, no use of force, and a code of conduct to guide the claimant states in addressing their maritime dispute over sovereignty. Both countries are also trading states which have cooperated bilaterally and regionally to promote free trade. The Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement signed in November 2007 was the first bilateral FTA signed by Tokyo with another country. Both countries are also enthusiastic supporters of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but they will have to explore other multilateral frameworks for FTAs since the TPP has been repudiated by the Trump Administration.

Relations with Difficult Neighbours: Between Malaysia and Indonesia

As a small state, Singapore’s relations with its immediate neighbours to the north and south have always been challenging, sometimes problematic and potentially tricky and thorny. But despite occasional bilateral problems, all three states are anchoring ASEAN as its original founding members. These three littoral states realize that a disunited and weakened ASEAN will mean that each Southeast Asian country can be easily ignored by the great powers and will have less weight and voice in the international system.

Relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were somewhat bitter shortly after the former left the Federation of Malaysia. When Singapore was in Malaysia between 1963 and 1965, Lee and the PAP government championed the concept of a multi-racial ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ which challenged ‘Malay Malaysia’, an ideology of Malay ethnic supremacy based on *Bumiputra* (sons of the soil). To the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Lee’s foray into national politics was an existentialist challenge to indigenous Malay rights and political arrangements which predated Singapore’s entry into Malaysia. After Singapore became independent, its national ideology became entrenched as multi-racialism based on meritocracy and ethnic equality. Both countries remained ideological competitors over ethnicity and governance after their acrimonious political divorce even though kin straddle both sides of the causeway and share cultural similarities.

According to former political strongman Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003), the only agreement he obtained from Lee Kuan Yew was the proposal to advance both countries’ time zone by 30 minutes. Dr Mahathir

said: 'I am afraid on most other issues we could not agree' (Mahathir, 2015). Notwithstanding the differences between the two neighbours, they agreed to refer their territorial dispute over Pedra Branca (an outlying island off the easternmost point of Singapore) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ awarded Pedra Branca to the city-state in May 2008, and Malaysia abided by the judicial decision for a time. However, in February 2017, Kuala Lumpur wanted to reopen that case with the ICJ and Singapore responded by assembling its legal team to deal with the Malaysian *volte-face*.

Since that time, Malaysia–Singapore relations have improved markedly with a new generation of top political leaders who do not carry the historical baggage of Singapore's acrimonious stay in Malaysia. Relations between the two prime ministers, Malaysia's Najib Razak and Singapore's Lee Hsien Loong have been cordial, productive and substantive. Breakthroughs in relations included a deal to return land in Singapore owned by Malayan Railway (KTM: Keratapi Tanah Melayu) back to the island and an agreement to build a high-speed rail (HSR) between Kuala Lumpur and the city-state slated to be completed by 2026. Singapore has also substantially reduced its dependence on Malaysia for water by building desalination and water recycling plants, reservoirs and the Marina Barrage. It is an open secret that any unilateral attempt by Malaysia to cut the supply of water to Singapore (despite a bilateral treaty guaranteeing the sale of water) will be a *casus belli*. That the city-state has the will, money and technology to build more desalination plants will eventually remove the water issue as a bilateral problem and a tripwire for conflict.

When Singapore became independent in 1965, it was confronted by a hostile Indonesia. Fortunately for Singapore and Southeast Asia, the demagogic President Sukarno was replaced by General Suharto in 1967. Suharto focused on economic development instead of national aggrandizement, and promoted ASEAN as a strong regional organization. Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew forged a good personal rapport. Lee, during his 1973 state visit to Indonesia, scattered flowers on the graves of two Indonesian marines, regarded as war martyrs in Indonesia, who were sentenced and hung in Singapore for killing and maiming civilians in their act of sabotage during *Konfrontasi*. In so doing, Lee pragmatically chose to close an emotional and painful chapter in Singapore–Indonesian history to forge better relations with the Suharto regime.

Bilateral relations in the post-Suharto era have occasionally been rocky; President Habibie derisively calling Singapore a little 'red dot' in 1998. Conceivably, this slur against the island state was made because of Habibie's disappointment that his tiny but affluent neighbour provided little financial help when Indonesia was rocked by the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Habibie remarked that Singapore was not a friend, and pointing at a map said: 'there are 211 million people [in Indonesia]. All the green [area] is Indonesia. And that red dot is Singapore' (*Economist*, 2015). Ironically, many Singaporeans have embraced the 'little red dot' as their country's moniker and a badge of courage and pride for being indomitable despite its puny size. The hard truth is that big

states are often condescending towards small states in the international system as evidenced by Jakarta's relations with the city-state.

A recent irritant, quite literally, in Jakarta–Singapore relations is the periodic smog which shrouds the city-state due to the indiscriminate burning of Indonesian plantations and forests to clear land for agriculture. Singaporeans were irate when Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla callously said: 'For eleven months, [Singapore and Malaysia] enjoyed nice air from Indonesia and they never thanked us. They have suffered for one month because of the haze and they get upset' (*Straits Times*, 2015). Moreover, Singapore and Indonesia had signed the Extradition Treaty and Defence Cooperation Agreement as a package in April 2007 but neither of these agreements have been implemented.

Despite the issues of smog and extradition, in December 2016 the Indonesian parliament ratified a sea border treaty with Singapore demarcating maritime boundaries in the eastern stretch of the Singapore Strait. Earlier, in 1973 Jakarta and Singapore had agreed on the maritime boundary along the central part of the waterways, and in 2009, agreed on boundaries in the western section of their maritime domains. Thus, the two neighbours have managed to avoid an acrimonious territorial dispute.

SINGAPORE: SMALL STATE, BIG IDEAS

Obviously, the gravity of size does matter in international relations. Small states like Singapore are inherently vulnerable and have little margin for error; they have to avoid becoming the strategic pawns of great powers which entangle them in their own quarrels or abandon them when it is inconvenient or too costly to support a smaller ally. It is debatable whether Singapore 'punches above its weight' in international affairs. A small state is usually a 'price taker' which must adapt and cannot shape the international system according to its image and preference.

There is the view, as articulated by Kishore Mahbubani (then Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore and former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), that small states must behave like small states. He argued:

Mr Lee Kuan Yew never acted as a leader of a small state. He would comment openly and liberally on great powers, including America and Russia, China and India. However, he had earned the right to do so because the great powers treated him with great respect as a global statesman. We are now in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era. Sadly, we will probably never again have another globally respected statesman like Mr Lee. As a result, we should change our behaviour significantly.

Kishore continued:

What's the first thing we should do? Exercise discretion. We should be very restrained in commenting on matters involving great powers.

He concluded:

Hence, it would have been wiser to be more circumspect on the judgment of an international tribunal on the arbitration which the Philippines instituted against China concerning the South China Sea dispute, especially since the Philippines, which was involved in the case, did not want to press it. (Mahbubani, 2017)

Bilahari Kausikan, another former Permanent Secretary of the Singapore Foreign Affairs, fiercely criticized Kishore's thesis for being 'muddled, mendacious, and indeed dangerous'. He noted: 'Singapore did not survive and prosper by being anybody's tame poodle' (*Straits Times*, 2017). In July 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Balakrishnan reiterated:

Some people have suggested that Singapore lay low and 'suffer what we must'. On the contrary, it is precisely because we are a small state that we have to stand up and be counted when we need to do so.... We must not become a vassal state. We cannot be bought or bullied. We must be prepared to defend our territory, assets and way of life. (Balakrishnan, 2017)

Notwithstanding its tiny size, Singapore has made its modest contributions to international society in terms of ideas, proposing the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to foster closer ties between the two continents. The 1st ASEM was held in Bangkok in March 1996 and has been held regularly ever since. Today, ASEM comprises two partner organizations, the EU and the ASEAN Secretariat, and involves 30 European and 21 Asian partner countries.

Besides ASEM, Singapore proposed the Forum of Small States (FOSS), an informal grouping established in New York in 1992. Singapore's MFA noted: 'Membership in FOSS is on a non-ideological and non-geographical basis. It now comprises 107 countries and meets a few times a year to discuss issues of concern to small states' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2016). The MFA also mentioned that in 2015, the Singapore had launched the FOSS Fellowship Programme to foster better understanding and closer cooperation among FOSS member states. The MFA explained: 'Under the Fellowship Programme, Permanent Representatives to the UN from FOSS states are invited to Singapore for study visits where they have the opportunity to exchange views on development challenges with Singapore's leaders and policy makers'.

Less successful was Singapore's proposal for an East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF). Then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed EALAF when he visited Chile in October 1998. The Inaugural meeting was held in Singapore in September 1999 with officials from 27 countries in attendance. Unfortunately, the scheme did not gain traction in the two regions probably due to their weak economic, cultural and diplomatic links.

Another of Singapore's initiatives was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the genesis of which was the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005.

Subsequently, many other countries including the United States and Japan decided to join this scheme. However, as mentioned earlier, after being elected to office, President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP.

Singapore has contributed to the defence diplomacy of East Asia by hosting annually the Shangri-La Dialogue since 2002. This is a Track One inter-governmental security forum organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Attendees include defence ministers, permanent heads of ministries and military chiefs of various Asia-Pacific and European countries.

CONCLUSION: THE YEARS AHEAD: SINGAPORE'S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

A key challenge for Singapore is to navigate the power transition in East Asia. While the US superpower remains the most powerful country in the world, China is rising impressively and becoming more assertive. Conceivably, Singapore will be placed in a difficult position when relations between Washington and Beijing become increasingly tense if not more hostile. One arena of contention in maritime Southeast Asia is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea among six claimant parties.

Singapore wants to remain friends with both superpowers and does not want to choose sides. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said: 'We are friends with both America and China. It is easiest to do this if the two countries are on good terms with each other. In fact, both countries do aim to be on good terms with each other'. Lee continued: 'Both believe the Pacific is vast enough to accommodate both powers and President Xi Jinping said recently that America and China should "cultivate common circles of friends"'. That is precisely what Singapore is trying to do – to be among America's circle of friends, and also among China's circle of friends' (Lee, 2016).

Singapore has also performed two important diplomatic roles for Beijing and regional stability: first, it has been the country coordinator for enhancing better China–ASEAN relations between mid 2015 and mid 2018. Second, it has provided a neutral forum for Beijing and Taipei to hold talks despite their lack of closure over the Chinese Civil War. That Singapore could do so is because it has had good relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

At the 1993 Wang–Koo Talks in Singapore, both sides left with the tacit understanding of a 'one China' principle, with each side putting its own interpretation on 'one China'. To be sure, some Taiwanese have denied the existence of the so-called '1992 Consensus' forged earlier at the Wang-Koo summit in Hong Kong. On 7 November 2015, President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan met in Singapore. They participated as 'Leader of Mainland China' and 'Leader of Taiwan', respectively. This event was significant because this was the first meeting between the leaders of both sides of the Taiwan Strait since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

Notwithstanding the good political and economic relations between Singapore and Beijing, there has been some geo-political stress. Arguably, the South China Sea dispute is becoming a ‘thorn in the side’ of Sino–Singapore relations even though the latter is not a claimant state. As a matter of principle, the city-state has advocated international law to address maritime disputes in East Asia. But the Mainland media, especially the hawkish *Global Times* (a daily newspaper published by the *People’s Daily*, a CCP mouthpiece) has attacked Singapore’s position on the South China Sea dispute and its close strategic ties with the United States.

In November 2016, nine Terrex armoured carriers of the SAF in transit after military exercises in Taiwan were impounded in Hong Kong. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said shortly after: ‘The Chinese side is firmly opposed to any forms of official interaction between Taiwan and countries that have diplomatic relations with us, military exchanges and cooperation included. We require the Singaporean government to stick to the one China principle’ (China Foreign Ministry Regular Press Conference, 2016). In actuality, the SAF has been conducting military exercises in Taiwan since 1975 and Beijing did not raise those exercises as an issue when the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1990. In December 2016, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen called the seizure a ‘low point’ for Singapore from a ‘defence perspective’ (Lim, 2016).

China’s action against Singapore through the Hong Kong Port Authority could be seen as trying to ‘kill two birds with one stone’. Impounding Singapore’s Terrexes in Hong Kong is apparently both a signal that Beijing is not happy with the city-state’s stance on the South China Sea issue, and also a warning to Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen, that China can further isolate Taiwan by putting pressure on Singapore to scale back and subsequently end its military exercises in Taiwan. Almost two months after seizing the Terrexes, the Hong Kong Port Authority announced that it would return the armoured vehicles to Singapore.

Besides the challenge of a rising China and its geo-political tension with the US superpower, the policies of the new Trump Administration may also prove problematic for Singapore; a case in point is the jettisoning of the TPP. At the time of writing, it is unclear what the operational policies of the Trump Administration will be in the disputed South China Sea, and towards traditional allies, like Japan and South Korea, and traditional friends, like Singapore.

Besides relations with the great powers of the United States and Japan, ties with Malaysia and Indonesia will always pose a challenge to Singapore. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib was generally friendly towards Singapore but it is unpredictable whether his successors will remain so. Any serious political turmoil and ethnic conflict in neighbouring Malaysia will be very worrisome indeed. Indonesia has democratized and there are more political actors with a cacophony of voices. It is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, and the majority of Indonesian Muslims practise a moderate brand of Islam. Still it is

worrisome to many Singaporeans to see the advent of militant Islam in that country. That former Jakarta governor Ahok (a nickname for the Christian and ethnic Chinese politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) has been jailed for blasphemy in a case that has drawn thousands of Muslim mass protesters is a story followed closely by many Singaporeans.

Coping with and surmounting its vulnerabilities is the unceasing task for Singapore's foreign policy. Besides the external challenges posed by the great powers and its immediate neighbours, the city-state may face internal challenges in the years ahead. In the long run, the ruling PAP's one-party dominance may well be eroded and more voices will be heard within a factionalized ruling party, and pressure from an emboldened political opposition and a more autonomous and demanding civil society may spill over into foreign policy. The city-state may be facing an era of long-term slow growth. Though the PAP government has assiduously accumulated huge national reserves and has the financial wherewithal to pay for a strong SAF and rising welfare demands of an ageing society, it is unclear whether future governments can pay for both guns and butter if the economy were to slow down and tax revenues were to dip concomitantly.

Also uncertain is whether neighbouring countries can in the 21st century get their act together, put their house in order, and then build ports and airports the like of which can seriously compete with Singapore's position as a global hub. There may also be 'black swan' events such as the construction of a canal in Thailand's Isthmus of Kra, which may appear highly improbable now, but could conceivably be a game changer for Singapore as a great port and emporium after more than two centuries. Whether Singapore will thrive as an independent and successful small state or not in the long run is an imponderable question but much will depend on the quality of its future political leaders and citizens, and the cohesion of its pluralist society.

Notes

- 1 Take for example the combined Malaysian-Indonesian military exercises in Johor which took place on Singapore's 26th National Day celebration. The media reported: 'Operationally Ready National Servicemen who served in 1991 would recall the joint Malaysian-Indonesian military exercise, codenamed Malindo Darsasa 3AB, that occurred that year. It involved an airborne assault by paratroopers in southern Johor. If the name of the airborne assault, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for "Total Wipeout"), as well as the choice of a drop zone just 18 km from Singapore, were not sufficiently provocative, the scheduling of the airdrop on the 9th of August – Singapore's 26th National Day – most certainly was. The SAF's response was measured and confident. "It triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of National Day".' See 'A strong and silent keeper of the peace', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 1 July 2008.
- 2 Singapore's Ambassador-at-large Bilahari Kausikan noted: 'This confronts us with a paradox: An anomaly can only remain relevant, survive and prosper by continuing to be an outlier. We cannot be just like our neighbours. We cannot be only just as successful as our neighbours. If we were

only just like them, why deal with us rather than bigger and more richly endowed countries? To be relevant, we have to be extraordinarily successful. But this does not endear us to our neighbours'. Bilahari Kausikan continues: 'The basic issue in our relations with our immediate neighbours, and in varying degrees with other countries in South-east Asia, is not what we do but what we are: the implicit challenge that, by its very existence, a Chinese-majority Singapore, organised on the basis of multiracial meritocracy, poses to systems organised on the basis of different and ultimately irreconcilable principles. That we have the temerity to be more successful adds to the offence. But we have no other choice.' See Bilahari Kausikan, 'In an ambiguous world, can Singapore cope?', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 27 May 2016.

- 3 Professor Ezra Vogel intimated to me that then Prime Minister Lee invited him to be a resource person to discuss *Japan as Number One* with his Cabinet colleagues. Vogel noted that Lee did most of the talking on Japan on that occasion.
- 4 See Lee's (2000) chapters 'Japan: Asia's First Miracle' and 'Lessons from Japan'.

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Myanmar Foreign Policy: Principles and Practices

Maung Aung Myoe

INTRODUCTION

Regarding the foreign policy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, article 41 of the 2008 constitution states that ‘the Union practises *independent, active and non-aligned foreign policy* aimed at world peace and friendly relations with nations and upholds the *principles of peaceful co-existence* among nations’. In a subsequent article, it is stated that ‘the Union shall not commence aggression against any nation’ and ‘no foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of the Union’. Looking back into history, the first constitution of post-colonial Myanmar, drafted and ratified in 1947, said little about foreign policy principles; yet, following a general trend of the time, in articles 211 and 212, it stated that Myanmar ‘renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and accepts the generally recognized principle of international law as its rule of conduct in its relation with foreign states’ and ‘affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation among nations founded on international justice and morality’. It was only in the second constitution of 1974, did the foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma appear as a basic principle and article 26 said: ‘The State consistently practises an *independent foreign policy*, aimed at international peace and friendly relations among nations, and upholds the principles of peaceful co-existence of nations.’

The seventy-year history of its evolution, since mid 1947, has displayed remarkably enduring key features and cardinal principles of Myanmar foreign policy that have survived changes in political regime and administrations: the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government (1948–1958); the Caretaker

government (1958–1960); the Union Party (UP) government (1960–1962); the Revolutionary Council (RC) government (1962–1974); the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government (1974–1988); the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government (1988–1997), which was later renamed as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government (1997–2011); the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government (2011–2016); and finally the National League for Democracy (NLD) government since 2016.

This chapter attempts to look at this evolution of principles, key determinants, and practices of Myanmar foreign policy since the country's independence in 1948. The study pays attention to both internal and external factors that influence the formulation and implementation of Myanmar foreign policy. It argues that the country's history, security dynamic, geopolitical setting and economic policy have shaped Myanmar's neutralist, non-aligned and independent foreign policy. It also argues that, for 70 years, despite changes in government and political regime, Myanmar has managed to pursue an independent and non-aligned foreign policy with neutralism and peaceful coexistence in its external relations, and exercised considerable flexibility and freedom in deciding international issues. In spite of adjustments in foreign policy strategy or diplomacy, the fundamental principles of the policy have remained unchanged.

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES

The Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), on its website, claims that 'since achieving independence, and for quite some time thereafter, Myanmar has adopted and practised an "independent" and "non-aligned" foreign policy'. By way of justification, MOFA states:

At the time of Myanmar's independence, the international system had an Eastern and Western bloc, between which a 'Cold War' was raging. It was also the time when colonial nations were regaining their independence. These newly independent states were in favour of adopting 'independent' foreign policies, 'independent' in the sense of being totally free of outside influence. For Myanmar, which wrested independence with great difficulty, only an 'independent' foreign policy was congruent with independence. Concurrently with independence, Myanmar faced an internal insurgency and therefore wished to avoid a disastrous contention on its soil between the Eastern and Western blocs. Hence it wished to be non-aligned between the two great blocs. At the time of independence, it was essential to prioritize economic and social reconstruction. It was declared at that time that foreign assistance, without any strings attached from both sides, would be accepted. As Myanmar is geographically situated between two highly populous nations, India and China, it desired to be independent and non-aligned.¹

The claim to have practised a 'non-aligned' foreign policy since the day of the country's independence, however, is somewhat overstated. At least for a couple of years after independence, the Myanmar government was in search of appropriate foreign policy principles to guide its external relations. In those days

Myanmar tried to rest its foreign and security policy on the twin pillars of collective security and collective defence. As a result, the very first act by the Myanmar government soon after independence was the application of membership to the UN. As a small and newly independent country, Myanmar was typically seeking a security guarantee to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Collective security under the banner of the UN was undoubtedly an attractive option. The Myanmar government also sought a security guarantee through Anglo-American military commitment. In the parliament on 5 September 1950, while explaining the Myanmar government's decision to denounce North Korea's aggression in support of the UN's resolution, Prime Minister U Nu said:

In the present world set-up there are two blocs: the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet bloc. Our policy of non-partisanship precludes us from joining either of these two power blocs. The right course and the only course for us to take is to join the United Nations Organizations.... It is formed by all those countries which abhor aggression and which are determined to suppress aggression in any part of the globe ... We have joined this organization without prejudice to our declared policy of non-partisanship and with the full conviction that this organization will be able to offer protection to the attacked country in the event of aggression.... What was foremost in our thoughts was the expectation of United Nations assistance when our country is subjected to aggression by a stronger power. We have pinned our faith to the United Nations Organization on that score.²

However, this expectation of a security guarantee from the UN was eventually lowered when the Myanmar government found that the organization was incapable of resolving Kuomintang (KMT) aggression in Myanmar in the early 1950s. Myanmar's disappointment with the UN could be observed in a speech delivered by U Nu at the Bandung Conference on 22 April 1955. He said:

Our own experience with the Kuomintang aggression against our country was none too happy. We found the United Nations, which had acted with such speed and energy in Korea, unwilling even to bring in a verdict of 'aggression' against the Kuomintang regime ... Failure of the United Nations to live up to this principle only means that the organization loses in moral stature and authority. We would like to see such defects remedied, and the organization assume the role for which it was originally intended.³

However, as far as successive governments in Myanmar were concerned, it appeared that the UN had ultimately failed to meet their expectation.

At the same time, possibly for both external and internal security reasons, the Myanmar government sought Anglo-American military assistance. Just three months after independence, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) commenced an armed struggle in Myanmar on 28 March 1948 and went underground to fight against the central government, precipitating a long period of communist insurgency which came to an end only in 1989 when its rank and file revolted against the leadership. In order to stabilize the situation, the government announced a fifteen-point 'Leftist Unity Program' on 25 May 1948. When it was further elaborated on 13 June 1948, at a mass rally in Yangon, U Nu confirmed that his

government would 'secure political and economic relations with Soviet Russia and the democratic countries of Eastern Europe in the same way as we are now having these relations with Britain and the United States' and his government would refuse 'any foreign aid which will compromise the political, economic and strategic independence of Burma'. He also called for a 'Marxist League' among left wing political forces 'to propagate Marxist doctrine and the writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin among the people'.⁴ Some Western media reported that Myanmar has turned red and would move into the communist camp.

The call for a Marxist League in Myanmar by U Nu was by no means a shift in Myanmar's foreign policy orientation and the AFPFL leadership never meant to signal a dramatic turn in external relations. It was more of a tactical move to counter the Myanmar Communists' accusation of the AFPFL leadership as being colonialist stooges. In fact, Nu dropped that point just a few days later. At the mass rally, U Nu defended the *Britain-Burma Defence Agreement*, popularly known as *Let Ya-Freeman Agreement*, and the British Service Mission in Myanmar. He claimed that the agreement did not impose any restriction on Myanmar's defence (or foreign) relations as (1) it could enter into any defence agreement she pleases with any country it chooses, (2) it could purchase arms freely from any country that it chooses, (3) it could declare war and peace as it likes, (4) it could freely prohibit in time of war the armed forces of any other country, from passing across its territory, and (5) it could seek a defence mission from any country it pleases.⁵

While U Nu was saying that Myanmar could enter into defence agreements with the Soviet Union, China, India or the United States, or with any other country, as far as the *Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of Burma*, signed on 17 October 1947 for the transfer of power was concerned, article 4 of the treaty stated that defence matters between the two governments would be regulated by the Agreement concluded between Britain and Myanmar on 29 August 1947, i.e. the *Britain-Burma Defence Agreement*. If one looks very carefully at the general provision of the agreement, it says: 'This Defence Agreement between the Government of Burma and the United Kingdom Government has been freely concluded between the two countries and is *without prejudice to any Military alliance which may be made in the future between the Government of Burma and the United Kingdom Government*'. Moreover, article 8(a) of the agreement sets a condition that 'the Government of Burma agree(s) to receive a Naval, Military and Air Force Mission from the United Kingdom Government and not from any Government outside the British Commonwealth'. In other words, the agreement placed Myanmar firmly within the British sphere of influence at least for the first three years after independence.

At the same time, in order to explain factors shaping Myanmar's foreign policy, U Nu stated that his government wished that 'Burma should be in friendly relations with all three great Western Powers – United Kingdom, United States, and the USSR' and

Myanmar's policy of seeking friendly relations with all the big three among the Powers is based on three considerations: (1) geographically, Burma is situated close to the sphere of Anglo-American influence, (2) weight must also be given to the wishes of the Shan, the Chin, the Kachin, the Karen and the Karenni, and (3) the majority of those who are in effective political life in Burma have great regard for Soviet Russia and believe that Soviet Economics will solve the problem arising from the poverty of the Burmese peasants.⁶

The second and third points simply meant that there were pro-British and pro-Soviet people in Myanmar and their desires should be counted.

It was abundantly clear that Myanmar was firmly in the Anglo-American camp as far as security policy was concerned. It was also reasonable that Myanmar wanted to seek military assistance from the West in their fight against communist insurgents since they could not expect such assistance to come from the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Then by early 1949, Karen insurgency broke out and has been fighting against the central government until recently. By the middle of 1949, Myanmar had been plunged into a civil war and ever since the government security forces have fought both ideology-based communist insurgency and ethnic-based Karen insurgency.

In the midst of chaos caused by insurgency, when the Union Government was even mockingly labelled the 'Yangon Government', as it could barely manage to survive within the small confines of Yangon City, as well as the growing reality of the Communist Party of China (CPC) coming to power in the neighbouring country, the Myanmar government was in a desperate search for a security guarantee. To this effect, on 14 June 1949, speaking in the parliament, Prime Minister U Nu briefly explained his government's foreign policy in the following terms:

Regarding the Union Government's foreign policy, I have made it clear on several occasions. I wish to reiterate one particular point. It is no other than our earnest desire to co-operate as closely as possible with countries of common interest, in economic, political and defence matters, with a view to the achievement of common ends. Although our independence is over a year old, we have up till now no economic or defence treaty on which we can fall back in time of need. It is obvious that we cannot go on in this fashion indefinitely. It is now time that we should enter into mutually beneficial treaties or arrangements, defence and economic, with countries of common interest. The Union Government is at present considering this question in all its aspects.⁷

Soon afterward U Nu sent his Deputy Prime Minister cum Commander-in-Chief General Ne Win and foreign minister Dr E Maung to the United Kingdom and the United States in July and August 1949, respectively. They expressed Myanmar's willingness to participate in a 'Pacific Area Security Pact'.⁸

Then in early February 1950, General Ne Win asked his close confidant Bo Set Kyar to meet a senior diplomat at the US embassy in Yangon. Set Kyar delivered Ne Win's message that he was 'willing to discuss Burma's full alignment with the Western powers if the United States is prepared to extend long-term assistance, including loans, military supplies and technicians'.⁹ The US embassy sent a telegram to Washington DC on 14 February 1950 for further instruction. Three days later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram in reply to the

US embassy, asking for possible ways to help the Myanmar government. In the telegram, it is said:

[The] UK and Commonwealth have been giving military and financial assistance to Burma and [the] US feels such assistance is needed by Burma and can be helpful. It is in this context therefore that US [is] particularly interested [in] exploring with [the] Burmese government possible types [of] technical assistance from [the] US which [the] Burmese government could use to complement [the] UK and Commonwealth aid program.¹⁰

By early March 1950, U Nu revealed that his government was seeking American military and economic aid and said that ‘greater advantage lies in closer relations with the Western democracies and it will be our endeavor to obtain aid of various kind from the West.’¹¹

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 was a major turning point in Myanmar’s foreign relations. Recognizing of the geopolitical reality of the birth of the PRC, Myanmar immediately decided to recognize the new regime in Beijing by terminating its relations with the KMT which now resided in Taiwan. Therefore, Myanmar became the first non-communist country to accord diplomatic recognition to the PRC in December 1949. At the same time this triggered an aggression by the remnants of the KMT in Myanmar. Some of those forces loyal to the KMT and the Taiwan administration, mostly from Sino-Myanmar border provinces, escaped into Myanmar and planned to use Myanmar territory as a springboard in their fight against the communist regime in Beijing. This situation placed the Myanmar government in a delicate situation where both East and West blocs could have intervened in Myanmar affairs.

Meanwhile, on 1 May 1950 a ‘left wing’ faction within the AFPFL, led by Thakin Lwin, had proposed that Myanmar’s Trade Union Congress should join the Moscow-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. The AFPFL government felt that such a move would undermine its policy of staying clear from bloc politics especially at the time of seeking development assistance from the West. This factional politics was further compounded when the Myanmar government voted to condemn North Korea as the aggressor against South Korea in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 27 June 1950. This led to a final split and formation of a new party by left wing politicians, the Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP) in December 1950. Then on 1 February 1951, Myanmar, along with the Soviet Union and India, voted against the US-sponsored UNGA resolution condemning the PRC as an aggressor in Korea. When UNGA called for an embargo on the shipment of war materials to China, though it abstained from voting, Myanmar announced its intention to comply with the request. In June 1951, U Nu was quoted as saying that Myanmar foreign policy was not framed on the basis of political ideologies, and therefore it had no intention of taking sides in the struggle between communist and anti-communist.

Although the Myanmar government advocated an idea of friendly relations with both blocs, it generally held favourable views on Anglo-American power. Some

key leaders in the AFPFL government were not enthusiastic about cultivating close relations with the Soviet Union. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein in fact held negative views on the Soviet Union. He even delayed the diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.¹² It is also important to note that the Soviet Union did not show any serious interest in Southeast Asia either. Only after the coming to power of Khrushchev in late 1953, pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, did both Myanmar and the Soviet Union cultivate a warm diplomatic relationship.

By 1952, Myanmar confirmed that it had followed a policy of neutralism. In his speech delivered at the *Pyidawthar* (Union Welfare) Conference on 4 August 1952, Prime Minister U Nu explained Myanmar foreign policy in some detail in the following words:

Before the advent of independence we did not have any foreign relations ... But independence changed all this. We now have full rights to participate in world affairs. Now we could play our role in world affairs to the fullest extent of our ability. We are now like the proverbial prawn, which, despite its tiny proportions, could yet swim in the ocean. But we abhor the very idea of acting as a disciple to any big power or as a satellite of any political bloc. We do not like to lift our fingers or nod our heads at a signal from anyone ... For these reasons, we have steered clear of membership in any bloc and have openly declared our policy of strict neutrality. The cardinal prerequisites for pursuance of a *policy of neutrality* are as follows:

- (1) We must use our own consideration to either support or object to any matter on its own merits.
- (2) We must establish the friendliest relations with all nations whenever possible.
- (3) We must accept from any country any assistance for the creation of a Welfare State provided such assistance is given freely and does not violate our sovereignty.
- (4) We must render our utmost assistance to any country which needs it.

By upholding the above four prerequisites for neutrality, our Union has gained a high prestige in the international sphere. Some nations may feel piqued because we have not supported their cause, but even such nations cannot despise us for having followed this step through sinister and ulterior motives. The most they can say of us is: these people will never be our followers nor of anyone else.¹³

In his own words, U Nu concluded: 'I can assure you that no foreign policy can be better than ours which has embodied these four principles'.¹⁴

By the time it brought the KMT case to the UN General Assembly in March 1953, the Myanmar government was disappointed with the resolution passed by the assembly, which merely referred to the KMT troops as unspecified 'foreign forces', and recommended nothing more than negotiations. By then, it was clear that Myanmar could no longer rely for its security on collective security and collective defence. Thus, neutralism was the best alternative for Myanmar foreign policy.¹⁵

FOREIGN POLICY OF NEUTRALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT

By 1953 Myanmar had adopted neutralism as its fundamental principle of foreign policy but with some qualification, being 'independent' in taking a position and

making decisions on what is 'right' at any given time. Yet, the Myanmar government was still in the process of fine-tuning its 'neutralist foreign policy'. This 'neutral' foreign policy was peppered with qualifying adjectives such as independent, positive, dynamic, active and so on.

The first use of the term 'independent neutrality' as Myanmar foreign policy by senior government officials reportedly appeared in two speeches delivered by Prime Minister U Nu and Deputy Prime Minister cum Defence Minister Ba Swe on 13 and 14 September 1954, respectively, at the Commanding Officers Conference of the Myanmar Armed Forces in Maymyo. In his speech, U Nu explained that Myanmar's 'neutral' foreign policy had both negative and positive aspects. He said:

The negative aspect is non-involvement. We do not stop at non-involvement. We do our utmost to shun any activity which is likely to create misunderstanding in any quarter. The positive aspect is that we have endeavored our utmost to be on the best of relations with all countries of the world in spite of non-participation in any bloc ... Besides we have played our little part in the establishment of friendly relations between countries and the promotion of mutually advantageous activities.¹⁶

By now, Myanmar was no longer interested in joining a regional collective defence. Commenting on the recent formation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), U Nu said that such an organization would only increase the chances of World War III and war would 'not solve any of the problems we want to solve; therefore, we will not be a party to the proposed SEATO'.¹⁷

Ba Swe further commented on the 'positive neutrality' in Myanmar foreign policy and explained how such policy was put into practice. As he elaborated:

It was possible that this policy could be understood as one of indifference towards international developments. There were two aspects of a neutral policy – inactive and active. An inactive neutral policy consisted of an attitude which was concerned only with one's betterment regardless of others. The active aspect of a neutral policy, on the other hand, was the non-participation in any power bloc whose objective was to bring about a third world war, but participation in measures for bringing about world peace.¹⁸

Since Myanmar viewed the struggle between the power blocs as the cause of international tension, Ba Swe further explained that, 'accordingly, the Union Government had kept clear of power bloc politics. On the other hand, in order to give prominence to her policy of neutrality, Burma had supported international issues based on right policies and withdrawn her support on those based on wrong policies'.¹⁹

Meanwhile, together with India and China, Myanmar initiated 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', essentially to ensure that neighbouring giants would respect Myanmar's sovereignty and territorial integration. In June 1954, Myanmar, China and India, during Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to India and Myanmar, expounded the 'Five Principles': (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference

in each other's internal affairs; (4) respect for mutual equality and to work for mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. These principles, since then, have constituted and steadfastly remained as the core of Myanmar Foreign Policy.

During his state visit to China in October 1954, U Nu described Myanmar foreign policy as one of 'dynamic neutrality'. Then in January 1955, when a joint communiqué was issued at the end of Yugoslav President Tito's state visit to Myanmar, it was mentioned as 'active' or 'positive' neutralism. When he delivered his Independence Day speech on 4 January 1956, President Dr Ba Oo claimed that 'Burma gained worldwide recognition due mainly to her steadfast pursuance of the policy of maintaining *strict neutrality* between the two Power Blocs'. Then on 13 January 1956, in his new capacity as Prime Minister, following electoral victory, Ba Swe stated Myanmar foreign policy to be one of *active neutrality* aimed at bringing about understanding and better relations between the two opposing blocs. It also appeared that the usage of the term 'independent neutrality' continued in official statements and speeches. At a press conference held on 3 July 1956, Ba Swe stated:

Time and experience have borne out the value and wisdom of the stand of *independent neutrality* which has been the keystone of the Union of Burma's foreign policy. Our objective of establishing friendly relations with all countries has proved to be the only realistic policy in a world in which co-existence has become inevitable ... By steadfastly refusing to become involved in any way in the cold war, we have gained the trust of both the major blocs ... This policy will be continued without any change by the government. The government will continue to work for the attainment of a lasting peace, and for the dissolution of all blocs since these are at one and the same time a symptom of fear and mistrust, and a cause of international tension. In adhering to this policy, we will be scrupulously honest in our dealings with all peoples; whether they will reciprocate is a matter which we can only leave for them to decide for themselves.²⁰

A few months later, on 18 September 1956, President Dr. Ba Oo again stated: 'the [foreign] policy of *active neutrality* will continue'.

In his speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on 27 September 1957, Prime Minister U Nu provided a long review of international affairs and Myanmar foreign policy in the past decade. According to his explanation, Myanmar's foreign policy is directed towards:

(i) securing a world peace based on international justice and morality, and (ii) establishing and maintaining friendly relations with all other nations and cooperating with them for our mutual benefit, but at the same time avoiding any entanglements which might entail the loss of our freedom of action in foreign affairs.²¹

In his conclusion, U Nu remarked that Myanmar has succeeded in making friends 'without sacrificing our freedom of action in foreign affairs [and] our right to decide each issue on its strict merits, without dictation or pressure from any external source, remains unscathed'.²²

Meanwhile, Myanmar had been involved in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) together with India, Indonesia, Egypt and some other

countries. The NAM materialized based on the Bandung Principles of 1955 and was expected to be a third force in the great-power blocs' politics. By then, Myanmar had clearly embarked on and officially endorsed the principle of non-alignment in its foreign policy. In his address to the Chamber of Deputies on 5 April 1960, Prime Minister U Nu stated:

We are pledged to the policy, followed ever since independence, of *positive neutrality, non-alignment* with any bloc, doing our utmost to promote peace in the world, giving our full support to the aims and objectives of the United Nations and our full support and active cooperation to its working and taking all measures in our power to promote the closest relations of friendship and amity with our neighbouring countries.²³

About two years later, on the day of the military takeover of the state, 2 March 1962, the military junta, in the name of the Revolutionary Council, issued a statement on Myanmar foreign policy reflecting and applying the same tone and terminology in the following manner:

The Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Union of Burma, desirous of maintaining and strengthening Burma's existing friendly relations with all countries, hereby make the following declarations:

- (1) They reaffirm their unswerving dedication to the ideal of peace, friendly relations and cooperation between all nations based on international justice and morality.
- (2) They reaffirm their wholehearted support for and complete faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations as embodied in its Charter.
- (3) They reaffirm their conviction that the policy of positive neutrality pursued by the Union of Burma ever since her independence is the policy best suited to her in the context of the prevailing world conditions, and that its faithful pursuance best serves the larger interests both of Burma and of the world.
- (4) Accordingly, the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Union of Burma look forward to the continuance of their existing cordial relations with all countries on the basis of the above stated policy.²⁴

Six months later, on 2 September 1962, when General Ne Win briefed Myanmar ambassadors on foreign policy he highlighted that what is well defined and clear-cut in Myanmar's foreign relations is the policy of 'strict neutrality of non-alignment.'

In the latter part of the 1960s, the use of the term 'non-alignment' became less and less pronounced in official statements, yet it remained official policy. Although Ne Win, for the first time, mentioned 'independent foreign policy' during his trip to India on 5 March 1965, it was not until 1971 that the BSPP government officially announced the 'independent foreign policy', dropping any reference to non-alignment. At that time, there was no official explanation given as to what made the government drop the 'non-aligned' aspect of Myanmar's foreign policy. It did not necessarily mean that Myanmar no longer practised 'non-aligned' foreign policy; to the contrary, it was so 'non-aligned' that it even withdrew its membership from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1979. In order to justify its 'adjustment' in foreign policy, the BSPP produced two small booklets, one for 'restricted' internal circulation in April 1974 and the other for

public consumption in December 1978. Both documents claimed that the use of the term ‘independent foreign policy’ was by no means representative of a change in foreign policy or a sign that the positive neutralism practised successively in the past was being abandoned; rather, its purpose was to make it abundantly clear that Myanmar would take an independent position and stand firm on what it considered to be the truth or the righteous in international issues.²⁵ Ten years later, at the Fourth Party Congress of the BSPP in August 1981, the party modified the country’s foreign policy description to include ‘independent and active’, probably in response to the criticism of its nearly 20 years of inward-looking and isolationist behaviour. This independent and active foreign policy is further endorsed by SLORC declaration no. 3/88, which the BSPP made when it came to power through a military coup on 18 September 1988. The Myanmar government had ‘officially’ practised an ‘independent and active foreign policy’ since 1981. More than 30 years later, in an interview with the *Washington Post* on 19 November 2015, about 10 days after the election had resulted in a landslide victory for the NLD, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi confirmed that her government would follow a non-aligned foreign policy as it had proven to be a very successful ever since Myanmar gained independence.²⁶

Myanmar’s independent and non-aligned policy, as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adheres to the following principles:

- (1) respect of and adherence to the principle of equality among peoples and among nations and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence;
- (2) taking a non-aligned, independent and just stand in international issues;
- (3) maintaining friendly relations with all nations, and good-neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries;
- (4) continued support of, and active participation in, the United Nations and its affiliated organisations;
- (5) pursuance of mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes;
- (6) regional consultation and beneficial cooperation in regional economic and social affairs;
- (7) active participation in the maintenance of international peace and security and the creation of an equitable economic order and opposition to imperialism, colonialism, intervention, aggression and hegemonism;
- (8) acceptance of foreign assistance which is beneficial to national development, provided there are no strings attached.²⁷

Throughout much of the post-colonial period, the Myanmar government has strongly and persistently supported issues related to disarmament, anti-colonialism and the national liberation movement, and national self-determination. ‘In matters of world affairs and international issues, in line with the principles and purposes of the United Nations and on the basis of the principles of Peaceful Co-existence’, the MOFA statement claimed, Myanmar has acted as follows:

- (1) actively participating in United Nations activities in accordance with its own basic principle; consistently supporting disarmament;
- (2) opposing arms race, production and sales;

- (3) supporting national liberation movements;
- (4) supporting decolonialization;
- (5) opposing aggression of imperialists;
- (6) opposing colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination;
- (7) supporting efforts to ensure world peace;
- (8) opposing aggressive imperialistic wars.²⁸

In essence, the basic principles of Myanmar foreign policy, with ‘neutralism’ or ‘non-alignment’ and ‘peaceful coexistence’ at its core, had been more or less settled by the early 1950s by abandoning reliance on both collective defence and collective security for its survival. Despite its realist worldview of international politics, Myanmar political elites, both civilian and military, rather than opting for either balancing or bandwagoning strategies, embraced a non-alignment policy and maintained an equal-distance policy between and among the great powers. While the practice of diplomacy or foreign policy strategy is adjusted from time to time, these basic principles remain relatively unchanged up to the present. Even the NLD administration which came to power in 2016 endorsed the same foreign policy principles.

KEY DETERMINANTS OF MYANMAR FOREIGN POLICY

Myanmar’s ‘independent, active and non-aligned’ foreign policy, initially started with ‘neutralist’ principles, was shaped and consolidated by the country’s history, security dynamic, political economy, and geopolitical setting. Most of the post-colonial political elite in Myanmar, who were in control of the state pretty much until the fall of the BSPP in 1988, came from a background and with the credentials of anti-colonial struggle, national liberation, and social revolution. Even for later generations, the socialization process has instilled a strong sense of nationalism centred on ideas of liberation and revolution. In fact, thinking about ‘enduring ideas and lingering notions in Myanmar’²⁹ one can sense that many of the present generation are still in liberation and revolution mode, with somewhat dogmatic assumptions about the context, meaning and power of these political lexicons. The history of the nationalist movement certainly influences the trajectory of Myanmar foreign policy. When Myanmar was about to regain her independence, most nationalists were advocates of complete political and economic freedom and they were quite obsessed with any form of foreign subjugation or neo-colonialism. But even the initial pro-West policy of the AFPFL government, in the view of this author, was never meant to undermine Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The security dynamic undoubtedly shapes Myanmar foreign policy behaviour. Both internal and external security challenges, in the forms of insurgency and aggression, have played a role in Myanmar’s pursuance of a ‘neutralist and non-aligned’ foreign policy. The existence of insurgent groups makes the Myanmar

government worried about external interference in the form of support for them. The issue of internal security challenges is also closely related to regime legitimacy, regime security or regime survival. In this connection, external support for insurgencies and political organizations, for ideological and geopolitical reasons, is a major concern for the Myanmar government. At present, there are dozens of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) operating in the border areas of the country. It is in this context that the Myanmar government tries to minimize interference by other countries, especially neighbouring countries, by making sure that as far as possible there will be no excuse whatsoever for intervention; therefore, neutralism and non-alignment are an essential ingredient of Myanmar foreign policy.

While the pursuance of 'neutralist', 'non-aligned', or 'independent' foreign policy was certainly influenced by security consideration, the political economy aspect should not be underestimated. As a war-torn country, further devastated by insurgency, post-colonial Myanmar desperately needed foreign capital and development aid in various forms for rehabilitation and development. When his initial pro-West foreign policy was criticized, U Nu replied that although the ideal position in foreign policy was to remain strictly neutral it was necessary to draw foreign capital and technical help to develop the country.³⁰ Obviously, the Myanmar government was seriously interested in seeking Western capital and technical assistance. An economic assistance agreement between the United States and Myanmar was signed in September 1950, yet it was cancelled in 1953 as the Myanmar government was not satisfied with US policy on the KMT issue. In the words of Frank Trager, 'with this step, Burma's relations with the United States suffered a very serious setback, though not a mortal blow'.³¹ By the time the aid programme was resumed in 1956, the Myanmar government was careful not to lean towards the United States but to maintain balanced relations between the power blocs.

At the same time, Myanmar faced a serious problem with the export of rice. In the past, Myanmar was known as the rice bowl of Asia, and in the 1950s it was a leading exporter of rice, the most important source of export earnings. During the Korean War, the price of rice skyrocketed and Myanmar's rice export earnings peaked. Myanmar's plan of 'building a welfare state' was partially based on the income generated from the rice exports. However, when the Korean War was over, the demand for Myanmar rice contracted severely and the price declined sharply. Myanmar lost some of its traditional rice export markets and faced more competitors. Moreover, the Myanmar government suspected and accused the United States of 'dumping its surplus rice in countries that are traditionally Burma's best rice customers'.³² By late 1954, carry-over rice stocks and new produce piled up to 2.5 million tons for export, while rice prices plunged significantly to almost half of what they had been just three years before. It was in this state of affairs that Sino-Soviet bloc countries came to the rescue. Between 1954 and 1956, Myanmar signed a series of barter trade agreements, exchanging rice for goods and technicians from the Sino-Soviet bloc, with China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, the USSR, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, easing the

pressure on Myanmar's rice trade. Therefore, by the mid 1950s, Myanmar had distanced itself from the West, the United States in particular, for a more balanced relationship between power blocs and followed what was by now known as 'positive neutralism'. As Myanmar continued to practise a market economy, its external economic relations were dynamic and diversified, making its 'neutralism' active and dynamic.

After coming to power in March 1962, the Revolutionary Council announced the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) as its political and socio-economic programme. The economic aspect of the BWS was based on a socialist centrally planned economy. It discouraged the inflow of both foreign capital and private sector investment, and relied on an autarkic economic policy. External trade was minimal, and foreign investment non-existent. Industrial policy emphasized import substitution. This inward-looking policy, which lasted for 26 years from 1962, in a way reinforced the strictly neutralist and non-aligned foreign policy. During SLORC/SPDC rule, from 1988 to 2010, although the Myanmar state announced it would follow a market economic system, in reality, in the face of Western economic sanctions, it was essentially a form of self-sufficient economy put on a 'war-footing' by the military regime who felt its survival threatened, pursuing local food sufficiency in the event of military emergency. Only regional countries traded with and did business in Myanmar and it was China that topped that list. The Myanmar economy was thoroughly penetrated by Chinese businesses and commercial links between the two countries had grown stronger over time. China's trade, aid and investment in Myanmar, though arms supplies and political support were far more important, had undoubtedly influenced Myanmar's foreign policy behaviour.

The geopolitical setting of the country is an important element in Myanmar's foreign policy. Myanmar political elites see that their country is sandwiched between two populous and powerful countries, China and India, and they understand the geopolitical reality of the asymmetry of power between Myanmar and them. Hence, it is not merely their size and population but their geopolitical interests and influence in the Indo-Pacific region that matter more to the Myanmar government. Moreover, not long after its independence, Myanmar witnessed the beginning of an encroachment of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. While the origin of the Cold War in Southeast Asia is still a subject for debate among scholars, it is safe to state that the region was ripe for competition among the great powers as local political forces in some regional countries had increasingly engaged in revolutionary armed struggle and the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of colonial powers. Conflicts in Indochina, where Cold War competition was the most ferocious, from the day of the return of the French colonial power to the US intervention, was a major factor that impacted on Myanmar security calculus and its foreign policy. By the middle of the 1950s the Cold War became more serious in Southeast Asia as the US-led regional collective defence organization the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formally established,

further cementing regional rivalry among the great powers. Prime Minister U Nu reminded his party supporters that ‘our Union of Burma was like a gourd among the thorns and we needed to be extremely cautious [in foreign relations]; if we were not, there were plenty of reasons to become like Korea or Vietnam’.³³ The Vietnam War was the high watermark of Cold War competition in Southeast Asia and some regional countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, were increasingly drawn into the conflict. Thailand was firmly supporting the US war effort in Vietnam. In this context, Myanmar leaders were concerned with spill-over effects from wars in Indochina. The Myanmar government had struggled to stay out of the conflict and to distance itself from both sub-regional security complexes, resulting in the pursuance of an isolationist foreign policy. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 and Myanmar was invited to join it, Myanmar refused to do so as the association was viewed by some countries, including China, as a pro-US/anti-China organization and the region was so divided. Only in the post-Cold War period, when ASEAN was prepared to absorb all the countries in geographically defined Southeast Asia, did Myanmar apply for membership.

FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE

While the basic principles and direction of Myanmar foreign policy had essentially been settled in the 1950s, it was the strategy for implementing those principles and diplomacy that played a crucial role in addressing the country’s security challenges throughout its 70 years of post-colonial existence. Holsti argues that the Myanmar foreign policy strategy and diplomacy could be classified as ‘diversified’ during the AFPFL era and as one of ‘isolation’ during the RC period.³⁴

In terms of implementing foreign policy principles, different political leaderships have pursued different styles of diplomacy. U Nu pursued Myanmar foreign policy through both bilateralism and multilateralism, whereas Ne Win and his successors were more inclined towards the former. Myanmar’s participation in multilateral institutions had become more symbolism than substance. While it persistently pursued a foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment, under the same systemic pressure of global and regional Cold War, but due to different leadership styles and worldview, Myanmar displayed two different foreign policy behaviours. During the AFPFL period, Myanmar diplomacy was full of activism and Prime Minister U Nu was at the front of multilateral diplomacy. However, pro-activism or activism in Myanmar foreign policy became less and less pronounced during and after RC/BSPP rule. Ne Win initially followed in U Nu’s footsteps but by the late 1960s he eventually gave it up when Myanmar witnessed growing encroachment of the Cold War in Indochina. Myanmar foreign policy, in one respect, is all about preventing any foreign influence or interference in internal affairs. U Nu pursued it through active diplomacy while Ne

Win relied on isolationism, but both followed non-alignment in their decisions. Therefore, Myanmar foreign policy has undergone a process of restructuring, from non-aligned and diversified to isolationist. The isolationist foreign policy of Ne Win was criticized by a scholar as 'negative neutralism' for group survival.³⁵ Some observers branded it as xenophobic. Yet the present writer argues that this characterization is somewhat contradictory to Myanmar national character. It is not a pathological hatred towards foreigners but the dislike of foreigners lecturing Myanmar on what to do and how to do it. There are plenty of examples in Myanmar society that demonstrate that we learn from foreigners and absorb foreign behaviours after localization.

Myanmar employed greater flexibility in making decisions and taking actions. Myanmar has persistently supported the PRC's membership in the UN even at a time when China was a serious source of threat to Myanmar. As mentioned earlier, Myanmar voted in favour of the US-sponsored UN resolution to condemn North Korea as an aggressor in the Korean War in 1950, but against the resolution branding China as an aggressor in the war in 1951. The Myanmar government condemned Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in 1956. It was also against the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Meanwhile, it also opposed the first Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit to condemn the Soviet Union for its resumption of nuclear tests in the official declaration.

Under the banner of non-aligned and neutralist and later independent and active foreign policy, Myanmar has maintained correct and balanced relations with all the major powers in the world. Myanmar's votes at UNGA reflected this position and avoided being caught up in power bloc politics. Myanmar steered away from superpower rivalry, the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-US competition, among others. U Nu carefully balanced his foreign trips among the United States, China, India and the Soviet Union. Ne Win also followed suit, resisting China's pressure to support North Vietnam in the war and refusing to condemn the United States. He was quiet on the Vietnam War when he visited the United States in September 1966. Exactly a year before, Ne Win showed up in Moscow, six weeks after his trip to China. Even in the darkest hours of Myanmar political life, when the CPC fully supported the BCP insurgency, particularly between 1968 and 1978, following the anti-China demonstrations in Myanmar as a consequence of China's decision to export 'cultural revolution', and bilateral relations plunged to the lowest point in modern history, Myanmar turned neither to the United States nor to the Soviet Union for political support. Ne Win tried his best to restore normal diplomatic ties with China. In fact, in order to stay further clear of Sino-Soviet conflict and rivalry among third world countries, Myanmar even withdrew its participation from the NAM in 1979; it rejoined the movement only in 1992 after the end of the Cold War. Myanmar also refused to join ASEAN as it viewed the association as being divisive in dealing with pro-US and pro-Soviet countries. Only in 1997, did the Myanmar government join the association.

By the mid 1970s 'isolationist' foreign policy was practically and pragmatically abandoned, yet the degree of openness and diversification was far from determined. In other words, Myanmar foreign policy was again restructured to be self-reliant, with moderate contact with the outside world, when the BSPP government came to power. The country maintained equal distance not only between the superpowers at the time but also among great-power neighbours, such as China and India. Bilateralism was at the core of its foreign policy strategy with minimum participation in multilateral institutions. Even in terms of receiving development aid it relied mostly on Japan and to a lesser extent on West Germany and smaller regions such as Scandinavia. Myanmar showed interest neither in ASEAN nor SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation) for any regional cooperation. Myanmar was not prepared to join ASEAN until and unless it absorbed all regional countries, regardless of political orientation, and guaranteed the fundamental principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state and of a non-military pact.

This self-reliance remained in practice for nearly 15 years. This omnidirectional, mostly bilateral and non-aligned foreign policy strategy was seriously compromised when the military came to power in 1988 as it encountered Western sanctions and externally imposed isolation. When Myanmar decided to end its isolationist foreign policy and to reintegrate more meaningfully with the international community, it was isolated by Western countries, led by the United States and the European Union, in response to a poor record of violation of human rights and other democratic norms. The period of SLORC/SPDC rule in Myanmar, between late 1988 and early 2011, was essentially a period of externally imposed isolation. Only when the USDP came to power in 2011 did Myanmar eventually and meaningfully reintegrate with international community. This process was further speeded up when the NLD government led by Aung San Suu Kyi came to power in 2016.

During the SLORC/SPDC period, according to some observers, Myanmar's foreign policy strategy could arguably be said to be one of 'dependence' on China as they had deepened their bilateral relations due to strategic imperatives and pragmatic approaches on both sides. It was also coincided with the end of the Cold War, bringing new opportunities and challenges to countries like Myanmar. The structure of the international system was altered as it entered a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War world order with the United States remaining the only superpower of the day. The decompression effect of the collapse of the Cold War also coincided with US military intervention around the world to establish, maintain and strengthen its 'hegemony' under the so-called 'New/Liberal World Order'. The Myanmar government appeared to realize that its isolationist foreign policy had left the country with few friends and was vulnerable to external manipulation. The perception of external threat, once minimized by the isolationist foreign policy, had now become prominent in national security policy. The security discourse circulated among key state institutions was full of illustration of the 'might is right' maxim while the threat perception in

general was considered as 'multi-dimensional' and (military) intervention, most likely through proxies, was a possibility. It was also in this context, in addition to 'isolation and sanction' imposed by the West, that Myanmar was forced to cultivate close diplomatic, political, economic and even military ties with China. Through trade, aid, investment and arms supply, China has tried to bring Myanmar into its strategic orbit. Yet the SLORC/SPDC administration became increasingly concerned about falling under China's shadow and the perceived growing Chinese influence in the country. Therefore, Myanmar had utilized its natural resources and geographic location as key assets in its diplomatic manoeuvres to maintain its 'independent, active and non-aligned' foreign policy and to refrain from overreliance on China. By the early 2000s, Myanmar had strengthened its relations with Russia, particularly through arms deals, as a counter-balance and as an alternative or additional veto power at the UNSC. Meanwhile Myanmar improved its relations with India, Japan and other smaller regional countries.

On the other hand, being cognizant of the changing international and regional security environment, and although it remains realist to the core, Myanmar has embraced constructivism in the form of regionalism. In this context, Myanmar's embrace of regionalism is aimed at fostering and enhancing state security, which is always conflated with regime security and national security in the overall perspective. Myanmar was particularly attracted to the ASEAN's *modus operandi* known as the 'ASEAN way' and appealed to ASEAN's 'constructive engagement approach' towards the country. The 'ASEAN way' involving an informal and incremental approach to cooperation based on consultation and dialogue, which constitutes the ASEAN diplomatic norm, was by and large in line with the comfort level of the military regime in Myanmar. Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997. After 20 years of membership and the chairmanship of the association in 2014, Myanmar has, slowly yet surely, integrated into the ASEAN process and displayed a sense of community. The ASEAN experience gives further impetus for Myanmar to participate in other regional organizations and institutions. Now, multilateralism is once again back in Myanmar's diplomatic foreign policy strategy.

Without deviating from basic principles, the USDP government has announced a new foreign policy objective of reintegrating Myanmar into the international community in its endeavour to make Myanmar's foreign relations more active, dynamic, and international. Since it came to power in 2011, the USDP government has pursued a foreign policy strategy that delicately balances the strategic interests of major powers in the country, that primarily maintains friendly relations with countries both near and far, and that applies multilateralism with an emphasis on regional cooperation or regional institutions. While maintaining a stable relationship with China, the USDP administration has cultivated closer ties with the United States, Russia, India and Japan, demonstrating an adjustment in its foreign relations from one of dependence on China to a more diversified and dynamic relationship with major powers.

The NLD administration also continues to adhere to the ‘independent, active, and non-aligned foreign policy’ as explained by the State Counsellor cum Foreign Minister. Despite her pro-West outlook during her years in opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi is practical in her foreign policy strategy and she understands the reality of great-power politics and the country’s security needs. The NLD administration has been delicately balancing her relations with China, Japan, the United States and the European Union amidst pressure for alleged crimes of ethnic cleansing or genocide against the ‘Rohingya’ community.

CONCLUSION

Soon after the country’s independence in January 1948, Myanmar’s political elites were preoccupied with formulating a foreign policy to guide Myanmar’s external relations. Taking all relevant factors into consideration, the government of the time realized that a small and newly independent state with limited resources for national security should have a foreign policy that safeguards the country’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Moreover, the country’s peace, stability, and development have always been at the top of the Myanmar government’s priorities; therefore, freedom from foreign interference or intervention in internal affairs is a primary imperative. The country’s history, security dynamic, political economy and geopolitical setting were key determinants in its foreign policy. It was in the interest of this young nation that the Myanmar government decided to follow a neutralist foreign policy to navigate the stormy weather and turbulent tide of global power competition. For 70 years, despite changes in political regimes, from parliamentary democracy to socialist-military authoritarian rule and back again to a mixed parliamentary-presidential democracy, Myanmar has managed to pursue a foreign policy of neutralism or non-alignment and peaceful co-existence in its external relations with considerable flexibility and freedom in deciding international issues. While foreign policy adjustments, particularly in terms of diplomacy or practice, have been made occasionally, the fundamental principles remain unchanged.

Myanmar foreign policy, as in many other countries, from its inception has been influenced by both internal and external factors. Insurgency, both leftist and rightist, and the Cold War were possibly the most important internal and external determinants in Myanmar’s pursuance of ‘neutralism’. Being disappointed by the lack of interest on the part of the United States and the UK to provide a security guarantee, and by the failure of the UN to address the KMT aggression, Myanmar embarked on a policy of neutralism. Competition among the super-powers and Cold War ideological rivalry undoubtedly necessitated that adoption by the Myanmar government of a neutralist foreign policy not only to avoid entanglement in international or regional conflicts, but also to prevent external interference in its domestic affairs. Perhaps the Cold War great-power rivalry

provided Myanmar's foreign policy of positive neutralism with both substance and credibility. Moreover, history and political economy aspects of Myanmar foreign policy should not be underestimated.

The security calculus changed once Myanmar discovered that neither collective security nor collective defence was available to protect it. By the early 1950s, the Myanmar government had clearly learnt that much needed military assistance to crush both leftist and rightist insurgencies would not be forthcoming from either the United States or the Soviet Union. India and Yugoslavia provided military aid to the Myanmar government, and it was their military assistance that saved the Union of Myanmar from collapse. Consequently, since the early 1950s, Myanmar has firmly embraced a foreign policy of neutralism and non-alignment.

Recognizing great-power rivalry and global Cold War competition, the Myanmar government understands the realist nature of world politics. It also understands that international institutions can be ineffective, as it learnt from its own experience with the UN. One can safely conclude that Myanmar appeared to understand that international institutions are epiphenomenal in great-power politics. Despite this realist worldview, the Myanmar government decided not to follow either balancing or bandwagoning as its foreign policy. Instead, it opted for a neutralist course of policy to stay clear from great-power politics.

The fact that the Myanmar government's foreign policy behaviours differed between AFPRL/UP and RC/BSPP administrations even under the same systemic pressure or stimuli of world order suggests that internal factors were at play in the country's foreign policy. A similar explanation could be found when one compares foreign policy output between the SLORC/SPDC administrations and USDP/NLD administrations. The personality, worldview, educational background and career path of leaders were undoubtedly influential in the setting of foreign policy goals and strategies. In addition, the differences in the structure of state–society relations and the status of domestic civil and political institutions were keys to explaining the trajectory of Myanmar foreign policy. Therefore, differences in regime type and leadership, though fundamental principles remain intact, have produced different foreign policy behaviour even under the same systemic pressure. If one follows a neoclassical realism line of argument, it is therefore safe to state that principles and practices of Myanmar foreign policy are certainly shaped not only by systemic factors but equally by internal factors. All key determinants of Myanmar's independent active non-aligned foreign policy are likely to persist as they are still relevant to the present day. Thus, it will be just a matter of foreign policy strategy or diplomacy, centred on the politics, personality, and perception of the leadership as well as the structure, status and substance of domestic institutions, which makes Myanmar's foreign policy reactive, active, or proactive in its pursuance.

Notes

- 1 http://www.mofa.gov.mm/?page_id=32 (accessed on 30 January 2017).
- 2 Thakin Nu. *From Peace to Stability* (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary, 1951), pp. 98–99.
- 3 *Statement made by the Hon'ble The Prime Minister of the Union of Burma on 22 April 1955*.
- 4 Points 1, 5, and 15 of the Left Unity Program.
- 5 Thakin Nu. *Towards Peace and Democracy* (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary, 1949), pp. 114–117.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 209. [An interesting point is that when this speech was reproduced in Myanmar language, these paragraphs were censored and removed from the speech. See *Pyidaungsu Pandaing* (Yangon: Sarpay Beikbam, 1955), pp. 55–69].
- 8 Frank N. Trager. *Burma: From Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), pp. 218–219; John F. Cady. *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 598).
- 9 U.S Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United State 1950, Volume VI: East Asia and The Pacific* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 232–233.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *New Times of Burma* (7 March 1950).
- 12 Thein Pe Myint. *Kyaw Nyein*, fourth printing (Yangon: Sar-Ok-Zay, 1999), p. 125.
- 13 U Nu. *Burma Looks Ahead* (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1953), pp. 97–103.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 15 In this regard, the story of Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein, retold by Thein Pe Myint, is quite illustrating. Kyaw Nyein went to England, together with Aung San, in January 1947 during Myanmar's talks on 'independence within one year'. At that time, Kyaw Nyein had high expectations of help from Soviet Russia. He secretly contacted the Russian Consul, explained Myanmar's struggle for independence, and asked for assistance. The Consul listened, but said nothing. Kyaw Nyein explained that Myanmar might need to fight the British and asked for a promise of Russian help, yet no promise was forthcoming. Already disappointed with Russia, Kyaw Nyein was further upset when Russia accused independent Myanmar of being an imperialist stooge and branded Aung San a traitor. Consequently, Kyaw Nyein suspended or delayed diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. Kyaw Nyein was also worried that the UK and the United States would meddle in Myanmar's internal affairs. Kyaw Nyein was not initially a neutralist – he appeared to hold pro-Anglo-American views – but he became so, not because of any ideology but for realistic and practical reasons. Kyaw Nyein, who believed that the British were against the AFPFL government, was to experience British disapproval when he travelled to the UK as Foreign Minister to buy arms. He was received not by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden but by the Permanent Secretary, who scolded him for the arrest of Alexander Campbell, a British subject. He came back from England empty-handed and badly hurt. No country would sell arms to Myanmar as it was considered part of the British sphere of influence. He then looked for help from the United States. While he was in Paris for the UN General Assembly, Kyaw Nyein met Secretary of State George Marshall in a bid to buy arms and ammunition, and Marshall promised to sell arms to Myanmar. In a show of gratitude, Kyaw Nyein voted in favour of the United States. But once he arrived back in Myanmar, the US ambassador informed him that the United States had decided not to sell arms to Myanmar because of the Let Ya-Freeman Defence Agreement. Also, because of communist insurgency, no communist countries would sell arms either. Eventually, thanks to Nehru, India sold Myanmar a huge quantity of arms and ammunition, enough to arm nine regiments (Thein Pe Myint, *Kyaw Nyein*, pp. 125–129).
- 16 *New Times of Burma* and *The Nation* (15 & 16 September 1954) quoted in William C. Johnstone. *Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 96–99.

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- 19 Ibid.
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- 21 *Premier Reports to the People (Prime Minister U Nu's Speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 27 September 1957).*
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 U Nu. *Crusade for Democracy* (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1960), Address to the Chamber of Deputies on 5 April 1960.
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- 25 Central Committee of the BSPP. *Foreign Policy of the Union of Burma (Political Meaning)* (Yangon: BSPP Press, 1974), p. 17; Central Committee of the BSPP. *Independent Foreign Policy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma* (Yangon: BSPP Press, 1974), pp. 33–34 (both are in Myanmar language).
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- 27 http://www.mofa.gov.mm/?page_id=32 (accessed on 30 January 2017).
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- 29 I borrowed this phrase from Dr Tin Maung Maung Than's presentation at the International University of Japan on 27 January 2017.
- 30 Quoted in Richard A. Butwell. *U Nu of Burma*, second printing (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 172.
- 31 Frank Trager. *Burma: From Kingdom to Republic*, p. 321.
- 32 *New York Times* (2 May 1956) quoted in Frank Trager. 'Burma's Foreign Policy, 1948–56: Neutralism, Third Force, and Rice', *Journal of Asian Studies* (Vol. 16, No. 1; November 1956), pp. 89–102.
- 33 Prime Minister U Nu's speech delivered at his residence on 24 June 1958. *Collected Speeches of U Nu* (Yangon: Ngar Doet Sar Pay, 2015), p. 246.
- 34 K.J. Holsti, 'From Diversification to Isolation: Burma, 1963–7', in K.J. Holsti, *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 105–133.
- 35 Maung Maung Gyi, 'Foreign Policy of Burma since 1962: Negative Neutralism for Group Survival', in F.K. Lehman (ed.), *Military Rule in Burma since 1962: A Kaleidoscope of Views* (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1981), pp. 9–28.

PART VIC

Foreign Policies of Asian States – South and Central Asia



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Indian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Greatness

Sreeram Chaulia

India is a nation of unfulfilled greatness. Its potential has lain fallow, underused.

Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore in 2000 (Allison and Blackwill, 2013: 155)

Together we will script a glorious future for India. Let us together dream of a strong, developed and inclusive India that actively engages with the global community to strengthen the cause of world peace and development.

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India in 2014 (Baghel, 2017: 81)

INTRODUCTION: THE PROLONGED MARCH TO POWER

For a country with a vast population, landmass and pivotal geographical location, India has been slow to realize expectations of becoming a world power. Seven decades since winning independence from British colonial rule, it remains in the category of predicted future great powers and superpowers whose best time under the sun still lies ahead. The impression that it has the potential to take on a truly prominent role in world affairs but struggles to live up to the billing is writ large in assessments of India by both critics and admirers (Karnad, 2015; Chandler and Zainulbhai, 2013).

Historical scholars have marveled at and taken solace in the ‘miracle’ of India’s mere existence and survival as an unbroken nation-state since 1947 in spite of its sheer diversity and plethora of socioeconomic and political faultlines (IANS, 2017a). Predictions by Western commentators of India’s imminent Balkanization or collapse in the wake of dramatic moments of domestic political upheaval or wars with China and Pakistan (Chandra et al., 2008: 5) have indeed been defied

by an enduring quality of the country as a befitting inheritor of an ancient civilization with continuity for thousands of years.

Contentment about India just existing and being what it is for eons has percolated into the foreign policy realm, where Indian decision makers and intellectuals have taken pride in the fact that the weak post-colonial state managed to stay intact during the hostile period of the Cold War and began to show signs of strength, particularly economic, after 1991. The perception of India's manifest destiny, innate greatness and exceptionalism as a moral force for good in the world has generated a degree of complacency and passivity when it comes to statecraft and long-term strategizing in Indian foreign policy.

Aparna Pande has characterized this problem as follows:

India's history is its asset as well as a great burden. The fact that the country has existed for millennia creates hubris and belief that, in the final analysis, India will go on. Why bother with building a new framework for global engagement and international leadership when the legacy is massive enough to enable muddling through? India's success as a twenty-first century global power might depend on jettisoning that way of thinking. (Pande, 2017: 173)

The baggage of navel-gazing and self-righteousness while neglecting strategic planning and proactive behavior in foreign policy has come at a severe cost. India's voyage to join the ranks of genuine great powers that wield influence in their immediate vicinity and beyond has been prolonged and indefinitely postponed. Manjari Miller has described these lacunae as a strange phenomenon of India resisting its own rise due to a refusal to play the game of geopolitics and geo-economics with the same determination and farsightedness that China has done in recent decades:

The Indian elite fears that the notion of the country's rise is a Western construct, which has unrealistically raised expectations for both Indian economic growth and the country's international commitments. As one senior official with experience in the prime minister's office said, the West's labeling of India as a rising power is 'a rope to hang ourselves'. By contrast, Chinese political leaders and intellectuals pay a great deal of attention to the international hype surrounding their country's emergence, and Chinese think tanks and media outlets regularly try to shape and respond to this discourse. (Miller, 2013: 14)

Pouring cold water on hopes of India assuming more global responsibilities as a provider of military security and economic prosperity, the establishment of the career bureaucracy and the domestically inclined political class has defined India's role in the world narrowly in both geographic and thematic senses. The idea that India's natural sphere of influence should be limited to South Asia owing to civilizational commonalities that made the Indian subcontinent a compact entity, and also due to India's finite material resources, is ingrained in the minds of most Indian thinkers and doers.

For the popular news media as well as in the imagination of lay Indians, the very concept of 'foreign policy' invokes thoughts and memories of how India relates with two neighboring countries – Pakistan and China. The more distant a

country or region is to India, the less interested Indian opinion-makers are about how their nation is interacting with or making inroads in those parts of the world. Shaping the security and economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific, which is the pivotal area for determining the configuration of power in the current world order, is itself seen by conservative Indian politicians and bureaucrats as a stretch that would strain India's capacities and deplete its sparse human and material stocks. Globalization may have affected India in countless ways, but Africa and Latin America are so removed from the average Indian psyche that visualizing India as a prime mover and shaker in these emerging continents is considered fanciful.

A related obstacle which instills procrastination and vacillation in India's march to great power status is the 'developmentalist' orthodoxy that the country has to fix its myriad internal social and economic problems before embarking on an expansive foreign policy. The phrase 'our problems are primarily domestic' is a constant refrain among Indian politicians and thought leaders who reflect a welfare state ideology that prioritizes poverty reduction, infrastructure growth and governance improvement over any grandiose foreign policy. The perception that there is a sequential process wherein a developing country should primarily aim for basic stability and overcoming internal issues, and only later look to increasing its international footprint, is commonplace among many Indians even seventy years after overthrowing colonial rule.

India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a rare exponent of a hyperactive global peacemaking diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s. But he never advocated power politics and running the race for dominant player in the world in a materialistic way. Claiming that 'we have little time to spare, and little energy to give, to international affairs', he laid down a foundational principle that 'the first thing we kept in view was to build our own country on solid foundations and not to get entangled in matters which do not directly affect us' (Hoyt, 1992: 164). Much has changed since Nehru was the sole helmsman of Indian foreign policy during the heated Cold War era, but avoiding a robust realpolitik approach and eschewing any tendencies of 'hegemonic' intent still resonates in New Delhi.

India's inward demeanor, coyness for alignments with great or middle powers, failure to assemble a military with power projection abilities and willingness to use force outside South Asia, and lackluster efforts to champion and promote the Indian private sector to capture overseas markets are factors that have acted as brakes on its journey to major power status. Indians fondly recall that their country was nearly equal to China in economic condition and international prestige until 1980 or so. They go on to lament that a 'strategic gap' has opened up since then and has been widening to the point where Asia's number one power is now five times as big as its number two power in economy and military, not to mention relative influence in various continents of the world (Mohan, 2017).

China's leapfrogging growth that left India behind since the opening up by Deng Xiaoping is widely interpreted as solely an economic feat. But if one analyzes how China grew from an East Asian power into a pan-Asian and extra-regional

great power, it is obvious that it displayed an affinity for geostrategic and geo-economic maneuvering and positioning unlike India. For example, the 'Global Going Out' strategy unveiled by the Chinese government in 1999 to promote its corporations abroad for trade and investment made China a household name and paved the way for it to supplant the United States and European powers in numerous corners of the globe (Yueh, 2013).

As David Shambaugh explains, 'China's global expansion did not occur by happenstance. It grew directly out of Communist Party and government policies' and from learning 'one key lesson from studying the experiences of other previous powers: genuine global powers possess multidimensional strength' (Shambaugh, 2013: 5). In India, by contrast, it has been a widely held maxim that simply registering impressive GDP growth year after year and slowly accumulating military sinews will automatically take it to its destined place in the comity of nations whenever providence allows. There has been less of a willful state-guided, targeted and time-bound foreign policy mission, at least until 2014, to envisage India as a top gun and to carve out a long-term strategy to reach that milestone.

The strategy deficit and myopic lenses which have driven Indian foreign policy for decades are not only functions of bureaucratic conservatism and politicians' preoccupation with domestic matters but possibly also of regime type. India's raucous multi-party democracy, which is the embodiment of a quasi-federal polity, diffuses power to states, limits governments to five-year terms, regularizes relentless turnover of power from one hand to another, and places short time horizons in front of political elites who find themselves hemmed in to pursue a foresighted foreign policy.

From 1989 to 2014, India had a series of coalition governments involving a variety of national and regional parties coming together in shaky setups marred by internecine conflict, bargaining and even blackmail. Governments fell or had to undergo frequent reshuffles without completing their five-year tenures and policies were in non-stop flux. Arijit Mazumdar has analyzed the negative effects of this domestic political structure on Indian foreign policy during the 1990s as follows:

In a situation where leaders were more concerned about staying in office, attention to international affairs was not a priority. Weak minority governments, lacking popular support, were hesitant to make radical changes to the broad contours of India's foreign policy ... the chaotic nature of Indian democracy and the country's federal polity makes it difficult for India's policymakers to come up with a grand strategy. (Mazumdar, 2011: 172, 178)

Even after coalition governments mastered the tricks of the trade for lasting a full term or two successive terms from 1999 to 2014, the predominance of divergent parochial and ideological forces within them stonewalled formulation and implementation of a coherent strategic blueprint that could give momentum to India's aspirations in the international arena. Harsh Pant aptly summed up the pathetic

state of affairs during two terms of the stable coalition government led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from 2004 to 2014:

Indian policymakers seem to have come to believe that just because their nation was experiencing robust economic growth, they didn't really need a serious foreign policy, that they could afford to get by with ad hoc responses or grand finger-wagging. And once economic growth faltered, there was hardly anything with which they could anchor the nation's foreign policy. (Pant, 2014)

Whether or not an excessively deliberative and fragmented democracy like India is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a unitary and resilient authoritarian nation like China, which has less contestation and maximum forward planning in foreign policymaking, is an open question. Writing in 1992, the American scholar George Tanham felt that India historically lacked a monolithic political entity and feeling of 'India as a whole' or 'greater India' when it came to defining strategic interests clearly and aggressively (Tanham, 1992: 51). The former Indian foreign and defense minister Jaswant Singh has concurred that India had a strong moral, civilizational and cultural basis but a loose 'national concept' as a single state with strategic intent. He quotes an ancient truism contrasting China and India to drive home the point. 'India has always existed without a state, but China cannot exist without one' (Singh, 1999: 10). The Chinese scholar Sui Xinmin has also observed that India's diverse and fissiparous political entities negate the prospect of a unitary strategic actor in world affairs (Xinmin, 2014).

What India has lacked for years is something that China has boasted for a while, i.e. a well-articulated foreign policy agenda with definite goals and objectives that lead to rapid and irreversible accumulation of power in the international system. India has been alien to China's methodical strategy and vision spanning one hundred years or more to supplant the West as the next global economic, military and political power (Pillsbury, 2015). One comparative study of Chinese and Indian strategic behavior since both countries became independent nation-states asserts that both countries have shown similar propensity to use force, modernize their militaries and move towards offensive military doctrines (Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2012). But the gap between the two in comprehensive national power and global influence that piled up in the last three decades suggests otherwise. It is a *fait accompli* that China has emerged 'as the most astute and effective geopolitical player of the 21st century' (Mahbubani, 2009: 210), while India has just started its catchup effort under a dynamic political leadership since 2014.

EVOLUTION OF AN UNDERPERFORMER

The true worth of transformation is only apparent when it is juxtaposed with stasis. Appreciating the metamorphic impact of Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Indian foreign policy from 2014 onward necessitates a *tour d'horizon*

of how leaders since independence approached the outside world. If one were to periodize the pre-Modi foreign policy of India into discernible stages, there are three such time brackets, viz. 1947 to 1964 under Nehru; 1964 to 1991 under a variety of political personalities, most notably Indira Gandhi; and 1991 to 2014, again with a range of governments under multiple prime ministers belonging to different parties.

The *first phase* was marked by a heavy dose of idealism and moralism. In the wake of winning freedom from British rule through laborious nationalist struggle, the post-colonial Indian state was imbued with an anti-imperial mindset. Nehru, who spent his youth in the vanguard of the independence movement, took charge in 1947 with a zeal to oppose remnants of Western hegemony and to position India as a fulcrum for building an anti-colonial block of newly liberated nations under the rubric of Afro-Asian solidarity (Berger, 2013).

For Nehru, the principle of non-alignment, or maintaining equidistance from both the West and the East in the Cold War, was at once a pragmatic defensive shield to protect weak, poor and vulnerable India from being destabilized by greedy great power interventions, and also a principled stand to create a new world order free from *Machtpolitik*. The notion that non-alignment 'is a means to combat the entire system of "traditional" world politics' (Power, 1964: 272) spoke of Nehru's grandiose vision to see India as a system-changing actor that had the will to revise the very foundations of international relations. In soft power terms, this phase was marked by the high visibility of India in the international arena due to Nehru's personal diplomatic endeavors for global peace and his pedantic admonition of big powers about their misdeeds. His role of 'half saint and half statesman' (Mohite, 1992: 28) irritated the West and aroused suspicion in the Soviet Union, but also gave India a sense of disproportionately punching above its weight in world affairs.

The main disappointment of the Nehru phase sprang from the naivety about geopolitics and neglect of hard power. While sermonizing about the evils of hegemonic behavior in the international realm, India failed to realistically assess national security threats and prepare for them. Two debacles mar Nehru's foreign policy legacy. India suffered a territorial loss in the first war with Pakistan over Kashmir (October 1947 to January 1948) and endured a traumatic defeat in the war with China (October to November 1962).

At a formative stage of the Indian nation-state, Nehru refrained from pressing the Indian Army to assertively flush out Pakistan-sponsored invaders from the whole of Kashmir and instead resorted to an appeal to the United Nations for justice. Nehru's belief that international institutions and law, rather than brute force, could restore what was rightfully India's cost the country a large sliver of land in Kashmir which remains under Pakistani control to this day. While being 'decidedly optimistic' about the UN as a fair player, Nehru 'did not dwell on the possibility that the United Nations deliberations would constrain India's freedom of action' to forcibly evict the Pakistani intruders (Kennedy, 2012: 181).

With Mao Tse Tung's China, Nehru was ideologically predisposed to deny that it could pose an existential threat to India. Having forfeited independent Tibet as a buffer that had hitherto protected British-ruled India from China, New Delhi has never managed to recover strategically against Beijing (Arpi, 2013). Chronic under-investment in India's defenses along the disputed border with China and Nehru's Pollyannaish hope that the two Asian neighbors would follow a model code of conduct called 'Panchsheel' (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) proved no match to Mao's ruthless power play. An aggressive China caught India sleeping at the wheel in the brief 1962 war (Lintner, 2018) and shattered Nehru's construct of pan-Asian brotherhood of decolonized countries against Western capitalist exploitation.

The *second phase* of Indian foreign policy had to involve changes following the blunders of the Nehruvian era. Especially under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India realized the centrality of building a strong military and of shedding the overly preachy diplomacy of the past in favor of a *realpolitik* approach to the world. The decisive military intervention that Mrs Gandhi took in 1971 to carve up Pakistan and create an independent Bangladesh showed an India that had learnt its lessons from the past. Although rhetorically still wedded to non-alignment, she had no qualms about exploiting the Sino-Soviet split and forging a *de facto* alliance with the Soviet Union in the lead-up to the 1971 war. Had New Delhi not drawn strategically close to Moscow at that time and thereby deterred Beijing from entering on Islamabad's side, the likelihood of India winning the war and becoming the undisputed regional power in South Asia would have been low (Gaikwad, 1990: 129).

Mrs Gandhi also took India into the nuclear weapons power club by testing its first atomic device in 1974. It was the moment of arrival of the first non P-5 (permanent members of the UN Security Council) nuclear nation. The bold move sent a signal that India, which had been associated with Mahatma Gandhi's pacifism and Nehru's idealism, cannot sit by idly as hostile China's nuclear arsenal was accumulating (Chakma, 2005: 217).

Mrs Gandhi's tenure as prime minister is associated with an 'Indira Doctrine' of foreign policy that was never formally announced but seen as operating in South Asia as a reflection of India's objective of excluding extra-regional powers from meddling in its backyard. Critics of India's role in South Asia have portrayed this Doctrine as a hegemonic blueprint wherein Mrs Gandhi meddled covertly and blatantly in small South Asian neighbors' internal affairs through the Indian intelligence and security apparatus to tilt these smaller countries against the West and China and keep them firmly in India's orbit (Crossette, 2008).

But given India's snailish economic growth during this phase, such a Doctrine could not fully achieve its purported goal of shooing away competing outsider powers and winning over hearts and minds of small South Asian countries. Persistent economic woes owing to ideological rigidity and centralized planning meant that India lacked the resources to outbid China in the developing

world and could not move up the ladder from being a subcontinental power into a pan-Asian force. The Indian economy was largely closed to foreign investment and technology in this phase and New Delhi was unable to expand its influence in its extended neighborhood of the Asia-Pacific, where China as well as Western-allied Japan, South Asia and the Southeast Asian 'Tiger' economies were on the march.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and rang in the *third phase* of foreign policy, India was abjectly unready for the US-led new world order and the era of capitalist globalization. The shock of a sudden macroeconomic collapse in 1991 compelled structural domestic policy reforms and gradually pushed open the door for rapprochement with the West. India and the United States, two 'estranged democracies' (Kux, 1994) which had been separated by ideology and history, finally cast aside old mistrust and moved towards partnership. But the lingering Indian antipathy to Western hegemony and concerns about losing much-prized 'strategic autonomy' came to a head when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee tested a second and far more powerful set of nuclear bombs in 1998.

Like in 1974, fear of being left behind by a fast rising China and resentment of the China–Pakistan military axis, motivated these atomic weapons tests (*NYT*, 1998). The subsequent Western sanctions on India for proliferation of nukes and painstaking negotiations to remove them demonstrated that there were limits to a quick and easy India–US realignment in the post-Cold War period.

It was only near the end of the first decade of the new millennium, with the United States panicky about China's ascent, that a more lucid strategic vision for a 'defining partnership' emerged (Rajghatta, 2009). Still, this whole phase was riddled with problems such as American pressure on India to conform to an anti-Iran campaign and Washington's expectations that India move away from dependence on Russia for its military modernization.

One net positive that came out of this phase was that India's economic growth hit historic highs (particularly between 2003 and 2008). This turned India into an attractive destination for foreign investors for the first time ever. Commercial diplomacy, which had become so central in conditions of capitalist globalization, was belatedly added to India's foreign policy repertoire and Indian diplomats could leverage their country's cachet as a big consuming market to strengthen relations with key partners. The 'Look East' policy commenced by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s, began to take shape with more gusto once India entered into free trade agreements with ASEAN (2010) and opened up relations with Japan and South Korea.

Nonetheless, by the time Modi took up the mantle of Indian foreign policy in 2014, a half decade of economic slowdown and incoherent diplomacy burdened by domestic coalition politics had left India in a state of drift. Whatever changes were witnessed in the third phase were incremental rather than seismic and lacked the ballast that could thrust India into a higher league of Asian or global powers.

Although the term ‘non-alignment’ had lost meaning in the post-Cold War years, India seemed satisfied in this phase with attaining the status of a ‘swing state’ that could tilt the global pendulum of power either towards the United States or China (Kliman and Fontaine, 2012).

The thought that India should cease crowning other great powers and work to propel itself into a great power via a long-term roadmap for extended geopolitical influence, strategic flexibility and economic dynamism was missing. Intensive engagement with the outside world was still seen as expensive for a developing country with hundreds of millions of poor citizens and the ambit of India’s leadership was still confined to the South Asian sub-region.

‘MODI-FYING’ THE ELEPHANT

Given the parochial and isolationist tendencies in Indian society and the reluctance in the state apparatus to obtain and wield power with systematic rigorousness (Mattoo, 2012), can India realistically aspire to be a great power, which by very definition demands that a country step out of the confines of its immediate surroundings and have a consequential impact on international affairs far away from its borders? To qualify as major powers, states have to meet the following criteria:

unusual material capabilities, the willingness to pursue a wide range of foreign policy interests across a large geographical area, and recognition by other states that they are major powers (Volgy et al., 2011: 12)

The problematique I have elaborated earlier in this chapter poses stark doubts about India’s suitability to fulfill Volgy’s prerequisite of states ‘extensively pursuing a broad variety of foreign policy activities outside their region’. The metaphor of India as a wobbly elephant that cannot quite get its act together and exert power in a concerted fashion by means of a cogent ‘organizing framework’ in global affairs (Malone, 2012) is not historically inaccurate.

Yet, there is an abundance of hope for Indian foreign policy since 2014, which has been spearheaded by the unusually strong-willed and visionary Prime Minister Modi. Positing an individual political leader as a *deus ex machina* for a deep-rooted structural malaise in the foreign policy DNA of a country might come across as wishful. But there are plenty of reasons for applauding Modi as a motivator who has put India en route to great power status within a finite timeframe.

If the pulling and hauling of coalition politics and emasculation of central governments to effectively craft foreign policy had been a drawback since the 1990s, Modi’s resounding electoral victory in the 2014 general elections and his commanding political authority as the unchallenged leader and mascot of India have worked wonders for the country’s international image. Unlike the previous seven prime ministers who were trapped in perpetual tightrope-walking with a bewildering assortment of political parties and their regional interests to merely

hold on to power, Modi's landslide electoral wins in 2014 and 2019, and his consolidation of the political space within India have provided ample room for him to be a decisive and bold foreign policy planner and executioner who does not need to warily look over his shoulder and calculate domestic risks of a hyperactive and ambitious foreign policy.

Freed from the crutches of multi-party coalitions that unduly inflate the weight of obstructionist provincial parties, Modi has sought to turn India's quasi-federal polity into a diplomatic asset. His mantra of 'cooperative federalism' has drawn state governments ruled by different political parties closer in an integrated formation that serves India's overall national interests in world affairs. He has tried to 'institutionalize the participation of states in foreign policy', especially by forming a new States Division within the Ministry of External Affairs to coordinate with India's provinces for export promotion and attracting inward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Maini, 2017).

Innovations such as including Chief Ministers of Indian states in prime ministerial visits abroad, using Chief Ministers to go on delegation visits that pave the way for heads-of-government summit meetings, and giving Chief Ministers a platform to address heads of all Indian diplomatic missions abroad have borne fruit under Modi (Tewari, 2017). He has also roped in state governments for resolving outstanding disputes and thickening ties with South Asian neighbors like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal to present a picture of India as one when it interacts with the outside world.

The 'national concept' which had been found lacking in Indian strategic practice is gradually being cemented through Modi's slogan of an 'India First' foreign policy where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and there is a harmonization of provincial interests with the broader national interest. In the Prime Minister's own words:

'India First' is the central point of our foreign policy. It is about protecting India's strategic interest, it is to ensure that India marches forward in achieving economic prosperity by leaps and bounds and reaches the position which it is destined to reach. (PTI, 2016)

The brand of cultural nationalism that Modi represents as the head of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has infused a much needed national perspective and vim into India's foreign policy. For example, he broke pre-existing communal taboos and domestic vote bank compulsions by becoming the first ever Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in July 2017 to cement a strategically crucial relationship for India's security. I have commented on the salience of this historic trip as follows:

Banished are the overcautious, hypocritical and domestically poisoned lenses for approaching Israel, and ushered in are bold, dispassionate and objective ways of handling this key West Asian power. Driven by the motto of 'India First', Modi has overcome a huge psychological barrier, and slayed many a mental demon by finally making the journey to Israel. (Chaulia, 2017a)

Israel is just one out of a record-breaking 59 countries that Modi has personally visited from the point of his inauguration in May 2014 up to December 2018. His penchant for foreign travel to countries big and small is unmatched in India's diplomatic history and reveals political will at the top of the nation to immerse earnestly and with full gusto in foreign relations. Notwithstanding detractors within India's opposition parties who have demanded that Modi repeat the same old tradition of devoting his time and attention primarily to domestic affairs (PTI, 2015), the Prime Minister has made it a habit to demonstrate India's presence in far-flung corners of the globe with the realization that India has been missing in action for far too long.

Establishing international omnipresence and visibility, along with interacting with a wide cross-section of foreign stakeholders beyond just government officials and corporate tycoons, has given India's soft power tremendous ballast (Mahapatra, 2016). What Modi has done so far is to transform India from a disinterested and disengaged country to an outreach-centric state that is consolidating past partnerships and forging new ones in sync with the changing global power equations.

Elsewhere, I have reflected at length on how the apathy, lethargy and 'ad-hocism' which stood for Indian foreign policy for decades have been cast aside by the Prime Minister's vision to muster all of India's capabilities and chase the ultimate target of making the country a 'leading power' in the world through a 'full spectrum' and '360-degrees foreign policy' (Chaulia, 2016: *passim*). In a country notorious for the absence of noteworthy foreign policy doctrines, Modi has crafted one through his personal touch as India's *numero uno* diplomat, leading brand manager and strategist-in-chief.

DEVELOPMENTAL DIPLOMACY

By wide consensus, Modi has imbued global content into Indian diplomacy and is the most successful leader in generations to convince India's people that his foreign policy is not a vainglorious exercise but an instrument to deliver concrete material benefits to them. As a politician who gets panned by India's churlish news media and opposition parties for spending precious sums of taxpayers' money for globetrotting (Seth, 2015), Modi strives to reiterate the link between his proactive diplomacy and India's economic development. His formulation that the FDI he courts from the world, including the globally spread out Indian diaspora, stands for 'First Develop India' (PTI, 2014) is a folksy method of proving the relevance of foreign economic policy to 'welfarist' skeptics at home.

Modi's success in attracting unprecedented levels of FDI into India through a diplomatic full-court press has settled the debate about whether a poor country can afford to have a global foreign policy. He has unraveled the flawed

sequential logic of ‘first domestic, then international’ which used to constrain previous Indian governments in giving foreign policy its due. Modi’s path-breaking diplomatic agreements by overcoming hurdles with the United States, Australia and Japan for civil nuclear commerce to flow with India to help boost its electricity generation and clean energy goals, his deal for India buying pulses from Mozambique to tackle rising food price inflation in India, and his compact with the United Arab Emirates to set up a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (ISPR) in India are some instances where the Prime Minister has aced developmental diplomacy.

India’s soaring GDP growth itself since Modi took office in 2014 is partly a result of his foreign policy strategy of gathering and retaining the confidence of global investors and trading partners. In the annals of India’s post-Cold War foreign policy, economic diplomacy is not Modi’s invention per se, but he has set the bar far higher in this field and generated outcomes much faster.

India is also maturing under Modi as a net giver and a net provider of economic well-being to less developed countries. His conceptualization and timely delivery in May 2017 of the low-cost high-benefit South Asia satellite to economically uplift neighboring countries proved that despite budgetary limitations, Modi is ‘positioning India as a player that transcends narrow self-interests and magnanimously generates public goods for neighbors and the wider international community’ (Chaulia, 2017b).

Likewise, Modi’s founding of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) in 2015 to aggregate multilateral financing, research and technology for developing countries to make green energy transitions reveals how India is giving concrete shape to South–South cooperation with doable and tactile projects whose value is self-evident to its beneficiaries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. India is still slower and far below China in the amounts of foreign aid and loans it disburses in the Global South, but under Modi’s watch, it has ‘quietly transitioned into the role of provider as in the last three years it has given more aid to foreign countries than it has received’ (Sharma, 2017).

Chinks remain in maximizing the utility of India’s human resource potential as part of its global outreach in the developing world. But the renewed emphasis on skill transfer and capacity building emanating from India’s ‘development partnerships’ abroad should eventually situate it as a leader of the Global South – a tag which China already enjoys as an inexorable qualification for new entrants to the high table of great powers.

REVISED POWER EQUILIBRIUM

On the security front, Modi has distinguished his tenure from that of his predecessors through two mentionable additions to sharpen India’s foreign policy toolbox, viz. strategic surprise and strategic resolve.

Since 1989, India has faced a proxy war in its northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir from jihadist terrorists based in Pakistan. Depending on the rhythm of bilateral relations and Pakistan's internal power dynamics, the armed separatist insurgency in Indian Kashmir has waxed and waned for decades. Spectacular cross-border terrorist strikes by hardline jihadists sheltered and trained by Pakistani intelligence agencies have often brought the two fraught neighbors close to war. But India has yet to find a lasting deterrence mechanism to curb these terrorist attacks, drawing derisive criticism that it is a 'soft state' and an 'easy victim' with a reactive and defensive military that cannot stem a conventionally smaller rival from wreaking mayhem on its soil (Unnithan and Shukla, 2006).

The clamour to 'do something' to raise the costs of terrorism for Pakistan and to prove India's mettle as a rising power that can compel its enemies to alter their behavior had been part of Modi's own rhetoric even before he assumed the post of Prime Minister. In September 2016, following yet another daring attack on an Indian military camp by Pakistan-supported jihadists in Kashmir, he ordered a daring surprise late night raid by the Indian Army inside Pakistani territory to dismantle seven terrorist training camps and kill an estimated fifty jihadists and Pakistani troops (Negi, 2016).

These 'surgical strikes', although denied as having occurred by Pakistan for face-saving purpose, were meant to shake Islamabad from the time-tested assumption that India does not respond in a forceful and calibrated way to counter imminent threats massing across its border. The scale and publicity with which Modi took this calculated risk made him wildly popular in India and inserted a fresh strategic possibility into the India-Pakistan conflict of 'surgical strikes 2.0', i.e. more 'preemptive and measured actions' to check subsequent terrorist attacks in India (Agarwal, 2017). In February 2019, Modi ordered airstrikes on jihadist camps deep inside Pakistani territory in retaliation for a suicide bombing in Kashmir against Indian security forces. Although Pakistan pooh-pooed the venture as a failure, Modi nonetheless signaled that a new deterrence-seeking security paradigm had set in (Chaulia, 2019).

It bears reminder here that Modi had earlier authorized comparable preventive attacks by the Indian Army on Northeast-focused separatist insurgents hiding in the jungles of Myanmar in June 2015. Surgical strikes are not one-off events and will likely to be launched iteratively at a time and location of India's choosing to keep its foes off balance and to fulfill Modi's promise of an 'India free from terrorism' by 2022 (PTI, 2017a).

If Pakistan is now on notice due to India's political will to spring a strategic surprise, then China has had to reckon with Modi's India that is not going to step back from defending its interests with resolve. During a two-months-long standoff in 2017 between the militaries of China and India over 34 square miles of disputed Himalayan land at the tri-junction with Bhutan known as the Doklam plateau, India faced a barrage of threats and warnings from Chinese state-owned

media about 'the PLA's overwhelming firepower and logistics' and capability of 'annihilating all Indian troops in the border region' (GT, 2017).

Despite China's conventional superiority over India, Modi did not succumb to this psychological warfare and maintained a stoic strategic resolve not to pull out the Indian Army until the Chinese agreed to halt road construction and simultaneously withdrew the People's Liberation Army (PLA) presence from the tri-junction. In response to menacing Chinese references to India's humiliating defeat in the 1962 war to China, the Modi government stressed that times have changed and called China's bluff by quietly but firmly insisting that 'the situation in 1962 was different and India of 2017 is different' (IANS, 2017b).

In the end, armed hostilities did not break out and the row was settled through mutually agreed troop withdrawals and assurances. The American security analyst Bonnie Glaser noted during the Doklam faceoff that China had found in Modi 'a leader who is willing to stand up for Indian interests and work together with other countries in the region that are looking to impose constraints on China ... and that's something Beijing is worried about' (PTI, 2017b).

Modi is far from vanquishing Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for good or averting all future threats from China on India's land or maritime frontiers. But by taking up the gauntlet with a strategy, he is treading new terrain in Indian foreign policy and trying to install a revised power equilibrium in Asia.

Modi does not underestimate the continuing strategic challenge posed by the two 'all-weather allies' China and Pakistan, whose military and economic strategies have for decades been interwoven to counter India's power. The China–Pakistan axis is even more pressing today because India's 'rise as a potential competitor to Beijing has further reinforced the original rationale for its partnership with Pakistan' (Small, 2015: 4). China's decision to invest \$46 billion in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and attach it *ex post facto* to its global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a 'flagship project of great importance' (Dasgupta, 2017) is not lost upon India, which needs to come up with its own regional connectivity roadmap to stay geo-economically and geopolitically relevant.

If the China–Pakistan–India strategic triangle has a persistent pattern in which India is the antagonist of the other two, it is a logical strategy for Indian foreign policy to bring in fourth parties that can balance this two-sided threat. Elsewhere, I have charted out the nature of the challenge and the remedy thereof:

The spectre of Chinese hegemony and the threat it poses to India's ambitions in Asia and beyond has magnified. China will seek to bolster Pakistan with more financial aid and military support to try and keep India bogged down in South Asia ... Indian national strategy under Modi should be to ensure that major external powers like Russia and the USA stay on its corner or are at least wary of China to ward off the possibility of a two-front war by China and Pakistan against India. (Chaulia, 2017c)

Modi's unapologetic and uninhibited strategic partnership with the United States, a departure from wary and guarded Indian governments of earlier periods,

is in no small measure motored by qualms about China's looming shadow. Invocations from Washington and New Delhi that they share a 'joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean' (Parashar and Dasgupta, 2015) and that they will 'elevate their strategic consultations' to 'enhance peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region' (PTI, 2017c) are telltale signs that India is now practicing more hardnosed realpolitik, keeping in sight its own ambition to be a 'leading power' and an independent power center in the international system rather than a 'swing state' opportunistically oscillating between China and the United States or remaining equidistant from both of these preeminent powers (Chaulia, 2016). Nonetheless, since the Donald Trump administration took charge in Washington in 2017, Modi had to adjust and dial down confrontation with China because he saw that the United States was no longer intent on counterbalancing China through strategic alliance building in Asia.

INWARD TO OUTWARD

Besides forging new equations with great powers, Modi's India has also ramped up defense diplomacy by conducting wide-ranging joint military exercises with Western and Asian partners. It has extended a more stridently protective role as a 'net provider of security' to smaller countries in the Indian Ocean Region and is also promoting co-production and co-development of hi-tech weaponry with trusted partners like Russia and Israel. In hard power capabilities, how far India can accomplish Modi's accelerated vision of defense modernization through the 'Make in India' campaign will determine its long-term ambitions to be acknowledged as a great power.

Increased budgetary outlays for the Indian Navy are vital pathways for India to project power in the high seas and extend its zone of influence. Joint naval exercises by India with the United States, Japan, Singapore and Indonesia have traversed the eastern rim of the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Albeit inferior to the Chinese or American navies, the Indian Navy has professed intent to defend Indian companies drilling for oil off the coast of Vietnam in maritime space contested by China and sent stealth warships there to signify 'operational reach and commitment to India's "Act East" policy' (HT, 2016). India's heavy investment in the Chabahar port of Iran has given its navy greater leeway in the Arabian Sea and off the west coast of Africa. With both China and India fixated on American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of 'sea power' as *the* medium for achieving national greatness (Mohan, 2009), the maritime race in Asia is a central variable to watch in the future.

The Modi government has undertaken extensive restructuring of the Indian Army's 'tooth to tail ratio' by shifting thousands of personnel into combat preparedness mode in 'the first such exercise in Independent India's military history' (Singh, 2017). India is also raising two divisions of its high-altitude Mountain

Strike Corps 'to accrue quick-reaction ground offensive capabilities for the first time against China' so that it could take any future war into Chinese territory (Pandit, 2017).

However, India is still reluctant to negotiate with foreign governments to set up overseas military bases and has avoided boots on the ground in Afghanistan even though its national security is intrinsically tied to stabilizing that country (Destradi, 2014). The art of connecting India's military with its foreign economic policy and regional connectivity endeavors is still not sophisticated. Turf battles among the ministries of defense, external affairs and commerce make a mockery of Modi's exhortations for a coordinated 'whole of government' model of foreign policymaking (Rana, 2016).

High-profile rescue diplomacy by the Indian Air Force and Army in Nepal after its devastating earthquake and in Yemen after the onset of war illustrate the Modi government's undertaking 'to shoulder greater global responsibilities' (IISS, 2015). The Indian Navy has been escorting thousands of commercial vessels in the high seas, the majority of which are 'foreign bottoms' or non-Indian owned, an expensive undertaking that is justified for furthering 'the linkage with the country's economic interests and regional credibility' (Bhaskar, 2016: 49).

The adoption of a generous stance and tone in foreign policy where India gives to the world rather than asks from it is a marker of great power-like ethos. The comfort with which the United States, and lately China, fan out their militaries to distant shores in the name of humanitarian, peacekeeping and stabilizing missions to 'provide public goods for global security' (Jianshu, 2017) must be studied by India for lessons as it attempts to design its own outward strategic posture.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE CHALLENGES

The Modi effect on Indian foreign policy has yielded multiple positives. He has overturned ossifying traditions and brought in doctrinal and long-horizon perspectives that had been direly lacking. But again, in the context of a country like India where policymaking is personalized rather than institutionalized, the challenge is for the Modi diplomatic momentum to be implanted and elevated in the decades to come. Reversion to non-strategic and reactive ways in the governance of India's foreign policy after Modi departs from the political scene cannot be ruled out since the bureaucracy remains entrenched and unreformed. The task of diversifying and training the next generation of young foreign policy leaders who are bolder and more creative is incumbent upon Indian educational institutions and think tanks which are presently managed by elderly figures.

On the substantive policy side, India has a laundry list of unfinished tasks such as devising a befitting strategy to parry China's gargantuan BRI by speedily giving

flesh to intercontinental connectivity ideas like the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) in tandem with Japan (Chaulia, 2017d), taking the lead in evolving new security structures with likeminded nations as a hedge against the isolationist and strategy-devoid foreign policy of President Trump's United States (Roche, 2017), extending the country's currently weak political presence in the Middle East and Latin America, adroitly entering into and shaping the direction of regional preferential trade blocs, and shepherding a variant of 'globalization 2.0' that privileges Indian-style democratic and pluralistic values.

But the aforementioned tactical policy imperatives can only be met if the macro-level psychological baggage of the past I outlined in the initial portion of this chapter is permanently laid to rest. In 2013, *The Economist* legitimately complained that India lacked 'the culture to pursue an active security policy', had 'little interest in grand strategy' and was uncertain 'whether it wants to' become a great power (*TE*, 2013). The will to lead and to transpose one's national preferences onto the international system and remake it is an essential mental quality for any nation to climb into the A-list of the global power distribution. Fervent desire and ambition to be a leading power has to be complemented with strategic acuity and tactical dexterity to convert latent power into concrete power.

Expecting a single energizing foreign policy entrepreneur like Narendra Modi to accomplish such a monumental transformation of attitudes in a typically argumentative and heterogeneous country is impractical. As a politician, there are limits to how far and how long he alone can be the steward of India's upward path in the world. Unless India awakens with a socially embedded movement, consciousness and discourse in favor of activist and muscular foreign policy, its sclerotic 'system' will find alibis to continue to delay ascent into the league of great powers. A sustainable foreign policy metamorphosis awaits India.

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Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy: Colombo's Relations with Washington, Beijing and New Delhi

Peshan R. Gunaratne

INTRODUCTION

Mr. President, we understand Sri Lanka's choice, as a small developing country, to remain nonaligned in matters of foreign policy. We respect genuine nonalignment ... Your visit has undoubtedly strengthened the bond between our two countries, and it's laid a basis for even closer, more cooperative relations between Sri Lanka and the United States in the future And finally, Mr. President, I'd like to thank you again for the elephant – [laughter].... The elephant happens to be the symbol of the President's political party and by coincidence – [laughter] – we happen to be also that smart. [Laughter] (Reagan, 1984: 871)

President Ronald Reagan proposing the toast at the State Dinner hosted for President J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka sheds light into the policy adopted by the South Asian island nation in the 1980s, at the height of the Second Cold War. Sri Lanka or Ceylon as was identified by the British, its last colonial master, since the collapse of the Soviet Union strives to maintain its non-aligned status in the international arena. However dynamics in global politics compounded with domestic political complexities, influence Sri Lanka's foreign policy orientation and hence derail the policy of non-alignment.

Sri Lanka under different heads of state had witnessed diverse foreign policies from a post-independence pro-Western policy to Cold War non-alignment. Since independence in 1948 Sri Lankan leaders had professed a foreign policy spectrum consisting of neutrality to non-alignment in attempting to appease every actor in international relations. The rise of great powers thus impacting

the balance of power in the international arena nevertheless had had adverse repercussions on the foreign policy orientation of a small power like Sri Lanka. The absence of consistency and the lack of uniformity in the policy on foreign relations have made Sri Lanka plunge into a vortex of self-destruction with adverse socio-economic and political repercussions. This small Indian Ocean Island has encountered communal tensions, a decades-old protracted conflict, and financial meltdowns due to wrong or bad policies orchestrated by her leaders. Irrespective of such paralysing effects on the very fabric of the Ceylonese society this nation state had been resilient and strong to overcome any such orthodox or non-traditional security challenge confronting her.

The author, through this chapter, attempts to shed light on the foreign policy of Sri Lanka since its independence in 1948. It will not be a critical examination but a mere analysis of the policy on foreign relations and the contributing factors through the Realist lens. This section reviews Sri Lanka's position in the international society and the region, its behaviour as a 'buffer state', the significance of its geostrategic location, and the impact of a rising China and India on Sri Lanka's foreign relations. A brief introduction will enlighten the reader of the factors influencing external relations. Moreover the author will engage in a discussion on foreign policy decision making with particular emphasis on the scope and ambit of the powers exercised by the executive and the legislature on foreign policy matters. The chapter also includes sections examining Ceylon's foreign relations (1948–1971), Sri Lanka's foreign relations (1972–1993), contemporary issues (1994–present) and the author's opinion. However the author intends to concentrate on and emphasize the contemporary issues plaguing Sri Lanka's foreign policy rather than the historical background, hence the final section will constitute a major portion of this chapter.

Ronald Reagan in 1984 acknowledges the paramount importance of non-alignment for a buffer state like Sri Lanka. He also jokes about the baby elephant, a gift from the people of Sri Lanka to the people of the United States. The elephant is the symbol shared by both the Republican Party and the United National Party (UNP). The latter is identified with a pro-Western policy vis-à-vis pro-China policy of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). These contrasting foreign policy orientations of the two major political parties in Sri Lanka indicate the fact that strict adherence to either non-alignment or neutrality is literally impossible and may not coincide with the hopes, aspirations, and national interests of Sri Lanka. Albeit political leaders indicate through their election manifestos that their government, if elected will adopt a non-aligned policy, global political dynamics will ultimately determine and shape Sri Lanka's international relations.

Sri Lanka is merely a middle-income country with a small economy which caters to a population of 20 million. With a small pool of technical and scientific manpower, with minute or hardly any natural resources, with zero nuclear or space programmes, Sri Lanka can aspire to become only a small power in an anarchic self-help international system. Despite the lack of any major significance,

this South Asian nation has been the cynosure of regional and international politics. From WikiLeaks to Hillary Clinton's controversial emails, and from the controversial Lotus Tower (identified by Indian researchers as an assassin's mace weapon built by the Chinese) in the heart of Colombo to United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and from the Panama Papers to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Sri Lanka has surfaced and resurfaced multiple occasions for numerous reasons. Moreover inroads are constantly being made by the United States, China, and India into this strategic entrépot. In this backdrop it is credible to deduce the fact that the geostrategic importance of Sri Lanka outweighs its demographic and economic limitations.

We live in a highly integrated and a globalized world shaped by emerging economic and military powers in the East and the South. The world is looking to the East where miracles are taking place. It is an era where the Americans and the Europeans, with their military superiority are struggling to maintain their influence in the global arena amidst their diminishing economic might. Moreover the world is in a dilemma as to whether the US dollar would be replaced by the Yuan or whether the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) would surpass the G8. The gradual shift of balance of power from the West to the East has redrawn the boundaries of a new world order. However where is Sri Lanka in this tapestry? Is Sri Lanka immune from the financial crisis plaguing the West? Is the United States genuinely interested in grooming Sri Lanka as the guardian of democracy in South Asia? Does Sri Lanka have bosom friends in the East? And is India a trustworthy neighbour without any hidden agendas? These are questions of paramount importance that can only be addressed by a coherent and a cogent foreign policy.

Factors Influencing External Relations

The term 'foreign policy' is of diverse and of ambiguous meaning. Many may tend to believe that the foreign policy of a country is a mirror image of the domestic policy or, domestic and foreign policies are intricately interlinked, therefore it is immaterial to draw any distinction between the two. In support of this argument Senator J. William Fulbright postulated that if even the link between domestic and foreign affairs could be drawn, it is now wholly erased. Conversely,

even if the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is today less clear-cut than it once was, the latter remains an activity of government both directed at and implemented largely in an environment external to the state in question. As such *it is generally formulated in greater secrecy and by fewer hands* than domestic policy. (Franck and Weisband, 1974: 33, emphasis added)

Hence, foreign policy decision making from 2005–2015 was strictly limited to the corridors of power of the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Defence and

Urban Development and the Ministry of Economic Development during the Rajapaksa administration. Moreover there is compelling evidence to suggest that crucial decisions on international relations were made by an inner circle of which the three brothers; Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and Basil Rajapaksa, were at the epicentre.

National interest also plays an imperative role in determining the foreign policy of a country. According to Rosenau, 'foreign policy inputs are geography, culture and history, technological and economic development, social structure, moods of public opinion, political accountability, government structure, values, talents, experience and personality of leader, and external and internal situation etc.' (Rosenau, 1976: 16–17). However Prakash Chandra in '*International Relations*' has narrowed the above broad determinants to 'internal factors, external factors, and policy making factors' (Chandra, 2004: 117). Without prejudice to the above facts, another school of thought may reckon that it is not compulsory for a country to have a policy governing its external relations. However to determine what constitutes a policy governing external relations and which factors may contribute to the formulation of such a policy and then to arrive at a coherent conclusion as to what a foreign policy of a country is, it is imperative to engage in a rigorous examination of both primary and secondary sources.

George Modelski in his critique *A Theory of Foreign Policy* professed that, 'foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment' (Modelski, 1962: 6–7). A contested concept such as 'communities', according to Modelski, is at the heart of foreign policy formulation. Moreover Geoffrey Stern in *The Structure of International Society: An introduction to the study of international relations* identifies the different dimensions of foreign policy as:

- 1 the goals, purposes or objectives sought by political authorities in the arena beyond a country's national jurisdiction;
- 2 the norms and principles from which such goals are derived;
- 3 the inventory of methods, measures, stratagems, tactics, and devices by which political authorities seek to obtain their goals;
- 4 a range of decisions or courses of actions, innovative, adaptive and reactive in pursuit of a goal or goals;
- 5 a particular decision or action undertaken in pursuit of a particular objective;
- 6 an accumulation of piecemeal and pragmatic day-to-day reactions to situations, events, and pressures emanating from the international arena. (Stern, 1999: 108–109)

Colombo's relations with Washington, Beijing and New Delhi are to a greater degree limited to the above-stipulated parameters and interpretations of foreign policy. In light of the aforementioned definitions, unpardonable inroads made by the sole superpower and the great powers into the domestic affairs of Sri Lanka, amalgamated with ulterior motives, undoubtedly are not without any adverse

consequences on the latter. India's concerns about devolution, Beijing's unconditional financial assistance, Japan's support for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation, repercussions of American smart power and the European Union's emphasis on human rights have undoubtedly had a profound impact on the minds of the leaders, and foreign policy pundits and advisors of Sri Lanka hence enabling these foreign policy architects to cautiously steer Sri Lanka away from shark infested unchartered waters. In addition to the influence of States a multitude of other non-state actors play an increasingly influential role in shaping the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. Among other actors influencing the foreign policy orientation of Sri Lanka is the Tamil diaspora.

The Tamil diaspora consists of Sri Lankan Tamils who migrated to the West in search of greener pastures due to relative deprivation and marginalization in post-independence Sri Lanka. It is no enigma that this very diaspora provided military and financial support to strengthen the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a ruthless terrorist organization who fought against legitimate armed forces of Sri Lanka. Albeit the military wing of this terrorist outfit has been defeated, the diplomatic war initiated by the diaspora has not ceased. Despite the fact that the dénouement of decades-old protracted conflict in 2009 marked the end of hostilities between the parties thus bringing an end to the anarchy and mayhem caused by terrorist suicide bombings, more virulent and diabolical instruments are being used in the international arena by the diaspora and their umbrella organizations to offset post-war development and reconciliation. Armed with a Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) the diaspora has been bombarding Sri Lanka with war crimes allegations and human rights violations. The diaspora has also become a force to be reckoned with particularly in the UK due to the growing number of Tamils in its electorates and the power they wield and exercise in determining the outcome of elections. The diaspora's persuasive power of titanic proportions is quite effectively projected through the conduct of the British statesmen with regard to the internal affairs of Sri Lanka particularly during the latter stages of the protracted conflict.

Now is the time for the fighting to stop ... Protection of civilians is absolutely paramount in our minds. (*Guardian*, 2009)

These were the words uttered by one-time British Foreign Secretary David Miliband addressing the media while on a one-day visit to Sri Lanka in 2009. Miliband and his French counterpart, Bernard Kouchner rushed to Sri Lanka during the latter and most crucial stages of the protracted conflict under the guise of 'responsibility to protect' to force the Rajapaksa administration to call for 'humanitarian aid and their workers to be allowed in and their fighting to be stopped' (Dayasri, 2011). Moreover former Prime Minister Gordon Brown also had contacted former President Rajapaksa to encourage the latter to cease all hostilities at such a decisive juncture. Furthermore the following leaked cable

from the US Embassy in London in 2009 is concrete proof which indicates the strength of the Tamil diaspora in the UK.

Waite said that much of [Her Majesty's government] and ministerial attention to Sri Lanka is due to the 'very vocal' Tamil diaspora in the UK, numbering over 300,000 who have been protesting in front of parliament ... [W]ith UK elections on the horizon and many Tamils living in Labour constituencies with slim majorities, the government is paying particular attention to Sri Lanka, with Miliband recently remarking to Waite that he was spending 60% of his time at the moment on Sri Lanka. (*Guardian*, 2010)

External intervention was not simply restricted to a mere one-day visit by the aforementioned individuals. In the aftermath of a failed diplomatic approach both Miliband and Kouchner at an informal session of the UNSC enlightened the assembly about the developments in Sri Lanka.

Former Prime Minister David Cameron at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in Colombo in 2013 was not only critical about the conduct of the Rajapaksa administration during the latter stages of the war but also travelled to the Tamil majority Northern Province of Sri Lanka to please the Tamil diaspora at home. The diaspora also had a profound impact on UK elections in 2015 where the Conservative Party Manifesto explicitly provided:

Promote reconciliation and human rights in Sri Lanka, including through supporting the UN investigation into war crimes, which the Prime Minister was instrumental in securing following his historic visit to Jaffna. (*The Conservative Party Manifesto*, 2015: 77)

Sri Lanka in this context, in attempting to mitigate the harshness, has been adopting a constantly fire-fighting approach. Besides it is credible to deduce the fact that Western financial constraints, war crimes and human rights allegations against Sri Lanka are not coincidental. However external factors influencing Sri Lanka's foreign policy orientation transcends beyond the diaspora factor.

Chief Ministers of Tamil Nadu have been vocal critics of Sri Lanka's treatment of the latter's Tamil minority. Moreover South Indian leaders have also been strong advocates of devolution of power in Sri Lanka. In the examination of the dynamics of South Indian politics it will be abundantly clear that hostilities orchestrated by the Federal government of Tamil Nadu have a direct effect on the trajectory of New Delhi's policy towards Colombo. The Tamil Nadu or South Indian influence therefore is another decisive factor which shapes Indo-Lanka relations.

Bilateral relations between these two South Asian states are understood through a spectrum which spans from coercive diplomacy to mutual understandings. The arrival and the departure of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE and even India's hostilities towards Sri Lanka at international human rights fora underscore the sensitivity of Sri Lanka's Tamil issue. Albeit India and Sri Lanka

are neighbours and are members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the New Delhi–Colombo nexus is governed largely by the trust deficit harboured by both. The former's suspicions were exacerbated further by China's penetration into the Sri Lankan economy and by frequent visits made at the Colombo port by Chinese nuclear submarines.

India as the predominant power in South Asia, adopting a condescending approach towards its neighbours was reasonably foreseeable and hence is not capricious. India projected itself as the legitimate inheritor of the British Raj and its foreign policy was crystallized during the Cold War period which was to repel any superpower encroachments in the region. Moreover the notion that South Asia is an Indo-centric sub-continent has elevated India to the status of 'big brother'. Being positioned at the southern strategic front it is not difficult to fathom the bitter experiences Sri Lanka had encountered in conducting its affairs with India. It is further evident that certain policies adopted by India were of an intrusive nature to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. However pragmatic foreign policies of the Bandaranaiques, Jayewardene, and the Rajapaksas had aborted the birth of any military confrontation between the two countries. Nevertheless the *raisons d'être* of Indo–Lanka relations: devolution of power and the rights of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, are exploited by the two main leading political parties in Tamil Nadu at elections to galvanize the support of the masses. At a particular juncture the Tamil Nadu Assembly 'urged the centre to move a resolution in the United Nations Security Council seeking various measures against Sri Lanka, including a referendum on creation of Eelam' (*Hindu*, 2013a). This stance on the Sri Lankan issue was quite evidently reflected through New Delhi's conduct and behaviour at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

In light of the above it is coherent to deduce that the Indian central government is in a precarious position. Strides made by New Delhi in attempting to balance its relations with Colombo while addressing grievances and demands of Tamil Nadu are explained with great lucidity by Stephen Cohen in *India: Emerging Power*:

Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the Indian leadership is to conduct an essentially conservative foreign policy while managing the domestic revolutions ... India's leaders have tried to balance the demands of an active foreign policy with these domestic political pressures.... As its economic and military power grows, New Delhi will be tempted to exploit foreign policy for narrow domestic political advantage. There will be occasions when intervention in the affairs of India's neighbours will seem to be justified, as when ethnic Indians are being persecuted, strategic interests seem to be threatened, or intervention might yield some economic advantage. (Cohen, 2002: 237–241)

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party supremo Karunanidhi's withdrawal from the ruling coalition on the eve of the Geneva resolution on Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha's influence on Indian Premier League cricket matches and her intention to abrogate the '1974 maritime boundary agreement

under which Katchatheevu fell on Sri Lankan side' (*Hindu*, 2013b) impinge crucially on the destiny of Sri Lanka. Hence as the concluding remark, emphatically emphasizing that the South Indian factor acts as a spoiler thus adversely affecting the robust relationship between Colombo and New Delhi is cogent.

Foreign Policy Decision Making

Sri Lanka engenders a clear separation of powers manifested in an Executive Presidency, a legislature and a vibrant judicial system. Being a dualist state, Sri Lanka is a party to a galaxy of treaties and international agreements. Foreign policy in Sri Lanka is determined primarily by the executive and the legislature. The Executive President of Sri Lanka is to 'receive and recognize, and to appoint and accredit Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Plenipotentiaries, and other diplomatic agents'; and to 'declare war and peace' (Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka). According to internationally accepted practice as specified in Article 41(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the principal institution for the conduct of foreign relations is the Ministry of External Affairs. This ensures that in the conduct of foreign relations, various organs of the State speak with one voice. All communications to foreign governments must, in principle, be channelled through the Ministry of External Affairs.

At this juncture it is of cardinal importance *in limine* to examine some of the most crucial questions on the foreign policy orientation of Sri Lanka: Who makes and takes such decisions? Are those powers inherent to the executive or are such powers vested with the legislature? Is the ambit of such powers stipulated in the Constitution or are they customary?

Prior to independence Ceylon's external relations were governed solely by its last colonial master, the British. Such powers were gradually transferred and vested with the Prime Minister as the head of state, since independence. Jeyaratnam Wilson emphatically emphasizes that the transfer of power was a carefully calibrated strategic move orchestrated by the British to maintain its grip on this strategic entrepôt even after independence.

Consequently when power was transferred, Whitehall insisted on external affairs and defence being invested in the office of Prime Minister. Presumably it was hoped that the men who took power, Jinnah (Pakistan), Nehru (India), D. S. Senanayake (Sri Lanka) and Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaya), not having defined foreign policy goals, and being western-oriented, would not merely maintain the Commonwealth connection but also guarantee the protection of British interests in the new environment of independence. (Wilson, 1974: 52)

Moreover H. S. S. Nissanka, a leading academic in the study of Sri Lanka's foreign policy pontificates further that

some foreign students analyzing the foreign policy of Sri Lanka seem to think that the 'attitude of the elite in the ruling party' was a determining factor on the foreign policy of

Sri Lanka. This is a misunderstanding ... the decisions of foreign policy matters had come, as a general procedure, directly from the Prime Ministers. (Nissanka, 1984: 101)

The Prime Minister of Ceylon continued to handle foreign affairs and defence with a Parliamentary Secretary, a *de facto* foreign minister, until the advent of the Executive Presidency in 1978. Albeit the bifurcation of this singular power vested with the Prime Minister into the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs, the Executive President exercised considerable power over both the Cabinet portfolios as the head of state and as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Article 33 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (as amended up to 15th May 2015) which provides the 'duties, powers and functions of the President' also discloses that the President shall have the power 'to make the Statement of Government Policy in Parliament at the commencement of each session of parliament' (The Constitution, Art. 33(2)(a)) and 'to receive and recognize, and to appoint and accredit Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Plenipotentiaries and other diplomatic agents' (The Constitution, Art. 33(2)(d)). Despite the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the chief diplomat, crucial foreign policy decisions are taken either by the executive or are limited to a closed group of confidants. Hence making the Minister literally and metaphorically the chief diplomat who will merely enlighten the international community about policies dictated by the executive. The President as the head of the Cabinet can exercise his Constitutional powers if the Minister of Foreign Affairs misdirects himself fundamentally on external affairs. According to Article 43(3) 'the President may at any time change the assignment of subjects and functions and the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. Such changes shall not affect the continuity of the Cabinet of Ministers and the continuity of its responsibility to Parliament' (The Constitution, Art. 43(3)). In the contemporary context the President as stipulated in the Constitution and by practice wields executive powers in respect of foreign policy decision making whereas the Foreign Minister is responsible for overseeing the international diplomacy of the government of Sri Lanka.

Despite the fact that foreign policy decision making is centred on the President or his confidants, it is a much more complex or 'incremental' process which involves other actors. According to V. P. Dutt:

[Foreign policy is] a product of complex interplay of history, geography, past experiences, present requirements, perception of the ruling elite of national interest and ideological consciousness besides domestic, regional and international affairs. (Dutt, 1984: 1)

The direct involvement and influence of the ruling elite are also pontificated by Prakash Chandra which further emphasizes and negates the fact that the external relations of Sri Lanka are not solely governed by a singular power but are affected by a multiplicity of factors. Chandra in '*International Relations*' stresses that:

[i]n the formulation of foreign policy, the ruling elite plays a decisive role. Since the final shape of foreign policy is the handiwork of these elites, the impact of their views and personality is quite natural. It is the task of policy makers to transform inputs into outputs ... decision making in foreign policy does not mean the formulation of a 'grand design' by a few leaders in terms of their personal wisdom or whims. It is essentially an 'incremental process' involving the interplay of a wide variety of basic determinants. (Chandra, 2004 : 118)

Presidential advisors, ambassadors, diplomats, academics and foreign policy gurus also contribute towards a pragmatic foreign policy. Their insights and perceptions on diplomacy are sacrosanct in avoiding gridlock and in circumventing foreign policy pitfalls in an anarchic self-help international system. Sri Lanka also has a number of think tanks such as the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute (BIDTI), Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRSS), and Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) which concentrate primarily on foreign policy matters.

CEYLON'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (1948–1971)

Sri Lanka's foreign relations prior to independence as discussed in the Introduction were determined solely by Britain. Even after independence in 1948, Sri Lanka's diplomatic relations were in hibernation. D. S. Senanayake (Sri Lanka's first prime minister since independence) supported the Commonwealth hence such an approach was recognized as the 'Commonwealth Phase' post-independence foreign policy of Sri Lanka. Senanayake was from the UNP and its foreign policy orientation, from the inception, engendered pro-Western characteristics. This was further crystallized through the inking of a Defence Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ceylon in 1947 where Senanayake signed on behalf of the Government of Ceylon. Dudley Senanayake followed his predecessor's footsteps by establishing a closer nexus with the West. Dudley Senanayake was also from the UNP and was in office only for a year. Nevertheless the latter was re-elected in 1965 where he dealt with China's membership in the UN.

Sir John Kotelawala, albeit being also from the UNP, sought to establish relations with the East hence drastically changing post-independence Sri Lanka's foreign policy trajectory. According to Shelton Kodikara:

UNP Prime Ministers' 'non-alignment' consisted primarily of three elements: first, opposition to colonialism; second opposition to all forms of arms production and the armaments race and nuclear testing and nuclear weapons production in particular; third, rejection of the idea of collective security as the proper defence against Communism. (Kodikara, 1992: 104)

A significant milestone in Sri Lanka's international relations was the 1952 Rubber-Rice Pact which was signed between China and Sri Lanka. It is argued

that Kotelawala did not intend to look to China but a multitude of factors pursued him to conduct external relations in such a manner. The global political and economic landscape was in rapid transformation in the 1950s. The period was marked by a rapid rise of rubber prices and domestic political complexities such as the rationing of rice to the public being a domestic election issue. In such a backdrop Kotelawala had no other opportunity but to enter into a pact with China. However this shift in Sri Lanka's foreign policy signified the beginning of closer ties with the East while prolonging ties with the West. Hence Sri Lanka began performing a balancing act between the East and the West which continues to this date.

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the fourth Prime Minister of Ceylon and acclaimed 'Silver Bell of Asia', albeit a founding member of the UNP, later established the SLFP through which he became the head of state. Bandaranaike did not only abrogate the Defence Agreement with the UK thus resulting in the removal of the British air and naval bases in Ceylon, but also adopted a neutral foreign policy with the intention of making Ceylon 'Asia's Switzerland'. In addition he strengthened Sino-Lanka relations since the 1955 Bandung Conference. The Joint Statement by the Heads of Governments of Ceylon and China in 1957 acknowledges that,

[o]ur two countries have been bound by ties of friendship for many centuries. While recognizing and respecting differences of outlook that may exist between us, we are determined to strengthen those ties, develop our economic cooperation to our mutual benefit and in the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world peace. (Jayawardane, 2005: 118)

Following Bandaranaike's assassination, his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike was elected as the first female prime minister in the world in 1960. Her government adopted a non-aligned foreign policy but giving greater emphasis to Sino-Lanka ties and Afro-Asian solidarity. Sri Lanka was one of the first States in the international arena to support the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan and to recognize the former as a nation state in the global community. As Ceylon's ambassador in China A. B. Perera delivering a speech on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of Ceylon's independence in 1962 opined:

The Government of Ceylon are firm in their belief that only the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and its Organizations. We oppose all attempts to create 'two-Chinas' or any other variation of the 'two-China' theory. In the stand already taken and the stand it will take in the future, government of Ceylon is fortified by the fact that international law, international practice and the high principles embodied in the United Nations Charter are all on its side. (Jayawardane, 2005: 190)

Mrs Bandaranaike's commitment to regional peace and security was reflected through 'The Mini Summit of December 1962 where on her own initiative she convened a meeting of six heads of states to help resolve the Sino-Indian border conflict' (Ministry of External Affairs). Moreover, controversies surrounding the alleged offer of [a] naval base to China and the Sri Lanka-China Maritime

Agreement of 1963 underscore historical strategic links between the two states (Muni, 2012: 246).

SRI LANKA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1972–1993)

J. R. Jayewardene (JR), who became Prime Minister in 1977 and subsequent to amending the Constitution crowned himself as Sri Lanka's first Executive President in 1978, adopted a dynamic and a pragmatic foreign policy. His pro-Western policies were completely contrary to that of his predecessors. Jayewardene was nicknamed 'Yankee Dickie' for his strong affiliations with the United States as mirrored through this chapter's introductory quotation. He was also instrumental in establishing a long-lasting friendship between Japan and Sri Lanka.

In 1951, he led his country's delegation to the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco. Quoting the Buddha, he famously declared, 'Hatred ceases not by hatred but by love', moving the other 51 nations to view Japan with compassion. (J. R. Jayewardene Centre website)

JR's 'Look East' policy and his pro-US stance in international affairs not only antagonized India but also adversely affected Beijing–Colombo relations. Furthermore the Ministry of External Affairs depicts JR's foreign policy as 'multidimensional and a blend of several elements'. His two terms were plagued by an insurrection in the South and by terrorism in the North of the country. Hence his administration was pressurized by the international community for alleged human rights violations and by India on the terrorism issue. However JR's special relationship with Washington in the Cold War period did not serve any purpose in overcoming unpardonable inroads made by India into the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. India under the Premiership of Rajiv Gandhi forced JR into signing the Indo-Lanka Accord as the ultimate solution for the LTTE issue. In a context where India and Israel were in fact training LTTE cadres, JR

was seeking anti-terrorist assistance from Israel, since Western countries including the USA declined his similar requests. J.R. Jayewardene's request for military assistance was once again rejected by the US when he sent his Minister for Internal security Lalit Athulathmudali, to Washington in January, 1985. (Yatanoor, 1997: 87)

Albeit JR attempted to establish a strong nexus between Washington and Colombo, Washington had been coordinating its Sri Lanka policy with New Delhi. As one senior Sri Lankan government minister commented:

What went on between Colombo and Washington was no secret to India because the US kept New Delhi well informed of whatever discussion Colombo had with Washington about the Sri Lankan problem. (Jayawardane, 1995: 204–231)

Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was Prime Minister in the Jayewardene administration became the third Executive President in 1989. A noticeable feature of his

foreign policy was that he did not possess a concrete set of policies with regard to diplomacy. His government was criticized for human rights violations by the West despite the fact that it was a UNP government. Sri Lanka hardly had any interactions with China during his term in office since more emphasis was on domestic politics and Indo-Lanka relations. The Premadasa administration's capricious and hostile actions antagonized both India and Israel. India was displeased by Premadasa's declaration of an ultimatum to withdraw the IPKF.

The lowest point in Indo-Sri Lanka relations after the withdrawal of the IPKF was the cancellation of the sixth SAARC Summit scheduled to be held in Colombo from 7–9 November 1991. (Jayawardane, 1995: 204–231)

Sri Lanka had miscalculated its steps.... When many were not unwilling to intervene in the ethnic conflict and thereby antagonize India, Israel stepped in and was allowed to open an interest section in Sri Lanka.... following the withdrawal of Indian troops in March 1990, President Ranasinghe Premadasa, known for his populist foreign policy, ordered the closure of the Israeli mission. (Goldstein, 1999: 142)

Another foreign policy blunder of the Premadasa administration was the dismemberment of intimate and cordial ties enjoyed with Israel during the decisive stages of the protracted conflict. Albeit Israel was instrumental in providing much needed military supplies for the Sri Lankan armed forces, ties with Israel were severed subsequent to the withdrawal of the IPKF.

As the concluding remark it is cogent to deduce the fact that every Prime Minister and Executive President, whether from the UNP or the SLFP, had conducted diplomatic relations in a manner compatible to the national interest of Sri Lanka. Their foreign policy decisions were aimed at protecting the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of this small island nation. However drastic tectonic shifts in Sri Lanka's foreign policy will be examined in the next section while closely scrutinizing a majority of the contemporary issues affecting external relations.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (1994–PRESENT)

Chandrika Bandaranaike's Foreign Policy

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was elected as the fifth executive president of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in 1994. According to the Ministry of External Affairs of Sri Lanka

[t]he assumption of office by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in 1994, saw a dramatic transformation in Sri Lanka's foreign relations, giving Sri Lanka a new dignity and a new image within the comity of nations. These policies have been further enhanced after the assumption of office by President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005. (Ministry of External Affairs Sri Lanka)

Furthermore according to a review of activities conducted during 1994–1998 by the said Ministry it was concluded that 'in the realm of Foreign Relations the

period under review has been a dramatic transformation, giving Sri Lanka a new dignity'. According to the report the People's Alliance (PA) government has succeeded in the following areas:

- Correcting the imbalances that had earlier plagued Sri Lanka's foreign relations.
- Restoring relations with many countries which had hitherto suffered through neglect.
- The acceptance by the international community of the sincerity of purpose displayed by President Kumaratunga in trying to resolve the ethnic problem.
- The changed attitude of her government towards the promotion and protection of human rights.
- PA administration's ongoing efforts abroad at building investor confidence and promoting Sri Lanka as a gate way to South Asia. (Sivarajah, 2004)

Against this backdrop Lakshman Kadirgamar was selected as the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka from 1994 to 2001 under the Kumaratunga administration. Albeit his conduct as the Foreign Minister ceased in 2001 with the diffusion of legislative power to the UNP he continued as the special advisor on foreign affairs to Kumaratunga. Kadirgamar's first official visit to China in 1995 followed by Kumaratunga's state visit to China as the head of state in 1996 suggest that the Kumaratunga administration had considered Sino-Lanka relations are paramount. Kadirgamar was assassinated by an LTTE sniper in 2005.

Ranil Wickremesinghe's Foreign Policy

Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected as the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka subsequent to the UNP's victory at the 2001 Provincial Council elections thus making him the leader of the legislature while Kumaratunga of the PA continued as the Executive President. This eccentric combination plunged the government into gridlock.

Wickremesinghe is a nephew of JR and the latter as articulated above enjoyed a special relationship with the Reagan administration. However, Wickremesinghe was entertained by George W. Bush in July 2002 where the former acquiesced Sri Lanka to be exploited as a transit point for the CIA's extraordinary-rendition programme in 2003 (*Nation*, 2015). During his Premiership which lasted only for a brief period of 3 years, Norway acted as the facilitator for the peace process between the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the LTTE between 2000–2006 where the parties inked a ceasefire Agreement. Wickremesinghe significantly tilted towards the West with the motives of garnering international support to resolve the protracted conflict through a political solution, to attract much required foreign direct investments (FDI), and to extricate Sri Lanka out of the West's human rights orbit. The involvement of international heavyweights such as the EU, the United States, Japan, and Norway in the aforementioned peace process as co-chairs provides a glimpse into Wickremesinghe's foreign policy.

Although traditionally the UNP hierarchy is accustomed to foster ties with the West, Wickremesinghe was adamant in strengthening ties with China. He was

accompanied by Tyrone Fernando, the foreign minister of his administration where the delegation entered into a number of Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Tourism promotion and FDI being key areas of cooperation it is coherent to deduce that Wickremesinghe intended to 'cement stronger political, economic, and cultural ties with China'.

Mahinda Rajapaksa's Foreign Policy

Mahinda Rajapaksa addressing the nation as the sixth Executive President on the 65th independence anniversary celebrations held at the Eastern port city of Trincomalee reiterated that

Sri Lanka's foreign policy is that of non-alignment. It is necessary for us to build a new era in foreign affairs based on this policy. This is essential for the freedom of Sri Lanka today. In addition to our traditional relations we have established new links with Asian, African, Arab, and Latin American countries. (President, 2013)

This exact policy was encouraged through his election manifesto titled 'Mahinda Chinthana' where he also emphasized that he would

follow a non-aligned, free and progressive foreign policy. Priority will be given in the political, defence, economic, trade and cultural spheres to the cordial and friendly relationships that we already have with countries in the Asian region including India, Japan, China and Pakistan. It is my belief that the United Nations Organization and International Financial Institutions should be more democratic in their approach. We will actively intervene in this regard. It is my intention to strongly implement international treaties, declarations on anti-corruption. This will enable us to act under international law against those found guilty of corruption, when engaging in trade with foreign countries or foreign institutions. (Ministry of External Affairs Sri Lanka)

While grappling with the contemporary world order and the diffusion of power from the West to the East, it is highly questionable whether Sri Lanka has been competent in balancing its relations with the existing sole superpower in the West and with the emerging superpower in the East. Besides, Sri Lanka emerging victorious from the war against terrorism, has embarked upon a rapid development programme with the intention of transforming itself into the wonder of Asia. However, in such a context, China's growing influence over Sri Lanka, China replacing Sri Lanka's traditional donors – the United States, Japan, Canada and the EU – and China defending Sri Lanka on the international stage are tangible evidence to refute the fact that non-alignment is at the crux of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. Moreover this also suggests that Rajapaksa's 'Pro-China' policy has begun to encroach upon the orthodox non-aligned policy. The reason for such a shift in the orthodox policy as opined by Rajapaksa is that 'the end of Sri Lanka's civil war has ushered in a new era in the nation's foreign policy. But in the aftermath of the LTTE defeat, there is likely to be growing strategic rivalry between India and China, something which will also complicate

Sri Lanka's relations with the West' (Ranasinghe, 2010). Sri Lanka's engagement with African states, Russia, and many Eastern European states further explains Rajapaksa's hostility towards the West.

The primary cause for such a shift was that Sri Lanka was specifically and unfairly targeted on the international stage by the West when the country was hungry for post-conflict economic development. China has surpassed the United States, Japan and other traditional donors to Sri Lanka while further dwarfing the involvement of India, Middle Eastern states, and the EU. China has also been unreservedly supporting Sri Lanka in confronting diplomatic challenges and further has been strengthening military and defence ties.

When the US ended direct military aid in 2007 over Sri Lanka's deteriorating human rights record, China leapt in to the breach, increasing aid to nearly \$1billion (£690m) to become the island's biggest donor, giving tens of millions of dollars' worth of sophisticated weapons, and making a free gift of six F7 fighter jets to the Sri Lankan Air Force. China encouraged its ally Pakistan to sell more arms and to train pilots to fly the new planes. (*Independent*, 2010)

Sri Lanka under Rajapaksa was designed and determined to become the hub and the wonder of Asia. Sri Lanka's geostrategic significance, hosting international sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) has attracted the interest of the energy hungry rising dragon hence making the island a pearl of the 'string of pearls'. There is further strong evidence to indicate that China is to surpass the United States as the economic and military superpower. In such an environment it is prudent to revitalize Sri Lanka's 'Look East' policy further amalgamated with a 'Pro-China' policy which existed since the recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1950. In constructing a regional strategy it is judicious to take into account the following issues:

- The US will remain as the world's superpower for at least another decade or two.
- India is Sri Lanka's big brother which has a higher influence than China; hence, any strategic move should not antagonise India.
- Sri Lanka's China Policy has to be worked out in the context of a possible strategic cooperation between the US and China in the future.
- China would not go any extra mile beyond the strategic objectives in assisting Sri Lanka as was evident in its refusal to give Sri Lanka a US\$500 million loan to buy petroleum products.
- No single superpower will succeed in the Indian Ocean Region and therefore, India and China both will remain as superpowers in the region for the conceivable future.
- Sri Lanka should aim at building neutral strategic cooperation with the US, India and China on the basis of Sri Lanka's national interest. (*Sunday Times*, 2013)

It is very logical to deduce further that the Rajapaksa administration pivoted increasingly towards China because of the war crimes and human rights path pursued by the United States, Canada and the UK. Albeit being the immediate neighbour, Sri Lanka may also have many reservations in selecting India over China for economic and military assistance.

India sponsoring the LTTE, training and financial assistance provided to the LTTE in destabilizing Sri Lanka in the past, India's federal system and its impact on the Central government, India's isolationism towards the latter stages of the conflict in 2009, and India's behaviour at the UNHRC disregarding South Asian solidarity have undoubtedly pushed Sri Lanka towards China's orbit. Under the Rajapaksa administration Sri Lanka's relations with the West were deteriorating rapidly.

The growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and India's neighbouring countries has made it clear that China is following a planned strategy to encircle India which has implications for India's security. At the same time Sri Lanka has a right to develop close relations with China. Though Sri Lanka has taken care not to allow its alliance with China to offend India and has repeatedly clarified that it will keep India's security concern in mind and will not compromise India's security interests. (UKEssays, n.d.)

Meanwhile India remains concerned about the inroads made by the Chinese in their own backyard. New Delhi is naturally cautious about growing Chinese investments in mega projects and infrastructure development projects in Sri Lanka. Moreover, India remains wary of China's so-called 'String of Pearls' and the Maritime Silk Road in which Sri Lanka was earmarked as a hub. India's anxiety was amplified when the Rajapaksa administration twice facilitated the docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo in September and November 2014. (*Diplomat*, 2015)

Against this backdrop, Canada protesting against Sri Lanka hosting the CHOGM in 2013, the UK calling for an international investigation into war crimes committed in the latter stages of the conflict, the United States relentlessly pursuing a diabolical approach against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC, and the EU depriving Sri Lanka of the Generalized System of Preferences, GSP+, are some factors which suggest that Sri Lanka's relations with the West were at a low ebb during the Rajapaksa administration.

To counter Chinese influence, India has been forced to step up its diplomatic offensive and offer Colombo reconstruction aid.... However, where New Delhi will have to continue to balance its domestic sensitivities and strategic interests, Beijing faces no such constraint in developing even stronger ties with Colombo. As a consequence, India is struggling to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than China. (Pant, 2012: 44)

Even though Mahinda Rajapaksa enjoyed the support of the majority Sinhala Buddhists in the South for defeating the LTTE and ending the protracted conflict in 2009, he was defeated in the 2015 Presidential election failing to garner the support of the Tamil minority. Robert D. Kaplan in his book '*Monsoon*' reports:

One diplomat told me that the West should simply ostracize the Rajapaksa regime and not worry about it becoming a linchpin of Chinese great-power strategy. As he saw it, hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese money invested in the US economy was more central to American interests than one more Chinese-built port in the Indian Ocean which, in any case, was of greater concern to the Indian and Japanese navies than to America's. (Kaplan, 2010: 337)

However the diplomat's calculations seem to have palpable contradictions given the *dénouement* of the General elections. The UNP of which Wickremesinghe is

the leader, won the 2015 elections consolidating 106 seats of the 225-member parliament thus defeating the former strongman Mahinda Rajapaksa of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA).

Maithripala Sirisena's Foreign Policy

Maithripala Sirisena was elected as the seventh Executive President of Sri Lanka in 2015 and established a national unity government with the UNP thus making Ranil Wickremesinghe the Prime Minister. The Sirisena–Wickremesinghe government since the fall of the Rajapaksa administration has made rapid progression in recalibrating Sri Lanka's foreign policy. Through a joint article written to *The Diplomat* the author had attempted to identify Sirisena's foreign policy during his first 100 days in office:

The Sirisena administration has shown no hesitation in changing the pro-China policy of Rajapaksa while also looking to repair the damage done to Colombo's ties with the United States, India, and the European Union. The temporary suspension of the Colombo Port City Project was one of the initial moves of the new administration. (*Diplomat*, 2015)

Moreover US–Sri Lanka bilateral relations were strengthened with Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Sri Lanka. A week after the elections the United States had begun to make strategic inroads into this South Asian entrêpot. Washington's growing influence is primarily aimed at diluting the influence of the rising dragon in Sri Lanka. In addition, Google's commitment in Sri Lanka to provide universal internet coverage through balloon-powered drones hovering above the skies of a sovereign state is no mere coincidence. Albeit the architect of 'Google Loon' is a Sri Lankan-born millionaire entrepreneur, the ulterior motive and enigmatic designs of Google in Sri Lanka at this juncture cannot be ignored.

Sirisena was invited by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the G7 summit held in May 2016 which was considered a rare honour given to a head of state of a middle-income country. In addition both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are making frequent trips to Brussels with the intention of bolstering ties with the EU and regaining GSP+. Western leaders have also complimented President Sirisena for the positive developments made in peace-building, reconciliation and human rights. This new administration has also attempted to reset Colombo's ties with New Delhi by diluting the suspicions generated during the Rajapaksa administration. Sirisena's first State visit to India 'marked a new chapter in Indo-Lanka relations. The visits came with the ulterior motive of restoring ties between the two countries to a state of "irreversible excellence"' (*Diplomat*, 2015). The Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), a free trade agreement which the Rajapaksa administration delayed is to be inked between the current governments of India and Sri Lanka amidst much opposition from Sri Lankan professionals. Even though the new

Donald Trump administration has cast doubts over the practicality of the TPP, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka had expressed that Sri Lanka has the intention of joining the TPP.

China is frustrated and disappointed with the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe administration's foreign policy as recently remarked by the Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka Yi Xianliang. Addressing the media the ambassador criticized certain comments made by Sri Lanka's finance minister on Chinese loans being 'expensive' (*Hindu*, 2016) and also reckoned that the Chinese companies had incurred losses due to the delay of the Colombo Port City Project. Conversely although Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has made many high-level State visits to China and had praised Chinese investments in Sri Lanka through his speeches on the global stage, the conduct of his administration raises a multitude of rhetorical questions hence resulting in confusion. Nevertheless it is strikingly clear that the Sirisena administration has not embraced China as his predecessor but has only looked to China for financial assistance. China since the establishment of the Sirisena administration has been suspicious of the continuity of the 'strategic cooperative partnership' established during the Rajapaksa administration. Unhindered access granted to Chinese submarines during the former regime has now come to an abrupt halt. When a senior Sri Lankan Navy delegation was entertained on the US Navy's aircraft carrier USS *Carl Vinson* a few days before Kerry's visit, 'the new Sri Lankan government declined permission for Chinese vessels to dock in the country' (Press Trust of India, 2015).

CONCLUSION

Each of the five imagined scenes depicts the mouth of a great river beneath a rocky outcrop. In the first, *The Savage State*, a lush wilderness is populated by a handful of hunter-gatherers eking out a primitive existence at the break of a stormy dawn. The second picture, *The Arcadian or Pastoral State*, is of an agrarian idyll: the inhabitants have cleared the trees, planted fields, and built an elegant Greek temple. The third and largest of the paintings is *The Consummation of Empire*. Now, the landscape is covered by a magnificent marble entrepôt, and the contended farmer-philosophers of the previous tableau have been replaced by a throng of opulently clad merchants, proconsuls, and citizen-consumers. It is midday in the life cycle. Then comes *Destruction*. The city is ablaze, its citizens fleeing an invading horde that rapes and pillages beneath a brooding evening sky. Finally, the moon rises over the fifth painting, *Desolation*. There is not a living soul to be seen, only a few decaying columns and colonnades overgrown by briars and ivy. (Ferguson, 2010: 18–32)

Niall Ferguson, the Professor of History at Harvard University depicts the rise and fall of an empire and a great power. He was influenced by a series of five paintings, *The Course of Empire*, depicting the life cycle of a great power, hanging in the New York Historical Society, mastered by Thomas Cole. The basic assumption is that 'all empires, no matter how magnificent, are condemned to decline and fall' (Ferguson, 2010: 18–32). Ferguson has compared the pentaptych with the United States and hence has framed the latter within the mutable life cycle of a great

power. In light of the drastic transformations reshaping the contemporary anarchic system into a multipolar power structure, United States supremacy in global affairs and its clout has begun to descend. This symphony, marked with a *crescendo*, *legato*, and finally *decrescendo* is no comforting tune for the United States which is plagued by a financial crisis. The author opines that Washington has not yet come fully to grips with the reality of systemic changes in the international arena. Estranged, the United States is anxiously progressing towards uncertainty.

China is to fill this vacuum by carrying the mantle of leadership in a recalibrated global system. China's rise dubbed as 'peaceful development' or 'peaceful rise' is contrastingly different from the rise of other great power *arrivistes* such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union (USSR). China has been to a greater extent successful in replacing hard power with smart power and projecting the latter. Rosemary Foot and Barry Buzan have been sharing similar sentiments and have been actively engaging and contributing towards an intellectual conversation on China's Rise and its impact on the world order.

To comprehend Sri Lanka's dramatic shift in its diplomatic relations one must first grasp the changes manifest in the contemporary context. The emergence of China in an Asian century and its impact on the balance of power must be carefully perused in making a pragmatic foreign policy. However since 1994 both UNP and UPFA leaders pursued a pro-China policy while not strictly adhering to non-alignment. From Chandrika Bandaranaike's state visit to China in 1996 to Rajapaksa's scheduled Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Xi Jinping in 2014 both countries have experienced strong and cordial relations although the current administration is an exception. Further, Sri Lanka's shift in foreign policy since 1994 is not due to the nature of the political party but due to the following foreign policy determinants:

1. A new world order is being carved by the diffusion of power from the West to the East in the Asian century.

The international community is aware of the ascent of China and the foreseeable repercussions of such a revolutionary transformation. As articulated in previous sections China intends to reshape the global order ensuring that China will emerge as the sole superpower in a multipolar world. Sri Lanka while accepting the 'big power–small power' relationship shall definitely consider itself to be privileged to foster a strategic nexus with this Asian Titan. In an international system where Sri Lanka is being unfairly targeted by the West on human rights issues, China will constitute an iron curtain which defends a small south Asian power from diabolical machinations of the West.

2. Immense political and economic pressures exerted on Sri Lanka by the West. The EU deprived Sri Lanka of GSP+, Canada protested over Sri Lanka's chairmanship of the Commonwealth, the UK threatened the Rajapaksa administration

with an international inquiry into human rights violations and war crimes, and the US-sponsored resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC while also reducing the amount of aid granted to Sri Lanka. However, conversely, China has defended Sri Lanka in international fora and has provided financial assistance to bolster and promote post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. It is logical therefore to adopt a pro-China policy when the West is adopting increasingly hostile policies towards Sri Lanka.

3. Growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Sri Lanka is dubbed the 'pearl of the Indian Ocean'. This is no mere metaphor given the importance attributed to the strategic choke points in the IOR in China's 'String of Pearls'. Both China and India are emerging powers and rapidly industrializing nations in Asia. Hence the security of SLOCs is of cardinal importance since it also ensures an unhindered, constant supply of much needed natural and petroleum resources through the Indian Ocean. China has been actively engaging with Sri Lanka to ensure safe passage of its supply ships through the Indian Ocean given the rise of piracy in the region. Moreover, China establishing mega ports in Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar has heightened India's fear of encirclement. As a consequence of naval arms races between India and China synthesized with their volatile history, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become increasingly insecure. This rivalry, animosity, and suspicion undoubtedly has had a resounding effect on Sri Lanka's foreign policy. At this juncture deducing that Sri Lanka is a 'buffer state' plagued by a security dilemma is cogent. Albeit it is essential for Sri Lanka to maintain equidistance in a tripartite relationship, Colombo seems much more comfortable with an intimate nexus with Beijing.

4. China's extensive use and projection of smart power.

Buddhism has been the singularly powerful soft power used by China in strengthening its relations with Sri Lanka. A majority of Chinese leaders are Buddhist and are cautious about Wahhabists and *jihadists* infiltrating China's Xinjiang province thus making it volatile. China, being concerned about the terrorist activities of the religious extremists, has made anti-terrorism policies a priority in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Professor Patrick Mendis underscores the significance of Buddhism in bonding the marriage between China and Sri Lanka:

The tower, named in deference to the Buddha's Lotus Sutra, is being paid for by Beijing. Cementing longstanding historical ties as well as reaffirming the Buddhist bonds between China and Sri Lanka, the Chinese-funded telecommunications tower is a physical manifestation of Beijing's foreign policy slogan of a peaceful rising. The Lotus Tower shrewdly embodies a Buddhist emblem of Peace; it also harkens back to the ancient power that once radiated from the Middle Kingdom. The construction of the tower comes at a time when India and the United States have purposefully reengaged with strategic Sri Lanka to rebalance international relations and power structure in the region. (Mendis, 2013: 1)

5. Sri Lanka's two main political parties and their diverse allegiances.

Since independence the liberal UNP has practised a pro-Western foreign policy while a more nationalist UPFA government orchestrated either a non-aligned or pro-Chinese foreign policy. The inking of the Rubber-Rice Pact in 1952 under a UNP administration was nevertheless an exception which was mainly driven by global economic compulsions and domestic political constraints. The period between 1994 and 2014 is marked by three administrations as discussed in the previous section where diverse foreign policy orientations were widely examined.

Assessing the above factors it is judicious to infer that Sri Lanka had been pursuing a pro-China policy until the election of Maithripala Sirisena. The pro-China policy was strictly adhered to by the Rajapaksa administration mainly due to the economic and political pressures exerted on Sri Lanka by the West, based simply on tenacious and concocted evidence on human rights violations and war crimes. The Sirisena–Wickremesinghe administration seems to harbour a certain degree of animosity towards China while tilting towards the West with the intention of salvaging Sri Lanka from human rights and war crimes allegations thus enhancing Sri Lanka's profile and stature and giving the country increased influence in international affairs. However given the dynamics in US politics where Donald Trump is the President, and given the rise of the political right in Europe, drastic policy changes can be anticipated in Washington, Brussels, and Colombo. Against this backdrop President Sirisena, addressing the public in Galle, recently disclosed that he intends to request the Trump administration to remove Sri Lanka from the UNHRC agenda (*Fox News*, 2016, updated current version provided in Annexure I).

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ANNEXURE I

Albeit almost 3 years have lapsed since the intimation of such an intention, no tangible steps were taken by the West to exclude Sri Lanka from the UNHRC agenda.

Sri Lanka's dreams of perpetual peace and unprecedented prosperity were shattered on 21st April 2019 when three churches and three high-end luxury hotels in Sri Lanka's commercial capital, Colombo were rocked by suicide bomb blasts killing 253 locals and 42 foreign nationals (Xinhua, 2019) to which the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility. The group's news agency, Amaq, stressed that 'the bombings had been intended to target Christians, as well as citizens of countries belonging to the coalition fighting the Islamic State, also known as ISIS' (New York Times, 2019). Among the dead foreigners were four Chinese scientists from the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (SCSIO) and from the First Institute of Oceanography under the Ministry of Natural Resources (The Island, 2019). They were to cooperate with Sri Lankan scientists on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project. In such a backdrop the United States has pushed for the inking of the Acquisition of Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Sri Lanka. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe speaking in Parliament stressed that these are not agreements per se but letters signed between the US embassy and the Foreign Ministry of Sri Lanka. He further emphasized that,

these agreements generally establish the framework under which US military personnel operate in a foreign country. SOFA provides for rights and privileges of covered individuals while in foreign jurisdictions and how the laws of foreign jurisdictions apply to US personnel. These letters were exchanged in May, 1995 during the Presidency of Chandrika Kumaratunga... Subsequently President Mahinda Rajapaksa also signed another agreement; the ACSA in 2007.... The Defence Ministry took steps to renew this agreement on August 4, 2017" (Sunday Times, 2019).

However the opposition alleges that the agreements signed in 2007 and 2017 are contrastingly different and the latter encompasses clauses which are inimical to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

Moreover Mahinda Rajapaksa, the leader of the opposition disclosed in Parliament that Prasad Kariyawasam, a one-time foreign secretary who is accused of pushing for the ACSA, had been appointed as the international affairs adviser to the Speaker of the Parliament. Rajapaksa further protested against the fact that the adviser's pay is being funded by a US federal agency. Dinesh Gunawardena, as a member of the opposition emphatically emphasized that 'the joint opposition will make a formal appeal to the Speaker to remove Kariyawasam from his post since he had caused irreparable damage to Sri Lanka's national interests' (*Sunday Times*, 2019a). In light of such developments, President Sirisena has categorically stated that 'although there are discussions in the society about agreements

such as SOFA and Millennium Challenge and a Land Act which is not suitable to the country, I will leave no room to sign such detrimental agreements' (*Daily Mirror*, 2019).

At this juncture it must be understood that the government which was established in 2015 is spending its final few months in office before the Presidential election which is scheduled to be held in December 2019. Hostilities between the President and the Prime Minister have intensified since the Easter Sunday attacks where the Prime Minister alleges that he was not privy to any security council meetings chaired by the President. Conversely, the President has vehemently opposed the conduct of the Parliamentary select committee on the Easter bombings while the Prime Minister insists that its proceedings cannot be challenged even by the Executive President. With regard to the Easter attacks the President said that 'I want to be clear that I am not shunning away from responsibility but I state that the government should take the responsibility for this... Similarly, the liability for weakening the intelligence units, imprisoning intelligence chiefs, weakening the three forces must be borne by the government and all its parties' (*Sunday Observer*, 2019).

However Rajapaksa seems to still enjoy the support of the Sinhala Buddhists in the South which was reflected through the landslide victory of his political party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) at Local elections in February 2018. The party is chaired by the former Minister of External Affairs Professor G. L. Peiris and has already intimated that Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, a former defence secretary will be introduced as the candidate for the upcoming presidential election. The UNP of which Ranil Wikremesinghe is the leader, has fractured due to the demands by factions within the party to change the leadership and to introduce a new candidate for the election. The SLFP of which Maithripala Sirisena is the leader, since its underperformance at Local elections in 2018, is still undecided as to amalgamate with the SLPP or to contest alone.

Colvin R. de Silva, in *Ceylon under British Occupation 1795–1833* which was first published in 1941 recognizes the nexus between domestic political compulsions and foreign interference in Sri Lanka as, 'a petty state, mediaeval in structure, unprogressive in ideas, parochial in policy and diplomacy and rent by internal dissensions, could not anyhow checked the advance of a modern imperial power' (*Sunday Times*, 2018). The United States seem to have understood the paralysed state of affairs of the government in power in Colombo since the Easter Sunday attacks and have exploited the window of opportunity to fast-track the inking of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA). Albeit Alaina B. Teplitz, the US ambassador to Sri Lanka stressed that 'these are kinds of agreements that countries make in order to facilitate their security and defence relationships. And they are done to avoid many hours of negotiating every time we have a visit' (*Ada Derana*, 2019). The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna / People's Liberation Party (JVP) members disclosed in parliament that certain provisions of the proposed agreements are

inimical and capricious to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka (*The Island*, 2019). Such concerns were the bone of contention at the meeting between Foreign Minister Tilak Marapana and the Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo on the SOFA. The Foreign Minister had 'raised issues on some of the provisions in SOFA, including the provision relating to immunity being provided to foreign servicemen on Sri Lankan soil. He said these were matters that related to diplomatic immunity, privilege, and local laws' (*Sunday Times*, 2019b). In addition the minister had held discussions with the National Security Advisor, John Bolton where 'the use of the Indian Ocean through a "rule based order", a reference that the US uses aimed at neutralizing the growing Chinese maritime influence in the seas' (*Sunday Times*, 2019) was highlighted. In this backdrop, the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan in his critique, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783* are of cardinal importance. Mahan opined that the main strategy of sea power is the "command of the sea" – the ability to deny use of the sea as a means of transportation to an enemy while simultaneously protecting one's own merchant shipping – and the ability to use the sea to project power ashore while denying that capability to the enemy' (*Sunday Times*, 2018). Hence it is clearly evident that the United States has locked Sri Lanka into its Indo-Pacific Strategy and has an ulterior motive of diluting Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.

Bangladesh Foreign Policy: The Last 45 Years

Imtiaz Ahmed

INTRODUCTION

Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) is credited to have said, ‘foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy’. Domestic compulsions, as it is argued, dictate the making and remaking of a country’s foreign policy. The statement has been challenged many a time, indeed, not only on grounds of flagging the importance of idiosyncratic variables, particularly in authoritarian regimes, whether democratic or non-democratic, but also, and this is more recently, on account of globalization, which has tended to blur the distinction between the internal and external, domestic and foreign. Still the Bismarckian legacy is strong as ever, particularly in an age where many scholars think that domestic compulsions ought to make a difference to the country’s foreign policy. The foreign policy of Bangladesh, with 45 years of experience now, is no exception and is, indeed, an interesting case to consider, particularly on the issue of domestic compulsions. A closer look at Bangladesh foreign policy, which has gone through several phases since the time of the country’s independence, makes this clear.

DIPLOMACY OF RECOGNITION

The first phase of Bangladesh foreign policy could be referred to as the *diplomacy of recognition*, which included the policy of bringing back Bangladeshis stranded in Pakistan because of the break-up of the latter. Several

countries did not recognize Bangladesh at the initial stage of its independence in December 1971. The United States, China, and some Arab countries tilted towards Pakistan during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh (March–December 1971) and more particularly during the Indo-Pakistan War in December 1971. One of the first foreign policy challenges that Bangladesh faced was to change the position of those who had favoured Pakistan and have them recognize and support the newly independent country. This was also the time of the ‘Cold War’, which complicated further Bangladesh’s position internationally, as it meant that ‘if you are not with us, then you are against us’. Bangladesh’s economy was tied to the United States, and it was desperate to reconcile its relationship with the latter. The United States’ recognition came in April 1972, but Bangladesh had to wait to get recognition from the rest of those who had sided with Pakistan.

This came about in 1974 when Pakistan was hosting the Organisation of Islamic Countries Conference (OIC) in Lahore in February 1974. It was becoming extremely difficult for the OIC not to invite Bangladesh, which was then the second largest Muslim populated country in the world after Indonesia. Several key leaders of the OIC came to Dhaka and impressed upon Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to join the Conference, which he gladly did. By joining the conference, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman not only got the recognition of the Arab countries but also managed to get Pakistan’s recognition. Critics point out that India did not take this development in good spirit, and soon after this the relationship between Bangladesh and India began to falter. The issue of enclaves, for instance, may be cited as a case in point.

Bangladesh and India have over 200 enclaves:¹ 111 are exchangeable Indian enclaves in Bangladesh (totalling 17,160.63 acres) and 11 non-exchangeable enclaves (totalling 3,799.35 acres) – *non-exchangeable* because India has no control over or access to these. Bangladeshi enclaves in India total 95, out of which 51 (totalling 7,110.02 acres) are exchangeable and some 5,128.52 acres are non-exchangeable. In May 1974 both countries agreed to exchange enclaves and agreed to allow the people residing in the enclaves to either stay where they are or move to their parent country. While Bangladesh enacted legislation to actualize the May 1974 Agreement in November of the same year, India decided not to ratify the Agreement and asked for an amendment.

But why did India request a change of the text of the May 1974 Agreement after Bangladesh had ratified the Agreement in the Parliament and again barely five days before the deadline (31 December 1974) for the signing of the relevant maps in respect of ‘areas already demarcated’ and interestingly with a plea to do away with a firm deadline and have it postponed until the Agreement ‘has been ratified by the two Governments’?² This in fact had the effect of postponing the exchange of ‘territories in adverse possession in areas already demarcated in respect of which boundary strip maps are already prepared’ for an indefinite period, which in turn contributed to suspicions in the minds of the Bangladeshis.

Critics, such as Sumanta Banerjee, maintain ‘there is a feeling in Dhaka that India is reluctant to exchange the enclaves because it would lose around 10 lakh acres of land to Bangladesh’.³ It may be mentioned that the May 1974 Agreement clearly distinguished between the ‘already demarcated’ and ‘still to be demarcated’ areas and made it clear that the latter would not pose an obstacle to the exchange of enclaves ‘in areas already demarcated’. What made India revise the original text then? With no official explanation as such, the reluctance to forfeit 10 lakh of territory, as critics pointed out, may indeed be the reason. This incidentally is also the perception of many Indians, particularly those residing in Assam. But this is far from true, as Rukmini Das and Deepak Raju have pointed out,

If one were to compare the area of land that India receives in this exchange to what India gives away, the former falls short of the latter by 10,000 acres. While it may appear like a net loss of territory, such loss is illusory. What we lose are enclaves we cannot access, govern or use in any way without the consent of Bangladesh. The enclaves surrounded by Bangladeshi territory were never part of any political campaigns, never on the agenda for development or reforms of any kind. In fact, except on paper, mainland India would never know the loss of those territories.⁴

The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, also expressed similar views earlier:

In the exchange of enclaves, India will transfer 111 enclaves with a total area of 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh would transfer 51 enclaves with an area of 7,110.02 acres to India. While on paper, the exchange of enclaves between India and Bangladesh may seem like a loss of Indian land to Bangladesh, the actual scenario is quite different as the enclaves are located deep inside the territory of both countries and there has been no physical access to them from either country. In reality, the exchange of enclaves denotes only a notional exchange of land as the Protocol converts a de facto reality into a de jure situation.⁵

But this request for an amendment to the May 1974 Agreement by India in December 1974 and that after Bangladesh had ratified it in its Parliament in November 1974 did not go well with Sheikh Mujib. In fact, sources close to him opined that Mujib lost interest in developing further Bangladesh’s relationship with India following this incident.

Having a fully ‘recognized’ Indo-Bangladesh border, however, was ‘partially’ resolved when India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, visited Dhaka and signed the Protocol between Bangladesh and India in September 2011, and now one can say that it got ‘fully’ resolved with the ratification of the Agreement in the Indian Parliament in June 2015. Critics, however, point out that apart from the opposition in Assam with respect to the exchange of enclaves the very change in the wording with regard to the Tin Bigha Corridor from the original ‘lease in perpetuity’ to ‘24-hour access to Bangladeshis’ would continue to be a source of contention and vex the relationship between the two countries.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Practically, the *diplomacy of recognition* ended in 1974, particularly following Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. This gave way to a newer phase in foreign policy, which could be best referred to as *economic diplomacy*. There were good reasons for this. Apart from the slow pace of the post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, mainly for the want of resources and misgovernance, Bangladesh faced two massive floods in consecutive years – 1973 and 1974, which not only led to famine at home but also created conditions for seeking a larger amount of foreign aid. Although the lack of entitlement, to follow Amartya Sen,⁶ is blamed for the famine, there was also the issue of 'bureaucratic muddle' contributing to it. This refers to the export of some 60,000 bales of jute to Cuba, which violated the conditions of US food aid under PL 480 Title I. Receiving food under the latter disallows the receiving country from trading with the US 'enemies', which then included Cuba.⁷ But food was desperately required following the unprecedented floods. After the United States stopped the flow it took some time for the required food to reach Bangladesh, via Russia. In the meantime, thousands died of starvation. The ensuing economic crisis made it clear that Bangladesh cannot do without the support of the West, and so catering to the interests of the West with the hope of receiving food and non-food aid from the West became a cornerstone of Bangladesh foreign policy. Following the changeover of the government in 1975 the shift to *economic diplomacy*, particularly in cementing the relationship with the Western economies, gained further momentum.

Globalization, however, brought newer dynamics to Bangladesh foreign policy. Bangladesh's clothing industry, for instance, has progressed well mainly because of the relatively cheap labour and the ingenuity of some local manufacturers. This has contributed to a situation where our capitalists and workers are structurally tied up with the economies of the developed West and therefore ought to be more attentive about developments there, including the growth of the economy or lack of it or even who is in charge of the government. Now since the meltdown in the US economy, there are regular discussions as to what impact it would have on the Bangladesh economy. There is actually a possibility of gaining from the crisis. The reasons are not far-fetched. Traditionally, products from Bangladesh abroad have catered to middle and low-income groups and since the US government, even under Donald Trump, is pledged to support the 'un'- and 'under-employed' people of the United States, there is a possibility that the latter would directly benefit from such a policy and therefore would be able to afford goods imported from Bangladesh. This certainly would range from textile goods to pharmaceutical products. Now the challenge lies with Bangladesh to deliver the goods and broaden its market. In fact, in garment export alone the turnover in FY 2016 crossed the US\$33.5 billion mark,⁸ which is no mean achievement on the part of Bangladesh. Bangladesh has now emerged as the third largest garment

producer in the world after China and the European Union collective. But this does not discount the possible challenges from the new US administration under Donald Trump, particularly when the United States remains the single largest destination for Bangladeshi exports. I will have more to say about this later.

ENERGY DIPLOMACY

Taking economic potential further would require resolving the deficit in the energy sector. Or, to put it differently, Bangladesh must embark upon a new phase in its foreign policy, that is, start pursuing *energy diplomacy* creatively. In addition to economic meltdown, the developed economies are facing a global energy crisis, particularly against the backdrop of the United States and other major countries' military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and more recently Syria. This is bound to have a short if not a long-term impact on both developed and less developed economies,⁹ including Bangladesh, unless creative policy initiatives are undertaken to overcome them.

The skyrocketing of oil prices from US\$3 per barrel in 1970 to a record high of US\$147.27 in mid July 2008 and then scaling down to US\$52.01 in December 2016 with possibilities of a further rise against the backdrop of another war in the Middle East region only indicates that the energy crisis is far from over and will not go unless and until alternative energy resources are found. If Bangladesh is to go beyond its current economic growth of nearly 7 per cent and reach the not so implausible growth of 10 per cent in less than a decade's time then it needs to resolve its energy requirements on a priority basis. And here Bangladesh needs to think beyond oil and coal and keep all options, including civilian nuclear power, open. This would require investment in knowledge creation, language competence, sophisticated dialoguing and expertise in drafting agreements at both bilateral and international levels. Any lethargy or slippage in what would be protracted external manoeuvrings is bound to cost Bangladesh heavily. There have been some policy initiatives in this sector. Noteworthy is the signing of an agreement with India where the latter would supply 250 MW of electricity to Bangladesh from the Indian grid. Second, on the issue of the maritime boundary, which has energy security implications, Bangladesh has resolved its claims with India and Myanmar, paving the way for a long-term use of maritime resources. Third, Bangladesh has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Russia to build a civilian nuclear reactor. But globalization is inviting policy initiatives in other areas as well.

There has been some realization in India that if development in the North East region were to be expedited and made meaningful then it would require active support from Bangladesh. In this regard, the two countries, following Sheikh Hasina's visit to Delhi in January 2010, signed a 50-clause agreement, which resulted in India providing a US\$1 billion loan to Bangladesh for infrastructural

development; removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers by India and reduction of 'tariff lines', which since 2011 have come down to 25, again consisting mainly of tobacco and alcohol; resolving the border disputes in the light of 1974 Land Boundary Agreement, although the latter is yet to be ratified by India; operationalizing connectivity between Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan, sharing of rivers, and many more. Following the agreement there have been some improvements in trade figures. In fact, the two-way trade during the fiscal year 2012–2013 between Bangladesh and India reached almost US\$5.7 billion, of which India's export to Bangladesh totalled US\$5.13 billion and Bangladesh's export to India reached US\$563.9 million, an increase of 35.4 per cent and 13.15 per cent respectively over the previous year.¹⁰ Such trade concessions seem to have benefitted India more than Bangladesh but the goal has been mainly to foster a win–win relationship, with the objective of having Bangladesh at India's side in the latter's quest to develop the North East. And there are good reasons for this.

Few will deny the fact that globalization has made a difference to China, indeed, to a point that it had contributed to a 10 per cent GDP growth for many years, and even with the global economic meltdown, China is expecting a growth rate of 6.7 per cent in 2016.¹¹ But more importantly, when it comes to South Asia, China has emerged as the largest trading partner not only of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka but also of India, although the political relationship between India and China remains far from cordial. China, for instance, took its territorial dispute with India to the Asia Development Bank where it blocked an application by India for a loan that included development projects in India's North East state of Arunachal Pradesh. China, in fact, claims the latter as part of its own territory and refers to it as 'Southern Tibet'.¹² What is worrying for India is the marginalization and alienation of the North East and the impact that China's development could have on the region, as one critic pointed out:

The development of infrastructure by China in its border regions with India has been so rapid and effective and the Indian response so lackadaisical that the Indian Member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh was forced to suggest, in sheer exasperation, that the government should allow Arunachal to get a rail link from China as, even sixty years after independence, India has failed to connect this state to the nation's mainland.¹³

In fact, before work began in September 2010 to extend the world's highest railway line onwards from the Tibetan capital Lhasa west to the second-largest city, Xigazê, near the Nepalese border, China had already announced another rail extension east to Nyingchi, less than 50 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh.¹⁴ India could respond only by deploying two additional army divisions, heavy tanks, and ramping up its air power in the region,¹⁵ a far cry from the kind of development that is required to assuage the sub-nationalist aspirations among the people of North East India. This is where globalization and Bangladesh comes in. If China could end up as one of the largest trading partners of both Bangladesh and India then there is no reason for

the three countries not to join hands and work for a win–win outcome in the region. At this stage, however, India is keen to solicit a newer positive relationship with Bangladesh that would come to its aid in developing the North East, indeed, with an eye of offsetting China's influence there. But this hopefully would change soon and policymakers in both Delhi and Beijing would see merit in the three countries working together. And this is more likely with Narendra Modi in power now, particularly in the context of the importance the latter has given to India's development and cementing better relationships with neighbouring countries.

But globalization ought not to be measured in statist terms alone. In contemporary times, among the many ironies that have found acceptance in our lives, the most outrageous is the simultaneity of war and rehabilitation. Apart from highlighting the futility of both, it constitutes a sheer drainage of resources. But then contradictions of this kind also create opportunities for many. If the private US army, Blackwater, is super-profiting from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan then there is money to be made from rehabilitation work as well,¹⁶ and this is precisely what BRAC (Building Resources Across Communities), a Bangladeshi non-governmental organization (NGO), is engaged in, albeit on a modest scale, in war-torn Afghanistan. But skill in rehabilitation work and disaster management does not come naturally, it is an outcome of years of experience, and BRAC is a proven institution, *non-governmental foreign policy initiatives*, particularly for want of state sponsorship and regulations, are nonetheless susceptible to hazards and limitations. Killings and kidnappings of BRAC officials in Afghanistan are cases in point. Not that this should provide reasons for postponement of such ventures but it is a clear indication that *non-governmental foreign policy initiatives* are no less vital than governmental initiatives and therefore demands creating newer structures and space for manoeuvrability. Take the case of Grameen Bank, for instance. That Professor Yunus has become Bangladesh's global ambassador can easily be judged from the number of foreign dignitaries he meets and international awards he receives every year. Sadly there is no mechanism to honour such persons on a regular basis and put them into use for the service of the country. Indeed, much to his credit, micro-credit is now a global product for which Bangladesh can surely be proud of, and there is no reason why this expertise cannot be made into an exportable item for the benefit of Bangladesh and the world.

CLIMATE DIPLOMACY

Choices in foreign policy are often limited by constraints and compulsions. One area that could be highlighted in this regard is the environment and the dire conditions of marginalized people. Bangladesh is already at the top of the Global Climate Risk Index. The international NGO, Germanwatch, prepared the index of 170 countries and Bangladesh tops the list with a death toll of 4,729 in 2007 due to natural calamities with an additional absolute loss of property worth more

than US\$10 billion.¹⁷ At the same time, according to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, formerly UNISDR), over 4.4 million people in Bangladesh were affected by natural disasters in 2015.¹⁸ But then the challenge for climate diplomacy is much more complex as it includes not only a global dimension of natural disasters but also a human dimension responsible for such disasters. Let me explain.

In the wake of human-driven climate change the post-Enlightenment positivist discourses and disciplinary boundaries got reformulated. Earlier 'natural history' remained separated from 'human history', the latter did not bother to reflect on or encroach upon the disciplinary quest of the former.¹⁹ Separate time-scales in the evolution of the two – nature and human – dictated that the history of nature and historiography were on different planes, and save minor cautionary remarks by poets and philosophers, the disciplinary boundaries were taken for granted. This became untenable when more and more scientists in the late 20th century agreed that something significant was happening with the climate. Frequent cyclones around the world, big floods in Bangladesh, drought in Australia, melting of glaciers of the Himalayan ranges, the continuous rise in the global sea level, which incidentally has been rising at a rate of at least 0.04 to 0.1 inches per year since 1900,²⁰ all made life on earth hazardous and risky, particularly for the riverine and coastal people of Bangladesh. Climate change could no longer be ignored.

Indeed, in the wake of climate change, the separation between natural science and human history became weak and somewhat unreal. This is not to discount the age-old relationship between the two but then such relationship was minimal and millennial, one hardly affecting the other. Change in the geographical environment, for instance, required millions of years while change in the system of human society could come about in a few hundred or thousand years. But that is no longer valid. The speed with which climate change started to reshape the earth, thanks to human-led activities, transformed humans into a geological force, imbibed with the power of 'changing the most basic physical processes of the earth'.²¹ This led some to contend that the earlier geological epoch of Holocene (Whole or Entirely Recent and dated 9,700 BCE) got replaced by the Anthropocene, with humans becoming a force of nature, tragically contributing to the extinction of species, indeed, as one critic remarked, 'similar in intensity to the event around 65 million years ago which wiped out the dinosaurs'.²² A rollback or halting the process of what is surely nothing less than 'self-destruction' is not that easy.

It is no accident that global warming and globalization came to be discussed almost at the same time, indeed, both attracting public attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s.²³ This was the time when capitalism entered a new phase, with the developed economies outsourcing their labour-intensive industries to low-wage countries of the Third World. China, India, Brazil, even relatively smaller countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and Sri Lanka, all became global industrial houses emitting carbon dioxide from activities like cement production, deforestation, and the burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil and natural gas, all polluting the

air more than ever. The developing countries wanted quick development, racing to catch the developed economies by blindly reproducing fossil fuel civilization with little or no interest to the sustainability of the environment. The developed economies, on the other hand, wanted to boost up their shrinking profits by having marketable goods produced with cheap labour elsewhere in the world, hoping simultaneously of replacing their labour-intensive industries with knowledge-economy.²⁴ This, however, required massive investment in education, which, for reasons of special interests and quick profits got limited to certain areas and in the process failed to address the issue of rapid *deindustrialization* in the developed economies. Political fallouts from deindustrialization and 'knowledge gap' were immense, the evidence of which is now found in the electoral mandate for Brexit and the shocking victory of Donald Trump in the UK and the United States respectively.

There are already some apprehensions that the world will witness a reversal of some of the international agreements reached for reducing global warming during Trump's presidency. This is mainly because during the election campaign Trump called human-caused climate change a 'hoax'. At the same time, he vowed to dismantle the US Environmental Protection Agency 'in almost every form'.²⁵ Alarming though this may be, it is unlikely that Trump can unilaterally erase the Paris Climate Agreement of 2016, which commits more than 190 countries to reduce their emissions of global warming carbon dioxide pollution. Nor can he fully dismantle Obama's domestic climate change regulations under the Clean Power Plan. However, he can certainly slow down the process and even ignore some of the commitments made. This will invite what can be referred to as the 'copycat syndrome', with other big polluters, like India and China, becoming equally disinterested in the task of reducing global warming and limiting the impact of human-driven climate change. Any rollback on global climate commitment may not harm the big polluters blessed with large territories and developed economies but is bound to impact upon the relatively small and environmentally fragile states, like Bangladesh.

The challenge of climate change, however, could be met only with regional and global efforts and therefore *climate diplomacy* is bound to emerge in the priority list of Bangladesh foreign policy. Bangladesh did end up playing an active role at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, particularly in bringing about a compromise among the key global actors. It may be mentioned that although China and India are at loggerheads when it comes to territorial claims the two countries have no problem in working together on climate change, often to the detriment of disaster-prone countries of the region, including Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives. A creative effort, therefore, is required for Bangladesh to reap benefits from *climate diplomacy*.

Such creative efforts, however, seem to be lacking. In fact, while addressing the plenary session on 'Leading the Fight against Climate Change' at the World Economic Forum at Davos on 19 January 2017, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina defended the dirty coal-fired power plant in Rampal, a place only 14 kilometres

away from the world's largest mangrove forest, the Sunderbans. This was all the more ironic because Hasina was responding to the green activist and former US vice president Al Gore when the latter requested her not to build the plant in close proximity to the world's largest mangrove forest since it is 'the last remaining tiger preserve' and when 'thousands of people were demonstrating against it'.²⁶ The episode, however, did not end there. After returning home, Hasina blamed the Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus for paying 'money to World Economic Forum to make this a topic of discussion'.²⁷ This only showed that the policymakers of Bangladesh are not only ill advised but also lack the sophistication, if not the expertise, of using *climate diplomacy* to Bangladesh's advantage. Indeed, not by blaming an individual but by recognizing the Anthropocene as a critical factor in development can Bangladesh mainstream *climate diplomacy* in international relations and foreign policy goals.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have referred to the process of post-territoriality or deterritorialization as giving rise to a simultaneous process of *reterritorialization*,²⁸ although the latter remains substantially different from the previous territoriality. Indeed, a territorial meaning of Bangladesh has become less relevant and the meaning that is now having greater appeal is more demographic and cultural, which is inclusive of Bangladeshis living abroad. Indeed, given its civilizational and social links, Bangladesh is readily taken to be sympathizing or even supporting the Islamic cause in the Arab countries and elsewhere, which at times creates the notion that it is 'soft' on the so-called 'Muslim militants' or 'Islamic terrorists'. This has particularly been the case with the United States in the post-9/11 period, the latter even categorizing Bangladesh as 'high risk' in its global war on terrorism. If globalization has deterritorialized Bangladesh, it has certainly also re-territorialized Bangladesh, albeit on a different plane mixed with anguish and apprehension.

This brings us to the issue of Bangladesh requiring a foreign policy initiative best referred to as *cultural diplomacy*. The Arab countries host around 6 million Bangladeshi expatriates accounting for 75 per cent of the country's migrant workers. In the 2009–2010 fiscal year, Bangladesh earned a remittance of US\$10.99 billion, out of which the workers in the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Libya and Iran sent US\$7.22 billion.²⁹ The total remittances increased to US\$15.31 billion in 2014–2015,³⁰ again the bulk of it coming from the Gulf region. But then this is also the region catering to a precise Islamic *mazhab* (school of thought), namely Hanbali or Salafi or, as some now prefer to call it, Wahhabism, which is relatively more rigid or inversely less tolerant than the Hanafi *mazhab* or the Sufi tradition found in South Asia and Bangladesh. There is no denying the fact that the power of

petro-dollars and the empowered status of some of the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, made the confluence between the Bangladesh diaspora and Wahhabism all the more easy if not deadly.³¹ It may be mentioned that there is a substantial difference between Wahhabism and what Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wrote and preached in his lifetime. In fact, the orthodox *ulama* of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have succeeded in reproducing and even exporting their own brand of Islam, often, it seems, in the garb of Wahhabism. Only now, following 9/11 and the terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, is there a serious realization that things have got out of hand. As King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia remarked: 'Terrorism and criminality would not have appeared ... except for the absence of the principle of tolerance.'³² And since the bulk of the Bangladesh diaspora are either unskilled or semi-skilled with few having profound knowledge of Islam there is a tendency among them to fall for the intolerant version found in the Arab countries and have them exported and reproduced at home. This is why there has to be a substantial investment in matters of culture or what Joseph Nye called the use of 'soft power'.³³

Our strength, in fact, lies not in our being a *homo politicus* (political being) or *homo economicus* (economic being) but in our being a *homo culturicus* (cultural being). To provide a regional example, we have not fared well politically, our 'democratic culture' has been marred by violence and divisiveness but when it comes to 'cultural democracy' we have fared much better than many of the developed democratic societies of the world. Ghalib and Tagore are enduring testimony to this, as are Lata Mangeshkar, Manisha Koirala and Muttiah Muralitharan. More specifically, Bangladesh culture, rooted as it is in the Hanafi, Sufi, Bhakti and Baul traditions, not to mention reproduced in the literary voices of Tagore, Nazrul, Jibananda Das, Shamsur Rahman and countless more, can certainly be channelled for spreading tolerance not only at home but also regionally and globally. This, of course, would require mainstreaming *cultural diplomacy* in Bangladesh foreign policy.

A beginning could be made by sponsoring *Bangladesh Parishod* or a Bangladesh Cultural Centre in different cities of the world; albeit managed and run by a pool of officially sanctioned, well-qualified members of the Bangladesh diaspora. The post-globalization diaspora, in fact, is qualitatively different from the old diaspora. The former is passionately attentive to whatever is taking place in the motherland, from a game of cricket to the making of *futchka* and *rosh-gollas*, from political rumours to the price of petrol. At the same time, however, they are well-versed in the country of their residence, knowing well in many cases the personalities close to the government, opinion-making agencies and business houses. If managed efficiently, such Councils can become information-gathering/delivering bodies and informal lobbies, helping Bangladesh in getting access to people and things, indeed, far more creatively than possible on the part of the formalized diplomatic missions. This would also be cost-effective as many a member of the diaspora would be willing to invest both time and money in

bettering the cause of the motherland and garnering a reputation both at home and abroad. Indeed, instances of this kind are already there. Indeed, some major political parties have over the years managed to form international wings, albeit mainly to serve partisan causes. In the age of globalization and post-territoriality it is only prudent that the state make use of Bangladeshis, whether residing at home or abroad, with greater efficiency and a spark of creativity.

CONCLUSION: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

In this age of globalization and technological connectivity, if foreign policy compulsions are to be minimized and choices materialized then it is imperative that newer institutions are built. Starting from its first diplomatic mission in Kolkata on 18 April 1971 Bangladesh now has 55 missions abroad. These missions often become the target of criticism for want of efficiency on the part of some officials. Once when transiting at Dubai airport I was briefed by a host of presumably illegal migrants, jailed and deported from Saudi Arabia, on the inefficiency of some officials at the Bangladesh mission in Riyadh. In fact, several of them complained that some of the officials who had gotten used to waking up and coming to the office late ended up addressing their problems around 1pm when it was time for them to have lunch in the prison. Charges of corruption were also raised, which included stateless refugees from Myanmar – the Rohingyas – getting passports from Bangladesh and giving a bad name to the country for their misdemeanours! And when misgovernance collaborates with polarized politics, where partisanship and not merit dictates key international appointments, the combination could be deadly. This is as much an issue of quality as it is an issue of institution building. It goes without saying that the parliamentary bodies in foreign policymaking need to be active and the standing committees if and when required must call the concerned officials and make them accountable to public expenses and the country's foreign policy goals.

First, key foreign appointments could be made subject to parliamentary sub-committee hearings in the like of the United States; to bring more efficiency to those appointed to lead the country.

Second, the colonial legacy of having to run the foreign policy bureaucracy independent of the public must come to an end. Even research institutions must cease to be at the mercy of government. Instead, it should raise its own funds, recruit scholars for particular projects and build cells for independent and quality research, which the government would then have the option to accept, modify, postpone or reject. More qualitative transformation has to come by linking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) with independent research and academic centres, both formally and informally. Since officials of MOFA are transferred every three years it is important that a permanent pool of researchers and scholars feeds them, and the most productive and cost-effective would be to link them

up on a regular basis with such existing institutions. In fact, it is the latter, with constant interactions with foreign policy researchers, scholars and practitioners, both at home and abroad, which can build a *culture of diplomacy*. The government of the day could then readily benefit from it. At the same time, to institutionalize the role of culture or 'soft power' in foreign policymaking it is important that a Director General of Public Diplomacy be appointed at the MOFA at the earliest.

Third, there is a tendency now to promote partisan officials and even appoint party cadres to missions abroad, and this seldom on the basis of merit. This must stop as it is bound to encourage sycophancy and patrimonialism and promote mediocrity. In fact, the political interference in appointments and promotions has been such that despite the mission having a regular protocol officer the Head of the Mission keeps receiving ministers, members of parliament and other senior politicians of the ruling party at the airport, lest the latter be displeased with the former and have him pay the price by transferring him from the post! Foreign policy in the age of globalization cannot be carried out efficiently with de-professionalized bureaucrats.

Fourth, a National Civil College (NCC), similar to the country's well-reputed National Defence College, needs to be built. Any promotion above Joint Secretary or, as in the case of MOFA, Director General would require passing out of the College, after having gone through an intensive certificate programme matching the respective bureaucracies and national requirements. There is also a need for en-gendering foreign policymaking given that women constitute more than half of the country's population. A beginning could certainly be made in this regard by making NCC a gender-sensitive institution. NCC could run mandatory training programmes for parliamentarians and other civil functionaries, including freshly appointed ambassadors. The institute could also recruit researchers on a both short and long-term basis for feeding the senior level student-bureaucrats and even the respective ministries. A Foreign Policy Archive could also be housed in the NCC, which the public, as part of the Right to Information, could access regularly, while 'secret and restricted documents' could be made available to the public after a lapse of 20 years.

Finally, the menace of violent extremism that has so much infected the world, including Bangladesh, needs both national and international responses. In this context, countering and preventing violent extremism can no longer be the task of security forces alone. It ought to be a part of foreign policy goals and activities carried out by foreign policy officials working in Bangladesh and abroad. This requires newer modes of interactions not only with the Bangladeshi diaspora, particularly those residing in the Arab world, but also with the local communities abroad, disseminating the place of tolerance in Bangladesh society and the manner in which the government and people are countering and preventing violent extremism in Bangladesh. In the age of globalization positive images of the country are critically important in creating grounds for attracting foreign investments and economic development. A negative image, particularly on the issue of violent extremism and polarized politics, could damage the country not only politically but also economically.

Bangladesh foreign policy began its journey 45 years back with the *diplomacy of recognition*, which soon gave way to *economic diplomacy*. To make the latter meaningful, particularly in the age of globalization, it is now important that Bangladesh embark upon a triadic foreign policy formulation encompassing *energy, climate* and *culture* against the backdrop of creative institutional reforms and newer structures. This, indeed, has the potential of bringing benefits not only to Bangladesh but also to the region and the world.

Notes

- 1 The Indo-Bangladesh enclaves, also known as the *chitmahals* in Bengali, are the enclaves along the Bangladesh–India border. According to a popular legend, the enclaves were used as stakes in card or chess games between two regional kings, the Raja of Koch Bihar and the Maharaja of Rangpur, during the Mughal era. The British colonial power did not change the status quo. As a result of the 1947 partition both India and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) came to possess small pieces of land within their respective territories that belonged to the other country.
- 2 For a closer exposition, see, A.S. Bhasin, (ed.), *India–Bangladesh Relations: Documents – 1971–2002, Volume IV* (New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2003), pp. 1889–1901.
- 3 S. Banerjee, 'Indo-Bangladesh Border: Radcliffe's Ghost', *EPW Commentary*, Volume 36 (8), 5–11 May 2001.
- 4 Rukmini Das and Deepak Raju, 'A settlement long overdue', *The Hindu*, 13 August 2013.
- 5 *India & Bangladesh: Land Boundary Agreement* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India), 6 September 2011. See, http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/24529_LBA_MEA_Booklet_final.pdf. Accessed on 19 July 2019.
- 6 Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
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- 8 The World Bank, *Bangladesh Development Update: Sustained Development Progress* (Dhaka: The World Bank Office, October 2016), p.14.
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- 10 M.H. Saleh, 'Bangladesh–India Relations and Sub-regional Cooperation'. Paper presented at the International Conference on Indian Foreign Policy, Mizoram University, Aizawl, India, 19–20 August 2013, p. 6.
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- 12 H.V. Pant, 'China Rising', in I. Pande, (ed.), *India China: Neighbours Strangers* (Noida: HarperCollins, 2010), pp. 95–96.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 98.
- 14 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2011* (London: IISS, 2011), p. 212.
- 15 Pant, 'China Rising', p. 99.
- 16 J. Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2008).

- 17 *The Daily Star*, 'Bangladesh riskiest on Global Climate Index', 5 December 2008.
- 18 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), '2015 Disasters in Numbers', http://www.unisdr.org/files/47804_2015disastertrendsininfographic.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2017.
- 19 For a closer exposition, see, Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'The Climate of History: Four Theses', *Critical Inquiry*, Volume 35, Winter 2009.
- 20 Cited in <http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/sealevelclimate.html>. Accessed on 23 November 2016.
- 21 As Naomi Oreskes maintains,

For centuries, scientists thought that earth processes were so large and powerful that nothing we could do could change them. This was a basic tenet of geological science: that human chronologies were insignificant compared with the vastness of geological time; that human activities were insignificant compared with the force of geological processes. And once they were. But no more. There are now so many of us cutting down so many trees and burning so many billions of tons of fossil fuels that we have indeed become geological agents. We have changed the chemistry of our atmosphere, causing sea level to rise, ice to melt, and climate to change. There is no reason to think otherwise.

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- 22 Will Steffen, 'Humans creating new "Geological Age"', *The Australian*, 31 March 2008, cited in Chakrabarty, 'The Climate of History', p. 207. See also, Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer, 'The Anthropocene', *IGBP [International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme] Newsletter*, no. 41, 2000, p. 17.
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A Quarter Millennium of Nepal's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Changes

Uddhab Prasad Pyakurel

INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Nepal and Britain celebrated the bicentenary of the establishment of diplomatic ties. While celebrating the occasion, the British ambassador to Nepal, Richard Morris addressed a group of Nepalese at a reception hosted by him. In his speech, he attached high importance to Nepal–UK ties, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nepal visited the UK as a part of the bicentenary programme. The Treaty of Sugauli signed in March 1816 is said to formalize full relations between Nepal and Britain as two independent nations. This is clearly the western perspective, where Nepal came to be recognized as an independent country after the treaty of 1815–16 that fixed the political boundary of Nepal. Looking from the Nepali perspective, the socio-political formation of Nepal started long before 1815; Nepal had signed the Betrawati treaty with Tibet and China in 1792, and had signed a trade treaty with the British in the same year. Perhaps, the James Logan Mission of 1770 was the first attempt of the British to make friends with the Nepalese after the Kathmandu Valley was conquered by Prithvinarayan Shaha of Gorkha. While Prithvinarayan Shaha was in the process of conquering eastern Tarai such as Morang, he tried to cultivate friendly relations with the British so that there would be a mutual understanding not to interfere in each other's affairs. Kathmandu first allowed a British mission led by Captain Kirkpatrick only in 1792, and had signed a commercial treaty with British-India.

Other arguments have been advanced. For instance, British historian Alastair Lamb suggests that the Sugauli Treaty of 1816 revives Nepal's status as an

independent state and further argues 'in 1814, Nepal was no longer an independent state, since 1792 it had been a Chinese tributary. Thus, the treaty made Nepal's status again as independent' (Poudel, 2016). My argument here could be that they should read the Thapathali treaty between Nepal and Tibet which was agreed in March 1856. The draft treaty agreed by Tibet and Nepal was sent to China for their approval and China approved the treaty with two significant modifications including 'the Emperor of China shall be obeyed by both states as before'. It is said that China initially tried to impose more revision favourable to Tibet. Once Nepal rejected all modifications, the Chinese had warned Nepal that the treaty was the result of Nepal's fight not only with Tibet but with China as well. They also asked whether Nepal still respected the Emperor. If we are to follow Lamb's argument, the question could be whether Nepal had again lost its independent status with the Thapathali treaty? What is definite is that the treaty had laid the ground for the creation of the Rana client state of Nepal for the British, facilitating the export of sturdy young men from Nepal to fight the British Empire's wars around the world (Thapa, 2016). British Ambassador to Nepal, Mr Andy Sparkes CMG talked about the importance of the 1815 treaty and stated that,

...after the war, the Treaty of Sugauli formalised in March 1816 established a full relationship with Britain as two independent nations ... the next real watershed moment was the signature in 1923 of the Treaty under which the British accepted in writing that Nepal was an independent nation. This was crucial for Nepal's future ...Without it, with Indian independence in 1947 Nepal might have been hard put to it to retain its separate identity. (IFA, 2013: 8–9)

However, such arguments cannot explain the attempts made by Jang Bahadur Rana to show loyalty towards the British. When the Indian people were launching their first freedom struggle, the Ranas offered their support and fought on behalf of the British against India. It is said that the events of 1857 became important to remember as they eased the way for the British crown to rule the Indian subcontinent directly instead of through the East India Company (Pratap, 2018). Also, Prime Minister Chandra Shamsheer's visit to the UK in 1908 should not be undermined as it accelerated the momentum to sign the 1923 treaty.

As it is central to the importance of agreements and treaties between Britain and Nepal at that time, this chapter provides an understanding of Nepal's foreign policy since its inception and looks at whether Nepal has progressed in the right direction. Records state that Nepal had established the *Jaisi Kotha* to look after foreign affairs in 1769 soon after Nepal's unification.¹ The initiative will celebrate a quarter millennium in 2019. The following sections of this chapter provide an overview of the foreign policy of Nepal, and analyse whether all the changes made were based on the mission asserted by the modern Nepali state.

AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION TO STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL

Nepal² is an ancient land mentioned in Atharva veda, *Arthashastra* of Kautilya and *Manusmṛti*. The *Himavat Khanda Purana* – a part of the *Skanda Purana* establishes the distinct identity of Nepal in the Himavat or Himalayan region. Similarly, the 4th century BC inscription of Samudra Gupta at Allahbad categorizes Nepal as *praty-anta* or frontier state. In the 6th century BC, the small political formations of Tarai like Videha, and Sakyas of Kapilvastu were destroyed owing to the attacks of southern powers – Kosala and Kasi. Later, in the 3rd century BC, the Mauryan emperor Asoka came to Nepal and gave his daughter Charumati in marriage to Devapala Khatiya, a local raja of Nepal. He also reduced the tax from one-sixth of the produce to one-eighth in Lumbini region as Buddha was born there. This fact is recorded in the Rummindei inscription of Asoka in Tarai. Similarly, Nepal has been influenced as profoundly as any other area of India by the dicta on interstate relations that are generally attributed to the Indian ‘master statesman’ Kautilya (Rose, 1971: 10). As far as Nepal’s relations towards the North are concerned, it was the first half of the 7th century AD which paved the way for the opening of a new channel of communications between the two countries. When a Chinese pilgrim, Hsuan-chuang, visited Nepal in 637 he had to journey to India via an established route through Kashmir and Turkistan. It was the first official Chinese mission, led by Li I-piao and Wang Hsuan-tse and which arrived to Nepal in 644 during the kingship of Narendra Deva, that was able to use the new route through Tibet. It was the route which was used by many Chinese and Indian delegates for at least the next two decades. There were a few exchange visits between China and Nepal for some years including a Nepali envoy’s visit to Changan with presents for the Emperor in 647, and another mission sent by Narendra Deva in 651 shortly after the death of Songtsen Gampo. After the 7th century, Nepal expanded its relations with Tibet, and the relationship had become quite favourable to Nepal by the 18th century when Gorkha was expanding its territories towards Kathmandu and other princely states under the unification project. It is said that Tibet was not happy about the direct relations between Nepal and China and hence did not allow Nepal to use the aforementioned route anymore at least up to 1384 (Rose, 1971: 12). The emergence of a powerful kingdom in Tibet with its capital at Lhasa transformed the Kathmandu valley, an isolated sub-Himalayan backwater, into the intellectual and commercial entrepôt between India and Central Asia in the 17th century. Once Nepal acquired up to Xigatse (some 564 kilometres away from today’s Nepal-Tibet border inside Tibet) through military expedition, Tibet was compelled to sign a treaty in 1789 surrendering its economy-related interests to Nepal.³ But the 1792 treaty not only became a compelling factor in Nepal’s decision to withdraw its expansionist expedition towards the North but also forced Nepal to accept China’s suzerainty.⁴

In fact the Betrawati treaty of 1792 with China, Tibet and Nepal had pushed Nepal again to remain within the southern plain area which remained and

remains almost unchanged in the minds of Nepali elites even today. It is worth quoting here former Minister and Nepal's first permanent representative to the United Nations Rishikesh Shaha who tried to put Nepal's geo-political reality into words. He says:

The fact that some of Nepal's high Himalayan valleys lie beyond the main Himalayan crest and are enclosed between it and the Tibetan border mountains does not mean that Nepal has an equal degree of interdependence with its neighbours on both sides.... there are two other compelling practical considerations which are bound to incline Nepal, in practice, towards India, notwithstanding Nepal's inherent psycho-political fears of Indian dominance. Nepal is bounded by Indian Territory on three sides and has no access to the sea except through India. The Tibetan region of China which borders Nepal to the north is far removed from the centers of the population, and of agriculture and industry in China ... Nepal may feel that it can defend itself without India's cooperation, but India can exert leverage to make Nepal cooperate in India's vital defense aims. (Shaha, 1982: 218)

This acknowledgement of their geo-political reality had not come easily to Nepali people due to historical events. Nepal did not stop its 'unification' project even after 1792, which rapidly reached Sutlej in the east and Champaran in the south. It started strengthening the annexation towards east, west and south after the expedition towards the north was stopped. While doing so, Nepal also tried to strengthen (if not begin⁵) its relations with British-India on the one hand, and continued invading princely states in the western, southern and eastern parts. The British desire to stop the further expansion of Nepal, and to fix its political boundary according to the western concept of territory resulted in the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1815, which ended with the signing of the Sugauli Treaty with the British East India Company in 1815–1816. From then onwards Nepal's foreign policy became too India-centric which has been referred to as an 'isolation policy', 'strategy for survival', etc. The major concern of Nepal during the time was to be treated as an independent country (Husain, 1970: 208).⁶

Jang Bahadur's rise to power is one such situation which resulted in the major redefining of Nepal's foreign policy towards both China and British-India (Rose, 1971: 106). Just before that King Rajendra and others were for the anti-British policy supported by most of the Kathmandu elites. However, Jang Bahadur had to reverse this policy mainly due to two reasons: (i) rapid decline of power of a distant China, and (ii) an aggressive British-India along with the successful annexation of the last of the major Indian states – the Sikh kingdom of the Panjab. It helped Jang Bahadur Rana realize Nepal's limitation and hence tried to win the goodwill of Britain. Jang Bahadur saw that British rule in India could not be easily overthrown and it would be futile and dangerous for Nepal to go up against British rulers in India. Although being tilted towards British-India, Jang Bahadur tried to maintain Nepal's relations with China too. He was not disposed to look to China for assistance against the British, but he did realize that Nepal's relationship with Peking had served as an effective deterrent to the British in the past and could still be exploited profitably. Which is why he sent a mission to

Peking in 1852 that was received by China with the 'usual formalities and friendliness'. That incident seemed to have made Jang Bahadur go beyond Nepal's five-decade-long non-interventionist policy towards the North after signing the Betrawati treaty in 1792.

Jang Bahadur's attempt at confrontation with Tibet was at a time when the Ching dynasty in China was involved in a desperate struggle for survival against Taiping rebels and the British were confined by the war with Russia in Crimea. To justify the dispute with Tibet, Jang Bahadur provided a few trade and border-related reasons which according to Rose (1971: 110) were not important. Whatever the intentions, Nepal decided to launch a summer military campaign in Lhasa by late April 1855 if Lhasa did not agree to Kathmandu's extravagant terms.⁷ Eventually Nepal's attack from across the major passes of the Nepal–Tibet border in early April 1855, compelled a negotiation between Nepal, Tibet and China. They started the dialogue on May 1855 and eventually agreed a 10-point Thapathali treaty in March 1856. The draft treaty signed between Tibet and Nepal was sent to China for their sanction and China also approved the treaty with two significant modifications.⁸ It is said that China initially tried to impose more revision favourable to Tibet. When Nepal rejected all modifications, the Chinese had warned Nepal that the treaty was the result of Nepal's fight not only with Tibet but with China as well. They also asked whether Nepal still respected the Emperor. Nepal's response to China that Nepal had suffered no provocation from China and had war only against Tibet seemed to have convinced China to give a seal to the agreement.

Then, the relationship of Nepal with its two neighbours – Tibet and British-India – remained relatively quiet⁹ until the end of the 1940s. In fact Nepal's relations with neighbours passed through a turbulent period again in the 1950s mainly due to Chinese aggression on Tibet and Nepal's willingness to diversify its relations beyond the neighbourhood. Rose (1971: 178) considers it as 'new foreign policy' and says that the prospect of British withdrawal from India was 'a bitter pill for the Ranas, and it was some time before they were prepared to accept the need to make major policy adjustments to meet the new situation'.

INDIA-'CO-ORDINATED' FOREIGN POLICY

As stated elsewhere Nepal had no relations with countries beyond China and India till the late 1940s. It had some old treaties and agreements with China and Tibet but its newest major interactions were confined to India. However, Nepal tried to emerge from its policy of isolation just a couple of years before the conversation between Nehru and Chou En-lai discussed in the previous section. Quoting the statement by the then Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher, Muni (1973: 12) says this foreign policy revision was intended to seek international recognition for Rana's authority through an extension of diplomatic contacts and

to keep the government of India in good humour. It is reported that Ranas took advantage of the contacts established during the Second World War and exchanged goodwill missions with the United States in 1946. On 25 April 1947, Nepal and the United States signed An Agreement of Commerce and Friendship which mutually accorded 'most favoured nation' treatment in future commercial relations. In fact Nepal established relations with the United States almost two months before establishing the formal relations with independent India in June 1947, and with France in April 1949.

The following statement by the then Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher Rana in May 1948 provides the logic behind Nepal's interest in ending its isolationist policy. He states:

In modern times, it is neither possible, nor desirable for any state to keep itself in isolation from the world's affairs. It shall be our policy therefore to enter into diplomatic relations with all such countries that seek our friendship. It is evident that we shall require much help and co-operation from abroad in our nation-building project. We hope we shall obtain such needful assistance and cooperation from our neighbouring and friendly countries. (Rose, 1971: 180 & Baral, 1988: 18)

With these new incursions into foreign policy, Nepal's relations with India were 'readjusted without however disturbing the structure and essence of the past'. Baral (2018) gives credit to the Indian leadership, especially the first Prime Minister of independent India, Nehru who often voiced his government's security and geo-politics-related concerns about Nepal's moves to be involved in international affairs. According to him, India's reconciled position on the status of Tibet, which was declared an Autonomous Region of China, and the cordial relations between China and India in turn helped Nepal to establish diplomatic relations with China. It is worth quoting at length the dialogue between Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru while the latter was visiting China in October 1954. When Chou En-lai mentioned Nepal's wish to have diplomatic relations with China, Nehru replied:

I am glad you have mentioned this also. Nepal's foreign policies are looked after by us and we have been giving them aid and training facilities for their personnel, but we do not interfere in their internal affairs. But you will understand that traditionally Nepal and India are closely linked together and according to the treaty the foreign policy of India and Nepal is to be coordinated. Nepal government had also mentioned to us about your desire to establish diplomatic relations with them and we told them that we had no objection. But I think the question may better be discussed in details after the king of Nepal, who is in Switzerland for treatment, returns to Nepal.

Nehru further stated:

Our desire is that Nepal should be independent and in fact we do not want to exercise the rights which Britain did. But her foreign policy must be coordinated with ours. America, however, is creating a lot of trouble. Although America has no Embassy in Kathmandu, the American Ambassador in India is accredited to Kathmandu. They are further sending books for libraries and lot of money is thrown about. Nepalese are easily bribed and they are thus inducing Nepal to allow America to establish an Embassy there, but on our advice they postponed.

The main difficulty is that if China opened an Embassy there, America will also do likewise. Therefore, Nepal should be treated with indulgence. After the king's return from Switzerland, and in the view of the frequent changes in the Prime Ministers he is a more important and popular figure – this can be considered. I would suggest that you can accredit your Ambassador in Delhi as concurrently Ambassador to Nepal, thus obviating the difficulty of Nepal being also forced to allow Americans to open embassy in Nepal. (Bhasin, 2005: 358–9)

The important point to note in Nehru's statement is about coordinated foreign policy. On the one hand, no document exists in Nepal that provides evidence for this; on the other, Nehru time and again refers to it. While responding to then Prime Minister of Nepal, M. P. Koirala, on 23 March 1954, Nehru wrote:

In the previous talks I have had with you as well as with the other representatives of the Nepal Government, we have discussed foreign affairs and we have agreed that there should be full coordination between the foreign policy and defense policy of the two governments. Indeed that was even laid down in the collateral letters exchanged at the time of the last treaty between the two countries. That treaty was made before the change-over in Nepal and is, therefore, rather out of date, but the basic points laid down in it still hold. (Koirala, 2008: 285)

In the same letter Nehru further tells why there should be such a coordinated foreign policy between India and Nepal.¹⁰ On 8 May 1954, Nehru replies to another of Koirala's letters, where he says:

I have discussed the matter [foreign policy of Nepal] with Regmi and your ministers here as well as the King and they were all of the opinion that Nepal's foreign policy should be closely coordinated with that of India. This afternoon I had a talk with your Ministers, and there and then I drafted a brief aide-memoir on this subject ... you will see that paper and I hope that you will soon let us have your approval of it. (2008: 295)

Reading these conversations along with Koirala's letter to Nehru on 10 March 1954,¹¹ it could be argued that terms like 'coordinated policy' was Nehru's sophisticated way of saying that Nepali leaders should seek permission from Nehru before making important changes in their foreign policy. While doing so, Nehru had often been gone beyond bluntly suggestive sometimes undermining Nepal was a separate state.¹²

DIVERSIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Once King Mahendra took oath of office, he intensified the diversification process of Nepal's foreign policy, especially under the Premiership of Tanka Prasad Acharya.¹³ Nepal would build diplomatic relations with China in August 1955, with Russia in July 1956, Japan in September 1956, Sri Lanka and Egypt in July 1957, and Germany in April 1958. According to Shaha, Acharya told the Indian Ambassador, Bhagawan Sahay, that Nepal would not establish diplomatic relations with Russia. But Acharya went against his word while Sahay was in Delhi (Shaha, 2014: 122). Acharya's personal accounts pose several questions.

Diversification of Nepal's foreign policy was thought to be King Mahendra's interest.¹⁴ Acharya once stated that it was the palace which 'wanted to show the Chinese that he [Acharya] was an insignificant nobody, and to show the Indian that the Chinese had come here [Nepal] just to meet me [Acharya] and that Nepali people were against it' (Fisher, 1997: 180–1). Acharya's comment seems to have been made after the king dismissed Acharya and replaced him by appointing K. I. Singh as Prime Minister, someone who was strongly against the establishment of more foreign embassies in Kathmandu, and also critical of the economic aid agreement that Acharya's government had recently concluded.¹⁵ Rose (1971: 216) termed Acharya's ousting from the post of prime minister in July 1957 as the king's attempt to undo Nepal's foreign policy as 'Nepal may have gone too far too quickly in expanding relations with China and that a new balance should be struck'. Acharya's own observation may be closer to the truth. He says that 'the Indians felt that I leaned too much towards the Chinese ... this compelled the King to get me out of the cabinet. He wanted to show the Indians that he was not pleased with me' (Fisher, 1997: 182). King Mahendra's dual policy could be considered compatible with the popular discourse that Nepal has maintained its peace and national independence by acting in concert with the stronger government of India (Shaha, 1962: 220).

ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY

It could be argued that Nepal was in a position to extend its relations beyond India from the late 1940s following India's independence from Britain. However, it had to wait for B. P. Koirala as Prime Minister to assert sovereign equality and to go beyond India-centric foreign policy. As Juliane Kokott describes:

[S]overeign equality, firstly, functions better in an international community with not too many and too different participants. That means among States which are not only theoretically, but also factually more or less equal. Second, during the doctrinal high times of sovereign equality, the international community was just less integrated, so that most of the important decisions were taken on the national plane anyway.¹⁶

All previous governments were to be recognized by others as independent states but they could not really talk about relations on an equal footing. Even Acharya's attitude while dealing with China tells us that Nepal was not in a position at that time to assert sovereign equality. Acharya, who was considered by the Nepalese as a 'hero' for modernizing Nepal's foreign policy, once said to Zhou Enlai when on a visit to Kathmandu, 'look, we are such a small country. You are such a big state; how can you treat us on equal terms?' (Fisher, 1997: 177).

However, B. P. Koirala diversified Nepal's foreign policy in a very sophisticated manner., signing a new trade treaty with India on 11 September 1960, which was an important and significant achievement. Allowing the Chinese to

open an embassy in Kathmandu in August 1960, skilful handling of the issue of Mount Everest and of the Mustang incident were major achievements of B. P. Koirala's government towards a diversified foreign policy. Only a person like B. P. Koirala, with good exposure and a clear vision, could deal with the China-Mongolia issue without offending China. Also, he could provide both India and China with a platform to apply the 'equal friendship' principle.¹⁷ He also warned against efforts to suppress freedom-loving citizens by means of force which in the context was an obvious reference to Tibet.¹⁸ He even dared to establish relations with Pakistan and Israel without looking for consent from India. Many historians and scholars mention that Koirala's moves to deepen Nepal's relations with Pakistan and China – two countries that India considered arch enemies – cost him his government as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru allegedly incited Mahendra to oust him.¹⁹

In fact, the 18-month-long regime of the first democratically elected Prime Minister was a crucial time for Nepal in the matter of foreign policy, not to mention other aspects. B. P. Koirala's government reached out to more than a dozen countries including Austria, Italy, Serbia, Switzerland, Poland, Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, Netherlands, Laos, Israel, Sweden, Thailand and Indonesia, to establish diplomatic relations with Nepal within a short period of time. In fact Nepal was the first South Asian country to reach out to Israel, then a *bête noire*, without knowing the reaction of India (Baral, 2018). Koirala's government could be credited for Nepal's diplomatic relations with Mongolia and Hungary as they were established just 15 days after Koirala was ousted from the Premiership. Speaking to the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, Koirala said that he spoke on behalf of 'a small uncommitted nation which had no pretensions of any kind' (Lohani and Thapa, 1996: 14) and expressed his solidarity for those countries that were struggling for their birthrights of freedom and independence. These countries he spoke for included Algeria, Congo, countries in the Middle East, Hungary, Lebanon, Germany, Korea and Vietnam. Some of these, for various reasons, were not even members of the UN. Koirala had the vision, and ability to implement that vision, of making Nepal a visible player in global politics. He argued that Nepal had judged international issues on their own merit without fear or favour. He appealed for China to take its rightful place at the UN and at the same time supported the Mongolian People's Republic in its 'rightful claim' to membership in the UN. In a well-balanced speech he said:

In our opinion the United Nations can neither become universal nor can it reflect the political realities existing in the world today until the People's Republic of China is given its rightful place in the Organization. The United Nations will not be able to fulfill effectively some of its important purposes and functions until the People's Republic of China is brought in. The UN Charter speaks of 'the peoples of the United Nations' and it cannot be fully representative of the people of the world when 630 million people have been deprived of the beneficent and constructive influences of the various activities of the UN ... In this connection, we feel that the Mongolian People's Republic too has a rightful claim to membership in this Organization. (Koirala, 1996: 15)

For Koirala, the primary objective of the foreign policy of every country should be to secure its own political independence, sovereignty and security and to promote international peace and cooperation. He stated that

Nepal is a small country in terms of economic and military resources and strength, but it is fully conscious of its responsibility and role it has to play in the deliberation of the UN as one of its members. Our role in the UN will always be governed by the principles and considerations outlined ... We believe in the independent exercise of our judgment in considering international issues. If we believe in a policy of non-alignment with any one of the power blocs, it is because we do not wish to commit ourselves beforehand to support one side or the other, and we wish to retain our independence of judgment in assessing international issues as they arise. (Koirala 1996: 17–18)

After the elected government was dismissed through a coup in December 1960, King Mahendra's public statements strongly implied that foreign policy considerations had played an important part in his decision as he claimed that 'anti-national elements had received encouragement to a larger degree from the Koirala government. As it is our ultimate responsibility to safeguard nationalism and sovereignty ... we hereby dissolve the cabinet as well as both houses of parliament' (Rose 1971: 231). While doing so, King Mahendra resumed the foreign policy in place before B. P. Koirala came to power. Though Mahendra tried to give new flavour to Nepal's foreign policy, causing some anxiety for India, he was not able to make much progress. A personal account of Rishikesh Shaha, who was the king's permanent representative to the UN in the 1960s, tells that the determinants of Nepal's foreign policy vis-à-vis world politics during the Mahendra era were, by and large, India-guided. He says:

I go into trouble with both my home government and my Indian friends on the spot when I chose to vote for the US resolutions condemning Soviet armed interventions in Hungary. Although India abstained from the vote on the resolution, Burma and Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] went along with me in voting in favor of the US resolutions. The gain for us as a result of my explanation of the vote was that my statement received wide publicity, and other powers acquired the impression that even India could not always take Nepal for granted. (Shaha, 1996: 96)

To close this section, it should be stated that there was some turbulence in Nepal's foreign policy particularly with its southern neighbour, India, and especially after the *coup d'état* by King Mahendra against the democratically elected government. Mahendra initially tried to tilt towards China as a way of gaining some bargaining chips to restore support from India after it had expressed its displeasure about the coup.

ZONE OF PEACE: AN ASSERTION TO BE A GLOBAL PLAYER

King Birendra, son of Mahendra, ruled Nepal as an absolute monarch after his accession to the throne in 1972 and the 'Zone of Peace' proposal was made

central to Nepal's foreign policy initiatives ... at least for domestic consumption (Shah, 1982: 210–11). Birendra's proposal of a 'Zone of Peace' encompassed a dream to convert Nepal to a neutral territory that could pursue a policy of non-alignment which would bring peace, progress and prosperity. In fact, Birendra's 'Zone of Peace' proposal can be seen as a legacy of B. P. Koirala's foreign policy to assert for Nepal's sovereign equality. Birendra also tried to add an aspect of 'neutrality' to his proposal, hoping to use it as leverage in finding a space for Nepal in the global political arena. It is said that King Birendra never missed a single opportunity to air his proposal at formal state banquets and international conferences. However, some critics like Rishikesh Shaha questioned the King's announcement as a proposal lacking any preparation, saying that Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the King's ministers, including the Prime Minister, had not taken soundings from other governments beforehand on the likely reaction to Birendra's proposal to declare Nepal as 'Zone of Peace' (Shaha, 1982: 211). For Shaha, the announcement was 'a surprise announcement',²⁰ hence it 'was foredoomed to failure'.

As Birendra found it hard to get his proposal accepted globally after the reluctance of India to support it, Nepal tried to be visible through the forum of least developed countries (LDCs). King Birendra himself attended the international conferences of LDCs in Paris in 1981 to highlight the need for increased external aid and assistance to help LDCs overcome their economic backwardness (*The Rising Nepal*, 1981). Also, Birendra was one of those people who could see the need for a South Asian regional identity and then work for the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) consisting of seven South Asian countries working together to boost the relations and economy of all the member countries.

High-level visits from countries other than India and China often took place during Birendra's reign. The Soviet Union sent its Chairman of the Presidium, Marshal Voroshilov, on a state visit to Nepal in 1960, Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip made a state visit in 1961, and the 39th Vice President of the United States, Spiro Agnew visited Nepal during his tenure from 1969–1973. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands paid an official visit to Nepal on 26 January 1973, and unofficial visits to Nepal in April 1975 and again in October–November 1977; he also made a friendly visit to Nepal from 25–29 January 1986. Dr Kurt Waldheim, who later became the President of Austria in 1990, paid a visit to Nepal in his capacity as Secretary General of the United Nations in 1981. France's President François Mitterrand made a state visit to Nepal in May 1983, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany visited in July 1987.

BACK TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Almost all governments formed after 1990 tried to confine Nepal's relations within its immediate neighbourhood, i.e. with India and China. In doing so,

Nepal rolled back its previous foreign policy of diversification and assertion. In fact, in the early years of the new democratic regime the emphasis was on rebuilding damaged Nepal–India relations. The policy of mutual security was once again emphasized in the Joint Communiqué signed during the visit of Prime Minister K. P. Bhattarai to India in 1991. It stressed the importance of ‘prior consultations with a view to reaching agreement on such defense related matters which in view of either country could pose a threat to its security’. These assurances, according to Thapliyal (2003), not only reiterated the understanding reached in the treaties of 1950 and 1965, but also accepted mutuality and sensitivity to each other’s security interests. Thapliyal points to improvements in Sino–India relations at the regional level as one of the causes for improved relations between Nepal and India. Loss of interest in and negligible support for Nepal by China and other international forces during the 1989 Indian blockade seems to be one of the deciding factors in Nepal prioritizing the revival of the relationship with India. The Indian blockade was taken up as a useful tool by democratic forces in Nepal to compel the monarchy to restore multiparty democracy. India’s say in Nepali politics became more influential with the new regime in place after the revolution. However, Nepali leftist forces tried to balance India with China and for that they defamed India, in public.

The Nepali government decided to highlight a pilgrimage visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi offering it official status, but did not give similar weight to the two-day visit of Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi in March 2018. It was the Prime Minister’s first visit to Nepal after a gap of 24 years. When Mongolia’s Foreign Minister Tsend Munkh-Orgil visited in 2016 Nepali intellectuals and journalists questioned the trip saying that it was Nepal’s blunder²¹ to invite him at a time when the Chinese delegation was visiting. India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, however, was warmly welcomed at a time when the country was struggling to elect a new Prime Minister and political parties were struggling to find a suitable candidate to get majority support in a hung parliament. All of these examples illustrate how Nepal has become confined by its own neighbourhood. B. P. Koirala’s vision of Nepal as a global player appears to have faded, and ironically, the eventual beneficiary of this is China. China mania has increased in Nepal in recent years with some political elites moving closer to China (Baral, 2018: viii), and the reason is India’s assiduous ‘micro management’ of Nepal. People’s perception of India is that it is the more dangerous of Nepal’s neighbours, whereas China has been considered as too distant – both in physical and cultural terms – to threaten the country’s independence, but close enough to serve as a potential source of support (Rose, 1971).

Nepal formed many committees after 1990 with the ambition of forming the best and most compatible foreign policy for the country: a high-level task force under former Foreign Secretary Uddhav Deo Bhatta in 1996, another high-level task force headed by Murari Raj Sharma in 2006, a committee under the

International Relations and Human Rights Committee of the Legislative Parliament of Nepal in 2011, a Dinesh Bhattarai-led committee to strengthen constitutional capacity for foreign policy goals in 2013, and a Durga Bahadur Subedi-led report on organization and management of the Ministry, its Departments and Missions in 2015 are just a few of them. The last was the High-Level Task Force on Foreign Policy (HLFP) under then Minister of Foreign Affairs Krishna Bahadur Mahara in 2017 to study the emerging dynamics of Nepal's foreign policy and addressing them within the broad guidelines provided in the constitution.²² The report of the HLFP, which submitted its report titled 'Reorienting Nepal's Foreign Policy in a Rapidly Changing World' to the Prime Minister on 8 January 2018, came up with a number of recommendations. The report gives credit to the country's political leaders, saying that they 'have concentrated largely on a nation-building process, which is no mean feat for any country'. Yes, the leadership had struggled to define a democratic trajectory for the country, manage a decade-long internal insurgency, deal with the post-conflict peace-building process through an Interim Constitution of 2007, restructure the state by preparing a constitution through two different Constituent Assemblies, and holding all three levels of elections to implement the new constitution adopted in 20 September 2015. It could be argued that Nepal has lost its strength further while dealing only with India and China. It has established diplomatic relations with 156 countries out of 193 members of the United Nations, yet has Missions in only 30 countries. Within the past three decades or so, most high-level official visits of Nepal have been confined to India and China, and high-level visits to other countries have been more for the purpose of attending international conferences than for promoting bilateral relations. Visits by Heads of Government of other South Asian countries to Nepal have been rare, except for the purpose of attending SAARC summits. It is a sign of the consequences to be faced by Nepal in adopting a neighbours-first policy.

Before concluding, it is worth quoting Khanal (1996: 130–3) who describes the development of Nepal's foreign policy in two parallel but inter-related courses. For him, the complex, sensitive relations between Nepal, India and China are in one sense clearly strategic whereas the search for political relations with the UN and the member states bilaterally is a political one. This according to him can be considered as a search for goodwill and Nepal's more realized political identity. According to Khanal, for strategic foreign policy Nepal had to accept a larger share of continuity than change, though in the world's radically changed circumstances further appropriate development is desirable.

Countries use various means to serve their interests, including cooperation, confrontation, threats, persuasion, sanctions, or military force among others, though the 'evidence suggests that countries command more respect by practicing reciprocal respect than by the use of other means' (Malla, 2012: 189). Here, one needs to realize that Nepal's foreign policy has not been able to achieve

status enhancement for Nepal. Labour diplomacy within the broader term of economic diplomacy, security diplomacy beyond defence diplomacy and public diplomacy have been given importance to address newly emerged situations especially due to the problem of huge youth labour migration abroad. What should not be forgotten is that world attention was more focused on Nepal in the past while it had diversified its relations globally. A study on the responses by friendly countries during the two blockades Nepal faced in the space of three decades may help send a clear message about the strength in having diverse relations with many countries. The take home message from two blockades was that the more you limit your relations to within the neighbourhood, the less you get international support. The 1989 blockade got more attention from external powers as Nepal had enough interaction with them but the latest blockade in 2015 was almost ignored by the world as Nepal's interaction with them had minimized. Rather, Indian Prime Minister Modi tried to use international fora to justify India's blockade.

As stated earlier, Nepal has gone back to confining its foreign relations within the neighbourhood, even ignoring regional cooperation, i.e. SAARC. The recent report of HLFP justifies this by seeing it as Asia-oriented, as it should be due to the reality of the rise of Asia. However, the official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal states its mission is²³:

to strengthen close, cordial and friendly relations with immediate neighbors, South Asian countries, major powers and other countries; play an active role in the United Nations, and other international and regional organizations and forums; to safeguard and promote rights and interests of Nepali nationals living abroad; and to enhance Nepal's image in international arena.

But we need to understand that often weak states will be further undermined if they hold no social capital globally. The more smart connections and networks a country has is a major indicator of social capital today. This is clearly the case if HLFP suggests that Nepal should strengthen relations with the countries in the European Union (EU). However, recent attempts by the government of Nepal to criticize the EU and the West has gone beyond the spirit of the report. The government position on the EU and the West might have made its neighbours (both China and India) happier, but we need to look at the possible consequences of China and India coming together to exploit Nepal. China is not as trustworthy as many Nepali perceive today, it offers lip service to maintain goodwill in Nepal but goes with India for major interests. Nepal experienced China's apathy during the 2015 blockade by India. China has not shown serious interest in operationalizing the Kodari Highway (Pyakurel, n.d.), the only highway that connects Nepal with the Tibetan part of China even after the promise made by the Chinese President that 'it will be in operation shortly', which coincided almost exactly with the time India imposed the last blockade on Nepal. After several commitments, China reopened the border point on May 29, 2019 but with the placement of stern regulatory measures (Pyakurel 2019).

CONCLUSION

Nepal's desire for survival today is a matter of interest for scholars as Nepal's socio-political formation is just that – in survival mode, with a remittance economy and import-driven market. It is no more a question of geo-politics for Nepal, being strategically located between the two Asian rising powers. Various narratives are constructed among the Nepalis about the interests of western as well as neighbouring countries. China's policy is to capture the market of South Asia, especially that of northern India through Nepal. Recently, China has started building an industrial park in Jhapa, and is also investing money in Chitwan, and Udaypur – all near the border with India. Project proposals under Belt and Road Initiatives are other issues to be discussed. The Chinese intention to build railways and roads is to make a route for Chinese goods to be supplied to the Indian markets of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Similarly, India wants to bring the fresh water of the Nepali hills to the plains of India to meet its irrigation and consumer requirements. There is talk of plans for the Saptakosi High Dam to be built by India in eastern Nepal, which would result in the bio-diversity of Nepal being harmed. There is also a narrative that India is trying to control Nepal through religion, with the pilgrimage of Modi and the coming of Sankaracharya to Nepal. But Nepalis have a tremendous capacity for survival, as seen during the British era of colonialism. There is a saying – Bhote (the term earlier referred to the residents of Bhote, Tibet) ko bal, Angrez ko kahāl, Gorkhālī ko Chhāl (Bhote has muscle power, English have military power but Gorkhālīs are expert in intrigue). It is said that Nepali leaders are doing *chhāl* towards India by appearing to be close to Hindus; but they have not forgotten the economic blockade of India in 2015, so they avenge it by secretly being close to China. Other than this, Nepal toned to take benefits from China as much as it can, avoiding issues, i.e. the debt trap experienced by Sri Lanka and others due to the high interest rate imposed by China in the development projects. The need of the hour is that in survival mode, Nepal needs to maintain cordial relations with all friendly nations in the world-balancing between India and China.

Notes

- 1 *Jaisi Kotha* was renamed as *Munsi Khana* during the Bhimsen Thapa regime in 1816. The Foreign Department was named in 1934 and given Ministry status. In 1951, a Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established.
- 2 Before 1769, Nepal referred only to the Kathmandu valley.
- 3 There is no single authoritative text of the 1789 treaty between Tibet and Nepal. However it is said that along with huge material benefits, there were some important clauses tilting in Nepal's favour. For example, Nepal was granted the rights to maintain a *vakil* (envoy) at Lhasa; Nepalese in Tibet who committed crimes would be tried by Nepali representatives in the area; and a Tibetan Lama was to visit Kathmandu each year to 'bless the temple' (the Swayambhu Nath).

- 4 The terms of the Treaty of Betrawati signed on 2 October 1792 were: both Nepal and Tibet will accept the suzerainty of the Qing emperor; the Government of Tibet will pay compensation for the property of the Nepalese merchants looted by the Tibetans at Lhasa; the Nepali citizens will have the right to visit, trade, and establish industries in any part of Tibet and China; in case of any dispute between Nepal and Tibet, the Qing government will intervene and settle the dispute at the request of both the countries; the Qing will help Nepal defend against any external aggression; both Nepal and Tibet will have to send a delegation to pay tribute to the Imperial Court in China every five years; in return, the Qing emperor will also send friendly gifts to both the countries and the people who carry the tribute will be treated as important guests and will be provided every facility.
- 5 Some scholars argue that there was already contact with British-India. It is said that a Company surgeon was sent to Nepal in 1769, two years after the unsuccessful expedition to Kathmandu of Capt George Kinloch, by British-India in an unsuccessful attempt to improve trade relations (Marshall, 1977). Another mission led by George Foxcroft in 1783 tried to reach Nepal to gather data to write a natural and political history of Nepal and the government sanctioned the visit. He had carried a letter from the Governor-General, but was turned back by Gorkhas and forced to return to Patna (Michael, 1998). It is unclear if this was an official mission. However, evidence shows that Nepal and British-India could sign a treaty of trade in 1792 only after the Betrawati Treaty with Tibet and China.
- 6 It is said that the major concern of the Ranas after the Sugauli treaty was to acknowledge Nepal as an independent nation, which is why the Nepal–British treaty of 1823 has been considered to be ‘a great achievement of 25 years of Chandra Shamsher’s diplomacy’ which for the first time formally acknowledged Nepal as an independent nation (Husain, 1970: 208).
- 7 The terms were payment of ten million rupees to Nepal as ‘damages’ for the various iniquities suffered by Nepali at the hands of Tibetan officials; cession of the Taklakot area in the western Tibet and restoration of those sections of Kuti and Kerong districts that had once belonged to Nepal (Rose, 1971: 110).
- 8 One of the modifications was: ‘the Emperor of China shall be obeyed by both states as before’, whereas the second was: ‘Tibet and Gorkha have both respected the Emperor of China up to the present time. As Tibet is a land of monasteries and shrines (devoted to) penance and worship, if any other Raja should invade Tibet, Gorkha will give as much assistance as possible’ which replaced the original text: ‘Nepal promised to come to the aid of the Tibetans if they were attacked by any other “Rajah”’.
- 9 While mentioning the Tibetan compulsion to expand its relations with Russia, Rose writes, ‘Nepal had proven to be an unreliable ally, more concerned with maintaining good relations with the British and Chinese than in protecting its historical interest in the trans-Himalayan area’ (Rose 1971:149). Rose writes, Nepal may even have felt that it had more to gain from Chinese-dominated Tibet than from an autonomous government at Lhasa under strong British influence. The Tibetans suspected that Nepal wanted a Chinese presence in Tibet as a potential balance to British-India (Rose, 1971:164).
- 10 He further writes: ‘You know also that we have been having long talks with the Chinese Government in Peking in regards to Tibetan matters. It is important therefore that there should be the closest coordination between India and Nepal so as to avoid any differing approach, which may lead to complication’ (Koirala, 2008: 286).
- 11 The letter was intended to inform Nehru about the expansion of Nepal’s cabinet and allocation of the external affairs portfolio to Dilli Raman Regmi. In another letter dated 30 April 1954 Koirala wrote to Nehru informing him of his statement given to the press while replying about Nepal–Tibet relations: ‘Our relations with Tibet remains the same in spite of the presence of the Chinese there and we are still dealing directly with Dalai Lama and not with the Chinese and to our belief Tibet was still autonomous’ (Koirala, 2008: 291–2).
- 12 Replying to Koirala on 8 May 1954, Nehru called the statement made by Koirala about Tibet unfortunate, stating that it ‘must no doubt have irritated the Government of China greatly. Your statement was not in keeping with the facts of the situation, because there can be no doubt at all that Tibet is under Chinese sovereignty and it has ceased to be autonomous. Even before, for many years, China has always claimed sovereignty over Tibet and hence was less autonomous. Since the

Communist government has come into power in China, that right of China's has been enforced and China is in full control of Tibet, although they have not interfered with many local matters. That fact has to be recognized ... you must have seen the text of the agreement between India and China in regards to Tibet. That, I think, is a good agreement which will give us peace on our long border and which recognizes facts as there are.'

- 13 Major developments were the 1956 vote in the UN General Assembly on the Hungarian question, in which Nepal voted with the West against the Soviet bloc; and the 4th Congress of the World Buddhist Fellowship with the participation of Buddhist monks and scholars from 32 countries in November 1956. The former was the first major issue in the UN on which Nepal had not voted with India, and the latter was considered by the Nepalese as a proud moment which helped establish cultural relations with several other countries directly rather than through India as an intermediary.
- 14 For Mahendra's politics of balance was not to use two neighbours against each other. Mahendra started the change in foreign policy; with the appointment of Tanka Prasad Acharya as Prime Minister with 'poorly disguised anti-Indian proclivities' expressed his government's determination to modify Nepal's 'special relations' with India in the direction of 'equal relationship' with all countries (*Gorkhapatra*, 30 June 1956), in his first press conference after taking office. Nepal would institutionalize diplomatic relations with the Communist Chinese Government just before the appointment. Later, King Mahendra was questioned by Acharya wondering whether Mahendra was really interested in diversifying Nepal's relations beyond India and China or whether he tried to use neighbouring India and China against each other for his political benefit (see Fisher, 1997).
- 15 Acharya states, 'it is said that when K.I. Singh came from Tibet he had two suitcases full of Indian notes amounting to several lakhs ... The Chinese perhaps did not favour him much. They just gave him asylum, that's all. Where did he get all that money? When I consider all these things, I have a suspicion that Mahendra was involved ... from circumstantial evidences I conclude that K.I Singh was fully instigated by Mahendra (King) and Hari Shamsher' (Fisher, 1997: 166).
- 16 Juliane Kokott. (2010). *States, Sovereign Equality*. Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, p. 2., available at <http://cesl.cupl.edu.cn/upload/201101205780734.pdf>, accessed on 24 May 2018.
- 17 Koirala 'implicitly criticized Chinese policy towards India' in his first public statements from Peking itself. He stated, 'notwithstanding of its size or might if any power attempts to occupy or control even an inch of territory of another Asian country such attempts will definitely disrupt peace in the world'. For details, *Gorkhapatra*, 16 March 1960 cited in Rose (1971: 225).
- 18 *Gorkhapatra*, 16 March 1960 cited in Rose (1971: 225).
- 19 "Nepal welcomes Pak bilateral visit after 24 years" *My Republica*, March 5, 2018, also available at <http://www.myrepublica.com/news/37433/?categoryId=81>, accessed on 25 May 2018.
- 20 Shaha writes, 'following the King's coronation speech, the Foreign Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to be in great haste to solicit and secure endorsement of the proposal by as many as possible'.
- 21 Such an anxiety was shown by Nepali leaders/scholars in December 2016 when Liu Qibao, a powerful member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, wrapped up his three-day official visit to Nepal without meeting former prime ministers Deuba and K. P. Sharma Oli. It is understood that Deuba's (mis)adventure in Goa (where Deuba shared a stage with Lobsang Sangay, Tibetan PM-in-exile) played a role in the cancellation of the planned meeting with Liu in Kathmandu, just an hour after Liu met Prime Minister Dahal for 45 minutes. Foreign policy experts in Kathmandu say that Liu has conveyed his government's displeasure with recent adventures of Nepali leaders that had made China somewhat suspicious; for details, see Subhash Ghimire, 'Dancing with the dragon', *My Republica*, 27 December 2016. <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/11875/> (accessed on the October 27, 2019).
- 22 The Constitution of Nepal (2015) has outlined the directive principles, policies and obligations of the State regarding its foreign policy. The foreign policy of Nepal is guided by the abiding faith in the United Nations and policy of non-alignment.
- 23 <https://mofa.gov.np/the-ministry/> (accessed on the October 27, 2019).

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Afghanistan's Foreign Policy

Kaushik Roy

INTRODUCTION

The word 'Afghan' first emerges in a Sassanian inscription of the 3rd century CE. One can argue that the present-day Afghanistan came into existence when Ahmad Shah Abdali established the Afghan monarchy in the first half of the 18th century. Before him, we hear of various tribes and small kingdoms of Afghanistan like that of Ghur, Ghazni, etc. but there was no unified Afghan polity. One scholar has argued that Ahmad Abdali was not the founder of Afghanistan because he was born in Multan (then in Mughal India) and then took service with the Iranian (Persia until the 18th century) ruler. Further, he used Persian in his official correspondence, and the word Afghanistan was absent in his lexicon (Hanifi, 2012: 88–9). But we must note that the base of Ahmad Abdali's domain remained Afghanistan and the core of his army comprised of Afghans. Taking a post-modernist slant, B. D. Hopkins asserts that Afghanistan was the figment of British colonial imagination, *Amir* Dost Muhammad's domain, writes Hopkins, in the first half of the 19th century was referred to by contemporaries as the Kingdom of Kabul rather than the Afghan Kingdom, and Herat remained an independent political entity (Hopkins, 2012). But skirmishing with such technicalities would lead us nowhere, so, this chapter will use the rise of Ahmad Abdali as a starting point for a review of Afghanistan's foreign policy.

Until now, a lot has been written about the great powers' intervention in Afghanistan, but not on the Afghan perspective of its relation with the neighbouring states. This is due in part to the fact that most of those sources originate

in countries which have intervened in Afghanistan. Technically, foreign policy refers to interstate relations. However, it is influenced by domestic policy, geopolitics, geoeconomics and a host of other factors. Hence, though the principal focus will be on foreign policy, those related factors will also be discussed when deemed relevant.

The chapter is divided into five sections: the first section gives a brief overview of the land of Afghanistan and its people; the second section covers the foreign policy of the Durrani rulers; the third section focuses on the tortuous British relationship with Afghanistan; the fourth section deals with the Soviet 'Bear's' shadow over Afghanistan; and the last section covers Afghan policy vis-à-vis the United States and NATO from the end of the Cold War up to the present day. First, a word of caution is necessary. For a substantial period of the almost three-hundred-year timespan covered by this chapter, there was no unified state of Afghanistan. The country remained fragmented and there were several competing polities within Afghanistan for a considerable amount of time. Further, great powers often intervened in Afghanistan due to the latter's geopolitical position. So for much of its history, Afghan foreign policy focused on how to respond to foreign occupation of the whole or part of the country.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Afghanistan is socially and ecologically diverse. It is a landlocked country with an area of 250,000 square miles, slightly larger than France which has an area of 212,000 square miles (MacMunn, 2002: 3). The Hindu Kush and its associated ranges form roughly 60 per cent of Afghanistan's landmass (Robson, 1986: 15–16), with the eastern Hindu Kush mountain range separating north Afghanistan from Central Asia. Western Afghanistan is mostly semi-arid desert. The hilly and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan is not conducive to intensive agriculture – only 12 per cent of the land is arable (Maley, 2009: 10) and most of the agricultural land divided into smallholdings (Rubin, 2002: 19). About 85 per cent of the people are nomads and peasants.

In 1979, Afghanistan's population was 13.05 million including 800,000 nomads (Maley, 2009: 8). There are 55 ethnic groups in the country. The dominant ethnic group remains that of the Pashtuns/Pathans, comprising some 45 per cent of Afghanistan's population, concentrated mainly in the south and south-east. Next are the Tajiks, who are mainly in the north and north-east, who make up an estimated 27 per cent. After them are the Hazaras (who are predominantly Shias – most of the other tribes are Sunnis) who are in the central highlands of Afghanistan and make up 10 per cent of the country's population. The Qizilbash (noted for the red headgear worn by those Turkoman tribes who supported Shaikh Haider) were settled in Afghanistan by the Persian Emperor Nadir Shah. Now, they are concentrated around Kabul and Herat. North of the Hindu Kush

is Afghan Turkestan inhabited by the ethnic groups of Turkic origins like the Uzbeks and the Turkmen. Balkh is the principal town in this region. The Uzbeks are semi-nomads but the Tajiks are agriculturists and artisans (Goodson, 2001: 14, 16; MacMunn, 2002: 4; Noelle, 2008: 63–4). The Aimaqs are to be found in the west of Afghanistan, Brahuis in the south-west, and the Baluchis in the west and south-west (Rubin, 2002: 26).

Afghanistan remains a patrilineal society (Rubin, 2002: 23). Tribal allegiances still persist in Afghan society. The tribes are divided into *khel* (lineages) which are further subdivided into *kholikor* (clans). Local authority is exercised by the tribal *maliks* (headmen) (Goodson, 2001: 14, 18). The *kors* are in conflict with each other over control of land, forest and use of water, but when Afghanistan is threatened by an external enemy, the *kors* cooperate with each other (Ruttig, 2012: 105).

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE DURRANI REGIME

In 1747, Ahmad Khan Abdali, a 24-year-old general of the Iranian Emperor Nadir Shah, commanding 10,000 cavalry, declared independence after the death of his master and took the title of Shah in Kandahar. Ahmad was lucky to have captured a caravan carrying treasure from India to Persia (MacMunn, 2002: 54); this treasure enabled him to cement political and military alliances with various Afghan tribes. The Abdali/Durrani and Ghilzai confederacies formed two major components of the Pashtun tribe; Ahmad belonged to the Saduzoi subdivision of the Abdali Confederacy. Afghanistan was a deficit economy (and remains so), hence, Ahmad Abdali launched repeated plundering raids on the decaying Mughal Empire. After defeating the Maratha Confederacy in the Third Battle of Panipat on 14 January 1761, he annexed the agriculturally rich province of Punjab. By 1762, his empire besides Afghanistan included Kashmir, Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and parts of Khorasan. His domain controlled the trade routes which linked Persia, Central Asia, and eastern Turkestan with India. Bokhara's intervention in Balkh and Badakshan forced Ahmad to launch a campaign against Turkestan in 1768. Badakshan supplied the Durrani Empire with lapis lazuli, jasper and ruby. The supply of the precious metals from Badakshan somewhat strengthened the Afghan economy under Ahmad Shah Abdali (Noelle, 2008: 71, 73).

The failure of Ahmad Abdali's successors to conduct similar forays into India resulted in a cash deficit for the Durrani monarchy which in turn activated civil war and consequently the downfall of this dynasty. In a tribal state like that of the Durrani Empire, the chieftains were keen to participate in campaigns to win glory and, of course, to gain booty: Abdali was able to provide both these non-tangible and tangible rewards. In the tribal conquest state built by Abdali, the chieftains were to be supplied with booties and their energy was to be directed

against external conquests. Otherwise, the fragile polity would implode. Hence, conquest was inbuilt within the system. But, his successors failed on both the counts. Under his weak successors, the tribal chieftains' energies geared hitherto towards foreign conquests, turned inwards, against each other and against the monarch. Ahmad's son Timur Shah (r. 1773–93) proved to be unpopular with the chieftains, prompting him to transfer the capital from Kandahar to Kabul. In 1789, Sind became independent of the failing Durrani monarchy (Sykes, 2002 v.1: 369). In 1793, he was succeeded by his eldest son Zaman Shah. This in turn resulted in further loss of revenue and political prestige of the monarch. The breaking away of Sind also encouraged other provincial governors to revolt against the central authority at the earliest opportunity.

Zaman Shah (r. 1793–1800) also failed to repeat Ahmad's success in India. In 1797, Zaman entered Punjab with his army. The British East India Company (EIC) feared that none of the Indian powers were strong enough to confront him and that the Muslims of the subcontinent might rally to his standard. However, Zaman had to turn back due to the appearance of Sultan Mahmud with a large force in Farah. In 1798, the Sikhs captured Lahore and turned away the Afghan garrison. In that year, Zaman sent a letter to the Governor-General of British-India Richard Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, emphasizing that the EIC should cooperate with him in pushing the Marathas back from north India to Deccan. The *Wazir* (Prime Minister) of the Mughal Empire who was the ruler of Awadh exchanged correspondence with Zaman and offered the latter a large sum of money in return for help to make him independent of British control. Wellesley ordered Mehdi Ali Khan, a naturalized Iranian and Resident of the EIC at Bushire, to encourage Iran to attack Zaman. At that time, Zaman also demanded Khorasan from Iran. Fath Ali Shah who came to the throne of Iran in 1797 replied that Herat and Kandahar belonged to the Iranian Empire. He directed his army towards Afghanistan. This in turn forced Zaman to retreat from India in 1799. In 1800, Wellesley sent John Malcolm (b. 1769–d. 1833) to Iran to encourage Fath Ali to attack Afghanistan. In 1800, Kashmir became independent of the Durrani Empire. In that year, Zaman was deposed by his half brother Mahmud. In 1802, he was able to defeat the Uzbeks and drove them back across the Oxus River. But in 1803, Mahmud was deposed by Shuja, a son of Zaman (Robson, 1986: 25; Sykes, 2002 v.1: 373, 377–8, 380–1, 384).

Between 1800 and 1814, the French menace in the shape of Napoleon threatened the EIC. Napoleon Bonaparte and Tsar Paul I of Russia planned a joint invasion of India. Napoleon planned to march into India, with the Iranian Army as an ally, through Tehran, Herat and Kandahar. In 1801, the Tsar ordered his Cossacks to advance from the Don to India. However, due to logistical failure, the Cossacks turned back from the Volga. In 1809, Mountstuart Elphinstone mounted the first British diplomatic mission to Kabul in order to establish an alliance with Shuja against the Franco-Russian bloc. In June 1809, Shuja signed a treaty in accordance with which no Frenchman or other European was to be allowed to enter

Afghanistan. However, Shuja was deposed by Mahmud in that year (Sykes, 2002 v.1: 377, 388).

Hopkins asserts that the Elphinstone mission to Kabul created the impression that Afghanistan was *yaghistan* (land of rebellion) and this image shaped British policy towards that country. Hopkins is probably overstating his case. As we will see in the next section, *realpolitik* especially the geopolitical position of Afghanistan shaped British policy. Hopkins in making a case study of the First Afghan War (1839–42) goes on to say that the fluid political landscape of Afghanistan was made more fluid by British interactions and interventions (Hopkins, 2012: 1, 3). Such an assertion is simply not true because we have seen that even before British intervention Afghanistan was on the verge of disintegration. As we will see in the subsequent sections, the geopolitical position of the country along with its weak economic base forced the Afghan rulers to intervene in foreign countries and this in turn resulted in foreign interventions.

BRITAIN AND AFGHANISTAN

During the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, Britain was the principal power with which Afghanistan had to deal. The Russian bogey was the principal driver of the relationship between Britain and Afghanistan. Britain viewed Afghanistan as the gateway to the invasion of India. During this period, Afghanistan fought three wars with British-India (EIC and after 1859 the Raj). During this time, the Saduzois were overthrown by another influential Durrani subdivision, the Muhammadzai Barakzais. Shah Mahmud, the last Saduzoi ruler was deposed in 1818. Shah Mahmud established a separate principality at Herat and Akram Khan came to power in Kabul and the latter continued to rule until his death in 1826 (MacMunn, 2002: 58).

Dost Muhammad (b. 1792–d. 1863) gained control of Kabul, and took the title of *amir* in order to differentiate his regime from that of the Saduzois who took the title of Shah. Dost's reign officially started in 1826. In 1834, Dost extended his sway over Kandahar after defeating the Saduzoi Shah Shuja. In 1837, he captured Ghazni. His immediate policy was to legitimize his authority by launching *jihad* (holy war) against the Sikhs who had captured Punjab under the weak successors of Ahmad Abdali. However, his campaign against the Sikhs proved to be a failure in 1835 (Noelle, 2008: 15, 17, 36–7). Dost's failure to win British support for acquiring Peshawar from the Sikhs turned him away from British-India. The EIC's agent Alexander Burnes was unable to offer anything substantial to Dost. In response, Dost wrote a letter to the Tsar stating that he was desirous, like the ruler of Iran, to enter into friendship with him. He asked for aid against the Sikhs and the British. Dost warned that without aid from the Tsar, the Sikhs and the British would destroy the traditional trade between Kabul, Bokhara and Moscow. In December 1837, Captain Ivan V. Vitkevich, a military officer also

functioning as a diplomat arrived at Kabul. Influenced by Vitkevich, Dost signed a treaty with the Iranian ruler Shah Muhammad Qajar against the independent Kamran Mirza in Herat (Sykes, 2002 v.1: 403–4, 407).

Lord Auckland, Governor-General of British-India (1836–42) valued the friendship with Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh more than an alliance with Dost. Auckland was supported by Claude Martin Wade, the EIC's Resident at the *Khalsa*/Sikh Kingdom. Wade wanted division of Afghanistan into three competing states: Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Auckland rejected the policy of Burnes and the British Minister at Tehran John McNeill, that Dost should be supported and strengthened against the Tsarist Empire. The EIC signed a Treaty of Friendship with Ranjit Singh in 1809. Auckland feared that Dost was turning towards Russia. And Saint Petersburg was encouraging Iran to capture Herat in 1837. Shah Mahmud not only laid siege to Herat but also claimed sovereignty over Kandahar (Sykes, 2002 v.1: 387, 405; v.2: 1). Some 65 miles west of Herat is the Iranian frontier and Herat is the gateway from Iran into western Afghanistan. The British strategic managers feared that a Russian invasion across the Pamirs with the Iranians in tow would not only encourage the Afghan tribes but also the Muslims within India to declare a *jihad* against British-India. This assumption to a great extent resulted in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42) (MacMunn, 2002: 6; Robson, 1986: 19). In July 1838, a tripartite treaty was signed between the EIC, the *Khalsa* Kingdom of Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. The British supported Shah Shuja in an attempt to convert Afghanistan into a buffer state against the expanding Russian Empire. Shah Shuja ruled Afghanistan from 1803 to 1809 and was then overthrown and became a prisoner in the Sikh Kingdom and later in British-India. By September 1839, the Persian siege of Herat failed but the Russian danger remained, so Auckland continued with the invasion of Afghanistan. In April 1839, the British-Indian Army captured Kandahar. Ghazni fell in July of the same year. On 4 November 1840, Dost surrendered to the British and was deported to India (Noelle, 2008: 39, 41, 44–5; Sykes, 2002 v.2: 2).

Shah Shuja was installed in Kabul with British military help and he agreed to accept a British Resident and a British military contingent. Though he surrendered his foreign policy to the British, in internal affairs Shuja was to be independent (Noelle, 2008: 47). The British paid 200,000 pounds sterling to Kamran Mirza's *Wazir* Yar Muhammad Khan to keep him pro-British. However, he proved to be disloyal and encouraged the Durrani of Zamindawar to rebel against the British-sponsored regime of Shah Shuja (Sykes, 2002 v.2: 17). In November 1841, the anti-British rebellion started in Kabul. The eastern Ghilzais who were angry because their subsidies had been cut, proclaimed *jihad* against the British (Noelle, 2008: 48, 50). Local grievances merged with religious feeling to create a countrywide anti-British uprising. The leadership was provided by Dost's son Akbar Khan. Shuja was murdered outside Kabul. In September 1842, with the aid of reinforcements from India, the British recaptured Kabul.

However, the new British Governor-General Lord Ellenborough (1842–44) rejected the policy of converting Afghanistan into a buffer state and in October 1842, Dost was allowed to make a comeback. The *amir* reestablished his authority at Kabul in late 1843. In 1845, Dost expanded his control over Kohistan (MacMunn, 2002: 142; Noelle, 2008: 53, 60). In 1855, he established his authority over Kandahar (Robson, 1986: 33). The Anglo-Afghan Treaty signed at Peshawar in January 1857 stipulated that Dost would be supplied with cash and arms. Further, the British would maintain a *vakil* (Indian agent) at Kabul. The *amir* received 10,000 pounds sterling (Rs 100,000) annually which he used to build up a regular army to deter Iran (MacMunn, 2002: 161; Robson, 1986: 33). The point to be noted is that the British did not raise the issue of maintaining a military contingent or a permanent Resident at Kabul. The *amir* displayed wisdom in remaining neutral when an anti-British uprising occurred in India during 1857–58. The British allowed Dost autonomy in his foreign policy as long as he did not try to establish diplomatic relations with the Tsarist Empire. The British did not react when Dost turned his attention towards Herat which he captured in 1863 from the pro-Iranian ruler Sultan Ahmad Khan (Robson, 1986: 33–4). Thus, Dost had reunified Afghanistan like Ahmad Abdali before him but with indirect British aid. Britain and Afghanistan remained on friendly terms into the late 1870s.

In early 1869, Sher Ali established himself as *amir* and in March of that year came to Ambala to meet the British Governor-General Lord Mayo (MacMunn, 2002: 168). But, the bonhomie between the British Raj and Afghanistan vanished due to a geopolitical shift in Eurasia. Rapid expansion of the Tsarist Empire in Central Asia caused anxiety to the strategic managers of the British Empire who again in the 1870s attempted to bring Afghan foreign policy under their own control. This in turn resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–81). Anglo-Afghan trade was miniscule – in 1878 its value was less than one million pounds sterling. Hence, trade between British-India and Afghanistan played no role in the outbreak of the war. Like the British, *Amir* Sher Ali himself was nervous about Russian expansionism. The dominoes were falling one by one. Tashkent was captured in 1865 and Samarkhand in 1868. The Khan of Bokhara was made a vassal of the Russian Empire. In 1869, Russia occupied Krasnovodsk at the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea and it was transformed into a major base for the conquest of the Turcoman tribes along the borders of Iran and Afghanistan. Sher Ali's anxiety increased when in 1870 he started receiving letters from Konstantin von Kaufman, the self-styled Tsarist Governor-General of Turkestan. In 1873, Khiva fell to the Russians and Sher Ali panicked, requesting an urgent meeting with the Governor-General Lord Northbrook (Robson, 1986: 24, 35–6). Northbrook was for following a passive no interference policy as regards Afghanistan, but in late 1875 Lord Salisbury prodded Northbrook to follow an aggressive policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Salisbury believed that a clash with Russia over the 'Eastern Question' might be imminent. The conquest of Khokand by Russia in

1875 further strengthened the resolve of the hardliners in Britain to intervene in Afghanistan.

So, Afghanistan had to be built into a buffer state against the Russian Empire. The Conservative administration in Britain appointed its own aggressive Governor-General and Viceroy Lord Lytton in 1876 (MacMunn, 2002: 170; Robson, 1986: 41). Lytton's formula was for Sher Ali to be provided with arms and cash, and in return, British agents would be stationed inside the country and free passage would be granted to British subjects. Sher Ali refused to become a vassal of the Raj and strenuously resisted the demand to station British agents at Kabul, Herat and Balkh. The British occupation of Quetta in November 1876 made Sher Ali suspicious of British intentions (Robson, 1986: 43–4). His refusal to allow a British mission to proceed to Kabul resulted in the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1878. Sher Ali, while on the run, died of natural causes at Mazar-i-Sharif in December 1878. At that time, Lytton, like Wade 40 years earlier, was seriously thinking of partitioning Afghanistan into three separate states: Kabul, Herat and Kandahar (Johnson, 2013: 305, 310).

What happened next was an action replay of the First Anglo-Afghan War. An anti-British uprising occurred throughout Afghanistan. The British Resident and his bodyguard were assassinated in September 1879. British and Indian military reinforcements poured across the Khyber and Bolan Passes and order was restored. However, it was too costly for the Raj to maintain a large permanent army in Afghanistan, so a friendly *amir* like Dost Muhammad was put on the throne of Kabul, and the British withdrew. In August 1880, Abdul Rahman (a grandson of Dost Muhammad and rival of Sher Ali's line) was installed in Kabul with British military help and he agreed like Shah Shuja to follow a pro-British foreign policy (Johnson, 2003: 700; Robson, 1986: 12). *Amir* Abdul Rahman Khan (r. 1881–1901) was partly dependent on British aid for maintaining his rule. He received an annual subsidy of 80,000 pounds sterling from the British (Molesworth, 1962: 17; Rubin, 2002: 19). This annual subsidy was 15 per cent more than the revenue generated from Afghanistan's domestic base (Hanifi, 2012: 92). In the next century, the Afghan ruling elite's dependence on foreign aid for their state building project would increase. The Afghan–British relationship continued to remain amicable up to 1919. Abdul Rahman's policy was to preserve Afghanistan's independence from both the Russians and the British. He said that Afghanistan is like a grain of corn between two millstones (Johnson, 2003: 709).

However, Abdul Rahman had to pay a price. In return for British subsidy and British guarantee to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, in November 1893, the British imposed the Durand Line (named after the Raj's Foreign Secretary Henry Mortimer Durand) on Afghanistan. The Pashtuns inhabited the region west of the Indus to south-east Afghanistan. The British-imposed Durand Line cut this region in two with a group of Pashtuns coming under the Raj and the rest incorporated within Afghanistan. The Pashtuns annually raided the British territories

east of the Indus. When British-Indian punitive columns pursued them, the tribes escaped into Afghanistan whose border was porous. Afghanistan was unwilling and unable to police its eastern and south-eastern border effectively. The creation of the Durand Line was an attempt to tame the Pashtuns by bringing a slice of the region west of the Indus under British administration. After 1947, with the division of British-India into India and Pakistan, the region between the Indus and Afghanistan's south-eastern border came under Pakistan's control. And the issue of the Pashtuns inhabiting both sides of the Durand Line continues to haunt Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. This in turn encouraged Islamabad from the 1980s onwards to replace Afghan nationalists with Pakistani-controlled Islamists in order to marginalize the contentious border issue (Tarzi, 2012: 18–19).

Abdul Rahman was succeeded by his son Habibullah (r. 1901–19). In 1905, the Raj concluded a treaty with him affirming British control over Afghan foreign policy (Tarzi, 2012: 20). Habibullah during the First World War came under intense pressure from the hardliners within his court, led by his brother Nasrullah, to attack the Raj when the British Empire was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Central Powers. Temporarily, the German threat (like the French threat in the first decade of the 19th century) to Afghanistan haunted the Raj. In 1916, a German Mission under Wilhelm von Hentig reached Kabul. Later, he would become Chief of the Oriental Section of the Nazi Foreign Office. Hentig's mission aimed to raise the flag of *jihad* in order to create a diversion in Britain's backyard. The situation appeared dangerous because in 1917 the *Kaiserheer* was marching across the Don River and Crimea (Strausz-Hupe, 1943: 89). However, by November 1918, with the collapse of the Kaiser's Germany, the German threat to India through Afghanistan vanished.

The Afghan attack on India on 3 May 1919 under *Amir* Amanullah (r. 1919–29) (who had succeeded to the throne after the murder of his father Habibullah in February 1919) resulted in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Amanullah had to agree to the invasion because he owed his rise to power to the anti-British elements within the Afghan Army. It was a typical case of Afghan domestic policy shaping the country's foreign policy. Had the Afghans attacked between 1914 and 1918 when most of the British and Indian troops had been withdrawn from the subcontinent then things would have been really messy for the British, but thanks to the pro-British Habibullah, such a situation did not arise. Amanullah had given a call to the Indian Muslims to declare a *jihad* against the infidel British (MacMunn, 2002: 260, 269; Strausz-Hupe, 1943: 92), but it did not prove to be much of a success. After some desultory fighting, peace was made on 8 August 1919. This time the British showed wisdom in not marching towards Kabul, and Afghanistan gained full independence in pursuing its own foreign policy. Amanullah symbolized this change by taking the title of king instead of *amir* in 1923 (Goodson, 2001: 43). Amanullah claimed: 'My people are savages and I will tame them' (quoted from MacMunn, 2002: 298) – he was successful for the time being.

Amanullah's attempt to reform Afghan society from the top down resulted in a bottom-up reaction and in November 1928, a rebellion drove him out of power. Afghanistan's 'big brother', the USSR, intervened by sending 1,000 men into north Afghanistan to restore Amanullah. The Soviet force captured Mazar-i-Sharif and Tashkurghan, and in June 1929 advanced towards Kabul. But, this move was not successful. In June 1930, the Soviets sent another force into Afghanistan ostensibly in hot pursuit of the Basmachi leader Ibrahim Beg. Nadir Shah (not to be confused with the Persian Emperor Nadir Shah), a general of the Afghan Army, became king (r. 1929–33) and signed a Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression with the Soviets in 1931. In 1933, Nadir was assassinated and his son Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) ascended the throne (Goodson, 2001: 47).

Zahir in order to retain autonomy of his country encouraged the export of lambskins and fruits to foreign countries, but such export items brought paltry revenue (1.5 million pounds sterling annually). In order to reduce imports, Zahir also attempted to increase the cultivation of cotton and sugar beets. In 1934, Afghanistan joined the League of Nations following Iran and Turkey who had already joined this body in 1921 (Sykes, 2002 v.2: 330, 333). Though in 1946, Afghanistan became a member of the UN, it remained under the Soviet shadow (Maley, 2009: 65). Between 1924 and 1939, Soviet share of Afghanistan's foreign trade rose from 7 per cent to 24 per cent (Goodson, 2001: 48). After 1919, the Raj, beset by economic problems and rising nationalism in India, refrained from intervening in Afghanistan. This in turn allowed the USSR to establish dominance over the country, which continued until the 1980s.

THE 'BEAR' IN AFGHANISTAN

After 1947, as the British decolonized South Asia, the 'British problem' for Afghanistan vanished. In the post-Second World War era, Afghanistan functioned as a buffer state between the competing Soviet and American alliances just as the country before 1945 operated as a buffer state between the British Empire and the Russian Empire. During the height of the Cold War, the strategic managers of Afghanistan became dependent on aid from the USSR in their attempt to build the state. In this era, Afghanistan as Barnett R. Rubin notes became a classic 'rentier' state. Rentier states lack the infrastructural power necessary to penetrate society (Rubin, 2002: 13). In other words, a rentier state is a weak state. Like the Durranis and the Barakzais before, the post-Second World War Afghan state was unable to raise revenues from the domestic sector. For instance, in 1963, foreign aid funded 49 per cent of state expenditure (Maley, 2009: 13). And the peasants hardly paid any taxes. At a time when the state was dependent on foreign aid for paying its officials, the USSR became the major aid giver (Rubin, 2002: 19–20). The Soviets trained Afghan engineers, doctors and military personnel. Sovietization of the Afghan Army started in 1955 when Afghanistan bought

\$3 million worth of weapons from the USSR's client state Czechoslovakia. In July 1956, a \$32.4 million arms deal with the Soviets was made. Soviet military instructors were stationed in Afghanistan. By 1978, Soviet military assistance totalled \$1.25 billion. Besides providing credit, low interest and interest free loans, transit and barter agreements, the Soviets also constructed the gas pipeline from Sheberghan (Goodson, 2001: 50–1).

Muhammad Daud, the cousin King Zahir Shah, was Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963. In 1964, Zahir Shah introduced a democratic constitution. Nevertheless, political institutionalization remained weak. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came into existence in 1965. At roughly the same time, two Marxist factions emerged in Afghanistan: Khalq (radical) and the Parcham (moderate). In 1972 Afghanistan experienced one of the worst famines in its history which seriously delegitimized Zahir's rule. In July 1973, with the Parcham, Daud seized power from the king in a bloodless coup and established a republic with himself as President. Daud's overthrow of the monarchy, the focus of loyalty for many Afghans, was the first stage in the destruction of the Afghan state. The Soviet Union remained neutral when Daud moved against Zahir Shah (Maley, 2006: 16; Newell and Newell, 1982: 111–13). Hafizullah Amin (b. 1929–d. 1979), the Khalq leader, started planning for a coup against the Daud regime from 1975, recruiting airforce and army officers to his cause. In April 1978, both Marxist factions led public demonstrations against the government. On 27 April, elements within the military turned against the Daud regime, and on that day the regime collapsed (Newell and Newell, 1982: 67–74). The Soviet Union initially did not react unfavourably to the collapse of the Daud regime; Moscow had been alienated by Daud's attempt to balance the overwhelming Soviet influence on Afghanistan by making overtures to the United States. In April 1977, when Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (b. 1906–d. 1982) demanded removal of the NATO experts from northern Afghanistan, Daud refused. It is to be noted that the United States turned a blind eye towards internal rebellion against Daud because the latter was pursuing border disputes with Washington's ally Pakistan (Maley, 2009: 18, 20).

The Khalq/Taraki regime lasted from April 1978 to December 1979. The USSR was close to the Parcham. The tension between Khalq and Parcham factions resulted in the Taraki regime losing control over the Afghan Army. As popular opposition against the Khalqi brand of Marxism mounted, the Soviets anticipated that Afghan Marxism was in danger. If Afghanistan was destabilized, the Soviets feared that troubles would spill over into their Muslim dominated Central Asian republics. In March 1979, President Nur Muhammad Taraki, unnerved by domestic opposition to his regime actually asked for Soviet military intervention. At that time, Aleksei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers refused but Moscow obliged a few months later by sending not merely economic aid but an invasion force. To stabilize Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion started on 27 December 1979. The Soviet invasion was in line with the Brezhnev Doctrine

which stated that the socialist states had common responsibility to counter threats to socialism in any one state of the socialist community. The Soviet takeover started with the execution of the principal Khalq leader Amin (Maley, 2009: 27, 30–1; Newell and Newell, 1982: 66). The Soviet invasion of 1979 was a repetition on a greater scale and thoroughness of their 1929–30 intervention.

Just as Shah Shuja was put on the throne at Kabul with the aid of British bayonets, Babrak Karmal the Parcham leader was installed in Kabul as President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with the aid of Soviet gunships and tanks (Newell and Newell, 1982: 118–19). By January 1980, about 85,000 Red Army soldiers were in Afghanistan (Goodson, 2001: 58). Moscow was now in control of Afghanistan's foreign policy. But, Karmal's dependence on the 'godless' Soviets and the modernization policy implemented from above resulted in a Islamic backlash among the villagers and the subsequent rise of Islamic militancy. In addition, the Khalq which had its support base among the Pashtuns, were also alienated from the Soviet-sponsored Karmal regime. Karmal lasted until 1986 when he was replaced by another Soviet stooge, Dr Najibullah, a Ghilzai.

With the Red Army deployed in Afghanistan, US policy was geared to aid the Afghan militants in order to create a 'Soviet Vietnam' in Afghanistan. Military aid to the Afghan resistance fighting the Soviets started under US President Jimmy Carter in 1979 and increased after Ronald Reagan became President in 1981. The Reagan Doctrine favoured assistance to the anti-communist resistance. While the Saudis also poured funds into the Afghan resistance, the British trained the militants. The US financial and military aid to the *mujahideen* (soldiers of God) flowed through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In an attempt to exercise leverage over the militants and also to prevent post-Soviet Afghanistan from pursuing any anti-Pakistan, pro-Pashtunization policy, Pakistan distributed the aid to seven religious parties, which weakened and fragmented the nationalist leadership. Daud, as Prime Minister had demanded that the Pashtuns residing in north-west Pakistan should be included within Afghanistan. This had resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan between 1961 and 1963. Afghanistan even voted against the admission of Pakistan in the UN. At that time, Afghanistan's relation with Pakistan's enemy India was close. Pakistan's policy was that Afghanistan should be controlled by a government with an Islamic rather than nationalistic disposition. The military dictatorship of Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq (r. 1977–88) which followed an Islamization policy in Pakistan was comfortable in doing business with the Islamic radicals of Afghanistan. Iran's policy of arming the Shia groups further intensified the division of Afghan resistance into several competing religious parties (Maley, 2006: 24; 2009: 57, 65–8; Rubin, 2002: x). While the ISI provided most of the funds to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami*, Tehran forced the Shia groups into an umbrella organization known as *Hezb-i-Wahdat* (Goodson, 2001: 61, 63). Zia-ul-Haq in order to strengthen and sustain the *jihād* in Afghanistan, encouraged

the construction of *madrasas* (Islamic educational seminaries) in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Most of the *ulema* (religious teachers) who later spearheaded the rise of the Taliban were educated in these *madrasas*. By spreading the messages of an orthodox Wahabi form of Islam in the 21st century, these *madrasas* facilitated the Talibanization of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) regions of Pakistan (Dorransoro, 2012: 36, 38–9).

In the mid 1980s, the Afghan Army was reduced to one-third of its size due to mutinies, desertions, purges and battle casualties. Soviet counter-insurgency (COIN) resulted in the decline of crop production in Afghanistan by 25 per cent. Intensive landmining by Soviet troops destroyed the *karez*, the traditional irrigation system (a network of interconnected underground tunnels), which to a great extent sustained crop cultivation. About 6 million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan's economic and military dependence on the USSR increased in the 1980s (Maley, 2006: 9; Newell and Newell, 1982: 127, 129). The US-supplied Stinger missiles, in the hands of the *mujahideen*, blunted the power of the Soviet Air Force (Maley, 2009: 41). Due to intensive guerrilla warfare conducted by the *mujahideen*, the Najibullah regime was able to maintain only juridical and not empirical sovereignty over Afghanistan.

However, the 'Afghan baby' was becoming too costly for the weakening Soviet economy; Soviet troops started withdrawing in February 1989. Nevertheless, Moscow continued to pour financial aid into Afghanistan. Soviet aid to Najibullah ranged between \$250–300 million per month (Goodson, 2001: 70). And this financial largesse was used by him to buy the support of key notables and their militias in the different parts of the country. In the first six months after the Soviet withdrawal, the Najibullah regime received arms worth \$1.4 billion (Maley, 2009: 141). All this enabled the Najibullah regime to remain afloat, albeit uncomfortably, in the turbulent politico-military landscape of Afghanistan. In August 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's government was seriously shaken by a failed military coup, and in December 1991, Gorbachev announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Russia declared that it would end its financial and military support to the Kabul regime (Rubin, 2002: 1). After the severance of Soviet aid, the Najibullah regime collapsed and the different *mujahideen* groups started fighting each other.

US–PAKISTAN INTERVENTION

A combination of ISI aid and the utilization of networks of radical *mullahs* (Islamic preachers) in order to mobilize manpower for *jihad* enabled the Taliban to hold sway over Afghanistan. Pakistan assumed that Afghanistan under friendly Taliban would enable Islamabad to gain strategic depth against India. In 1996, the leader of the Taliban, Muhammad Omar, a Ghilzai Pashtun was elected

as the *Amir ul Muminin* (Commander of the Faithful) by an assembly of the *ulema*. The core of Taliban soldiers were orphans from the Pakistani refugee camps who had never experienced a normal life. In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, and Omar declared the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Maley, 2006: 21; Rubin, 2002: xv). Taliban control over Afghanistan was however incomplete as Ahmad Shah Massoud (b. 1952–d. 2001) established himself in the Panjsher Valley. He depended on the gem trade (lapis lazuli and emeralds) to survive financially, signing a contract with a Polish firm to market the gems in 1999. The Taliban regime, meanwhile, depended on taxes from opium cultivation and foreign aid (especially Saudi Arabia and Pakistan); the Afghanistan–Pakistan transit trade was another source of income (Rubin, 2002: xix, xxiii, xxv).

In 1996, Osama bin Laden, one of the founders of *Al Qaeda* came to Afghanistan, establishing his base in Kandahar the following year. The *Al Qaeda*-trained 055 Brigade of Arab volunteers comprised the shock troops of the Taliban. The use of Afghan soil by bin Laden as a base for conducting global terrorist attacks, together with Omar's inability or unwillingness to hand over bin Laden to the Saudi authorities, resulted in a downward turn in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan by 1998 (Rubin, 2002: xv, xxvii–xxviii). Omar was unable to get rid of bin Laden for several reasons: the Afghan cultural traits of *melmastia* (hospitality to the guest) and *nanawatai* (right of asylum) and the fact that any attempt to hand over bin Laden to the 'infidels' would have weakened Omar's ideological stance resulting in a loss of face among his supporters and maybe a civil war. It must be remembered that bin Laden's reputation was high in Afghanistan, he himself commanded a core group of dedicated soldiers, and foreign recruits were joining *Al Qaeda* in growing numbers to fight the Americans. There was a running joke in Afghanistan that Mullah Omar could not hand over Laden to the Americans, but Laden could hand over Omar to the Americans (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 77–8).

The violent death of US Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979 at Kabul resulted in the downgrading of US–Afghanistan diplomatic relations. In 1989, the US Embassy was closed and remained so until the exit of the Taliban. A gross failure of US policy towards Afghanistan was not to supply Massoud with weapons between November 1988 and October 1990. During February–March 2001, some financial and military aid was given by the CIA to the Northern Alliance led by Massoud, but in September 2001, he was assassinated by *Al Qaeda*. After his death, the mantle of leadership went to General Muhammad Fahim, the Tajik commander, who became Defence Minister and Dr Abdullah Abdullah (a fellow Tajik) who became the Northern Alliance's Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 74; Maley, 2006: 7, 27). The Northern Alliance commanded some 20,000 troops against 60,000 Taliban fighters plus 8,000 Pakistani and ISI instructors (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 79, 81; Goodson, 2001: 82–3). The *mujahideen* militants who had been sponsored by the CIA to fight the Soviets

were now turning against the United States. Firebrand *mujahideen* leaders were speaking of fighting the rotten and corrupt Western Civilization and establishing a global Islamic Caliphate. In a classic example of blowback, the chickens were now coming home to roost. *Al Qaeda's* attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001 orchestrated by bin Laden proved to be the nemesis of Omar and his regime. The Afghans paid a high price due to continuous war; between 1978 and 2001, 2 million Afghans died (Goodson, 2001: 93).

After Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001), the US military stayed in Afghanistan in order to build a moderate democratic state amenable to the West's interest. Many Muslims all over the world viewed the US invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq (the so-called Global War on Terror) as a new Crusade against the Islamic world. The UN stepped in to establish a non-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Lakhdar Brahimi, an Algerian and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, with the support of the German government, convened a meeting in Bonn between 27 November and 5 December 2001. It was attended by a range of non-Taliban Afghan political actors, UN officials, and representatives of a number of governments. The Pakistanis were not happy because of the exit of the Taliban but the Russians and the Iranians (due to their large number of Afghan refugees, drugs problem and anti-Taliban orientation) played a positive role in the Bonn conference. The UN accepted the resolution that an interim authority should be established upon the official transfer of power on 22 December 2001. The 44-year-old Pashtun Hamid Karzai, selected as Chairman of the Interim Administration was an outspoken critic of the Taliban. After the assassination attempt of September 2002, Karzai was protected by US bodyguards (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 99; Maley, 2006: 30–1, 33–4). This reminded people of Shah Shuja's dependence on the British troops for protection and brought Karzai a lot of public criticism from the Afghans. At the Emergency *Loya Jirga* (grand tribal assembly) held between 11 and 19 June 2002, when several delegates pushed for the 87-year-old Zahir Shah (the former king); Dr Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born US Ambassador (2003–5) threw his weight behind Karzai. It was a good choice because Zahir Shah was too old to provide energetic leadership and after his death a succession crisis would have occurred. But, to many Afghans, Karzai appeared to be a US stooge. The *Loya Jirga* held between 14 December 2003 and 4 January 2004 adopted a constitution for Afghanistan. This Constitutional *Loya Jirga* had 502 members, most of them elected indirectly and some were appointed by Karzai. It is interesting to note that this *jirga*, chaired by Sebghatullah Mojadiddi, attempted to eject a female candidate who had verbally attacked a radical *mujahideen*; an indication that religious intolerance and patriarchal trends continue. On 9 October 2004, the presidential election was held and Karzai emerged as the winner (Maley, 2006: 34–5, 40, 43–4, 46–7).

To maintain 'empirical sovereignty', the Afghan state needed an army to be its ultimate line of defence. In May 2002, the Afghan National Army (ANA)

started forming. Its inception was plagued by heavy desertion rates. Further, the Afghan Government lacked funds to provide sustainable funding to the ANA. For instance in 2004–5, the ANA cost 25 per cent of the Afghan national budget or 63 per cent of the country's domestic revenue. After 2006, the United States provided \$2 billion worth of heavy weaponry to the ANA. The question is how long will the Americans continue to finance it? The ANA's annual running cost amounted to 17 per cent of Afghanistan's GDP during 2006–7.

After the army, comes the police. Between 2003 and 2005, the United States spent \$860 million in training 40,000 policemen of the Afghan National Police (ANP). But the ANP, with its inferior equipment was outmanoeuvred by the *jihadi* militants. Moreover, the culture of drug abuse spread among its personnel (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 120–1, 123). At the same time, the farmers of Afghanistan had turned to extensive poppy cultivation which is 20 to 30 times more profitable compared to wheat. Further, the destruction of *karez* by the Soviet troops forced the farmers to grow poppy which could be easily irrigated with water harvested from the melting snow. In 2004, opium exports amounted to 61 per cent of the country's GDP. In 2007, Afghanistan produced 8,200 tons of opium, which was more than produced in the whole world in 2006 (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 124–6; Maley, 2009: 130).

The Afghan state attempted to co-opt the *jihadi* militants and their leaders. Under US pressure in 2004, Ismail Khan relinquished his separate regime in Herat and joined the Karzai administration as Minister for Water and Energy. It is an example of Karzai's initiative to integrate Afghanistan. To an extent, this policy proved to be successful. Unlike Abdali, Karzai was able to unite Afghanistan, but only with active external help (US funding and presence of US and NATO forces). In January 2006, there were 2,753 armed groups with 180,000 personnel. Some 90 of the 249 candidates who gained seats in the parliament after the 2007 election were recognized militia leaders (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 129–30).

The Taliban was down but not out. Like a hydra headed monster, it came back. By 2003, it was back in the game, conducting ambushes and assaults on the isolated government outposts, carrying out targeted assassinations and issuing *shab-nama* ('night letters' – proclamations pinned to doors and in public spaces) (Bird and Marshall, 2012: 141). From 2003 onwards the Taliban started regrouping in Pakistan, with extensive support from the Pashtuns in FATA and KP. In 2002 Mullah Omar, then in the Pakistani city of Quetta, jointly founded a Council of Leaders, which by March 2003 comprised 33 members.

The Afghan government's reconciliation efforts excited no interest among its ranks; in 2006, while the Pakistan government blamed Afghanistan for conducting terrorist attacks in the FATA, Kabul accused Pakistan of providing sanctuary to the Taliban. Many Pakistanis (especially from Waziristan) joined the Taliban to fight in Afghanistan. The Taliban also conducted a recruitment drive among the *madrastas* of Baluchistan and Karachi (Giustozzi, 2007: 15, 24, 35, 37). By 2010, there were about 25,000 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan (Bird and Marshall,

2012: 142). In May 2011, Osama bin Laden was executed by a US Special Operations Force (Chari, 2014: 4). Still the insurgency continues in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the Taliban earned \$155 million from poppy production in 2012. In that year, foreign aid to Afghanistan amounted to seven times its domestic revenue (Safi, 2014: 29, 35). It seems probable that foreign aid will decrease in the near future which in turn will have adverse effects on state building in Afghanistan.

Unable to destroy non-state actors like the Taliban through COIN operations, the new Afghan government launched a diplomatic initiative to co-opt the Taliban. After the tenure of Karzai was over in 2014, President Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah formed the National Unity Government (NUG). Ghani's diplomatic strategy is to win over the Taliban and to follow a policy of rapprochement with Pakistan so that the latter will pressurize the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Ghani is also engaging with China to encourage Pakistan to force the Taliban's hands. Ghani made a distinction between the 'good' (moderate) and 'bad' (extreme) Taliban. Ghani's policy is to negotiate with the moderate Taliban. Besides his policy of outreach to Pakistan, Ghani also signed a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) with the United States which enabled US forces and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to stay in Afghanistan until 2016 in order to boost the combat effectiveness of the ANA. For former US President Barack Obama, the Afghan War was one of necessity, while the Iraq War was one of choice. The point to be noted is that Karzai was unwilling to sign the SOFA due to US/ISAF's accidental killings of Afghan civilians during the COIN operations. In Karzai's eyes, the United States aims to use Afghanistan as a platform for a new Great Game against Russia and China. Initially, it seems that Ghani's policy might have a chance of success. The raising of the black flag of Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan posed a challenge to the Taliban. Many disgruntled Taliban leaders joined the Afghan IS. Fighting occurred between the Taliban and the Afghan IS. In July 2015, the Taliban declared Mullah Omar's death and the mantle of leadership passed to Mullah Mansur. Subsequently, the Taliban leadership fragmented as several Afghan warlords challenged Mansur's takeover of the organization (Felbab-Brown, 2016).

However, the middle-level leadership of the Taliban (the actual field commanders who are facing the drone attacks) are against any negotiation with the US-sponsored Afghan government. They believe it is their duty to fight on. Not only Abdullah Abdullah but also many Pashtun leaders including Karzai are against Ghani's reconciliation policy with the Taliban and Pakistan. Further, up to the present, Ghani's so-called reconciliation policy has not achieved much. And the Taliban poses a serious threat to Kunduz and several districts of Helmand. The NUG's future itself is at stake. Not only Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah do not see eye to eye with each other, but a *Loya Jirga* might spell the end of the ramshackle government (Felbab-Brown, 2016). Much would depend on the nature of the new US administration.

In 2017, President Ghani and the Chief Executive of NUG Abdullah competed with each other rather than collaborating to restore the credibility and effectiveness of their government. Ethnic polarization of the government continues: while the Pashtuns are with Ghani, the non-Pashtun communities rally round Abdullah. Corruption continues to be a serious problem for the polity. Moreover, increasing numbers of Afghans are becoming disgruntled with the so-called democracy in their country. Despite some increase in revenue collection, Afghanistan remains dependent on foreign aid. The problem is that as foreign nations are winding down their presence, they are also reducing their aid to Afghanistan. Worse, the reduction in the number of foreign soldiers in the country is also reducing the requirement for support services (drivers, translators, housekeepers, etc.) which has sustained many Afghans. Meanwhile the Taliban, drug dealers, and smugglers continue to pose a serious threat to the sovereignty of the nation. Between January and September 2017, 8,019 Afghan civilians died mostly due to attacks by non-state actors (Fair, 2018: 110–13).

In 2016, Donald Trump won the US presidential election: one of his campaign pledges was withdrawal from Afghanistan. But, after taking office, the dynamics of the US security establishment resulted in a shift of Trump's foreign policy. Steve Bannon, who as Senior Counselor and later Chief Strategist to Trump advocated withdrawal from Afghanistan was fired in 2017, and the National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster who wanted the US troops to remain emerged triumphant in the White House power struggles. On 21 August 2017, Trump noted that the United States was fighting but not winning in Afghanistan, but he warned that the negative consequences of early withdrawal from Iraq had to be recognized. About 20 terrorist groups, he counted, were functioning in Afghanistan with Pakistan's connivance. Further, due to the sacrifice made by US service personnel, Trump said that the nation demanded a victory plan. The Trump administration increased US troops to 14,000. Further, 1,000 US military advisors were sent to train the brigades of the ANA (Fair, 2018: 115–17).

The Afghan government's foreign policy also has to take into account the differing interests of its neighbours. The rivalry between India and Pakistan centres on the decades-old dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan supports the Taliban while India following the 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' approach is bent on supporting the anti-Taliban Afghan government. However, Pakistan is China's 'all weather ally'. So, China's President Xi Jinping in June 2017 made an attempt to smooth Afghanistan's tortuous relation with Pakistan. Further, rising Chinese investment in Afghanistan from 2013 onwards forces Beijing to intervene much more actively in this country (Yongbiao, 2018). China, Russia and Iran view US military presence in Afghanistan with disquiet. However, the threats posed by radical Islam and especially the nascent Islamic militancy in Xinjiang province of China and in the erstwhile Soviet Central Asian republics prevent Beijing, Moscow and Teheran from directly opposing NATO-US military intervention in Afghanistan. The greatest problem for the United States in Afghanistan is its

dependence on the land routes of Pakistan for supplying its troops. The US government's worsening relations with Iran pushes Washington into further dependence on the goodwill of Pakistan. While on one hand Pakistan is fighting the Tehrek-i-Taliban in Afghanistan, on the other hand it is supporting the Afghan Taliban. All these problems are not going to be solved soon. The future seems to be grim for the state building project in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States, all of which invaded Afghanistan, failed miserably in achieving their objectives – they did not learn from history because they were not willing to study it. There is no evidence that the Soviet General Staff and US strategic managers attempted a serious study of earlier British expeditions in Afghanistan. Foreign invading powers not only displayed an ignorance of the objective conditions of Afghanistan, due in part to a lack of understanding of racial and cultural tensions, but also displayed an hubristic overestimation of their own military capabilities.

The cornerstone of Afghanistan's foreign policy is to balance the neighbouring giants in order to avoid being crushed by either. The state building elite of Afghanistan face a structural problem: Afghanistan cannot generate adequate resources. While Abdali was dependent on plundering Indian treasure, Dost and Sher Ali on British funds, Najibullah on Soviet funds, and Karzai and Ghani on US aid in order to maintain the superstructure of the state in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a rentier state. A rentier state lacks the intention and infrastructure to raise funds from its domestic base in order to build and sustain a centralized administrative fabric and maintain public authority. Hence, it is dependent on foreign rent. A rentier state sustains itself by collecting 'rent' (read foreign aid) from other polities due to its geopolitical position. And this in turn encourages the neighbouring states to intervene in the internal affairs of the rentier state. Afghanistan is hobbled by its weak domestic economy and its failure to sustain itself through internal taxation. The creation of a modern state structure in case of a rentier state required more funds which in turn increased the dependence on foreign funders resulting in foreign interventions. The real challenge for the post-Ghani government is how to acquire funds from foreign sources and destroy the non-state actors like the Taliban, IS and the drug smuggling organizations. Any attempt to suck funds from the domestic society will result in tribal rebellions and state breakdown. With the decline of US interest in Afghanistan during the second decade of the 21st century, the real challenge for Afghan foreign policy is how to attract an adequate amount of foreign funds in order to build up a cohesive military, police and civil administration. Here lies the conundrum of Afghan foreign policy.

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Developmental State and Foreign Policy in Post-Karimov Uzbekistan

Timur Dadabaev

INTRODUCTION

One feature of President Mirziyoyev's strategy is its drastic departure from Karimov-era foreign policy. Islam Karimov's policy during his reign from 1991 to 2016 placed primary importance on not giving in to the ambitions of dominance characterized by large international players, such as Russia, the United States or China. Conversely, Karimov attempted to avoid falling into isolation, as exemplified by the declared neutrality of Turkmenistan. In attempting to draw a balance between global players while establishing Uzbekistan as the leading player in the Central Asia (CA) region, Karimov attempted to place Uzbekistan on a global geopolitical map. To this end, Karimov's goal was to build a foreign policy of global significance in which both global and regional players take into consideration the special role and position of Uzbekistan on various issues. These highly varied issues included the global war on terrorism, the international campaign in Afghanistan, US efforts to contain Russia, and the development of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In this sense, geopolitical issues in foreign policy decision-making played one of the most significant and important roles during the Karimov era. President Karimov advocated that these approaches follow a pragmatic course dictated by Uzbek national interests. However, the major deficiency of such foreign policy has been its drastic and frequent unpredictability. In particular, Uzbekistan prioritized the importance of Russia¹ and Turkey² in the early years of its independence³. Uzbekistan later changed its stance towards Turkey due to perceived threats and a lack of commitment by Russia. This policy subsequently shifted towards

Western support in the late 1990s and early 2000s; however, this change was followed by an additional shift towards pro-Chinese and -Russian policy as a result of US and Western criticism of the Uzbek government's reaction to the 2005 Andijan events⁴. With the intensification of the Russian Eurasian initiative and the Chinese Silk Road (i.e., Belt and Road Initiative) project in the latter 2000s, Uzbekistan moved towards balancing Russian and Chinese influences by gradually improving its ties to the United States, Japan and South Korea in order to diversify its external partners.⁵ These drastic shifts were described by observers as both reactionary and opportunistic.

With the election of President Mirziyoyev, the Uzbek government displayed a departure from such an approach, instead moving towards new foreign policy agenda setting. In contrast to the Karimov-era policy, Uzbekistan shows signs of downgrading the importance of global issues in its foreign policy objectives in favour of focusing on a problem-solving approach within the CA region under Mirziyoyev's presidency. Mirziyoyev prioritized the economic rebuilding of Uzbekistan and directed the foreign policy of his administration to serve this task. Mirziyoyev's policy was first aimed towards rebuilding troubled relations with Uzbekistan's neighbour in order to both stabilize and maximize the economic potential of these relations. This policy also aimed to increase the efficiency of Uzbekistan's interactions with non-regional partners, especially in economic areas. In this sense, Mirziyoyev's foreign policy distinguished itself from Karimov's era in that it prioritized economic *versus* political issues in terms of setting the agenda for foreign policy interactions.⁶

This chapter aims to answer the following questions: What are the ways in which the new Uzbek foreign policy defines its priorities? What are the main tendencies and features of Uzbekistan's policy under Mirziyoyev's presidency? How does it relate to the previous foreign policy of Uzbekistan? How can it be understood and conceptualized?

To answer these questions, this chapter first outlines three main documents: first, President Mirziyoyev's foreign policy speech of 2016; second, President Mirziyoyev's January 2017 presidential address presented abroad at the meeting with the ambassadors of Uzbekistan; and third, the president of Uzbekistan's 2018 decree regarding optimization of the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan. These three documents define the priorities and objectives of the Uzbek foreign policy during the post-Karimov era. To a large degree, these documents define the policy decisions undertaken by Mirziyoyev in the period during which he came to power.

This chapter proposes several arguments: first, that Uzbekistan foreign policy following the death of authoritarian leader Islam Karimov shows signs of drastic change. Such change is defined by a shift in the function of government that aims to assume developmental roles both domestically and in terms of foreign policy exposure. Domestically, such developmental functions demonstrate themselves in the following forms: creation of industrial zones, preferences in terms

of taxation and economic conditions for foreign investments, as well as relaxation of visa regulations. In foreign policy, however; the developmental functions of the Uzbek state are demonstrated in new functions that are attributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign missions abroad, and measures which aim to bridge foreign policy institutions with regional actors.

Second, that the source of Uzbekistan's foreign policy shift from the one dictated by President Islam Karimov towards that which is more localized and reliant on the initiative of missions abroad and local Uzbek governors is rooted in the developmental strategy of Uzbekistan and various documents stipulating the importance of industrial and infrastructure development.

The third point emphasized in this study is that the notion of a developmental state has been largely applied to the public policy realm in the disciplines of political economy. There are few recent studies that have attempted to adopt a developmental state model to illustrate the foreign policy behaviour of the states.⁷ In this sense, this chapter aims to contribute to the latter stream of studies by suggesting that the Uzbekistan example demonstrates that in certain geographic and political conditions, the government is able to perform the functions that connect the domestic goals of economic development with the foreign policy objectives and patterns of interactions evident within other states. Along these lines, the behaviour of the Uzbek government may be considered interesting from several perspectives. Specifically, the behaviour demonstrates that despite the authoritarian legacy of governance in Uzbekistan, the new Uzbek government is interested in foreign policy decision-making that relies heavily on the pro-active behaviour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its foreign missions. This stance represents a drastic departure from the previous policy, which assumed that foreign policy is formulated and shaped by a president's office and is only implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Uzbek example mentioned below demonstrates that certain developmental states, such as Uzbekistan, may not necessarily be interested in centralizing all of their foreign representation functions and, in certain situations, may instead delegate them to subnational actors, such as local municipalities and regional governorships. This approach represents an attempt to develop a new model of foreign policy behaviour in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign missions, and local governors' offices are tagged into a complicated hybrid relationship with the sole task of promoting and facilitating implementation of the country's development strategy.

DEPARTURE FROM THE KARIMOV-ERA FOREIGN POLICY

The appointment of Mirziyoyev as an interim president in 2016 and his election to the presidency in December of the same year encouraged various speculations regarding the future direction of Uzbek foreign policy. One interpretation is that Uzbekistan will shift its balance in foreign policy in favour of overwhelming

support towards Russian or Chinese foreign policies, thereby essentially turning into satellite states for these powerful international players. It also has been proposed that Uzbekistan will continue to follow Karimov's foreign policy of balancing these states and Western influences. Finally, it has been suggested that Uzbekistan might even fall into a path of isolationism similar to Turkmenistan.

Mirziyoyev's foreign policy instead opted to prioritize development in two directions: first, as opposed to focusing on certain countries, Uzbekistan prioritized the resolution of its economic objectives. Thus, the tasks of economic development to a great extent predefined the economic partners of Uzbekistan in both short- and mid-term perspectives. Second, in terms of priority regions, Uzbekistan takes a different approach to Karimov's foreign policy by prioritizing CA as the region of vital influence, as explained in the following sections.

There are several reasons Mirziyoyev concluded that the Karimov-era foreign policy did not necessarily serve the purposes of Uzbekistan, as mentioned in the speech of the president of Uzbekistan during the meeting with Uzbekistan ambassadors. First, Mirziyoyev criticized the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic missions as reactionary and not pro-active in respect to the government's tasks. One reason for the foreign ministry's passive reactionary functions, as criticized by Mirziyoyev, is a predetermined authoritarian type of government in which the direction of foreign policy has been primarily decided by President Karimov. In the era prior to Mirziyoyev's presidency, the foreign ministry was expected only to implement Karimov's decisions to the letter. Thus, by design, the Karimov-era foreign ministry of Uzbekistan was not structured to initiate diplomatic initiatives. This results in Mirziyoyev's second point of foreign policy dissatisfaction which is related to ambassadors' passive activities during their missions abroad. As noted by Mirziyoyev, there are ambassadors who are in 'sleeping' mode and it is impossible to 'wake such people up'. Mirziyoyev further stated that 'some Ambassadors got used to such "non-dusty" [implying not very hard] work and do not want to change. We will part our ways with such Ambassadors.' Mirziyoyev additionally cited that as recently as 2017, ten ambassadors of such type were fired from the foreign civil service. The third point of Mirziyoyev's dissatisfaction with the foreign service concerns the objectives it uses as signposts for its activities. In the Karimov era, Uzbek foreign policy often served the pleasure of Karimov's government and aimed to defend his political regime, as opposed to defending the particular interests of the Uzbek state. In the post-Karimov era, the new president defined economic development as the primary signpost for foreign mission activities. In this sense, the new president described facilitating 'export, export and once again export' as the main goal of Uzbek foreign policy. As Mirziyoyev stated, Uzbekistan should learn from states which 'in their foreign policies, prioritize facilitating exports of their products in foreign markets'. In addition, Mirziyoyev further tasked the foreign missions of Uzbekistan with attracting foreign investments and technologies for the industrialization and infrastructure development of Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev's final

objective, which signifies a significant departure from Karimov-era foreign policy, is to open the country to foreign visitors and attract foreign tourists. To facilitate this goal, Uzbekistan has unilaterally abolished visa requirements for a large number of countries. Mirziyoyev now expects the foreign missions of Uzbekistan to intensify the work of promoting tourist flows and facilitating greater numbers of foreign visitors into Uzbekistan.

As if registering these points of dissatisfaction, President Mirziyoyev stated:

I have reports of ministries of external trade, various committees of tourism and investments for 2017 which reflect reports from foreign missions abroad on the volume of export and foreign investments, as well as foreign visitors. However, the data in these reports radically differ from real situations. In your reports, everything is very smooth and well-written, while the real situation is very different.⁸

He also added that the primary work of many ambassadors is to prepare reports and ‘analytical materials’ which do not have any ‘relevance’ and are taken from the internet.

To depart from the old methods of foreign policy, the special committee on reorganizing the work of the Foreign Ministry has been initiated under the supervision of the president’s councillor.

TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN FOREIGN POLICY

President Mirziyoyev’s requirements of ambassadors, foreign missions, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned above are rooted in his vision of the role of government and its functions. In particular, Mirziyoyev envisions a developmental type of government which further implies foreign policy necessary for a developmental state. As noted in the ‘developmental strategy’ section below, the post-Karimov government of Uzbekistan may be conceptualized as a particular governmental type. The features of such government represent attempts to rationalize the industrial structure (e.g., by facilitating cooperation between producers for the sake of strengthening their competitiveness, and by introducing the best techniques throughout all enterprises which do not yet follow a new structure); redistribute resources (e.g., low rate credits, preferences, and coordinated industrial investments); create industrial zones and preferences; and attract investments into such sectors and zones.

Foreign ministry as a component of such developmental state strategy is also tasked with facilitating the functions mentioned above. In particular, several arrangements have been made to both drastically alter the work of the Uzbek foreign ministry and structurally facilitate its developmental functions. First, the decree of the president regarding optimization of the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisioned that each foreign mission of Uzbekistan abroad is to be attached to a particular region of Uzbekistan with the primary responsibility of

attracting investments and facilitating exports from that particular region abroad. In addition, the governors (i.e., *hokims*) of those regions are to be in frequent (according to the president, 'daily') communication with ambassadors of the missions to which they are attached and to visit those countries on a regular basis (according to the president, 'at least, twice a year') in order to promote their regions abroad. Additionally, under the previous authoritarian rule of Karimov, all foreign policy decisions and foreign visits were controlled by the presidential administration and the foreign ministry. In contrast, the new President, Mirziyoyev, emphasized that there was no need for presidential approval for foreign visits by regional governors if the aim of such visits was to promote exports abroad or investments into the country. In this sense, the new president is in favour of promoting interregional diplomacy, which is to be assisted and facilitated by the foreign ministry apparatus. This is a highly unorthodox decision with efficiency that has yet to be tested in practice. Moreover, the president had already criticized the low efficiency of such visits in his 2018 speech, as he noticed that many such visits were not adequately planned but rather appeared to be conducted merely for the sake of the visits themselves.

The second developmental function assigned to the foreign ministry and missions abroad is to improve their personnel structure (especially in economically important states of CA, Russia, China, the United States, South Korea, Japan and Turkey) in order to include a special unit/staff member specifically responsible for trade and investments.

Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was called to rationalize its structure in order to redistribute staff members into newly created units responsible for coordination of the work both on bilateral interstate economic cooperation committees, as well as on coordination of economic interactions within the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This finding also represents a departure from previous years when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was solely responsible for maintaining diplomatic relations and implementing decisions of the president, without any functions of an economic nature attributed to the Ministry of External Economic Relations. However, the Ministry of External Economic Relations has since been abolished, with its functions being split between various agencies including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Economic diplomacy is now one of the most important tasks which needs to be addressed by the MOFA's apparatus. Mirziyoyev noticed that the central apparatus of the Ministry consists of 334 staff members, whereas related institutions are made up of 900 staff members. In addition, embassies consist of 300 staff members which brings the total number of foreign ministry staff members to approximately 1,500. Nonetheless, the president contends that the Ministry's work efficiency is not well accounted for.

Finally, according to the president, the new foreign policy structure needs to connect the experience of ambassadors with domestic public policy. To this end, the president suggested appointing former ambassadors for leadership positions

in various regions of Uzbekistan after they complete their term as foreign policy officials. In this way, the experience of these high-ranking foreign policy officials will not be wasted; their experience, network abroad, and knowledge instead contributing towards domestic development.

All of the measures mentioned above aim to streamline the efforts of the Uzbek MOFA to facilitate effective implementation of the National Developmental Strategy 2017–2021, as discussed in the next section.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY 2017–2021⁹

Uzbek foreign behaviour demonstrates that its motivations are socially constructed and contingent on the history and legacy of previous interactions as well as its own national developmental strategy. In its interactions with foreign partners, Tashkent distinguishes long-term and short-term priorities. The long-term priorities have not radically changed. They are mainly aimed at reducing imports and increasing export-oriented manufacturing.¹⁰ The areas prioritized by the development strategy are rooted in an analysis of the structure of Uzbekistan's GDP. Per the latest economic indicators, the share of industry in GDP is only one-third (33.1%), with the remaining shares attributed to services (almost half), and agriculture, forestry, and fishery (one-fifth).¹¹ Therefore, the development strategy of 2017–2021 aims to expand industry and diversify Uzbekistan's economy.

Private-sector participation in the production of Uzbekistan's GDP is also very low, especially in industry, forcing the government to take the lead in seeking foreign partners. However, policy supporting the development of export-oriented, small and medium-sized private industrial production plants was announced a couple of decades ago and has been inherited by the current government. The short-term priorities are defined through various programmes that have a time-frame for implementation: once a specific programme is completed, another defines the new short-term priorities of the country. It would thus be incorrect to assume that Uzbekistan is prepared to accept any agenda set by its counterparts as long as this agenda implies investments. As a guideline for a cooperation agenda, the new president announced the Strategy of Actions for Further Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2017–2021, which outlined five main areas to be prioritized:

- Improvements to the state public administration system.
- Improvements to the judicial system.
- Liberalization of the economy.
- Development of the social sphere.
- Facilitation of security, promotion of interethnic and interreligious accord, and implementation of a balanced, beneficial and constructive foreign policy.

The wide spectrum of reforms required has led Uzbekistan to adopt a step-by-step approach, beginning with improving the system of state operations (streamlining bureaucratic procedures for more efficient and corruption-free operations) and improving the judicial system. In this respect, ‘liberalization of the economy’ and ‘implementation of a balanced and beneficial foreign policy’ are of special importance. Economic investments that entail technology transfer to establish an export-oriented manufacturing sector in Uzbekistan directly relate to cooperation schemes planned with China, South Korea and Japan.¹² Such reforms are expected to prepare economic conditions in which investors will be interested in building plants in Uzbekistan. The liberalization of the currency which implies elimination of a ‘black market’ rate, unification of governmental and market exchange rates and guarantees of the government to convert local currency into a foreign one without restrictions is one of the crucial steps in this direction, as it allows investors to move their capital in and out of the country freely.

The last point, regarding foreign policy, includes not only establishing priorities for countries but also drafting action plans and road maps for cooperation with each country considered strategically important.¹³ Action plans for Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan have been signed during Mirziyoyev’s visits to these countries and are now being implemented. The action plan and its road map for relations with China was developed and signed during Mirziyoyev’s visit in May 2017.

EVOLUTION OF UZBEKISTAN’S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY¹⁴

According to the logic outlined above, Uzbekistan constructed its foreign policy in such a way that it uses the principle of non-alignment with military and political blocks and non-intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states. This principle was followed by Karimov and was reinstated by interim and now President Mirziyoyev in his first address to a joint session of the chambers of parliament in September 2016. Adhering to this principle in Uzbek foreign policy has several implications, both historically and in the contemporary context.

In terms of the evolution of this principle, Uzbekistan has followed a path from showing support for Russian-led economic and military alliances in the early 1990s to support for regional economic cooperation initiatives (such as strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the initiation of the Central Asian Union) in the mid 1990s to an emphasis on bilateral cooperation schemes from 2000 onwards, none of which necessarily lead to the establishment of any kinds of alliances. Uzbekistan, similar to other CA states, joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the end of 1991, after the Ashgabat meeting of CA leaders. However, in the case of Uzbekistan, its motivations for integration were and remain purely economic. Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, the first President of Uzbekistan, Karimov, clearly and consistently indicated that under

his foreign policy, Uzbekistan would not join any type of re-integration scheme that implied the establishment of a transnational body. Such a lack of support for transnational bodies did not develop suddenly but was a result of unsuccessful integration attempts in the post-Soviet space in previous years, the first step of which was Uzbekistan being kicked out of the Russian currency zone in the early 1990s. Among the other CA republics, Uzbekistan lacked the experience, the necessary preparation and the economic base to introduce its own currency. Thus, it did its utmost to remain in the Ruble Zone. However, Russia was more concerned about its own economic sustainability, and it unilaterally imposed conditions for using Russian currency overseas, including in CA. This was the first signal for the CA states to begin the now irreversible process of distancing themselves from Russia. As was famously stated by President Karimov, 'None of the post-Soviet states object to integration. At the same time, none is going to abandon its independence.'¹⁵ Thus, the main policy objective of Uzbekistan was, and still is, the creation of a common market and the promotion of free trade. Anything that goes beyond this goal alarmed the Uzbek leadership and motivated it to protect the nation-state's sovereignty. When characterizing the agreements on the Central Asian Common Economic Space, President Karimov stated:

This [Central Asian] region has always been integrated in one way or another. After acquiring independence, the peoples of this region realized once again the necessity to collectively build their own future. One of the practical steps in this direction was the signing in Tashkent by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan of an Agreement on Common Economic Space among these sovereign Central Asian states.¹⁶

Beginning in 1998, Uzbekistan began to develop closer coordination within the CIS and with other CA states in the area of regional security as a reaction to the increasing number of regional threats. Uzbekistan was primarily alarmed about the terrorist acts carried out in the capital, Tashkent. It then faced the reality of a rise in extremism in the region, exemplified by intrusions of the militant so-called 'Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan'. The country was further taken aback when the repelled intruders, after finding refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, again attempted to enter the country in subsequent years. These cases clearly demonstrated to the Uzbek leadership at the time that the threats faced by Uzbekistan were transnational and could not be confronted without regionally coordinated efforts. By the early 2000s, Uzbekistan's regional policy was mainly influenced by economic and regional security concerns. Following constructivist logic, these types of concerns need to be understood not as final goals of Uzbek foreign policy at the time but rather as constraints of the international environment that shaped the Uzbek state's identity and thus led to it constructing internal and foreign policy responses to it. This has led to Uzbekistan attempting to diversify its unjustifiably Russian-oriented foreign policies of the past. Such diversification was not necessarily connected to anti-Russian sentiment among Uzbek elites but was more related to attempts to secure closer cooperation with the United States and

European states with the backdrop of common threats and concerns about fighting Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events in the United States. This policy of diversification resulted in Uzbekistan's supportive stance towards the United States in its invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of a US military base in Karshi, which was later closed in 2005 as a consequence of US criticism of the Uzbek responses to the Andijan uprising. As seen above, the construction of Uzbek foreign policy in the pre-Mirziyoyev era was not based on a principle of being pro-Western or anti-Russian. Rather, it was largely constructed by following a reactionary process as a series of responses to perceived threats, internal and external limitations and regional and global constraints. It can be equally argued that such a reactionary foreign policy construction is still being adhered to by President Mirziyoyev. However, the biggest difference between him and his predecessor is that Mirziyoyev sees Uzbekistan's Karimov-era identity and past patterns of interaction with its neighbours and the international community as the major constraints on its economic development and security, both within the country and regionally. Therefore, for him, shaping better ties with neighbouring countries has implications for re-constructing Uzbekistan's internal and regional identity that will boost Uzbekistan's ties with these countries and eventually impact the level of prosperity of the population and help reduce poverty, which is frequently cited as one of the main reasons for terrorism. As seen above, Uzbekistan's foreign policy continues to adhere to the principle of favouring cooperation in particular areas as its primary concern by joining forces with countries that, at the time, are best positioned to assist it in achieving its goals. At the same time, Uzbekistan continues to avoid 'putting all its eggs in one basket'; thus, for now, it does not aspire to join any kind of union or alliance.

The second aspect of Uzbekistan's foreign policy closely relates to the first one explained above. It concerns Uzbekistan's recent emphasis on dramatically improving and maintaining its relations with neighbouring CA states as an area of vital importance. While cooperation with its neighbouring states is not a new direction in Uzbek foreign policy, there have been a few periods in the past when relations between Uzbekistan and its neighbours intensified, similar to the current situation. For instance, in January 1993, CA states signed the 'Protocol of Five Central Asian States on a Common Market'. The immediate task of currency coordination in the period after the exit from the Russian Ruble zone served as a uniting factor for the CA states. Therefore, a step in that direction was the conclusion of an agreement between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 1993 on coordinating the process of national-currency introduction.¹⁷ While the meeting and consequent agreement were filled with various plans for coordination between the two states, the outcomes did not deliver on the promises.

The history of regional-integration summits has continued with the Central Asian Common Economic Space (CA CES) which was initially created between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the Tashkent Summit on January 10, 1994, to promote the free movement of goods across borders and the simplification of

procedures for such movement. Kyrgyzstan expressed its intention to join only a few days after the announcement of the creation of the new regional grouping on January 16, 1994. On April 29–30, 1994, a meeting was held in Bishkek at which the host – Kyrgyzstan – became a formal member of the CA CES. There was an outpouring of predictions by both scholars and politicians about the unification of the whole of CA into one state and reviving Turkestan, which existed in the region prior to the Russian Revolution. Some even suggested that the Turkistani identity in the region had always prevailed over other identities, which is not exactly true.¹⁸ Over time, pan-Turkistan ideas have faded into obscurity due to a lack of popular and political support behind such a unifying ideology. CA states have chosen a different pattern of integration.

The summit on April 29–30, 1994, in Cholpon-Ata on Lake Issyk Kul stressed the need for increased cooperation in the political, cultural and especially economic spheres among CA states.¹⁹ The CA CES was declared open for membership to all CIS member states that were willing to join and to adhere to the purposes of the organization.

On July 8, 1994, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed at their summit in the Kazakh capital (at that time, Almaty), to form a comprehensive defence and economic union. Under the terms of the agreement, a new Council of Heads of States and a Council of Heads of Governments were formed to oversee the standardization of laws and the implementation of decisions. It was also decided to form a similar Committee of Foreign and Defence Ministers to coordinate the three countries' foreign policies and work on improving regional security.

During the meeting of the Council of Heads of Governments in August 1994 in Bishkek, the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development (CABCD) was established based on the contributions of member states of the Union. The bank's first loan was extended in April 1995 to fund a joint-stock venture, 'Sayman', which specialized in making electricity meters.²⁰ The Prime Ministers' Council was also given responsibility for coordinating finance and economic planning issues.

It was decided that the member states would chair the interstate committees on a rotational basis. During the Almaty Summit, it was announced that Kazakhstan was to chair all committees for a period of one year, and then Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would in turn serve as chair for one year each.²¹ The Chair of the Summit, Kazakh President Nazarbaev, emphasized that the structure of the Union outlined in the Summit documents was only the beginning of the process of integration in the region, and he suggested that membership in the Union should be open to all member states of the CIS. Summits were held on a regular basis that focused on the region's economic and security issues.

On April 24, 1995, a meeting of the Heads of Governments in Bishkek approved a five-year integration plan. According to many analysts, the institutional side of regional integration was finally formed at this summit: the Executive Committee

of the Interstate Council, the Council of Ministers of Defence, the 'Centralazbat' peacekeeping force, and the Assembly of Central Asian Culture, among others.²²

Another significant document at the time was the Treaty on Eternal Friendship between the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which was also signed in Bishkek on May 30, 1996.

Beginning with the next meeting, the focus of the heads of state moved on to particular problems and concerns. Although summits on the Aral Sea problem had been held before (Kazakhstan, 1993, Nukus, 1994 and Turkmenistan, 1995), the February 28, 1997 meeting of the heads of state was the latest to devote itself to addressing the Aral Sea environmental disaster. Consequently, the Almaty Declaration of the leaders of the CA states pronounced 1998 a year of protecting the environment in CA under the aegis of the UN. The meeting also declared the non-nuclear status of CA.

During the December 1997 meeting in Akmola (later re-named Astana), the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan discussed the process of implementing the Agreement on a Common Economic Space as well as the issue of establishing water, food, communication and raw-mineral resource consortiums within the region, as had been initially planned. This meeting showed a certain level of concern among the CA leaders that most decisions included in the initial agreement had not been implemented.

Further, in January 1998, the heads of state met in Ashgabat and signed a joint declaration on regional cooperation, specifically referring to certain areas of special concern. Again, the presidents opted to highlight certain areas because they realized that without a political decision, integration in the region was slowing down.

On March 26, 1998, the presidents of four CA states (including Tajikistan, which was not a member of the Union) held the Tashkent Summit. The presidents again focused on discussing issues of cooperation within the framework of the Agreement on a Common Economic Space created among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan at the Tashkent Summit of 1994. The presidents welcomed Tajikistan's request to join the agreement.²³ However, in combination with the solemn mood of welcoming the new member, concerns remained over the efficiency of the organization.

As seen above, the intensification of relations between Uzbekistan and its CA neighbours in the past included plans for the creation of a common market of goods, services and capital through a free trade zone, a customs union and a currency union. However, later years showed that both Uzbekistan and its CA partners were moving too fast in their quest to establish CA cooperation schemes. This past experience is also a factor that influences the current initiatives of President Mirziyoyev and his counterparts. Therefore, a majority of Uzbekistan's proposed initiatives aim to establish a working system of bilateral relations to create a favourable environment and spirit between the countries, which might be helpful in resolving regional problems (among others, water and

borders) based on 'realistic compromises'. Prior unsuccessful experiences with cooperation serve as lessons for these states not to engage in immature institution building but rather to focus on building bilateral relations.

Therefore, the first year of President Mirziyoyev's foreign policy was marked by attempts to focus on improving relations with neighbours and creating a friendly neighbourhood around Uzbekistan. This is a rather radical departure from the foreign policy of Mirziyoyev's predecessor, who sought to either develop relations with only those regional countries that had similar positions as Uzbekistan or did not have any relations with them at all. A good example of the latter were relations with Tajikistan, with whom Uzbekistan has been embroiled in conflict over water and other issues and with whom relations have remained 'frozen' for the last two decades. With the succession of the presidency to Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan clearly signalled to its neighbours its newly found strategic objective of improving ties with its regional counterparts. Mirziyoyev sees the region as a 'single organism which for decades had common geography, economic and cultural space'. In his own words, Mirziyoyev's regional policy consists of two elements: 'not to avoid (discussing) sharp corners and (seeking) reasonable compromises'.²⁴ This policy was launched at the funeral of the former President, during which he clearly indicated to his regional counterparts that he intended to change the dynamics of relations with them. After the funeral, the newly appointed acting president initiated several visits of high-ranking officials to all the countries of CA in order to discuss ways to 'normalize' and improve relations with them. Additionally, he initiated public diplomacy by mobilizing local communities in the Fergana Valley to exchange visits in order to build a friendlier environment for uneasy political decisions.²⁵ Although the mutual visits of local community and administrative leadership between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the autumn of 2016 were not easy to conduct given the history of two interethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan against the Uzbek minority there, these visits paved the way for more fruitful later visits by the heads of state and government of the two states. This unconditional approach to the regional states by Mirziyoyev resulted in 11 meetings of the regional heads of state, 2 working visits and 15 phone calls between the leaders of the CA states over the 10 months following Mirziyoyev's succession.²⁶ The aim of these visits and calls on the Uzbek side was to signal to his CA counterparts that Mirziyoyev is genuinely interested in closer and friendlier relations. For President Mirziyoyev, improvement of the ties with neighbours is not purely a matter of reshaping Uzbekistan's regional identity, it also includes an element of changing Uzbekistan's economic standing. In particular, during his first trip abroad to Turkmenistan, Mirziyoyev discussed transportation infrastructure development through Turkmenistan, such as a rail- and motor-road 'Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman' corridor as a way of opening up the country to the international community.²⁷ In Kazakhstan, he signed a road map for economic cooperation that paved the way for further projects to be discussed later in Tashkent in September 2017.²⁸ In its relations

with Kyrgyzstan, the issues of opening the borders to Uzbek goods, removing obstacles to railroad construction between China and Uzbekistan, part of which needs to run through Kyrgyzstan (Kashgar–Osh–Andizhan, a route that has been a matter of great concern in Kyrgyzstan), and the resolution of water-related disputes ranked very high on the Uzbek agenda.²⁹ To find compromises, Mirziyoyev conditionally dropped the Uzbek objection to dam construction upstream in Kyrgyzstan during his state visit in September 2017. This stance would have been unthinkable in the years of President Karimov, who even referred to the possibility of ‘water wars’ in the region. In the case of Tajikistan, President Mirziyoyev paved the way for the revival of air travel between the two countries for the first time since 1992 as well as the restoration of rail- and motor-road communications between the two states. This resulted in the revival of cultural and economic cooperation between the two countries, with Uzbek producers of electrical goods and machinery holding a successful exhibition in Tajikistan. The traditionally strong ties with Kazakhstan have also further developed, with the presidents of both countries exchanging state and working visits with each other and boosting trade in military equipment, oil, machinery, vehicles and other goods produced in both countries. The volume of trade between the two countries has increased 35 per cent on a year to year basis, reaching USD2 billion.³⁰

Under the new leadership, Uzbekistan has also shown signs of appreciating the soft-power potential of improving its image. In particular, the country has attempted to solidify its foreign policy gains by organizing exhibitions dedicated to its culture and economic potential in neighbouring countries while also promoting the potential of neighbouring countries in Uzbekistan. The events dedicated to Kyrgyzstan were held in August and September of 2017, prior to the visit of the Uzbek president to Kyrgyzstan. In September of 2017, the first exhibition of Tajik culture and economic potential was held in Tashkent. It was the first such exhibition to be organized in the last 20 years.³¹ Kazakhstan announced during the visit of President Nazarbayev to Uzbekistan in September of 2017 that 2018 would be the year of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan (meaning that various events introducing Uzbekistan to the Kazakhstani public would be held), and Uzbekistan announced that 2019 would be the year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan.³² For Uzbek foreign policy, these exhibitions represent ways to support and promote its regional policy while signalling to neighbouring countries that Uzbekistan’s aim is not only to exploit its neighbours’ potential but also to promote regional capacity building. This approach of promoting both economic potential and cultural attractiveness can also contribute to the formation of a regional identity, which can then translate to common or similar identifications of ‘self’ and a consensus about the vision of the ‘other’ with respect to the regional states.

In this sense, Mirziyoyev’s newly defined regional policy signifies a shift in Uzbek foreign policy towards prioritizing cooperation with neighbouring CA countries, which is an obvious departure from the Karimov-era policy that tended to downplay the regional identity of Uzbekistan and its regional partners while

balancing the influences of global powers such as China, the United States and Russia. Such policy changes have also been well received in neighbouring countries. Water-related disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were de-escalated over the period of Mirziyoyev's presidency. Air travel with Tajikistan has been restored. The traditionally strong partnership with Kazakhstan, which showed certain signs of competition for regional domination, improved to the degree that it facilitated more intensified economic relations and trade.

Finally, the biggest change that can be observed in the newfound foreign policy of Uzbekistan is a move from a politically motivated one towards an economics-driven one. Certain elements of the developmental state model – in which government promotes foreign economic activity to be pursued in priority areas – have been adopted, with Mirziyoyev criticizing the country's diplomatic corps for ineffective promotion of the economic interests of the country abroad and enlarging the economic functions of embassies abroad while downplaying geopolitical ones. Mirziyoyev infamously called on diplomatic staff and ambassadors in December of 2017, saying: 'Listen carefully. We will change the work drastically starting from the new year. I do not need such Ambassadors who do not report weekly on work regarding investments and who do not bring even 10 tourists into the country.'³³ In order to promote such economic attractiveness, Mirziyoyev abolished entry visas for passport holders of seven countries (Japan, Indonesia, Israel, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey) while relaxing the visa regime with a large number of other states (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, <https://mfa.uz/en/consular/visa/>). In addition, each region of Uzbekistan is now attached to the Embassy of Uzbekistan abroad with such missions responsible for promotion of this region's external economic relations and investments into it.³⁴

GLOBAL ACTORS AND MIRZIYOYEV'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Following the principles of foreign policy outlined immediately after being appointed interim president of Uzbekistan in September 2016, President Mirziyoyev prioritized Russia and China as the most important partners external to the region. In doing so, he adhered to the legacy of previous successful engagements with these countries (be it the agreement on eternal friendship with Russia, Uzbekistan's dependency on the Russian labour and trade markets or its involvement in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) that created the foundations for common norms (such as the 'Shanghai spirit' or Eurasian identity) in partnerships.

At the same time, the discourse about Uzbekistan siding exclusively with Russia, China or the United States in the post-Karimov era was not empirically proven by the events that occurred in the first year of Mirziyoyev's presidency. This discourse was heavily present in the Russian and Western press. Those portraying President Mirziyoyev as a pro-Russian sympathizer emphasized his successful handling of

negotiations with the Russian president in the aftermath of Karimov's death and the positive mood in those negotiations. This led to speculation that Mirziyoyev would pay his first state visit to Russia to coordinate his further steps as president with Putin.³⁵ Some even expressed hope that it would pave the way for further integration between Uzbekistan and Russia, possibly including integration into the Eurasian Union.³⁶ However, these hopes and predictions proved to be groundless. The Uzbek president made his first foreign visit not to Russia but to politically neutral neighbour Turkmenistan. Nor was Mirziyoyev's second visit made to Russia, but rather to neighbouring Kazakhstan, as if to symbolize the importance of good neighbourhood construction for Uzbekistan in the post-Karimov era. The Uzbek president eventually met Putin on his third foreign visit in April 2017 when he explicitly welcomed Russian investment agreements for USD12 billion and trade contracts for USD3.8 billion.³⁷ In addition, issues related to controlling and managing labour migration from Uzbekistan to Russia received attention and were followed up on after the visit.³⁸ However, it became obvious that Mirziyoyev did not contemplate Russian dominance in his country or a radical switch to a pro-Russian stance. This balanced attitude towards Russia has led observers to again prematurely believe that Mirziyoyev is a pragmatic politician in the style of Karimov who looks for opportunities to exploit his Russian and CA counterparts.³⁹ Other analysts have proclaimed that Uzbekistan is pivoting towards China by portraying Sino-Russian competition and comparing the results of Mirziyoyev's Russia visit in April with his China visit in May 2017.⁴⁰ However, such extreme expectations that Uzbekistan will switch its strategic partnerships subscribes to a rather binary ('all or nothing') conception of international relations that is not well-grounded in empirical evidence. In contrast, from the perspective of Uzbekistan, many of the projects promoted by the EU, the United States, Russia, China, South Korea and Japan are compatible with one another and do not necessarily imply a conflict of interest.

Mirziyoyev's foreign policy shows signs of prioritizing certain areas in which certain countries could contribute more than others. Thus, the selection of partners and areas of cooperation is instead made on the assumption that Russia can contribute more in areas of trade because a number of goods produced in Uzbekistan (cars, agricultural products, cotton and textiles, and human resources) can find a vast market in Russia, while Russian-produced machinery, oil and certain agricultural products can be sold in Uzbekistan. Among the most significant contracts Uzbekistan signed was with Gazprom for the annual purchase of 4 billion cubic metres of Uzbek natural gas beginning in 2018.⁴¹ Other contracts included the organization and production of composite materials in Uzbekistan, the modernization of air traffic control and supplies of equipment and spare parts for oil and gas-extracting corporations in Uzbekistan. In terms of military and security cooperation, Uzbekistan continues to use a large arsenal of Russian-made arms for which it needs maintenance support. By the April 2017 visit, the parliaments of both countries had ratified an agreement on military cooperation that implies

cooperation in the maintenance of equipment as well as the modernization of military hardware and training. Thus, it is clear that Mirziyoyev's Russia policy is not ideologically driven but is rather focused on elements of pragmatic cooperation. He readily accepts facets of cooperation with Russia that are advantageous for both countries but is not in a rush to make ambitious announcements about politically driven initiatives such as entry into the Eurasian Union. Russia is Uzbekistan's second largest economic partner after China, and it will remain so for the foreseeable future. Mirziyoyev is eager to further utilize Russia's competitive advantages for the development of Uzbekistan, but the contracts signed so far indicate that those areas of cooperation do not collide with the interests of other large players such as China.

Although many analysts see or predict Sino-Russian collusion and even rivalry in Uzbekistan, the contracts and agreements signed between Uzbekistan and China during the May 11–13, 2017 visit of the president of Uzbekistan to China suggest that there is currently no sign of exclusive rivalry between Russia and China in the country. The focus of the 2017 visit of President Mirziyoyev to China was obviously the promotion of economic ties between the two countries based on the 'Shanghai spirit' bargaining strategy.⁴² Negotiations on many of the 11 intergovernmental, 1 intermunicipal and a package of other economic contracts for the amount of USD22.8 billion were started even before Mirziyoyev was elected president.⁴³ In total, the number of agreements, memorandums and protocols signed during the visit reached 76, of which 35 are agreements of various types (including agreements between the governments, between agencies and framework agreements), 31 are memorandums (including notes of meetings that focused on particular projects with the general budget allocation of these projects already decided) and 10 are protocols (which are discussions of intent for particular enterprises). The largest infrastructure-related agreements focused on the joint production of synthetic fuel (USD3.7 billion), investments in Uzbekistan's oil industry (USD2.6 billion), investments in new projects (USD2 billion), cooperation agreements for the construction of energy-generation plants (USD679 million), railroad infrastructure development agreements (USD520 million), an agreement on Tashkent–Osh road construction (USD220 million) and a number of others. In terms of establishing manufacturing lines in Uzbekistan, agreements were reached to facilitate the establishment of manufacturing facilities for cement (USD153 million in Andijan and USD100 million in Tashkent), textiles (USD200 million), electric appliances (USD139 million), metal goods (USD115 million) and glass goods (USD83 million).⁴⁴ In terms of the memorandums and protocols, some are already being realized in established production facilities, such as one for the production of soft and hard toys in Tashkent at the Soviet-era toy production factory Tashkentigrushka.⁴⁵ The costs of the project are calculated at USD23 million, and it is expected to produce 700 kinds of plastic and soft, electronic and mechanical toys and to generate 950 jobs.⁴⁶ The majority of these projects represent attempts to establish production and infrastructure-related

facilities to enable Uzbekistan to produce goods not just for its large yet still limited internal consumption but also for exports. This is exemplified by the toy production facility mentioned above, which aims to produce 7 million units of toys annually, of which 80 per cent are meant to be exported to other countries in CA, Russia, Afghanistan and others. In this sense, Afghanistan and other neighbours are placed as not only important political actors for Mirziyoyev but importantly economic markets and trade partners. Stabilization in Afghanistan is considered not only as pre-empting political threats but importantly opening new opportunities for Uzbekistan. This is the reason why Uzbekistan championed organizing the conference on peace in Afghanistan in Tashkent in March 2018 during which Mirziyoyev emphasized that Afghanistan needs not to be seen as a threat but an important neighbour.⁴⁷

In this sense, Mirziyoyev's foreign policy inherited the economic priorities of the Karimov era, which aimed to create production facilities within the country and export the goods to neighbouring countries.⁴⁸ In doing so, Uzbekistan attempts to turn its disadvantage of being the most populous country in the region into a competitive advantage and to use its lower labour costs and high literacy and education levels to boost its exporting potential. This is another reason why the new Uzbek foreign policy treats its neighbours with care: it helps Uzbekistan open up new trade routes for its newly emerging industrial base. Chinese technology might not be the most advanced internationally, but it is advanced enough for Uzbekistan to develop a manufacturing sector to satisfy the needs of its population, create an export-oriented economic manufacturing base and generate employment for its large population. In addition, the economic structures of both countries are somewhat similar in terms of the relations between the state and the business community, as government plays a significant role in both countries that resembles the developmental state model. Thus, the tasks for the working groups that were preparing agreements between the two countries were less complicated because their negotiating and bargaining styles somewhat resembled each other.⁴⁹ The agreements signed during the May visit of the president to China are considered to be the backbone for a strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and China; thus, their implementation is strictly controlled and administered by a special committee headed by the prime minister.⁵⁰

The structure and content of the agreements between Uzbekistan and China and between Uzbekistan and Russia reveal that there are only a few areas where the expertise and interests of the countries overlap. To a great extent, these interests diverge from each other, offering Uzbekistan a chance to pragmatically develop its relations with both countries in a non-exclusive manner. Similarly, Uzbekistan's foreign policy under Mirziyoyev does not exclude other non-regional partners. For instance, Mirziyoyev suggested that Japan and South Korea could be important partners in economic cooperation agreements and as sources of investment and technology for the Uzbek economy. In particular, technologies that are available in Japan and South Korea but that are unavailable in China and Russia can

serve as a motivating factor for developing deeper cooperation. In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management of Uzbekistan currently cooperates with Japan on increasing the efficiency of water consumption at the consumer level. Additionally, the Ministry announced in 2017 that Uzbekistan is interested in importing technologies using hydroponic growing methods for agricultural products from Japan, South Korea and Iran.⁵¹ Hydroponic growing uses mineral nutrient solutions to feed plants growing in water, without soil. This technology is important for Uzbekistan, as it faces water deficiencies and soil corrosion in certain areas of the country. In addition, this technology could allow Uzbekistan to produce agricultural products throughout the year. Finally, India and Pakistan were given roles as trading and humanitarian exchange partners.

CONCLUSIONS

There are several conclusions that can be made from the analysis above. First, there is a clear shift in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan compared to that implemented under the authoritarian President Islam Karimov on several accounts: first, there is a change in focus from global issues (as exemplified by attempting to balance China, Russia and the United States in CA and to position Uzbekistan as a regional superpower) towards a more pragmatic foreign policy of regional nature (which aims to resolve regional problems while prioritizing improved relations with regional states). This is a most significant shift, as it has the potential to impact a backlog of problems with neighbouring states that serve to limit the economic development of Uzbekistan and the CA region in general.

Additionally, there is a shift in the way Uzbek foreign policy defines its priority areas. With the previous administration under Karimov, issues related to political problems with neighbours (e.g., borders, water, ethnicity, religion) were of primary concern and largely dictated the formation of Uzbekistan's heavy-handed foreign policy responses. However, such forceful responses only complicated the task of establishing a dialogue with neighbouring states and resolving these problematic issues. The new administration under Mirziyoyev attempts to establish a soft approach in which it is prepared for compromises that not only take into account Uzbekistan's concerns but also consider the conditions of neighbouring countries. This open-ended approach received approval from all neighbouring countries and facilitated the resolution of many problematic issues.

The national developmental strategy of 2017–2021 represents the most important document used for defining directions of cooperation with regional and non-regional states for Uzbekistan. Implementation of this document has shifted from a strategy of government-dictated foreign policy objectives (i.e., an authoritarian approach) towards a process in which the government and its foreign policy institutions perform the roles of function facilitation and coordination. In this sense, the new policy aims to guide the economic activities of foreign partners,

not through the dictate but rather by offering preferences and assisting foreign engagements. Such tasks also require reforms within the foreign ministry and its foreign missions abroad. In addition, the relations between the foreign ministry and domestic actors (such as both local government and the presidential administration) have necessitated reformulation and drastic change as described above.

While such developmental state functions in foreign policy signify both a more open economy and flexible dialogue with regional and non-regional partners, it is still too early to make final judgements regarding the outcomes of these foreign policy changes. Such shifts instead represent an early start in efforts to position Uzbekistan as a liberalizing state open for foreign engagement. To this end, governmental efforts play a more constructive developmental function by relaying a reassuring message to foreign partners.

Notes

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- 3 Timur Dadabaev, *Towards Post-Soviet Central Asian Regional Integration: A Scheme for Transitional States* (Tokyo: Akashi, 2004).
- 4 'Andijan events' refers to the May 13, 2005 clash between the Uzbek Interior Ministry and National Security Service and a crowd of protesters in Andijan, whom government claimed were an Islamic radical group called *Akromiya* during which a great number of civilian casualties were reported.
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- 13 For the analysis of the cooperation road maps, see Timur Dadabaev, *Chinese, Japanese and Korean In-roads into Central Asia: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Cooperation Road Maps for Uzbekistan* (Honolulu/Washington: East-West Center, 2019).
- 14 This section builds on the arguments in Timur Dadabaev, 'Uzbekistan as Central Asian game changer? Uzbekistan's foreign policy construction in the post-Karimov era', *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 2018, 1–14. doi:10.1177/2057891118775289
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- 42 'Shanghai spirit' implies norms that connect the issues for cooperation prioritized by both countries without seeking unilateral gains. These norms also imply the importance of mutual sacrifices and compromises for mutual gains.
- 43 The amount of USD22.8 billion includes both Chinese and Uzbek shares in the deals signed. The amount of pure Chinese contribution/investment in the deals is roughly USD10 billion while the remaining part accounts for the Uzbek side's contribution, which includes both monetary contributions as well as the costs of land and infrastructure development.
- 44 For details, refer to the article cited in note 8.
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- 49 Interview with unnamed official aware of negotiations between the two countries, Tashkent, September 7, 2017.
- 50 Decree of the President of Uzbekistan. 'O Merah po Rasshireniyu Vsestorennogo Strategicheskogo Partnerstva Mezhdru Respublikoi Uzbekistan I Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi [On measures for expanding the multidirectional strategic partnership between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the People's Republic of China]', PP-2982, May 19, 2017.
- 51 *Sputnik*, 'RUz Budet Vyraschivat Frukty Kruglyi God [Uzbekistan will grow fruits and vegetables all year round]', September 6, 2017. <http://ru.sputniknews-uz.com/economy/20170906/6236626/uzbekistan-selhozkulturni.html>

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PART VII

Offshore Actors



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Iran's Foreign Policy

Mehdi Mozaffari

INTRODUCTION

Iran represents a highly critical actor, both in the international and regional arenas. As a country, Iran possesses considerable advantages, in terms of natural and human resources as well as in geopolitical terms. At the same time, the Iranian regime is a regime that does not resemble any other political regime. It is unique and proud of its uniqueness. Since the 1979 revolution, the world has undergone dramatic changes. The Cold War has ended; the Soviet empire has imploded; apartheid in South Africa has been replaced by a democratic pluralistic regime; the countries of Eastern Europe have become democratic; and China is opting for a capitalist economy. Despite this vast array of changes, the Islamist *regime*, as a political and governmental organization, has not changed much. It has retained its main revolutionary characteristics, its revolutionary institutions and its revolutionary ambitions. The Supreme Leader is still the leader of the revolution in addition to being the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the Islamic Umma.

However, since the resolution of the nuclear issue with the P5+1 (China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK, the United States + Germany) in July 2015, a new horizon has opened in Iran's relations with the great powers, and with the United States in particular. This process is still ongoing and needs to be consolidated. Another important issue concerns the role that Iran is playing in different parts of the Middle East, its confrontation with some Arab countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, as well as Iran's hostility towards its self-proclaimed

enemy: Israel. Having the above-mentioned elements in mind, this study is aiming to provide as true a picture of Iran's foreign policy (IFP) as possible. Since ideology exercises an important influence on IFP, the study will start with a brief theoretical discussion of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy which will be followed by an analysis of the pillars of IFP. Then, I will turn to a brief presentation of IFP's decision-making institutions. The study will continue with a more specific and empirical discussion of Iran's policy towards the great powers as well as vis-à-vis the regional actors.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Scholars of international politics generally acknowledge that ideology has an impact on foreign policy. What is disputed is the modality and degree of ideological influence on the formulation and execution of foreign policy as such.

According to Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8–10), three types of beliefs shape the outcome of foreign policy: *worldviews*, *principled beliefs* and *causal beliefs*. 'Worldviews' are embedded in the symbolism of a culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse. They are not purely normative, since they include views regarding cosmology and ontology as well as ethics. 'Principled beliefs' consist of normative ideas specifying the criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust. 'Causal beliefs' are beliefs about cause–effect relationships. Such causal beliefs provide guides for individuals on how to achieve their objectives. We find similar elements in Thompson and Macridis, who note that 'the term ideology applies not only to the manner in which objectives are shaped, but also to how given objectives will be pursued' (1992: 12).

Inspired by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Walter Carlsnaes (1987: 168) suggests that 'ideology performs diverse functions. We may distinguish between a cognitive function, serving as an "analytical prism", and a normative function, providing specific policy prescriptions, a "guide to action"'. The general functions of ideology are legitimizing the regime and justifying or rationalizing shifts in policy. More specifically, Barry Farrell draws a connection between the degrees of the impact of ideology on the nature of political regimes. He posits that ideology 'in all probability plays a more important role in influencing the foreign policies of closed societies than it does open societies' (in Carlsnaes, 1987: 11). Based on this proposition, I presume that ideology plays *a fortiori* a more important role in totalitarian regimes than in non-totalitarian closed regimes. This is because the legitimacy of totalitarian regimes is founded on ideology.

Departing from a systemic view, Alexander Wendt contests this approach by emphasizing that 'the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas' (1999: 96), and 'interests are themselves cognitions of ideas' (1999: 122).

On the issue of the tension between 'ideas' and 'interests', it appears as though there is room between Marxism and Neorealism on the one side and constructivism on the other. This median, or conciliatory, position is defended by Goldstein and Keohane as well as by Carlsnaes. Referring to Max Weber, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) insist that they do not argue that ideas *rather than* interests (as interpreted by human beings) move the world. Instead, they suggest that ideas *as well as* interests have causal weight in explanations of human action (1993: 3–4). By applying the Weberian position to the context of foreign policy, Carlsnaes also arrives at the conclusion that 'the ideological nature of foreign policy is often contrasted with the notion of interest ... but ... these are not mutually exclusive but have, on the contrary, coexisted over the years, albeit with a tendency for agencies of interests to contain the agencies of ideology' (Carlsnaes, 1987: 6). The present study is based on this dialectical approach between ideas and interests.

THE PILLARS OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ever since the Islamist revolution in February 1979, the Iranian regime has remained strongly ideological. This ideology is deeply rooted in religious convictions with numerous mythical ramifications in which symbolism plays a crucial role. Since foreign policy is inspired and even guided by ideology, the ideology itself becomes the arbiter of the success and failure of the external conduct of the country. In fact, since the Revolution, Iranian authorities have – rightly or wrongly – systematically justified their decisions on some critical issues such as war and peace, hostility or reconciliation, intervention or restraint, through the foundational ideology which is considered the GPS of foreign policy.

This ideological corpus is explicitly formulated in the Constitution, which stands as the *foundational discourse* of the regime. In this document, we find the regime's worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs all in the same document. Furthermore, the Constitution, based on an ideologized religion, is allocating legitimacy to the religious elites and their leadership as well as providing them with real power. The groups in power have therefore acquired a direct interest to implement the Constitution. It is also worth noting that the Constitution itself defines its own role as follows:

The mission of the Constitution is to realize the ideological objectives of the Revolution (*Nehzat*) and to create conditions conducive to the development of man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam. (Preamble)

The worldview of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the outside world rests on four pillars:

The first pillar relies on its *revolutionary character*. In the words of Lenin, every revolution has an *ideology* or 'a revolutionary theory'. The great revolutions

have a *total ideology, a worldview* which expresses the *core beliefs* of the revolution and provides answers to every essential question (Mozaffari, 2013).

A revolutionary regime adopts a revolutionary foreign policy that is (1) revisionist, (2) active and threatening, and (3) strongly value-oriented. The great revolutions (e.g. the French, Bolshevik or Islamist) challenge the entire international system, the world *status quo*. Their aims include a complete transformation of the existing system, replacing it with an entirely different system. Khomeini's Islamist revolution challenged, in the context of the Cold War, both the USSR (the challenger) and the United States (the challenged). The revolutionary slogan on foreign affairs was and still is: 'Neither Eastern nor Western' (*Na Sharqi, Na Gharbi*) which is engraved on the portal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' main entrance.

The foreign policy of Islamist Iran is also disenchanted and revisionist, because the structure of the current international system is perceived to be unjust and repressive. The existing corrupt rule must therefore be replaced by a true Islamic order, which is (by definition) just, fair and virtuous. Until the realization of the 'sublime universe', the world remains structurally divided into two antagonist spheres: the world of good and the world of evil – light and darkness. There is the 'Party of God' (*Hizbollah*) on the one side and the 'Great Satan' (*Shaytân-e Bozorg*) on the other. Compromise between the two is impossible. The struggle is constant until the former has eliminated the latter.

The second pillar of the Islamist worldview is shaped by its *totalitarian character*, as expressly stipulated in article 4, in particular:

All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.

The totalitarian character of the regime is reinforced by the institutionalization of an entirely religious leadership that commands total power (article 110, the longest article of the Constitution).

Another totalitarian characteristic is the obsession with the presence of irreducible *enemies*, who are ceaselessly hatching conspiracies. To the leadership, the situation is never normal; a state of emergency is the rule. They deliberately give the impression that they are constantly facing important threats requiring mobilization and readiness. They justify their actions and decisions by the state of emergency. For the same reason, totalitarian regimes must create *crises* or maintain existing crises. Normality, appeasement, and tranquility are the worst enemies of such regimes. Creating artificial and unnecessary crises therefore becomes a mode of government which is the case of the Iranian regime (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965).

The hostage-taking at the US embassy in Tehran (November 4, 1979) was a purely provoked crisis. The prolongation of the war with Iraq prior to the Iraqi

proposal for ceasefire in 1982 was also deliberate. The Rushdie Affair in 1989 and the vehemently hostile posture towards Israel are solely motivated by the need for an enemy. Conducting an enigmatic and thoroughly ambivalent policy in the very delicate and highly dangerous area of nuclear energy once again demonstrates the regime's almost vital need for crises.

The third pillar is the *non-Westphalian view*. Ideologically, the Iranian regime is *Islamist* based on the notion of the 'Islamic Umma' (*Ummat-e Islam*) as opposed to the Iranian nation (*Mellat-e Iran*) (Djalili, 1989: 58–63). The Iranian leaders rarely talk about 'Iran' in neutral terms; instead, they usually tie the name of the country to Islam, talking of '*Iran-e Islami*', '*Mihan-e Islami*', '*Vatan-e Islami*' and so on. The non-Westphalian character of the Iranian regime is actually *pre-Westphalian*, which has been inherent to the classic Islamic state. According to Professor Ann K. S. Lambton, 'the basis of the Islamic state was ideological, not political, territorial or ethnical and the primary purpose of government was to defend and protect the faith, not the state' (1981: 13). According to the current Iranian Constitution, the regime is precisely founded on the *belief* in Islam alone, 'a single world community' (*Ummat-e Wâhed-e Jahani*), not on the *nation* (Preamble).

To achieve the goal of the 'single world community', the Leader/*Rahbar* has an 'ideological army' (*Artesh-e Maktabi*) at his disposal. This is perhaps the only army in the world which, in addition to the regular duty of 'guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country', also is in charge of 'fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world' (Preamble).

The fourth pillar of the Islamist worldview is based on its *imperialistic ambitions* which are expressed in two ways: *reactively* and *actively*. The reactive character of Islamist imperialism is equivalent to the concept of 'hegemony' as described by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). In their analysis, hegemony is not the majestic unfolding of an identity; rather, it represents a response to a crisis (p. 7). In this sense, Islamist hegemonic ambitions express the profound frustration of a *longue-durée* Islamic stagnation. Islamists assign the responsibility for this to Western imperialists and their Muslim allies who are in power in Muslim countries. Keeping this perspective in mind, the zealous efforts by the Iranian government to acquire nuclear arms become rather understandable. The proactive Iranian hegemonic ambitions are explained by the fact that the Islamist Iranian struggle against imperialism is not a principled struggle; the goal is not to put an end to imperialism as a harmful concept and as an erroneous political and economic construction. Rather, the real issue for the Iranian regime and for Islamists in general is to *replace* Western imperialism with a new Islamic hegemony as a reminiscence of the golden age of Islamic world power.

Furthermore, it is a fact that Iran as a country possesses many positive factors, including its geographical location between the Caucasus and Central Asia to the north and the Persian Gulf to the south, between Asia to the east and the

Middle East to the west; it has a population of nearly 80 million people most of whom are quite young; and the country possesses massive reserves of gas and oil; the second-largest gas reserves and the third-largest oil reserves in the world. Moreover, due to its inherent geopolitical character, Iran stands as a powerful actor in the region, regardless of who is in power.

At the same time, Iranian ambitions meet serious obstacles. First, Iran is a Shia country, while the huge majority of Muslims are Sunni (roughly 90 percent). Shia Iran can possibly become the new center of a Shia empire at some point in the future, but not the center of an Islamic empire. To sweep away this serious obstacle, Iranian Islamist leaders tried to tone down their Shia credentials from the first days of the Revolution. Khomeini systematically addressed all Muslims (except in particular ceremonies and events directly related to Shia), and he considered himself the supreme leader of the Islamic world. As an example, it was in this capacity that he delivered his death decree 'fatwa' against Salman Rushdie on behalf of all Muslims. In the post-Khomeini era, Khamenei, the current leader, argues that it is not Iran that is seeking war with Sunni Islam, but the United States that is seeking war with the entire Islamic world (Sadjadpour, 2008: 25). Animated by the same ecumenical spirit, the Iranian government tried to build a bridge between Shia and Sunni believers by organizing inter-faith gatherings in Iran.

Second, Shia Iran faces a major obstacle. In the view of Muslims, Iran does not really represent prestigious *Islamic* land. Tehran, the capital of the country, is a trivial city; it is nowhere near as prestigious as cities like Mecca, Medina, Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo or Istanbul. The two holy Islamic cities in Iran – Mashhad and Qum – are only holy in the eyes of Shia believers. Aware of these handicaps, Khomeini and his successor have made considerable efforts to seize control over some of the Islamic holy centers recognized unanimously by all Muslims. During the first years of the revolution, Khomeini's attention was primarily oriented towards Mecca and Medina, the most sacred of the Islamic cities. To reach this objective, he tried to destabilize the Saudi royal family's power by supporting unrest in the kingdom, for instance in connection with the military occupation of the holy mosque of Mecca (November 20, 1979) by Saudi Islamists and by provoking bloody demonstrations during the hajj pilgrimages. Together with various other terrorist actions allegedly perpetrated by Iran (e.g. the attack on Khobar, the US military base in Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996), these events created difficulties for the Saudi kingdom, but did not bring it down. Parallel to these initiatives, Khomeini developed a plan B consisting of the conquest of Jerusalem. After Khomeini's death (June 1989), plan B became the master plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is a fact that the 'liberation' of Palestine has always been one of the Islamic goals of Revolutionary Iran. This trend has continued and was reinforced after 1990. During the eight years of war with Iraq, Khomeini attempted to justify the deliberate prolongation of the war by declaring that 'the route to Jerusalem goes through Karbala' (a holy city in Iraq).

Furthermore, Iran is the only country with a 'Jerusalem Day' (*Rouz-e Quds*), created by Khomeini as a day of protest against the Israeli occupation on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan, and also the only country to establish a 'Jerusalem Army' (*Sepah-e Quds*). Add to this the extensive Iranian assistance to Hamas, an Islamist entity related to the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tehran, the symbolic takeover of Jerusalem is perceived as a necessary step towards the realization of the new Islamic empire. Otherwise, it is difficult to find rational reasons for this particular attachment of a country such as Iran to Palestine. Iran is not an Arab country, nor has it ever been in war or in direct armed conflict with Israel. There is no clash between Israeli and Iranian national interests. On the contrary, they both have an interest in bilateral cooperation, as this could potentially render them more secure in the face of possible Arab ambitions. The point to be made here is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is anti-Israeli rather than pro-Palestinian.

The proactive policy goes far beyond the borders of the Muslim world. The call of the Iranian Constitution is universal: to all the 'deprived' (*Mustaz'afin*) around the world, regardless of religion, race or other particulars. This call has provided Iranian foreign policy with an audience in the non-Muslim world. The Iranian alliance policy follows the same line. Iran's friends represent a conglomerate of various and somehow contradictory tendencies. Most of them, countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba and Syria, belong to the left or the extreme left and pursue an 'anti-imperialist' agenda. The extreme right wing was also among the former President Ahmadinejad's friends, including groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, Holocaust negationists and neo-Nazis such as David Duke, Willy Castro and Robert Faurisson (Michael, 2007). All are extremists, whatever their political orientation. It is noteworthy that after the election of Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013, we have witnessed a notable diminution of negationist activities, initiated by the government.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

In the circuitous Iranian decision-making process, the main goals are decided by Ayatollah Khamenei. All other instances fall under the auspices of the House of Leadership (*Beyt-e Rahbari*). The department of foreign policy of the House of Leadership is headed by Dr (in pediatrics) Ali Akbar Velayati, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for roughly 16 years in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to this institution, which is functioning as the supreme arena for decision making, various other institutions are implicated in the study, analysis and elaboration of decisions. The main institutions in this category are:

The Supreme Council for National Security, the competence, composition and duties of which are defined in the Iranian Constitution. The goal of the Council is to safeguard national interests and to preserve the Islamic Revolution and the territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. The President of the Republic is head

of the Council with the participation of the Speaker of the Majlis and the Chief Justice as well as some army commanders and two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader. The decisions of the Council become effective after confirmation by the Leader. Since 2003, management of Iranian atomic project figures as the most sensitive task for this Council. The former Secretary General of the Council, Ali Laijani, is now Speaker of the Majlis; Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani was appointed new Secretary General. Shamkhani who is of Iranian Arab descent and is fluent in Arabic, plays an important role in shaping the current foreign policy.

The Strategic Council for Foreign Relations consists of former ministers (former Foreign Ministers Kamal Kharrazi and Ali Akbar Velayati, former Minister of Commerce Mohammad Shariatmadari, and a cleric, Mohammad H. Taremi-Rad, who previously served as ambassador to China and Saudi Arabia). This assembly was established in 2006 by Khamenei as a polite gesture towards a number of senior officials, who had served him impeccably for a long period and are now enjoying their retirement. That is why they are usually referred to as ‘Senators’, which in bureaucratic Iranian jargon means ‘respected powerless’.

The Center for Strategic Research of the Expediency Council was chaired by Hassan Rouhani before his election to the Presidency. He was replaced by Ali Akbar Velayati. Nonetheless, this Center was under the direct control of Hashemi Rafsanjani until his death on January 8, 2017. In sum, the Center has limited influence on foreign policy decisions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the administrative instrument of Iranian foreign policy with limited influence. Generally, the real influence of such a ministry depends to a great extent on the personality of the minister. The present minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, an American educated in Denver, Colorado, is enjoying more influence than his predecessors under President Ahmadinejad. During the two years of intensive negotiations of the Nuclear Deal with the 5+1, Zarif became an internationally known figure that gave him more weight in the Iranian decision-making process. At the same time, his international stature has been used by some radical factions in Iran against him; he has been accused of having been unnecessarily ‘soft’ and excessively ‘compromise-seeking’ in the nuclear negotiations.

The Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, chaired by Mojtaba Zolnour, has very limited influence on Iranian foreign policy. The Majlis deputies have the right to seek clarification from ministers. Using this mechanism, the deputies can influence foreign policy decisions, but this right has never been used effectively.

The Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran) under the command of General Hossein Salami, in charge of sensitive areas such as the atomic and oil industries as well as security issues regarding Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Russia. From September 2008, the command of the Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf

is also allocated to the Pasdaran. It is also noteworthy that a number of Iranian diplomats are recruited among the Pasdaran.

Reviewing the Iranian governmental institutions that are dealing with questions related to Iranian foreign policy, it became clear that, due to a strongly personalized decision-making system, these institutions are more and less comparable to think tanks rather than genuine decision-making bodies.

RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL

After more than two decades of a very intense and partially covert nuclear program, the tension between Iran and the world community reached an unprecedented high level under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). As a consequence of Iran's steadily defiant policy, a number of harsh economic sanctions were imposed on Iran by the UN Security Council (resolutions 1696 of July 31, 2006; 1737 of December 23, 2006; 1747 of March 24, 2007; and 1803 of March 3, 2008) combined with US and EU sanctions. These sanctions, parallel to international isolation of the Iranian regime, had a deep, negative impact on the economy and social life of the country. It was under the hard economic and social pressure that the Iranian regime itself had created, that Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader, was obliged to open the door for negotiations with the 5+1. He justified this new line as being one of 'heroic flexibility' (*Narmesh-e Qahremananeh*); a political tactic attributed to Imam Hassan, the second Shia Imam. Following this line, Iranian envoys met secretly with the American delegation in Oman already under the presidency of Ahmadinejad. When Hassan Rouhani became president (2013), he declared the resolution of the nuclear issue his first priority. After almost two years of long and intense negotiations, Iran finally reached an agreement on July 14, 2015 with the 5+1 countries about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On July 20, 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 that provides for the termination of the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue and establishes specific restrictions that apply to all states without exception.

Under the agreement, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities during the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will be converted to avoid proliferation risks. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement provides that, in return for verifiably abiding by its commitments, Iran will receive relief from the United States,

European Union, and United Nations Security Council nuclear-related economic sanctions.

For Iran, the successful Nuclear Deal was an ideal opportunity to make a soft volte-face, leaving the ideological, revisionist and strong anti-US policy behind and return to normality. The course of events after the Nuclear Deal has shown that Iran's real goal had a middle-range purpose rather than a comprehensive strategic one. In other words, for Iran, the Nuclear Deal was primarily an urgent necessity to reach three goals. First, to get free from suffocating economic sanctions. Second, to put an end to Iran's diplomatic isolation; and third, to gain time and wait for a better moment to fulfill its nuclear ambitions.

In this game, a faction of Iranian decision makers, led by President Rouhani's team, have wished to grasp the opportunity to lead Iranian diplomacy on to a wider horizon, including particularly the beginning normalization of relations with Washington. Already one year before his election, Rouhani had outlined his foreign policy in a book, composed of twelve chapters. In this book, he defines the main lines of his policy as 'idealism based on realism', 'detente', and 'moderation'. All these lines have to be conducted according to the general guiding principle which is '[Good] governance and Wisdom (*Modiriyat va Tadbir*)' (Rouhani, 2012).

This option has been categorically rejected by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. To him, the JCPOA is limited to the JCPOA and nothing else, and 'the principal enemies of an independent and advanced Iran remain the US, the UK, international finance and the Zionists' (speech, January 8, 2017). At the same time, the Iran Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 (the only currently operative Security Council resolution on Iran) 'calls on' Iran not to develop or test ballistic missiles 'designed to be capable of' delivering a nuclear weapon, for up to eight years. The wording, although less strict than that of Resolution 1929, is interpreted by Security Council members as a ban on Iran's development of ballistic missiles. The JCPOA itself does not specifically contain any ballistic missile-related restraints. Administration officials maintain that the missile issue is being addressed separately. Iran has continued developing and testing missiles, despite Resolution 2231. On October 11, 2015, Iran tested the domestically produced medium-range (1,200 mile range) 'Emad' ballistic missile, which Director of National Intelligence Clapper testified is 'more accurate' than Iran's previously produced missiles. US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power called a Security Council meeting to consider whether Iranian missile tests of March 8–9, 2016, constituted a violation of Resolution 2231, terming the tests 'provocative and destabilizing'. Iran reportedly conducted another missile test in May 2016, although Iranian media had varying accounts of the range of the missile tested. The State Department called that test 'inconsistent' with Resolution 2231. A July 2016 test of a missile of a range of 2,500 miles, akin to North Korea's Musudan missile, reportedly failed. It is not clear whether North Korea provided any technology or were in any way involved in the test. Thirty-eight

Iranian technicians reportedly have attended at least some of North Korea's missile and space launches in recent years (Katzman, 2016: 14). It is also important to mention that Iran is determined to reinforce its military capacities for the years ahead. According to the Six-Year Plan, the Majlis voted for a significant increase in the defense budget, from the current 2 percent of GDP to 5 percent (January 8, 2017).

Since the door of normalization with the United States is hermetically closed, Iran is trying to open new windows in three other directions. The first goes in the direction of Russia and China. Since the Revolution in 1979, Tehran and Moscow have continuously been on good terms with each other, both during and after the Soviet period. But, the closeness has never been transformed into a strategic alliance between the two countries. In addition, Russia has even repeatedly voted in favor of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. This attitude of Russia is in contrast with its continuing support to Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and Russia's systematic veto against any critical resolutions on this issue at the Security Council.

However, Russia remains Iran's main military supplier. The most recent Russian military delivery is five battalions of the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system. This deal was originally agreed in 2007 and the systems were delivered during 2016, although after the conclusion of the Nuclear Deal. Probably in exchange, 'Iran has largely refrained from supporting Islamist movements in Central Asia and in Russia not only because they are Sunni movements but also to avoid antagonizing Russia' (Katzman, 2016: 48). Tehran–Beijing relations are of a character similar to Tehran–Moscow relations. Like Russia, China also voted for sanctions against Iran. China was also opposed to Iran's full membership of the Shanghai Club (June 24, 2016).

Europe in general and Germany, Italy and France in particular represent the second Iranian option. Focusing on Europe is primarily motivated by Iran's economic needs. For decades, the country has suffered from the lack of renovation of its infrastructure, particularly in the oil industry and sectors like the automobile industry and civil aviation. In this situation, Iran is searching desperately for foreign investments. On the European side, Iran represents a highly interesting market with the country's considerable natural resources and its 80 million people. Therefore, in the first period, right after the Nuclear Deal, numerous European business delegations traveled to Iran to study the possibilities for marketing and investment. After the Nuclear Deal, Iranian diplomacy has deployed great efforts to improve and extend relations with African, Latin American and Asian countries. During the summer of 2016, President Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, paid visits to several countries on these three continents and have also hosted some high-ranking foreign delegations in Tehran. All these unprecedented efforts were obviously meant to attain two main goals. First, to consolidate the return of Iran to the international society of nations. Second, to promote the credit and prestige of Rouhani's presidency with regard to his

chances of re-election in April 2017. Meanwhile, there are already clear indications that the election of Donald Trump as US president will not only have an impact on the result of the coming Iranian presidential election, it is also highly probable that the new American administration will follow a very different line of conduct than the hitherto conciliatory line of the Obama administration. During the electoral campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly attacked the Nuclear Deal with Iran, calling it 'a disaster' and 'the worst deal ever negotiated'. However, after the election, the dominant discourse among the most prominent figures of the new administration (e.g. then Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense General James Mattis) is more about a 'revision' and to 'stick to the Iran nuclear deal even if it is flawed'.

In his TV press conference, President Rouhani called Trump's vehement opposition to the Nuclear Deal nothing but a 'slogan', and considered a revision of the deal an illusion (January 17, 2017). However, the presence of a number of people in the new US administration who are known for their hostility towards the Iranian regime has created an atmosphere of uncertainty, even anxiety among Iranian high authorities. These sentiments were reinforced by the death of Akbar Hashmi Rafsanjani (January 8, 2017), one of the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic who was known, in the domain of foreign policy, as a 'pragmatic politician', a 'facilitator', a man in favor of 'appeasement' and even open to a normalization with the United States. His absence may result in further reinforcement of the 'radical' faction who assumes that its interests may be better secured with a confrontational policy than with a conciliatory one.

IRAN'S REGIONAL POLICY

Since the turn of the century, six major events have conditioned the evolution of Iran's regional policy: the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001; the Iraq war and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003; the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010–11; the civil war in Syria since 2012; the capture of Mosul by Daesh in June 2014; and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2016 (Djalili, 2016: 38–9; Katzman, 2016: 22). At the same time, the Taliban government fell and Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown thus freeing the Tehran regime from two of its enemies; one to the east of the country and the other to the west. Contrasted with these two unexpected gains, some of the other events such as the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria and the rise of Daesh, confronted the Iranian regime with new challenges. However, the most critical challenge undoubtedly remains the grave tension and occurrences of overt hostility between Tehran and Riyadh reflected most directly by the proxy war in Yemen and the continuing tension in Bahrain.

The recent Saudi–Iranian tension began in January 2016 in reaction to the execution of the Shia religious leader Baqer al-Nimr and 46 others being sentenced

for terrorism in Riyadh (January 2). In Tehran and in Mashhad, Saudi diplomatic missions were attacked by crowds of people (January 3). The day after, Riyadh cut its diplomatic ties with Tehran. The Saudi decision was immediately followed by Bahrain and Sudan while the United Arab Emirates recalled their ambassadors. The UN Security Council condemned the attacks against Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran.

Rivalry between the two countries is not a new thing. There was also real tension between them during the first years after the Revolution, but this tension has now developed into unprecedented hostility, however, so far without direct confrontation. It is therefore hard to envisage a normalization of relations between Tehran and Riyadh as long as the wars in Syria and Yemen continue.

On the regional chessboard, three actors occupy a special place in Iran's foreign policy. These are Hizbollah, Hamas and Syria. In revolutionary Iran, this triangle is called the 'Resistance Front' and led by Iran itself. Hizbollah as a Lebanese Shia organization was actually created by Iran in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. Since that time, Hizbollah has remained as a political and military Iranian arm against Israel as well as against any other Iranian rivals and enemies in the region. According to Nasrallah, the general secretary of Hizbollah, the Iranian government is covering both Hizbollah's budget and its missiles arsenal (Al-Âlam TV, June 24, 2016). This is also the case with Hamas which benefits from Iran's financial and military assistance. Hamas' relations with Iran have, however, had their ups and downs, depending on the character of Hamas' position towards Iran's regional rivals, Saudi Arabia in particular. The general rule is: the more distancing the attitude from Riyadh and Doha, the more rewards from Tehran and vice versa.

Relations between Iran and Syria are of another nature. Syria is the only country with which Iran has a military defense alliance. It was during the Iraq–Iran war (1980–8) that the Tehran–Damascus tandem took form. During this war, Syria was the only Arab country that backed up a non-Arab country (Iran) against an Arab country (Iraq). Since then, Iran has consistently supported Assad's regime with all means. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2012, Iran entered it quite overtly as a military partner, together with the Lebanese Hizbollah on Assad's side. Besides the Pasdaran, Iran has created a new battalion, the 'Defenders of Haram', under the command of General Ghasem Soleimani who is also the commander of the Jerusalem Army. The 'Defenders of Haram' is composed essentially of Iranian, Afghan and Caucasian warriors who are engaged in daily battles in Syria. Due to its deep involvement and its military, financial and political engagements, Iran became the dominant actor in Syria. But, with the direct military intervention of Russia in 2015, Iran lost its dominant status in favor of Russia. The degradation of Iran's position increased when Turkey and Russia reached an agreement on a resolution of the Syrian conflict. In this way, Iran had to step back and became the minor partner in this *troika*.

To summarize Iran's regional policy, the IFP continues to follow the same line and pattern that were designed by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implementation of the revolutionary line and pattern requires a complete transformation of the region which would lead to the supremacy of Islamist Iran over the entire Middle East. However, facts and events show that Iran's revisionist policy in the region has hitherto produced the opposite result. Iran is still considered a disturbing element rather than a trustworthy partner; an agitator rather than a state seeking cooperation.

CONCLUSION: IS CHANGE POSSIBLE IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY?

This study has demonstrated that ideology exercises a deep and real impact on Iranian foreign policy. The question is therefore not so much about the personality of the Leader, but about the ideology incarnated by the Leader. The analysis has also demonstrated that the application of ordinary tools such as 'national interests' and 'materialist gains' on the particular Iranian case have very limited explanatory capacity to render the political complexities of Iran fully understandable. On the other hand, it appears that taking ideology as the point of departure is a more appropriate method for grasping the real sense and orientation of Iranian foreign policy. The study has also highlighted Iranian matrices of capabilities and sensitivities (hard and soft). Now, a question arises: under what conditions will the Islamist regime revise its revolutionary and revisionist foreign policy?

This question leads us to consider the relational landmarks of the Islamist regime. The fact is that this regime, which is ideologically and institutionally monistic, is not monolithic, *politically* speaking. If we put aside several groups, inside Iran and particularly abroad, who are against the very existence of the current Islamist regime, and look only at various voices, tendencies and forces within the Iranian political system, we observe that there are roughly those who refer to themselves as Fundamentalists (*Usul Garâyân*) and those who refer to themselves as Reformists (*Eslâh Talabân*). The differences are, however, limited to the functionality of the political system. In other words, the struggle is about the 'causal beliefs' and the modality of implementation of the 'road map' rather than the substance of the political regime in power. More specifically, the fundamentalists (the hawks) favor a more rigorous policy, while the reformists (the doves) want to introduce a degree of moderation in the exercise of power together with more openness towards the outside world. Each of these two groups is representing specific social and economic interests. The reformists stand on the side of what could conveniently be called the New Bazar. Although they are a post-revolutionary social class which is composed by a large faction of urban businessmen, the *nouveaux riches*, many of whom have an academic education, either

from Iranian or from Western and Southwest Asian universities, they are allied with the bureaucratic establishment and technocrats who are searching for a similar goal, favoring a civilian and pragmatic approach rather than a strongly ideological and revolutionary one. On the other side of the road, we have the Old Bazar who still has the upper hand on the social and political scenes. Traditionally, the Old Bazar is very conservative and it has always been suspicious of Western foreigners and their 'malicious intentions' against the Iranian people and their traditional cultural values. Animated by such a perception, the Old Bazar is pursuing the same protectionist policy as always (Mozaffari, 1991). Furthermore, the Old Bazar is defended and protected by the Shia clerical caste, the *Ulama*, who stand as the guardians of traditional cultural values.

The clash between the Old and the New Bazar has a direct impact on the formulation and orientation of Iran's foreign policy. The impact is reflected on most main issues regarding Iran's commitments in world politics. As a result of this clash, messages sent to the outside world often become ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. During the thirty-eight years that the revolutionary regime has governed the country, tension had occurred between these two blocks on different issues (the US hostages, the Iran–Iraq war, the Rushdie Affair, regional policy and so on). The recent and still ongoing dissension on the Nuclear Deal may represent the most profound dispute between the two groups.

Parallel to the internal antagonism between Fundamentalists and Reformists, it is of prime importance to pay attention to the weight and impact of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) on Iran's external relations. For years, they have accumulated immense wealth and have taken control of a large part of the production, distribution and sale of oil. Some of them have occupied high political positions such as President of the Republic, mayor of Tehran, various ministry portfolios, speaker of the parliament, or they have become wealthy businessmen. Most importantly, the Pasdaran are conducting wars in Iraq, in Syria, in Yemen and providing military support to Hizbollah in Lebanon and to Hamas against Israel. They are also in charge of a new army, the Cyber Army (*Artesh-e Cyberi*) which now occupies a critical place in their arsenal. Becoming rich and powerful, the Pasdaran are following the same path as the Supreme Leader who, in reality, is leading the fundamentalists. They prefer to consolidate their hegemonic position by keeping the country as distanced as possible from the West; the United States in particular.

The study of the internal struggle confirms that it is unlikely that this struggle alone will lead to the transformation of the revolutionary line to normality. This being said, we can observe, however, that, on some occasions, the regime has been obliged to demonstrate some degree of flexibility and to accept an outcome that was not the solution preferred by the regime. The first case in this category is the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8) where Khomeini, due to the extreme fatigue of the population and lack of adequate armaments, reluctantly accepted UN Resolution 598 (July 20, 1987), and the subsequent ceasefire with Iraq. We witnessed a

similar scenario in the Rushdie Affair. Iranian authorities firmly rejected granting any concessions in connection with Khomeini's death decree. Faced with a unanimous decision of the then twelve members of the EU to recall their ambassadors from Tehran, the Iranian foreign minister declared that the Iranian *government* would not make any attempts on Salman Rushdie's life. Yet another example is the suspension of the uranium-enrichment program in 2003 which happened as a collateral consequence of US military success during the first year of the invasion of Iraq. Iran's acceptance of direct dialogue with the United States and subsequently negotiation with the 5+1 on the nuclear issue is the most recent example of Iran's sporadic flexibility in its foreign policy. Strong economic and political sanctions which were imposed on Iran were surely the determining factor in these cases.

Thus, in all four cases, *pressure* was the real cause of change of the Iranian attitude. Either exhausted resources, strong international pressure or a combination of both were decisive factors for the change of Iranian policy. With President Trump in the White House, a new situation has arisen and Iran will have to face a number of serious challenges. According to most expert assessments, the new administration views Iran as a regional adversary rather than a potential partner. It is expected that the new administration will take new steps to counter Iran's regional influence, even if it decides to continue the implementation of the JCPOA (Katzman, 2016). It seems that faced with this new situation, the most practical and least costly way for the clerical regime to maintain itself in power could be to abandon its revolutionary and revisionist ambitions by becoming a *normal* state. As Henry Kissinger put it (*Der Spiegel*, 8/2008 – February 18, 2008): 'The key issue with Iran is whether it sees itself as a cause or as a nation.'

POSTSCRIPT

The completion of the first version of this chapter coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump as president in January 2017. Since then, US–Iran relations have experienced severe tensions on all fronts, leading to the reinstatement of all US sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran from November 4, 2018.

Parallel to this spectacular American volte-face, regional relations in the Middle East, and particularly around the Persian Gulf, have also undergone changes, resulting in the rise of new tensions between Iran and its main Arab challengers, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; not to mention the obsessive hostility of the Iranian Islamic regime towards Israel.

In what follows I will try to recall, in a succinct way, the most important events that have occurred since then and which have had a real impact on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In this connection, the most important event is obviously President Donald Trump's unilateral decision (May 8, 2018) to withdraw from the 2015 JCPOA,

negotiated by the Obama administration to lift sanctions on Iran in exchange for a freeze of its nuclear program. Immediately, the first wave of sanctions went into effect for Iran's economic sector and the next wave of sanctions has targeted Iran's energy as well as its banking sectors since November 4. As a reaction to the sharp US decision, European countries, as well as Russia and China, have urged Trump to stay in the pact. The European Union moved to thwart America's re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, announcing a 'blocking statute' to shield EU operators to recover damages and ban EU persons from complying with the sanctions. Trump's decision had an immediate impact on major European companies and more than seventy international companies, particularly within the energy, banking, insurance, aviation, and automobile industries, have decided to withdraw from the Iranian market.

The reaction of Iran to Trump's announcement was swift. President Hassan Rouhani went on state TV to attempt to salvage the Nuclear Deal upon which he has staked his political career. He said that Iran would stick by the terms of the agreement if the other signatories could prove that they would meet their commitments. Iranian hardliners, who have always been against the 2015 deal, stoked outrage against the United States. Some staged a mass burning of US flags in the center of Tehran. In parliament, lawmakers burned a flag as well as a copy of the deal. The most emphatic reaction, however, came from Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei. 'You heard what worthless things the American president said last night,' he told Iranians in a televised speech. 'He lied maybe up to 10 times and he threatened the state and the nation. I tell him on behalf of the Iranian nation: Mr. Trump, you can't do a damned thing!' In a sense, the Ayatollah is right; the huge internal problems in Iran, particularly in the economic sphere, do not have so much to do with President Trump. Dates, however, are speaking for themselves: the widespread unrest in Iran started already in December 2017, almost six months before Trump's announcement of the American withdrawal from the JCPOA.

In fact, the popular unrest that spread in many cities was caused by the exasperation of a large number of young people, mostly unemployed, the prevalent corruption among political leaders and the clerical aristocracy as well as among high-ranking Revolutionary Guards.

People had waited with great expectations that the billions of dollars that had been recovered by the government after entering into the JCPOA would help improve their economic situation, particularly the situation of the most deprived. What happened was the opposite. Some of the fresh dollars went into the pockets of the opulent classes and the rest went into the construction of new missiles as well as to cover the expenses of Iran's military engagement in Syria, the financial support of Hizbollah in Lebanon, and into a reinforcement of pro-Iranian military groups in Iraq and Yemen. Actually, putting an end to Iran's 'destabilizing' policies in the region is precisely one of the major requests of the present American administration. On May 21, 2018, Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of

State, presented the US requests in 12 points, conditions for a new deal with Iran. The Iranian government promptly rejected the US requests.

This could mean that the imposition of the extraordinarily severe US sanctions on Iran is the beginning of a new era in Iranian foreign policy and that it, in a broader sense, is challenging the Iranian regime's capacity for survival. However, this is not the first time that Iran lives under sanctions. Since the Revolution of 1979, Iran has been subjected to numerous kinds of sanctions. Experience shows that whenever sanctions and circumstances have become almost unbearable, the Iranian government, as the price for survival, has shown flexibility by submitting itself to the new situation. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, has coined a new term for this tactic: *heroic flexibility* (*Narmesh-e Qahremananeh*). Will the use of this tactic once again be able to save the regime from the dangerous abyss caused by sanctions?

To answer this question, it is convenient to say that there are factors in favor of the Iranian government and factors that go against it. The most important positive factor going for the Iranian regime is that, this time, the United States is acting alone, while the European powers, as well as Russia and China, find these sanctions unjustified and not particularly productive. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that opposition to the American decision is limited to the governmental level. In general, commercial companies themselves decide on their course of action. Consequently, and despite governmental policies, many large companies of all kinds, Russian and Japanese, among others, have left Iran. Yet, there is another important point in this case: the current situation of the Iranian government is substantially different this time. The weakness of the regime is now internal and it is profound as never before. The unprecedented deep and generalized dissatisfaction embraces a broad category of various strata of Iranian society. Add to this that since December 2017, the Iranian people have crossed a psychological barrier of great importance. In various huge demonstrations in 2018, people shouted: 'The story of reform is over' (*Eslahtalab, Uslugra, digeh tamume majara*).

During the spring of 2019, tensions between Iran and the West reached a new phase. On May 9, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that his country would end its compliance with two particular conditions of the Nuclear Deal if Europe did not step in to protect the country from US sanctions. He confirmed that it would breach the 2015 Nuclear Deal for the first time by beginning to speed up the enrichment of uranium, taking stocks above permitted limits. Iran set a 60-day deadline (non-renewable) within which Europeans must find a viable solution for bank transfers between Iran and the outside world. The European troika of UN mediators (the UK, Germany and France) rejected Iran's ultimatum.

On June 3, amid heightened tension with Iran, President Trump ordered the US aircraft carrier *Abraham Lincoln* to leave for the Persian Gulf, together with 1,500 troops. The US move was apparently a reaction to Iran's repeated alarming statements (e.g. July 31 and December 4, 2018) threatening the security of oil transport through the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, already on May 12, four ships near the Strait of Hormuz reported damage from explosions. Already then, the United States and its Arab allies raised allegations against Iran. At the same time, attacks on oil tankers belonging to Saudi and UAE companies further increased tension around the Strait of Hormuz. These attacks were attributed to the Revolutionary Guards, who have also been declared a terrorist entity by the United States. The shooting down of an American military drone by the Revolutionary Guards on June 20 brought up tension dramatically. While the Iranians claimed this to be a legitimate act of defense since the drone had violated Iranian space, the Americans, on their side, claimed that the incident occurred in international space. The incident nearly resulted in an armed confrontation. However, despite the gravity of the incident, President Trump showed restraint, trying to reduce tensions.

On July 1, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Iran had now more than 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, consequently exceeding the 300-kilogram threshold of the deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed the breach.

The tensions between the Iranian regime, on the one side, and the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, on the other side, are highly critical and could very well lead to a dangerous military confrontation. What has remained unchanged, however, is the nature and identity of the Islamist regime, which has been in power for 40 years. As has been argued throughout this chapter, this is an ideological regime, animated by planetary political ambitions. Therefore, as long as this regime does not change its nature, tensions and conflicts will remain.

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Turkish Foreign Policy¹

Ayşe Zarakol

INTRODUCTION

Famously located between West and East, secular and Islamist, military tutelage and democratic authoritarianism for much of its modern history, Turkey has been vacillating in multiple terms, especially in the last decade. At least since the 2013 Gezi protests, however, most outside observers have been increasingly concerned about the authoritarian turn of the Erdoğan regime.² Such concerns reached a fever pitch in the aftermath of the botched coup attempt of July 15, 2016, to which Erdoğan immediately responded by declaring a state of emergency, which gave him the ability to issue decrees with the power of law. Since the coup attempt, tens of thousands have been arrested, and hundreds of thousands have been purged from employment. Many have also had their property and bank accounts confiscated. Turkey now holds the dubious distinction of having the most number of journalists in prison.³ In the meantime, relations with the West and especially the United States, which were already on a downward trajectory, have soured. Turkey has entered a marriage of convenience with Russia.⁴ On the home front, in addition to the political fallout from the coup attempt, Turkey faces the spill-over effects of its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, and is targeted by at least three different terrorist organisations. In 2017, President Erdoğan has pushed for a national referendum for drastic constitutional changes, which he narrowly won under a cloud of suspicion of widespread irregularities. These constitutional changes have given him unparalleled powers over domestic and foreign policy. Given the near-unlimited control Erdoğan has enjoyed over the Turkish media and the stifling political environment in which many opposition

party MPs are in fact imprisoned, the bigger surprise of the referendum was how close the results were (51% to 49%). The referendum has thus ushered the country into yet another new era of uncertainty,⁵ and Erdoğan's vulnerability was made more readily apparent in the 2019 municipal elections, which dealt a humiliating blow to Erdoğan and the candidates he backed. All of these factors make Turkish foreign policy incredibly volatile and hard to predict.

Because so much is in flux compared to previous decades (both in terms of Turkish domestic politics and in terms of international developments given also the erratic behaviour of the US President Trump), where Turkey will go from here is anyone's guess. Since 2016 Turkey under Erdoğan has radically changed course on several fundamental foreign (and domestic) policy issues: just to give one example, relations with Russia came to a near-breaking point in December 2016 and within a mere eight months went in the exact opposite direction. At the time of writing, the Turkish–Western alliance is almost at breaking point due to Turkey's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, not heeding American and NATO warnings.

Any description of current Turkish foreign policy therefore runs the risk of becoming outdated by the time of publication. This chapter, therefore, attempts to place the key developments of recent years in the longer view of Turkish politics and foreign policy. Special attention is given to exploring the liminal position Turkey has occupied between the West and Asia (and/or the Middle East). As will be discussed below, since the 19th century, Turkish foreign policy has been pulled in two contradictory directions, for reasons having to do with its incorporation into the modern international order: while almost all Turkish decision-makers believe that Turkey is 'intrinsically' entitled to high standing in world politics (material conditions notwithstanding)⁶, one side thinks this is achievable only through engagement with (and inclusion in) 'the West', whereas the other side desires disengagement with 'the West' and sees the path to regional if not global leadership through involvement in 'the East'. Both strains of thought have been present in Turkish foreign policy imagination for more than a century, but it was very much the former group that dominated both the state apparatus and foreign policy thinking in the 20th century. In the 21st century, this situation has been reversed. This suggests that to the extent that it can follow a coherent grand strategy going forward⁷ Turkey is likely to be more involved in Middle Eastern and Asian politics, for better or worse.

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DRIVERS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, FROM THE 19TH TO THE 21ST CENTURY

The most important similarity between Turkey and countries more traditionally understood to be in Asia is Turkey's historically complicated relationship with

the West and the contemporary legacies of that relationship. In this section, I will provide a brief overview⁸ of the historical traumas stemming from the manner in which many of the precursors of the current Asian states were integrated into the modern international order in the nineteenth century. I will then discuss the impact of such traumas on Turkish foreign policy thinking in the 20th century. The second section of the chapter focuses more on recent developments in the AKP period (2002–present).

The Long Shadow of the 19th Century

What the Republic of Turkey has in common with many Asian countries is that it too inherited from its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, an existential problem of ‘catching up with the West’. This is a legacy of 19th-century developments, a legacy that was subsequently built into the nation-building narratives of the Republic. It was in the 19th century that the Ottoman Empire became a (stigmatised) member of international society. According to Erving Goffman (1963) every ‘society establishes the means of categorising persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories’ (2). This leads members, without much thinking at all, to anticipate certain behaviours as natural, normal or ordinary, and as such, everyday unconscious anticipations are transformed ‘into normative expectations, into righteously presented demands’ (2), especially in instances when they are not met. The person who has an attribute that makes him not what is anticipated (and therefore implicitly demanded) carries, in effect, a stigma, an attribute that reduces him to be ‘different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind’ (3). Stigmatisation has all sorts of consequences for the stigmatised actor. Goffman notes it is often accompanied by a ‘stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents’(5). A wide range of imperfections is imputed to the stigmatised individual ‘on the basis of the original one’(5) and his life-chances are reduced by the discrimination he faces as a result. Stigmatisation is not the same thing as discrimination, however; the stigmatised actor internalises, to some extent, the social standards s/he is being judged by. States, just as individuals, can be stigmatised (Zarakol, 2011, 2014). In that sense, Turkey (like Japan, or Thailand or Russia or many others) can be thought of as one of the ‘stigmatised’ outsiders in the modern international system.

The international and domestic choices of Turkey (and other similarly situated states) from the 19th century onwards cannot be fully explained without reference to stigmatisation. At some point during their 19th-century interactions with the West, having to cope with the stigma of their insider-but-outsider status created great ontological insecurity for the Ottoman Empire (as well as many of the other non-Western polities still standing): a ‘deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore, i.e. how to

get by in the world' (Mitzen, 2006: 341). Because this ontologically insecure relationship with the West was one of the key ingredients used to forge a 'modern sense of self' (via, for instance, national historiographies), this insecurity remained ingrained in the identities of such states in the 20th century. The perceived social, technological and economic lag vis-à-vis Europe created a sustained preoccupation with international stature, a near pathology not in any way healed, but perhaps even exacerbated, by the memories of the near brushes with great power status.

The material justifications of many such insecurities vis-à-vis the West are much more recent than is usually assumed. Up until the end of the 18th century there was no great unbridgeable development gap between the territorial states of North-western Europe and the agrarian empires along the European periphery, such as the Ottoman Empire and Russia. If that statement sounds controversial, it is only because the 19th-century European schemas about the civility, modernity and social development (or lack thereof) of the various regions of the world are still with us to some degree. Since the 19th century, it has become customary to assume that something was culturally wrong with the states left out of the 'Rise of the West'. What is forgotten is that prior to at least the 18th century, social and economic life in countries such as the Ottoman Empire, Russia or China, was not so different from other agrarian empires now considered part of 'Western Civilisation', such as Spain.

The state-building trajectory in the Ottoman Empire did not diverge significantly even from Western Europe until the 18th century (Tezcan, 2010; Zarakol, 2016a). The Ottoman trajectory of state-building could be summarised as: an early period of limited political authority characterised mostly by feudal-type arrangements (13th–15th centuries), with an 'Age of Confessionalisation' which witnessed strong trends towards centralisation, territorialisation and sovereign absolutism in which the Sultan came to claim authority above the *ulama* and secular dynastic law (*kanun*) emerged as an alternative (and even superior) to religious law, *shari'a* (15th–16th centuries); a period of struggle between the absolutist crown and alternative loci of power, such as the *ulama* and the janissaries (17th century); a period of decentralisation and de-territorialisation wherein the Sultan's power was very much limited by *shari'a* and the recognition of the autonomy of janissaries as well as local notables (18th century); followed by a resurgence of absolutism and recentralisation of political authority, as well as subsequent attempts to limit the Sultan's power, both of which were justified primarily in reference to external developments and Western models even if Islamic referents were not completely abandoned (19th century). All of this suggests that the supposedly great divergence between Turkey (and other similarly situated states in Eurasia) and states in Western Europe became pronounced only in the 19th century.

How is it then that the narrative of inferiority vis-à-vis the West (and the accompanying internalisation of stigmatisation) took such a permanent hold in

the worldview of the Ottoman elites in the 19th century, so as to seep so thoroughly into 19th-century Turkish narratives? And how did many of the same processes that are now considered to be at the root of the 'Rise of the West' (such as resistance to absolutism) come to be considered in the Turkish historiography to be the causes of Ottoman 'stagnation' and 'decline'? We can speculate about several reasons. First of all, it seems that the 19th century was truly a transformative century in terms of international relations, 'generating a shift from a "polycentric world with no dominant centre" to a "core-periphery" order in which the centre of gravity resided in the West' (Pomeranz, 2000: 4, cited in Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 1). As described by Buzan and Lawson, this century witnessed four types of fundamental change in international relations: the material inequalities created by 'industrialization and the extension of the market to a global scale' (2); processes of state-formation and nation-building (3); new ideologies such as 'liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and "scientific" racism, [which] generated new entities, actors and institutions (e.g. settlers, civil society, limited companies) and either reconstituted old ones (e.g. the state), or undermined them (e.g. dynasticism)' (3); and the destabilisation of great power relations (3). It can indeed be concluded that the modern international system that we still inhabit was formed in the 19th century.

Of these changes, much is made of material differences created by the developments in the 19th century between the West and others, and these were indeed significant: 'In 1820, Asian powers produced 60.7% of the world's GDP, and Europe and its offshoots (mainly the United States) only 34.2%; by 1913, Europe and its offshoots held 68.3% of global GDP and Asia only 24.5%' (Maddison, 2001: 127, 263, cited in Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 27). Yet, the relatively rapid creation⁹ of this material gap in the 19th century between the West and 'the Rest' does not adequately explain the liminal position the Turkey came to occupy in the modern international order from the 19th century onwards. The argument here is not that all was well in the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th century, but rather that the comparative economic and political 'backwardness' of the Empire vis-à-vis Western Europe at the time has been greatly exaggerated by both national and Western historiographies that read centuries back into history the supposed causes of the declines of these empires.

The hierarchical arrangement of the 19th-century international system was anything but an unadulterated reflection of the distribution of material capabilities. Non-Europeans were denied basic rights such as contractual guarantees. Furthermore, they were stigmatised as being inferior, backward, barbaric, effeminate, childish, despotic and in need of enlightenment. The stigma was then used to further exclude such states from the sovereign protections accorded by society, opening them up to further European exploitation, leading to more relative backwardness, and giving more 'objective' credence to the stigma. For example, that non-European states did not have the material capabilities of European states was

used as evidence of the scientific validity of the 'Standard of Civilization'. Even more importantly for present-day purposes, European notions about progress were very much *internalised* by the elites in the 'semi-sovereign' states of the 19th century. Even if they did not completely buy into theories of racial inferiority, they accepted the validity of other 'objective', 'scientific' judgments about their countries and compatriots. This collective psychology is at the root of elite efforts, witnessed all over the semi-periphery in the 19th century, to 'pass' as Europeans by adopting European fashions, speaking European languages among themselves, and learning European arts. The Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey) is a prime example of this pattern.

Elites outside of the Western core of the 19th-century international system accepted the judgment of 'civilisation' because in their efforts to catch up with the West militarily they had become habituated to the worldview of modernity. Every institution they copied in an effort to keep up with the West, starting with military training, brought them closer to that worldview. At some point the words 'reform', 'modernisation' and 'Westernisation' became synonymous. Once they accepted the modern worldview, they could not but feel shame (even if at the same time they felt resentment). The people most exposed to the ideas of a global social hierarchy were also the people who were in the best position to effect domestic change: the intelligentsia, the military (the military was always the first to modernise), and the ruling elite. All of the key institutions of the modernisation state such as nationalism, mass-schooling and modern bureaucracy took their form around this time; not long after they were dutifully emulated outside of Europe by those states that still had the capability to shape their own domestic policies. Zygmunt Bauman's point about East-European educated classes being the most avid students of the Enlightenment applies equally to the late Ottoman and early Republican leadership: 'They needed a mighty lever to lift society all the way up to the ideal: only a state wielding absolute power could serve as such a lever, and such a state, both able and willing to serve, was still to be created' (1994: 37). The emulation of key institutions of the modern 'gardening' state, even in their incomplete forms, at precisely the moment during which the elites in the 'backward' countries had internalised the judgment of history, was instrumental in cementing the ontological insecurity created by such backwardness in *proto-national* psyches.

Elites in the Ottoman Empire did not necessarily buy into the 19th-century European rhetoric of being on a civilising mission to rescue the rest of humanity from itself. Rather, they internalised the idea of linear progress and the idea that European material advancement was somehow connected to European culture and lifestyle. Even those elites who rejected or resented Europe did not reject this dichotomy of backwardness and modernity. They believed, along with their European contemporaries, that there really was a developmental lag between civilisations. In other words, the problem of relative strength was no longer seen

simply as a difference in material capability (which is par for the course throughout human history) but had become a moral, social, and cultural issue. It had become an existential dilemma par excellence. As a result, from the 19th century onwards, domestic debates in Turkey have always been framed in reference to the external gaze of the West. This is true of anti-Westernisers in both contexts as it is true of Westernisers. The Islamists and Erdoğanites¹⁰ in Turkey read their countries' histories through essentially the same stigmatised lens as their pro-West counterparts (even as they glorify the lost imperial past) – their disagreement is about the strategy that should be pursued in the present. We will return to them in the second part of the chapter.

Legacy of the 19th Century on 20th-Century Turkish Foreign Policy

It is for these reasons that elites in the Ottoman Empire (as elsewhere) all entered the 20th century with the same internalised lesson: their country was 'behind' the West in every aspect and something radical had to be done to change this status quo. That motivation is what gave rise to revisionist governments across the board within the first thirty years of the century (Committee on Union and Progress and its offshoots in the case of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey). However, the reactionary ideologies of these revisionist governments were themselves very much products of modernity themselves. At the very least, they exhibited the same faith in the power of the 'modern' state. Such regimes also exhibited an unwavering commitment to do whatever was necessary, including the sacrifice of millions of lives, to catch up with 'the West'.

It may be objected that Kemalist Turkey was nothing like Bolshevik USSR or militarist Japan, given especially the divergence in foreign policy responses vis-à-vis the West, not to mention in ideology. Such differences, however, should not lead one to overlook the many similarities between the Kemalist regime and its counterparts elsewhere: they all 'pursued shock modernization programs that involved mass mobilization, nation and state building, political centralization, as well as attempts at radical interventions in the realms of society and culture' (Khalid, 2006: 234). And whatever differences may have existed in ideologies substance-wise, the ideological end-products in these regimes of the early 20th century resemble each other quite a bit: such 'regimes produced an official historiography that shared many elements: a glorious foundational moment and a larger-than-life founding figure; leadership by a group with clearly defined goals, to which the founders remained unwaveringly loyal; and a clear break from the past, so that all connections to the old regime were downplayed' (234). Furthermore, what is remarkable is the fact that all such regimes went on to forcefully 'civilise' peoples in the territories under their control: for example, '[b]oth the Soviet and the Kemalist states had at their disposal the baggage, common to

modern European thought, of evolution, backwardness and progress, of ethnic classification of peoples, and, indeed, of orientalism' (251). Where they differed most is in the foreign policy projection of their respective strategies for status-seeking and recognition.

Whereas more ideological regimes elsewhere in Asia aimed to situate themselves more deliberately as alternatives to the West, the Kemalist regime aimed to claim its 'rightful' place among the 'civilised' nations of the West. This divergence in foreign policy stances has a lot to do with the varying levels of ontological and physical security. The Ottoman Empire was defeated, dismantled and occupied as a result of First World War. The Kemalist regime did not emerge until 1920, and did not gain control of the country until it managed to fight off the occupation. In other words, the Turks had to face the loss of their empire. The regime that emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire focused on proving that Turkey was a modern, European, Western – and by implication, not an Asian or Middle Eastern country – precisely because this was the only avenue open to Turkey at the time for gaining the level of international recognition it so desired.

Until at least the proclamation of the Republic, the Turkish anti-occupation forces led by Mustafa Kemal had made much of their connections of solidarity with Asia and people suffering under Western imperialism.¹¹ This discourse was quickly dropped after 1923. Whatever anti-colonial sentiments and sense of solidarity with colonised peoples that had existed prior to the founding of the Republic dissipated quickly, and it could be argued that Turkey 'turned away' from the Middle East in particular and the Asian continent in general. The Turkish ruling elite wanted to distance themselves from the territories of the former Ottoman Empire that were now under League of Nations mandate arrangements, fearing the same fate. Additionally, anti-colonialism in those years was associated with those intellectuals with communist or socialist sympathies, who came to be considered dangerous after the Republic broke away from its Bolshevik alliance (see e.g. Uzer, 2002; Berkes, 2005). From that point on, the official discourse had little to say about anti-colonial struggles elsewhere (and in fact at times went to the opposite extreme, flirting with Nazism in the lead up to Second World War). After Second World War, Turkey sought and gained a place in the Western alliance, and generally maintained a cool distance from later solidarity efforts such as the Bandung Conference and the non-aligned movement. From the inception of the Republic in 1923 until the 21st century, then, Turkish foreign policy maintained an almost singular focus on its Western alliances and ignored most developments outside of the West, including the politics of anti-colonial struggles. For much of the 20th century,¹² then, Turkey was relatively absent from political, economic and social dynamics of the Asian continent. Much of this would change after Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 following the financial crisis of 2001.

DIRECTION(S) OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ERDOĞAN YEARS (2002–PRESENT)

The ways Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have challenged the domestic legacies of Kemalism are well documented.¹³ The domestic overhaul has had serious implications for foreign policy as well, for reasons discussed in the previous section. Though ostensibly still a Western ally, Turkey under the AKP/Erdoğan rule¹⁴ has been following, especially in the last decade, its most revisionist foreign policy strategy since the creation of the republic in 1923. The differences with the Westernising stance of the 20th century started becoming more apparent in AKP's second term, when Erdoğan's ambitions started manifesting in the country's (at the time) gradual drift away from Turkey's traditional partnerships with the West and also in the pursuit of influence in previously neglected regions of the world.¹⁵ During this period, Turkey started showing a greater level of interest in its southern and eastern neighbours than any other period since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As discussed in the previous section, since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Atatürk, Turkey had been generally aloof to the concerns of the Arab Middle East in particular and also distant from Asian politics in general, in an attempt to distance itself from its neighbourhood and signal its Western-ness in order gain acceptance from Europe. The AKP rejected the notion that the Westernising efforts had been good for the country; the natural corollary of this thinking in foreign policy was to question the single-minded focus on relations with the West.

Erdoğan's pointed involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict¹⁶ was one of the first signs of his desire to gain a regional leadership role in the Middle East and more active role in Asian politics, both for Turkey and for himself. Before the 'Arab Spring', Turkey also aggressively increased its economic ties with the region: between 2001 and 2010, 'Turkey's total trade with Middle Eastern and Asian countries increased from \$18.7 billion to \$131 billion and Turkey's trade with Gulf Cooperation Council members also tripled in the same period'. More importantly, 'from 2003 to 2010, the EU's share in Turkish foreign trade declined from 51.38% to almost 42%, whereas Turkey–Asia and Turkey–Near and Middle Eastern foreign trade increased to 26.5% and 12%, respectively'.¹⁷ In the same period, public outbursts in defence of Palestinians briefly made the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan the most popular leader in the Middle East, by a wide margin (followed at the time by Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah). During this period, Turkey was following what was called a 'zero problems with neighbours' foreign policy strategy, as conceptualised by the then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.¹⁸

The 'Arab Spring' of 2011 changed these dynamics. In the initial aftermath, Turkey attempted to ride this positive image to a regional leadership position, taking strong stances first in Egypt against Mubarak and later in Syria against Assad. Such choices also had much to do with Erdoğan reading the developments

in the region through the lens of the experience of his own party and background. Having faced its own secularist 'nemesis' in the Turkish military-bureaucratic-Kemalist elite, Erdoğan and the AKP leadership felt a strong affinity with other (Sunni) Islamist movements throughout the Middle East facing opposition from bureaucratic and military establishments. There were also reports that Erdoğan increasingly came to see himself as a world-historical leader who would deliver salvation to the Middle East. His speeches increasingly reflected such a mindset. For example after his victory in the 2011 elections, Erdoğan greeted, in addition to citizens of Turkey, the 'sister people' of 'Baghdad, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, Nicosia and others,' who he knew to be 'eagerly watching Turkey.' Furthermore, Erdoğan declared his party's gains to be a victory of hope for all oppressed peoples, adding that 'Sarajevo has won as much as Istanbul; Beirut as much as Izmir; West Bank and Gaza as much as Diyarbakır' and that 'the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans had gained as much as Turkey.' Turkish foreign policy of the period (as directed by Ahmet Davutoğlu) very clearly reflected this ambition, so much so that Turkey was often characterised (and sometimes criticised) as following a neo-Ottoman foreign policy course.¹⁹ Mohammed Ayoob predicted a 'Turko-Persian future' for the Middle East, arguing that current developments are 'likely to redound to the benefit of Iran and Turkey, the only two countries in the region with adequate hard and soft power and with reasonably favorable regional security environments to influence events in the Middle East' (2011: 68).

Other sympathetic observers considered Turkey to be a rising power in the mould of the BRICs, coining the term MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey).²⁰ It should be noted here that, at least for a short while, Turkey's image as a rising regional power also helped its relations with the West, at least with the United States. At the time, Europe was still reeling from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–8, and the so-called 'Arab Spring' had introduced great levels of uncertainty to the Middle East. By contrast, AKP's Turkey seemed to be a success story, both economically and politically. For these reasons, Turkey became a favoured ally of the Obama administration and up to 2013, Turkey was promoted heavily (both by Turkey and the West) as an attractive model of a Muslim polity that has made its peace with modernity and liberalism. In 2012, the Independent Task Force (chaired by Madeleine K. Albright and Stephen J. Handley) Report issued by the US Council on Foreign Relations noted that 'If current trends in Turkey persist and the international system continues to undergo a redistribution of power, Turkey will in the coming decade be among the most important actors in the broad region surrounding it and beyond it' (Cook et al., 2012: 3) and encouraged the United States to deepen its alliance with Turkey.

Turkey's positive image in the West came crashing down after Erdoğan's brutal suppression of Gezi protests in 2013, and the authoritarian turn that followed it. Soon after, Turkey's ambitious foreign policy in the Middle East (and beyond) also started running into trouble. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Syria. Despite frequent pleas from the onset of the war, Turkey never managed to convince

the United States to intervene directly to depose Assad, who was strongly backed by Iran and Russia. As a result, Turkey has followed its own strategy of arming Sunni rebels in Syria, with the dual intent that they may eventually displace Assad and act as a check on the growing presence of Kurdish militia in the area. Turkey has always feared Kurdish autonomy in Syria because of the strong connection between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) militias in Syria and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey. For the initial years of the war, the United States was on board with the Turkish plan to arm and provide logistical support to Sunni rebels (at the time labelled as 'moderate' opposition forces), but has grown wary of this strategy in the wake of the rise of ISIS. The boundaries between 'moderate' and extremist Islamist groups seem more porous than initially thought. As a result, in the last couple years, the United States has gradually shifted its support towards the Kurdish opposition forces, causing great alarm in Ankara.

In September 2015, the dynamics of the Syrian War changed drastically when Russia decided to directly intervene on the side of Assad. Immediately this signalled that the outcome that Erdoğan desired in Damascus – government by Sunni Islamists in the mould of the AKP – would likely never to come to pass. Similar hopes about Egypt had already been dashed after the military coup of 2013. Other Sunni regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar had responded to such developments with a *realpolitik* attitude, but Erdoğan had remained ideological in foreign policy well into 2015, unable to come to terms with the loss of Turkey's positive image and regional influence from just a few years ago. Moreover, in 2015, the Kurdish peace process explicitly failed and the military conflict in Southeast Turkey restarted,²¹ which further intensified Turkey's cross-border interest in Syria. In November 2015, Turkey downed a Russian jet that it accused of violating its border with Syria. The fallout from Russia was swift – an economic embargo was put into effect, tourism ground to a halt and Russia accused Turkey publicly of supporting ISIS in Syria.

2016: The Coup and Its Aftermath in Turkish Foreign Policy²²

For these reasons, Turkey entered 2016 increasingly isolated in the foreign policy realm. Its Syria policy had put it at odds with both the United States (implicitly) and Russia (explicitly), and with other regional players such as Iran. Given the authoritarian turn domestically, relations with the EU were not great either, and despite Erdoğan's intermittent rhetorical overtures to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, relations with major players in Asia did not extend much beyond the superficial. In the early months of 2016, Erdoğan tried to reverse the tide by playing the only foreign policy card he had left, and made a deal with Germany's Angela Merkel to stem the tide of refugees to Europe in return for certain concessions from the EU.²³ The refugee deal could hardly be considered a success in terms of its implementation, but both sides used it to their

advantage domestically. Meanwhile Turkey was feeling the impact of the breakdown of relations with Russia more and more, and tensions with the United States over Syrian Kurds became very apparent. Finding himself backed into a corner, Erdoğan made two significant foreign policy reversals²⁴ in the summer of 2016: first he attempted to normalise relations with Israel (relations had been on deep-freeze partly due to the flotilla incident of 2010 and partly due to Erdoğan's aggressive anti-Israel rhetoric)²⁵ and then he reconciled with Russia.²⁶

It was against this foreign policy backdrop that the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 took place. The botched attempt seemingly came out of nowhere and was indiscriminate in its violence towards civilians. Fighter jets terrorised Ankara, the capital, and Istanbul, the largest city, through the night. The parliament building was bombed (along with several other sites), a first in Turkish history. Given that in the preceding months there was no anticipation of the coup and no build up towards a groundswell of support for such an intervention (unlike in previous coups in Turkish history), the first reaction of the Turkish public was shock. When the extent of the civilian casualties (more than two hundred) and the damage from the aerial bombing became clear, trauma followed.

Though there are many unanswered questions about the coup attempt which point to certain vulnerabilities on Erdoğan's grasp of power, Erdoğan was swift in his response and quickly exploited the aforementioned trauma of the Turkish public. The narrative that he pushed immediately after the coup, blaming the attempt entirely on Gülenist factions within the army, rapidly became the new orthodoxy within Turkey, at least for a while. Fethullah Gülen is a Muslim cleric who lives in exile in Pennsylvania, and heads a global movement (or a cult, according to some) which includes a network of schools and other businesses. Gülen and Erdoğan were close allies until 2013. It is partly because of this history of alliance that many Turks, even those who typically oppose Erdoğan, found the accusations of wide-scale infiltration of state institutions by Gülenists very credible, and (at least initially) rallied behind Erdoğan.²⁷ Furthermore, the widespread conspiracy theories about the ties between the Gülen movement and the United States have resurfaced anti-Western sentiments among large segments of the public. This has created a bunker-like mentality in Turkey.

On July 18, a three-month state of emergency was declared giving Erdoğan the power to issue decrees with the power of law. This state of emergency was renewed numerous times, until the constitutional changes in 2017 made emergency powers redundant. The emergency decrees first shut down thousands of institutions and businesses associated with Gülenists. The land, buildings and other property of all of these institutions were then transferred to the state. Next step was the reorganisation of the military; the army, the navy and the air force were all brought under the authority of the Ministry of National Defence; the gendarme and the coast guard were brought under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and were separated from the military chain of command. Even more significant has been the use of this crisis to detain and purge not only suspected

Gülenists from the ranks of the government bureaucracy but also any political dissident, ranging from left-wing union activists to liberals to Kurds. At the time of writing, more than 120,000 people had been purged from the public sector jobs (including nearly 7,000 academics), more than 90,000 people detained and nearly 45,000 people arrested.²⁸ The actual number of those affected is likely to be higher, as many private businesses have also been purging their ranks in attempt to curry favour with the regime.

Even more worrisome, however, was the broad support these purges enjoyed from at least half of the Turkish public. For weeks after the coup attempt, the state encouraged the public to go out every night for mass commemorations of July 15. On August 7, Erdoğan took this a step further and held a mass rally for 'Democracy and Martyrs' that was reported to have more than five million people in attendance. The leaders of two of the three opposition parties in the parliament were in attendance as well. The rally was also notable for its use of imagery associated with both Erdoğanism and Kemalism. The leftist-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) was not invited. Now, many politicians from this party, including many MPs and the party leadership, are jailed, facing trials where prosecutors are demanding nearly century-long prison sentences. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, there emerged briefly a dangerous national consensus in Turkey around Erdoğan, who managed to relegate the leaders of the main opposition parties to the sidelines by successfully recasting any opposition to him as being pro-coup. The post-coup version of Erdoğanism uses Kemalism as a legitimising precedent (while downplaying its secularist emphasis), and includes a pronounced paranoid vein about the enemies of the state, domestic and foreign. Erdoğan frequently denounces the West for not condemning the coup attempt strongly enough, and his immediate circle has all but openly accused the United States of sponsoring the coup. In fact, Erdoğan and his followers were calling the situation a 'New Independence War', invoking the memories of the period between 1919–22, called the 'Independence War' in Turkish historiography, when Turkish militia forces under Mustafa Kemal's leadership fought off the occupation of Anatolia and established the Republic of Turkey, as discussed in the first part of this chapter. Another aspect of this narrative emphasised Erdoğan's role in increasing Turkey's global profile and suggested that all problems that have befallen Turkey since the Gezi protests of 2013 were a conspiracy by the West to undermine Turkish greatness. Perhaps to shore up this argument, Erdoğan also amped up the belligerence in his foreign policy rhetoric after the coup attempt, questioning for instance the ownership of various Greek islands and the borders with Iraq, with a focus on Mosul. In the referendum, voters were urged give Erdoğan historically unparalleled executive powers as a slap on the face to foreign forces that want to undermine supposed Turkish greatness.

On August 9, 2016, Erdoğan visited Putin in Russia. Given his suspicions about the Western involvement in the coup attempt, it is understandable why Erdoğan was personally keen on a rapprochement with Russia. Erdoğan also needed Russian

help to shore up the flailing Turkish economy and to signal to the United States that he had other options. Most Western observers were initially sceptical that this move would amount to much, given Turkey's long-standing institutional ties with the West and its significant policy differences with Russia over Syria. The strain produced by the coup attempt between Turkey and the United States did seem to be papered over when on August 24, 2016, Turkish armed forces militarily intervened in Syria with the support of the United States. However, it quickly became apparent to all that Turkey was not particularly interested in fighting ISIS: its primary targets seemed to be the Kurdish YPG fighters, putting Turkish plans at odds once more with the United States. Turkey also ran foul of Russia when Erdoğan declared on November 29, 2016 that the real goal of the Turkish military intervention was to remove Assad from power. Erdoğan felt compelled to retract this statement within the week.

For all these reasons, it could be argued that Turkey found it difficult to be in Syria and not fighting ISIS, and has increasingly had to take a more confrontational stance against the group. At the same time, its growing dependency on Russia forced Turkey to turn a blind eye towards many pro-Assad regime developments (such as the fall of East Aleppo) that it would have highly critical of less than year ago. In sum, Turkey's broad pro-Sunni rebel stance in Syria was complicated by the precariousness of its current relations both with the United States and Russia. The immediate consequence of this situation has been to import ISIS and al-Nusra terrorist activity into Turkish territory. The December assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara by an al-Nusra sympathiser Turkish policeman²⁹ and the numerous other major terrorist incidents in 2016 made it clear that there could be severe consequences for Turkey's involvement in Syria in the coming years. Since 2016, Turkish dependence on Russia has only grown, and the distance with the West has only widened.

CONCLUSION: WHITHER TURKEY?

As noted in the introduction, the future direction of Turkish foreign policy remains hard to pin down at the moment for two reasons: since 2016, the domestic situation in Turkey has been very volatile, on the one hand, and Donald Trump's tenure as US President has made the international environment very uncertain, on the other hand. The Erdoğan regime initially welcomed the latter development for a number of reasons. First, they were concerned that Gülenists wielded some influence with the Clinton campaign. Second, they saw Clinton as a continuation of the Obama administration, and as discussed above, the early honeymoon between Obama and Erdoğan had been replaced in recent years with great mistrust between the two governments, as Erdoğan suspected US involvement in many of the challenges he was facing, from the Gezi protests to the coup attempt. Third, Erdoğan, like Putin, believes that he can work with a man like Trump and convince him to withdraw US support from Kurdish forces in Syria, for instance. For these reasons, Erdoğan has uttered barely a word of criticism about Trump's anti-Muslim ban. Erdoğan's hopes about Trump seemed

vindicated when Trump called after the referendum to congratulate Erdoğan, without waiting for reports of independent election observers. The honeymoon was short-lived however. Turkey immediately got on the bad side of United States again by firing at (and killing) Kurdish militia across the Syrian border, an act which also seriously endangered the lives of American forces engaged in joint operations with the Kurds. However, notwithstanding a few exceptions, Trump has been generally very forgiving of Erdoğan's numerous offences against US foreign policy, including the recent purchase of the S-400 missiles from Russia. If congressional sanctions were not mandated by law, it is not hard to imagine Trump and Erdoğan coming to an agreement over this matter. For all these reasons, it is very difficult to project where Turkey's relations with the United States will go (at least until the next US Presidential elections); it is possible to imagine *both* a scenario under which Erdoğan tags happily along with (an unlikely but now within the realm of imaginable) US–Russia rapprochement led by Trump and Putin, *and* a scenario under which he is cut out from the picture because Putin no longer needs a resentful and paranoid Turkey to disrupt the workings of NATO.

Two things remain certain, one having to do with current politics and the other with Turkey's broad foreign policy strategy. First, it is clear that Turkey will not be able to extricate itself from the Syrian quagmire anytime soon. Even after the Syrian Civil War ends, its repercussions within Turkish politics will be felt for many years to come, both due to the high number of refugees and the number of now active terrorist groups with origins and/or ties to the Syrian conflict. Notwithstanding Erdoğan's political propaganda, the super-presidency he created has not solved any of these problems, and exacerbated most, along with the decline of the Turkish economy. To the contrary, the political scene is likely to get worse in the years to come, and there is a real possibility of violent breakdown. Needless to say, a Turkey bogged down with such domestic turmoil is unlikely to be much of a presence in regional or world politics. Nevertheless, despite all this, Turkey remains obsessed with international stature and part of Erdoğan's charisma lies in his ability to spin a narrative of greatness in foreign policy that satisfies his domestic base. In that sense, there is a lot of continuity between the Kemalist years as discussed in the first section of this chapter and the Erdoğan years as discussed in the second section.

If Erdoğan manages to stay in power, he is certain to look for new ways to shore up the narrative of Turkey's rise and intrinsic greatness. Relations with Europe are at an all-time low. In the lead up to the referendum Erdoğan deliberately antagonised a number of European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, in order to lend credence to the narrative that European countries are critical of his policies because they are envious of Turkey's greatness. After the referendum, there were talks on both sides of suspending EU membership talks. At the time of writing, EU is considering bringing sanctions against Turkey due to reports of unauthorised drilling in Cypriot waters. As discussed above, due to the Trump factor, there is more hope of salvaging the relationship with the United States, but even that path remains volatile due to the unpredictable personalities

and foreign policy choices of both Erdoğan and Trump. Erdoğan is looking for ways to compensate the loss of Western support in Eurasia, through Russia, but also China or other Asian allies. He now seeks the inclusion of Turkey in a major Asian political and economic partnership, though it is not clear whether such moves would be welcomed by other Asian powers. China, for example, is certainly interested in growing its economic presence in Turkey, but may bristle at Turkish involvement at Asian political affairs, and it is not clear that Erdoğan knows how to keep a low profile. One way or another, however, Turkey is likely to be a bigger presence in Asian politics in this century than it was in the last.

Notes

- 1 Parts of this chapter summarise arguments from previous work: see e.g. Zarakol, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b; McCargo and Zarakol, 2012; Çapan and Zarakol, 2017.
- 2 See e.g. Filkins, 2013.
- 3 See e.g. Roy Greenslade, 'Record number of journalists in jail globally after Turkey crackdown', *The Guardian*, December 13, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/dec/13/turkey-has-81-of-the-worlds-259-jailed-journalists-behind-bars> Last accessed on February 1, 2017.
- 4 See e.g. Julian Borger, 'Why killing of Russian diplomat may well bring Turkey and Russia closer', *The Guardian*, December 19, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/why-killing-of-russian-diplomat-is-likely-to-bring-turkey-and-russia-closer> Last accessed on February 1, 2017. See also Zarakol, 2016c.
- 5 Zarakol, 2017b.
- 6 For a detailed exploration of the causes for this belief, see Zarakol, 2011.
- 7 This argument assumes that the current polarisation and threats will not cause the country to descend into civil war and that Erdoğan will maintain his grasp on power. The current volatility of both Turkish politics and the international environment brings even such extreme scenarios within the realm of possibility, but for the sake of argument, this chapter assumes the continuation of the current status quo.
- 8 For more in-depth accounts, see Zarakol, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014.
- 9 While the Ottoman Empire lagged behind Western Europe in this sense, it had started to industrialise well before the end of the 19th century. There were in fact two waves of factory building in the Empire in the 19th century, one before the Ottoman Empire signed a free trade treaty with the British Empire in 1838 (Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention) and one after the 1870s (Pamuk and Williamson, 2009: 14). The free trade treaty was signed by the Ottoman government 'in order to obtain the political support of Britain against the threats from Russia and Mohammed Ali of Egypt'(6) and 'eliminated all local monopolies, allowed British merchants to buy goods anywhere in the Empire, and exempted foreign (but not domestic) merchants from an 8 percent internal customs duty that had been levied previously on goods transported within the empire'(5). Such liberal trade policies played an important role in undermining Ottoman local industry in the middle period of the 19th century, no doubt. Yet the fact that the Ottoman state followed what turned out be a misguided economic policy does not demonstrate that it was hopelessly 'backward' in the 19th century (as it is often characterised to be in modern Turkish historiography). To the contrary, the free trade treaty was a direct result of the Ottoman state's very contemporary efforts to centralise and to expand the power of the state apparatus: it was 'viewed as the next step in the Empire's transition to economic liberalism after the sultan eliminated the Janissary corps in 1826, urban guildsman on the military payroll that were the strongest advocates of protectionism' (Quataert, 1994: 764; cited in Pamuk and Williamson, 2009: 5).

- 10 I am making a distinction between Islamists and Erdoğanites because while Erdoğan still uses religious symbolism to mobilise his supporters, his current following seems much more dependent on his personal charisma and his position of power (à la Putin in Russia) than any kind of coherent ideology, Islamist or otherwise.
- 11 See Zarakol, 2011: chapter 3 and Çapan and Zarakol, 2017.
- 12 Space does not permit an in-depth exploration of this period, but see e.g. Hale, 2000 for an overview.
- 13 See e.g. Waldman and Caliskan, 2016.
- 14 It is difficult to label the current regime. On paper, Turkey is still a democracy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, and Ahmet Davutoğlu from 2014 to 2016. In 2014 Erdoğan was elected as the President. At the time, the President was just the head of state and was supposed to occupy mostly a ceremonial function. However, Erdoğan acted as the de facto head of the executive branch after his election, and especially after the declaration of the state of emergency after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. The state of emergency made it possible for him to pass decrees with the power of law. In 2017 he pushed for constitutional changes that made his emergency powers permanent, and got those changes ratified by national referendum. Most political scientists now consider Turkey to be a 'competitive authoritarian' state. Elections are not free or fair, and freedom of press is severely limited. However, despite such conditions, Erdoğan suffered a humiliating defeat in the 2019 municipal elections.
- 15 See e.g. Öniş, 2011; Babacan, 2011.
- 16 See e.g. Kösebalaban, 2010.
- 17 See Zarakol, 2012b.
- 18 See Aras, 2009. The 'zero problems' policy was the cornerstone of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's 'strategic depth' doctrine which also held the main principles of Turkish foreign policy to be a balance of security and democracy in domestic politics; closer relations with the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus; complimentary policies with the West and a diplomatic approach which is active in international organisations and peace-building efforts.
- 19 See e.g. Sözen, 2010.
- 20 See e.g. Martin, 2012.
- 21 See e.g. Martin, 2012.
- 22 Parts of this section borrow from Zarakol, 2016a, 2016b, and 2016c.
- 23 See e.g. Hakura, 2016.
- 24 Prior to these moves he also pushed Prime Minister Davutoğlu to resign; Davutoğlu was seen as the architect of Turkey's foreign policy (and therefore also of its troubles).
- 25 See e.g. Macintyre, 2016. However, the reconciliation has yet to fully take hold, partly because Erdoğan has been unable to walk back his incendiary rhetoric. In November 2016, he gave an interview to the Israeli press (for the first time in six years) where he drew parallels between Hitler and Israel. See e.g. 'Seething Erdogan accuses Israel of "barbarism" in TV interview timed to mark warming of ties', *Times of Israel*, November 21, 2016. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/seething-erdogan-accuses-israel-of-barbarism-in-tv-interview-timed-to-mark-warming-of-ties/> Last accessed on February 1, 2017.
- 26 See e.g. Suchkov, 2016.
- 27 It should be noted that a small group of Eurasianist-nationalists have increasingly filled the void left by the Gülenists in the governing ranks around Erdoğan (in addition to a much larger group of sycophants).
- 28 See e.g. <http://turkeypurg.com>
- 29 The assassination made Turkey only more beholden to Russia. See Zarakol, 2016c for a more in-depth exploration of this episode.

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Israel's Foreign Policy

Meron Medzini

INTRODUCTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EARLY YEARS

Israel's foreign policy since it gained its independence in 1948 can be understood in the context of its historical, political and geographic circumstances, the regional and the international environment in the first half of the 20th century. Israel's transformation from a relatively weak, semi-agrarian country, into a modern industrial power, economically and militarily capable of resisting attempts by its neighbors to annihilate it, is partly due to effective diplomacy based on certain foreign policy goals that will be described below.

The over-riding focus of Israel has been sheer physical survival, which meant the creation of a national security environment based on five principles: acquisition of weapons; immigration that meant bringing in as many Jews as possible to Israel in order to ensure a large army; seeking international legitimacy and recognition; seeking food and vital resources the country lacked such as oil; and finally seeking funds to pay for the arms, food, resources and immigrant absorption and the creation of a new society able to fend for itself. All this had to be carried out under the constant shadow of war threats imposed on Israel by its Arab neighbors. Their refusal to accept Israel within any borders, as a free, independent, sovereign Jewish and Zionist state, in the heart of the Middle East, meant that Israel faced a permanent threat from its neighbors that they would launch a series of wars to annihilate Israel at the time and place of their choice.

There were other foreign policy goals in the early years: to retain Israel's territorial gains achieved during its War of Independence in 1948; the prevention

of the return of any significant number of Palestinian refugees displaced during that conflict; and to repel plans by the super powers to impose a forced settlement of the Arab–Israel conflict. Hence the quest for national security was paramount and over-rode all other considerations, leaving diplomacy as a lesser option. In the early years it became obvious to Israel's leaders that they faced a number of options for resolving the Arab–Israel conflict. The first was to engage in wars to bring their adversaries to their knees. This was seen as impossible due to Israel's limited manpower and super power pressure to end any war quickly. The second option was to retain the existing status quo. This could be done only with the support of at least one super power. The third was to accept a settlement imposed by the powers. One such instance was the decision by Prime Minister Begin to accept the September 1978 Camp David Framework Accords, fearing that refusal to do so would create a major rift between Israel and the United States. Another option was to engage in negotiations leading to either limited agreements or a comprehensive settlement of all claims with all of Israel's neighbors. Between 1948 and 2019 Israel's foreign policy was a conglomeration of these elements. On three occasions it opted for a preventive war and in the case of the 1967 war a pre-emptive strike. It accepted an imposed settlement in 1978, it was on the whole satisfied with the maintenance of the status quo and sought to gain time to entrench itself in the Middle East and wait for such time when its neighbors would be willing to come to terms with its existence. It was prepared to engage in diplomacy leading to partial or interim settlements and announced its intention to enter into a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict. In pursuing its goals, Israel had to take into account the volatile nature of Middle Eastern politics, Cold War reality and its dependence on the outside world for weapons, food, energy and manpower (immigration).

The regional dimensions of Israel's environment created their own momentum. Given its tiny territory (just over 7,700 square miles in the 1949–1967 Armistice Demarcation Lines), tinier population (650,000 in May 1948, that doubled to 1.2 million in 1951), absence of natural resources, and reliance on air and sea routes for its lifeline, Israel had no religious, linguistic or cultural common heritage and affinity with its neighbors. Israel's early founders and leaders subscribed to the doctrine of an inevitable constant struggle with its neighbors, learning how to live in a volatile permanently unstable region, and all this under the influence of the Cold War. This meant that every effort undertaken by Israel in the spheres of science, industry, education, technology and even social legislation was with an eye on building a society imbued with fighting ethos and the maintenance of a large, mostly reserve army that ensured its physical survival.

In its first eight years, deft diplomacy enabled Israel to bring more than a million Jewish immigrants to the country, establish diplomatic relations with some forty countries, including the super powers, ensure the supply of oil, obtain almost eight hundred million dollars of German reparations that saved

its economy from collapse and laid the foundations for its modern industries, develop its agriculture and establish its own arms industries. It was able to fight off a plan secretly concocted by the British and US governments under which Israel would cede territory in the Negev to both Egypt and Jordan, creating a land link between Asia and Africa. It was able to lay the foundations for a National Water Carrier bringing water from the north to the arid south, and above all it managed to obtain modern arms first from Britain but mostly from France, that became Israel's major arms supplier from 1954 to 1967. The strong ties with France drew Israel to engage in war against Egypt in the Fall of 1956, alongside Britain and France.

Already in 1950 Israel proclaimed its security doctrine and announced that if certain situations would be created, they would be seen by Israel as *casus belli* and a valid reason to launch a preventive war. Among these points were a major change in the regional military balance of power; threats to Israeli shipping through international waterways such as the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran leading from the Red Sea to Eilat, threats on the narrow waistline in central Israel, the entry of Iraqi or other Arab forces to Jordan, a threat to Jerusalem, and the concentration of a large number of troops along its borders forcing it to call up the reserves. By late 1956 the military balance of power tilted against Israel when Egypt began to receive huge amounts of modern weapons from the Soviet Union in what became known as the Egypt-Czech deal. The Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran were blockaded, Israel was subjected to infiltration by Egyptian and Palestinian saboteurs that endangered the lives of its citizens, and there was fear regarding the stability of the Jordanian monarchy. France and Israel found a common enemy in the form of Nasser whose regime openly supported the anti-French rebellion in Algeria. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, it inevitably led to the Sinai-Suez War.

The Sinai war fought in October and early November 1956, relieved the immediate threat to Israel, but it was forced by the United States and the Soviet Union to give up the territory it occupied and return to the 1949 Armistice Lines. But that brief war gave Israel ten years of relative peace in which it built the foundations of modern Israel. One of the results of that war was the French decision to build for Israel a nuclear facility in Dimona. That would in time give Israel a nuclear umbrella with which it hoped to deter its enemies. Israel's foreign policy since the late 1950s was based on certain assumptions, some of them still hold true in 2019. Israel's leaders came to the conclusion that given the Cold War and the perennial regional instability, there was not much hope to achieve either comprehensive contractual peace treaties with its neighbors, or even a series of interim agreements based on non-belligerency. They were convinced that the only way to bring the Arab states to the negotiating table would come when Israel would be strong and powerful to instill in them the sense that there was no way to annihilate Israel or that the price would be heavy and

even suicidal. Some of this was due to the pro-Arab Soviet (and today Russian Federation) policy. The Arab states were far more important to the Russians than Israel, although the Soviet Union supported the partition of Palestine in 1947 and creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Soviet influence in the Middle East meant control over oil resources and that carried vast influence on the economic development of Western Europe and Japan, then dependent on Arab oil. The anti-Israel policy of the Soviet Union at the time was seen as a hint to Russian Jews not to dream of immigrating from that country to Israel. The hostile Russian stand only strengthened the Arab resolve not to deal with Israel on any level. Israel's leaders also felt that the Arab view of the Arab-Israel conflict was rooted in their historic perception that eventually they will triumph over the Israelis. The Arabs were convinced that time was on their side and must pursue policies that would systematically weaken Israel and wait for the right time to strike. That could take a long time, hence in the interim they must never make peace with Israel. Israel did not expect much support from China, India and Japan, but sought to establish working relations with those powers, as it did with the emerging African nations. Gradually the Arab-Israel conflict came to be seen as one with national, political, religious, historic, territorial, ethnic, communal and even economic dimensions. This reality was not understood by many during the first fifty years of Israel's existence. Since the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, these elements have become more understandable by those seeking to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian peace, mainly through the two-state solution.

Once it became clear that the Soviets would block any move towards an Arab-Israel political settlement, that left the United States and Europe as Israel's major backers. Of the European powers, Germany loomed as Israel's strongest friend in Europe, a replacement for France if and when the Algerian rebellion would be over and France would resume its traditional pro-Arab policy. Israel viewed Germany as a country that had purged itself of its Nazi past and was ready to help Israel militarily, economically and politically, a situation that prevails to this very day. Given the unwillingness of its neighbors to come to terms with its independence, Israel pursued a policy of retrenchment, built its economy, industry, its deterrent military capability, increased its population and sought friends among the newly created third world nations, mostly in Africa and some in South and East Asia, such as Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea and, since the late 1980s, Japan. During the decade between the 1956 Sinai War and the 1967 Six Days War, Israel was able to shift its focus from France to the United States, which became its major arms supplier. Slowly Israel was seen as a US proxy in the Middle East, while the Soviet Union was the chief political backer and major arms supplier to Egypt and Syria. Given the Cold War reality, the international community was content to abandon any attempt either to impose a settlement on the Arabs and the Israelis or even to mediate between them.

POLITICAL STALEMATE (1967–1973)

Fifty years after the Six Days War that changed dramatically the face of the Middle East and of Israel, it is not clear what led Egypt's President Nasser to undertake a number of measures that inevitably led to Israel's pre-emptive strike on 5 June 1967. He may have been misled by the Soviet Union fearing that Israel might topple the Syrian regime, then closely allied with the USSR. He may have thought that Israel was led at the time by the seemingly weak and ineffective government of Levi Eshkol, and would not react properly. He may have thought that the United States, then in the midst of the Vietnam war, would stay out of the fray and he may have misjudged the strength of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the determination of the Israeli people to preserve their nation, barely 22 years after the Holocaust. By undoing the post-Sinai War arrangements, namely, filling up Sinai with troops, armor and artillery, expelling the United Nations Emergency Force and re-imposing the naval blockade on the Strait of Tiran, Nasser left Israel with no choice but to strike. The key question that faced the Israeli government at the time was how would the super powers react and would Israel be told to relinquish any territory it would gain in the war. Israel's pre-war diplomacy focused on getting US approval for a strike, based on Eisenhower's tacit consent that Israel would have a case if the Egyptians blockaded the Straits of Tiran again. Once international diplomacy failed, Israel struck and within six days was able to occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. By doing so Israel almost quadrupled its size and brought under its control some 1.5 million Palestinians who, unlike 1948, did not abandon their homes.

By highly adept diplomacy, Israel was able to fend off Soviet and Arab attempts to undo its gains through the United Nations General Assembly. All anti-Israel resolutions demanding total Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of the previous Armistice System failed to be adopted by the General Assembly. That body handed the problem to the Security Council that adopted, on 22 November 1967, Resolution 242 that was a series of guidelines for future negotiations between Israel and the Arab states (the Palestinians were not even mentioned by name). Among the principles were Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in the 1967 war, freedom of navigation in international waterways, resolution of the refugee problem and the right of each state to live in peace in secure, agreed and recognized borders. A UN mediator was appointed to pursue talks with the parties to implement 242. In the next six years a number of efforts were made to bring about a more permanent settlement between Israel and its neighbors. They all failed. Israel was determined to keep the territories as bargaining chips and coined the phrase 'land for peace'. In return for total withdrawal it demanded total peace with Egypt and Syria, while seeking special arrangements with Jordan mainly regarding Jerusalem. The Arab response was the Khartoum formula: no

peace, no negotiations and no recognition of Israel. They did not preclude third-party mediation which the Americans and the Russians sought to impose on the parties, with little success.

The appointment of Golda Meir as Prime Minister of Israel in March 1969 signaled a tougher Israeli position. Her slogan was: 'If they will not talk to us, how will they live with us.' She was willing to explore various ways to lessen tensions along the Suez Canal and bring an end to the War of Attrition launched by Egypt in March 1969 that caused both sides considerable casualties. To avoid a super power confrontation, especially when Soviet pilots began to fly operational missions for the Egyptian Air Force, Israel accepted an US proposal for a ceasefire (August 1970) and resumption of the UN mediation efforts. But these failed and Israel was content with the prevailing status quo which it used to establish Jewish settlements in those areas of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights that it intended to keep under any future agreement. It became obvious that Egypt and Syria would not be content to accept the status quo forever and they began to make preparations for another round, using the phrase coined by Nasser: 'What was taken by force would be restored by force.' Israel failed to assess properly the willingness of newly appointed President Sadat (who succeeded Nasser in September 1970) to launch a war knowing full well that he had no chance of winning, but in the process he would unleash political moves, this time under US leadership. Israel was basking under the euphoria of its great victory in the Six Days War, its enemies were constantly making preparations for war. It was the 1973 Yom Kippur War that set the stage for the political process.

THE PEACE PROCESS – STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH (1973–1975)

Even prior to the onset of the peace process after the Yom Kippur War, there have been a number of attempts to resolve the Arab–Israel conflict or at least to prevent constant eruptions. In 1949 the United Nations organized a conference in Lausanne, but the effort failed because the initial Arab demand was that Israel return to the 1947 partition lines (in the course of the War of Independence Israel had acquired an additional 2,000 square miles, mainly in the Galilee and the Negev), and allow the return of all the Palestinian refugees who were displaced during the war. In 1949 and in 1950, under massive US pressure, Israel stated its willingness to take back between 65,000 to 100,000, but this would be done as part of a peace agreement. Between 1950 and 1967 there were a number of attempts to reach agreements between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Syria. Talks were held between Israeli negotiators and King Abdullah of Jordan and a non-belligerency agreement was even initialed, but both sides recoiled at the last moment. Talks were held in 1949 with Syrian leaders, but frequent changes of regime in Syria ended this effort. The assassination of King Abdullah in July

1951 ended the talks with Jordan. They were resumed in 1963 when his grandson, King Hussein, began a series of meetings with Israeli diplomats and in 1965 with Foreign Minister Golda Meir. The contacts with the Jordanian monarch yielded a series of local arrangements on water, flood and pest control, security and access for Israeli Arabs to make the pilgrimage to Mecca through Jordanian territory. Talks with King Hussein intensified after the Six Days War and were largely responsible for reaching an understanding with Jordan on security matters.

It was noted that following the Six Days War, Israel informed the United States that it was prepared to return all of Sinai and all of the Golan Heights to Egypt and Syria in return for a contractual peace and the termination of belligerency and all claims. Israel wanted special arrangements for the West Bank. The Arab states, then under the trauma of the humiliating defeat in the Six Days War, opted to adopt the Khartoum formula that said no peace, no recognition and no negotiations with Israel. However, all the parties accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 as the foundations for possible future negotiations. But 242 was rejected by the emerging Palestinian leadership since it did not even mention their existence and treated them as refugees.

The advent of the Nixon Administration in January 1969 saw a US attempt to initiate a peace process. The Rogers Plan of 9 December 1969 called for Israel to return to the lines of 4 June 1967 with minor border rectifications but did not call for direct negotiations or peace treaties. Israel's position since 1967 had been that it was prepared to make substantial withdrawals in return for contractual peace treaties with all its neighbors achieved through direct negotiations. The Soviet Union, closely allied with the Arab cause, suggested an automatic implementation of Resolution 242 with no need for direct talks. It suggested in fact that the parties go back to the 1949 Armistice arrangements that would be guaranteed by the super powers. Parallel to the efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union, the UN mediator Gunnar V. Jarring also proposed a plan to both Egypt and Israel (in February 1971) under which Israel would withdraw from all of Sinai, there would be demilitarized zones on both sides of the border, freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, mutual recognition of the right of each party to live in peace with secure and recognized borders, and termination of all claims and non-interference in the domestic affairs of each side. Sadat accepted parts of the proposal but demanded total Israeli withdrawal on all fronts, resolution of the refugee problem according to Resolution 194 and did not accept direct talks let alone a peace treaty and normalization of relations (all these were eventually part of the 1979 Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty). Another Israeli–US proposal for a limited Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal also failed. Sadat saw that diplomatic contacts to bring about an Israeli withdrawal were to no avail and resorted to war. He was prepared to suffer a major military defeat in return for a political move, mainly by the United States, to bring about

an end to the status quo. He also despaired that the Soviet Union would be able to achieve an Israeli withdrawal and pinned his hopes increasingly on the United States. The latter wanted to bring about an Israeli–Egyptian agreement that would also result in the ousting of the Soviet Union from Egypt, to be replaced by the United States. Israel would have to accept certain conditions for that grand design to occur.

The Yom Kippur War began the peace process. Egypt's initial military gains restored the honor of the Egyptian army, but did not prevent Israel from crossing the Suez Canal and encircling the Third Egyptian Army. The Yom Kippur War ended when the United States and the Soviet Union decided to put an end to the fighting, the Russians fearing a total Egyptian military collapse and the Americans determined to prevent Israel from dealing a major blow to the Egyptian army so that Egypt would be ready to accept US mediation and the beginning of token Israeli withdrawal. Israel accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 (22 October 1973) that ended the war, only when assured by the United States that direct negotiations under UN auspices would commence to bring about the implementation of Resolution 242. Israel faced a momentous decision. Among the results of the war were the international isolation of the Jewish state, the loss of some 2,700 dead, a heavy reliance on US weapons and ammunition, a leadership that did not anticipate the war and was now discredited, and an Israeli public stunned by the early days of the war when the tide seemed to be turning against Israel. It was told by the United States in no uncertain terms that if it decided to continue fighting it would be doing so alone. Israel needed a long time to recover from the blow and therefore accepted Kissinger's step-by-step approach. Direct Israeli–Egyptian negotiations started but were stymied by Kissinger who feared that the parties would make progress obviating his involvement in the process. He therefore suggested an international peace conference that was sponsored by the United States and the USSR and held in Geneva on 20–21 December 1973. That conference paved the way for two separation of forces agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria. Kissinger's 'step-by-step' approach avoided dealing with core issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, peace treaties, and mutual recognition, and instead focused on American mediation that led to partial, as opposed to full agreements, limited in time, space and security arrangements. These were designed to create the proper psychological atmosphere for future expanded talks on core issues.

The Disengagement of Forces agreements brokered by Kissinger in 1974 led to limited Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights, and the creation of a UN peacekeeping force that would police the demilitarized zones established between the parties. The Israel–Syria Disengagement of Forces Agreement signed on 31 May 1974 is still in force in 2020 and is observed scrupulously by both sides. Kissinger's diplomacy then focused again on Egypt. He was able to bring about an Israel–Egypt Interim Agreement (signed on 1 September 1975) that would last for three years and pave the way to a

peace treaty. The agreement called for additional Israeli withdrawal in Sinai, Suez Canal to be opened for Israeli shipping, with US-manned early warning stations monitoring the area. The Interim Agreement was made possible when the United States and Israel signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which the United States made far-reaching military, political and economic commitments to Israel. It would supply Israel with modern arms, would provide Israel with oil in case of emergency, would insure that the Geneva Conference would not be reconvened without Israeli agreement, that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not be involved in any negotiations with Israel, that Resolution 242 could not be amended without Israel's approval. The United States agreed that Israel has the right to navigate freely through international waterways. This understanding would become the foundations of US–Israel ties since 1975 and was the most outreaching commitment the United States had ever made to Israel. The Rabin government that came to power in June 1974 could now focus on what Rabin described as the 'lean seven years', the time needed to rehabilitate Israel and to extricate itself from its international isolation that included a United Nations decision to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thus removing Jordan from the determination of the future of the West Bank. Israel had also to contend with increasing acts of terror emanating from Lebanon engineered by the Soviet-backed Palestinian terror groups.

A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH (1975–1979)

By 1976 it was evident that the step-by-step approach had run its course and should be replaced by a comprehensive settlement. The newly installed Carter Administration in Washington felt that the key issue in the Arab–Israel conflict was the Palestinians and not Israel's relations with its neighboring Arab states. Russia had begun to favor the creation of a Palestinian state while Carter spoke of Palestinian right to a national entity or homeland, something that alarmed Israel greatly, fearing that a Palestinian state would become a base for launching attacks on Israeli territory. A new Israeli government headed by the right-wing Likud party leader Menachem Begin, took office in June 1977 and announced its readiness to pursue peace negotiations in the framework of a renewed Geneva Conference. Both the Russians and the Americans favored this approach, but they claimed that there was no need for direct negotiations between the parties. All that remained was to implement Resolution 242. Israel rejected this approach and refused to consider PLO representation in Geneva. The talks faltered and led to Sadat's decision to undertake another dramatic step that would stun the world: he would travel to Jerusalem and argue the case for peace in the Knesset – the Israeli Parliament. Once again his aim was to force the United States to follow his lead, which it did even while it realized that

the Sadat visit to Jerusalem would put an end to the idea of a comprehensive settlement and a reconvened Geneva Conference under the sponsorship of the United States and the USSR.

It took Israel and Egypt almost a year, from November 1977 to September 1978, to reach an agreement negotiated under US auspices and mediation at Camp David, and a Framework Accord was signed at the White House on 17 September 1978. It called for an Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty to be achieved in three months and an autonomy to be granted to the Palestinians for a five-year period to be followed by final status negotiations. Begin abandoned his long-standing opposition to grant the Palestinians certain rights and agreed that at some stage the Palestinians would have the right to determine their own future (although he still referred to them as the Arabs of the Land of Israel). The Israel–Egypt peace treaty was signed on 26 March 1979 and is still in force over forty years later, calling for total Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai Peninsula, the establishment of normal relations between the two states, and a series of security arrangements based on extensive demilitarized zones in Sinai. The treaty did not mention Jerusalem, did not link it to the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, and proclaimed that the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran would remain open under any circumstance. This was a major Israeli diplomatic achievement – the first peace treaty with the largest, most powerful and important of Arab States. It removed Egypt from the circle of enemies. True, Sadat viewed the agreement as a government-to-government deal while Begin sought to have it as a people-to-people agreement. The treaty also rehabilitated the frayed Israel–US relations. But there was a heavy price to pay. Begin created a precedent of land for peace, total withdrawal, costly withdrawal of the IDF from Sinai, and providing legitimacy to Palestinian national demands.

WAR IN LEBANON AND ITS AFTERMATH (1982–1992)

Between 1979 and 1982 Israel was busy withdrawing its presence from Sinai and reaping international approval for the peace treaty with Egypt that saw the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Begin and Sadat. Israel then turned to seeking to destroy the PLO presence in southern Lebanon. That organization had in fact become a state within a state posing a serious threat to Israel's northern border areas. The PLO launched rocket attacks, infiltration and sabotage in Israel. The Begin government was determined to put an end to this presence as the PLO was acquiring long-range artillery and armor. In June 1982 Israel launched a war in southern Lebanon that effectively destroyed the mini-PLO state there, eliminated its presence from Lebanon, destroyed its military capability and led to the dispersal of the PLO away from Lebanon. For the time being the PLO danger from Lebanon abated. A peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon negotiated in 1983 under US auspices failed to be approved by the Lebanese parliament and

remained a dead letter. By early 1985 Israel deployed the IDF in a security zone along the Israel–Lebanon border. Efforts to bring about an understanding with Jordan went into high gear when King Hussein signed an agreement in London with Israel’s foreign minister Shimon Peres on 11 April 1987. It called for the convening of an international conference with the participation of a joint Jordanian–PLO delegation; Jordan would assume a major role in the West Bank replacing the Israeli occupation, while Palestinian legitimate rights would be recognized under Jordan, living in peace with Israel. The agreement was rejected by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir who was opposed in principle to resolving the Arab–Israel conflict through an international conference. He opted for Israel to gain time, increase its population with the anticipated arrival of at least a million Soviet Jews and accelerated the pace of Jewish settlements in all parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The failure of the London Agreement was followed soon by the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) that erupted in December 1987 and lasted until 1993. It was aimed primarily to awaken Arab and international awareness of the needs of the Palestinians, to cause Israel economic hardship and above all to create for Israel a negative image in the international media.

By 1987 it became obvious that the world was facing a major change. The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, told the Arab states in general and Syria in particular, that the Soviet Union would not support them if they engage in another war against Israel. Russia now required massive Western economic aid for the regime to survive and that meant no war in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union slowly opened its gates to Jewish emigration and this resulted in some half a million Russian Jews arriving in Israel from 1989 to 1992. Another major event changed abruptly the situation in the Middle East. The occupation by Iraq of Kuwait in August 1990 brought about an US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein that included Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf States. Yasser Arafat opted to support Saddam Hussein thus incurring the anger of the pro-US Arab states. They were promised that once the Gulf War would be over, the United States would turn all its attention to resolving the Arab–Israel conflict. Israel was told in no uncertain terms to refrain from responding even if it were attacked by Iraqi missiles. The Shamir government complied and this led to the convening of an international peace conference for the Middle East in Madrid at the end of October 1991. The conference participants, apart from the United States and USSR as sponsors, included Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and a Palestinian delegation within the framework of the Jordanian delegation. After a ceremonial opening, Israel and its neighbors would begin to negotiate bilateral peace agreements. By the end of 1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated and was replaced by the Russian Federation. That power ceased for the next twenty-five years to play a major role in the Middle East. It did permit Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel. By 2000 over a million Russian Jews arrived in Israel changing dramatically Israel’s population make-up, its economy, industry, science and

technology. Israel's participation in the Madrid conference reaped major foreign policy achievements. Ties with the Soviet Union, suspended in the Six Days War were restored and full diplomatic relations were established with India and China. By then most of the African nations that broke off their ties with Israel during the Yom Kippur War restored them as well. Israel restored ties with all of the newly freed Eastern European nations as well as the former Soviet Republics in Europe and Central Asia. A change had occurred among Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Palestinians realized that a military option to eliminate Israel was no longer possible and they would have to reach a political settlement that would entail recognition of Israel, an end to terror and a Palestinian state only in the West Bank and Gaza. Israelis were also feeling the pressure of the Palestinian uprising and sought ways to reach broad agreement with the PLO on certain parameters that would enable the two sides to co-exist. The 1992 Knesset elections saw the rise to power of the second Rabin government. Rabin was set to deal with domestic issues, focusing on the absorption of the million immigrants from the Soviet Union. Another task was to rehabilitate the ties with the United States, highly strained during the Shamir era.

THE OSLO PROCESS (1993–2001)

Rabin set out to explore peace talks with Syria, but they did not progress due to Syria's insistence on total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, followed by a refusal to discuss the nature of peace once withdrawal was completed. Rabin then authorized talks between Israeli academics and PLO representatives that were held in London and later in Oslo under Norwegian auspices. These yielded concrete results and a Declaration of Principles was initialed between Israel and the PLO and later signed at the White House in the presence of President Clinton on 13 September 1993. These contained mutual recognition – Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat accepted Resolution 242 in all its parts, recognizing the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, renounced terrorism and proclaimed invalid those clauses of the PLO National Covenant that denied Israel's right to exist. This was a historic breakthrough for which Rabin, Peres and Arafat won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. The Declaration of Principles gained for Israel enormous international goodwill and was followed by a Protocol for Economic Relations (April 1994). An agreement called the Gaza–Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo in May 1994, and that allowed Arafat to enter the Gaza Strip in July 1994. A Palestinian Authority was established and that formally released Israel from responsibility for civilian aspects of Palestinian lives. Oslo led to the signing on 26 October 1994 of the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty. An Israel–PLO Interim Agreement was signed in Washington on 28 September 1995 that elaborated on Israeli withdrawal from the major cities of the West Bank and the redeployment of the IDF, transfer of

powers from Israel to the Palestinian Authority, and the effective creation of a Palestinian autonomy for the next five years at the end of which negotiations for permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza would be completed. Among the issues to be resolved would be the refugees, Jerusalem, settlement, security, borders and normalization of ties. The Interim Agreement divided the West Bank into three zones: Area A would be under Palestinian control, and that included all the major cities, Area B would be under Palestinian civil control while Israel would be in charge of security, and Area C under exclusive Israeli control. The talks began to falter after the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish extremist on 4 November 1995 which was followed by an outbreak of terror attacks by Hamas which led to the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister in May 1996. But even before that, it was obvious that the Oslo Process was mired with problems. Israeli settlements in the West Bank continued to be built and expanded, Palestinian incitement against Israel never ceased and a growing number of Palestinian terror attacks on Israelis raised serious doubts in Israel regarding the value of the Oslo Process. Above all, the Palestinian leadership never made any effort to educate its people that they would have to live side by side with an independent and secure Jewish state of Israel.

Mostly from an ideological standpoint and security considerations and the influence of nationalist-religious right-wing parties that dominated his cabinet, Prime Minister Netanyahu was opposed to Oslo from its outset and made sure that while the agreements could not be annulled, he would do his best to slow down the process and make sure that Israel would grant the Palestinians concessions parallel to what the Palestinians would concede. Israel did withdraw from the major cities in the West Bank in early 1996, elections to the Palestinian Authority resulted with the appointment of Yasser Arafat as the first Chairman of that authority. Under massive US pressure Netanyahu was forced to yield Israeli control in most of Hebron (January 1997) and agree to an additional 13.5 percent Israeli withdrawal from Area C in October 1998. This resulted in the collapse of his government and elections held in May 1999 brought to power the Labor Party headed by former IDF Chief of Staff general Ehud Barak. He promised to seek peace with Syria, total withdrawal from Lebanon and a peace settlement with the Palestinians within eighteen months. Talks were held with the Syrian government under US auspices but failed. Syria was not prepared to enter into peaceful relations with Israel and demanded an initial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The IDF completed its withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, ending Israel's eighteen-year presence in that country. Barak then turned to talks with the Palestinians held in Camp David in July 2000 under US auspices. Barak offered an Israeli withdrawal from some 94 percent in the West Bank, but Arafat demanded more. The talks failed because Arafat refused to make any commitments regarding the future of Jerusalem, the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem and a no further claims clause once an agreement was reached. President Clinton blamed the Palestinians for the failure of the talks but in December 2000

presented his own parameters for a possible peace. These were accepted by Israel but rejected by the Palestinians.

DISENGAGEMENT AND STALEMATE 2001–2017

In September 2000 the Palestinians initiated the second Intifadah which lasted until 2004. This time the uprising would take the lives of some 1,400 Israelis and bring about a number of consequences. The first was the election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001, the second was the quelling of the uprising by harsh military measures. The third was Sharon's decision to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and remove all Israeli settlements from that area. This was completed in September 2005 and was seen by the Palestinians as a sign of weakness and loss of nerve by Israel. Sharon was also able to obtain two major commitments from President George W. Bush in April 2004: Israel would be allowed to retain three settlement blocs in any peace treaty and that Israel would not have to absorb a massive number of Palestinian refugees. The Bush Administration was absorbed by the war against Islamic terror that was the outcome of the attack on the United States in September 2001.

Sharon suffered a stroke and was replaced in January 2006 by Ehud Olmert. He engaged in extensive talks with the Palestinian leadership, now headed by Abu Mazen who succeeded Arafat after his death in November 2004. But the talks failed to yield conclusive results. US attempts to revive the peace talks failed. By 2007 the Gaza Strip came under total control of the Hamas faction of the Palestinians and their territory was now in fact divided into two separate entities: the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas' objection to the very existence of Israel made any contacts with them impossible, and in fact ruled out any hopes of a peaceful settlement of the Israel–Palestinian conflict. When Hamas began to launch rockets at Israel's southern cities, this led to three Israeli operations against Hamas in the Gaza region. The last was fought in the summer of 2014. Netanyahu was re-elected Prime Minister of Israel in 2009, 2013 and 2015 as head of a right-wing, nationalist-religious coalition. His policy has been to insist on a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, a united Jerusalem under Israel, and extensive Israeli security presence in parts of the West Bank, chiefly the Jordan valley. These demands were rejected by the Palestinians who sought international pressure on Israel in the form of Security Council resolutions that repeatedly determined that Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were illegal and contrary to international law. Very strained relations between the Obama and Netanyahu Administrations gave the Palestinians hopes that their cause would be championed by the international community. But these hopes were dashed in November 2016 with the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. His pro-Israel stand was well known.

ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS AT THE START OF THE TRUMP ERA

At the end of the Obama presidency, the Middle East witnessed seismic developments that impacted heavily on Israel's foreign policy decision makers and were bound to be felt in the coming years of the Trump Administration. Among the key developments that shook the Middle East since the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century was the Arab Spring that started in 2011 and resulted in civil wars and failed states in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, following the ousting of Presidents Gadhafi in Libya, Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen and Ben Ali in Tunisia. Vicious civil war erupted in Libya that has disintegrated into three units, each governed by a separate regime. Syria witnessed a civil war that has taken the lives of at least half a million civilians and resulted in massive destruction and the displacement of half of its population, most of them becoming refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. This period also saw the rise of ISIS (also known as Daesh), that sought to create a Moslem nation governed by the rules of Shariah. It has already wreaked havoc in Syria and Iraq.

The Middle East had witnessed since 2011 the decline of the standing of the United States and the return of the Russian Federation as the major foreign power in the region. It can be safely argued that the Russians, together with their friends Turkey and Iran, have become a major factor determining future developments in the region. The People's Republic of China is also making hesitant moves in the direction of the Middle East, mostly in the economic sphere as it seeks to avoid political and military entanglement similar to the Russian involvement. All this at the time when the United States influence in the region had been steadily declining as President Obama sought to limit that power's military presence in the region and signaled that it was in retreat. Israel had to take all this into account while realizing that closer to home the era of the rule of Abu Mazen was also drawing to a close and there is a fierce behind the scenes struggle for his succession. Israel also noted that Iran had become a major factor and remains Israel's major adversary in the region as it supports heavily the Assad regime in Syria, the Houtis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, while constantly calling for the destruction of the Jewish state. In view of the fact that there have been no major Israeli moves, let alone, initiatives towards the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian impasse, partly because it appeared to Israel's leaders that the Obama Administration was openly hostile when it came to the issue of Jewish settlement growth in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with the Americans claiming that this was impeding if not utterly destroying the two-state solution. Above all Israel was highly reluctant to undertake a major political move that would involve territorial concessions while the region was in turmoil and while there was no readiness on the part of the Palestinian leadership to enter into

meaningful negotiation with it. In fact, the political process between Israel and the Palestinians has been in effect frozen since the closing years of the 20th century. This was due to the adamant refusal of the Palestinian Authority to accept Israel as the nation of the Jewish people and accept the concept of the finality of the conflict, meaning once an agreement had been signed there would be no further claims. With a new president, Donald J. Trump, in the White House, Israel found a very close ally. For various reasons, he moved the American Embassy to Jerusalem, recognized that city as the capital of Israel and legitimized Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights. He also withdrew the United States from an agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration with Iran. In 2019 Trump announced an American peace initiative to resolve the Israel–Palestinian conflict, consisting of massive economic investments in the Palestinian territories and limited self-rule. The Palestinians rejected the plan out of hand.

ISRAEL'S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

The following discussion will enumerate some of the options facing Israel. Each one of them must be examined in light of whether they provide an adequate answer to the following core issues: Israel's security, normalization of relations, the future of Jerusalem, a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, the future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, issues of demography and democracy, mutual recognition, end of conflict, a non-militarized Palestinian state, land swaps between Israel and Palestine, fair sharing of water resources and economic partnership, and an end to incitement and amending the textbooks that deny any connection between Jews and the Land of Israel. Another yardstick is the future of the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control since July 2007.

The first option, the two-state solution, is the one favored by the international community as seen in the December 2016 Security Council Resolution 2334 and the Paris declaration of 15 January 2017. It calls for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, whose borders will resemble those of the 1949 Armistice Lines (also known as the 1967 borders), minor land swaps giving Israel three settlement blocs in return for equal land to be ceded by Israel. The Palestinian state would be demilitarized. Both Israel and Palestine would share water resources and create what would amount to an economic unity (as envisioned in the United Nations Partition Plan of 29 November 1947). The Arab refugees would then be settled either in the Palestinian state, or in other lands, a few would be allowed to enter Israel under a family reunion scheme. Israel had in the past negotiated this idea and was prepared to accept it in principle during the July 2000 Camp David summit between the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak and US President Bill Clinton. Israel offered some 94 percent of the West Bank, an arrangement

that would allow Moslems to worship in Temple Mount, an adequate resolution of the refugee issue, taking into account the flight of some 850,000 Jews from Arab states since 1948. Israel also offered adequate security arrangements and a great deal of economic incentives and cooperation. In January 2001 Arafat rejected a US peace plan known as the Clinton Parameters that contained much of the above. Between 2006 and 2009, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert negotiated a similar plan with Arafat's successor Mahmoud Abbas known as Abu Mazen, but to no avail. In 2009 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once again announced Israel's willingness to accept the two-state solution and called for direct negotiations with no prior conditions. The key problem would be the future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, whose population at the beginning of 2020 was estimated at some 450,000 settlers (apart from 250,000 Jews living in those parts that used to be East Jerusalem under Jordanian rule until June 1967). This plan does not solve the future of Jerusalem and the resolution of the refugee issue.

The second option is for Israel to carry out unilateral withdrawal from certain parts of the West Bank, primarily from areas known as Area C, where Israel has both military and civilian responsibility, unlike Area A which is wholly under Palestinian responsibility and Area B where the Palestinians have responsibility for civilian affairs while Israel looks after security. Israel did withdraw from the major cities in the West Bank in early 1996; in September 2005 it handed over unilaterally the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority who subsequently lost it to Hamas rule in July 2007. Those who argue against such a move claim that the areas that Israel would give up would become a launching pad for missiles and rockets that could be fired at Israel's urban centers. There is also fear that Hamas could then take over the rest of the West Bank and reject all future contacts, let alone, negotiations, with Israel based on mutual recognition.

The third option would be partial or even full annexation of the West Bank to Israel. Those who propose this move argue that the West Bank was illegally occupied by Jordan in 1948 and that only two countries ever recognized the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank: Britain and Pakistan. Hence Israel has the right to annex the West Bank and impose on it its laws, administration and sovereignty. The major argument against this measure would be the demographics and the degree of freedoms to be granted to the Palestinian population to exercise either self-government or be allowed to vote for the Israeli parliament, thus exercising their rights as full-fledged citizens of Israel. This, in the long run, could create an Israel with a non-Jewish majority that would end the Zionist dream.

A fourth option is to grant full autonomy to the West Bank, leaving that area to be governed by the Palestine Authority but falling short of a sovereign independent political entity called Palestine. Prime Minister Netanyahu called this a 'state minus'. This plan was initially proposed by Menachem Begin in late 1977 and was included in the 1978 Camp David Framework Accords. It was to last for five years at the end of which there would be a final determination as to the fate of this territory. On 1 September 1982 President Ronald Reagan proposed

that following an Israeli withdrawal, an autonomous West Bank become part of Jordan who would grant it autonomy under the Jordanian throne. This was predicated on two premises: there would be no independent Palestinian state and that Jordan would sign a peace treaty with Israel. This plan was rejected by Israel, the Palestinians and the Jordanians.

A fifth option is to return the West Bank to Jordan, a country from which Israel seized the area in June 1967, in the context of the existing Israel–Jordan peace treaty. Another version of this option was to create a co-dominion: Israel would look after security and law and order in the West Bank while Jordan would be responsible for the civilian side. This was known for years as the ‘Jordanian option’. However, in the summer of 1988 Jordan divested itself from all responsibility for the future of the West Bank and shows no interest in governing this area at present. Its monarch argues that in any case the Palestinians form the majority of his citizens and has no desire to add over two million more Palestinians.

A sixth option is for Israel to unilaterally withdraw leaving the governance of the West Bank to an international factor, be it the United Nations Trusteeship Council or a group of foreign powers who would administer the area on its behalf and insure security on both sides of the borders. This would mean that there would be, for the time being, no independent Palestinian state.

The seventh option is to enter into negotiations with the Palestinian Authority for a two-state solution that would include exchange of territories and population and be part of a regional arrangement. This plan was promoted by the former Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman who is seeking the transfer of some Israeli Arabs to a future demilitarized Palestinian state. Ideas have been floated in the past regarding a possible federation between Israel, a Palestinian state and Jordan. Another version of this idea is the cantonization or the creation of a confederation made up of the initial Mandated Palestine that included until 1922, Trans-Jordan. There would be Jewish, Moslem, Christian and Druze cantons, each governed by a cantonal government while a central (or federal) government would be responsible for defense, foreign policy and certain economic aspects.

The eighth option is for all the parties to go back to the 2002 Saudi or the Arab peace plan that proposed a peace treaty between Israel and the entire Arab world in return for total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, Jerusalem to serve as capital of the two states, there would be an accepted resolution of the refugee issue based in United Nations resolutions and all claims to belligerency would be terminated. The plan does not discuss the future of Israeli settlers, who presumably would be asked to return to Israel. Some Israelis see possible Israeli–Palestinian interim agreements on certain issues such as economics, water, easing Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian population and even limiting settlement growth in certain areas in the West Bank. This could be done in the context of Israeli agreements with

friendly Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and some of the Gulf States, all of whom fear Iranian domination, growing Russian presence and a slow US retreat.

The ninth option would be for Israel to undertake measures that would strengthen the Palestinian Authority, by granting it additional powers, helping it undertake large-scale development projects (such as the new city of Rawabi near Ramallah), and easing restrictions on Palestinian mainly in Area C that comprises some 60 percent of the West Bank. This could come in a series of limited agreements, that could at some point in the future lead to broader understandings, interim agreements and finally to a comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians and the entire Arab world.

Meanwhile what seems to be emerging is the idea of a bi-national state, where the lines separating Jews from Arabs (both Israeli Arabs and Palestinians) are being blurred, and where there is growing economic cooperation, at a time when some 100,000 Palestinian laborers are employed daily in Israel. There are some Palestinians who would be satisfied with this arrangement, hoping that in time there would be more Palestinians than Jews and, if democracy prevails, they would be the majority and eventually rule the entire country. Some Palestinian leaders have already threatened that failure to achieve any settlement that would be acceptable to them, would inevitably result in their handing over the keys to the administration of the West Bank to Israel, asking only for civil rights such as voting for elected institutions. If Israel refuses that could create an Apartheid state, once it accepts, it could lose the Jewish and Zionist ethos and character of the state of Israel, and the country could eventually resemble the multi-nation state of Lebanon.

For the time being, most Israelis do not see the implementation of any of the above described options but they envision the maintenance of the existing status quo or in other words, their concern is how to continue to manage the conflict and assure that it does not erupt into a major war or even a large-scale uprising, similar to the second Intifadah that took place between 2000 and 2004 and cost the lives of some 1,400 Israeli civilians and military. This option is pertinent and could be maintained as long as there are other, more serious problems in the Middle East, as long as the United States would support Israel in this stance and as long as Israel's economy continues to flourish. Much will also depend on the attitude of Egypt and Jordan, world Jewry and the European Union. In early 2020 there appears to be validity to the Israeli argument that there is no real partner among the Palestinians who not only could negotiate an agreement but also deliver and implement it as did Sadat and King Hussein. Israel must also make sure that in so doing it preserves the country's image of a democratic nation that maintains freedom of expression, civic and human rights and to insure that Israel is not isolated in the world. This calls for very deft diplomacy and understanding of both regional and international developments.

CONCLUSION

In the past seventy years of its existence, Israel has deployed all its foreign policy options faced since independence. It successfully defended itself when attacked in 1948, 1969 and 1973. It launched preventive wars in 1956, 1982 and 2006 (the Second War in Lebanon), it pre-empted in June 1967, it launched four operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It fought against an imposed settlement but accepted one that it thought provided it with peace with Egypt and security (the 1978 Camp David Agreement). It successfully negotiated two bi-lateral peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, it agreed to enter into negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of all issues. In the process Israel made some outstanding achievements. It has diplomatic relations with more than 100 nations. It has established extensive ties with the leading nations of Asia, chief among them India, China and Japan. It has good working relations with the Russian Federation and is an Associate Member of the European Economic Community. It participates in the annual NATO leadership talks and military exercises. The ties between Israel and the United States have stood the test of time and have entered into a new phase since January 2017. Israel has become one of the world's leading arms manufacturers and sellers. It possesses probably the strongest army in the Middle East and one of the largest in the world. According to foreign sources it has nuclear capability. It has become the second hi-tech leader and has made enormous strides in science, technology, industry, medicine and agriculture. Its experts are internationally sought after. Its scientists have won Nobel Prizes, as did three of its prime ministers – Begin, Rabin and Peres. From a Jewish population of 650,000 in May 1948, it grew to 6.5 million in 2020, a ten-fold growth due mostly to immigration of Jews from some 100 countries. The crowning achievement in that sphere was the arrival of over one million Jews from the former Soviet Union.

But it has yet to achieve its greatest dream – that of becoming an integral part of the Middle East, of being accepted by the Arab and Moslem world on an equal basis, of signing peace treaties with all its neighbors and playing a key role in the development of the region in which it was destined to live. Anti-Semitism is still a reality in many countries and the existence of Israel has not fully eradicated that scourge. But at least Jews now have a haven, a shelter in times of need, a country that they can call home.

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American Foreign Relations and East Asia

Bruce Cumings

INTRODUCTION

I want to discuss two tendencies in America's relationship to the world, the first being internationalism or Atlanticism, the particular tendency that has high expression, for example, in the 'special relationship' between the United States and the UK. The other tendency is usually labeled isolationism, but I prefer provincialism, or perhaps, for much of the 19th century, continentalism. It was this second tendency that first brought the United States into contact with East Asia; later, in the 20th century, it would be labeled 'Asia-first'. In other words, continentalism was expansionist, but away from Europe, toward the Pacific and East Asia. Readers will find detailed analyses of American foreign policy in East Asia elsewhere in this volume. Here, I will present a historically informed analysis of longstanding orientations in America's relationship to the world, with particular attention to East Asia – and, in my conclusions, to the present when, for the first time since 1945, serious challenges to the American hegemonic role in the world have emerged at home.

Provincialism does not mean stupidity, or ignorance – even though Atlanticists often characterized it this way. I mean that for most Americans foreign affairs has been and still is an abstraction, and even foreign travel is rare. Average Americans have always been provincial; only 35 percent even possess a passport. This led to an extraordinary autonomy for those who conducted foreign affairs. For much of the country's history, those people came from New England. 'New England' was an attempt to implant England and its practices throughout the continent, but it truly succeeded for the most part in the northeast quadrant of the United States. The typical diplomat would be a Boston Brahmin with a Harvard or Yale degree,

the capability to speak one or more foreign languages, possessing a self-contained, stiff, even dour personality – in other words, a person like former Secretary of State John Kerry. Diplomatic service was the wholly owned subsidiary of graduates from Ivy League schools from the beginning until the late 1960s – and usually wealthy graduates, since salaries were so low. As an observant man, Godfrey Hodgson, who happens to be English, wrote,

To an extent that is quite astonishing to Europeans, who are brought up to think of the United States as a great populist democracy with a strong anti-aristocratic bias, the foreign policy of the United States as a great world power over the whole seventy years from 1898 to 1968 was a family affair. (Hodgson, 1976)

That foreign affairs ‘family’ had blue running in its veins and proper schooling at Exeter or Andover, Harvard or Yale. After graduation they inhabited institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Trilateral Commission, and belonged to the Cosmos Club in Washington and the Century Club in New York. Since 1941, Godfrey Hodgson noted, the foreign policy establishment was fully united on these points: prize Atlanticism, support internationalism, oppose isolationism (Hodgson, 1976: 113–14, 116–17). But it was not always so.

‘THE GREAT RULE OF CONDUCT’: A CONTINENTAL FOREIGN POLICY

Atlanticists looked to the East; Continentalists looked West. For a hundred and fifty years after the Plymouth and Jamestown settlements, European settlers clung closely to the Atlantic coast with a disinterest in probing inland that seems inexplicable when compared to the raging expansion of the 19th century. But it did not dawn on them that they inhabited a continent until around 1750, and even then they did not know its immense scope. Then continental expansion finally created an authentic American worldview that contrasted mightily with New England’s Anglophile Atlanticism. It was not isolationism, a misleading term that casts the pre-1941 American worldview back upon the 19th century. Instead it was a form of exclusive continentalism, appearing autonomously, before direct interaction with the European states. (Isolationism was a reaction *against* that interaction, especially during and after The First World War.)

From George Washington’s farewell address down to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor – that is, for another chunk of 150 years – the fundamental orientation of the United States was toward the West and the Pacific, with Americans turning their backs on Europe to varying and always interesting degrees. If it is almost impossible to fathom this fact in our time, that owes to the heaps of calumny loaded upon anyone who dissents from the Atlanticist (and usually Anglophile) consensus of our relatively tiny foreign policy elite, and the fifty years from 1941 to 1991 when world war and cold war locked Europe and the

United States in a tight embrace. But as the years of the new century begin to pass quickly before our eyes, this half-century may turn out to be an anomaly in America's relationship to the world. In any case that is not where American values ran from the founding of this country onward: loathing England was a pastime, a part of the continental soil, it was fun, an amusement indulged in varying degrees of sophistication – from the epithets of the everyday town square to the august judgments of Tom Paine ('It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions') and John Quincy Adams.

Or George Washington: his Farewell Address is always noted but rarely appreciated for the comparative and realistic judgments embodied in it. 'Europe has a set of primary interests,' he said, 'which to us have none, or very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the cause of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.' Apart from commercial involvement, there was no need for Americans 'to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities'. The United States could afford to remain distant, detached, disengaged, in a 'respectably defensive posture'. Given the difficulties and distances in crossing two great oceans, aggressors 'will not lightly hazard giving us provocation', Washington said. Entangling alliances would hinder American freedom of action, but also draw the United States into European quarrels. 'The Great Rule of Conduct' should be to extend commercial relations but 'to have with them as little *political* connection as possible' (Nordlinger, 1995: 51; Washington's address quoted, 50–1).

This new nation, just by virtue of its coming into being as an anti-colonial entity, posed the greatest threat of all to the European empires – along with the periodic influence of leaders who took that origin seriously enough to make it their task to dismantle those same empires: preeminently John Quincy Adams. He deftly clothed American expansion in the anti-imperial garb of getting Spain out of Florida, challenging imperial trading monopolies and privileges in Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine (it ought to be called the Adams Doctrine), establishing the line that would later become the boundary with Canada in the Northwest, and more or less telling the British off whenever he got the chance – as in his memorable exchange with Minister to the US Stratford Canning in 1821: first he assured Canning that he would never dare to accuse the British of territorial claims on the moon, noted their modesty in claiming merely the entire earth, and finally asserted the American right to expand 'to all the shores of the South Sea' (meaning the Pacific), whether England liked it or not: 'keep what is yours, but leave the rest of the continent to us' (LaFeber, 1965: 18–22, 39–41; also Varg, 1983: 93).

THE EXTERMINATING HAVOC

Thomas Jefferson believed in 'an empire for liberty'. He and many others saw the United States as a special country that would inspire other peoples to burst

the chains of despotism. But his empire also expanded to the West, in the unfolding of the yeomanry ideal; it did not anticipate a foreign expression, not colonies, nor any 'imperative of world redemption'. Nor large standing armies, *realpolitik*, or imperialism: the westering of the yeomanry middle class would move *away* from those European sins, not toward them. In his 1801 inaugural address Jefferson referred to 'the exterminating havoc' of the Old World, from which the United States was separated 'by nature and a wide ocean'; to the West was the New World, 'the chosen country' with 'room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation'. Jefferson's empire was based on the consent of the governed, where the governed were white settlers. His conception of empire swept most Americans and most historians before it; indeed Samuel Flagg Bemis' rendering as late as 1965: 'American expansion across a practically empty continent despoiled no nation unjustly' [BC: But despoiled some justly?] (Bemis quoted in Hietala, 1985: 259).

John Quincy Adams was also a founding father of expansionism, like Jefferson, and a very early continentalist: he wanted it almost as soon as geographers proved its existence, writing in 1811 that the United States was 'destined by God and nature' to occupy the land from sea to sea and to be 'the most populous and most powerful people ever combined under one social compact'. Adams, possessing a supple mind mostly unmatched in American statesmen ever since, quickly determined that the continent 'should ultimately be ours', but acknowledged that it was but 'very lately that we have distinctly seen this ourselves; very lately that we have avowed the pretension of extending to the South Sea' (Goetzmann, 1966: 3–4; Adams quoted in Johansen and Gates, 1967: 113).

But unlike Jefferson, Adams was the opposite of an agrarian or an Arcadian; a completely worldly man (even by Jeffersonian standards), highly educated, master of five languages, he took close account of the maritime interests of New England traders, trusted Britain not one bit, and wanted a continental nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific both to secure the national market for Americans, and for the United States to take its proper place among the nations – that is, at the forefront. An envoy to the Hague at 31, and later to Holland, Russia, and the Court of St. James before President James Monroe made him Secretary of State in 1817 (he became the best of the 19th-century secretaries), Adams was an architect of empire.

The 1890s saw the beginning of the end of America's isolation in the world, and its distinction from Europe. That distinction was based on an exceptionalism that was bedrock belief throughout the 19th century, that America constituted a *novus ordo seclarum* (inscribed on the back of the dollar bill), a new order for the ages, an anti-imperial challenge to the powers and a beacon to those they oppressed; its destiny faced west, away from the Old World. At the turn of the 19th century John Hay, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt wanted to join that Old World and reconstitute it on American principles, just as leaders in London sought to bring America

into partnership, as insurance against their own decline. In a few short years Woodrow Wilson would harness their high-minded ideals to more foreign ventures, thereby adding the construct 'idealism' into the American foreign policy lexicon, but neither he nor any other president could again speak with the conviction and clean conscience of John Quincy Adams in his celebrated Independence Day address in 1821: about the revolutionary nature of the United States, its independence, its principles – tenets which were simultaneously the undoing of the rest of the world:

It was the first solemn declaration by a nation of the only *legitimate* foundation of civil government. It was the cornerstone of a new fabric, destined to cover the surface of the globe. It demolished at a stroke the lawfulness of all governments founded on conquest. It swept away all the rubbish of accumulated centuries of servitude.

Adams went on to say that America had always respected the independence of other countries and abstained from interference in their affairs 'even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings'. And then this indelible promise: 'Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled,' he said, the United States will welcome it. 'But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own' (LaFeber, 1965: 42–6; emphasis in original).

George Washington's rules stood on a par with the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence and guided every administration for the next century (excepting Woodrow Wilson's), persisting through three presidents in the 1920s whose homegrown qualities would not be seen in the Oval Office for another eight decades. They presided over one of the great economic booms in American history, in which California invented the urban and suburban world that the middle class almost everywhere has inhabited since the 1950s. But the Pacific coast remained fundamentally non-industrial: it was part of a continental market and had been since the railroads reached the coast, but it was dependent on the East and did not have the stunning quality that it acquired during and after the Second World War: a new, high-tech industrial base to complement the enormously productive industrial structures of the Northeast and the Midwest. The continuing incompleteness of the continental market helps to explain why in the interwar period Americans got isolationism instead of the global prominence that their highly productive economy, in another era, might have demanded; this prolonged the ideal of a self-contained, westward-facing America that cultivated and developed its own garden (the largest national market in the world), kept to itself, and pursued its own interests and ideals. The vast internal market, still not completed, shaped an economy that was still fundamentally autarkic; New England, Atlanticism and 'free trade' were still a regional and a minority phenomenon before Pearl Harbor.

PERRY AND JAPAN

It is a curiosity that Japan should have been ‘opened’ in 1853 and then reopened in 1945 by Americans who closely conformed to the feudal ideal of the stately, noble individual, with neither of them – Perry or MacArthur – ever at a loss for imperious self-importance. Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry was the younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry, who had defeated British forces in the Battle of Lake Erie in 1813 and thus spared the country’s northern frontier a British invasion. Perry was ‘an awesome presence’ on any quarterdeck. ‘Ruthless, stiff-necked, the embodiment of “Manifest Destiny”.’ Not only a navy man but a diplomat with wide experience, Perry understood the historic importance of his mission from the beginning even if much of his nation did not, and in typical mid-century fashion linked his enterprise to the thread of westward progress which ‘broke in the hands of Columbus’, but which he would again tie up to ‘the ball of destiny’, rolling it forward until Japan is brought ‘within the influence of European civilization’. With California in the union and ‘our territory spreading from ocean to ocean’, Perry thought the United States midway between Europe and Asia, was now the real ‘Middle Kingdom’ (Bryant, 1947: 275, 277; Wiley, 1990: 46; Perry, 1856: 5, 75). The Navy Department was well disposed, too, desiring coaling stations in the far Pacific (the importance of steam power having been fully demonstrated), but most Americans paid little attention, before and after (the little towns around the Great Lakes named ‘Perry’, ‘Perryville’, and the like are named for Matthew’s brother).

Although talk of ‘opening Japan’ was not new, President Millard Fillmore responded to the desires of New England whalers and traders by sending Perry on his mission to the ‘far West’ (China), by virtue of putting a bigger navy in the Pacific and building coaling stations in Japan. But the devout Perry was no mere agent of commercial interests: he was taking ‘the gospel of God to the heathen’, reconnoitering an important part of the world unsullied by the ‘unconscionable government’ residing in London (‘our great maritime rival’, in his words). Perry embarked in command of a large Asiatic Squadron comprising ten ships, but he reconnoitered in Tokyo (then called Edo) Bay with just four of them: ‘black ships’ consisting of the 20-gun sloops *Saratoga* and *Plymouth*, moving under sail, and two new state-of-the-art vessels, the *Mississippi* and the *Susquehanna*, propelled by steam. Cruising via the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean, with many stops en route including Hong Kong and Shanghai, the squadron arrived off Okinawa in the spring of 1853; American marines landed and marched through the streets of Naha, as Marines would a century later – where today the only Marine Expeditionary Force remains on permanent foreign duty. In early July splendid Mount Fuji came into view, and on July 8 the four ships anchored near Uraga, at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.

A week later two columns of well-armed Marines stood stiffly as Perry walked slowly into a brand new reception hall and handed over President Fillmore's letter for delivery to the Emperor – as if he were an equal, which astonished the assembled officials. The letter opened with an even more pregnant line: 'You know that the United States of America now extend from sea to sea.' Perry then retreated to his black ships and began a stately 'exhibition of seclusion that rivaled that of Japan,' in Bryant's words. Perry cloistered himself in his stateroom pending an audience with the Emperor and demanded that Millard Fillmore be addressed on the same level, using the same Japanese designation, while his crewmen dazzled the Japanese with a variety of new technologies (the telegraph, the daguerreotype, steam engines, Colt revolvers). After several weeks of fruitless negotiations, during which the Japanese urged him to depart for Nagasaki where foreigners were always received, leading Perry to maneuver his ships closer by the day to Tokyo, he finally weighed anchor for Hong Kong. He returned in February 1854 with eight warships – nearly the entire American Asiatic Squadron – and resumed his practice of cloistering himself and deploying ever closer to the Mikado. 'The more unyielding he might be in adhering to his declared intentions,' the Commodore thought, 'the more respect these people of forms and ceremonies' would accord him. But just in case, according to Japanese records, Perry also threatened war: American forces had recently taken the capital of Mexico, he pointed out; 'circumstances may lead your country into a similar plight.' At length, after much back and forth about Japan having no interest in trade and the United States now being a great Pacific commercial nation (with Japan's leaders painfully aware of their military inferiority), on March 31, 1854 Perry secured The Treaty of Kanagawa, an accord of 'friendship and commerce' (Mitani, 2006: 187–9; Bryant, 1947: 277–9).

Out of it came several coaling stations, the opening of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to trade, and another orgasm from Walt Whitman when a return Japanese delegation materialized in New York ('The Originatress comes, ... Florid with blood,' 'I chant the new empire,' 'I chant America, the Mistress'; 'I chant commerce opening, the sleep of ages having done its work – races, reborn, refresh'd ... with the arrival of the American pioneers in the Pacific a glorious millennium begins'). But Perry's visit takes its place in history not for its impact on America, which was negligible at the time, but as the spark detonating Japan's remarkable rise to power, drawing it out of the Tokugawa isolation that had lasted since 1600 and propelling it into fifteen years of internal civil struggle, the outcome of which was the top-down revolution in 1868 known as the Meiji Restoration. These momentous events, linking American expansionism to the birth of East Asian modernity, dawned slowly on the world and especially Americans, who greeted Perry's return with muted enthusiasm. Never a shrinking violet, Perry took a page from Frémont and produced a book-of-the-mission in 1856 that made him – however temporarily – a national hero. After the mission, Perry and his men decided that Japan was 'the most moral and refined of all

eastern nations', a judgment that would color American perceptions for nearly a century, until a different stereotype arrived in the 1930s (Perry, 1856).

THE FIRST AMERICAN EMPIRE

The second coming of 'Manifest Destiny' arrived in a confrontation with the oldest empire in the Americas. The war with Spain began with the sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, a massive explosion that took the lives of 266 men – and an explosion which everyone believed to have been determined by Madrid. President McKinley had dispatched this ungainly battleship, sporting four 10-inch guns, to Havana in case American citizens might need evacuation, amid the sporadic war ongoing in Cuba since 1895, when some 30,000 armed insurgents launched an insurrection against Spanish rule to the cheers of many Americans. But war between the United States and Spain was avoidable until the *Maine* exploded and the famed 'yellow press' kicked up an incessant racket. (William Randolph Hearst offered \$50,000 to find the criminals who used a 'secret infernal machine' to demolish the warship.) And so a reluctant, sleepless and haggard William McKinley authorized the strike that internationalists like Teddy Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Whitelaw Reid and their friends had long anticipated. The Army was a mere 27,865 strong in 1898, but volunteers quickly swelled its ranks, this time to over 200,000 men, soon reorganized into a modern fighting force by Secretary of War Elihu Root. It was the newly enlarged and competent Navy, however, that struck the first and hardest blows. Admiral George Dewey's decisive attack on the fleet at Manila provided a large mass of American patriots with another lightning victory, and dealt a quick death blow to the Spanish empire in the Pacific. Of course it was hard to tell here (and in much of the war) whether Dewey was brilliant or the Spanish incompetent. In any case he outgunned them two-to-one. In Cuba an *opera bouffe* ensued 'in which an enfeebled Spain,' in Robert Dallek's words, 'outdid the United States in military ineptitude.'

The war occasioned America's first extensive colonial acquisitions, ending continentalism with a leap into the Caribbean and across the Pacific: the United States seized Cuba, Puerto Rico and three strategic positions in the Pacific: Guam and Wake Island along the line to Manila, and the Philippines itself. Cuba got its independence in 1901, but not before the Navy got a base on Guantánamo Bay, and under the Platt Amendment Cuba remained a virtual American protectorate until 1959, an adjunct to American-owned sugar plantations, nickel mines, and casinos, as Washington reserved to itself a 'right to intervene' to protect 'life, property, and individual liberty'. Panama was more or less the same. Puerto Rico was a protectorate, modeled on the British colony of Hong Kong, and it remains so today; it was joined by the informal protectorates of the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua (Stephanson, 1995: 75–8; Musicant, 1998: 210, 250–1;

Dallek, 1983: 22). The United States had carved out an empire in the Caribbean, and with Pearl Harbor and Manila, Guam (1,500 miles south of Japan), Wake (2,000 miles west of Hawaii), and Midway (2,200 miles east of Japan), stepping stones across the Pacific to a boundless maritime empire.

Less conspicuous was the simultaneous development of a Japanese empire in the Pacific, beginning with the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and the emergence of its first-rate navy; suddenly the 'West' was not empty of anyone who could effectively resist, the vast ocean was not a void, 'natives' had arisen who were formidable. Akira Iriye's life work has taught us how half a century of cooperation and rivalry, trust and distrust, friendship and secret war plans, accommodation and racism played out across the plain of the North Pacific as prelude to that 'sneak attack' at Pearl Harbor. Commodore Perry had awakened a sleeping giant that unaccountably gave off surprise after surprise: here were Orientals who were 'clean' and vigorous instead of 'torpid and slow', leaping forward instead of vegetating in the teeth of time. After a 'sudden revolution' the most isolated, exclusive, rigid, and conservative nation in Asia overnight had become 'the most active and enterprising'. This was an American, Henry M. Field, commenting in 1877, but this became the consensual American judgment after Perry: the Japanese are different, they give surprise, they are special, they are formidable – they are dangerous (Field quoted in Iriye, 1972: 13–14).

At the turn of the new century affairs again shifted out of plumb, as a new and clear direction came to a handful of critically placed Americans. An assassination brought Roosevelt to power, famously an 'exploding, radiating' force in his own right. But he was also a man of the world who believed in power politics and whose tenure coincided with the rise of a core of people who began to form a distinctively American disposition toward the world: John Hay (a protégé of Seward), Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan, Whitelaw Reid (publisher of the New York *Tribune*), and an academic named Woodrow Wilson. They remained true to the 19th-century dictum that expansion should be away from Europe, toward Asia and Central America (toward perceived vacuums), but they brought a considered new logic to America's place in the world: not only was the United States the embodiment of the new and Europe the personification of the old, but the affairs of the world itself should now be conducted on a new basis. Their worldview would not be constituted as the bedrock of American foreign policy for another half-century, when the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 and the British inability to defend Greece and Turkey in 1947 marked the emergence of the United States as the hegemonic power of our time.

PROVINCIALISM, AKA ISOLATIONISM

The non-Atlanticist worldview did not need concentrated expression in the 19th century, when no other power except England could really threaten the United

States. President James Polk settled the border between the United States and Canada in 1848, and effectively removed any British threat to the United States. In the 1840s and early 50s a concentrated expression of West-facing continentalism did emerge, known as Manifest Destiny. It was in this milieu that the United States began its relationship with Japan. But this soon disappeared as the country moved ever closer to Civil War. It would take another great crisis – the depression, the collapse of the world economy, and the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy – to concentrate the minds of continentalists of that era, the 1930s, really the only period in American history that could be called isolationist in a self-conscious sense. An example of such thinking is Samuel Crowther's *America Self-Contained*, a book written in 1933. When I checked it out of an enormous university library, it was the first time anyone had done so since 1949 – a nice symbol of the moribund status of Crowther's political economy by the time of the Korean War. Crowther was a publicist for Henry Ford, himself an industrialist with decidedly bizarre views from a liberal standpoint.

Crowther led off by saying that 'We in the US have today no friends among the nations of the earth. But we have many bitter enemies,' a nice mercantilist view that Richard Hofstadter would perhaps find paranoid. In Crowther's world nothing existed beyond the nation-state; this was his unit of analysis. He thought the United States should make its isolation more complete, 'shape our own destinies', instead of doing a lot of 'sordid international shop-keeping' in that 'old system of world economy'. Continuing to do so would only lead to an American standard of living 'fixed by the [world's] lowest common denominator'.

The logic of the system of world economy, he said, would inevitably lead to a 'world super-state with a planned economy', a preference internationalists hid under code words like 'economic interdependence' and Adam Smith's notion of an international division of labor. If the state of the world were as Smith described it, Crowther wrote, his counsel would be wholly logical. But the world was carved into feudatories called nations. Crowther identified internationalism and the New Deal with a dying 'old order', an Anglophile foreign policy, and a state meddling in the economy in *the wrong way* – mainly to redistribute wealth. Instead of a New Deal, the United States needed a new order. It was such thinking, of course, that led isolationists to flirt with European fascism.

The American nationalist was always made to seem 'the boorish provincial' instead of the patriot, while free traders lowered tariffs and let foreigners 'cavort without an admission fee in the largest market in the world'. The hallowed ground upon which internationalists trod was prepared by cosmopolite college professors at Eastern universities, all Anglophiles who deemed Adam Smith a genius. Crowther, however, thought the internationalists, economists and world bankers displayed 'a strange dementia' which assumed that the world of their theories was the world that existed.

Crowther preferred German mercantilism. Remembering that Friedrich List had lived in Pennsylvania for a while and was a confidant of James Madison

and Andrew Jackson, Crowther sought to Americanize Listian thought. List had helped Germany set up its railroad system, a good 'national' industry, and had recommended that the American South stop shipping cotton to England, since the exchange put the United States in a dependency relationship. Only one American economist could measure up to List, he said, and that was none other than Henry C. Carey.

Sounding like Kim Il Sung expounding on the 'Juche' idea, Crowther invoked Friedrich List to the effect that a high tariff policy has the advantage of 'securing the interior market against all events, fluctuations of prices, and against all changes in the political and economical conditions of other nations'.

Crowther defined 'freedom' as America's national freedom to do what it wanted and to maintain its independence of action. Early Americans had the right idea, viewing imports as destructive and exports as constructive: 'We don't need to import a nickle's worth.' Internationalists saw the world as 'one big happy family', but it was actually a feuding nightmare: better to make a happy family at home, 'giving over America to the Americans'.

England was for him the great antagonist of the American political economy, with New England the regional expression in the national market. All the panics and depressions of the 19th century were British-induced, he thought; cotton exports put the United States 'exactly in the position of any one-crop country, such as Cuba or Brazil today'; the advanced technology and superior position in the world economy of England meant that, as a late developer, the United States had to import-substitute in glass, tin, and various other industries, with high tariffs essential lest the industries 'could not get a start'. Furthermore England kept the United States on raw materials dependence, even when American industry was competitive. Germany had suffered from British dominance, and thus put great effort into its chemicals industry – seeking to make synthetically what it could not import. The United States can do the same: 'by chemical means we freed ourselves from every material foreign clutch'.

The United States could not hope to sell in markets dominated by England and, the implication was, it would have to find regions where England was not dominant (which tended to be the Americas and East Asia), or stay at home. The free traders and internationalists did not understand this, and pinned their hopes on cooperation with England. Their fantastic theories had finally, in the depression, led America to ruin: 'Grouping bankers and socialists together as, to be elegant, the morticians of an era, is in no sense cynical but a plain statement of fact'.

In another book written with George Peek, Crowther remarked brilliantly of Roosevelt and other New Dealers, 'they would remake the United States as an incident to remaking the world', something rather close to the truth. For 'America's choice' in coming years, the authors provided a Chinese menu: Column A was internationalism and Column B 'policy for America', meaning high tariffs, control over capital export, a good Navy to defend the Panama Canal, and so on (Peek and Crowther, 1936: 12).

Many isolationists were much less coherent than Crowther; we do not speak here of introspective and thoughtful people given to explication of their motives. But it is the self-contained political economy, with a unilateralist foreign policy, that structures the fundamental conceptions of the isolationist current, of American nationalism, and of 'Asia firsters'. Isolationists did have a foreign policy: it was expansionism in regions 'open' to their interests, especially the Pacific. They tended to support Roosevelt's Latin American policies, but always hoped to avoid British empire-building.

Much of this account would be familiar to historians of the 1930s. But the idea that concrete interests and a very different conception of political economy motivated isolationists and the right wing rarely penetrated comment on the political conflicts of the early post-Second World War period (when internationalists were dominant, but former isolationists fought strong rearguard actions). Instead the dominant interpretation was a psychological one: Hofstadter's paranoid style, or Daniel Bell's judgment that the 'radical right' was rebelling against 'modernity', frustrated and discomfited by a new world they did not understand. 'Insofar as there is no real left to counterpose to the right, the liberal has become the psychological target of that frustration,' he wrote, a statement that implicitly assumed liberal innocence. At times Bell hinted at a political-economic basis for this frustration, linking rightists to 'the automobile dealers, real estate manipulators, [and] oil wildcatters' (Bell, 1963: 47). But the modal emphasis among sociologists and political scientists studying the right wing was to seek psychological explanation for aberrant viewpoints, rather than to probe into economic interests or conceptions of political economy.

Remnant isolationism evaporated in the early 1950s: Eisenhower's victory over Robert Taft in the 1952 election clinched this victory. Taftism in the Midwest and elsewhere combined Westward-leaning, nationalist, and isolationist constituencies with a principled position on federal spending, *including* a limited defense budget. Defense spending had quadrupled under Truman and was the fuel for a huge standing army, a national security state, and a massive military-industrial complex. At \$50 billion (the 1952 figure) defense was over 50 percent of the federal budget; meanwhile the entire federal expenditure from 1787 to 1917 was a little under \$30 billion (Mills, 1956: 212n).

Taft was primarily a conservative champion of small and medium business and an opponent of federal spending and regulation. Highly intelligent and respected for his integrity, he was never terribly interested in foreign affairs (like most of his countrymen), but nonetheless embodied principles that went back to Washington's farewell address. He consistently argued that American security could never be fully guaranteed, and to seek this would end up creating a garrison state and a permanent war economy. European quarrels would never end; the United States should stay out of them. America was isolated by geography, even in the age of airpower, and that was a good thing. A seventy-group Air Force, a formidable Navy that did not duplicate the Air Force's strategic mission, and a small

atomic arsenal would provide a sufficient and relatively inexpensive defense, he thought; a large standing army was anathema to the American experience, but the Navy had a venerable tradition and airpower was a high-technology gift that would allow America to stand apart from Europe, as it always had. It might once have been the case that foreign enemies would take a modestly armed America lightly, Taft believed, but the spectacle of an immensely productive power creating a world-beating military machine in a matter of months after Pearl Harbor, would not be lost on anyone (Hogan, 1998: 99–101, 141–3, 394–6).

It is, of course, impossible to imagine what a president like Bob Taft would have done about the wars in Korea and Vietnam, or the Cold War challenge from the Soviet Union and China. The point is that his voice was stilled, and that voice was as old as the United States itself, had been dominant just a decade earlier, and reached a particular height of sophistication in the work – the very popular work – of historian Charles Beard. In 1952 a large Republican constituency was cut adrift from its own history, and never found a coherent stance on America's relationship to the world thereafter. For the next half-century a bipartisan internationalist coalition, committed to the Cold War and high defense budgets, dominated American foreign policy and almost anyone who dissented seriously from their basic tenets was tarred with the brush of isolationism, pro-communism, or simply 'Neanderthal' thinking. Cranks like Patrick Buchanan and Ross Perot sought to appeal to Taft's historic constituency on foreign policy grounds in the 1990s, with Buchanan harking back to 1930s nationalist themes and getting nowhere, while Perot (a know-nothing on world affairs) was instrumental in handing the White House to Clinton in 1992. His 'big sucking sound' (jobs going to Mexico or China) now has an important constituency, but this borderline southerner/Texan from Texarkana could never be elected president.

THE GREAT CRESCENT

After President Roosevelt died in 1945, Dean Acheson became, in effect, the vicar of US foreign policy through the critical and pivotal early Cold War years. He embodied the fullness of American ambition during and after the Second World War, and expressed it concisely in a speech delivered at Yale shortly after Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, entitled 'An American Attitude Toward Foreign Affairs'. As he later said in reflecting back on this speech, he had really sought to 'begin work on a new postwar world system'. 'Our vital interests,' Acheson said, 'do not permit us to be indifferent to the outcome' of the wars in Europe and Asia; nor was it possible for Americans to remain isolated from them – unless they wished a kind of eternal 'internment on this continent' (only an Anglophile like Acheson would liken North America to a concentration camp). He located the causes of the war and the global depression that preceded it in 'the failure of some mechanisms of the Nineteenth Century world economy'

that had led to 'this break-up of the world into exclusive areas for armed exploitation administered along oriental [*sic*] lines'. In its time, 'the economic and political system of the Nineteenth Century ... produced an amazing increase in the production of wealth', but for many years it had been in an 'obvious process of decline'.

Reconstruction of the foundations of peace would require new mechanisms: ways to make capital available for industrial production, the removal of tariffs, 'a broader market for goods made under decent standards', 'a stable international monetary system', and the removal of 'exclusive or preferential trade arrangements'. The world economy was his main emphasis, but in good Achesonian *realpolitik* fashion he also called for the immediate creation of 'a navy and air force adequate to secure us in both oceans simultaneously and with striking power sufficient to reach to the other side of each of them' (Acheson, 1965: 216–17, 267–5).

Acheson later had the opportunity to implement these ideas, first at Bretton Woods, then with the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and finally with NSC 68 in 1950 (which tripled US defense spending); he is the person who comes closest to being the singular architect of American strategy from 1944 to 1953. Postwar American foreign policy privileged the externalization of the regulated Open Door that Roosevelt had developed at home in the 1930s (this is what Bretton Woods was about), moved toward a two-world anti-communist containment strategy in 1947–50, and pursued a half-hearted anti-colonialism that never found a winning strategy in regard to strong anti-colonial movements – which soon swept the colonial world.

US policy toward East Asia, which in its essential elements has persisted for more than 70 years, can be easily summarized. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his key advisor George F. Kennan saw Japan as the linchpin of regional security and political economy. If for Kennan this was because Japan had the only complete industrial base in East Asia, and therefore the only formidable war-making power, for Acheson Japan was the centerpiece of a 'great crescent' stretching from Alexandria to Tokyo, in which Middle Eastern oil (oceans of which were now flowing into the world economy) would provide the cheap energy to fuel the revival of Japan's steel, auto and electronics industries, leading to a spurt of export-led development centered on the vast American market that propelled rapid growth rates for 40 years from the early 1950s onward, a model then transplanted to South Korea and Taiwan (highest growth rates in the world from the 1960s to the late 1990s), thence to China – highest growth rates in the world from the 1980s to the first decade of the 21st century (Cumings, 1990).

Amid the general success of the great crescent, two wars occurred that would have flabbergasted Acheson and Kennan – had someone told them at the end of the Second World War that the United States would fight two major wars in Asia and not be able to win either of them. The mote in their eyes was a failure to

understand the unprecedented strength of anti-colonial, revolutionary nationalism. Today Korea remains divided, a recalcitrant North Korea still refusing to join a world economy led by the United States, whereas Vietnam, after it won its war, had the self-confidence to join that world and become, in essence, what Acheson expected it to become: another success for export-led development.

The trade-off for this regional growth was to make of Japan and South Korea semi-sovereign countries, as the United States kept each on a defense dependency and stationed tens of thousands of troops in each nation, and to make of the Pacific an American lake, with no naval rival remotely comparable to the prewar Japanese Navy. Each capital dealt with the United States through its foreign ministry with very little horizontal diplomacy, a hub-and-spokes system quite unlike Western Europe, and lacking the alphabet-soup international organizations like NATO or the European Union. East Asia therefore has no regional autonomy of its own, nor a theory of international relations that is its own; everything is borrowed, or dependent on the United States (Inoguchi, 2007).

When export-led growth transformed China into the second-largest economy in the world, however, there emerged a formidable economic partner and strategic rival with its own independent military. Still not remotely strong enough to challenge American military power at this writing, and thus expanding by halting half-steps in the South and East China Seas, it seems inevitable that this will be the most important relationship throughout the 21st century. With a burgeoning literature on 'the coming war with China', it might be useful to examine what both countries have in common.

China and the United States are both continental nations, of geographically similar size. Both have experienced prolonged periods of non-involvement with the rest of the world – China through centuries in which the Han majority expanded on the continent, almost by accretion, with only a brief heyday of world trade in the 11th century; America through nearly two centuries (the 1780s to the 1940s) of relative isolation and indifference to events abroad. With a couple of exceptions like Tibet, most neighbors lived at peace with China and to varying degrees (Korea and Vietnam a lot, Japan less so) emulated its arts and letters, philosophy, statecraft, and social institutions. Meanwhile American borders have been peaceful for 150 years, if entirely permeable by Mexicans. China's legendary self-absorption and self-sufficiency, compounded by its solipsistic (or at least Sino-centric) sense of cultural superiority and civilizational centrality as the Middle Kingdom, nonetheless led to a kind of benign neglect of its near neighbors. America's provincialism and self-absorption are harder to detect, because they are so organic to the majority of the people that they are not matters for reflection – not really worth talking about. (In a single generation three foreign-born people were the most important national security advisors to their presidents: Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Madeleine Albright – how often does this happen in any other country?)

Welcoming a reformed but non-insurgent China into the world economy was always at the core of Franklin Roosevelt and Dean Acheson's strategy, but the

Korean War intervened and postponed that outcome until Richard Nixon saw value in using communism to contain communism (based on the Sino-Soviet split), and accomplished the one fundamental and consequential turn in American strategy toward East Asia since the 1940s: his 'opening' to China was a master stroke, and after Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1979, China joined the world economy on a platform similar to – but vastly bigger and thus more consequential – the export-led strategies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. By the turn of the 21st century, China's great leap outward was so impressive that leading Americans did not know whether to continue welcoming it, or openly fear it. Candidate Donald Trump became the first successful presidential candidate to single out China for a cascade of (usually ill-informed) abuse since Nixon's opening, but where that might lead is anybody's guess at this writing.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR led to the final realization of the one-world system that FDR and Acheson hoped would emerge after the Second World War, with a true Pax Americana: the United States as the sole superpower. It also appeared to spawn the strongest resurgence of indifference toward the rest of the world, if not necessarily isolationism, since 1941. Two years before 9/11 a major opinion poll asked Americans to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the United States: fully 21 percent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered 'don't know'), and a mere 7 percent listed foreign policy concerns among problems that were important to the country. The attacks on the Twin Towers disrupted that somnolent apathy, but with the manifest failures of the Iraq War, recent polls show a growing isolationism again (Reilly, 1999: 8, 37; Kohut and Stokes, 2006.) In the late 1980s an officially sponsored and greatly popular television documentary series, *Elegy for the Yellow River*, castigated China's ingrown, navel-contemplating, sedentary and land-bound culture and argued that China would have to join with Western civilization or risk disintegration and oblivion (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 33). The United States could use criticism along the same lines. So, a curious isolationist affinity may be one of the deepest historical and cultural elements between the two peoples, paradoxically under-girding the chances for Sino-American peace. If so, it is one among many other affinities.

A RISING NATIONALISM AND UNILATERALISM IN THE US

It never occurred to me that George W. Bush, a Texas governor with few accomplishments he could call his own, would depart so completely from the internationalism bred into the bones of his father and grandfather. Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq and the failures that followed brought into being the broadest coalition among Atlanticists and Europeans since the Marshall Plan, pushed East Asia policy to the back burner for eight years, and occasioned an almost seamless opposition in the leading organs of internationalist opinion. Bush also combined

unilateralism and confidence in the efficacy of force with a Cotton Mather-like belief in good and evil and the messianic idealism of a Woodrow Wilson running amok at the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates – except that Wilson was as notable for compromising his doctrine of democracy and self-determination (regarding all the colonies, for example) as for promoting it in the first place. With its designation of ‘Islamic fascism’ as the global enemy, Bush’s foreign policy became a parody of Robert Taft’s critique: ‘no one has ever suggested before that a single nation should range over the world, like a knight-errant, protect democracy and ideals of good faith, and tilt, like Don Quixote, against the windmills of fascism’ (Patterson, 1972: 198). Historically, however, American unilateralism was associated with different ideas: no foreign entanglements; no encumbering alliances; the salutary shelter of two great oceans; no lurches outward in search of dragons to slay.

As the Iraq War ground on, centrist elites were indeed warning about a new isolationism, already showing up prominently in public opinion polls. Of course the attacks on 9/11 and the Iraq War did lead to a big, bubbling, spreading debate, but for the most part it consisted of liberals who either opposed the war and found confirmation in its catastrophic aftermath, or liberals who had initially supported the war but thought the occupation was conducted badly (probably a majority); and on the other side conservatives, almost all of whom had supported the invasion but who later divided over how bad things had gotten and who was to blame.

The presidency of Barack Obama represented a full return to internationalism, to the essential underpinnings of the postwar order, with a distinct allergy to new, unilateral interventions, and by 2011, a much-vaunted ‘pivot’ away from the Middle East and toward the Asia/Pacific. However he never escaped the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Syrian civil war led to a perplexed non-intervention that satisfied no one. His Asia pivot was likewise unfulfilled, differing little from the entrenched American presence in the region now entering its eighth decade. In a lengthy interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in *The Atlantic* shortly before he left office, president Obama gave the fullest expression of his foreign policy views (Goldberg, 2016). His distaste for interventionism stemmed from his disdain for the Washington foreign policy establishment. ‘There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It’s a playbook that comes out of the foreign-policy establishment ... [it] describes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses.’ He sought disengagement from Afghanistan and Iraq, but not disengagement in general: he learned that very little is accomplished in international affairs without US leadership. ‘There is not a summit I’ve attended since I’ve been president where we are not setting the agenda, where we are not responsible for the key results.’ (This might be a concise definition of what hegemonic power means.)

Obama drew for his interviewer a four-box grid showing the main schools of American foreign policy: isolationism, realism, liberal interventionism, and

internationalism. Isolationism, he predictably said, was untenable. He put himself in the internationalist box, but notice that the usual reflex to 'idealism' has been replaced by liberal interventionism, which he went on to implicitly denounce; the case of Libya was foremost in his mind: 'It didn't work.' 'Libya is a mess,' he said, 'a shit show' – this from the president whose mantra became 'don't do stupid shit'. Jeffrey Goldberg remarked, 'today the opinions of humanitarian interventionists do not seem to move him.' Real power, Obama said, 'means you can get what you want without having to exert violence'; here is another lesson in what effective hegemonic power looks like.

Donald Trump is now president, and judging by his campaign rhetoric, is an American nationalist of the first order. His appeals to racism and anti-immigrant sentiment, his opposition to free trade, his determination to slap tariffs on exporters to the American market put him right in line with prominent isolationists of the 1930s, like Samuel Crowther. Trump tapped into the same 'blue-collar Republicans' that Ronald Reagan did ('Reagan Democrats'). But he also did very well among blue-collar voters in reliably Democratic states, and especially among less educated voters. But he won 49 percent of Republicans in the bluest of blue states, Massachusetts, and is clearly capable of making heavy inroads in the Democratic base. Part of his appeal is racism and anti-immigrant sentiment; but it is also his opposition to free trade. Both are winners for him: Nate Silver of the website FiveThirtyEight found the largest single correlation between Mr Trump support and the number of racist web searches by state (Cohn, 2016).

What is less recognized is his apparent willingness to undermine or remove the fundamental security strategy of the United States since 1945: not opposing free trade or Atlanticism, even though he does that, but regarding the archipelago of empire structured by 900+ military bases around the world, including tens of thousands of troops on most major economic competitors – the UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Spain among others – which keeps them on defense dependencies (something particularly true of Germany, Japan and South Korea), and exercises a not-to-be-used, subtle, light hold on their jugular. It is an unprecedented system whereby the world's leading power utilizes a so-called 'external state' to maintain order among the great powers, exceptions of course being China, Russia, and France – which told Lyndon Johnson to take American troops home in 1967. Nothing like this system existed before the Second World War; it is inconceivable, say, that the UK would have had troops on the territory of France or Germany. This is a global system hardly ever talked about, hidden in plain sight so to speak. But it completely neutered the operation of *realpolitik* among the Western European countries and Japan.

During his campaign Trump complained that 'we defend everybody', often free of charge: however, 'we will not be ripped off anymore', as he threatened to withdraw 'American protection' from Japan and South Korea, including the nuclear umbrella, saying why don't they defend themselves against North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles. It would be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia too, if it

and other Middle Eastern allies don't start contributing seriously to fighting the wars at their doorstep. 'If Saudi Arabia was without the cloak of American protection,' Trump said, 'I don't think it would be around.' Trump said he would like to renegotiate security pacts with Japan and South Korea and other countries, unless they start 'paying their way'. (South Korea contributes about 55 percent of the cost of maintaining American troops on its soil.) NATO agreements should also be renegotiated, because NATO is 'unfair, economically, to us'. Asked by the editors of the *New York Times* if he was isolationist, he said he was 'not isolationist, but I am America First. I like the expression'. When asked when was the peak of American power, he reached back to Theodore Roosevelt, and also said two of his favorite Americans were generals Douglas MacArthur and George S. Patton (Sanger and Haberman, 2016).

The cunning of history is such that its emissaries sometimes arrive in strange form – like Donald Trump. Andrew Bacevich's 2005 critique of American power cut deep, and coincided with my own sense that the magnitude of our crisis requires a complete rethinking of America's relationship to the world. Professor Bacevich, a former military officer whose son died fighting in Iraq, presented a number of principles, the first of which was to 'heed the intentions of the founders'. Nothing in the Constitution, he argued, 'commits or even encourages the United States to employ military power to save the rest of humankind or remake the world in its own image'. He went on to argue for Congress to reassert its constitutional obligations in foreign affairs, 'to view force as a last resort', to limit American dependence on foreign resources, to organize US forces for national defense rather than power projection, and finally, to reconcile the professional military with the realities of American society. These principles, which I share, would call for a full rethinking of the many American garrisons abroad (the military archipelago), and truly significant reductions in defense spending – so we can bring ourselves into consonance with what all our advanced industrial allies spend (Bacevich, 2005: 208–21).

It is utterly forgotten that the five sides, five stories, five rings, and seventeen and a half miles of corridors making up the Pentagon (for which ground was broken on September 11, 1941, exactly 60 years before 9/11), were to revert to civilian uses after the war. It is forgotten that Franklin Roosevelt wanted a post-war peace in which America would be *primus inter pares* in Europe, in pursuit of two goals: first, 'a radical reduction in the weight of Europe, in effect to preside over its indefinite retirement from the international scene,' in John Lamberton Harper's words; these arrangements would have to be 'drastic and definitive enough' to realize the second – and more important – goal: 'to allow the United States to return to its natural Western Hemisphere and Pacific habitat and preoccupations – but with one eye cocked toward Europe and able to exercise long-range striking power ... to be able to arbitrate from afar' (Harper, 1996: 79). The first arrangement turned into a host of American military bases and American-dominated multilateral organizations, which did effectively retire West Germany,

Italy, England and Japan as ‘normal’ or pre-war big powers – but FDR did not have a permanent archipelago of bases in mind.

Roosevelt’s second point seems radical in our context, but it summarized 150 years of foreign policy conducted according to the principles of George Washington and John Quincy Adams. Then Roosevelt died young, and the Cold War and the hot wars in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq built a far different system: precisely the intensive close-up ‘arbitration’ and gross over-extension that Robert Taft and Charles Beard warned about just as the Truman Doctrine came into view: as Beard put it, Washington had now ‘set out on an unlimited program of underwriting, by money and military ‘advice’’, poverty-stricken, feeble and instable [eds.: *sic*] governments around the edges of the gigantic and aggressive Slavic Empire’. In this way, ‘the domestic affairs of the American people became appendages to an aleatory expedition in the management of the world’. Beard counseled ‘a prudent recognition and calculation of the limits on power’, lest the United States suffer ‘a terrible defeat in a war’ – like the ‘wrecks of overextended empires scattered through the centuries’ (Beard, 1947: 580, 592–3, 597).

The upshot seems to be that American foreign relations have a remarkable continuity throughout the history of the country: an aversion to Europe and what became known as Atlanticism, in favor of continentalism and a preference for ‘facing West’; that is by far the longest-lasting tendency; and its virtual opposite, the consensus of the small foreign policy elite on Atlanticism and internationalism that appeared to be dominant through most of our lifetimes – but is seriously under threat for the first time in more than 70 years. So long as the hidden external state, in the form of a myriad of military bases on foreign soil, is not undermined, probably internationalism will prevail, nothing really fundamental will change, and America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea will persist. But not if President Trump were to follow through on his campaign promises.

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Australian Foreign Policy

Michael Wesley

INTRODUCTION

Australia joined the international system when it was colonised by Britain in 1788. Prior to that time, Australia had been populated by its indigenous inhabitants for over 40,000 years, but Aboriginal society had little contact with the outside world, other than occasional trade in *trepang* (sea slugs) with merchants from Makassar in today's Indonesia. European explorers had known of Australia since the early 17th century, but had judged it to be of little commercial interest, compared to the abundant riches of Asia. London's perception of Australia's strategic importance changed following the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the American War of Independence (1775–1783). Both of these conflicts had shown that rivalries among Europe's great powers would now play out on a global scale during the age of imperialism, and that strategic vulnerabilities far from Europe could be exploited to the disadvantage of rivals on the European continent. Britain had seized the Philippine Islands from Spain during the Seven Years' War but returned them to Madrid under the Treaty of Paris, an experience that demonstrated to the Royal Navy the importance of strategic bases along the crucial Indo-Pacific trade route. Eastern Australia and some adjacent islands had been observed to grow tall, straight pine trees and wild flax plants, crucial to the maintenance of British naval power in the age of sail, and particularly important as the supply of pine and flax from the eastern Baltic became less assured amid rising great power rivalry there.¹

Modern Australia, then, was the product of the age of imperialism. Unlike other colonies established during the 'Second British Empire', Australia was a settler

colony. In an age when Britain preferred to rule through local elites, the colonisation of Australia took place on the pattern of the 'First British Empire' in North America: the indigenous inhabitants were ruthlessly pushed aside, and the continent was progressively populated by European immigrants. Rather than building on local governance, British institutions were imported directly. The political divisions and dynamics of 18th- and 19th-century Britain migrated with the immigrants, structuring Australian politics to this day.² Economically, the colony was integrated with the British economy, producing those things that the expanding British Empire needed during the age of high imperialism. Unsurprisingly, most Australians saw themselves as members of the British nation, a conviction which took on an increasingly hierarchical and racist cast as Social Darwinism gained intellectual ascendancy in the latter part of the 19th century. Australians bought in fully to the idea of the Anglo-Saxon ascendancy: that the English-speaking peoples were the epitome of human evolution, having forged the greatest advances in politics and governance, finance and economics, technology and industry, and science and culture. To this cast of mind, the colonisation of North America, Australasia and Southern Africa was a form of 'manifest destiny' – the bringing of the blessings of British rule to large parts of the earth's surface as a universal service to humankind.

Consequently, Australians were ardent imperialists, sending troops to fight in the wars of the British Empire in Sudan in 1885, South Africa in 1899, and China in 1900. It was because Britain was not seen to back the Australian colonies' desire to extend British rule into Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific Islands strongly enough that a significant rift opened up with London, giving impetus to the movement for federation and independence from Whitehall.³ Federation and independence in 1901 did not confer a fully fledged foreign policy for Australia. Despite tensions over Britain's perceived indifference to Australia's strategic interests in the Pacific, Australia still saw itself as an integral member of the British Empire. But almost immediately, complications began to develop for the new nation. The first Act passed by the Australian Parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act, colloquially known as the 'White Australia Policy', which was primarily designed to keep Asian immigrants from settling in Australia. This created further tension with Whitehall, which was in the process of negotiating the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which was signed in 1902. The British, rightly, anticipated that the Japanese government would find this policy offensive, and tried to convince Australia to soften or abolish the legislation. Australia refused. Even more disturbing for Australia was the realisation that a primary driver for the Anglo-Japanese alliance was Britain's conviction that with growing naval rivalry with Germany in Europe, the Empire could not afford to maintain a credible presence in the Pacific; hence Japan would patrol the Empire's interests in the Pacific. Especially after the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Australia's leaders were more inclined to see Japan as a threat rather than a protector. Tensions between Australia and Britain rose further when

London came to a secret agreement with Tokyo that Japan would maintain control of the Marshall and Mariana Islands it had seized from Germany during the First World War.⁴

These were early signs of an enduring tension that has run through Australian foreign policy ever since. From the point of colonisation, Australia has been a member of the most powerful and privileged group of nations on earth: first the British Empire, then the US alliance system. This has made Australia wealthy and secure beyond the dreams of many other states. And yet, Australia sits at the opposite ends of the earth from the current centres of global power. It abuts Asia, a continent colonised and subordinated during the age of imperialism that gave birth to modern Australia. The coming of independence and development to Asia has had contradictory implications for Australia. On the one hand, the process of economic development in Asia has allowed Australia to maintain its level of prosperity. The demand of Asian economies for Australia's resources, energy and agricultural products emerged just as the traditional sources of demand in Europe dried up. But on the other hand, the rise of Asia poses stark challenges to the world order in which Australia has always been such a privileged member. The emergence of Asian great powers inevitably heralds the relative decline of European and American great powers, along with their ability to set and enforce global norms that chime with their (and Australia's) preferences and cultural predilections. So Australia sits at the cusp of an old international order it is comfortable with, and a new international order that is unfamiliar and challenging yet – because of its geographic location – utterly compelling. Understanding Australian foreign policy is therefore a process of understanding how its governments seek to manage this enduring tension: in terms of Australia's conceptions of its role in the world; its security; and its international economic engagement.

AUSTRALIA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

The position or orientation that a country sees itself as having in relation to the world sits at the foundations of its foreign policy. Role conceptions – 'policy makers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions their state should ... perform on a continuing basis'⁵ – as well as role prescriptions – the position that other states see the subject state as playing internationally – both inform a country's sense of its position in the world.⁶ As states pay ever greater attention to the importance of their 'soft power' in influencing the perceptions and policies of other states towards them, many have become more explicit in defining their state's international role, and drawing more explicit links between this role in the political values of their own political system.

Exploring Australia's international role conceptions provides a useful place to begin examining the tensions which beset Australian foreign policy, and the role

that foreign policy plays in trying to reconcile these tensions. Often different role conceptions are deployed by different parties in the heat of political contests; at other times, alternative role conceptions can be useful for different international contexts. The conceptions of Australia's place in the world deployed by its foreign policy makers tend to cluster around three dominant images, each drawing on particular political values, foreign policy traditions, and orienting Australia to a particular set of preoccupations and commitments in the world around it.⁷

The first of these images, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that of a western country. This tradition reflects Australia's origins as a modern nation as a creation of the British Empire. The image of Australia as a western country tends to be most strongly advanced by the conservative side of politics in Australia, which believes that Australian society is most strongly defined by the traditions it has inherited from Britain and Europe: Westminster democracy, the rule of common law, a free market economy, and commitments to individual rights and equality. Many Australians believe that these are the values that the long era of western ascendancy in international affairs have bequeathed to the international society of states. From free trade and navigation to the international rule of law to the 'parliamentary diplomacy' of global institutions such as the United Nations to the use of the English language as the lingua franca of international diplomacy and commerce, there is much in the current world order with which Australians are familiar and comfortable. The corollary of this role conception for Australian foreign policy is the maintenance of strong alliances with the leaders of the western international order – the United States and Europe – and the staunch defence of the western-influenced institutions of global order.

The perceptions of Australia as a western country have been deepened by its energetic participation in the defining conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries. The legacy of 'Anglo-Saxonism' – a belief in the superiority of British institutions and therefore a special British role in the world – persisted long into the 20th century. Australia's longest serving Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, told his fellow Australians in 1943:

You and I are Australians. We are also British. We do not and cannot think of the other British nations as foreign people. They are all within the great British tradition – a tradition which has given the world the spirit and machinery of self-government, free institutions, justice within the law.⁸

It was the spirit of bringing superior civilisation to the natives that informed Australia's colonial administration of Papua after it assumed control from the British in 1906.⁹ Later, as the First World War came to be defined in Britain not as a great power struggle but as an existential clash between democracy and authoritarianism, Australia's leaders happily defined Australia's contributions as contributing to the efforts of the democracies. Again during the Second World War, Australian leaders exhorted their fellow citizens to greater efforts by describing the struggle as a fight against militarism and dictatorship. Then, as the

post-war era degenerated into a Cold War between the Soviet bloc and America and its allies, Australia's leaders once again defined Australia's commitments according to the values that defined Australia, and which they argued were at stake in the battle against communism.¹⁰ Australia sent troops to the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and allowed the development of joint intelligence facilities with the United States on Australian soil, which were to play a significant role in the global nuclear balance.¹¹ After the Cold War, as the struggle against Islamist terrorism became a defining conflict of the early 21st century, Australia played a prominent role, sending troops to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and continuing to provide air power and military training to the Iraqi fight against the Islamic State. Australian leaders consistently spoke of Australia's efforts in the 'War on Terror' in terms of the defence of western liberal democratic values.

It was this strong identification with western values that facilitated Australia's seamless transition from the British Empire to the American alliance system. As early as 1908, during the visit of the United States' 'Great White Fleet' to Sydney, Australian opinion showed its comfort with the United States as a significant security presence in the South Pacific and a possible security partner for Australia:

We welcome the American officers and men as in the main kinsmen, as representatives of a nation whose institutions are identical in spirit and almost identical in form to our own ... if it ever has to come to seeking the protection of another power our people could probably turn instinctively to Uncle Sam.¹²

In the space of a generation, the *Sydney Mail's* speculation had become a reality. In 1941, confronted with the Japanese advance through Southeast Asia, Prime Minister John Curtin wrote: 'Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.'¹³ Australia's strong identification with western cultural-political values facilitated its positioning in some of the innermost councils of the western alliance, some of which seemed quite out of proportion to Australia's sheer strategic importance to the alliance. Prime among these was its membership of the UK–USA intelligence agreement, in which the intelligence sharing among the 'five eyes' nations – the United States, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – is more seamless and less inhibited than with other allies.¹⁴

While on the surface, Australia's identification as a western country seemed to speak of strength, it also carried deep undercurrents of vulnerability. In a world defined by political and cultural values, Australia seems a long way away from the bastions of those values. Menzies captured Australian fears memorably:

Situated as we are in the world, washed on our western and northern shores by potentially hostile seas, and numerically incapable – despite intense defence preparations – of defending ourselves for long against all-out attack by a great power ... if ... a war comes, the business of foreign policy is to see that we enter with great and powerful friends.¹⁵

So the foreign policy corollary of the western country identification is an alliance with a 'great and powerful friend' of similar political and cultural values. This is the most consistent strand of Australia's foreign policy; since European colonisation, Australia has never been without a powerful, Anglo-Saxon democracy as its ally. These alliances have not only allowed Australia to bolster its military strength, enhance its intelligence capacity, avail itself of (British, then American) naval reassurance and (the American) nuclear umbrella, but to gain a voice in key international issues and forums through its deep connections with its great and powerful friends. For many Australian policy makers, the alliance gives Australia greater diplomatic gravitas, while imposing the obligation on Australian foreign policy to be a staunch defender of western values and western-informed global institutions.

Despite the depth of the western role conception in Australia's foreign policy psyche, it has not been without its critics. Many argue that modern, multicultural Australia is no longer as clearly western as it once was; with the migration of millions of people from Asia to Australia, Australian foreign policy should reflect less western and more post-colonial perspectives. Others argue that the western mindset that underpins Australia's dependence on its western ally deprives its policy makers of the ability to think independently and creatively about the outside world. A 'dependent ally', they argue, will always tend to see the world through American eyes, and follow the United States into conflicts in which Australia has no direct interest.¹⁶ Others have argued that the alliance makes Australia less, not more secure, because it places Australia in danger of becoming a target in a global nuclear exchange (courtesy of the joint intelligence facilities) or a terrorist attack (thanks to Australia's high-profile involvement in the 'War on Terror'). Another line of critique is that Australia's western identification is a barrier to more effective engagement with a rising Asia. Many Asian countries, particularly those once colonised by western countries, tend to be suspicious of western countries as cynical and exploitive; according to these critics, Australia's western identification often tends to complicate its efforts to build genuine partnerships with such countries. While its western identification is the oldest and most stable role conception underlying Australian foreign policy, it is not without its critics, who have different conceptions of Australia's role in the world.

The second role conception held by Australian foreign policy elites is of an internationalist 'middle power'. The concept of middle powers dates back to 16th-century Italy, and has evolved into a partly structural, partly behavioural identifier. Structurally, middle powers are defined as being neither so big that they intimidate other states or rely on physical force to achieve what they need to; but nor are they too small to be ignored. Behaviourally, middle powers are inclined to work to strengthen international norms and institutions that regulate the behaviour of powerful states and provide a voice for smaller states.¹⁷ To the holders of this conception of Australia's role in the world, this is a good description of Australia's structural position – too small to bully its way to outcomes but big

enough to be taken seriously – and should therefore be the key to orienting its foreign policy behaviour. To those who hold this role conception – mainly on the left of the Australian political spectrum – Australia should spend the greater part of its diplomatic energies in working to strengthen international norms and institutions. Australia will always be too small to defend itself alone, and will pay a major price if international relations lapses back to the ‘law of the jungle’ balance of power world that pre-dated the multilateral era. Australia, they argue, has powerful attributes that allow it to play a creative middle power role: a well trained and resourced diplomatic corps; long experience and expertise in operating in multilateral settings; and an intuitive understanding of global norms and a native grasp of the international lingua franca.

The roots of internationalist middle-powerism in Australia date back to the years following the First World War, as Australian elites joined an international movement rejecting war and power politics and advocating regulating states behaviour through international institutions. By virtue of Australia’s sacrifices in the war, Prime Minister Billy Hughes sought and won an independent Australian voice at the Versailles peace talks, and Australia became a founding member of the League of Nations. Much to the irritation of other leaders, Hughes showed himself adept at achieving his objectives at the conference. The most emphatic early articulation of middle-powerism into Australian foreign policy came at the hands of H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs between 1941 and 1949. In participating in the building of a multilateral system that protected the great and small alike, Evatt argued that Australia would at times need to diverge from the preferences of its great and powerful friends:

[T]he people of Australia have developed their own point of view and a mind of their own ... we have certain needs and interests related, for example, to security, the development of our country and the maintenance of our social and economic standards, and ... we will take positive steps to attain them in accordance with the ideals of international collaboration.¹⁸

Evatt played a vigorous role in the negotiations to establish the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, and was elected as the first President of the UN General Assembly.

Others took the conception of Australia as a middle power and moulded their own nuances into it. In 1964 the Liberal Garfield Barwick, as Minister for External Affairs, suggested another way of thinking about the possibilities of this role for Australia:

Australia is a middle power in more senses than one. It is clearly one in the general sense in which the expression is used. But it also has common interests with both the advanced and the under-developed countries; it stands in point of realised wealth between the haves and the have-nots. It is at one time a granary and a highly industrialised country. It has a European background and it is set in intimate geographic propinquity to Asia.¹⁹

Evatt’s and Barwick’s successor Gareth Evans was a committed middle-powerist, achieving great success in the multilateralist flowering that occurred at the end

of the Cold War. He provided perhaps the clearest framework for middle power diplomacy when he wrote:

The characteristic method of middle power diplomacy is coalition-building with 'like-minded' countries. It also usually involves 'niche' diplomacy, which means concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field.²⁰

Australian foreign policy during this period did achieve some remarkable successes, including the Cairns Group of Fair Agricultural Trading Nations work to build agriculture into the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO); the UN solution to the conflict in Cambodia; the founding of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; the international agreement on the Antarctica; and the international Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The concept of Australia as a middle power also has its critics, particularly among those on the right of the Australian political spectrum who are sceptical of the value of multilateral institutions. Evans' successor as Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, argued that to characterise Australia as just a middle power was to undersell the country's importance in international affairs.²¹ Prime Minister John Howard downplayed the importance of multilateral institutions to Australia, arguing that international politics is 'too messy and uncertain' to be manipulated into 'static frameworks [which] rigidly define the focus of the nation's diplomatic attention'.²² Other critics argue that middle-powerism tends to distract Australian foreign policy into chasing worthy global causes rather than minding its own interests closer to home.

The third role conception sits somewhat at tension with the first two. It is the idea that Australia is an Asia Pacific country, with its destiny tied to, and its most consequential relationships in what it defines as 'its region'. Australia's proximity to Asia and the Pacific, and its deeply complex relationships with those regions, has often been a cause of tension with its great power western allies. When Prime Minister Menzies reminded Australia's allies that 'the region you think of as the "far east" is for us our "near north"', he was making a claim that geography plays a powerful role in determining foreign policy priorities. From the late 19th century, Australian leaders believed that Britain was not sufficiently concerned about the encroachment of other powers into the South Pacific, and was all too prepared to sacrifice Australian interests there in order to satisfy British interests in Europe and the Middle East. Occasional acrimony developed into an open dispute during the Second World War, when Britain prioritised the war in Europe over that in the Pacific, and, with Japanese troops advancing through Southeast Asia, demanded Australian troops remain to fight German forces in North Africa. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin ordered Australian troops home, to fight in Papua New Guinea. Later, different geographies led to disagreements with the United States also. Australia and the United States took different sides on the question of whether Dutch New Guinea should become part of the Indonesian state; while Canberra and Washington disagreed strongly about

what course the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should take in dealing with the countries affected by the Asian Financial Crisis.²³ Some commentators argue that Australia's western identification prevents its full integration into the Asia Pacific, where many countries view western countries with a measure of distrust. Those urging a primarily Asia Pacific focus also criticise the more globalist middle power stance of some Australian governments, arguing that Australia cannot afford to distract its diplomatic attention with global causes, when there is so much to be done closer to home.

Asia represents the contradictory emotions of threat and opportunity for Australia. As an outgrowth of the British Empire infected with British race patriotism, Australians from very early times tended to look at Asia with a mixture of condescension and anxiety. The coming of European Empires to Asia meant the eclipse of the great Asian empires; a series of humiliating colonial wars revealed European societies to be superior in military technology, organisation and – they assumed – civilisation. Australians, a small population in possession of a large abundant continent far from their protectors, believed that the poor, crowded societies of Asia were poised to swoop down and take Australia for themselves. Despite being sure of their superiority to Asians, Australians feared what they saw as Asians' fecundity, enterprise and avarice.²⁴ Australians reacted violently to the arrival of significant numbers of Chinese during the gold rushes in the 1850s, and for the next century and more, a persistent trope of the Australian labour movement was that Asian and Pacific immigrants, because of their willingness to work for low wages, would undermine the conditions and dignity of Australian workers. On the other hand, soon after federation, Asia had started to become an important source of Australia's growing prosperity. While parts of the Empire such as India had long been the destinations for Australian resources and agricultural exports, Japan had become a significant customer by the 1930s.²⁵ Australian trade commissions were established in Shanghai and Batavia in the 1920s. As independence and development spread across Asia in the aftermath of the Second World War, Australia's trade with the region boomed, soon displacing the traditional sources of demand for Australia's exports. Almost without noticing, Australia had become economically dependent on the region it feared most.

To be sure, there was an increasing number of prominent Australians who argued that Australia could not sustainably rely on Asia for its prosperity while holding such paranoid and defensive views about its societies. As decolonisation proceeded apace, diplomats and commentators argued for the need for greater understanding of these societies, for the urgency of developing positive relationships with them, and that the racism of the White Australia Policy was anathema to both of these objectives. Soon after the end of the war, Australian governments were taking positions on Asian issues that placed them at odds with their western allies. The Chifley Labor government, allied with the trade unions, provided strong support to the struggle for independence of Indonesian nationalists against Dutch attempts to re-colonise the archipelago after the Japanese defeat – much

to the displeasure of Britain. Later, it differed from the United States over this issue of Indonesian control over Dutch New Guinea. But on other occasions, Australia's involvement in Asia moved in lock-step with allies. It was quick to send troops to the Korean War alongside American and British troops; it committed forces to defending Malaya against Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* campaign, and then to the US-led intervention in the Vietnam War. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Australia's strategic policy was based on the policy of 'forward defence', a conviction that once a direct threat to Australia had materialised it was too late to defend such a large continent; and therefore Australia and its allies needed to act to meet threats as they arose in the region far from Australia's shores.

In trade and diplomacy also, Australia had begun to engage energetically with the Asian region by the mid 1950s. Australia was closely involved in the negotiation of the Colombo Plan providing development assistance to Asian countries from the early 1950s. The Australian contribution included a several-decades commitment to bringing students from Asia to Australian schools and universities on Colombo Plan scholarships. The effect of significant numbers of young Asian students living with Australian families, and studying alongside Australian students, is believed to have had a significant effect on the country's slow repudiation of the White Australia Policy.²⁶ Through the 1950s and 1960s, the Policy was slowly relaxed and progressively dismantled; by 1973 Australia had instituted a fully non-discriminatory immigration policy, and adopted a multicultural self-image. The Menzies government overcame widespread fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism to sign a trade and commerce agreement with Japan less than a dozen years after the end of the Second World War. By the early 1970s, Australia's wheat trade with the People's Republic of China had made a country it refused to recognise one of Australia's most important export markets. Opposition leader Gough Whitlam gambled on paying a visit to Beijing in 1971, just pre-dating Henry Kissinger's secret visit, and signalling a major shift in Canberra's approach to engaging with communist regimes in Asia. Australia moved quickly to recognise the People's Republic of China on Whitlam's election in 1972, and the government of the People's Republic of Vietnam in 1973. Meanwhile Australia became the first country to become a dialogue partner of the new regional body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1974. In 1971, it entered the Five Power Defence Agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and the UK. With its withdrawal from the Vietnam War, Australia dropped the strategic posture of forward defence, adopting a strategic policy of defence self-reliance in the 1980s.

With the signing of the Single European Act in February 1986 and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in January 1988, it appeared that the world was drifting towards regional blocs, while Asia remained comparatively under-institutionalised. Australia and Japan had been collaborating at an officials-academics level since 1980 on economic integration in the Asia Pacific, and this became the basis for a new vision of Asia Pacific regionalism, announced on a visit

to Seoul in January 1989 by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke. The result was Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an institution that assuaged many of Australia's ambivalent impulses about its region. On the one hand, APEC's economic focus reflected the most powerful driver of Australia's regional destiny: the strong complementarity between the Australian economy and the economies of developing Asian countries. It also dealt with the ambivalence of many in Australia and Asian countries about whether Australia was really 'of' the Asian region, by being an Asia Pacific grouping. Many voiced doubts about Australia's Asian identity; few could quibble that Australia was not located somewhere near the intersection of Asia with the Pacific. 'Asia Pacific' also allowed the inclusion of Australia's allies in North America in the new grouping, contrary to the designs of other regional leaders such as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who wanted an Asian economic bloc excluding western members (including Australia). By 1994, Australia had succeeded in taking its 'Asia Pacific' regional vision into a new security institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum. By the late 1990s, the Asian Financial Crisis and diverging visions of trade liberalisation had begun to sap APEC's momentum, and new forms of regionalism began to emerge. The most insistent of these was the ASEAN+3 summits, which began in 1997 and had developed into regular meetings between ASEAN and Japanese, Chinese and South Korean leaders following ASEAN Leaders Summits by the turn of the century. Australia's exclusion from these meetings, which included its most important trading partners, provoked controversy and angst within Australian domestic politics. It was therefore seen as a major achievement for Australia to be invited, along with India and New Zealand, to expanded ASEAN+6 summits from 2004. These were to evolve into the annual East Asia Summit meetings.

AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

Australia's colonisation occurred as an act of imperial strategic policy making, from the belief that Britain's trading empire needed bases along some of its most important trade routes. The colony was ruled by Royal Navy officers for its first half century, most of whom were given commissions to extend Britain's sphere of influence far into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.²⁷ Unsurprisingly, even after the Australian colonies moved towards self-government, they continued to look at the world in highly strategic terms. Sparsely populated, endowed with huge terrestrial wealth, and located far from their imperial protectors, Australians developed an almost visceral sense of vulnerability that seemed out of all proportion for a country that shares no land borders with any other. In the late 19th century, colonial leaders began to voice real fears about the seizure of islands close to Australia by hostile powers, including France, Germany and the United States. Some Australian leaders argued that the islands of the South Pacific were as strategically important to Australia as the Channel Islands were to the UK, and

that hostile control of these constituted an unacceptable threat. This led the Australian colonies to agree to a policy of an 'Australian Monroe Doctrine' which would seek to exclude hostile interests from the South Pacific. They were unsuccessful, however in convincing Whitehall of the wisdom of this policy, and Britain acquiesced in French, German, American and eventually Japanese colonies in the Pacific, much to Australia's alarm. Nevertheless, Australia has continued to regard the South Pacific with a Monroe Doctrine-like attitude, providing the bulk of that region's development assistance and being willing on occasion to intervene to forestall the sort of instability that could lead to unwanted interventions by other powers.

This concern for the security of the approaches to Australia, across which it could be directly attacked, is perhaps the most enduring element of Australia's foreign policy. Australia sits between the world's two largest archipelagos, meaning that all of its strategic neighbours struggle with the common institutional dilemma of forging strong and resilient states from collections of islands. The rapidity of the imperial Japanese advance through Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific in 1941–1942 crystallised in Australian policy makers' minds how vulnerable these archipelagos are to determined attack, as well as how useful they are to mount attacks on continental Australia using modern weaponry.²⁸ As the Cold War deepened, Australia's anxieties about its archipelagic approaches made it especially receptive to the logic of the 'Domino Theory', which saw Asian communism spreading sequentially down through Southeast Asia towards Australia. These fears gave rise to the strategy of forward defence, and the repeated commitment of Australian forces to wars in Southeast Asia. But even after the forward defence policy had been discarded, Australia continued to place its archipelagic approaches at the highest priority in its strategic planning. In the most recent Australian Defence White Paper, the security of Australia's archipelagic approaches is placed only behind the defence of Australia's territory in defence priorities, as justified by the following uncompromising statement: 'We cannot protect Australia if we do not have a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.'²⁹ Consequently, Australia's defence posture tends to show a marked concentration on maritime and air weapons and surveillance systems that allow it to project force into what its defence planners call 'the air–sea gap' separating Australia from mainland Asia.

As the strategic expression initially of a global empire, Australia has always been keenly concerned with great power rivalries, particularly as they relate to its own security. Through the 19th century, the Australian colonies became sequentially apprehensive about rising powers that threatened British pre-eminence, both in Europe and in the Pacific: France, Germany, Russia, the United States. Australia's conviction that its own security was intrinsically linked to the integrity of British power and the Empire meant that it sent troops readily to serve in imperial conflicts, and declared war automatically on Britain's opponents in both World Wars. On one significant occasion, Australia's assessment of the danger

posed by a rising power differed markedly from that of Britain. Whereas Britain came to see a rising Japan as a useful ally, holding the ring in the Pacific while Britain concentrated on meeting the challenge of Germany in Europe before the First World War, Australia saw Japan as a threat. It was this divergence in perceptions through the 1920s and 1930s that fostered a gradual sense of common cause with the United States, which had also started to view Japan as a rival in the Pacific. After the war, Australia transferred its Empire allegiance to the free world, led by the United States. As it had with the Empire, Australia saw its own security as dependent on the fortunes of the western alliance, and once again readily committed forces to direct confrontations between the west and the communist forces: not only in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, but also contributing to the British-led anti-insurgency operations in Malaya in the late 1950s.

Even though the prospect of great power competition lessened after the Cold War, Australia continued to define its security interests in similar ways to leading powers of the western alliance system. Amid the 'New World Order' euphoria of the post-Cold War years, Australia became a supporter of peacekeeping operations dispatched by the United Nations to contain and resolve enduring and new ethnic conflicts. After the 9/11 attacks, Australia's attention switched from great power to transnational threats, acting within coalitions and partnerships to attack terrorist networks in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Australian policy makers also subscribed to the idea that 'failing states' were incubators of dangerous transnational threats, and Australia's defence and development agencies were reoriented towards contributing to state-building operations in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. The rapid evolution of Australia's security environment and perceptions led to an extensive debate among its strategic elites, over whether the bigger security challenge for Australia lay in transnational threats or the rise of new great power challenges. The debate had material consequences: if the main challenge was transnational, the Australian Defence Force would need a larger army, tanks and armoured vehicles, and expeditionary logistical capabilities for intervening in failing states; if the main challenge was from rising powers, maritime and air capabilities would be the priority. The debate, and its material implications, continues to this day.

It is the rise of Asian great powers neither aligned to the West nor sympathetic to its global dominance that poses the greatest challenge to Australia's security and foreign policies. In this global development lie some fundamental dilemmas for Australia. Until the turn of the century, Australia's main trading relationships in Asia were with countries either allied or aligned with the United States. Early in the 21st century, however, China emerged as Australia's most important trading partner, currently accounting for over a quarter of Australia's international trade and nearly 5 per cent of its GDP. This development has occurred at the same time as China's relationship with the United States has lapsed into more open and acrimonious rivalry. For the first time in its history, Australia's primary economic relationship is with a country outside the circle of its major strategic

partners, and there are strong signs that Australia's prosperity interests and security interests are pulling in different directions. Although Australian governments insist that Australia doesn't have to choose between China and the United States, this position is increasingly threadbare in practice. On some occasions, Australian decisions such as blocking Chinese telecommunications company Huawei from bidding to build Australia's National Broadband Network have been interpreted as anti-China and the result of US pressure. On others, Australian decisions such as that to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, have been made contrary to direct American lobbying for Australia to decline membership.

Another dilemma is that China's rise portends the end of a world with which Australia was familiar and comfortable. The world order constructed by western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries was natural and understandable to Australia, because it was built on principles and a language that Australia shared. The rise of China has led to greater contestation of many of the bases of global and regional order, raising the prospect that the strength of global and regional rules and institutions will wane, and that – especially in Asia and the Pacific – China will be able to leverage its economic and military power to reshape rules and interests to be more in line with its own preferences. Already Australian governments have voiced public alarm at Beijing's challenge to global norms such as freedom of navigation and respect for international law. Such is the level of concern that Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper listed as its third highest priority the need to uphold the 'global rules-based order'.³⁰

AUSTRALIA'S PROSPERITY

In economic terms, Australia has always been an international oddity. It has a small population enjoying the benefits of a continent rich in resources and agriculture. It developed during the Industrial Revolution and then the rise of Asia, both of which sustained strong demand for Australia's exports, making Australians among the richest people in the world for over two centuries. Consequently, Australia has a developed country's institutions, infrastructure, and standard of living, but a developing country's trading profile with its heavy dependence on primary commodities exports and manufactures imports. As a small trading economy determined to preserve its standard of living, Australia therefore has always placed great importance on its international economic diplomacy. The challenge for this diplomacy is to maintain and advance Australia's economic interests despite the country's relative economic size and lack of membership in any natural regional economic grouping. In the main this has meant anticipating and reacting to large international economic forces in ways that best preserve Australia's economic interests.

For the first century and a half after European colonisation, Australia's economic interests were couched within the economic dynamics of the British Empire.

The metropolitan economy supplied high demand for food and wool while infrastructure building in the major colonised economies exhibited consistent demand for energy and resources. During this period, the major preoccupation of economic policy was to ensure full employment and an equitable but high standard of living for the entire non-indigenous population – mainly through keeping labour scarce by way of restrictive immigration policies. Australian governments applied high tariffs on imported manufactures, as a way of stimulating local industry. This did not prevent Australia from agreeing to join a protectionist Empire trade bloc, signing the Ottawa Convention in 1932, which was to strongly influence Australia's direction of trade until the 1960s.

A major challenge to these economic arrangements came during the Second World War and its aftermath. The war impoverished Britain and led quickly to the dismantling of its Empire, while the new economic superpower, America, insisted on creating a post-war economic order based on free flows of trade and investment. This posed a major challenge to an Australia still committed to fostering local industry behind high tariff walls. Its response was to join the Bretton Woods institutions, but use its influence with its allies to exempt the Australian economy from commitments believed to be contrary to its interests. The understanding it came to in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was that Australia would avoid dismantling its tariffs, as required by GATT membership, as long as agriculture remained off the GATT agenda and therefore subject to high tariffs by GATT members.³¹ Any trade liberalisation that Australian diplomacy attempted, such as the 1958 Commerce Agreement with Japan, was bilateral and aimed at exchanging concessions to secure ongoing market advantages.

The tradition of protectionism and exclusive trade deals came under severe pressure during the 1970s, as Australia succumbed to the global downturn that followed the first oil shock. Between 1974 and 1975, world trade slowed and then went into reverse; the terms of trade for developed primary producing economies dropped by 7 per cent. Economic growth stalled, inflation rose and remained high, and unemployment soared. The Australian dollar was devalued by 17.5 per cent in November 1976. While most developed and many developing economies were badly affected, Australia's had become the worst performing economy in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) by 1982. The response was a revolution in both domestic and international economic policy, amounting to a complete reversal of the defensive, protectionist approach of the past 150 years towards a neoliberal, internationalist approach. Domestically, the government moved to deregulate large parts of the Australian economy, slashing tariffs, floating the dollar, deregulating financial institutions, driving micro-economic reform. At the same time, it engaged in activist economic diplomacy around an agenda of international economic liberalisation. Rather than trying to remain marginal to the GATT, Australia became heavily involved in pushing for a new round of multilateral liberalisation through the Uruguay Round. No longer content to accept the exclusion of agriculture from the GATT agenda, Australia

formed the Cairns Group of Agricultural Trading Nations in 1986, to pressure the United States, the European Community and Japan to allow agriculture onto the Uruguay Round agenda.³² When concerns rose over the formation of economic blocs, Australia used the idea of APEC's 'open regionalism' to press for multilateral liberalisation through the Uruguay Round rather than a retreat into exclusive trade blocs.

Australia's volte face on a liberal international economic policy initially occurred in the context of a global neoliberal push. The crisis of the 1970s had convinced many developed countries to pursue neoliberal economic reforms in the 1980s, and by the 1990s, globalisation had taken hold and dozens of formerly command economies from the Soviet bloc were joining the global market. The political difficulty of overturning 150 years of economic policy was certainly assuaged by a much more conducive international context. However by the turn of the century the neoliberal consensus had started to fray. Efforts to progress the next, 'Doha' round of WTO liberalisation had stalled, due mainly to the complexity of non-tariff trade protection measures, and the growing economic clout and very different interests of emerging economies. The result has been a general movement towards preferential trade agreements, a trend that Australia has increasingly been part of. Another development has been the increasing tendency to pursue trade agreements for strategic reasons, a trend particularly pronounced in the Asia Pacific, where rivalries are deepening.³³ While Australia has remained rhetorically committed to the ideal of multilateral, free trade, the context for this idealism is now not as conducive as it was in the 1990s. There is little sign that Australian policy makers are particularly concerned about the cumulative impact of preferential trade deals and geoeconomic competition on the multilateral free trade regime. There is even less evidence that they are willing to mount campaigns against the prevailing trends in international economic diplomacy in defence of multilateral free trade as they were in the 1980s and 1990s.

CONCLUSION

Australian foreign policy is an instrument for attempting to mediate several dilemmas conferred on the country by the combination of its historical circumstances, geography, and fate. From colonisation a privileged, relatively secure, and consistently prosperous nation, Australia's interests have always been in preserving the status quo. Yet the world, and particularly the world's most populous and dynamic continent to its north, continues to change around Australia. The long-run trend for Australia is that its international context is inexorably evolving away from the culturally familiar, consistently enriching, and relatively reassuring world that Australians had begun to take for granted. The bifurcation of Australia's security and economic interests is just one symptom of this broader trend.

The big question for Australia is whether its foreign policy approaches and processes are still up to the task of mediating among these diverse challenges and dilemmas. As we have explored, there are strong and enduring traditions of foreign policy making in Australia, many of which recommend familiar and tested responses to international challenges to its policy makers. But are the alternative conceptions of Australia's role in the world, its security or economic imperatives sufficient to meet the challenges of the future? In a world in which the west is becoming collectively less influential, where international institutions are struggling to adapt, and where the Asia Pacific is becoming increasingly rivalrous, do any of these role conceptions suffice? If not, does Australian society have the creativity to rethink its role in the world and respond effectively?

The history of Australian foreign policy gives reasons for both pessimism and optimism. Many of its security settings and self-perceptions have mis-read the needs of the international context at the time, leading Australia into mistakes and crises. On those occasions, Australia has fallen victim to an unquestioned orthodoxy that has only provided policy makers with sterile and inappropriate options. On the other hand, Australia's sudden recasting of its economic interests in the 1980s, matched with imaginative diplomacy and institution building, provides a cause for optimism. A country that can respond creatively to what seem to be daunting international challenges can by no means be written off. The years ahead will see whether the forces of inertia or of creativity will lead Australia's response to a rapidly changing world.

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PART VIII

Bilateral Issues



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India–Pakistan Relations

Rohan Mukherjee

INTRODUCTION

The India–Pakistan relationship remains one of the most fraught bilateral rivalries in the contemporary international system. Since 1947, both countries have engaged in numerous military conflicts and sought to diplomatically outmaneuver each other in international forums. Armed with nuclear weapons and increasingly sophisticated delivery systems since the late 1990s, both countries have engaged in conflict behavior at multiple levels ranging from nuclear threats to conventional war and sub-conventional tactics such as terrorism. To complicate matters, extra-regional great powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union (during the Cold War), and China have consistently been involved in the politics of India–Pakistan relations. While some potential solutions to the rivalry have periodically been tabled, sufficient numbers of spoilers exist on both sides to obviate any possible compromise or *détente*. If handled improperly, India–Pakistan relations can have considerably adverse impacts on stability in Asia and on the global order more broadly.

This chapter provides an overview of the relationship in three parts. First, it examines the historical roots of the India–Pakistan rivalry, which include identity-based differences, territorial conflict, external great-power involvement, and domestic politics within both countries. Second, it studies the contemporary dynamics of the relationship in terms of economic capabilities, military capabilities, and societal perceptions. Finally, by way of conclusion, it assesses the future trajectory of the relationship based on contemporary trends. In particular, it asks what conditions would need to hold in order for peace to break out between India and Pakistan.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF RIVALRY

The causes of the India–Pakistan rivalry can be broadly grouped into four categories: identity (and ideology), territory, geopolitics, and domestic politics. The first two causes form the bedrock of the rivalry, while the latter two have ebbed and flowed in their respective effects, sometimes dampening and sometimes accentuating the divisions between both countries.

Identity and Ideology

At the base of the India–Pakistan rivalry lies an identity-based ideological construct rooted in the 1930s, while India was still under British colonial rule (and Pakistan did not yet exist).¹ The ‘two-nation theory’, as it was called by its progenitors, argued that religion was the primary basis for nationhood and that South Asia’s Muslims and Hindus were essentially two different nations living in one territory. Linguistic and ethnic commonalities between Hindus and Muslims who had lived together for hundreds of years were viewed as secondary to this religion-based conception of nationhood. Politically, this ideology found expression in the stance of the Muslim League, a political party in British India. Its leaders such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah feared that an independent India under the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress – the leading organization in India’s struggle for freedom, led by the likes of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru – would be inimical to Muslim interests. Their fear was not religious in the sense of protecting the values and institutions of Islam, but rather with regard to how social relations would be ordered between Muslims and non-Muslims in post-independence India. It was ‘a minority community’s discourse of power’.² Christophe Jaffrelot argues that the Muslim League ‘openly used Islam’ to legitimate such a discourse.³ In response to the League’s claims, the Congress emphasized its ideology of civic nationalism, which was grounded in secularism, with Gandhi saying, ‘To me, Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Harijans, are all alike.’⁴

As the League’s political clout grew among Indian Muslims, the demand for a separate state for India’s Muslims, first articulated in 1930, became a rallying point. In the League’s Lahore Session of 1940, Jinnah (today considered the father of Pakistan) famously laid down the central principle of the two-nation theory. He argued that Islam and Hinduism ‘are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders; and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality’.⁵ The theory was essentially a religiously grounded ideology in which Jinnah sought legitimacy among British India’s Muslims. This ideology resonated with the personal beliefs of many Muslims but, significantly, not all. Bengali Muslims, for example, held ethnicity to be as valid an organizing principle as religion. Their reluctant

acceptance of Jinnah's plans would have serious consequences later, in the shape of East Pakistan's secession (in 1971) and the creation of Bangladesh.

Muslim leaders in British India thus advocated for the creation of a separate territorial state – Pakistan – for Indian Muslims. The British government further complicated matters by consciously exacerbating differences between Hindus and Muslims in areas such as recruitment for government employment and the creation of separate electoral constituencies for Muslims.⁶ The Hindu-dominated mainstream anti-colonial movement of the Indian National Congress was initially recalcitrant in the face of Jinnah and his colleague's demands, thus further convincing the latter that an independent India would be detrimental to the interests of South Asia's Muslims.

All these factors combined to produce the bloodiest period in the history of India and Pakistan, and one of the largest and most rapid migrations in human history.⁷ In what came to be called the Partition of British India, approximately 14.5 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs moved across the newly formed borders – Muslims migrated to Pakistan, Hindus to India, and Sikhs were divided between Pakistani Punjab and Indian Punjab – amidst widespread rioting, killing, and looting. The context was the creation of the state of Pakistan, its Western and Eastern regions geographically separated by another newly created state: India. Indian leaders roundly rejected the two-nation theory while Pakistani leaders embraced it, thus sowing the seed of further discord, particularly on the emerging territorial crisis in Kashmir.

Territory

Today the India–Pakistan conflict has been classified as an 'enduring rivalry', which is defined as a conflict that lasts 'more than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship in between'.⁸ Although ideology – grounded in religious identity – can explain the roots of Partition to a great extent, it does not *ipso facto* explain the persistence of hostilities between India and Pakistan, particularly when one considers the highly asymmetric nature of the conflict.⁹ Although India is by all traditional measures more powerful than Pakistan, the latter has gone to great lengths to balance against India by involving external major powers (mainly the United States and China) and maintaining an inordinately high defense budget as well as a nuclear arsenal. It is widely acknowledged that the Kashmir issue is what drives Pakistan's stance in this regard, and an understanding of the ideological dimensions of this issue can explain to some extent the persistence of conflict.

Mridu Rai's discussion of Kashmir's history illuminates the problem. She traces the origins of conflict back to 1846, when the British, in an attempt to consolidate their hold over the region, installed 'an "alien" Dogra Hindu ruling house over Kashmir without consideration for the wishes or interests of the vast majority of its people'.¹⁰ The Dogras came from outside Kashmir and ruled over

a population that was 95 percent Muslim. In order to secure their legitimacy, they undertook two policies. First, with British support, they removed traditional Muslim power-holders from local levels. Second, they emphasized their historical links to the Hindu Rajputs, 'India's most ancient sovereigns'.¹¹ As a result, religion became the basis of state patronage and the Dogra 'patterns of legitimation ... allowed the Hindus of Kashmir [i.e. Kashmiri Pandits, constituting 5 percent of the population] to exclude Muslims in the contest for the symbolic, political and economic resources of the state'.¹²

Kashmir's Muslims began to loathe the religious basis of legitimacy in Kashmir. A movement arose in ideological opposition to Dogra rule and as the conflict grew entrenched, religion became its primary axis. As early as 1931, a group of Muslims attacked Hindus in Srinagar. Soon after, the Kashmiri Pandits began to feel their numerical minority and reached out to Hindus in the rest of British India (where they were a majority), thus expanding the scope of the conflict. At the time of Partition in 1947, Kashmir was envisaged by the Muslim League to be a part of 'Pakistan' (the vital 'K' in the acronym created from the colonial provinces of Punjab, Afghanistan (the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)), Kashmir, Sindh, and Balochistan). However, Kashmir's Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh, after dallying with the idea of independence, acceded to India under the pressure of a tribal invasion from the NWFP, followed by irregular Pakistani forces. The result was a war between India and Pakistan. India's prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, approached the United Nations Security Council in 1948, which called for a referendum in Kashmir to decide its fate. The referendum – predicated on a Pakistani troop withdrawal that never occurred – remains unfulfilled, and today what used to be the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is de facto divided between India and Pakistan, with a sizeable additional tract of land (the Aksai Chin plateau) under dispute between India and China.

Kashmir remains the crux of the India–Pakistan rivalry because it stands as a crucial test of the respective states' claims to legitimacy, which are both grounded in religious identity (or the eschewal thereof). The incorporation of Kashmir is vital for Pakistan, which was founded on the very notion that the Muslims of South Asia can only be secure in a state of their own. As a Muslim-majority region in a Hindu-majority state, Kashmir stands in stark contradiction to the two-nation theory, and is hence viewed by Pakistan as unfinished business from Partition. In the words of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 'If a Muslim majority can remain a party of India, the *raison d'être* of Pakistan collapses ... Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically.'¹³

India, for the same reason, cannot but retain Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of its territory. The Indian state was formed on the basis of a secularist identity, which was seen as the only way of coping with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of Indian society. The Constitution of India, in its Preamble, proclaims India to be (among other things) a secular democratic republic.¹⁴ Kashmir therefore stands as an important emblem of India's

secularist credentials. During the crisis of 1947–48 Nehru repeatedly argued that ‘in Kashmir there is no communal issue as such’ and that it was a ‘national issue’ for the Kashmiris, Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs who had joined together to fight the invaders.¹⁵ Yet he also admitted that had the Pakistan-backed invasion succeeded, ‘the results...on the *communal and political* situation all over India would have been disastrous’.¹⁶ Thus while denying the importance of religion in the Kashmir conflict, he was acutely aware of the communal (i.e. religious) implications for India of the loss of Kashmir to Pakistan.

Geopolitics

While religious ideology and territorial conflict constitute the deep causes of the India–Pakistan rivalry, one can find proximate causes in the geopolitical situation that the two countries found themselves in immediately after independence, i.e. at the beginning of the Cold War. Seeking to augment its military inferiority relative to India, Pakistan wasted little time in becoming a US ally. As early as 1952, Islamabad was involved in the creation of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), a short-lived US-backed alliance that laid the groundwork for the 1955 Baghdad Pact. Pakistan’s eagerness to join the Western bloc resulted in a steady stream of military aid from Washington to Islamabad from the mid 1950s onward. Although US President Eisenhower had assured Nehru that these arms would not be used against India, this promise rang hollow in 1965 when Pakistan attacked India at the Rann of Kutch and in Kashmir, using US-supplied military hardware.¹⁷

India for its part strove to remain non-aligned during the Cold War. In principle, this was not a policy of neutrality but rather a ‘dynamic and positive’ policy of pursuing India’s self-interest in a polarized world.¹⁸ According to Nehru, ‘Non-alignment is freedom of action which is a part of independence ... [however] its application to a particular circumstance, or resolution, is a matter of judgment.’¹⁹ In practice, however, India’s judgment appeared to hew closer to the Soviet line, leading to a growing rift between Delhi and Washington. In the words of one analyst, the United States viewed non-alignment as ‘little more than a sanctimonious cloak for interests which contradicted those of the United States’.²⁰ Events came to a head over the East Pakistan crisis and Bangladesh War of 1971, which saw the United States and China align with Pakistan against India, which in turn concluded a defensive treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Given India’s own fraught relations with China as well as the divisions between the Soviet Union and China – which contributed to a United States–China rapprochement brokered by Pakistan in the early 1970s – this period saw India and Pakistan firmly entrenched on opposing sides of the wider Cold War geopolitical competition. The subsequent Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s further deepened US reliance on Pakistan as the proxy through which to undermine Soviet designs. Although this reliance subsided with the end of the Cold War, it

was revived following the 9/11 terrorist attacks as Pakistan once again became a frontline state in a global war prosecuted by the United States.

Data on arms transfers further highlight the role of geopolitics in the India–Pakistan relationship.²¹ Between 1954 and 1964 – the period in which Pakistan joined and deepened its involvement in the US alliance system – Washington accounted for 71 percent of the total value of arms imported by Islamabad and only 6 percent of arms imported by Delhi (whose largest supplier at this time was the UK). The use of US-supplied equipment in Pakistan’s 1965 attack on India led Washington to impose an arms embargo on South Asia, at which time China stepped in as Pakistan’s major arms supplier. From 1965 to 1973, the year the United States gradually began resuming military aid to Pakistan, China provided 59 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports and since then has outstripped all other suppliers, accounting for 41 percent of Pakistan’s total arms imports from 1950 to 2018 (the United States is the next highest provider, at 23 percent). India for its part initiated substantial defense imports from the Soviet Union in 1961, and over the next three decades till the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union accounted for 71 percent of India’s arms imports. Since the end of the Cold War – due to both equipment legacy reasons and positive bilateral relations – Russia has maintained this role, accounting for 67 percent of India’s total arms imports between 1991 and 2018.

The impact of geopolitics on India–Pakistan relations has been threefold. First, external great powers – the United States and China – have made it possible for Pakistan to overcome its considerable material asymmetry relative to India. Both the United States and China have contributed substantially to Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities, and China has also assisted Pakistan in becoming a nuclear weapons state.²² On the Indian side, the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia have helped Delhi grow and maintain its conventional military arsenal, while India has mostly developed its nuclear arsenal indigenously, building on early civilian nuclear assistance from Canada, the United States, and France.²³ Second, and relatedly, the proxy war in Afghanistan in the 1980s gave Pakistan access to and control over large quantities of small arms and large numbers of trained *mujahidin* fighters, many of whom Islamabad redirected to the purpose of fomenting a widespread militant insurgency in the Indian-administered Kashmir valley in the 1990s. The Indian response has relied overwhelmingly on military options that carry significant collateral costs in terms of repression and human rights abuses of the valley’s residents.²⁴ Third, the China–Pakistan ‘all-weather friendship’ has allowed Beijing to act as an offshore balancer against Indian power and influence in South Asia and beyond.²⁵ By building up Pakistan’s capabilities and providing diplomatic cover for the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment’s promotion of terrorism on Indian soil, China is able to sufficiently hobble India’s diplomatic and power-projection capabilities. In two of the wars fought by India and Pakistan prior to the development of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent – in 1965 and 1971 respectively – Beijing either explicitly threatened to open a second front with India,

or Indian decision-makers had to factor the likelihood of a second front into their strategic calculations.²⁶

It should be noted that geopolitics does not always have a negative impact on India–Pakistan relations. The great powers have on occasion played important roles as brokers and potential peacemakers. Examples include the US arms embargo on India and Pakistan following the war of 1965, the Soviet role in hosting peace talks in Tashkent following the 1965 war, and the changed attitude in both the United States and Chinese establishments toward the Kashmir conflict following the end of the Cold War. While China appears to have taken a more even-handed and distant approach to the conflict, frequently reiterating the latter's strictly bilateral nature (a stance welcomed by India), the United States has more actively acted as a broker at critical points such as the 1999 Kargil War, the 2001 military standoff following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.²⁷ More recently, during the military crisis that followed a major attack by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists at Pulwama in Kashmir in February 2019, the United States applied considerable diplomatic pressure behind the scenes to get Islamabad to back down in the aftermath of an Indian retaliatory airstrike on a terrorist base in Pakistan.²⁸ Despite these bright spots, the impact of broader geopolitical factors has been mostly negative, enabling the Pakistani military to mount a credible balancing strategy against India's dominant position in South Asia, thereby prolonging a rivalry that might not have lasted as long under other circumstances.

Domestic Politics

Geopolitical factors might not have been as damaging were it not for domestic political considerations on both sides – but especially in Pakistan – that militate against peaceful solutions to the India–Pakistan rivalry. Given that an existential difference in religious identity lies at the heart of the conflict, the growth of religious identity politics in both countries has made peace more elusive. The ideological sources of government legitimacy in Pakistan and India have over the years tended to greater religiosity. Pakistan has evolved from a state for Muslims to an Islamic state, while India's secular nationalism appears to be declining in the face of religious polarization and the consequent rise of Hindu nationalism.

In both countries, religious identity has gradually occupied center-stage in national politics and debates over national identity. In Pakistan, following Jinnah's secularist notions of a Pakistan for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, General Ayub Khan had argued strongly in favor of Islam being a 'dynamic and progressive movement' that had over time been bogged down in dogma by atavistic followers of the faith.²⁹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto himself was secular and progressive, if strongly nationalist. Following Bhutto, however, General Zia-ul-Haq's regime (1978–1988) initiated the 'Islamization' of Pakistan, with an alliance between Islamist parties and the military providing legitimacy to the General's

dictatorship.³⁰ Post-Zia, although the political parties led by Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto strove to provide democratic alternatives to the Pakistani people, they too (particularly Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party) built alliances with Islamist forces in Pakistani politics. Ultimately, the rise of the Taliban after 1994 as a potent fundamentalist force in neighboring Afghanistan and the Pakistani military's continued antagonism toward democratic political parties helped preserve the military's alliance with Islamist parties, despite the subsequent military regime under Pervez Musharraf (2001–08) harkening back to a post-independence style of secularist Islamic rule. The military's alliance with religious fundamentalists has been instrumental not just in domestic politics, but also internationally, 'opening up new foreign policy possibilities ... to deal with developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir'.³¹ Since 1989, Pakistan has exploited growing disaffection with Indian rule among Kashmiri Muslims by providing ideological and material support to various insurgent groups in Kashmir for a *jihad* against India.³² In 2002, largely due to a tacit alliance with the military against the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), a grand coalition of Islamist parties – the Muthahhidah Majlis Amal (MMA) – won 11 percent of the seats in Pakistan's National Assembly. Although the vote share of such parties has deteriorated since then, the presence of fundamentalist forces in Pakistani society and the military's recourse to religion as a source of legitimacy remain major obstacles to the possible emergence of more moderate policies toward India.

In India, religious majoritarianism had existed on the political fringes since the 1920s, when Vinayak Damodar Savarkar coined the term *Hindutva* ('Hinduness'). With its string of national electoral victories in the late 1990s and clear majorities in the national elections of 2014 and 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – the only credibly national party in India today – and the network of Hindu organizations it is affiliated with, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar ('Family of Associations'), have brought Savarkar's *Hindutva* into the political mainstream. Of Muslims and Christians, Savarkar wrote in 1923:

For though Hindusthan is to them a Fatherland as to any other Hindu, yet it is not to them a Holyland too. Their Holyland is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their names and their outlook smack of a foreign origin. Their love is divided.³³

Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, another progenitor of the movement and head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) from 1940 till 1973, suggested, 'all that is expected of our Muslim and Christian co-citizens is the shedding of the notions of their being "religious minorities" as also their foreign mental complexion and merging themselves in the common national stream of this soil.'³⁴ His 1966 work, *Bunch of Thoughts*, contains a chapter titled 'Internal Threats' that is devoted to the discussion of Muslims, Christians, and Communists.

The BJP's path to political power is scattered with various incidents of organized violence against people and symbols of non-Hindu culture, the most

prominent being the destruction of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya in 1992 by masses of BJP-led volunteers, followed by the anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat in 2002 under the watch of a BJP-led state government. The party has traditionally taken a strong stand on Kashmir, stretching back to Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the founder of the BJP's political predecessor the Jana Sangh, who said in 1952 of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir, 'It is a matter for national humiliation ... a part of India is today in the occupation of the enemy and we are peace-lovers, no doubt. But peace-lovers to what extent?'³⁵ While mainstream political parties in India have been steadfast in their defense of India's sovereignty claims over Kashmir, the religious nationalism underlying the worldview of the BJP and its political base renders any potential efforts at negotiation and compromise with Pakistan a fraught and complex exercise.³⁶

Some scholars suggest that religious identity has declined in salience relative to 'the imperatives of statecraft' in the India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.³⁷ However, such an argument misses the essence of the overall conflict, which is rooted in opposing ideas of the role of religion as a legitimating ideology of nationhood and the state. As long as legitimacy derives from religious identity – be it related to Islam, Hinduism, or secularism (which in India means state involvement in all religious life rather than the separation of religion and the state) – there is every chance that private beliefs will have social externalities and political ideologies will tend to demonize and vilify the religious 'other'. The growth of *Hindutva* in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan – while by no means equivalent phenomena – has engendered a more intransigent mode of politics that risks polarizing religious groups and rapidly escalating conflict situations. The recourse to religion as a legitimating instrument in domestic politics thus is an important obstacle to any resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

Aside from identity politics, another major feature of domestic politics – regime type – has played an important role in both India and Pakistan. India's democracy and Pakistan's quasi-democracy have in some sense balanced against each other in maintaining the delicate strategic equilibrium of South Asia. As is well known, Pakistan has been subject to long periods of military dictatorship, and even when not officially in power the military remains a dominant force in politics and society.³⁸ A 2011 Gallup poll found that 86 percent of Pakistani respondents expressed confidence in their country's military, compared to 56 percent for the judicial system and 28 percent for the national government.³⁹ India on the other hand has remained democratic with the civilian leadership and defense bureaucracy firmly in control of the military.⁴⁰ As a result of the military's dominance in Pakistani politics and society, India–Pakistan relations have been characterized by repeated instances of Pakistani military adventurism, while India for various reasons has reacted with restraint. Recent research shows that Pakistan under civilian rule has initiated more conflicts with India than Pakistan under military rule, suggesting that Pakistani military leaders are more adventurous in moments when they are not directly accountable to the public.⁴¹ For their

part, Indian leaders through the decades – including Nehru in 1948, Lal Bahadur Shastri at Tashkent in 1965, Indira Gandhi at Simla in 1972, and Manmohan Singh in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks of 2008 – have repeatedly sought to restore the status quo after every Pakistani attempt to overthrow it. Similarly, the so-called surgical strikes by the Indian military on terrorist camps across the Line of Control in Kashmir in September 2016 did not qualify as a major military response to Pakistani provocation (in the form of a terrorist attack on an army base at Uri in Jammu and Kashmir). Available sources suggest that the operation was finely calibrated to avoid escalation,⁴² and the Indian government's decision not to release any conclusive proof of the strike allowed Islamabad to save face domestically by denying that it had actually taken place. An exception to this trend occurred in February 2019, when the Indian government launched airstrikes against a terrorist training site in Pakistan in response to a major terrorist attack on paramilitary personnel in Indian-administered Kashmir claimed by the Pakistan-backed group Jaish-e-Mohammed.⁴³ This was the first time that the Indian air force had struck targets inside Pakistan since the Bangladesh War of 1971. Nonetheless, India's use of force in this instance also followed the pattern of the 2016 surgical strikes – the airstrike was calibrated to avoid hitting any civilian or military targets, and New Delhi declined to publicly provide proof, thus allowing Islamabad to claim that the Indian air force had missed its target.

While one might expect a democratic polity to be more fractious and uncoordinated than an authoritarian polity in its policy toward a rival state, India has exhibited a more consistent and unitary approach toward Pakistan than the latter – despite frequently being under unitary leadership – has exhibited toward India. Pakistan has historically struggled to speak with one voice or to negotiate as a unitary actor with India, particularly because the actions of the former's military and intelligence establishments tend to frequently undercut the claims and promises of its civilian leadership. Given that both militaries descended from the same organization – the colonial military of British India – the inordinate influence of the Pakistani military can be explained by at least three factors. First, India's first prime minister, Nehru, was returned to power three times, allowing him an unbroken period of rule from 1947 till his death in 1964. While the specifics of Nehru's rule can be debated, there is little doubt that India benefited from this institutional continuity through democratic means under a towering figure of the Indian nationalist movement. By contrast, Jinnah's death (due to illness) in 1948 deprived Pakistan of a single foundational figure who could unite different factions and maintain political unity in the early stages of nation and state building. In the event, political instability in Pakistan – especially in the years following the assassination of its first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan – opened the door to military rule. Second, and relatedly, Nehru was dogged by the fear of a military coup in India and took steps to preclude such an outcome.⁴⁴ By interfering decisively in matters of recruitment, promotion, and leadership selection, Nehru and his colleagues ensured that the military would not play an

outsized role in India's democracy. By contrast, in Pakistan the military itself became the guardian of democracy and nationhood, a trend that was exacerbated by Pakistan's comparatively more precarious geo-strategic position relative not just to India but also to Afghanistan. Finally, the pattern of US financial assistance to India and Pakistan impacted the relative power of the military versus other actors in both societies. Viewed comparatively as US aid recipients, India received far more economic aid and Pakistan received far more military aid. Barring two periods of approximately six years each – after the Bangladesh War, and during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan – publicly reported US aid to India for economic development was roughly double that of similarly intended aid to Pakistan.⁴⁵ Conversely (as discussed above), with the exception of the 1963–66 period, i.e. immediately after the Sino-Indian War, US military aid to Pakistan was consistently and substantially greater than US military aid to India.⁴⁶ Pakistan's status as a military ally of the United States served to strengthen the position of the military domestically to the detriment of democratic institutions. India's status as a non-aligned recipient of US development aid, combined with the other factors detailed above, helped India avoid a similar fate.

CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS

The India–Pakistan rivalry was born out of an identity-based conflict that found territorial expression over the status of Kashmir. As argued by Monica Duffy Toft, territorial conflicts are especially intractable because 'territory is a sine qua non of the state and can be an irreducible component of ethnic group identity'.⁴⁷ In this sense, Kashmir occupies a special place in dominant Indian and Pakistani self-conceptions, making it virtually impossible to forge compromises that might involve territorial division. Added to the deep causes of identity and territorial conflict are more proximate factors such as the global politics of great-power competition, as well as domestic political developments within both countries. Based on the analysis thus far, this section examines the current state of India–Pakistan relations along three lines: economic capabilities, military capabilities, and societal perceptions.

Economic Capabilities

A robust economy experiencing steady growth offers the ideal foundations on which to build long-term grand strategy predicated on increasing hard power capabilities and diplomatic leverage in the world's capitals. Given these strategic incentives, the relative economic performance of India and Pakistan remains a salient variable in the India–Pakistan rivalry. The data show that India has done better on this front than Pakistan. Starting with a 'pro-business drift' in the 1980s⁴⁸ followed by liberalization and deregulation in the early 1990s, the Indian

economy has been growing at a rapid clip for over two decades. Between 1991 and 2015, India's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent, compared to 4 percent for Pakistan.⁴⁹ More tellingly, after over three decades of lagging behind, India's per capita GDP overtook Pakistan's in 2009 and the gap has steadily widened since then.⁵⁰ The magnitude of this economic transition comes into focus if we factor in India's population size of 1.25 billion compared to Pakistan's 182 million.⁵¹ India's economy today is almost eight times the size of Pakistan's, although its relative size has been larger in the past (going up to more than an order of magnitude in the early 1960s, for example).⁵² In terms of the resources that both countries commit to their respective defenses, Pakistan's military expenditure of 3.6 percent of GDP is significantly higher than India's 2.4 percent, though in absolute terms the Indian defense budget is six times larger.⁵³ The relative balance of economic capabilities suggests that India has gradually pulled ahead of Pakistan over the last decade. The impact of this difference can be seen in military expenditure trends as well. Between 1991 and 2016, India's military expenditure increased at a compounded annual rate of 4.4 percent, whereas Pakistan's expenditure increased at 2.5 percent.⁵⁴ This gap has narrowed, however, over the last decade, in which the corresponding figures are 3.7 percent and 3.1 percent respectively.⁵⁵

Pakistan's relative economic weakness might be compensated for by the scale of investment involved in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), stretching north-south from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar in Pakistan. An infrastructure mega project currently worth US\$46 billion,⁵⁶ Chinese companies will build a network of highways, railways, and pipelines in Pakistan over a period of 15 years, while also overhauling existing infrastructure such as the Karakoram Highway.⁵⁷ A major focus of the CPEC is Pakistan's energy infrastructure, with Chinese investments pouring into sectors ranging from coal to renewable energy. Although Pakistan stands to gain substantially from this investment, the latter has also raised concerns about a potential loss of autonomy for Pakistan as it more firmly enters China's economic orbit.⁵⁸ Moreover, any gains Pakistan might make from the CPEC will be at least partially offset by the considerable increase of Japanese investment in India – mostly in infrastructure projects as well – in the near term. In late 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledged infrastructure investments in India worth US\$35 billion over five years.⁵⁹ Since then, much of this investment has been realized in the energy and manufacturing sectors.

India's growing economic might suggests the potential for fostering economic interdependence between India and Pakistan as a way of raising fortunes on both sides of the border and thereby finding a way out of the conflict spiral in which both countries periodically find themselves. However, it would appear that the deep and longstanding sources of conflict between the two countries have been hostile to the emergence of a meaningful economic relationship. As might be expected, India-Pakistan economic relations are negligible. Pakistan accounts for 0.3 percent of India's total trade, while India accounts for 2.9 percent of

Pakistan's total trade.⁶⁰ Although South Asia is one of the most poorly integrated economic regions in the world,⁶¹ this low level of India–Pakistan economic engagement stands in sharp contrast to India's substantial trading relationships with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. As far as economic interdependence goes, the composition of trade between India and Pakistan reveals a basket of goods that is easily substitutable by either side. India's top exports to Pakistan include cotton, organic chemicals, plastics, fibers, and vegetables.⁶² Pakistan's top exports to India include mineral fuels and oils, fruits and nuts, salt, and cotton.⁶³ Given that the goods crossing the border in both directions are mostly low-value primary goods, alternative sources of supply would be readily available in the event of a bilateral conflict. Thus, in the aftermath of the Uri terrorist attack of September 2016, even though India publicly mulled trade sanctions and economic penalties, the general consensus in Delhi was that India did not possess significant economic levers with which to punish Pakistan.⁶⁴ The lack of significant trade ties creates little incentive for peace and also does not provide any instruments with which one side might coerce the other in a conflict.

Military Capabilities

On paper, India's military capabilities appear formidable compared to Pakistan's. In addition to having a military budget that is six times larger, India has 1.3 million active personnel in its military compared to Pakistan's 644,000.⁶⁵ However, in many respects, the two militaries are quite evenly matched. In terms of missiles, for example, India possesses 54 strategic missiles (most of which are short-range ballistic missiles, though India is in the process of testing and inducting intermediate and intercontinental ranges of ballistic missiles), whereas Pakistan possesses more than 60 strategic missiles, entirely in the medium and short ranges.⁶⁶ Although India's 881 combat aircraft significantly outnumber Pakistan's 450 aircraft,⁶⁷ Pakistan has worked hard to close this gap.⁶⁸ Military planners on both sides are still prepared for a mostly ground-based war, in which case Pakistan's 2,561 main battle tanks are likely to be a sufficient match for India's 2,974 tanks,⁶⁹ especially given that 15 of the 18 divisions of the Indian army stationed near the border with Pakistan are infantry divisions (armored divisions are located in central India), i.e. intended to defend and hold territory rather than attack or project force.⁷⁰ More importantly, whereas Pakistan is relatively unconstrained in its ability to deploy forces in a manner oriented toward an Indian threat, India is constrained by its shared borders with both Pakistan and China to deploy only approximately half its ground combat forces on the border with Pakistan.⁷¹

Naval power is the one domain in which India's capabilities considerably exceed Pakistan's. With 28 principal surface combatants (aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates) and 14 tactical submarines, India is well ahead of Pakistan's 10 frigates and 8 tactical submarines.⁷² However, while sea-based missions might form a part of a broader conflict, they are unlikely to be at the core of the fight – since

1947, every India–Pakistan conflict has taken place over land, which is why both countries devote the majority of their military budgets to their respective armies. Depending on the nature of a battle, air power may also be involved. Ultimately, as Walter Ladwig has noted, in the two most likely conflict scenarios – a limited land grab, or airstrikes – India’s numerical advantages are likely to be quickly neutralized by Pakistan due to the terrain on the India–Pakistan border (especially in Kashmir), the respective deployment patterns of the two armies (discussed above), and the absence of any strategic surprise aiding an Indian offensive.⁷³

The military balance is further skewed in Pakistan’s favor by the balance of nuclear forces. According to the Federation of American Scientists, India possesses approximately 120 nuclear warheads while Pakistan has 130 warheads.⁷⁴ Although these warheads are not maintained in any state of immediate operational readiness, coupled with medium-range ballistic missiles they act as a strong deterrent to any escalation of conflict by India. India for its part has reportedly worked to develop a new doctrine over the last decade known as Cold Start, designed to radically reduce mobilization time and enable a rapid and limited armored strike across the border with the objective of holding an amount of territory small enough not to justify the use of strategic nuclear weapons by Pakistan.⁷⁵ In order to counter such an offensive, the Pakistani military has developed tactical nuclear weapons, i.e. short-range ballistic missiles (such as the 60-km range Nasr) that can deliver miniaturized low-yield warheads. In this manner, Pakistani strategists have sought to ‘generate risk and instability at the tactical level in order to enhance stability at the strategic level’.⁷⁶ In general, Pakistan’s nuclear posture has been one of ‘asymmetric escalation’ – as a means of deterrence, Pakistan threatens the first use of nuclear weapons in any military conflict with India, whereas the latter maintains a posture of assured retaliation with an explicit no-first-use policy in place.⁷⁷ Pakistan’s posture may have the effect of deterring the deployment of Cold Start among Indian military planners, but the credibility of the deterrent requires a level of decentralization in command and control that places Pakistani nuclear assets at some risk.⁷⁸ On the whole, it is worth noting that the India–Pakistan rivalry has spurred military innovations and counter-innovations in response to changing technology, doctrine, and tactics on both sides.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of the military balance between the two countries lies in the realm of sub-conventional strategies, i.e. terrorism sponsored by Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies in Kashmir and other parts of India, most notably Mumbai in 2008. Terrorist violence peaked in Kashmir in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with 4,507 fatalities in 2001 (24 percent civilian, 13 percent security personnel, and 63 percent terrorist).⁷⁹ In 2016, this number was down to 267, though high-profile attacks on government installations continue in states along the border with Pakistan. Recent targets include a police station in Gurdaspur (Punjab) in July 2015, an air force station in Pathankot (Punjab) in January 2016, an armed police convoy in Pampore

(Jammu and Kashmir) in June 2016, the army division headquarters in Uri (Jammu and Kashmir) in September 2016, an army camp in Baramulla (Jammu and Kashmir) in October 2016, an army base in Nagrota (Jammu and Kashmir) in November 2016, an army camp in Sunjuwan (Jammu and Kashmir) in February 2018, and a convoy of paramilitary personnel at Pulwama (Jammu and Kashmir) in February 2019.

The Uri attack resulted in the deaths of 19 soldiers and under domestic pressure to respond, the Indian government ordered a so-called surgical strike on terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir across the Line of Control. The strike was carefully calibrated and the Indian government refused to release conclusive proof of it, thus allowing the Pakistani government to deny it had taken place. This move thus placated domestic audiences on both sides while serving as a signal from one establishment to the other that future terrorist attacks of this scale would meet with retaliation. That retaliation came in February 2019 in response to the death of 40 paramilitary soldiers in a terrorist attack at Pulwama. India responded with an airstrike that was again calibrated, but potentially more escalatory given the location of the target inside Pakistan (as opposed to Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 2016). Both the 2016 surgical strike and the 2019 airstrike were markedly different from India's restrained response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks – which took many more lives – and indeed from India's general restraint toward Pakistan's military adventurism. In this manner, the strikes raised the bar for Indian retaliation to future attacks, and thereby reduced the room for any further escalation that the government is likely to have on this front when the next major terrorist attack takes place. Despite these developments, it remains clear that the Pakistani military relies on terrorism as a means of sowing discord in India's domestic politics (between Hindus and Muslims) and of keeping Delhi's resources tied down in fighting terrorism in its homeland. In this manner, too, Pakistan is able to somewhat reverse the natural tilt in the military balance toward India through the use of asymmetrical strategies.

Societal Perceptions

Despite frequent calls by NGO activists and celebrities in both countries for more amicable bilateral relations, public perceptions in Pakistan and India remain overwhelmingly negative toward each other. In 2011, for example, a Pew survey found that only 14 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of India, whereas 75 percent had an unfavorable opinion.⁸⁰ Pakistanis also considered India a significantly greater threat than the Taliban or Al Qaeda. On the Indian side, 65 percent of those surveyed held an unfavorable opinion of Pakistan, and 14 percent held a favorable opinion.⁸¹ Nonetheless, large majorities in both countries supported improved relations with the other side, thought that increased trade between them was a good thing, and supported further bilateral talks.

On Kashmir, 80 percent of Pakistanis thought it was very important to resolve the issue in order for bilateral relations to improve. The corresponding figure for Indians was 66 percent.⁸² A 2016 Pew survey in India showed that Indian views of Pakistan had become more negative, with 73 percent now reporting an unfavorable opinion while the share of those favorable remained at 14 percent.⁸³ This level of mutual public animosity can partly explain why both governments face immense pressure to react to provocations from each other, particularly the Indian government which is frequently faced with terrorist attacks on its soil orchestrated by the Pakistani security establishment. Public animosity can also explain the popularity of the military in Pakistani society (see above) – when citizens view their neighboring country as a threat greater than the terrorists and fundamentalists operating within their own country, it stands to reason that the military will be looked upon as the foremost guarantor of national security.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The history and contemporary dynamics of India–Pakistan relations suggest three inter-related conclusions with regard to the potential for peace between the two countries. First, the deep causes of the rivalry are rooted in identity and territory. These are emotionally charged constructs that will not be amenable to economic inducements or military force. Thus, there can be no grand economic bargain or purchase of territory to solve the Kashmir crisis. Nor can war (even if it does not escalate to nuclear war) guarantee successful conquest for either side, particularly given that the aspirations of the Kashmiri people themselves – many of whom reportedly prefer independence to either Pakistani or Indian control – are a major factor.⁸⁴ The resolution of the conflict will require emotional sacrifices on both sides, and perhaps a redefinition of national identities. For this to happen, both countries need to be in a position to gradually shift to new bases of identity, perhaps Pakistan toward the identity of a major Islamic democracy and India toward the identity of a regional hegemon and provider of public goods.

Second, geopolitics and domestic politics are proximate and hence more malleable influences on the India–Pakistan relationship. Although the rivalry is rooted in deeply held beliefs, a de facto distribution of territory does exist, and a political compromise along these lines undertaken by domestically powerful leaders on either side may hold. It is worth noting that India and Pakistan came closest to a resolution of the Kashmir issue – which was not very close at all – under the military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf. A similarly powerful leader in Pakistan's future, coupled with a majority government under a leader such as Narendra Modi in India, might facilitate the beginnings of a settlement. The role of outside great powers is also crucial in this regard: so long as the United States relies on

the Pakistani military to fight its wars and China acts as an offshore balancer in South Asia, the likelihood of peace will remain low.

Finally, the contemporary balance of economic and military capabilities suggests that there is no quick and low-cost way out of this rivalry. Mutual deterrence at the strategic level is likely to hold, despite short-term instability. This instability is likely to come from cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan, and increasingly from Indian retaliation either by way of military strikes or sub-conventional tactics designed to destabilize Pakistan (in Balochistan, for example). The reality of the conventional and nuclear balance is likely to keep leaders on both sides within limits, though peace is least likely to come from business-as-usual approaches by both governments. As stated above, strong political leadership *on both sides* is likely to be the key to internalizing the identity-related costs of territorial compromise.

A sliver of a silver lining lies in the fact that only 66 percent of Indians thought the resolution of Kashmir to be necessary for peace. This could be the result of India's size and multicultural social fabric, where far-flung ethnic groups find it difficult to empathize with territorial concerns in remote corners of the nation. But perhaps more likely this has to do with attitudinal changes brought about by economic growth, whereby more 'postmaterial' values might replace narrow concerns over territory.⁸⁵ Perhaps a time may come in the future when Indians will view the costs of maintaining control over Kashmir as greater than the benefits, and this might open the door to territorial compromise. Similarly, if the CPEC were to genuinely herald an era of broad-based economic growth in Pakistan, societal attitudes toward Kashmir might subsequently soften. Until such time, however, the India–Pakistan rivalry will persist as it has over the last seven decades.

Notes

- 1 Stanley Wolpert. 1984. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 123.
- 2 Vali Nasr. 2005. 'National Identities and the India–Pakistan Conflict', in T.V. Paul (ed.), *The India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 180.
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India and Japan: Friendship Rediscovered

Purnendra Jain

INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, India and Japan are linked by what some recognize as the strongest bilateral relationship among Asia's powerful nations. India and Japan had entered the post-war period with their relationship marked by a history of goodwill and contemporary absence of ill-will, then the exception for Japan in its relations with Asian neighbours, many of which it had fought across East and Southeast Asia during the Second World War. Yet during the cold war the two nations' pursuit of different politico-strategic alignments resulted in little meaningful engagement, though not hostility, between them. Post-cold war, relations plummeted in 1998 when Japan responded to India's nuclear tests as a leading critic and international campaigner against nuclear. Japan suspended aid programs to India and withdrew from many other bilateral political and diplomatic activities. This was arguably the lowest point in the post-war relationship.

Yet recovery was swift. The regional geostrategic transition accompanying China's ascent as a great power, alongside domestic political shifts in both nations, created conditions for each to see the other through a more favourable lens. Less than two years after the 1998 nadir, at the dawn of a new century the relationship began to strengthen considerably and since then has reached new heights through political, strategic, military and economic activities. Reciprocal visits by their heads of government have continued to symbolize the mutual importance of these nations' shared interests, particularly geostrategic. This is manifest in the patently strategic edge to Japan's foreign aid projects in India,

and official declaration in 2000 of Japan and India as ‘21st century global partners’. Especially since 2005, institutionalizing of shared security arrangements has enabled frequent joint military exercises and cooperation in technology, and a bilateral security agreement in 2008 even included agreement on ‘Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’. Attempts on both sides to bolster bilateral trade and investment have not generated a similarly strong or interdependent economic relationship, but undergirded by bilateral interest and action on shared security concerns, India–Japan relations today have unprecedentedly solid footing.

This chapter first foregrounds, with brief overview, the India–Japan relationship post-war to the end of the 20th century. It then maps out the trajectory as this relationship has evolved early in the 21st century, outlining key areas where closer partnership has bolstered the bilateral relationship. These developments have been inspired largely by intersections in how the two nations perceive both the transition under way in the regional geostrategic landscape shaped particularly by the rise of China, and other complex uncertainties that are now transforming the world system at large. Although shared understandings and interests inspire some forms of partnership, Tokyo remains strongly attached to its alliance with the United States, and New Delhi avows ‘strategic independence’ even while strategically supportive of both Japan and the United States. Mutual strategic attraction will likely continue to undergird broader and deeper Japan–India cooperation for some time, especially since bilateral and multilateral strategic architecture is being established. Inevitably, however, strategic uncertainty and shifts in domestic circumstances will also remain guiding factors on both sides of the currently amicable India–Japan partnership.

This chapter unfolds in six sections. The first presents a background summary of post-war relations to understand developments over the last two decades. The second discusses the 1998 nuclear test episode that also seriously tested the relationship. The third section explores developments in the decade from 2000 when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India to begin rebuilding the damaged diplomatic and political bridges. With both nations responding cautiously to China’s rise, the strategic, political and economic developments between them during this decade provided the necessary underlay for closer and deeper engagement in the 2010s. In the fourth section we examine the state of the bilateral relationship under like-minded national leaders Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister from 2012 (after a brief stint in 2006–7) and Narendra Modi who became India’s prime minister in 2014 and continues in this position after his re-election in May 2019. Abe and Modi have been admirers of each other’s country as none before them. Together they have taken the relationship to a new level, suggesting to some observers that a further ‘big leap’ is waiting to happen (Kawai, 2017). In the fifth section we turn to various multilateral frameworks involving India and Japan that illustrate their ability and will to collaborate beyond bilateral engagement where their shared interests converge with other partners’ interests on regional and global matters. This chapter concludes with the sixth section,

offering brief observations on possible futures for the relationship and its significance in regional and global contexts.

BACKGROUND

Post-war relations between India and Japan began on a high note. India objected to terms offered to Japan in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and separately signed a bilateral peace treaty in 1952. In this treaty, one of the first that Japan signed post-war, India renounced all claims to war reparations, unlike many other Asian nations. India also offered Japan needed support in multiple contexts. India invited occupied Japan to participate in the 1951 Asian Games that India hosted. India was a key player in pushing for Japan's admission to the United Nations and participation in the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955. In addition to the bilateral peace treaty, the two also signed a number of bilateral commerce and cultural agreements (Murthy, 1993: 66–75; 377–96). In the late 1950s Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exchanged official visits, generating a groundswell of mutual goodwill. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is Kishi's grandson, often evokes childhood memories of his grandfather's close and friendly interaction with India and with its Prime Minister Nehru.¹ At both political and popular levels, India–Japan relations were warm and supportive in the early post-war years.

In economic relations too, the nations enjoyed complementarity. India supplied iron ore that fuelled Japan's early post-war industrialization. Japan provided financial support to India, including through Tokyo's first ever yen loans for infrastructure development in 1958 under its newly minted foreign aid program. Some observers have even suggested that India's role in Japan's post-war industrialization is similar to India's contribution to Japan's industrialization during the Meiji period (1868–1912) when India supplied raw cotton that helped enable Japan to develop its textile industry (Okata, 1978: 41–8).

This early positive start was, however short-lived. Some have dubbed the period that followed, starting in the late 1950s, 'the dark age' (Hirose, 1996: 41). Relations began to cool a little from the early 1960s as Tokyo and New Delhi set themselves on economic, political and strategic paths that were not simply different from each other, but were in opposition. Japan strengthened its relations with the United States through a security treaty and became increasingly dependent on Washington for its strategic and foreign policy directions. India maintained its claim as a non-aligned nation, but in practice turned towards the Soviet Union, Japan's adversary through both territorial dispute and ideological opposition. Economically too, the drift apart was under way. In Asia, Japan oriented itself largely towards Southeast Asia where opportunities for trade and investment were present; India's economic policy was too protected and stifling. Cold war

geostrategic dynamics widened the gap between the two, and both looked in different, sometimes opposite, directions. Through to the mid 1980s the relationship was by no means adversarial or broken, but it was surely lacklustre. The earlier mutual warmth and interest had faded away; Japan's foreign aid to India served as the principal bilateral connection through this period (Jain, 2017a).

From the mid 1980s, both domestic and global contexts were shifting profoundly. New space and reasons were emerging to rekindle – perhaps, for both partners, require – the earlier mutual interest. For Japan the main motivation concerned foreign policy; for India it concerned economic policy. Domestically, in Japan the administration of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–7) was keen to broaden Japan's presence in Asia and regarded India as a potential partner to support Japan's Asian leadership. In 1984 Nakasone made an official visit to India, 23 years after the last prime ministerial visit by Hayato Ikeda in 1961 (Stevens, 1984). In India, the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was on the cusp of launching a new era of economic reform; Japan's partnership would be valuable for India's economic take-off from its post-war 'Hindu growth rate'.² Gandhi's three visits to Japan during his short tenure as leader (1984–9) signalled his enthusiasm to woo and cultivate India's economic relations with Japan.

Internationally too, conditions were re-forming to help propel India–Japan ties along an upward trajectory. The end of the cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s heralded the possibility that cold war international alliances would crumble and a new world order would emerge. Disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that India was no longer a close partner of one of Japan's central adversaries. Increasing Japanese investment and political exchanges with India helped to foster closer bilateral relations in the economic and political spheres. However, these positive developments in the relationship were virtually sundered in 1998 when India conducted nuclear tests and Japan responded severely with economic and diplomatic sanctions ('measures' as Japan's official discourse prefers) and freezing of its official aid to India.

THE NUCLEAR FALLOUT

This was not the first time India's nuclear testing had shocked Japan. The 1974 test of India's first 'peaceful' nuclear device was also 'a huge shock for Japan',³ at which Japan quickly passed a parliamentary resolution imposing mild sanctions on India (Langdon, 1975).⁴ Japan's swift and severe reaction after the 1998 nuclear tests was much harsher – beyond passing a unanimous parliamentary resolution condemning India's action, official dialogues were cancelled, and ODA loans and other official economic assistance were frozen (except humanitarian aid and assistance for grassroots projects). Tokyo temporarily recalled its ambassador in India, cutting official channels of communication. Japan was not

only one of the first Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations to impose wide-ranging economic sanctions on India, it also assumed the role of a chief global protagonist to 'punish' India for defying the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime – in the UN, at the G8 summit, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting and at other international forums soon after. Japan was especially punitive partly because then prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, struggling to improve his sagging popularity, strived to display global leadership ability through responding severely on the international stage to India's nuclear testing (Jain, 2008: 5).

Many in the Indian government and among Indian public intellectuals were stunned at the apparent duplicity in Japan's harsh treatment of India but lenience towards China on these two nations' nuclear testing. A senior diplomat in the Indian Embassy in Tokyo observed 'the language of demands, rewards and punishments, benchmarks and so on, [was] reflective of a donor syndrome at its worst, a departure from the earlier history of good sentiments or with [sic] the Indian belief in mutuality of interests'. Even some Japanese commentators regarded the severity of these moves against India as 'out of proportion' and 'unnecessary'.⁵ Unambiguously, the aftermath of the nuclear testing marked the lowest point in the bilateral relationship.

India defended its test actions and rejected harsh criticisms by Japan and Western countries about the tests. Both the Indian prime minister and defence minister of the time justified India's tests citing threats from China, an established nuclear power. The Indian side also pointed to Japan's hypocritical stance – its kid-glove treatment of nuclear-capable China, sheltering itself under the US nuclear umbrella, and blatantly disregarding its non-nuclear principles by allowing US ships with nuclear facilities to visit Japanese ports. Overall, the relationship chill brought a lull in bilateral diplomatic ties, but not a complete breakdown.

Around this time, India's relations with Japan were further strained by Japan's expression of interest in 'mediating' on the Kashmir issue, supporting the UN resolution and offering Tokyo as a venue for talks.⁶ India had already rejected an offer by the United States for such mediation and it was unthinkable for India to agree to Japan's intervention on the deeply contentious India–Pakistan territorial issue. Japan's offer to mediate on Kashmir was akin to India offering to mediate on the Senkaku islands dispute between China and Japan. Furthermore, Japan's statement at the 1999 G8 foreign ministers meeting and elsewhere on the 1999 Kargil crisis, when Pakistani forces occupied the high ground on the line of control and intruded into India-held Kashmir, suggested Japan's neutrality on the issue. Japan's failure to condemn Pakistan did not go down well with the Indian side and also 'disturbed relations' (Mathur, 2012: 25).

Yet this nuclear and political chill was short-lived. As Japan and India faced the turn to a new century, both had reasons to see each other through a more favourable – strategically important – lens. The transition accompanying China's

ascent as a great power, alongside domestic political shifts in both nations, created conditions for mutual benefit from cooperation rather than continuing a fruitless standoff. Without embedded historical resentment and with emerging mutual strategic interests, both sides worked to establish common ground as the basis for renewing mutual cooperation.

POST NUCLEAR: MENDING FENCES

Differences of view on nuclear weapons did not completely disappear and Japan continued to often remind India that it needed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Japan's strategic concerns had overtaken its need to symbolically oppose India's nuclear weapons stance. A consensus was emerging in both capitals that the bilateral relationship should not be held hostage to one single issue; both would benefit from identifying areas of mutual cooperation. The first major diplomatic step was taken by Japan's Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in 2000.

Breaking the tradition of choosing the United States or Southeast Asia to signal top priority for his first overseas visit as Japan's new prime minister, Mori travelled to India in August 2000. The intention was to signal the importance Japan now attached to its relationship with India and therefore Japan's desire to mend fences and regenerate the relationship just two years after India's nuclear tests. Symbolism ran high. Mori verbally elevated the relationship to a new height by declaring in New Delhi that 'as of today Japan and India are global partners', emphasizing Japan and India playing roles together on the global stage, from reforming the UN to dealing with terrorism.⁷ The Japanese ambassador to India Hiroshi Hirabayashi explained that beyond their bilateral relationship, 'Global partners are meant to act globally, with a global sense of mission and a global sense of responsibility....' (Hirabayashi, quoted in Jain, 2002: 231).

Although Japan's sanctions on India were largely maintained, Mori announced a series of initiatives to strengthen the relationship and cultivate friendship. These initiatives included a regular meeting at prime ministerial and foreign ministerial levels, holding talks on national security issues, and a business leaders' meeting to promote cooperation in the IT sector. Mori revealed later the crucial role of the United States in opening a new chapter in India-Japan relations in the post nuclear-test period. Washington's positive strategic view and engagement with New Delhi shaped Japan's perception of India, so that Mori regarded the critical role of all three countries in the new security architecture of Asia (Ghosh, 2008: 285).

When Mori's successor Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India in April 2005, he reiterated that the 'global partnership' between the two countries reflected the convergence of their long-term political, economic and strategic interests. He announced an eight-fold initiative to strengthen Japan's global

partnership with India,⁸ including a dialogue process to promote cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector and a new science and technology initiative (Cherian, 2005). Koizumi was also instrumental in establishing a group of four nations (India, Brazil, Germany and Japan) to pursue their case for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. Perhaps Koizumi's most significant contribution to the bilateral relationship was through a shift in terminology to refer singularly to 'India' rather than to 'India–Pakistan'. This radical shift to 'India' away from the 'India–Pakistan' mindset effectively acknowledged India's status as an independent nation and equal partner of Japan, rather than as half of a verbal relic that conveyed a strategically untenable bi-national unit. Japan's nominal decoupling of India from Pakistan was a major break from Japan's past diplomacy and of great strategic significance to India.

But the most important cheerleader for India among Japan's top political leaders has been Shinzo Abe who served as Japan's prime minister in 2006–7 and was returned to office in 2012. During his first term as prime minister, he visited India in 2007 when his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Manmohan Singh granted Abe a rare honour of addressing a joint session of the Indian parliament. Here Abe gave his famous speech on 'the confluence of two seas', emphasizing the importance of India as an Indian Ocean power for Japan, as a Pacific Ocean resident. He articulated a new geographical construct of 'broader Asia' incorporating both the Indian and Pacific oceans. This concept was later developed more fully as 'Indo-Pacific' (Jain and Horimoto, 2016).⁹

Since Abe's 2007 speech, India–Japan relations have been lifted several notches higher with the institutionalization of an annual summit between the two prime ministers and many other agreements and dialogue processes at both ministerial and senior official levels. Let us consider some key developments in the two most crucial areas of the bilateral relationship – economic and politico-strategic – for insights into the evolving areas of cooperation, their strengths and weaknesses.

Economic Ties

India–Japan economic ties have two distinct although interrelated components. One primarily entails government-funded economic cooperation under Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program and the other entails largely commercial activities through trade and investment in the private sector. Some analysts have argued that overall Japan's ODA program can be explained by a 'trinity model', where aid drives trade and investment (Shimomura and Wang, 2013). But the trinity model does not explain Japan's aid to India. Much of this aid is for infrastructure projects, but many of the projects do not necessarily translate into greater trade and/or substantially higher levels of investment. That cannot be expected since it is not what motivates these projects. Their value for India and for Japan is very much strategic rather than narrowly economic and so cannot be expressed in market value.

Aid

India was the first nation to receive Japanese yen loans in 1958, when the post-war bilateral relationship was at its peak (Jain, 2017a). The relative share of Japan's aid to India has fluctuated over the years with changes in the international economic and politico-strategic environment in which Japan has provided aid. When bilateral relations cooled in the 1960s, the drop in Japan's aid to India was matched by a bolstering of Japan's aid to nations in Southeast Asia, where Japan was eagerly cultivating markets and political friendship. But even when its share of the annual ODA package decreased, Japan's aid to India continued. When China was Japan's largest ODA recipient in the 1980s and 1990s, Tokyo remained committed to India, in some years accounting for almost half of the bilateral ODA India received (MOFA, 1994: 261).

When Japan introduced its first ODA Charter establishing guidelines and criteria for aid allocation in 1992, there were hints that Tokyo might apply its ODA principles to India as a diplomatic lever if India continued refusing to sign the NPT. But Tokyo did not apply ODA principles to India until New Delhi conducted nuclear tests in 1998. The aid sanctions Japan applied to India in response were anyway short-lived. India has been the largest recipient of Japan's ODA since the fiscal year 2003, when it replaced China as the perennial leading recipient in the 1980s and 1990s. Japan's aid has supported various mega-infrastructure developments in India such as the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and the Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) (Ghosh, 2017; Kojima, 2017). Some reports suggest Japan has surpassed the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in financing large infrastructure projects in India (Goyal, 2017).

Japan's willingness to supply more and more ODA to India and India's willingness to accept it reveal not only that this bilateral relationship is asymmetrical, but also that India appears to be dependent on foreign aid for its own development. Coupled with India's lack of capacity to increase exports to Japan, as discussed below, these circumstances make India–Japan economic engagement weak and make Japan central to India's economic development, especially for infrastructure projects. Some observers have argued in favour of shifting India's ODA-based relationship more towards an FDI-based relationship (Ghosh, 2008: 295). But Japan's aid to India remains the defining aspect of the bilateral relationship; it is unlikely India will 'graduate' any time soon from its aid dependency on Japan.

Trade and Investment

As noted above, much of Japan's aid to India supports large infrastructure projects with strategic value rather than specifically to promote trade and investment. So despite Japan's considerable aid to India, bilateral trade between India and Japan has remained low. Even in the 1990s when India began to open the

domestic market to liberalize its economy, trade with Japan did not increase substantially (Mehta, 2002; Chawla, 2002). The situation of the 1990s has not improved noticeably, even after the two nations in 2011 signed a comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) that was touted to raise the bilateral trade level. When the 2011 CEPA was signed, trade from India to Japan was worth 543bn yen and from Japan to India was worth 882bn yen. In 2016 the figures were 509bn yen and 889bn yen. In the five years since signing the CEPA, bilateral trade has stagnated. One media report suggests India's exports to Japan have almost halved over three years, from around US\$7bn in 2013–14 to under \$4bn in 2016–17 (Mishra, 2017).¹⁰ Reasons provided still include tariff and non-tariff barriers in Japan, as well as language issues and highly demanding product and service standards, combined with a lack of persistence on the part of Indian exporters.

Japan's foreign direct investment (FDI) in India has been steady. It peaked in 2008 with 543bn yen and since then has fluctuated significantly, plummeting to 181bn yen in 2011 but rising to 465bn in 2016 (MOFA, 2017). Surveys carried out by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) in 2015 and 2016 indicate Japanese firms ranked India as number 1 on the list of promising countries/regions for overseas business operations over the next three years or so (JBIC, 2016). But despite the favourable assessment, the level of Japanese investment has remained rather low. Regulations and rules in India are changed suddenly and some Japanese companies like the well-known NTT DoCoMo report bad investment experience in India (Rediff, 2017). So it is not surprising that Japanese companies are hesitant to move into the India market despite some perceived attractions.

That Japan's investment in India is languishing is also clear from its share in Japan's direct overseas investment annually. In 2016 the total increased by 25 per cent over the previous year, which was a record high. But India's share barely changed. Here we see a paradox, since some Japanese reports suggest that to hedge against growing political and economic risk in China, some Japanese corporations are targeting Southeast Asian nations (and other developing Asian economies) for transferring investment from China and for future investments (JETRO, 2017). The data discussed above suggests that although Japanese government investment in India through the ODA program has risen significantly, Japanese corporations are not – or not yet – shifting present or future investment plans from China to India.

Politico-Strategic Relations

As mentioned above, early post-war India supported the newly defeated, somewhat friendless East Asian nation in international diplomacy; India had not experienced Japan's wartime malpractices, unlike many other nations in Asia. But after this initial brief flourish, political-strategic ties remained low-key

while Japan and India were positioned on different sides of the cold war divide. And with only minimal economic linkages, neither had political or strategic interest in the other in the early post-war decades. The two nations appeared to remain at odds on matters concerning India's refusal to sign the NPT in 1970, although some in Japan held the view that India should not be held rigidly to the NPT regime until the regime itself was made more effective (Gordon, 1994: 308). Yet another important geostrategic factor ensured Japan had at least some strategic interest in India. This was – and still is – India's geographical location and role in the Indian Ocean, a key sea route for Japan's energy supply and trade. Japan saw India as a status quo power in the Indian Ocean, capable of contributing through its navy to the general stability of the area (Gordon, 1994: 309–10).

Also noted earlier, from around the mid 1980s some momentum seemed to be building under the leadership of Yasuhiro Nakasone in Japan and Rajiv Gandhi in India. An astute observer of Japan–India relations noted at that time the two sides could see a 'new opportunity to synchronize and improve relations' (Horimoto, 1993: 38). Exchanges and official visits provided fuel for diplomatic and political connections. Thus, when in the early 1990s the end of the cold war undercut the international alliances on which this 'war' depended, and opened the way for a new configuring of strategic relations internationally, the soils for building a closer strategic relationship between India and Japan were already being lightly tilled.

For India, the fading of loyalties that held the nation strategically to its cold war patrons and arms suppliers created new fluidity. India jettisoned its former foreign and economic policies in favour of a new program of national economic growth through market liberalization. India's Look East policy was formulated in 1992 to improve economic engagement with India's eastern neighbours. Strategic fluidity post-cold war around the economically liberalizing India included outreach from Japan's key security ally, the United States, and India's positive response. But perhaps most significant of all was the steady rise of China as a regional and increasingly global power through expansion of its economic and strategic influence. This was a key motivator for the India–US rapprochement and for India's quick extension of its Look East economic policy into an instrument for forging strategic partnerships and security cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia generally and with Vietnam and Japan in particular.

The strategic ramifications of the Indo-Pacific transition inspired particularly by China's rise began to force open new possibilities for the perceptions India and Japan could form of each other – as power balancer, as mediator, and as partner bilaterally and multilaterally in the greater and prospering Indo-Pacific region. Political and strategic convergence between them was relatively slow and weak in the mid 1990s, but it was pulling India and Japan in the same direction. The increasingly strategic nature of the relationship was made more evident in 1997 with Japan for the first time openly expressing its desire to engage in

defence cooperation with India during Foreign Minister Ikeda's visit to India (Ghosh, 2008: 286). Indeed, until the roughly two years of mutual 'disaffection' that ensued after Japan's severe response to India's nuclear tests in 1998, the signs were becoming clearer. This relationship was in the early stages of a sea change – from the cold war era when the two nations operated from opposing sides of the strategic divide, to a cooperative and mutually valued defence partnership with the advent of the 21st century.

The strength of Japan's interest in the relationship's strategic dimension became evident in the flurry of visits to India by the chiefs of the Japanese defence establishment (Ghosh, 2008: 288). Bilateral interest became evident in service-to-service exchanges and talks including joint coast guard exercises. Especially significant have been moves to institutionalize security arrangements, including the Japan–India Comprehensive Security Dialogue inaugurated in 2001, the Joint Statement Towards Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India in 2008, and the bilateral 2+2 Dialogue beginning in 2009. Many of these interactions followed the visit of India's Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Tokyo in 2006, with agreements on expanding defence ties including in the maritime space.

Prime Minister Abe's visit to India in 2007 set the scene for further security cooperation. In his 2006 book, Abe had expressed support for a cooperative strategic framework comprising Japan, India, Australia and the United States on the basis of their shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights. He speculated that in 10 years' time, Japan–India relations could well overtake Japan–US and Japan–China relations (Abe, 2006: 160). Abe's Indian counterpart at this time, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was an avowed supporter of India's deeper engagement with Japan. A significant result was the signing in 2008 of a bilateral security declaration.¹¹ This was Japan's second security agreement (Australia, in 2007) and was India's second after its long-standing security treaty with Russia, with which Japan still has not signed a peace treaty following the Second World War. During Prime Minister Singh's 2013 visit to Tokyo, the two countries agreed to enhance science and technology cooperation, including in cyber security. Lower-level bilateral defence talks have also been productive. Indian and Japanese defence and foreign ministry personnel have been holding a recurring maritime security dialogue for years. Japanese and Indian defence officials also interact through a number of bilateral forums including the 2+2 Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, and a Coast Guard-to-Coast Guard cooperation dialogue. In 2016, India and Japan also set up the first dialogue between both countries' air forces.

India–Japan security ties have continued to develop in the shadow of an increasingly assertive China. Both nations' bilateral relations with China are intrinsic to their bilateral relations with each other. The recent history of China's responses towards Japan – from history textbook controversies and hostility

towards Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine commemorating the war dead, to Japan's control of the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) that China claims – has put this fragile relationship on a 'rocky path' (Kokubun et al., 2017), and economic interdependence has not helped ease tensions. In this context India has great strategic significance for Japan. India's relations with China also remain rocky on the issue of territorial claims. More recently India is also concerned about the increasing influence of China in India's neighbourhood; the most recent manifestation is China's Road and Belt Initiative and the proposed China–Pakistan economic corridor that would run through the disputed areas in Kashmir. However, while the China threat theory remains a strong narrative in Japan, the Indian side may consider China less as a threat and more as a rival and competitor (Ito, 2013: 121). India wants to resolve any dispute or disagreement with China through dialogue and diplomatic negotiations as evident in the 2017 standoff between the two in Doklam at the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan, as discussed below.

Certainly, the continued rise of China is politically overshadowing both Japan as an established power and India as a rising power, and region-wide has created the perception of a shift in the balance of power in Asia towards Chinese hegemony. The apparent relative decline and/or uncertainty about the United States is also instrumental in this strategic picture. In his first term, Abe sought to avoid antagonism with China and enhance relations with India to better position Japan strategically amidst this power transition. India as a rising Asian power with high economic growth backed by the liberal reforms from the early 1990s also avoided unnecessary strategic provocations with China, as evident in India's response to Abe's call in 2006 for a 'concert of democracies' – the United States, Australia, India and Japan – linked together in the Asia-Pacific. India (and Australia) were the first to pull back from the quadrilateral proposal should it rouse China's anger. India has long cautiously avoided being trapped in Asia's balance of power politics to maintain strategic flexibility, but to avoid becoming vulnerable in the current power transition has recognized strategic value in relations with Japan (Koga and Joshi, 2013).

All up, it is hard to gauge the actual weight of concern about China in escalation of the strategic dimension of India–Japan relations. Certainly the impact is significant, as India–Japan relations have firmed more significantly since 2005 when Japan–China relations began to deteriorate significantly (Jain, 2007). Japan's tense relationship with China correlates with the significant development in Japan's relations with India, though of course other factors such as India's improved relations with the United States, Japan's trusted security and defence ally, are also influential. Furthermore, recent leaders of the two nations – India's Manmohan Singh before Narendra Modi and Japan's Koizumi and his successors have interacted closely. Even when the long-standing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, all of its three prime ministers maintained momentum, even if less intense than Abe in 2006–7,

through the annual summit and other processes. An 'Action plan to advance security cooperation based on the joint declaration on security cooperation between Japan and India' was signed in December 2009 under the DPJ government,¹² and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2011 when the DPJ's Naoto Kan was Japan's prime minister. During the Kan administration, an India–Japan civil nuclear deal made significant progress but was derailed in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.

The annual summit meetings institutionalized in 2005 are practical as well as symbolic, providing the much needed personal contact between prime ministers. For Japan, India is the first and only country with which it conducts an annual summit, whereas for India, Japan is the second country after Russia, with which India has conducted summit meetings since 2000. As India–Japan analyst Horimoto has observed, India and Japan do not discuss Russian affairs, as India remains close to Russia while Japan still has not signed a peace treaty with Russia after the Second World War (Horimoto, 2017: 17). The annual summit served as a powerful instrument boosting the bilateral relationship even when Japan was undergoing an annual turnover of prime ministers from 2006 to 2012. Without this institutionalized process in place, it was highly unlikely that annual meetings between the two nations' prime ministers would have taken place. With the return of Shinzo Abe as prime minister in 2012, the summit process became even more powerful for taking India–Japan relations to new heights.

RE-ENTER ABE IN 2012 AND MODI AS PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA SINCE 2014

The 2012 return of Abe as Japan's prime minister, after the short stint in 2006–7, brought a tailwind to Japan–India ties – one that would be strengthened further by India's change of leadership 18 months later. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government engaged Japan deeply during his decade in office, but the 2014 shift in the Indian government to the Bharatiya Janata Party's leader Narendra Modi brought huge propulsion to the relationship.

Modi and Abe had struck a positive chord even before Modi became India's prime minister. While still chief minister of Gujarat, Modi was instrumental in drawing Japanese investment to his home state. He also developed a personal rapport with Shinzo Abe during Abe's first term in office. When Abe was elected into the prime ministership for the second time in December 2012, Modi – still Gujarat's chief minister – was one of the first foreign political leaders to congratulate Abe. For a nation's newly elected prime minister to accept this type of phone call from another country's provincial leader is unusual and showed the personal political chemistry between Abe and Modi. When Modi's party scored a thumping majority in India's 2014 general election, Prime Minister Abe was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Modi.

Given their close personal friendship, Modi made Japan his first bilateral port of call abroad, outside of the South Asian region in August–September 2014, generating much discussion and media attention in India. The two leaders issued a joint statement, the ‘Tokyo Declaration for Japan–India Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, comprising a list of actions on which the two nations would work in wide-ranging fields, including cooperation at provincial and city levels. Since then, India–Japan relations have moved from strength to strength.

During Modi’s visit to Tokyo in 2014, Japan committed some US\$35 billion in public and private investments in India over a five-year period. India has been a priority nation for Japan’s ODA since Tokyo phased out its ODA to China in the early 2000s. In addition to Japan’s existing commitments for big infrastructure projects, during his India visit in December 2015 Abe committed even more financial aid for road connectivity in India’s Northeast, an underdeveloped but strategically important area on India’s periphery. More recent ODA commitments are for many more gigantic infrastructure projects throughout India, including a high-speed railway project to connect Mumbai and Ahmedabad, which is in Modi’s home state (Goyal, 2017).

The two nations have also strengthened their ties in areas that are crucial to their shared security and strategic interests. Recent examples include Japan in 2015 becoming a permanent member in the Malabar naval exercises with India and the United States, giving the strongest signal yet of Japan’s commitment to military cooperation with India. India and Japan have also conducted a bilateral Japan–India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) since June 2012. A joint prime ministerial statement in December 2015 opened more avenues for defence cooperation, including joint development and transfer of defence technology. As Baru notes, ‘The Joint Statement issued by both Prime Ministers clears many cobwebs out of the bilateral equation, especially on contentious issues such as cooperation in the development of nuclear energy and defence capability’ (Baru, 2015). Joint statements at the 2016 and 2017 summits included more declarations on strategic matters, with cooperation to fight terrorism and joint responses on regional issues. While the highlight of the 2016 summit was a nuclear deal for Japan to sell civil nuclear power equipment and technology to India, at the 2017 summit it was a deal for Japan to fund through ODA more than 80 per cent of a bullet train project connecting Mumbai and Ahmedabad, and the two leaders also declared India and Japan to partner ‘Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific’ (Panneerselvam, 2016; Jain, 2017b).

Two major unfinished items were on the bilateral agenda when Modi took over as prime minister from Manmohan Singh: a civil nuclear agreement and the sale of Japanese amphibious aircraft for the Indian navy. While Modi finally clinched a civil nuclear deal in 2016, at the end of 2017 a long-negotiated proposal for the sale of Shin Maywa US-2 amphibious aircraft to India remains elusive. Some strategists regard it to be of utmost significance in view of China’s assertiveness and the relative lack of US interest in the Indo-Pacific region (Nagao, 2016).

This item remains on the negotiating table, and there may also be other opportunities for Japan supply defence equipment to India. India is currently contemplating building six non-nuclear submarines and is in talks with a number of potential suppliers internationally, including Japan (Woody, 2017). Whether any of these possibilities become strategic realities is another matter. The point to note here is that Japan and India have become close partners in security and strategic matters, with Japan a potential supplier of India's military hardware, and actual supplier of hardware for India's nuclear energy, a scenario unthinkable even a decade ago.

Furthermore, in the past Japan was a fence sitter on most territorial and other disputes between India and its neighbouring nations. Even as recently as the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999, Tokyo refused to participate in any discussion on border disputes between India and Pakistan. But when in 2017 India's long-standing territorial disputes with China turned ugly with months of military standoff on the Doklam plateau – the three-way junction of India, Bhutan and China – the Japanese Ambassador to India lent support to India's action in a rare diplomatic statement, which China swiftly condemned (*The Hindu*, 2017). This was in stark contrast to Japan's position on earlier disputes involving India and its neighbours, signalling Japan's intent to solidify its strategic ties with India.

BEYOND BILATERALISM

India and Japan now also cooperate beyond the scope of bilateral matters. The emphasis on 'global partnership' takes the two into the realms of trilateral, quadrilateral and larger multilateral frameworks. Under Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan and India together with Germany and Brazil formed a grouping pushing for reform of the United National Security Council and seeking their permanent membership. Abe and his associates such as Taro Aso around 2007 pushed for a quadrilateral framework involving the United States and Australia besides India and Japan. This did not come to fruition because of lack of political interest in the capitals of these cities, but this has not died. The 2007 proposed quadrilateral framework with the United States and Australia that we noted above did not eventuate, was never dead and buried (Lohman et al., 2015). As recently as in October 2017, Japan's foreign minister Taro Kono raised the possibility of reviving the quadrilateral framework proposal, to which India has responded positively (*The Wire*, 2017). Australia has also indicated to Japan its interest in reviving this security dialogue involving the four nations (Grigg, 2017).

Abe and Modi in particular are inclined towards expanding their strategic partnership beyond their borders. In the joint statement after their 2016 summit, the two prime ministers stressed the potential of the collaboration between India

and Japan for realizing a prosperous Indo-Pacific region in the 21st century. They 'decided to draw on the strength of shared values, convergent interests and complementary skills and resources, to promote economic and social development, capacity building, connectivity and infrastructure development in the region'.¹³ This was further reiterated in the 2017 joint statement titled 'Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific', and in the 2018 'India-Japan Vision Statement'.¹⁴

The two nations have found Africa as a new territory for cooperation. They have proposed to cooperate in the development of Africa through establishing an Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (Jain, 2017c). The 2017 joint statement noted the need for joint exploration to establish industrial corridors, and an industrial network for the growth of Asia and Africa. These planned and proposed fora may provide opportunities for India and Japan to promote their economic interests jointly, but undeniably they are proposed with a strategic eye on China, whose diplomatic and economic footprint on the Asian and African continents continues to enlarge. More such collaborative frameworks involving like-minded nations appear to be likely, as India and Japan find more strategic meeting ground with each other and with partners beyond.

The 2017 joint statement also confirms India–Japan cooperation on development of India's Northeast as a key example of synergies between India's Act East Policy and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. While development of India's Northeast could be an economic project, it also has strategic value. Through India's Northeast, connectivity projects could be extended into other South Asian and Southeast Asian states such as Bangladesh and Myanmar, in response to China's Belt and Road Initiative, to which both Japan and India have refused to sign on.

CONCLUSION

Shinzo Abe's hope and expectation in 2006 that Japan–India relations would surpass Japan–US and Japan–China relations in a decade has not materialized. Unmistakably, however, this bilateral relationship has undergone remarkable transformation in the 21st century, particularly in the last decade. As outlined in this chapter, the relationship has developed at both official and private levels, especially through politico-strategic linkages but also, to a lesser extent, economic. Developments that have brought the relationship to its current strategic form were hard to visualize even when the relationship was being 'normalized' following the short-lived freeze in relations following India's nuclear testing at the close of the 20th century.

Today the relationship has some key features that make India–Japan ties somewhat different from the ties that bind the two nations in most of their other bilateral relationships. First, the unusual annual summitry at heads of government

level has given the relationship a significant boost and stability. Second, the absence of historical baggage and a bank of goodwill from the early post-war years has enabled the development of deeper and wider relations when the interests of both parties converged. Third, unlike many other nations where deep economic links develop first and are followed by political and strategic links (for example, Australia), with India, Japan's engagement today dominates in political and strategic areas and economic links are still rather weak. The strategic emphasis is evident even in Japan's ODA to India, as can be discerned in Japan's support for infrastructure projects on India's Northeast. Fourth, while both India and Japan see China as a nation of concern, they have somewhat different outcomes in mind. Japan partners with India as a counterbalance to China whereas India's interest is its own economic development through Japan's partnership, recognizing China as more of a competitor than a threat. While China looms large in India's strategic calculations, India cooperates with China where New Delhi sees possibility for benefit. A clear example is India's membership of the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which Japan chose not to join.

As the consequences of China's rise to great power status continue to reshape the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, India and Japan are in an intimate relationship. Strategically they are sharing ever more with each other and with additional strategic partners, even while their expectations may differ. Although Japan is declining in relative power regionally and internationally, its strategic response to the rise of China and India will have a significant impact on the balance of power in Asia. So too will India's place as an increasingly powerful Asian giant. That is why, after years of distant relations post-war, the two nations have rediscovered their long lost friendship. The closer alignment born of this contemporary friendship appears set to continue to contribute to the strategic equilibrium in Asia as the region and the world evolve strategically.

Notes

- 1 <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/abe-recalls-grandfathers-ties-with-nehru/article19685815.ece>
- 2 A term used to indicate India's slow economic growth.
- 3 Author's interview with an Indian diplomat in the Indian Embassy and a Japanese diplomat who had served as Japan's ambassador in India. Tokyo, 19 August 1998.
- 4 Japan had also imposed sanctions on India over armed conflict with Pakistan in the mid 1960s.
- 5 Author's interview with a Japanese diplomat who had served as Japan's ambassador in India. Tokyo, 19 August 1998.
- 6 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/7/703.html>
- 7 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/joint0112.html>
- 8 The initiative set out cooperation in eight key areas: (i) enhanced and upgraded dialogue architecture, including high-level exchanges, launching a High Level Strategic Dialogue, and fully using existing dialogue mechanisms; (ii) comprehensive economic engagement through expanding trade in goods and services, investment flows and other areas of economic cooperation, and exploring a Japan–India economic partnership agreement; (iii) enhanced security dialogue and cooperation;

- (iv) a Science and Technology Initiative; (v) cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening people-to-people contacts to raise the visibility and profile of each country to the other; (vi) cooperation in ushering a new Asian era; (vii) cooperation in the United Nations and other international organizations, including to quickly realize UN reforms, particularly in the Security Council; and (viii) cooperation in responding to global challenges and opportunities. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html>
- 9 Some have even suggested that Abe was the first Japanese politician to use the term 'Indo-Pacific', Katsuyuki Kawai's speech at Ananta Aspen Centre, 5 September 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kehWF4XQfg> (21.5 minutes)
 - 10 This discrepancy in yen and dollar value can be attributed to the fluctuating dollar–yen exchange rate.
 - 11 With the United States, Japan maintains a security treaty including military support which is different from Tokyo's agreement with Canberra and New Delhi.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0912/action.html>
 - 13 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India-Japan Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Japan, 11 November 2016. <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan>
 - 14 Kenji Hiramatsu, 'Towards a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific: PM Shinzo Abe's India visit is harbinger of a new era', *The Times of India*, 23 September 2017. <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/towards-a-free-open-and-prosperous-indo-pacific-pm-shinzo-abes-india-visit-is-harbinger-of-a-new-era/>; https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30543/IndiaJapan_Vision_Statement

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Will India Become China's Africa?

Jonathan Holslag

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, Jairam Ramesh, an Indian politician, proposed that China and India leave their historical disputes behind to form a profitable economic partnership.¹ The idea of *Chindia* was born. China would specialize in manufacturing and India in services, so that both could flourish. Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao, the two prime ministers at that time, echoed this idea by proposing to turn the Himalaya from a contested frontier into a mountain of peace. I, for one, was sceptical about the idea.² To create enough jobs for its rapidly growing population, India needed hundreds of manufacturing jobs, and, I thought, this would inevitably make the country a competitor of China. I also assumed that if India were to become a manufacturing powerhouse, it would be locked into fierce rivalry with China for raw materials. Furthermore, I saw no indication that growing economic ties facilitated solutions for the border dispute, the wrangling over Pakistan, and India's distrust towards China's growing presence in its neighbourhood. My conclusion was that if the two would grow together, trade conflicts, diplomatic tensions, military balancing and even war would become inevitable.

I was wrong. I was wrong not so much because I expected the rise of the two powers to lead to conflict, but because I neglected the prospect of India failing to rise altogether. That, this chapter asserts, is exactly what happened. As China paced ahead and managed most of its internal challenges, it left India far behind in terms of economic power, military prowess, and political influence. The liberal Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004–14) was not able to kick-start manufacturing growth and to attract large volumes of foreign investment. For

all the enthusiasm, there is no evidence that his ambitious successor, Narendra Modi, will be more successful.³ India is just no match for China any longer. This has immense strategic consequences. Given its large population and its strategic location, India is the only Asian state with the potential to restore the regional balance of power. The country clearly has the wish to become a regional leader and to defend its interests with regard to its rising northern neighbour. Yet, India's traditional policy of non-alignment prescribes it to do so independently and to decline any role in a regional network of alliances led by the United States. Its weakness, though, makes such strategy of independent balancing impossible.

The failure to balance China, this chapter goes on, could portend larger problems. As a result of India's inability to resist China's economic power politics, it will continue to lose investment and trade opportunities. This breeds more social resentment, political distrust, and, in the end, institutional fragmentation. Local parties with agendas focussed on individual states gain ground at the expense of the national government and the two leading parties, Congress (INC) and the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The weakening of India presents a unique opportunity for China to forge ahead with its strategy of mollification. Instead of acting against China's aggressive trade policy, India embraces it, looks at China as a possible source of investment and opens up its markets despite China's growing surplus. It allows China to externalize its overcapacity problem, to ward off trade disputes, and to advance an increasingly unequal economic partnership. And this could only be the start of India's humiliation. If it continues to lose ground, it might well become a dependency of China: economically exploited and politically fragmenting. India could, to express it with a slight exaggeration, become China's Africa. It goes without saying that India's economic weakness also makes India unable to match China's military modernization, and unable to balance its growing presence, and clout, in South Asia.

This chapter advances its arguments in three steps. It first reviews the shift in the balance of power since 2005, the year of *Chindia*, considering economic, military, and political indicators. Onwards, it documents India's failure to stand up against China's increasingly sophisticated power politics.⁴ It then formulates conclusions about the significance of the evolving Sino-Indian partnership for the future of Asian power politics. If India crumbles as a regional power, the chapter argues, China would, as long as it manages its economic problems, have a chance of emerging as the sole Asian great power and increasingly challenge the position of the United States. Framing the Sino-Indian partnership in the broader debate about international politics, it suggests that India's under-balancing, being the absence of balancing even if the threat is present, is due to a prioritization of commercial cooperation.⁵ Effective balancing requires a country to shore up its economic capabilities, so that it can strengthen its armed forces and defend its interests. But India has been unsuccessful in this regard, now even to the point that Indian leaders feel that they have no other option but to tread carefully with regard to China and to try to attract its financial support. Real, effective balancing is increasingly confined to the realm of nuclear deterrence.

THE ECONOMIC ECLIPSE

In 2004, *The Economic Times* of India ran a cover story titled ‘The Tiger can overpower the Dragon by 2020.’⁶ Experts claimed that India would have a much larger demographic dividend to benefit from than China. Almost at the same time, *The New York Times* published a long article about multinationals that moved their factories from China to India. ‘The Chinese economy is looking rather unstable’, the director of a large manufacturer stated⁷. Back then, China’s GDP was about two times as large as India’s. Now, over a decade later, China’s GDP is five times bigger. A combination of factors accounts for this success.⁸ China opened its market on the right time and much more vigorously. By the nineties, it had attracted ten times more foreign investment than India. That came with a significantly larger transfer of know-how and a greater productivity boost. The Chinese government also successfully conducted a policy of financial repression. It forced households to bring their savings to policy banks, which on their turn financed urban development, public infrastructure, and new factories. Financial repression, growth driven by investment and thus relatively low consumption levels, inevitably rendered China dependent on exports. The government managed that problem and secured access to foreign markets. About four per cent of China’s GDP since 2005 has been generated by the surplus in trade, whereas India incurred a chronic trade deficit. Manmohan Singh once called on the citizens of his country to follow the Chinese example by ‘saving like bees’, but that call clearly went unheard.

As a result, China today boasts a manufacturing sector that is eleven times larger than India’s (Table 50.1). The gap continued to widen despite China’s rising wages. Between 2005 and 2015, Indian hourly wages in the manufacturing annually increased by 10 per cent; Chinese wages by 35 per cent. This shows that China’s competitive advantage is no longer limited to low wages. Its competitiveness has been boosted by cheap capital availability, good infrastructure, reliable energy supply, the relocation of complex production chains towards China, and the fact that the country has built up many more advanced and thus less labour-intensive industries. China’s high-tech exports are now thirty times larger than

Table 50.1 Selected indicators of Chinese and Indian economic growth

	<i>China</i>		<i>India</i>	
	<i>2005</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2015</i>
Exports of goods and services (US\$ bn)	773	2,524	155	468
Manufacturing value added (US\$ bn)	734	3,510	118	302
GDP (US\$ bn)	2,269	10,351	834	2,042
GDP per capita (US\$)	1,740	7,587	729	1,577

Source: World Development Indicators.

India's and 65 per cent of these exports are now also controlled by Chinese companies instead of foreign multinationals. If India is plagued by a vicious circle in which poor infrastructure slows its industrialization and the lack of manufacturing incomes reduces the resources to spend on infrastructure, China has rolled out top-notch infrastructure across the country. Anyone who has visited the two countries will recognize the contrast. Since 2005, China has built one million kilometres of new roads, 5,000 kilometres of new railways, world-class airports, port terminals, connected almost its entire population on drinkable water and doubled its electricity output, which is now over four times larger than India's. Yes, some of these investments have led to oversupply, but the government has, for now, prevented it from causing a collapse.

It is not only in manufacturing that China has outshined its neighbour. In services, which many considered India's stronghold, it has performed better too. China's services exports are now almost double the size of those of India and IT services exports have become almost as large as those of Indian giants in the field, like Tata Consultancy Services and Infosys. In agriculture, China's value added has become three times larger than India's. This is an important achievement in light of the fixation of the Chinese government with food security and given the fact that China's arable land is about one third smaller than India's. While China has pushed back undernourishment from 20 to 10 per cent, it remained at around 20 per cent in India. One key to China's success is more intensive farming. This caused problems like soil degradation, but not more than in India. Another explanation is its ability to externalize some of its environmental problems. Thanks to its financial resources, it can preserve more of its own resources and make poorer countries sacrifice precious nature. China buys their resources, like palm oil and soy, and sells manufactured goods in exchange. Thanks to its political clout it can also divert water from international rivers, like the Mekong and the Ili, unpunished. As a result of Chinese water diversion, many neighbouring countries have suffered drought. India is not in a position to do so: it lacks the funds and the power. The challenge of resource scarcity will only become more pressing for India. With a population that grows much faster than China's, it has only half of the volume of freshwater available.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Differences in prosperity have an impact on the political power of the two countries. At home, it means different levels of public support for the government. In China's one-party-state, this is a matter of all or nothing: mass revolt or the persistence of the monopoly of power. Resilient authoritarianism, this is called. The Communist Party has taken a large gamble with its forced transfer of trillions of dollars of household savings to investments that are not always profitable. But as long as it prevents a cascade of defaults and losses, it has unmatched

authority and resources to continue its aggressive industrial and export policy. This is different in India. Over the last decade, public support for the two leading parties, INC and the BJP, has shrivelled. Whereas they controlled over 80 per cent of the seats in the national parliaments until the eighties, this dropped to 60 per cent in recent decades and 50 per cent in the 2014 elections.⁹ In the 2014 national elections, popular Narendra Modi secured 31 per cent of the votes, yet, as only 66 per cent of the voters turned out, this effectively represents less than 20 per cent of the Indian electorate. The so-called landslide victory of Modi in 2019 still only meant that he secured 25 per cent of the support of the Indian electorate. This forces the leading parties to form coalitions with local parties and to water down their reform programmes. The Indian government can thus take much less risk, so that adjustments inevitably become slow and incremental.

This is especially so, because there is no indication that economic policies yield results. Modi went to the elections with the promise that he would open up his country to attract foreign investors from countries like Japan and the United States. Since the installation of his government, however, Japan has only invested US\$353 million in India, compared to US\$13 billion in China; the United States US\$1 billion in India and US\$7 billion in China.¹⁰ He promised to create millions of jobs, but employment growth dropped to the lowest level in years.¹¹ He pledged to trim government subsidies on fuel and fertilizer, but failed to live up to that promise. The government is not all to blame, especially as that global economic environment came to look so grim. Yet, again, if it does not turn the situation around, the hopes of a strong reformist cabinet will fade and India will face more political fragmentation – and ineffectiveness.

The shift of the economic balance of power also has diplomatic consequences. China has emerged as the largest trade partner and investor of all of India's neighbours, except Bhutan. China has not yet drawn South Asia into a Chinese sphere of influence, but it has certainly prevented India from creating its own and from using its central geographic position to claim regional leadership. Thanks to unabated financial support, Pakistan remains a potent rival. China annually sinks US\$200 million of direct investment into the Pakistani economy, alongside an undisclosed but much larger amount of loans for infrastructure development, energy, and military modernization. Thanks to Chinese support, such as the delivery of so-called transporter erector launchers or truck-mounted rocket launchers, Pakistan was able to improve its nuclear deterrence against India, and thanks to the joint development of the Al-Khalid Main Battle Tank, it enhances its defence capabilities along the long continental border. The supplies to the Pakistani Navy, which is supposed to guard the disputed maritime border with India, include eight submarines, four frigates, and four missile patrol boats. This pales the Indian delivery of two corvettes to the Philippines.

Growing relations with China certainly helped the government of Sri Lanka to rebuff some of India's demands. It rejected for instance a request of Prime

Minister Modi to devolve police authority to the provinces, as agreed with India in 1987, to defuse tensions with the Tamil minority. Sri Lanka also refused to give in on a fishery conflict with India in the Palk Strait and arrested over 70 Indian fishermen. Likewise, Chinese trade, aid and new transportation routes came at a moment that the government of Nepal sought to clench a fist towards Delhi. The Indian government insisted on major revisions of Nepal's new secular constitution, as it feared, among others, that it could deteriorate the position of minority groups in the southern Terai region, which straddles the border with India. The Nepalese government refused. China even gave its official blessing to the new constitution. 'As a friendly neighbour,' the foreign ministry stated, 'China notes with pleasure that Nepal's Constituent Assembly has endorsed the new constitution.'

For the whole Indian Ocean Rim, China has become a more important export destination than India. China has coaxed most countries into its own trade networks and financed new direct connections, like ports. China has led the development of numerous ports and port sections: Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, Duqm in Oman, Port Sudan in Sudan, Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Lamu in Kenya, and so forth. Three important land corridors to the Indian Ocean are being developed: one via Myanmar, one via Pakistan, and one, still in an early stage, via Bangladesh. Only in 2012, India broke ground for its own linkages to Myanmar: the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Project. Growing economic ties came with various political initiatives. The Eastern African countries are all part of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China has pledged US\$60 billion of investment via this platform. India responded by setting up an India-Africa Development Fund of only US\$100 million. FOCAC now has a vast agenda that ranges from infrastructure development and energy to security and anti-piracy. It has a permanent secretariat and 12 dedicated Chinese diplomats to follow up the implementation of the agenda. The same has happened with Southeast Asia, one of the main geographic interfaces between China and India. Between 2005 and 2015, the exports of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to China grew from US\$71 billion to US\$142 billion; those to India from US\$20 billion to US\$40 billion. Thanks to its growing competitiveness and its much smaller reliance on the agricultural sector, China was able to go much further in making concessions in free trade talks with the ASEAN countries. It has effectively taken over the lead from Japan in spearheading regional transport projects. Its delegation to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta counts three times as many diplomats as India's embassy. Besides its ties with ASEAN, China has taken the initiative to deepen cooperation in other forums, like the Greater Mekong Sub-Region and Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM).

Beyond Asia, China has outpaced India with numerous initiatives. The Belt and Road strategy is set to strengthen China's economic position and divert even more trade away from India. The establishment of the Asia Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB) was a masterstroke. It eased some of the distrust towards China's economic power and gave countries like India the impression they would be equally important. Yet, at the same time, China positioned itself clearly at the head and retained all its options to finance projects bilaterally through its own policy banks and investment funds. China's push for trade has also changed its role in international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until a few years ago, China was rather defensive concerning economic openness, especially in trade in services, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property. That has reversed completely. China actively pushes for openness and has thus become much more prominent, defending the WTO actively and calling on countries like India to strictly follow the rules – and thus to steer clear of excessive anti-dumping measures.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The military balance of power has shifted as well. China officially spends 1.9 per cent of its GDP on defence, India 2.5 per cent.¹² Thanks to its phenomenal economic growth, China could increase the defence budget from US\$55 billion in 2006 to US\$215 billion in 2015. India's defence budget increased US\$24 billion to US\$51 billion. One of the main beneficiaries was the Chinese Navy. Since 2006, it acquired 141 modern warships, India only 19. China's Navy now has a core of 227 modern ships, compared to 20 in the Indian Navy.¹³ Those numbers matter. The fleet modernization permits China to increase its military presence in adjacent seas as well as to defend its interests in distant waters like the Indian Ocean. Since 2008, the Chinese Navy is permanently present in the Indian Ocean with at least three ships.¹⁴ Since 2014, it has regularly deployed submarines in the Bay of Bengal and even as far as the Gulf of Aden. In 2016, it commenced the construction of a large military hub in Djibouti, which makes it a resident power in the Indian Ocean basin.

Thus far, China's deployment in the Indian Ocean has mostly enhanced its freedom of action. Instead of having to rely on the United States or India to protect its merchant fleet against pirates or to evacuate citizens from unstable countries, it can do so independently. This is a major strategic advantage. Inevitably, it has also gained precious experience in the area, became more familiar with the theatre, and got ample of opportunities to eavesdrop on the Indian military. In the long run, its facilities in Djibouti and permanent deployment of ships in the Western Indian Ocean could make it harder for India to deter China when it exits the Malacca or Sunda straits, the main choke points between South and East Asia. Furthermore, the experience gained by attack submarines could pave the way for strategic patrols of new generations of ballistic missile submarines. India, again, does not have these assets. Its own deployments east of the Strait of Malacca are limited to one or two short voyages per year.

The Chinese air and land forces too have modernized much faster. Since 2006, China commissioned close to 190 new fighter jets, India 50. It commissioned around 1,500 new main battle tanks, India 300.¹⁵ These are just a few evolutions in terms of material, but like with the navy, they broaden China's options, along the contested border with India, for example. China's military presence along the Indian border now consists of three layers of defence. The first layer is formed by about 20,000 troops, divided into six border defence regiments and a host of dedicated battalions. These units have their main barracks near town, like Dingri and Changdu, but are operational across a large number of observation posts near the border. Troops of the regiments are lightly armed and are the ones usually involved in so-called border incursions. Next come two mountain infantry brigades and the 54th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, based in Nyingchi and Lhasa.¹⁶ These brigades are flanked by artillery regiments, equipped, among others, with advanced HQ-9 air defence batteries. The Chinese Air Force has now permanently deployed J-10 fighters in Lhasa. The third layer is formed by the group armies of the Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions. New railway lines provide the infrastructure to shuttle these troops into Tibet whenever necessary. Since 2010, these group armies have been frequently involved in large-scale high-altitude exercises, like Joint Action-2015D.¹⁷ All this gives China a range of possibilities to show its resolve in the border dispute, but also to deter India conventionally onshore as long as it remains vulnerable at sea.

As far as it can be verified, China also leads in terms of nuclear capabilities. China probably possesses around 260 warheads, compared to India's 120.¹⁸ In terms of core technologies, India appears to be only a few steps behind. Both countries now deploy road-mobile long-range missiles and can fit multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on them. China has mastered the technology to build an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle, a very fast manoeuvrable warhead; India will probably follow. In terms of defence measures, China deployed the HQ-9 defence missile; India completed the comparable Advanced Air Defence (AAD) a while later. China has commissioned a variant of the DF-21 as an exo-atmospheric interceptor missile; India built its Prithvi. China outshines India in the development of second-strike capacity by means of ballistic missile submarines, in satellites and in tracking radars. It also has complicated India's nuclear modernization by blocking its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a move that is officially said to be a consequence of India's refusal to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but unofficially helps China to make it more difficult for the United States to supply nuclear know-how openly and to prevent that India gets a leading edge on Pakistan.¹⁹

In terms of military power, India has gathered sufficient nuclear capabilities, perhaps not to prevail in a nuclear conflict with China, but certainly to afflict significant damage. Underneath this umbrella of modest nuclear deterrence, China has expanded and modernized its military means much faster. This gives it more manoeuvrability in case of tensions, but also allows it to combine its traditional

focus on security at home and in the maritime margins of East Asia with growing presence in Southern Asia.

ECONOMIC MOLLIFICATION

Do we have indications that India is ready to catch up and to prevent the balance of power from shifting further, to its detriment? This chapter has already indicated that it is not the case. Moreover, as is clarified in this section, India continues to succumb to China's strategy of economic mollification. India took notice of the unbalanced relations with China, but was unsuccessful in changing the situation. Unbalanced trade with China has been a concern for many years. India launched its first anti-dumping investigation against China in 1992. Since the nineties, China has made one proposal for economic cooperation after another. The first step was to promote investment joint ventures in India, particularly in the steel sector. To facilitate them, China proposed a double taxation avoidance agreement. During President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to India in 1996, he proposed to shelve the border issue and to concentrate on trade instead. Ahead of the visit, China sought to acquire 'full' most favoured nation status, which prescribes signatories offer trade tariffs to each other that are as low as those applied to their most favoured trade partner, but the two sides decided to limit it to seaborne trade. Jiang suggested that the US\$1 billion of bilateral trade at that time could grow exponentially if trade barriers were lowered.²⁰ This message was especially welcomed by pro-reform interest groups like the Indian Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). From that moment onwards, China regularly invited CII delegations. In 2001, China suggested to open the Nathu La pass for border trade, which was agreed in 2003.

After the turn of the century, China more frequently articulated its economic complementarity with India. As Prime Minister Wen Jiabao put it: 'With their vast markets, the Chinese and Indian economies enjoy different advantages and are complementary. Exchanges between the two governments and private enterprises of the two countries are conducive to mutual understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation.'²¹ By that time, new leaders had come to power both in Beijing and in Delhi, but, more importantly, members of the Indian parliament also started to ask more questions about the trade deficit, which came close to US\$1 billion. China responded by cultivating expectations of farmers and fruit traders to benefit from the growing Chinese consumer markets. In 2003, it agreed on a protocol of phytosanitary measures for mangoes, a crucial commodity in northern states that also happened to be the main power base of the ruling BJP. Whereas India wished to have one protocol for all sorts of fruits, China decided that they would be negotiated one by one to optimize its bargaining power. The Chinese government also started to promise more investment. The Chinese embassy in Delhi suggested, however, that this would require the removal of

visa restrictions and the relaxation of investment security review procedures.²² In 2006, president Hu Jintao proposed to double trade, but criticism of the trade deficit, now reaching US\$7 billion, grew louder. The matter was discussed at trade minister level in the Joint-Economic Group (JEG). In the years that followed, more investment delegations were sent to India. One, involving hundreds of business leaders, arrived in the wake of Premier Wen Jiabao in 2010. During this visit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh raised the trade deficit, but the summit meeting ended only with the commitment to push up trade to US\$100 billion and to promote Indian exports. China, again, stated that it would encourage domestic firms to invest.²³

When Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made way for the fifth generation of leaders, headed by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, and Manmohan Singh's cabinet was nearing the end of its second term, the trade deficit had grown to over US\$30 billion, which equals two times India's total education budget. Between 2000 and 2013, China's accumulated trade surplus was US\$191 billion. Compared to that loss on the current account for India, the stock Chinese direct investment, US\$18 billion, remained very small.²⁴ Putting it differently: China's trade gains from India were ten times larger than its investment in India. Moreover, India had not fulfilled its objective to reduce its dependence on raw materials exports. In 2013, the raw materials content in India's exports was still 61 per cent.

The new government addressed China on the trade imbalance. In September 2014, a five-year development programme was approved to promote more balanced economic relations. '[T]he trade deficit with China is a matter of high concern for India,' said Commerce and Industry Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman.²⁵ By 2015, however, the deficit had grown to US\$52 billion and it continued to increase in the first two quarters of 2016. China's response was to raise new expectations. In 2014, President Xi visited Prime Minister Modi's home state, Gujarat. The Chinese government vowed to invest US\$20 billion in India by 2018. These investments were to be sunk into two important industrial zones: one for electronics, again in Gujarat, and one in Maharashtra. In January 2016, the two countries opened the year of Chinese tourism in India. 'China is willing to support India in promoting its tourism resources and facilitate visa application for Chinese tourists to India,' President Xi promised in a written statement, 'China hopes India will relax visa limits and streamline entry and exit formalities.'²⁶ This declaration again reveals China's cunning. On the one hand, it cajoled India with the promise of large revenues from tourism. On the other hand, it tied it instantly to visa liberalization, which is useful also for Chinese workers and contractors. In May 2016, a 'Date with Chinese Investors' was organized for Indian start-ups. Chinese investors promised to invest US\$5 million in the ten most promising Indian companies.

Between 2014 and 2016, Chinese direct investments in India totalled about US\$260 million, a trivial amount compared to the US\$4 billion that will have to be invested annually if the target for 2018 is to be reached. Yet, the Indian

government did not seem to be discouraged. During a visit to India in May 2015, Prime Minister Modi called on China to participate in India's infrastructure development. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley promised Chinese investors that India would remain the only economy in the world set to grow at 7.5 to 8 per cent in an unsupportive global environment.²⁷ At an investment forum in Guangzhou President Pranab Mukherjee put it thus: 'Chinese companies with inherent strengths in infrastructure and manufacturing can look towards India as an important destination in their Going Global strategy.'²⁸ They leaned at an open door, as Chinese railway constructors and train builders had already targeted India as a new potential export market for their services and products. A consortium, led by the China Railway Corporation, conducted a feasibility study into a US\$36 billion bullet train project between New Delhi and Chennai. For this project, it was beaten by Japanese contractors. But only a few months later, India applied for a US\$500 million loan to the China-led Asia Infrastructure Development Bank for solar power projects.

Thus far, China's charm offensive – its strategy of mollification – remains successful. Having entered Modi's second term, China still runs a large trade surplus, cultivates expectations with relatively small investments and now positions its companies to benefit from India's infrastructure development. The unbalanced partnership has thus grown even more unequal.

CONCLUSIONS

For decades now, India has been described as the next China, as the new economic powerhouse of Asia, and at the very least as Asia's leader in commercial services. Now that the growth of China's labour force tails off and wages increase, a spillover of investment and manufacturing would become even likelier. But none of that has materialized or is about to come true. The economic gap between the two giants only becomes wider. The consequence is that China gains more power as the region's new leader. India is unable to resist this and to balance against China's rise. It has modernized its nuclear deterrence, for sure, but its conventional military power remains far behind, so that it has fewer options to respond to Chinese actions on the border or China's growing military presence in the Indian Ocean.

This chapter also showed that we have not reached a turning point. Yes, in 2015 and 2016, India grew faster than China, but there is no evidence this growth is sustainable. Growth in industrial production remains modest and India's economy remains as unbalanced as China's, being that India depends too much on consumption instead of investment. As a share of India's GDP, fixed capital formation – an indicator of investment – even dropped in 2015 and 2016. Even if China's economy is dangerously dependent on manufacturing exports, its government seems to manage the problem and to boost its exports at India's expense.

Instead of countering China's economic nationalism, India, even under the leadership of Narendra Modi, has shown itself to be keen on Chinese financial aid. China in turn has seized this as an opportunity to buy time and to keep India stuck in an unbalanced partnership from which China gains much more in trade incomes than it invests back in India. If this trend continues, India could weaken further and effectively become a Chinese economic dependency, yet still preserving its sovereignty by means of nuclear deterrence.

Outsmarting India with its economic statecraft, China could thus alter the Asian balance of power even more decisively. This all highlights the primacy of economic policy in the evolving international order: smart economic power politics, as China has demonstrated with its strategy of mollification, can permit a country to reap significantly more gains than its partner, strengthen its economy, and, as a result, also advance its economic and political clout.

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China–Japan Relations: Balance of Soft Power

Takeshi Uemura

INTRODUCTION

China's continuous rise has undeniably changed the political terrain in the Asia-Pacific, triggering a spate of scholarly attentions during the past few decades. Some picture an ominous future teeming with conflict and confrontation between the two superpowers, i.e., China and the United States.¹ Others predict wealth and development brought to the region as a result of China's development.² One way or another, the focus is predominantly on China's relationship with the United States, and the major concern lies in the domain of hard power. This chapter, instead, provides a general account of China's soft power and its relationship with Japan. As a significant Other neighboring China, Japan has always played a complex role, from a student of the ancient Chinese civilization, a brutal imperialist invader during China's 150-year humiliation, to a rivalry vying for influence in all spheres. As Hughes correctly points out, whether the two neighboring states can successfully manage their relations would bode tremendous implications for peace not only in the region but also the world at large (Hughes, 2009: 837).

Yet, recent scholarly accounts of China–Japan relations still underscore the dimension of hard power. Smith, for instance, stresses five factors constraining Sino–Japan relations, emphasizing China's military power and the US–Japan security alliance (Smith, 2009). Roy concurs, pointing out security factors potentially troubling the relationship (Roy, 2004). The attention to security issues is hardly surprising, especially with China's recent active (if not aggressive) maritime activities in the East China Sea, and Japan's heightened alert. As Figure 51.1 illustrates, the number of Japanese scrambles against Chinese aircraft in the disputed area has been on a sharp rise since 2009 (Japanese Ministry of Defense).




Figure 51.1 Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft

Source: *Defense of Japan 2019* Japanese Ministry of Defense, 75. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf Last accessed: Oct 28, 2019.

In contrast, experts have yet to scrutinize the soft power dimension of China–Japan relations. Works on soft power of the two countries are mostly about either China or Japan, with little comparison of them. A more comprehensive grasp of power should not be limited to the material confine, such as military, security, and economic factors. Intangible soft power is just as important in gauging the power structure of world politics.³ Largely based on Nye’s original definition, this chapter attempts to address the balance of soft power between China and Japan. The rest of this chapter starts with a brief review of the concept of soft power, followed by a delineation of China’s soft power components, and Japan’s response to China’s soft power endeavors. A preliminary conclusion is that China is chipping away Japan’s sphere of influence through a combination of soft power components.

SOFT POWER – A SLIPPERY CONCEPT

According to Nye, soft power is ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ (Nye, 2008: 94). This definition is obviously too inclusive to be directly used as an analytical tool. Recent studies have adapted it by looking into its concrete components, including the ability of creating dominant discourses, setting

international norms, and controlling agenda (Rothman, 2011). The operating mechanism for soft power may have many sources, and it is almost never entirely independent from the hard material capabilities. Setting and implementing institutional rules and agenda may be premised on states' military power (Mearsheimer, 1994). Therefore, this chapter seeks to compare the soft power balance between the two East Asian neighbors mainly by identifying the sources of their soft power, rather than seeking for any precise definition of the concept.

Also, unlike the classical realist grasp of the concept of power, soft power is not necessarily under the monopoly of sovereign states. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could be a genuine source of soft power, precisely because they are not played out or controlled by their governments (Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Soft power is only powerful when other states and societies are willing to accept it and find its related policies attractive (Rothman, 2011: 57). Since soft power invokes a particular set of imagination of its beholder's identity, it is meaningful to situate soft power against the backdrop of the beholder's identity, whether it is perceived by the Self or Other.

THE SOURCES AND COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S SOFT POWER

Until the early 1990s, Chinese leaders had little idea of what soft power was. Indeed, in the aftermath of Tian'anmen, Deng Xiao et al. had repeatedly demonized the concept of soft power, blaming Western ideas poisoning socialist China's development. As Deng said, 'The rampant spread of bourgeois liberalization may have grave consequences ... the imperialists are pushing for peaceful evolution towards socialism in China, placing their hopes on the generations that will come after us' (Deng, 1993). With dreadful concerns for their regime survival, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites launched a series of nationwide campaigns to demonize Western political ideas (Ding, 2010: 263, 264).

This adamant attitude toward Western ideas, however, began to relax as the CCP gained confidence in ruling the society and boosting the country's status in the international community. Beijing has sharply strengthened its posture in engaging itself in the international community during the Jiang Zemin Administration (Johnston, 2008). Hu Jintao heeded more attention to soft power, as the idea emerged at several important occasions of the parliament and top political advisory body (*People's Daily Online*, March 14, 2007).

To this date, China's soft power mainly comes from three interconnected sources, i.e., its growing economic might and military muscles, its influence particularly in its Asian peripheries through shared history in the ancient and colonial times, and skillful adaptation and maneuvering in the US-led international community. Above anything else, China's continuous growth since Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up in the late 1970s has impressed the world. Its leading role is particularly attractive among some of the non-democratic ruling

elites, seemingly serving as a hard case that even an authoritarian regime can achieve high economic growth while consolidating its power (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 466).

The success in accumulating wealth has paid tremendous dividend to Beijing's soft power aspiration. China's economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) has overtaken that of Japan by 2010, and the gap is only widening thereafter. Its foreign exchange reserve amounted to \$3.82 trillion by the end of 2013 (Ren, 2016: 435). As Chou correctly points out, how successfully Beijing can become a global soft power depends not only on 'the cultural appeal of China's norms, but also on China's economic cunning to draw the world in' (Chou, 2015: 105).

Against this backdrop of success, perhaps it is only natural for the Communist leadership under Xi Jinping to take a far more proactive turn to 'strive for achievements' (*fenfa you wei*) (Chang-Liao, 2016: 83). This departure from China's three-decade-long diplomacy mantra of 'keeping a low profile' (*taoguang yanghui*) since Deng Xiaoping is significant, for it immediately entailed concrete foreign policies. Beijing is no longer satisfied with a status of simply following the rules of someone else's game. A confident China is increasingly vocal in providing 'alternative values in addressing international problems' (d'Hooghe, 2011: 166). The goal, according to Callahan, is no longer just to 'save China' but also to 'save the world' (Callahan, 2011: 2).

Indeed, one of the aims behind China's launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is to reflect its own voice in the international community. Beijing's effort in reforming the existing international multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has been frustrated and stymied by Western leaders. The 2010 package to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions met suspicions, as reflected in the IMF managing director's expression that she 'wouldn't be surprised if one of these days the IMF was headquartered in Beijing' (Rastello, 2014). Suspicion in the US Congress made the modest package inactive for over five years (Ren, 2016: 436).

After Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2013, however, Beijing seems to have made a decision to play a role commensurate with its capabilities. The country's traumatic experience as a victim of imperialist colonization has faded, replaced by a great power mentality (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003). This is a state that 'no longer sees itself as a country facing imminent external danger or on the verge of internal implosion. Instead it sees itself as a country with resources for managing its grand transformation and a growing ability to shape its environment' (Zhang and Tang, 2005: 59).

This confidence is reflected in some of the Chinese leading think tank advisors' voices. Wang Jisi, for instance, claims, '[h]aving entered a special phase in its social development, and equipped with unique civilizational and cultural traditions, China can play an extraordinary role in human history, serving as both a bridge to the past and a herald of the future' (Wang, 2015: 57).

The AIIB initiative was successful as it attracted not only developing countries, but also the developed countries in Europe. This exceeded Beijing's initial expectation. The UK's announcement in March 2015 of its desire to become a founding member of the AIIB was quickly followed suit by other European countries such as Germany, France and Italy (*The Economist*, March 19, 2015). Headquartered at Beijing, the AIIB would certainly serve for China's interest in institutional design and agenda setting for international financial issues.

Meanwhile, China has been careful in representing itself as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, attempting to dilute neighboring states' concerns over China's threat as it grows stronger. To do so, China was willing to decrease its share in the AIIB from the initial speculated 50 percent to slightly over 30 percent, thereby exercising self-constraint over its own voting power. China's modest behavior in the AIIB is only part of its overall strategy to create a discourse of a benign image. Beijing has orchestrated this 'charm offensive' by coordinating its diplomats with the language and cultural knowledge of each region, cultivating interactions with local people.⁴

Even before the AIIB initiative, the world had already started talking about the Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2007). Although the concept developed short of any coherent content, it is still significant enough to attract other developing countries as a universal development model applicable to the third world nations. The popularity of the concept fed back to the confidence of the Chinese elites and scholars, regarding the situation as a sign of China's booming soft power (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 463).

The Chinese side however, is not unaware of the danger of inadvertently sending the wrong signals to the world hegemon. The China threat discourse, initially surfacing in the 1990s, mainly centered on the hard power aspect. The Chinese leaders are reasonable to be careful that, if further promoted, the Beijing Consensus could refuel the China threat, this time at the soft power front as a challenge to American values (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 463). As such, China is carefully walking a thin line between nurturing its soft power by emphasizing its unique development model such as the Beijing Consensus, while heeding attention particularly to the United States and neighboring states so as not to appear to be challenging the status quo world order (Ding, 2010: 267).

This leery posture is reflected in the former Hu Jintao Administration's careful choice of words in representing China to the world. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao replaced the use of 'peaceful rise' with the term 'peaceful development'. This change initially appeared in a lecture at the Boao Forum in April 2004, when Hu emphasized China's foreign policy along the line of peaceful development, while shying from mentioning 'peaceful rise' as he had done before. Experts claim that this change occurred as a result of an agreement among the Chinese elites to refrain from using 'peaceful rise' as an official term (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 467).

To emphasize its peaceful nature, Beijing has utilized a series of ancient philosophies and episodes, supposedly lending persuasiveness to its peaceful

development discourse. The well-known Confucius has been reinvented as a soft power to attract and appeal to the international society in general and Asian neighbors in particular. As a core value system, Confucianism is not only different from the West, suggesting an alternative world system based on Chinese uniqueness, but also lends legitimacy to hierarchy and order contra democracy.

The Confucian value system essentially presupposes hierarchy. In an ideal Confucian society, order is maintained through hierarchy in the group, where each individual plays an assigned role and duty. Indeed, traditionally Confucianism is institutionalized in five dyadic social relations, including emperor–subject, father–son, husband–wife, elder–younger brothers, and friend–friend. Four out of these five relations are unequal ones.

According to Kang (2007), Asian neighbors seem to welcome China's unique value system. Based on a common Confucian culture, some Asian countries are comfortable with the idea of a Sinocentric regional order. Asian societies are familiar with Confucian values, particularly the importance of family, and primacy of group over individual (Park and Shin, 2006: 343). This common value system imagines a pathway toward Asian value based on the Chinese civilization.

Another factor contributing to China's claim for uniqueness among Asian countries is its shared mentality of victim-hood. Stressing this shared history of victimhood could generate an in-group identity with other Asian countries at the expense of Western great powers. Japan, obviously, is often a convenient target for the Chinese government to incite a sense of vengeance among its people. Although the Sino-Japanese war ended over seven decades ago with Japan's surrender to the Allied Nations in 1945, the Chinese never seem to consider the account is fully settled. The first generation leadership under Mao Zedong may have relinquished the war debt, but the Chinese general public was never happy about the settlement. This sentiment is obvious from rampant civil lawsuits in China during the 1990s against imperialist Japan's wrongdoings. In short, a strong sense of victimhood against Japan has firmly remained until this day (Gries, 2004; Wang and Lu, 2008).

While attempting to generate in-group solidarity with Asian neighbors by appealing to a shared sense of victimhood against Japan, China also pursues its security and maritime goals by invoking ancient history in order to create a benign self-image. Beijing persistently depicts 'the rapid growth of Chinese maritime power as a new phase in a benign regional dominance', by 'invoking the voyage of Zheng He' (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2008: 123, 127).⁵ How the Asian neighbors accept such legitimization, however, is dubious at best.

In any case however, ancient appeals seem to pay more dividend on the softer side of public diplomacy. The Chinese Language Council International has been actively promoting Chinese language learning overseas by establishing Confucius Institutes all over the world. The name of the Institute has nothing to do with teaching Confucius, but only to use the historical figure to improve

China's national image. The Chicago Council survey on soft power in Asia reveals a 'deep respect for China's cultural heritage' (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2008: 5).

The Chinese also take high pride in their ancient normative ideas. The former leader Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious World' policy rings a Confucian tone of 'lasting peace and common prosperity' for all countries under heaven (Callahan, 2011: 1). Under the banner of 'Chinese dream', the Xi Jinping Administration continues to uphold this line of soft power, emphasizing the country's superior value system (Zhang, 2014).

Chinese scholars resonate with policy elites, going to some length to proclaim that China's imperial past inspires the future of the world. According to them, Chinese traditional values offer a cure for the ills of the modern Western society (Zhao, 2006; Yan, 2008: 91). Yan goes further by citing Xunzi's idea of hierarchy, and argues that equality among nation states is actually politically dangerous. Yan maintains that an international system based on hierarchy would bring a fairer and safer world (Chou, 2015: 112, 113).

Chinese elites' effort to revive these ancient ideas for its contemporary consumption, however, is unlikely to be taken at face value both internationally and domestically. China's traditional ways of political arrangement have long given way to rampant corruption and a plutocracy system, where the Communist Party dominates who gets what and how much (Chou, 2015: 109). Such political reality does not help the Communist Party much to regain legitimacy and authority either domestically or regionally (Cabestan, 2004). As Kurlantzick (2007b) observes, China's soft influence does not change its identity as an authoritarian state. Another Chinese public diplomacy watcher, Ingrid d'Hooghe (2005), also points out the limits of Chinese public diplomacy, maintaining that the regime's image as a human rights violator cannot be easily undone by any public diplomacy.

True, China's role in the Pacific region has consolidated in the past two decades. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008 have given rise to the idea of China's economic system as an alternative development model. The Chinese economy had continued to grow even during this economic hardship. Its businesses heavily invested abroad, including holding nearly one trillion US dollars in American debt (Lampton, 2008: 8).

Such economic performance brought attention to the country's economic model. China's national ownership of key economic sectors appears attractive to political elites in other developing countries. After all, who does not want to globalize on 'your own terms rather than somebody else's'? A 'politically illiberal economic liberalization' must sound appealing to leaders in other authoritarian countries (Breslin, 2009: 826, 834).

However, it is unfounded to worry that China's economic growth amounts to a serious challenge to US soft power. The Beijing Consensus did not pull Asian countries 'from India to Japan' away from their democratic identity to the authoritarian orbit, even when they were attracted to a pan-Asian mode of cooperation

(Green, 2008: 584). The Chicago Council survey of soft power in Asia found that the region shares a strong belief that China's rise was 'inevitable', but recognizes that acknowledging inevitability 'is not the same as liking it' (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2008: 5). A *Financial Times* article concurs,

The importance of Chinese 'soft power' is overrated.... Truly effective soft power is based on the projection of intrinsically appealing national ideals, principles and values. However wantonly the Bush administration has squandered those assets, I suspect most Asians, given the choice, would still opt for the – tarnished – American dream over the harsh constraints, relentless materialism and spiritual poverty of contemporary China. (Jonquieres, 2007)

Indeed, a closer look at China's soft power beyond its sheer size of economy confirms that the country has a long way to go before it could tip the balance of soft power vis-à-vis the US-led democratic value system. To begin with, China lacks the information channel to distribute its ideas across the borders. In contrast to its large population size amounting to approximately one-fifth of the world, its language only carries 4 percent of global information. The authoritarian regime's tight control over media and freedom of expression is no doubt a discouraging factor for this phenomenon. In addition, Chinese enterprises are reportedly underemphasizing research and development activities, leaving two-thirds of the country's patented projects completed by foreign firms in 2004.

Even its rapidly growing economy has done poorly in boosting human development in dimensions other than just living standard. China is the first country to 'have passed through the "Lewis phase" of development and to have become "grey" before it has become rich' in terms of income per capita (Nolan, 2012: 68). In addition, the government is hard-pressed in providing adequate public goods and services in public safety, education, health care, environmental protection and law enforcement. The widening gap between the urban and the rural has already caused many rounds of social unrest. The majority of medical resources, for example, are still allocated to government units and state-owned enterprises (Gill and Huang, 2006: 27, 28).

Instead, the source of China's growing soft power comes more from its skillful conformation to rather than stubborn confrontation against the existing international norm values. China's soft power is most likely to expand if it complies with global norms, such as liberalism, pluralism, autonomy, and human rights (Gill and Huang, 2006: 28). As a Chinese journalist from the *Global Times* puts it, 'playing by the rules that Westerners themselves have formulated, the Chinese are beating them at their own game' (Hu, 2008: 27). China has become stronger and wealthier, as Beijing adapts its foreign policy line and becomes increasingly more willing to accept the values of economic interdependence (Zhang and Tang, 2005: 51). Beijing has been successful in aligning with other regional players to its own interests, through promotion of free trade agreements in existing frameworks and norms (Breslin, 2009: 818).

JAPAN'S CHANGING PERCEPTION OF CHINA

As a neighboring country, Japan pays close attention to the rise and projection of China's soft power. How Japan responds to a rapidly growing China, however, has to be understood through its own perceptive lens. I have argued in this volume (Chapter 6, Volume 1) that 'a hierarchy-oriented philosophy has dictated the nation's subjective interpretation of the world order and its relationship with other countries'. This hierarchy is institutionalized during the post-war period, setting a perimeter for Japan's strategic choices. Within this hierarchical confine, Tokyo objectifies Asia as an Other to be distanced, for it represents the past backward Japan herself. Pre-war Japanese leaders since the 19th century, facing the imminent menace of Western powers and witnessing China's weakness, decided to establish Japan as a leader (*meishu* 盟主) of Asia (Irie, 1966: 42, 43). Japan's rapid modernization during the Meiji Restoration of 1868 translated into a strong sense of superiority vis-à-vis its backward Asian neighbors (Yun, 1997: 79).

This sense of superiority has conferred on Japan a self-perception as a modernized civil country, a leader of Asia in the post-war period, propagating universal values of democracy and peace. Formed against this backdrop of the self-perception of Japan, the perceived identity of China has continued to linger in the Japanese government and society during the post-war period. To Japan, Asia remains to be an objectified Other situated awkwardly out there (Tamaki, 2015: 24). This mentality is particularly true when Japan never thinks it lost the war to any Asian countries. Japan finds its place in the international hierarchy, vis-à-vis its erstwhile Western enemies, while its sense of superiority toward Asia strongly remained (Wakamiya, 2006: 121). This line of thought can be identified in its discourse about Asia in general and China in particular throughout its post-war history. Former Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, for instance, stated in December 1962 that Japan needs to become 'a pillar of the free camp along with North America and Western Europe', and distance itself from Communist China (Edström, 1999: 53).

This image of China as a potentially dangerous outsider of the legitimate international hierarchy has persisted to this day among the Japanese policy elites. Admitting the importance of maintaining a close relationship with China, the then Liberal Democratic Party leader Tanigaki Sadakazu warned in 2010 that China's military factor poses a concern for Japan and neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region (*Chuo koron*, 2010: 137–8, in Tamaki, 2015: 35). The 2011 China Security Report, for example, points out that 'China's defense spending remains opaque, its published defense budget for 2011 was 601.2 billion yuan, surpassing that of Japan in US dollar terms' (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011: 4). The 2014 Defense White Paper from the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) explicitly identifies China as 'seeking to unilaterally change the

status quo, potentially inciting crisis through escalation' (*Nikkei*, Aug 5, 2014: 1, cited in Tamaki, 2015: 33).

The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resonates this point. In an interview with the *Washington Post* in 2013, Abe comments:

In the process of [patriotic education], in order to gain natural resources for their economy, China is taking action by coercion of intimidation, both in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. This is also resulting in strong support from the people of China, who have been brought up through this educational system that attaches emphasis on patriotism. This, however, is also a dilemma faced by China. That is to say, the mood and atmosphere created by the education in China attaching importance to patriotism – which is in effect focusing on anti-Japanese sentiment – is in turn undermining their friendly relationship with Japan and having an adverse effect on its economic growth. And the Chinese government is well aware of this. (*Washington Post*, February 20, 2013)

Other influential parties share this image of China. The Democratic Party of Japan's leader, Noda Yoshihiko,

on the verge of taking over as the prime minister, admitted that, while Japan was heavily dependent on Chinese economy, he was also apprehensive about 'China's opaque military spending, along with its strategic thinking, [they] are both concerns not just for Japan, but also to other countries in the region. Recent, aggressive, Chinese foreign policy stance (*taigai shisei*) through military activities in the South China Sea potentially upsets the regional international order [Noda, 2011: 100]'. (Tamaki, 2015: 35)

These speeches are significant, because they were articulated by Japanese policy makers and directed at the international community. As Gustafsson correctly points out, Abe made a point in his comment to the *Washington Post* in 2013 that the Chinese Communist regime has little legitimacy to hold on to power, and thereby needed Japan as a scapegoat to stir anti-Japanese nationalism domestically (Gustafsson, 2015: 132).

Chinese immigrants to Japan did not help much in improving Japan's image of China. This is true particularly during the 1990s, when a large number of illegal Chinese immigrants flooded into Japan through syndicated criminal networks. The media repeatedly reported on such cases, causing a deterioration of its people's perception of China. The image of the Chinese illegal immigrants as serious offenders is a result of a 'political struggle between the state and societal actors'. Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has manufactured negative images of foreigners, particularly the Chinese. This sort of discourse has distorted the reality, gaining support from mainstream politicians (Shipper, 2005).

According to Hagström and Hanssen (2016), Japan's self-identity has changed significantly in the past decade in tandem with a deteriorating image of China. In their analysis of the discourse in Japanese Diet meetings during the 2009–2012 period when the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute intensified, China has often been associated with articulations such as 'aggressive', 'unreasonable', 'non-commensensical', 'proactive', 'coming on strong', 'hardline',

‘loud-mouthed’, ‘not very adult’, ‘expansionistic’, ‘great poweristic’, ‘hegemonic’, ‘anti-Japanese’, ‘communist one-party dictatorship’, ‘a country that does not know how to behave’, or simply a ‘threat’. The interesting point, according to the authors, is that these descriptions about China were ‘implicitly or explicitly contrasted with Japan’s own alleged peacefulness, its poised diplomacy, its democracy and constitutionality, and its adherence to international norms’. The LDP’s Yamatani Eriko, for instance, ‘criticized China’s maritime activities in the South and East China Seas by stating that “China is acting like a hegemon and does not follow international rules”’, contrasting this with Japanese ‘pacifism’ (Hagström and Hanssen, 2016: 279, 280).

Japan’s response as such, therefore, is a headstrong denial of China’s self-depiction as a peaceful power in the region. Seeing a rising neighboring state as a potential threat, Japan reacts in a classically *realpolitik* fashion. The former foreign minister Aso Taro originally articulated the concept of an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’, promoting ‘universal’ values of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy. Although the concept was short-lived,⁶ it vividly reflects the Japanese elites’ conviction that Japan is a member of the US-led international hierarchy, and their determination that a value-laden foreign policy has to be adopted to counter China’s authoritarian way.

In other words, Japan counters China’s soft power *qua* benign hegemon with an outright denial of its membership in the civilized international hierarchy. China is now increasingly described as an arrogant and unreasonable neighbor. The *Mainichi Shimbun* editorial, on September 28, 2010, criticized China’s uncompromising demand for compensation of the boat collision and an apology for detaining the Chinese boat captain as both ‘unreasonable (*rifujin*)’ and ‘astounding (*azen to saserareta*)’ (*Mainichi Shimbun*, 2010: 5, cited in Suzuki, 2014: 105). According to Suzuki, today, Japan no longer sees China as a victim to be respected as back in the 1980s. Rather, it is the Japanese side who often falls prey to China’s heavy-handed diplomacy (Suzuki, 2014: 106).

The Japanese appeal to universal values, however, seems to have yielded dubious results in terms of leadership competition *vis-à-vis* China in the international community. Japan’s bid for the permanent UN Security Council seat, for example, has quickly been jeopardized partially as a result of China’s orchestration behind the scene. Even Washington had only offered lukewarm support for Japan’s candidacy. In the eyes of Japan, China’s opposition would only fuel additional rounds of its containment China policy (Hughes, 2009: 853, 854).

As Gustafsson argues, the discourse for Japan to become a ‘normal’ country gained momentum in society, precisely because of the role that China has played in recent years. Proponents of this view maintain that Japan’s excessive pacifism has been mistakenly ‘abnormal’, leaving it vulnerable to exterior extortion and manipulation. To regain its normal status, therefore, it is necessary for Japan to revise its pacifist Article 9 in the Constitution (Gustafsson, 2015: 133).

Proponents of the 'normal' Japan discourse even welcome China's role as a potential menace. A Japanese China-watcher – Miyazaki Masahiro – plainly states that China's anti-Japanese movement actually provides momentum for Japan to regain its 'healthy nationalism', which will replace its 'mistaken pacifism'. For this reason, the supporters for Article 9 revision should thank China (Miyazaki, 2005: 233–36; Miyazaki, 2012). Other proponents are even more uncompromising, proposing to act strongly against China's pressure over issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine controversy (Komori, 2007: 203–7).

As long as Japan sees China as an illegitimate outsider of the civilized international hierarchy, deep-rooted suspicion and an essentially containment China policy will follow suit. Even if China does democratize and become a member of the same international hierarchy, it is difficult for Japan to accept China as a peer. In such a scenario, Japan would find it very difficult to locate China in the international society.

Again, this is because the Japanese perceive the world hierarchy based on power and dominance. Although the American 'Other' is often depicted as an overbearing hegemon that denies Japan its rightful status as an independent power (Suzuki, 2014: 105), Japan still heavily relies on the United States for its own security. This reliance has also resulted in 'an excessively deferential foreign policy to Washington' (Ishihara, 2012: 366). From this point of view, perhaps Japan would only see China respectfully when the latter replaces the United States as the hegemon of the world in the long future, whether peacefully or forcefully. Until then, however, there will be ups and downs in their relationship.

COUNTERBALANCING CHINESE SOFT POWER

Tokyo had hoped that an engagement policy would eventually enmesh China into the international society. By the early 1980s, against the backdrop of China fever in the Japanese society, Tokyo became the largest donor of official development aid (ODA) to China. A total of ¥3,133 billion loans, ¥145.7 billion grant aid, and ¥144.6 billion technical cooperation were disbursed to China during the 1979–2005 year period (Hughes, 2009: 839, 840). The Japanese government and NGOs were also keen to tackle environmental issues in China. In 2006, for instance, Japan offered China a \$6.82 million grant for China to deal with sulphur dioxide and yellow sand dust (Heng, 2014: 176). Although Japan's effort has gained certain recognition in the international community,⁷ it has so far failed to 'translate their own values and ideals into norms which are universally held' (Callahan, 2011: 7). Most importantly, Japan has failed to bring major powers, such as the United States, China, and India, to the Kyoto Protocol framework. Its decision of not extending the framework has caused doubts among other states on its ability as a leader in the global warming forum (Pajon, 2010).

Realists argue that if Japan's engagement policy toward China fails, it would shift to a default China containment policy. It might either choose to further consolidate the US–Japan alliance, or, had such attempt proved inefficient in obtaining desirable effects for Tokyo, it could seek to strengthen its own military power. Particularly the latter scenario may lead to a 'destructive downward-spiraling security dilemma with China' (Hughes, 2009: 856). A strong sense of containment through the US–Japan alliance could negatively influence China's intentions, cornering it to adopt a more revisionist foreign policy line (Legro, 2007).

Furthermore, the alliance with Washington is not without liabilities for Tokyo. Excessive dependence on Washington would harm Japan's political leverage vis-à-vis both Beijing and Washington. An extremely docile Japan would not only be taken for granted by its ally, but also belittled by China. Beijing's leaders seem to have long harbored a belief that they have to deal with the Americans first before they negotiate with the Japanese. Indeed, China's diplomatic normalization with Japan was realized in September 1972 only after Nixon's arrival at Beijing earlier that year.

As such, China sees the United States and Japan completely differently. Though a formidable nemesis, the United States has also been 'the most respected enemy' in the eyes of China (He, 1994). Japan, on the other hand, does not come anywhere close to that status. The discourse and articulation about Japan is often rampant with contempt in the Chinese society. The 'Japanese little demon' (*xiao riben guizi*, 小日本鬼子) has long been constructed as an Other to be looked down upon, someone who never matches the Chinese magnanimity.

For Japan though, its reaction to China's rise may not solely lie in the hands of a few policy elites. Indeed, the country's source of soft power lies mostly in its civil society. Unlike China, a democratic Japan nurtures a civil society that could voluntarily take attractive initiatives, which do not necessarily fall in line with the government policy. The Japanese NGOs are a case in point. Indeed, some Japanese NGOs have played significant roles in cultivating and maintaining strong ties between the two governments before the two capitals formally established their diplomatic ties in 1972 (Vyas, 2010: 468). Such NGOs have been particularly important during diplomatic downturns. When the official diplomatic contacts were suspended during the Koizumi Administration from 2001 to 2006 (Ijiri, 1996; Nelson, 2003), NGOs served as a communication back channel for the bilateral relationship to continue at lower levels of the governments and the grassroots level (Vyas, 2010: 473).

One of the examples of NGO activities at the local level is groups involved in sister cities. Many such groups assisted local governments in forming sister city links, facilitating student exchange, initiating cultural and sports events. Some Japanese NGOs specifically targeted top students in China, providing opportunities for them to study and work in Japan for a certain period of time. Returning back to China, those students usually became influential leaders (Mukai, 2003). The Japanese government too, hopes foreign students would develop a sense

of closeness to Japan and the Japanese people after spending time knowing the country and society in person. However, many Chinese students actually left Japan with mixed feelings due to their experiences in encountering anti-Chinese sentiments or actual discrimination at schools or workplaces. Therefore, as Vyas points out, it is not clear whether the Japanese government effort in facilitating human exchange contributes to a deeper understanding and friendship between the two peoples (Vyas, 2010: 477).

Japanese NGO activities in other areas are equally inefficient in cultivating pro-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people. Japanese environmental NGOs often carry out their tasks in remote areas of China, making it almost invisible to the general Chinese public of their support and goodwill (Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2005).

In addition, NGOs often have to deal with the strong suspicion of the Chinese government. When the Japanese NGOs attempted to enter the Sichuan area to provide aid in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake there, the Chinese government held back from granting their entry.

Instead of sending groups to China, other NGOs invite Chinese personnel to Japan to participate in a variety of activities. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, through its Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund (SJCFF), has established projects with each focusing on a specific issue area. Taking advantage of its unofficial position, the SJCFF has brought Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers to Japan for participation in a variety of study and exchange activities. In addition, the SJCFF has hosted rounds of research forums and tours for young scholars from both sides to discuss sensitive issues, such as the controversial interpretation of wartime history.

As is often noted, though, Japanese NGOs tend to have a limited budget compared with those in other developed countries (Pekkanen, 2006). Most NGO activities in China are funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Under government influence though, the budget from JICA available for development work in China dwindled, as criticism among the Japanese general public has grown in the past decades. Vyas, an expert in this area, concludes that 'it is difficult to see if they [Japanese NGOs] are having any great effect beyond the immediate participants in the NGOs' activities on domestic society, politics or general public opinion in each country, which is greatly dependent upon media exposure' (Vyas, 2010: 480–5).

CONCLUSION

The Chinese and Japanese soft power, each based on a fundamentally different value system, are essentially mutually competitive. While neither of them are well accepted in the international community, one's rise automatically triggers suspicion and caution from the other. Indeed, as Tsinghua University's Yan

Xuetong noted, ‘in the age of globalization, the sphere of competition is no longer about land, resources or markets but rule-making, setting regulations, norms or customs’ (cited in Leonard, 2008: 94). Although soft power per se might be intangible, it could well cause real repercussions. In its pursuit for a ‘harmonious world’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’, Beijing inadvertently triggered reactions from Japan, who immediately proposed a countering value system based on ‘universal’ values of democracy, and peace. Japan’s propagation of such values entailed real policy initiatives, including redirecting its financial capitals away from China.

Although skillfully strengthening its soft power base by learning and adapting to the prevailing rules and norms of the contemporary international community, China also seems to harbor the ambition to one day ‘rule the world’ on its own terms (Jacques, 2009). Meanwhile, Japan’s reaction to its neighbor’s rise, in both the hard and soft dimensions, will bode significant implications for the future of Chinese foreign policy orientation in the Asia-Pacific region and the world beyond. How the two cope with their controversies over history, maritime borders and other thorny issues will serve as a litmus test for China’s true intentions as a rising power.

The heat of the bickering in recent years notwithstanding, there is still enough room for the two nations to cooperate. Japan has much more to offer to China and the world than just ODA and the ‘cool Japan’ campaign. Both countries share similar challenges of aging societies, environmental pollution, and energy consumption. As a developed country encountering these problems at an earlier stage, Japan can shed light on the Chinese path toward further development. Any genuine cooperation as such, though, is premised on a sound relationship based on equal footing and trust. These conditions are hard to nurture, especially when the Chinese deem the Japanese as morally inferior, and the Japanese refuse to recognize China’s legitimacy in the international community.

Notes

- 1 Structural realists are mostly pessimistic about China’s rise and its impact on world politics. See, Friedberg (1993/1994).
- 2 Optimists include Kang (2007).
- 3 For a comprehensive understanding and analysis of the Chinese perception of American power, see Zhang (2005).
- 4 The term ‘charm offensive’ is believed to be first used by Kurlantzick (2007a).
- 5 Zheng He, the ‘eunuch admiral’ during the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century, commanded seven voyages to the South East and South Asian countries for trade and discovery.
- 6 The ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ concept was short-lived, mostly because it was obviously a containment policy against China, making it hard for other countries to accept. Furthermore, the key words were also reminiscent of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere, a concept that Japan had adopted to dominate its Asian neighbors during wartime.

- 7 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) evaluates Japan's environmental performance, noting that 'Japan has played a proactive and constructive role in international environmental cooperation, particularly in areas of climate change, waste management, and more recently biodiversity ... these activities have contributed to real improvements in some countries, such as China and Indonesia' (Heng, 2014:183).

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PART IX

Comparison of Asian Sub-Regions



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The East Asian Peace

Stein Tønneson

INTRODUCTION

In its simplest form, the term ‘East Asian Peace’ denotes the absence of inter-state war in the East Asian region since the 1980s. Not one single war has been fought between any of the sixteen/seventeen regional states. The term may also be used to describe the radical reduction that has taken place in the same period in the number and intensity of domestic armed conflicts. In an even wider meaning, the term may denote a general decline in violence, notably in mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2017) but also in criminal violence.

‘East Asia’ is understood as a region consisting of Northeast Asia (China and Taiwan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan) as well as Southeast Asia (the ten ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste). Its peacefulness in the last three to four decades stands in stark contrast to the frequent and widespread warfare in the previous 140 years. From the 1839–42 First Opium War until the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, East Asia suffered from a range of inter-state wars, civil wars, colonial wars, and two world wars. The region was the world’s main battlefield in the hot wars of the Cold War from 1945–79.

The East Asian Peace may be illustrated with a graph (Figure 52.1), showing estimates for the number of battle-related deaths in East Asia and the Rest of the World, 1946–2018. As can be seen, East Asia suffered 80 percent of all global battle deaths during 1946–79. In the 1980s, its share was just a little over 6 percent and in the period 1990–2018 less than 2 percent.




Figure 52.1 Battle deaths in East Asia (shaded area) and the Rest of the World (solid line), 1946–2018

Source: The figures are sum totals of annual 'best estimates' in three datasets: the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, and the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset. When no best estimates exist, we have used the low for the period 1946–79, and the high for 1980–2018. The figures for 2016–18 are from version 19.1, while the earlier ones are from previous versions of the datasets. For presentation of the datasets, see Gleditsch, N. P. et al. (2002) "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5); Eck, K. ... L. Hultman (2007) "Violence Against Civilians in War", *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2); Sundberg, R., K. Eck ... J. Kreutz (2012) "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research* 49(2); and Pettersson, T., S. Höglbladh ... M. Öberg (2019) "Organized Violence, 1989–2018 and Peace Agreements", *Journal of Peace Research* 56(4).

East Asia's transition from widespread warfare to relative peace sets it apart from the rest of Asia. South, Central and West Asia (the Middle East) suffered less than East Asia in the Cold War period, but have seen heavy warfare since, notably in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Caucasus and the Gulf regions, with many internal wars and inter-state wars between Iran and Iraq during 1980–88 and India and Pakistan in 1999.

CONCEPT AND DEFINITIONS

Around the turn of the millennium, East Asia's shift to peace was noticed and discussed by a few scholars focusing on East Asia and Sino–US relations (Ross, 2003; Solingen, 2007) and some who were mainly concerned with peace among the member countries of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations (Kivimäki, 2001; Kuhonta, 2006). As a scholarly term, the 'East Asian Peace' made its breakthrough in peace research with the initiation of a six-year research program, funded by the Swedish *Riksbankens Jubileumsfond* at Uppsala University 2011–17, inspired by the previous work of Kivimäki (2001; 2010),

and a programmatic article by Tønnesson (2009). The program sought to explain an onset of peace on a regional rather than a local, national or global level.

The launch of the program led to some controversy about definitions. Conceptually, the 'East Asian Peace' is based on a precise definition of peace as an absence of armed conflict, measured in battle-related deaths (the dependent variable). This narrow definition allowed researchers to discover East Asia's dramatic shift from widespread warfare to relative peace and make it an object of study. Yet most peace researchers feel that peace needs to be more broadly defined. If the absence of armed conflict is due to military deterrence externally and effective repression internally, if other forms of violence than armed conflict prevail (e.g., murders, infanticide or violence against women), or if there is no genuine reconciliation, then a society cannot be said to have peace (Eck, 2017; Bjarnegård, 2017; Guthrey, 2017). Many peace researchers therefore prefer to look at war and peace as two end points on a continuum, where the absence of war only makes up for an initial step on the way from war to peace. All kinds of violence must be eliminated, and all basic human rights be satisfied before a society can be said to have reached the peaceful end of the continuum. Some suggest speaking of low- and high-quality peace (Melandner, 2018). This may be a useful approach since it acknowledges the existence of peace as an absence of armed conflict (minimal or low-quality peace) and also invites inquiries into the conditions for developing high-quality peace in a local, national or regional setting.

TURNING POINTS

The onset of the East Asian Peace may be placed either in 1979 or 1989, depending on whether the drop in East Asia's share of global battle deaths from 80 to 6 percent or the further drop to less than 2 percent is seen as most significant. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was the last war in East Asia until this day with casualties in the amount of tens of thousands. Yet a low-intensity war continued in Cambodia during the 1980s between a Vietnamese-installed government, assisted by Vietnamese troops, and a coalition of insurgents, dominated by the Khmer Rouge. A great amount of land mines were deployed, which have continued to kill or maim local inhabitants until this day. In the years 1980–87, there were also heavy artillery duels and cross-border raids between China and Vietnam (Zhang, 2015), and in March 1988, they fought a naval battle in the South China Sea. In 1989, however, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, so a peace agreement for that country could be signed in Paris 1991 and Sino–Vietnamese relations be normalized.

Since 1989, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has not been engaged in any armed conflict abroad. Yet the most important turning point on China's way to regional peace came already in the 1970s with Sino–US rapprochement,

the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two great powers on 1 January 1979. In that same year the value of trans-Pacific trade bypassed that of trans-Atlantic trade. An age of cooperation and economic integration was initiated between China, Japan and the United States, and this happened a whole decade before the demise of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the East Asian development zone.

Deng Xiaoping, however, wanted first to teach Vietnam a lesson. He launched the 1979 invasion and kept Vietnam under heavy military pressure for a full ten years until it withdrew from Cambodia in 1989. Yet Deng did not want any further warfare, since this could prevent him from realizing his aim to grow China economically.

THE SHORT AND LONG PEACE

Kivimäki (2014) distinguishes between a Short East Asian Peace during 1954–57, and a Long Peace from 1979. This distinction has led to a discussion of why the principle of peaceful coexistence, which was enunciated in a joint declaration by China and India in December 1953 and later adopted by the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, did not end either the Cold War in Europe or the hot wars in Asia, while the Sino–US rapprochement in the 1970s was followed by a long East Asian Peace.

The basic differences between the two turning points are:

- The Vietnamese national question was not resolved by the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina but was resolved in 1975–76 through North Vietnam's conquest of South Vietnam – although the Cambodian question was left unresolved until 1991.
- In the late 1950s, under Mao Zedong's leadership, China gave up on peaceful coexistence and returned to a revolutionary approach, with active support to national liberation movements in other countries, notably Vietnam, and a catastrophic Great Leap Forward in China itself, with emphasis on self-reliance and rapid small-scale industrialization. The result was the 20th century's worst Asian famine. By the late 1970s, Deng's China pursued a totally different policy, seeking aid, foreign investments and market access abroad, leading the Chinese economy to depend more and more on global flows of investments and trade.
- The United States maintained a Cold War mentality in the 1960s and intervened militarily in several countries to prevent further communist expansion. In the 1970s, the US population no longer tolerated the loss of American lives in land wars far away. President Richard M. Nixon went to China in 1972 and signed a Vietnam peace agreement in Paris in 1973, allowing the United States to withdraw militarily from South Vietnam. Six years later, under President Jimmy Carter, the United States established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and a *de facto* alliance against the USSR. Since then the United States has been adamant that it will not engage in another land war in Asia but rely on maritime and aerial power, a system of bilateral alliances along the Pacific Rim, and economic and cultural engagement with China. So, while the United States contributed massively to the East Asian warfare during the first phase of the Cold War, it became a stabilizing factor from the 1970s, in cooperation with China.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE

How can the onset of the East Asian Peace be explained? Building on the literature on East Asia's economic miracle, on the work of Kivimäki (2014), and running in parallel with a comparable study by Bellamy (2017), the author of this article has put forward a developmental peace theory (Tønnesson, 2017a; 2017b). Whereas Kivimäki and Tønnesson seek to explain the reduction in armed conflict, Bellamy studies a reduction in 'mass atrocities', a phenomenon closely related to armed conflict since around two-thirds of such atrocities since 1945 have occurred in the context of war (Bellamy, 2017: 57). Bellamy explains the reduction in mass atrocities with four interconnected factors: the consolidation of states, the prioritization of economic development through trade, multilateralist norms and habits, and transformation of power politics (Bellamy, 2017: 8, 82). Tønnesson considers the fourth of these factors, the transformation of power politics in the 1970s and the mid 1980s, as preconditions for the shifts to economy-first policies in China and Vietnam but sees national priority alterations as the main explanatory factor behind the East Asian Peace, while emphasizing that they happened at different junctures in each nation.

There was no uniform regional turning point. Yet what happened in each case was remarkably similar. Japan was first. Its move to peace – and away from mass atrocities – happened in 1945–46, after its defeat in the War for a Greater Asia, and under US occupation. When Japan surrendered to the Allies, it was a nation in despair, with its cities in ruins and its morality crushed. Quite remarkably, the Japanese do not seem to have even thought of seeking revenge. Instead they decided to 'embrace defeat' (Dower, 1988; 1999). An elderly pro-Western diplomat, Shigeru Yoshida, took over as prime minister under US tutelage and remained in power for most of the period until 1954. Not one American soldier was killed in anger and Japan adopted a constitution that forbade it (in its famous Article 9) from ever again waging war or having an army. Radical reforms were carried out under Yoshida, including redistribution of land and the creation of a Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to coordinate economic reconstruction.

At the cost of signing an alliance treaty with the United States, Japan negotiated an end to the US occupation in 1952, signed a peace treaty in San Francisco with most of its former enemies, and allowed the United States to keep bases on its soil, mainly in Okinawa, which returned to Japanese sovereignty as late as 1972. Meanwhile, the United States had intervened militarily in Korea in 1950 to save South Korea from an invasion from the North, and in Vietnam for a similar reason. Japan declined a US invitation to take part in the Korean War and never sent any troops to Vietnam. Instead Japan made money on the US wars by providing goods and services. Despite being a staunch US ally, Japan has so far been constitutionally prohibited from fighting in any of the many US wars.

Inside Japan, Yoshida maintained a system of close surveillance and police control to prevent leftist rebellion. One of his reasons for supporting the pacifist constitution was that he did not want the working class to carry guns (Dower, 1988: 462). Yoshida's economically oriented foreign policy and his emphasis on economic growth would later be called the Yoshida doctrine. It was controversial in Japan at the time but allowed Japan to become rich. Only after it had reached genuine prosperity did its economy stagnate in the 1990s.

The Yoshida model was a causal chain with the following links:

- NATIONAL CRISIS
- new leaders
- priority for state-driven economic growth
- need for external and internal stability
- accommodation of the United States as the dominant global power
- pragmatic approach to neighbor states
- repression (and/or accommodation) of internal opposition
- receipt of US aid, investments, market access and protection
- RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH

The developmental peace theory is not meant to be deterministic. Each link does not by necessity lead to the next. Each may be contested. Yet every link is connected to the overriding goal of economic growth.

The theory also does not aim to predict that the model will be applied in other regions. It is derived inductively from the East Asian experience and, although we may not exclude that other regions will follow a similar logic in their transitions to peace, the theory is only meant to explain East Asia's unique trajectory. It is distinctly different from the institutionalized European model. In Europe, the transition to the 'Cold War peace' was based on a system of military deterrence and political integration within the European Economic Community (the later European Union).

Once Japan had demonstrated its ability to regain its sovereignty in a formal alliance with the United States, avoid being entangled in US wars, and achieve rapid economic growth, other nations began to emulate the Japanese model. This added an additional, essential link to the causal chain above: Learning from Japan.

A LEARNING CASCADE

One East Asian country after another emulated Japan: South Korea's dictator Park Chung-hee (1917–79) was deeply inspired by the Japanese example when he seized power in 1961 amidst a national crisis after the fall of Rhee Syngman's regime (1948–60). Park normalized relations with Tokyo in 1965 so he could get aid and investments. He avoided war with North Korea but contributed troops to Vietnam in exchange for US aid and set South Korea on a course to prosperity

by governing the market and promoting massive industrialization. At first, he aimed at import substitution but it was the export-oriented industry that drove national growth.

When the little island of Singapore was thrown out of the new Malaysian Federation in 1965, its leader Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015) applied a developmental policy aimed at creating a highly educated trade and investment hub and emphasized political stability both internally and externally. Lee was immensely successful, and like Japan, Singapore became a regional model.

Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–88), Taiwan's prime minister from 1972–78 and president from 1978–88, gave up his father Chiang Kai-shek's hope of reconquering Mainland China. Already under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, Taiwan had carried out a radical land reform and built up key defense-related industries to prepare for the expected next phase of China's civil war. At that time Chiang Ching-kuo secured internal stability by repressing any political opposition. He also engaged himself in economic reforms. When he came to power in the 1970s, the basis was already there for a successful developmental policy. Chiang boosted trade with Japan and the United States, obtained implicit US protection under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), and began to enhance regime legitimacy through liberal reforms. Taiwan became one of the most successful Asian Tigers. To avoid open conflict with the People's Republic of China, Chiang's successors as presidents of the Republic of China (Taiwan) upheld the One China policy principle, meaning there is just one China, although it is not presently united. Taiwan became more and more integrated economically with Mainland China but maintained its *de facto* political independence, under an implicit US security guarantee. A growing proportion of the island's population came to identify itself as Taiwanese rather than Chinese (or both). Yet even the two presidents representing the independence-seeking Democratic Progressive Party (Chen Hsui-bian 2000–08; Tsai Ing-wen 2016–) remained careful not to provoke Beijing too much, so the tenuous peace in the Taiwan Strait could be preserved.

After the demise of Indonesia's charismatic president Sukarno in 1965–67, amidst a horrible anti-communist massacre that cost perhaps a half million lives, a national priority shift took place under the New Order of General Suharto (1921–2008). He abandoned Sukarno's attacks against the West and his confrontational policy towards the new Federation of Malaysia. Suharto's government approached Japan and later the United States for aid and investments, formed the ASEAN grouping in 1967 with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, and applied a successful economy-first policy combined with harsh repression of communist as well as Islamist separatist movements. When Suharto's regime finally succumbed amidst the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, which hit Indonesia hard, the population had benefitted from a long period of growing prosperity. The dismantling of Suharto's New Order was followed by an upsurge of communal strife and armed conflict in Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan, West Papua, and parts of Java, with terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta. Then, from 2004–05, most

of the conflicts ended, and Indonesia became a functioning decentralized democracy under president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) – a retired general – and his successor, the civilian Joko Widodo (2014–). Key factors behind Indonesia’s turn to peace at the 2004–05 juncture were Timor-Leste’s secession in 1999–2002, Yudhoyono’s negotiation of an autonomy agreement with the Free Aceh movement in 2005, the apparent withdrawal of Army support to local militia groups, and a new policy of preemptive police intervention whenever a local incident threatened to escalate (Barron et al., 2016).

After its communist insurgency in Malaya had been defeated; the Malaysian Federation was formed in 1963 out of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, and for a short while including Singapore. Following a national crisis caused by ethnic riots in 1969, Malaysia adopted a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, giving ethnic Malays a preferential stake in commerce and industry to prevent ethnic Chinese domination of the economy and enhance ethno-political stability. In 1981, when Mahathir Mohamad took charge as prime minister (serving until 2003, and again from 2018), he modified NEP by adopting a growth promoting ‘Look East’ policy, integrating Malaysia with the Northeast Asian growth economies. The NEP policy was criticized for artificially boosting ethnic Malay participation in the economy instead of letting the market decide. Yet NEP played a key role in preventing communal strife between the economically disfavored ethnic Malay majority and the highly entrepreneurial and internationally connected ethnic Chinese minority. NEP has not prevented economic growth, and the federal state’s active management of the economy helped Malaysia get through the 1997–98 regional crisis with much less damage than Indonesia, Thailand or South Korea.

Most important of all: when Mao Zedong died in 1976, his Cultural Revolution ended, and a sense of acute crisis spread among the Chinese communist elite. Deng Xiaoping (1904–97) took charge in 1978 after a power struggle ended in the defeat of the Maoist ‘Gang of Four’. He gave up the idea that there had to be a Third World War and realized that China could enjoy a long period of peace. Deng undertook study tours to Japan and the United States, sent out delegations to learn from other nations, and set China on its way to peaceful development. Under Deng’s successors, ‘peaceful development’ was elevated to an official doctrine, with government white papers explaining how China would maintain international peace while advancing to full-scale modernity. Yet Beijing used a substantial part of the revenue gained from its export-oriented growth to build a formidable military force. This has provoked fear among China’s neighbors and worries in the United States for its ability to retain the trust of its East Asian allies. China’s internal security forces have long prevented not just armed rebellion but any kind of criticism against the Chinese Communist Party. Although China’s repressive developmental peace has allowed the creation of appalling inequalities between rich and poor, it has also dramatically reduced poverty and created a huge middle class. And since 2000, China has served as the main engine of global economic

growth. This has benefitted developing countries on all continents. They have enjoyed high prices for their raw materials, low prices on imported consumer goods, and have received Chinese aid and investments. Yet the peaceful aspect of the Chinese and East Asian growth has not been much emulated elsewhere.

As China made its transition, Vietnam was bogged down by its counter-insurgency warfare in Cambodia and its unlucky alliance with the USSR. When Mikhail Gorbachev announced his perestroika reform movement and told Vietnam that it could not count on more Soviet aid, the communist leaders in Hanoi realized that they could not just persist with their attempt to build a centrally managed socialist economy but had to learn from Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China, and reintroduce a market economy. There has been much debate in Vietnam as to which communist leader was in the forefront of promoting reform. In fact, they were all reluctant due to their Marxist convictions (Vu, 2017), and the process of reform depended on ‘fence breaking’ on the local level to show the central leaders the obvious superiority of a market-oriented system. The national priority shift in Vietnam did not happen in one go, but came in response to an internal economic crisis and several external shocks. First there was the signal from the USSR in 1986 that no further aid could be expected. Then came the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, and finally the collapse of the USSR in 1991 (Elliott, 2012). Taken together, these shocks led to a new Vietnamese policy of the same kind that China had embarked upon ten years earlier. Party chief Le Duan (1907–86) had been the main architect of the war against the United States and South Vietnam. When he died in 1986, the task of introducing Doi Moi, Vietnam’s slogan for reform, fell upon Truong Chinh (1907–88), the most rigorous Marxist intellectual in the national communist leadership. Having taken over as secretary general when Le Duan died, Truong Chinh introduced Doi Moi at the Communist Party’s 6th Congress in 1986, before leaving the party leadership to Nguyen Van Linh (1915–98). Linh was a rather conservative leader yet allowed further reforms. The government encouraged foreign investments in export-oriented industries and withdrew its troops from Cambodia. This allowed Vietnam to normalize its relations with China in 1991 and the United States in 1995, join ASEAN in 1995, get a cooperation agreement with the EU in 1996 and obtain rapid economic growth. Vietnam has since developed a highly diversified, export-oriented economy and scores highly on UN measures of poverty reduction. Despite pervasive corruption and a loss of popular legitimacy, the Vietnamese Communist Party has been able to maintain its authoritarian hold on its developmental state, with a monopoly of violence on its whole territory.

It is debatable if Cambodia belongs on the list of developmental peace states. It is a latecomer to development and remains on a low level of national income. Yet its economic and social conditions have radically improved. Peace was gradually established in Cambodia in the years following the 1991 Paris agreement. This agreement and the international pressure on Indonesia to withdraw from Timor-Leste in 1999–2000 are the only two examples of successful international interventions in East Asia

to enforce global peace building norms. UN-authorized interventions have played a limited role in ending war and mass atrocities in East Asia (Bellamy, 2017: 70). However, in 1992, a transitional UN administration (UNTAC) was established in Cambodia under Japanese leadership. Multi-party elections were held in 1993 under international monitoring, and a coalition government installed in Phnom Penh. This did not, however, put an end to Cambodia's political violence. The Khmer Rouge resumed its insurgency but succumbed to internal strife and disappeared in 1998 when its leader Pol Pot died. Meanwhile the power struggle between the coalition parties in Phnom Penh turned ugly, with street fights and an armed coup in 1997. Hun Sen (1952–), the leader whom Vietnam had installed in Phnom Penh, won the power struggle, and came out as winner in a series of increasingly manipulated elections from 1998 onwards. He tightly controls a corrupt and repressive, export-oriented developmental state. Hun Sen has listened to economic advice, invited foreign investments, learned from other East Asian countries, and established a lucrative special relationship with China. He got into a small-scale armed conflict with Thailand in 2008–11 over access to the temple Preah Vihear but managed to uphold a modicum of external and internal stability. Under his rule, the Cambodians have seen immense improvement in their living standards. Their life expectancy at birth increased from 33 in 1981 to 68 in 2013 (Tønnesson, 2017b: 149).

Once all these countries had opted to avoid external and internal war in favor of developmental policies, the region entered its era of peace. The East Asian Peace was thus the cumulative effect of a series of national priority shifts. This is a historical theory, meant to explain the emergence of the East Asian Peace as such. It does not predict that similar priority changes will happen or have the same effect in other regions, although this could happen if a pioneering state (like Ethiopia) could emerge, serving as a model for its neighbors.

PEACE IN WAITING

Some East Asian countries have not yet made the transition to developmental peace.¹ Thailand has kept its economy persistently open and has seen substantial economic growth alongside the developmental states. Indeed, it has become a middle-income country, much richer and more prosperous than Cambodia or Vietnam. Yet it has never established a stable developmental state or overcome its internal conflicts. King Rama IX, who ruled from 1946–2016, hailed to a retrogressive self-subsistence philosophy, out of sync with actual developments in his country. Civilian authorities have not gained insight in the dispositions of the huge Crown Property Bureau. No civilian government has been able to gain control of the country's armed forces, which see themselves as owing loyalty directly to the King and are good at looking after their budgetary needs. Thailand has had more military coups in the modern era than any other country in the world. Through most of the present century, an acrimonious power struggle has

played out between the parties of a highly popular and charismatic leader, Thaksin Shinawatra (prime minister 2001–06), and a traditionally powerful network centered on the protection of the monarchy. The power struggle led to two military coups in 2006 and 2014, and clashes at the Cambodian border in 2008–11 (which would not have happened without the power struggle in Bangkok). The power struggle has also contributed to preventing the government from offering autonomy to the Malay Muslims in Thailand's Deep South and from developing a consistent counter-insurgency strategy. Thailand's economic development has thus happened despite a lack of developmental leadership, and the government has failed to make peace with its population.

Although Myanmar's military junta opened up the country to foreign investments and trade in the 1990s, and carried out a 7-step transition to constitutional governance during the years 2003–11, the military regime's main goal remained national unity, not economic growth, and the country suffered from international sanctions because of the many human rights violations. The military government did not manage to create a developmental state. After its political opening in 2011, leading the sanctions to be lifted and allowing free and fair elections in 2015, Myanmar still did not achieve any consensus around a strategy for development. It got a two-headed government, with the military maintaining its autonomy and decisive powers in the state. An uneasy co-habitation of the military and civilian branches of government contributed to preventing any resolution of the country's internal armed conflicts.

The Philippines must also be characterized as an outlier (Bellamy, 2017: 129). Two presidents, Ramon Magsaysay (1953–57) and Fidel Ramos (1992–98), made genuine attempts to create a developmental state but largely failed. Past governments did not carry out a timely land reform, so the Philippines did not get a broad entrepreneurial class as in Taiwan. A few rich landowning families have been running their fiefdoms around the country (with private militias) and prevented the establishment of a strong central government. The legacy from the kleptocratic dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–86) has been detrimental to development, and the People Power revolution in 1986 did not bring the expected democratic stability. Several attempts to establish peace with the Muslim Moros and the communist New People's Army have failed, although the 2018 Bangsamoro Organic Law, which was accepted in a 2019 plebiscite, seems promising. The current president, Rodrigo Duterte (1945–), has been copying Thaksin Shinawatra's failed attempt from the early 2000s to fight drugs through extra-judicial killings of suspected dealers. He may run into difficulties with his armed forces because of his anti-American and pro-Chinese posture, and his apparent willingness to strike a deal with China in the South China Sea that does not include acceptance of the Philippines' sovereign rights.

The worst failure to create a developmental state is in North Korea. It is beyond comparison with the cases above. The Kim dynasty (Kim Il Sung 1948–1994; Kim Jong Il 1994–2011; Kim Jong Un 2012–) has never dared to open its

country to the global market in the way of China, Vietnam or Laos. This is not mainly because of paranoia or the *juche* (self-reliance) ideology but most likely because Korea remains divided in two states. A genuine economic opening of North Korea would expose it to South Korean dominance, with its larger population and much stronger economy. The Kim dynasty has had reasons to fear the fate of East Germany, and this has led it to retain a system of extreme repression internally and to acquire nuclear weapons to deter threats from the US–South Korean alliance. Since the other nuclear powers are totally unwilling to allow North Korea to have nuclear weapons, the Kim dynasty has ended up in a dead-end alley, at a horrible cost to its population. Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic breakout in 2018, however, did seem to create the possibility of a Vietnam-inspired model of development in North Korea, built on simultaneous rapprochement with South Korea and the United States. This option was much discussed during a failed summit between Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump in February 2019, held in the ‘model city’ Hanoi.

PEACE BY POWER?

The developmental peace theory has been exposed to competition from several rivals. A persuasive alternative theory says that the East Asian Peace came about because of changing power constellations in the international system. In the 1970s, Sino–US rapprochement and cooperation against the USSR led to a stabilizing power arrangement in East Asia between the two nuclear powers, the United States and China. China could dominate the continent, while the United States maintained its maritime hegemony through a system of bases and bilateral alliances (Ross, 1999). The system survived the end of the Cold War and included a Chinese decision to cease its support to insurgent groups abroad, thus contributing to a reduction of internal warfare in the countries concerned. The great powers were no longer interested in fomenting conflict in each others’ spheres of influence but rather sought to promote peace talks between governments and insurgent groups, something that could be seen from the concert of powers pushing for the Paris agreement on Cambodia (Kreutz, 2017). This happened at a time when the East Asian states had used increasing income to build greater administrative and repressive capacity and were therefore better able to prevent armed rebellion on their territory (Mueller, 2004; Bellamy, 2017). Such realist reasoning helps us understand some of the structural background for the onset of the East Asian Peace. The new power alignments were perhaps a necessary condition for the regional turn to peace but do not provide enough explanation. States and insurgent groups could have decided to continue their fight even under new, less favorable conditions – indeed some did – so the key factor behind the onset of regional peace was that national decision makers decided to utilize the opportunity presenting itself to launch peaceful development policies.

A DEMOCRATIC PEACE?

Democratic peace theory says that democracies rarely if ever fight wars against each other. On the domestic level, however, democratization may be dangerous. When authoritarian governments make themselves vulnerable through democratization, this may generate conflict instead of preventing it. Yet well-established democracies above a certain level of economic income (GDP) are far more peaceful internally than non-democratic states. The East Asian experience can hardly be used to either prove or disprove democratic peace theory, since there are only four well-established democracies in the region (Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan), who have little reason to go to war against each other. Goldsmith (2014), however, has applied a lower threshold for democracy based on the amount of domestic political competition and has found that countries with a high level of political competition internally have fewer militarized disputes with other states. At any rate, democracy's contribution to the East Asian Peace must have been modest. The consolidation and strengthening of states, however, with a capacity to tax, control and educate their population, is likely to have played a major role in reducing internal armed conflict (Mueller, 2004; Bellamy, 2017).

PEACE BY CULTURE?

Several authors have sought to explain the East Asian Peace by cultural, ideational or other 'soft factors'. One theory says that China's traditional political culture is peaceful and benevolent (Kang, 2007). Whenever China has been strong and united, it has refrained from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states – they have just had to show respect. In recent years, China has hailed to a doctrine of 'peaceful development', an 'ideational factor' that does much to explain China's show of restraint (Ren, 2016). While China's benevolent self-image and official doctrines may to some extent have contributed to foreign policy restraint, they have not prevented the People's Republic of China from promoting a nationalist narrative emphasizing how China was humiliated historically by Japan and the West, and therefore now has a right and duty to make up for past injustice by reunifying Taiwan with the mainland and pushing China's maritime claims and interests. China has also built the world's second strongest armed forces.

Another theory affirms that a culture of peace in the region has its origin in the emergence of an 'ASEAN Way' in the 1960s, a discourse emphasizing mutual respect, non-interference and consensus seeking (Acharya, 2001; Kivimäki, 2001; Bellamy, 2017: 146), which first came to characterize interactions among ASEAN's five original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) and later spread to the rest of East Asia

through the widening ASEAN membership and consultative frameworks such as the ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summits. Although the ASEAN Way may have contributed to providing a modicum of mutual respect and something states may cherish in common, I do not believe it has had much impact on war-and-peace decision-making. It has rather served as a convenient feel-good device for an organization whose original purpose was to prevent conflicts among Southeast Asia's non-communist states and thus reduce their vulnerability to communist expansion. Yet the record of conflict avoidance between the ASEAN member states from 1967 onwards is an important part of the East Asian Peace story.

The idea has also been advanced that the regional peace was forged by expansive informal trans-national networks among political leaders, government officials and experts within various domains, who by getting to know each other and developing ideas in common were able to find peaceful ways to manage their conflicts (Weissmann, 2012). While this describes one way in which conflicts have been avoided in the region, networks can hardly provide a strong explanation for the onset of the regional peace.

Svensson (2017) looks in a different direction by asking why East Asia has seen so little religious armed conflict, as compared with the Middle East. This could be due to more effective state repression of radical Islamist movements (in China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia) but another reason could be that religiously motivated insurgents in East Asia have mostly a local agenda (in Aceh, Mindanao, and Patani) and are reluctant to commit themselves to a violent global jihad. The East Asian Peace may thus have been helped by a failure of religious extremism to replace communism as a rationale for insurgency. This is an intriguing thought: instead of looking for peaceful ideas we may look for an absence of ideas about struggle. Yet the absence of religious armed conflict cannot explain the East Asian Peace as such, only that there has not so far been any substantial presence in East Asia of Al Qaeda or the Islamist State (IS).

A CAPITALIST PEACE?

Perhaps the strongest rival to the developmental peace theory is the capitalist peace, which is often referred to as the Kantian peace (Kant, 1795). Goldsmith (2017) has demonstrated a significant correlation between East Asian trade and peace. With an exception for North Korea, the East Asian nations have been integrated with each other and the rest of the world through dramatically increased trade in goods and services, and the creation of trans-national production networks managed by sophisticated information technology (Ravenhill, 2014). This has created an inter-dependent system of trade and investments, where war would be extremely costly for any nation involved, regardless of outcome.

The problem with using the correlation of trade and peace to underpin capitalist peace theory is that the same correlation may also provide a basis for believing in the development peace theory. The advantage of the latter is that it considers the expectations and priorities among the few individuals – presidents, prime ministers, defense ministers, foreign ministers, national security advisors and commanders-in-chief – who decide between war and peace. Even a huge expected cost may not prevent a decision maker from launching an armed struggle if he or she has strong nationalist or other ideological convictions, seeks to save a moribund regime, or fears aggression by another power.

PEACE BY TRIANGULATION?

Russett and Oneal (2001) argue that stable peace in a region (such as West Central Europe) builds on three cornerstones: shared democracy, economic integration, and international cooperation. On this triangular basis, the European Union may be considered to have become what Karl Deutsch (1957) called a ‘security community’, where nations see no need to keep armies ready to defend against each other, and armed conflict has become inconceivable. In such cases, peace is probably over-determined (meaning that more reasons for avoiding armed conflict are in place than needed to prevent it from happening). A combination of all three cornerstones is hardly a necessary condition for regional peace. East Asia has only one of the three: economic integration. It does not have shared democracy, and although most of the East Asian states are members of international organizations, they have not developed much regional political cooperation. The onset of the European Peace can also not be ascribed to a combination of all three cornerstones. Like the East Asian Peace, it originates in the aftermath of the Second World War, when key French and German decision makers were determined to prevent a repetition of their tragic past and saw a coal and steel union as a means to create a shared economic destiny. Later, the West European Peace was strengthened through a shared fear of Soviet expansionism and a need to maintain a US military presence. Although economic reconstruction (with Marshall aid) was a key ingredient in the development of the European Peace it was not as much a developmental peace as a security peace aimed, as Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General has quipped, at keeping Germany down, Russia out and America in. The European Peace also came to be intimately associated with democratic values as the ideological division between Eastern and Western Europe became clear. The European Peace grew from a security peace to a democratic peace, and democratization became a precondition for new countries to join the European Union. By contrast, the East Asian Peace is quintessentially developmental, with no shared democracy and no joint system of security. Does this mean that it is of lesser quality than a triangulated peace of the European kind?

QUALITY PEACE?

The short answer is yes. The East Asian Peace would have been more secure and viable if it were not just based on prioritizing economic growth and integration but could also rely on shared values and regional cooperation. Although some countries reduced their defense budgets and number of troops in the early phase of their economic growth policies, they have later invested heavily in armaments, and there has not been any clear downward trend in the number of militarized disputes. Some see this as evidence that there is no such thing as an 'Asian Peace'. By widening the geographical perspective from East Asia to all of the Asia-Pacific from Turkey to Australia, and establishing a 'stringent threshold for peace, focusing on the absence or diminution of violent conflicts short of war', including militarized disputes, territorial claims and state rivalries with no actual battles, Hoffman et al. (2018: 49) have managed to more or less write off the phenomenon of the (East) Asian Peace. There is no apparent reduction in the number of Asian militarized disputes, and the decline in armed conflict is not significantly greater in Asia than globally. In the view of this chapter's author, it is preferable to retain the focus on just East Asia (30 percent of mankind) and recognize the absence of war and armed conflict as peace. It may be vulnerable, fragile, shallow or minimal, but peace it is, and it is not something negative. (For a discussion of the misleading dichotomy negative/positive peace, see Tønnesson, 2017b: 5–6.) It is deplorable, however, that the long East Asian Peace has not allowed more disputes to be resolved, and more legitimate forms of governance to be established by the regional states.

A few researchers have investigated the question of the quality or viability of the East Asian Peace. Is it just about avoiding loss of lives and allowing for economic development, or is there more to it? On the positive side is the finding that the reduction in armed conflict does not seem to have been offset by any increase in other forms of violence, as has been the case in other parts of the world. Bellamy (2017) finds a dramatic reduction in mass atrocities. Homicide statistics, to the extent that they are reliable, have been fluctuating, but if there is an overall trend it is downward rather than upward (Kivimäki, 2010).

Demographic factors are also comforting. They may contribute to prolonging the peace. Few children now die in their infancy, and grownups live longer than before. The proportion of the elderly is increasing. With fewer children there are fewer lives to waste, and more resources must be spent on health and pensions, so in not so many years there may be less money available for armaments (Urdal, 2017).

The rule of law has expanded both domestically and internationally. The regional states often pledge to abide by the obligations they have subscribed to in bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions (Zou, 2014; Tønnesson, 2015). As shown by Scott (2017), China has benefitted greatly from the protection it has received from international treaties and from its membership in the World Trade

Organization (from 2001) as well as other international institutions. To the extent that the regional states use available law to manage and resolve their disputes, this will contribute to peace. Yet the declared respect for international law often does not stand the test of practice when perceived national interests are at stake.

It also weighs positively that many boundary disputes have been resolved through negotiation or arbitration (Fravel, 2008; Hyer, 2015). China has agreed on its land borders with all its neighbors, except India and Bhutan, and has signed and ratified its first maritime boundary agreement – with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin (Tønnesson, 2016b). Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Thailand have resorted to compulsory arbitration to resolve some of their boundary disputes.

Yet several factors detract from the quality – and thus perhaps the viability – of the East Asian Peace:

- Armed conflicts are still ongoing in the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar and West Papua (Indonesia). In the Philippines the national army is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the small extremist Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Abu Sayyaf in the Sulu archipelago, and in a small-scale conflict with the communist New People's Army (NPA) in several of the Philippines' islands, including Luzon. The Thai government has since 2001 been engaged in an armed struggle with Malay Muslim rebels in its southernmost provinces along the border to Malaysia. In Myanmar a so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement negotiated in 2015 has been signed by ten of the country's more than twenty ethnic armed groups, but the Union Army (Tatmadaw) has engaged in active fighting with a Northern Alliance of four ethnic armed groups along the border to China. Mass atrocities were committed in 2017 when well over 700,000 Rohingya were driven out of Myanmar into Bangladesh, and by 2019 an insurgency among the Buddhist Rakhine population in Western Myanmar became the bloodiest of all the country's conflicts. In addition there is tension between the government and the largest of the ethnic armed groups, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which controls territories along the border to China and Thailand, and is allegedly helping the Northern Alliance with weapons, training and advice. These conflicts are not only dangerous in themselves but could harm the relationship between Myanmar and China, who has pledged to construct a transportation corridor with roads and railways from the Chinese Yunnan province through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal.
- There are well-known unresolved inter-state militarized sovereignty disputes in the divided Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea (over the Senkakus/Diaoyu) and the South China Sea (the Spratlys, Scarborough Shoal, and the Paracels) and at the Sino-Indian border. All these disputes are fueled by nationalist sentiments in the countries concerned, which find expression both in official and social media.
- The militarized inter-state disputes in the region are also closely related to the trade war and power rivalry between China and the United States, with a risk that the latter may be drawn into a conflict on the side of one of its allies or use local disputes to teach China a lesson. There is also a direct conflict between the rapidly growing Chinese Navy and the US Navy over the latter's right to enjoy freedom of navigation in China's Exclusive Economic Zone. This has already led to several incidents.
- The East Asian region has dramatically increased its spending on armaments, resulting in a risk of clashes between airplanes, ships and submarines operating in the same areas.
- In several East Asian countries, the domestic peace depends on systematic repression of civil and human rights rather than legitimate governance (Eck, 2017). This increases the risk that opposition groups turn to violent means of struggle once an opportunity arises, either because

of popular resentment or because of factional struggles within a regime. The fear of such events may prevent governments from carrying out necessary economic reforms.

- East Asians have done little to overcome the memory of past conflicts through reconciliation. Wounds have been left open, and grievances linked to past humiliation are played out in nationalist mobilization (Guthrey, 2017; Tønnesson, 2016a; Ryu, 2017).
- Surveys of popular attitudes in various East Asian countries show that humanitarian values favoring minority rights, gender equality and non-violent methods of conflict management are not much developed, and reveal that militarized masculine honor culture remains pervasive, with appreciation or tolerance for the use of violence inside households, in law enforcement activities, and in political struggles (Bjarnegård, 2017; Melander, 2017). Campaigns involving extra-judicial killings of suspected drug dealers have been popular both in Thailand and the Philippines.
- If the United States and China should fail to reach a viable agreement on trade and investments or fall out with each other over matters related to cyber security, a hostile rivalry might follow with huge repercussions for the East Asian economies. The long period of economic and social improvement might then come to an end. Under such circumstances it would be difficult for even the most developmentally oriented government to stick to economy-first policies.

CONCLUSION: WILL THE EAST ASIAN PEACE COME TO AN END?

There seems to be consensus in the research community that the East Asian Peace is *fragile* (Tønnesson et al., 2013). The regional peace may not be sustainable unless it is bolstered by peace-enhancing measures. Yet a special study of the Sino–Russian strategic partnership finds that China is unlikely to be inspired by Russia’s use of force abroad, which has caused many problems for Russia, not least economically. Russia is a declining power while China may expect to continue its economic rise if it maintains international peace (Baev and Tønnesson, 2017; Tønnesson and Baev, 2017). Moreover, the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2016 did not necessarily heighten the risk of war in East Asia. Many East Asians worried about his anti-Chinese rhetoric, erratic statements, demands for change in the balance of Sino–American trade, and pressure on Japan, South Korea and other allies to take more responsibility and pay all the costs for their defense. On the other hand, Trump was not a warmonger. He did not want to waste money on wars in distant places, sought a negotiated solution to the US trade disputes with China, and even tried to strike a deal with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Three factors may save and prolong the regional peace. One is the priority that continues to be given by most governments to satisfying their economic interests. In some cases, this is coupled with a vision of green, sustainable growth. If there is no longer any US leadership either in promoting trade liberalization or combating climate change, East Asian nations may step forward and take responsibility together for developing global solutions.

The second factor is the general awareness of the horrible human and economic costs that even a limited military confrontation might entail. What has been built in the era of the East Asian Peace could be quickly destroyed.

The third factor is awareness of the risk that a military confrontation might lead to a nuclear Armageddon. To believe in the possibility of a limited war between nuclear armed great powers (Gombert et al., 2016) is to put the future of humanity at risk. This should hold back even the worst of leaders.

Note

- 1 The smaller states of Brunei, Laos and Timor-Leste are difficult to categorize. Brunei is a special case, resembling the oil sheikdoms in the Middle East. Laos should perhaps be reckoned in the developmental state category since it has followed the Vietnamese trajectory, although less successfully. Timor-Leste has a weak state and remains on a very low level of development. It cannot, at least not yet, be characterized as a successful developmental state.

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The ASEAN Political-Security Community and Its Dilemmas

Ayako Masuhara

INTRODUCTION

Since its founding in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emphasized sovereignty and noninterference as core principles or norms. As most of the original ASEAN member states had experienced colonial rule, territorial integrity and national existence free from external interference were extremely vital matters to them. Moreover, each country prioritized social order over democracy and human rights as it sought to promote development policy and national integration. This emphasis on social order could be seen as reflecting the region's conservative political culture.

However, ASEAN has undergone remarkable change over the last forty years, and especially in the past twenty years. The organization expanded by adding Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. As it grew to its current complement of 10 member states, ASEAN began seeking to transform itself from a regional intergovernmental organization into a community integrating the Southeast Asia region. In 2015, ASEAN declared the founding of the ASEAN Community, with three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Social-Cultural Community. At the same time, it released its APSC Blueprint 2025, which called for greater political and security cooperation among ASEAN members and for building a community in which all people could enjoy democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and social justice. However, ASEAN did not change or abolish its traditional norms and principles, even while

promoting the new mission contained in its blueprint. Unlike the EU, ASEAN member states do not transfer a part of sovereignty to their 'community'.

There are evident tensions between the newly espoused principles and the old ones, especially the noninterference principle. ASEAN has expressed an interest in implementing conflict resolution mechanisms among its member states, but the organization has been unable to mediate territorial disputes between ASEAN countries due to its commitment to noninterference. A similar dilemma overshadows ASEAN's intention to promote democracy and human rights in the region. How can it possibly do this while still maintaining its noninterference principle? In this article, I explore these important dilemmas confronting ASEAN.

Dilemma 1:

How can ASEAN settle disputes while maintaining its noninterference principle?

THE FOUNDING OF ASEAN AND THE DISPUTES AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

One main reason for the creation of ASEAN was to pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes that existed among Southeast Asian countries at that time. Ever since then, peaceful settlement of disputes has remained one of ASEAN's most important norms.

In August 1962, Great Britain and the Malaya Federation agreed to establish the Federation of Malaysia by August 1963, including Sarawak and the North Borneo portion (Sabah) of Borneo Island. The Philippines, which had claimed Sabah in June 1962, opposed establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. So did Indonesia's President Sukarno, who described the new federation as a product of 'British neocolonialism'. To prevent deterioration of the relationships between these countries, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia agreed to establish a confederation to be called Maphilindo. However, in September 1963, after Malaysia had gained its independence, it broke off relations with the Philippines and Indonesia and Maphilindo collapsed. Angered, President Sukarno declared a 'confrontation' (*Konfrontasi*) and sent troops to the border with Malaysia on Borneo Island.

However, regime changes in the Philippines and Indonesia put an end to the conflicts among these countries. In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, after winning the 1965 presidential election, shifted his nation's policy to improve its relationship with Malaysia. In Indonesia, following the September 30 Affair of 1965, Sukarno lost his presidential position. Army General Suharto, who took over as Indonesia's political leader in 1967, put an end to the 'Confrontation' policy. Also in 1965, Singapore, which had been part of Malaysia, broke away and became an independent state because of differences with Malaysia's central government.

In view of this series of disputes and confrontations, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore recognized the need to restore stability and confidence in the region. In addition, Thailand, facing the threat of the Vietnam War raging to its east, perceived the importance of cooperating with anti-communist governments in Southeast Asia. These concerns were reflected in ASEAN's founding declaration in 1967:

[The foreign ministers of the five countries are] mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation. (ASEAN, 1967)

The noninterference principle has been one of ASEAN's most important norms ever since its founding. The Bangkok Declaration announcing the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 stated that the ASEAN countries sought to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation. According to Acharya (2014: 56), this injunction was intended to apply not only to interference by extra-regional powers, but also to meddling by Southeast Asian countries in their neighbors' affairs.

THE TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION (TAC)

In 1976, the five ASEAN member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – established the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) at their summit in Bali, Indonesia. As one of its six fundamental principles, the TAC called for 'settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means' and formulated the following protocol:

- 1 The High Contracting Parties shall ... settle [their] disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations (Article 13);
- 2 [T]he High Contracting Parties shall constitute ... a High Council comprising a Representative at the ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties (Article 14);
- 3 [T]he High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may, however, offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation (Article 15).

These provisions of the TAC represented the first formulation of a dispute resolution process in the region. At the same time, the TAC reaffirmed the noninterference principle and stipulated the following commitments:

- (a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
- (b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

- (c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
- (d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
- (e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
- (f) Effective cooperation among themselves. (ASEAN, 1976: Article 2)

ASEAN'S LASTING PEACE AND ITS EXPLANATIONS

Since ASEAN's founding, no interstate wars have occurred in the ASEAN region, although there have been quite a few internal conflicts within member countries. In addition, there have been many instances of violence and human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the ASEAN regime has been generally identified with lasting peace and stability because of the lack of armed conflict between member states, which has permitted them to direct more of their resources to economic development issues.

Four explanations have been advanced for the prevalence of peace in the ASEAN region. Michael Leifer, a realist who described ASEAN as a 'diplomatic regime', explained the organization's achievement of stability in terms of the balance of power between the United States and China (Leifer, 1986; 1989). In contrast, liberalists argued that deepening economic cooperation promoted interdependence among member states and thus contributed to their political stability and that of the region (Suriyamongkol, 1988; Soesastro, 1995). Since the first half of the 1990s, institutionalists' interpretation that ASEAN or its core states could manage order and security in the region has gained credence (Emmerson, 1996; Acharya, 1995; 1999). Finally, from a constructivist perspective, ASEAN has been a 'security community' in which the member states and their people share common norms and a common identity (Acharya, 2014), thereby contributing to peace and stability.

Regardless of the explanation, for a long period of time ASEAN was the primary place for confidence building among the political leaders of its member states: President Suharto of Indonesia, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand. These five leaders, all essentially dictators within the authoritarian regimes of each country, met and consulted with each other regularly to reach consensus (*Musyawarah-Mufakat*) at ASEAN summits. This practice of *Musyawarah-Mufakat* at top-level meetings and ASEAN's noninterference principle functioned effectively to prevent differences between member states from leading to a deterioration of relations.

As described in the next section, ASEAN has gradually institutionalized its dispute settlement mechanisms since the adoption of the TAC in 1976. However, even before that point, ASEAN can be regarded as having successfully brought together the leaders of its member states for constructive dialog, thereby

preventing disputes from exploding into open conflict despite the absence of institutionalized resolution mechanisms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS: SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS

Twenty-five years after the TAC's adoption, the Rules of Procedure of the High Council of TAC were adopted at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2001. The Rules of Procedure regulated the composition of the High Council, initiation of dispute settlement procedures, convening and conduct of meetings, and decision-making processes.

The 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II described the High Council as a central important component in the ASEAN security community, since its activity reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve peacefully all differences, disputes, and conflicts within the region (ASEAN, 2003). The Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) of 2004 made further references to dispute settlement, stating that ASEAN would take the following steps:

- i. Utilise existing and planned national peacekeeping centres in some ASEAN Member countries to establish regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and stability;
- ii. Build upon the existing modes of pacific settlement of disputes to strengthen them with additional mechanisms as needed; and
- iii. Undertake joint conflict management and resolution research studies and exchanges among ASEAN centres of excellence on peace. (ASEAN, 2004: Sect. 1.4)

The VAP's annex established guidelines for carrying out studies of existing dispute settlement modes, the appointment of experts, and the activation of the TAC High Council to settle disputes upon the request of High Contracting Parties (ASEAN, 2004).

The ASEAN Charter (adopted in 2008) and the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint (adopted in 2009) also declared the need to establish 'appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms' (ASEAN, 2008; 2009b). For this purpose, ASEAN created the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, with such responsibilities as compiling experiences and practices, promoting research, and holding workshops on conflict resolution (ASEAN, 2009b).

Furthermore, in 2010 ASEAN's foreign ministers signed the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms. This document was considered a positive development in defining mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts, even though it still did not contain regulations governing the adjudication of disputes (Naldi, 2014). The Protocol stipulated that ASEAN member states shall resolve disputes through good offices, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. The articles concerning the procedures for establishment of an arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes are particularly noteworthy, because ASEAN,

consistent with its noninterference principle, has historically depended on bilateral negotiations as its preferred dispute resolution method.

The actions described in the preceding paragraphs indicate that ASEAN has gradually, step by step, promoted the institutionalization of dispute settlement mechanisms. However, how can ASEAN implement these mechanisms in intra-regional conflicts or take other effective steps to resolve regional disputes peacefully? To answer this question, we will look at two actual territorial disputes and how they were managed.

Case 1: Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia

Indonesia and Malaysia have had multiple territorial or border disputes, on land and at sea. The most controversial one involved their competing claims to two small islands, Sipadan Island and Ligitan Island, and the nearby continental shelf called the Ambalat Block. The islands and the Ambalat Block are located in the northern Sulawesi Sea off Kalimantan (Borneo) Island, between the province of North Kalimantan in Indonesia and the state of Sabah in Malaysia.

The Dutch and British colonial governments did not clearly determine the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan Islands or the related continental shelf boundary. Indonesia, which declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1945 and was granted sovereignty in 1949 after four years of war, adopted the Juanda Declaration in 1957. In this document, Prime Minister Juanda unilaterally declared that Indonesia was an archipelagic state. This declaration enabled Indonesia to claim territorial waters by drawing straight baselines between the outermost points of its most outlying islands and reefs and designating all water and land within that area as under the country's control. Four years later, in 1961, Indonesia began to assert sovereignty over the Ambalat Block, and in 1969, it proclaimed its control over exploitation of all resources in the Block (Druce and Baikoeni, 2016: 138, 140).

Indonesia began negotiating with Malaysia concerning the boundary between the two countries after the latter nation was formed in 1963, but no agreement was reached regarding territorial waters in the Sulawesi Sea and Sulu Sea (located north of the Sulawesi Sea), including Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the Ambalat Block. Malaysia also claimed continental shelf waters in the Sulawesi Sea, including the Ambalat Block; in 1969, it published an official map depicting its claims, which included the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands (Druce and Baikoeni, 2016: 140–41). Of course, Indonesia rejected this claim, according to Indonesia, in the 1891 treaty between Britain and the Netherlands, the border line was drawn along the 4° 10' North parallel of latitude across Sebatik Island. Sipadan and Ligitan Islands lie south of this parallel as it continues eastward from Sebatik Island into the Sulawesi Sea (Butcher, 2013: 240).

After bilateral negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia failed, Malaysia proposed referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, Indonesia did not agree to this proposal because it thought that it would have no control over the outcome. Instead, it called for referring the dispute to the ASEAN High Council, regulated by the TAC. Malaysia opposed this idea, stating in its official comments that it did not want to ‘burden’ its ASEAN partners, although in reality the Malaysian government’s main concern was that the High Council would side with Indonesia (Butcher, 2013: 243). Informal meetings between Indonesian and Malaysian interlocutors concluded that both governments should refer the dispute to the ICJ, as the Malaysian government had originally proposed. Finally, in 1996, President Suharto consented to this action, and the two governments submitted the issue to the ICJ in 1998 (Butcher, 2013: 244–5).

In 2002, the ICJ released a judgment that recognized Malaysia’s sovereignty over the two islands, on the basis that the British colonial authority had collected turtle eggs and built lighthouses on them. Indonesia accepted the ICJ’s decision, and it appeared that the dispute had been resolved. However, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated after that. Malaysia claimed the continental shelf, including the Ambalat Block, on the grounds of the 1969 map and the 2002 ICJ judgment. Malaysia’s state-owned oil company, Petronas, announced that it would grant a concession for oil exploitation in this area to Shell (Weiss, 2010: 174–5). The Indonesian government protested this action furiously, mobilizing its navy vessels and jet fighters. Indonesian citizens also expressed their anger, organizing large-scale anti-Malaysian demonstrations and screaming ‘Crush Malaysia’ in what was called a renewal of the earlier ‘Confrontation’ (*Konfrontasi II*).

To calm the tensions, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysian Prime Minister Ahmad Badawi (and his successor, Najib Razak) have repeatedly visited each other, and both governments have endeavored to settle the dispute peacefully through bilateral negotiations. Indonesia, which had claimed sovereignty over the Ambalat Block based on its status as an archipelagic state, was unwilling to make any concessions to Malaysia, a coastal state, and firmly rejected Malaysia’s proposal for joint exploration in the disputed area (Druce and Baikoeni, 2016: 149–53). Despite 28 bilateral meetings from 2005 to 2015, the Ambalat disagreement remains unresolved (*Kompas*, July 31, 2015). Indonesia and Malaysia have continued to accuse each other of violating their air and sea spaces.

The Indonesian government’s uncompromising attitude in this conflict reflects the nationalistic attitudes of its citizens, who do not support a compromise with Malaysia. They regard not only Sipadan and Ligitan Islands but also other Indonesian territories, including at least 10 disputed areas on the border between the two countries on Kalimantan (Borneo) Island, as having been or at risk of being ‘stolen’ by Malaysia (*Kompas*, October 11, 2011; *Antara*, June 29, 2012;

Detik, October 25, 2012). President Yudhoyono faced public criticism for taking an amicable posture toward Malaysia. Joko Widodo, who succeeded Yudhoyono as president in 2014, promised that there would be no compromise on a matter of territorial integrity.

ASEAN has never addressed the territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. Decades of bilateral negotiations and dialog between the leaders have not achieved a resolution, and the ICJ's judgment in favor of Malaysia did not end the dispute either; in fact, it led to further deterioration of the relationship. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that both Indonesia and Malaysia will agree to use ASEAN's dispute settlement mechanisms. On one hand, territorial integrity is a vital matter for Indonesia, and its presidents and lawmakers must defend it to retain their popular approval. The Indonesian government learned from the unfavorable ICJ judgment that it is risky to entrust a vital matter of territorial integrity to a court of arbitration, because there is no viable way to reject an ICJ decision. Indonesia thus preferred to refer the dispute to the ASEAN High Council instead. However, Malaysia has never consented to this option, fearing that it would not receive support from other member states in view of the balance of power between Indonesia and Malaysia in ASEAN.

ASEAN has no motivation to interfere in this territorial dispute without a request by both concerned parties. Consistent with its noninterference principle, as long as no force has been used, ASEAN tends to give priority to bilateral negotiations as a means of resolution. In the second case that we will consider, a territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, force was in fact used. How did ASEAN respond in this case?

Case 2: Territorial Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia

The Preah Vihear temple was built by the Angkor (Khmer) Empire from the 9th to the 12th century as a Hindu temple, and it became a Buddhist temple under the kingdom of Siam after the Angkor Empire declined. The temple area, located on the boundary between Cambodia and Thailand, has been disputed territory for more than a century.

The 1904 treaty between France, colonial master of Cambodia, and Siam (the former name for Thailand) stipulated that the watersheds of the Dangrek Mountain range would mark the boundary between French Cambodia and Siam (Singhaputargun, 2016: 113). The first joint border commission, convened in 1905, agreed that French Cambodia and Siam would demarcate the precise dividing line between the two countries. According to the 1905 agreement, the Preah Vihear temple was situated within Siamese territory. However, in the map drawn up by France in 1908, after a 1907 treaty that exchanged some other territories between the two parties, the temple was shown as being within Cambodia, without any explanation by France. Nevertheless, Siam did not protest to France (Singhaputargun, 2016: 113–14).

In 1941, the temple was controlled by Siam under the peace treaty that ended the Franco–Thai War, which had broken out after the Japanese military invaded French Indochina. The temple was then returned to French Cambodia after the Second World War. However, when Cambodia became independent from France in 1953, a Thai police force occupied the temple area. After negotiations between the two countries failed, the Cambodian government submitted a request to the ICJ in 1959.

Three years later, the ICJ ruled that the temple itself belonged to Cambodia, citing Thailand's lack of protest to France when it claimed control of the land, and ordered the Thai police force to withdraw from the area. However, the ICJ did not rule on the competing claims to the area surrounding the temple, nor did it stipulate the border between Thailand and Cambodia in its judgment. Although it accepted the ICJ's decision, Thailand claimed the area around the temple as its territory and built a wire fence to separate the temple from the surrounding land (Singhaputargun, 2016: 115–17).

In 2001, Cambodia proposed the Preah Vihear temple for inclusion on UNESCO's list of World Heritage Sites with outstanding cultural or natural value. The Thai government under Prime Minister Thaksin supported this proposal and suggested in 2004 that the temple be jointly listed as associated with both countries, a suggestion that Cambodia rejected (International Crisis Group, 2011: 3–4). However, after a military coup toppled Thaksin, Thailand's new military government objected to Cambodia's World Heritage Site initiative, alleging that Cambodia was attempting to encroach on Thai territory surrounding the temple. It again proposed a joint listing of the temple and the surrounding area, which Cambodia again rejected (Singhaputargun, 2016: 115–17).

In 2007, a pro-Thaksin government with Samak Sundarajev as prime minister, formed as a result of a general election in Thailand, once again supported listing the temple as a World Heritage Site. The foreign ministers of Thailand and Cambodia signed a joint communiqué endorsing its application to UNESCO in 2008. However, this signing provoked an emotional reaction among the Thai people. An anti-Thaksin group called the People's Alliance for Democracy demonstrated fiercely, claiming that Thailand would lose territory due to the Samak government's position. After the official listing of the temple by UNESCO in July 2008, Thai and Cambodian troops were mobilized, and they exchanged rifle and rocket fire that October. A second clash in April 2009 killed a number of soldiers on both sides (International Crisis Group, 2011: 4–6).

The Cambodian government requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) after the first clash occurred. However, Vietnam, a nonpermanent member of the UNSC, intervened to stop the Council from discussing the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, insisting that the issue should be handled bilaterally. Singapore, which held ASEAN's rotating chairmanship at the time, told Cambodia that its direct appeal to the Security Council could harm ASEAN's credibility. However, bilateral negotiations mediated by ASEAN

failed to resolve the conflict because of Thaksin's appointment by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen as an economic advisor to Cambodia (International Crisis Group, 2011: 14). Anti-Thaksin and anti-Cambodian sentiment flared up in Thailand and within the administration of Prime Minister Abhisit when this appointment was announced.

When further fighting took place in February 2011 along the border between Thailand and Cambodia, the Hun Sen government again asked the UNSC to convene an urgent meeting. However, at that time the UNSC asked ASEAN to mediate between the parties. Marty Natalegawa, foreign minister of Indonesia and ASEAN's chair for that year, proposed that Indonesia and ASEAN mediate the conflict and deployed Indonesian observers in the disputed area. At a special ministerial meeting of ASEAN, three points were discussed:

- 1 Encouraging Thailand and Cambodia to commit to peaceful settlement of the dispute based on the ASEAN Charter and TAC.
- 2 Securing a ceasefire in the border area.
- 3 Building a suitable environment for subsequent negotiations.

Thailand and Cambodia agreed to accept Indonesia's role as facilitator and the deployment of Indonesian observers in the disputed area, as well as to continue bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict peacefully (International Crisis Group, 2011: 18–20; Singhaputargun, 2016: 128).

However, the proposed Indonesian monitoring never materialized. Because the Thai military opposed the presence of a third party in the territory, Thailand demanded that Cambodian troops withdraw unilaterally from the disputed area before Indonesian observers were deployed. This demand led to a stalemate in the negotiations (International Crisis Group, 2011: 21).

After ASEAN's failure to mediate the conflict, in April 2011 Cambodia submitted a request to the ICJ, asking it to interpret its 1962 judgment on the sovereignty of the area surrounding the Preah Vihear temple and to order Thailand to cease military action as a means of ending the conflict. In July 2011, the ICJ ordered the establishment of a demilitarized zone by both countries. In the same month, the party of Thaksin's sister, Yingluck, won Thailand's general election. The Yingluck government immediately took steps to improve the country's relationship with Cambodia (Singhaputargun, 2016: 124–5). In November 2013, the ICJ granted Cambodia's claim to sovereignty over the whole promontory of Preah Vihear and ruled that Thailand was obligated to withdraw its military, police, or any other forces or guards stationed there (ICJ, 2013).

In this territorial dispute, military actions took place and ASEAN expressed its willingness to mediate the conflict by deploying monitors from a neutral ASEAN member country. Nevertheless, because the Thai military did not agree to the deployment of a third party, ASEAN's mediation role failed. Again in this situation, we can observe ASEAN's ambivalent position between two norms, namely its call for the peaceful resolution of disputes and its noninterference principle.

Dilemma 2:

How can ASEAN promote democracy and human rights while maintaining its noninterference principle?

'ASIAN VALUES' AND THE EMERGENCE OF A HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

The noninterference principle and *Musyawahar-Mufakat* have been called the 'ASEAN Way' by leaders of the ASEAN countries, who have identified these features as distinguishing ASEAN from other international organizations. In particular, the noninterference principle, along with 'Asian values' that tend to prioritize maintaining social order over individual freedoms, has played a role in ASEAN countries' frequent disregard for Western criticisms of alleged human rights abuses and in their justification of authoritarian rule. To its member nations' leaders, ASEAN is not a human rights organization but a political-cum-economic entity. It was important in helping these countries to survive the Indochina War during the 1970s, address the Cambodian issue in the 1980s, and navigate economic liberalization in the 1990s, but talk about human rights among the ASEAN countries was considered almost taboo (Muntarbhorn, 2013: 113).

In 1993, during the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers released a communiqué in response to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, which had been adopted in Vienna on June 25, 1993. In this communiqué, the foreign ministers welcomed the consensus expressed by the World Conference on Human Rights and reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration. Furthermore, they agreed that ASEAN should consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights (Muntarbhorn, 2013: 106–107).

However, ASEAN's understanding of 'human rights' at that time referred to socioeconomic rather than political or civil rights. We can see this socioeconomic emphasis in the contents of ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted at the 2nd Informal ASEAN Summit in 1997, and in the Hanoi Action Plan of 1998. Vision 2020 stated that ASEAN should address issues of unequal economic development, poverty, and socioeconomic disparities by 2020. The Hanoi Action Plan, designed to implement the affirmations of ASEAN Vision 2020, contained a more explicit human rights agenda that targeted economic development and the eradication of poverty and described specific measures to protect women and children (Tan, 2011: 152).

In 1997, Thailand and Singapore discussed the concept of 'flexible engagement' in the context of Myanmar's participation in ASEAN. This discussion was viewed as a sign of change in ASEAN's attitude toward democracy and human rights, even though the flexible engagement policy toward Myanmar was still

criticized by European countries. The ASEAN leaders did not accept an authoritarian state as a member unconditionally; however, neither did they establish promotion of democracy and human rights as a condition for ASEAN membership, because doing so would have contradicted the noninterference principle.

By this point, ASEAN was beginning to show movement on issues of democracy and human rights, but this movement did not have an explicit shape because of the organization's equivocal perception of human rights and its noninterference principle.

DID DEMOCRATIZATION CHANGE TRADITIONAL NORMS?

In the 1980s and 1990s, democratic movements overturned three ASEAN regimes. In 1986, Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos defected to the United States as a result of the People Power movement. Next, the military dictatorship in Thailand fell under pressure from a democratic movement and the mediation of King Bhumibol in 1992. Finally, Indonesia's dictatorship under President Suharto collapsed amidst a reformist movement in 1998.

After 1998, the words *democracy* and *human rights* began to appear in declarations and other statements by ASEAN, and governmental officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia became active in pushing for change on human rights issues within the organization. From the year 2000 onwards, informal workshops were held to discuss the establishment of an ASEAN commission on human rights (Muntarbhorn, 2013: 111).

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, adopted at the Bali summit in 2003, stated that ASEAN would establish a security community. The Declaration contained this sentence:

The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. (ASEAN, 2003)

The VAP 2004–2010, adopted at the organization's meeting in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, reinforced the 2003 statement, adding a phrase that expressed 'ASEAN's aspirations to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity' (ASEAN, 2004).

Not only did the VAP declare that the ASEAN Security Community embodied ASEAN's aspirations to achieve democracy in the Southeast Asian region, but other sections of the document contained even more ambitious affirmations. The section entitled 'Political Development' expressed ASEAN's desire to 'promote human rights', and the section on 'Shaping and Sharing Norms' called for 'building collective responsibilities and forming a standard or common adherence to

norms of good conduct in a democratic, tolerant, participatory and open community' (ASEAN, 2004: Sect.1.1, 1.2).

Kraft explained that 'the governments and officials of societies in ASEAN with formally liberal democratic institutions ... have indeed been the most receptive to the idea of a regional human rights mechanism and the most supportive of human rights practices in the region', and that 'officials from Indonesia and the Philippines have been very active in cooperating with non-government networks on the issue of human rights in the region' (Kraft, 2005: 7). However, according to Kraft, there is no linear causality between democratic change and norm change (Kraft, 2005: 5). Domestic political conditions may have been a significant factor in human rights considerations within ASEAN, but they did not sufficiently account for contemporary developments in the region.

THE ASEAN CHARTER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HUMAN RIGHTS BODY

The ASEAN Charter of 2007 further advanced the organization's commitment to democracy and human rights. Its preamble emphasized that the people of ASEAN's member states adhere 'to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms'. Article 1(7) explicitly stated that one of ASEAN's purposes was to 'strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN.' Moreover, Article 14 articulated the purpose of establishing an entity within ASEAN that would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms (ASEAN, 2008).

However, a controversy over Article 14 helped to delay the Charter's ratification process, as Myanmar opposed the establishment of a human rights body with investigative powers. Eventually, the human rights body was not granted such powers and Myanmar ratified the Charter. However, Myanmar's foreign minister insisted that this newly formed body must not interfere in the internal affairs of member states. In direct contrast, the Indonesian parliament initially declined to ratify the Charter because it viewed a human rights body without investigative powers as ineffectual. Indonesia eventually ratified the Charter in October 2008, on the condition that human rights institutionalization would continue to be strengthened and that democratic rule would be encouraged in member states (Tan, 2011: 156–7).

In 2009, ASEAN created the human rights body envisioned by the 2007 Charter, naming it the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). In the drafting process of the AICHR's Terms of Reference, Indonesia proposed empowering the commission to investigate human rights abuses, but

other member states fiercely opposed this investigative function, citing ASEAN's noninterference principle in support of their position. Indonesia was forced to relent and agree that the AICHR would function as only an advisory body on matters of human rights.

As a result, the AICHR's main functions were relatively modest. They included developing strategies to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the ASEAN countries; composing an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; enhancing public awareness of human rights among the people of the ASEAN countries; providing advisory services and technical assistance on human rights matters; engaging in dialog and consultation with other ASEAN bodies; and obtaining information from ASEAN member states on the promotion and protection of human rights (ASEAN, 2009a).

THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION (AHRD): A CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENT

ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), drafted by the AICHR, in November 2012. The AICHR was widely criticized for its lack of transparency and lack of consultation with civil society in the process of drafting this declaration. The actual contents of the document were criticized as well. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, while welcoming the AHRD, indicated that the wording of the document fell short of international standards ('UN official welcomes ASEAN commitment to human rights, but concerned over declaration wording', UN News Centre, November 19, 2012). According to Human Rights Watch, the Declaration omitted several key basic rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to freedom of association and the right to be free from enforced disappearance ('Civil society denounces adoption of flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration', Human Rights Watch, November 19, 2012). Amnesty International wrote to the AICHR, calling for postponement of the AHRD's adoption and contending that the document risked creating a substandard level of human rights protection in the region ('Postpone deeply flawed ASEAN human rights declaration', Amnesty International, November 5, 2012).

The portions of the AHRD that received the most criticism were several sentences contained in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of its General Principles:

(From Article 6): The enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with the performance of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all other individuals, the community and the society where one lives.

(From Article 7): [T]he realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context, bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds.

(From Article 8): The exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, and to meet the just requirements of national security, public order, public health, public safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare of the peoples in a democratic society. (ASEAN, 2012)

In these sentences, the AHRD seemed to deviate markedly from international human rights standards by indicating that in ASEAN countries, human rights would be balanced against individual duties, would be considered in the regional and national context, and would be subject to the requirements of national security and public order. International human rights organizations perceived these statements as below international standards. We can see again the shadow of 'Asian values' that give priority to public order over individual freedoms in ASEAN's conception of human rights.

THE APSC BLUEPRINTS: COHABITATION BETWEEN OLD NORMS AND NEW NORMS

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II of 2003 stated the organization's intention to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020. At the 12th ASEAN Summit in the Philippines in 2007, participants decided to accelerate the establishment of this community, setting a target date of 2015. The 14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand in 2009 adopted the first APSC Blueprint; a subsequent APSC Blueprint 2025 was adopted at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in 2015.

The 2009 Blueprint referenced the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy, but the content of the actions proposed for this purpose was not impressive. Along with the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body, the Blueprint encouraged taking stock of existing human rights mechanisms and bodies; cooperation with sectoral bodies on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, women, and children; strengthening interaction between the network of existing human rights mechanisms and other civil society organizations; enhancing information exchange in the field of human rights among ASEAN countries; promoting education and public awareness on human rights and the principles of democracy; convening seminars and training programs to promote democracy and democratic institutions; and conducting annual research on experiences and lessons learned about democracy (ASEAN, 2009b).

In comparison to the 2009 document, the Blueprint 2025 reflects a positive change by calling on member states to take the following steps:

- i. To strengthen domestic legislation and institutions, promote human rights education, and hold consultations with relevant stakeholders;
- ii. To ratify or accede to core international human rights instruments and ensure their effective implementation; and

- iii. To enhance engagement with the UN and relevant human rights mechanisms.... (ASEAN, 2015: Sect. II(A.2.5))

Moreover, the Blueprint 2025 called for the AICHR to continue obtaining information from ASEAN member states on the promotion and protection of human rights and to strengthen interaction between relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies and the network of existing human rights mechanisms and other civil society organizations (ASEAN, 2015).

However, a reference to the noninterference principle not contained in the 2009 Blueprint was restored in 2025. In the context of calling ASEAN a ‘rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred community’, the Blueprint 2025 referred to promotion of ASEAN’s ‘fundamental principles’. What are these fundamental principles? The Blueprint indicated that ASEAN member states ‘respect the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, and national identity’ and ‘abstain from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States’ (ASEAN, 2015).

ASEAN has repeatedly declared its intention to promote democracy and human rights in the region. However, can it become a driving force for democracy and human rights while still emphasizing the noninterference principle and abstaining from involvement in the domestic matters of member states?

THE NEW NORMS AND THEIR ASYMMETRICAL EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Nowadays, we can view democracy and human rights as having become norms of ASEAN, based on the declarations and statements that ASEAN has adopted. If so, have these new norms had a positive effect on actual conditions in ASEAN countries? Have they improved the political situation in Southeast Asian countries? The answers to these questions vary, depending on which ASEAN country one looks at. I will use Myanmar and Indonesia as examples.

ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy has had some positive effect in supporting democratization in Myanmar. During the 2000 APEC Summit in Brunei, some ASEAN leaders met with the leader of Myanmar’s military government in an informal session and demanded a ‘progress report’ on the political situation in that nation (Acharya, 2014: 153). In 2003, Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, warned that Myanmar might face expulsion from ASEAN if Aung Sang Suu Kyi was not released soon. Myanmar decided to relinquish its turn to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN, which rotates among member states, in 2006 after repeated criticisms from other ASEAN countries concerning its delays in democratic reform (Acharya, 2014: 222–3). ASEAN leaders made

critical comments on the brutal suppression of citizens and Buddhist monks by the Myanmar military in 2007, but ASEAN did not expel Myanmar from the organization. In 2008, ASEAN played a role in channeling international humanitarian aid to Myanmar in response to the damage that the country suffered from Cyclone Nargis (Acharya, 2014: 224).

Although some ASEAN member states criticized Myanmar for its failure to adhere to democratic and human rights norms, ASEAN's refusal to isolate Myanmar mitigated the impact of criticism and pressure from Western countries. ASEAN did not directly advance democratization in Myanmar, but its policy stance could be construed as supporting a dovish group, including President Thein Sein, who promoted democratic reform and negotiations with ethnic minorities, while restraining the rise of a hawkish alternative. In this context, actions taken by the ASEAN countries did appear to contribute to political reform in Myanmar.

However, whereas ASEAN leaders have criticized Myanmar's delays in moving toward democratic reform and addressing human rights abuses, they have rarely expressed similar criticisms of Indonesia, either before or after its democratization. As Southeast Asia's largest country, Indonesia under the Suharto government was a key founder of ASEAN, and President Suharto was a primary guardian of ASEAN's noninterference principle; along with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, he articulated support for 'Asian values' and ignored Western criticisms regarding democracy and human rights abuses.

After the Suharto government fell in 1998, Indonesia began democratizing rapidly and became a champion of democracy and human rights among the ASEAN countries. More than a few academics, NGO staff, and representatives of civil society became involved in domestic policymaking and legislative processes to promote democratization in Indonesia. Under the influence of these democratic groups, Indonesia's foreign policy shifted to promoting democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. This democratic shift contributed in turn to a change in norms within ASEAN.

Pro-democracy groups also insisted on promoting human rights in Indonesia and demanded the investigation of prominent human rights abuses from the Suharto era, including the massacre of communists after the killing of six generals on September 30, 1965; the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, in which many devout Muslims who opposed the government were killed; the murder of Marsinah, a labor activist who demanded wage increases, in 1995; and numerous human rights abuses that accompanied military operations to suppress separatist movements in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. However, these investigations have not been carried out because of opposition from political elites who had been close to President Suharto and from the military.

The Indonesian military was suspected of providing arms to militias that opposed East Timor's independence from Indonesia, thereby contributing to violence after the 1999 independence referendum (Honna, 2003: 174–5; Bertrand, 2004: 143–4). International voices fiercely criticized Indonesia for failing to

guarantee the safety of those East Timorese who supported independence. However, ASEAN never criticized Indonesia, again falling back on the pretext of its noninterference principle. At that point, active support for human rights had not yet become an accepted norm in ASEAN.

Indonesia would endure many more human rights abuses in the course of its democratization process. These included killings of Papuan separatists including the movement's leader, Theys Hiyo Eluay, by the military in 2001 (Bertrand, 2004: 157–9); rapes and killings by the military operation in Aceh in 2003 (Crouch, 2010: 291–3); the murder of Munir, a human rights activist in 2004; and repeated violence by the security forces in Papua, which has continued up to the present time (O'Brien and Vaughn, 2011: 223). These events have taken place contemporaneously with the gradual establishment of democratic and human rights norms in ASEAN. Yet ASEAN has never voiced any criticism of human rights abuses in Indonesia, nor has it ever demanded further democratization that could guarantee the promotion of human rights there.

In sum, ASEAN's attitudes toward Myanmar and Indonesia were distinctly asymmetrical. While applying human rights norms to Myanmar, ASEAN prioritized the noninterference principle in its dealings with Indonesia. Given this seemingly arbitrary application of two contradictory norms, it will remain difficult for ASEAN to create an effective mechanism that could promote democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE ROHINGYA PROBLEM

In September 2014, ASEAN presented a report of the High-Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia at the UN. In that report, the panel declared that 'cooperation to protect Southeast Asian peoples from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity is a necessary corollary to the establishment of a caring and sharing ASEAN community' (ASEAN, 2014).

Despite this honorable-sounding statement, however, ASEAN could not take an effective stand on the mass killing of members of the minority Muslim people group known as the Rohingya, in the midst of Myanmar's purported democratization. The Aung San Suu Kyi government faced worldwide accusations of failing to stop the 'genocide' or 'ethnic cleansing' of the Rohingya, carried out through communal violence and a brutal military crackdown. As a result, many of the Rohingya were forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Indonesia and Malaysia, both predominantly Muslim nations, accepted the Rohingya refugees and have strongly criticized the Myanmar government for its failure to address cases of human rights abuse.

Nevertheless, Myanmar retorted that these criticisms represented interference in its domestic affairs. Again, the gap between ASEAN's idealism and reality was painfully apparent.

CONCLUSION

During the last twenty years, ASEAN has sought to become 'a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred community bound by fundamental principles, shared values and norms, in which [its] peoples enjoy human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice' as well as 'a resilient community in a peaceful, secure and stable region, with enhanced capacity to respond effectively and in a timely manner to challenges for the common good of ASEAN, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security' (ASEAN, 2015). Nevertheless, it has never moved away from its traditional norms of sovereignty and freedom from external interference.

ASEAN's continued adherence to these traditional norms has produced unresolvable dilemmas with regard to ASEAN's approach to resolving conflicts between member states and to promoting democracy and human rights in member countries. As we have seen in this chapter, ASEAN's good offices proved powerless to resolve territorial disputes involving Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia, as each country prioritized its own national interests and some of them rejected mediation by ASEAN. Moreover, not only Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam but also Indonesia, an original ASEAN member state that has since become democratized, prefer to uphold the principle of noninterference in human rights issues.

As long as ASEAN prioritizes its noninterference principle, its ability to achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts or disputes between member states or to improve conditions of democracy and human rights will remain quite limited. On the other hand, should it attempt to repudiate the noninterference principle, it will have difficulty in promoting regional integration because of the inevitable strong pushback that would come from member states. Ironically, Western countries that have long noted the dilemmas inherent in ASEAN's noninterference policy are now experiencing similar dilemmas themselves. The problem that ASEAN faces has become a common one in international society.¹

Note

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Neighbors without Borders: Regional Integration in South Asia

Aparna Pande

INTRODUCTION

In the European Union, NAFTA, and ASEAN, regional integration has profoundly expanded the political options available to member nations. It is easy to forget that these supranational institutions are not organic, and were created over many years in a very specific set of circumstances. However, some regions have been left behind by the trend of interconnectedness, and remain isolated from their neighbors. The aim of this chapter is to build an understanding of the theory and history of regional integration and apply those lessons to South Asia.

Regional Integration is the process by which separate governments build institutions that enhance joint cooperation. Karl Deutsch once described the process as ‘the attainment, within a territory, ... of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of peaceful change ... that common social problems can and must be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 10). Definitions of regional integration encompass various factors, ranging from waning importance of the nation-state and the convergence of international interests to cultural alignment. For the purposes of this chapter we will examine regional integration as a form of thick cooperation. That is to say, we will assess how South Asia can develop institutions and expectations of cooperative problem-solving.

As the world’s fastest growing region, registering GDP growth above 7 percent and home to 1.7 billion people (2017) and counting, creating a sustained climate for stability and expansion in South Asia is attractive. Furthermore, cooperation initiatives like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) have demonstrated the potential for massive collective gains under a more integrated framework. However, successes have been limited, and efforts at cooperation have not produced tangible integration. As proof, South Asia's volume of intra-regional trade, less than 28 billion dollars, is the lowest of anywhere in the world, one fifth that of neighboring Southeast Asia. Despite shared histories, cultures, languages, and challenges, cooperation remains elusive. The future of South Asian growth and prosperity depends on building upon past projects and expanding the scope of regional integration.

This chapter will examine the theoretical and policy implications of South Asian integration in three parts. First, it will examine the history of regional integration, and engage in a theoretical review of Neofunctionalism (Haas), and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik). Any understanding of regional integration in South Asia must establish an understanding of *how* and *why* integration happens, and compare those incentives in South Asia to other historical cases. Here, looking at the seminal developments of regional integration in Europe along with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations can lay the groundwork for understanding integration in South Asia.

Second, this chapter will assess areas where cooperation would be advantageous. This includes reviewing the evolving attitudes held by regional powers towards integration. India, Pakistan, and their regional neighbors have all warmed and cooled in their enthusiasm for a unified South Asia. These cases are indispensable for understanding the political will behind integration, and the most likely manifestation it will take.

Third, this chapter discusses the policy areas that would benefit the most from regional cooperation. From energy cooperation to shared infrastructure, integration depends upon choosing paths that are genuinely mutually beneficial. Equally important are the cooperation initiatives that are already in motion. Looking at current attempts at cooperation such as SAARC and SAFTA, and their shortcomings will help guide a more complete understanding of future cooperation.

A theory of South Asian integration must take into account three essential factors – the theoretical approaches towards regional integration, the problems and politics specific to the region, and the areas of cooperation that hold the most promise for future collaboration. Specifically, the lessons drawn from regional peers and the structure of spillover incentives are pivotal in understanding how regional integration could be at work in South Asia.

MODELING REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Theoretical Approaches

By nature, regional integration involves some loss of sovereignty; cooperation is built upon acknowledgment and respect of the interests and powers of one's neighbors. Free trade areas thereby sacrifice sovereign control over tariffs and

security cooperation limits unilateral action. Generally, states are hesitant to relinquish their sovereignty, making it important to explore the theoretical rationale for why states would willingly integrate.

Theoretical approaches to regional integration attempt to account for why sovereign political bodies would willingly give up power. Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism provide contrasting accounts of when and how pooling sovereignty on the supranational level is better for the individual state than maintaining the status quo. Similarly, the European Union (EU) and ASEAN provide two different models for states to approach the problem of giving up sovereignty. Rather than pick or choose between theories or models, this section will look at existing models and use them to contextualize future possible platforms for cooperation in South Asia.

Of course, such an approach is limited by the many differences that span past cases of regional integrations and the challenges that face South Asia today. Many of the theories discussed are by-products of studying international cooperation in Europe, a circumstance which is certainly very different. Nevertheless, examining history gives us an idea for how countries have approached and overcome these challenges before. At the minimum, we can glean a starting position with which to pursue our interrogation.

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism takes the view that regional integration is a gradual process by which incremental economic cooperation between states creates opportunities and incentives for further collaboration down the road. This process, known as ‘positive spillover’, entails a gradual progression towards regional integration. States begin with cooperation over economic issues, and expand cooperation until it reaches the level of political integration.

The role of the ‘spillover’ is foundational to neofunctionalism. The idea here is that in order to fully realize the benefits of integration, cooperation in one area must be met with further cooperation. Haas (*Uniting of Europe*, 1958: 53) writes that integration happens when the ‘demands for central services intensify because the central institutions prove unable to satisfy the demands of their new clients’. For example, the European integration of coal and steel in the 20th century created an advantage to integrating the entire energy sector. Broadly speaking, this is because different sectors of the economy are so connected that integration in one sector creates a demand for integration in other sectors. This process is known as ‘sector spillover’, and over time leads to greater efforts to integrate regional economies as local elites realize the need to merge national functions to make cooperation more effective.

Slowly, as economic cooperation spills over, it creates pressure for political integration. The new economic supranational bodies offer constraints and opportunities unavailable in earlier international systems, and as the economy becomes increasingly integrated, political avenues of cooperation become more realistic. According to Haas (1958: xxiii), the key conclusion is that ‘group pressure will spill over into

the federal sphere and thereby add the integrative impulse'. The logic of neofunctionalism supposes that integration is not so much about the grand strategy of member states as it is the gradual convergence of interests between countries.

Thus, neofunctionalism holds that integration happens in small, technocratic steps, rather than by grand design. Joint growth creates a convergence of interests, which lobby for further integration. Cooperation therefore does not rely on a consensus for internationalism per se, but on a series of separate *subnational* agendas. For example, groups that benefit from low tariffs may seek to make labor more mobile by simplifying visa laws; on the other hand, political parties that want economic growth or military power may also see the benefits of making travel easier because transit allows for greater coordination across borders. Eventually, the many converging interests beget a system of harmonized political *institutions* that integrate the region. In turn, the prevalence of these new political institutions and more diffused national power builds norms of collaboration, as the political community of the state is supplemented by the political community of the region.

Over time, the shifting center of power changes the loyalties of regional elites. Actors come to expect that regular international cooperation will address their problems, and groups like political parties and industrial interests shift their focus to the regional level. In turn, more power at the international level creates an effect where people shift their focus away from purely domestic matters, thereby promoting even more integration because their political and economic resources are focused internationally.

It would be a mistake to conflate neofunctionalism with economic determinism. The theory certainly lends itself to the idea that integration begets further integration, which seems like economic determinism which places decision-making power purely in the hands of the market's ability to guide human action. However, neofunctionalism requires that subnational elites independently realize the benefits of integration, albeit in small steps. Haas stipulates that neofunctionalist logic works best when nationalism is weak, because there are few competing loyalties that interfere with the convergence of interests among subnational elites. While eventually international institutions help join together the interests of subnational elites, at the early stages of integration when the benefits from future collaboration are not as clear nationalism can derail the process of collaboration. Without weak nationalist sentiments, early efforts at integration may be pulled apart by countervailing interests. In these initial stages, more faith and goodwill is required to get integration off the ground. Neofunctionalists argue that this explains why efforts at regional integration have been confined to regions with weaker nationalist feelings, like Europe after the Second World War.

The lessons of neofunctionalism are important for a study of South Asian regional integration. There are two principal takeaways that are applicable:

- Small efforts at economic integration may have future integrative spillover effects.
- Integration efforts are most effective when nationalism is weak during the initial phases of cooperation.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The main claim of liberal intergovernmentalism is that integration happens as a series of bargains between member nations. These deals reflect the contemporary realities of commercial advantage, relative bargaining power, and incentives to create credibility among partners. Conceptually, liberal intergovernmentalism diverges from neofunctionalism in arguing that integration is not a gradual process of compounding incentives, but rather a 'sequence of irregular big bangs' (Katzenstein, cited in Moravcsik, 2013: 2).

Liberal intergovernmentalism views collaboration as a method of adapting to changing international landscapes. Just as tariffs and subsidies change domestically with transformations in a nation's comparative advantage, so too do attitudes towards integration change as the payoffs from collaborating shift.

Attitudes towards integration emerge from domestic political battles over the foreign policy and globalization. In regions such as Western Europe security concerns between regional powers are less pronounced, allowing economic interests to largely determine the grounds for collaboration. Even here, the manifestations of integration are not uniform, but subject to battle among domestic constituents. For some of these domestic special interest groups, integration promises cheaper goods and labor, while for others it damages their industries by flooding them with competition from abroad. Moravcsik (2013: 3) writes 'the specific conditions under which governments were willing to liberalize trade reflected the international economic competitiveness.'

Liberal intergovernmentalism outlines the processes of integration by looking at the market-advantages and relative bargaining powers of participant nations; stronger nations with clearly defined interests are better able to dictate the terms of the bargain. In this context, 'strength' does not mean hard power, but rather the country's interests, economic advantages, and the alternatives they have to their preferred option. The final arrangement, Liberal Intergovernmentalists argue, is a compromise between the different interests of the regional parties. Moravcsik argues that bargaining is a system in which actors with the strongest preferences for an agreement are more willing to offer concessions to secure the deal.

Approaching integration through the lens of bargaining helps explain why different attempts at integration produce varied results. Different actors hold different interests valuable, so the end bargain reflects their many interests to varying degrees. Regional integration becomes a mixed bag in which some of what each party at the table desires is accomplished. This approach suggests that integration is not (a) path dependent upon the initial conditions of cooperation, and (b) one size fits all, but rather takes radically different forms given different initial political preferences of the member countries.

The new intergovernmental institutions created from interstate bargaining reflect a need for states to ensure the credible commitment of their partners. Essentially, after a bargain is reached states need to enforce the terms of the

agreement. This gives rise to a need for central authority. In this way, Liberal intergovernmentalism differs from the Neofunctionalist logic, which attributes the growing strength of supranational parties to the shifting elite loyalties and spillovers into the political arena. Liberal intergovernmentalism believes that ‘governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions where potential joint-gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective’ (Moravcsik, 2013: 9). That is to say, the bargaining model that decides the *modes* of integration also shapes the *strength* of the resulting institutions; states with stronger preferences for compliance and creating collective action will lobby harder for supranational governance, while those with less skin in the game will not.

Liberal intergovernmentalism adds a substantive layer to how we can think about South Asian integration. We learn two lessons that are applicable:

- The modes of integration are shaped by the bargaining and national interests of partner nations.
- Strong regional integration will arise from a need to maintain credible commitments in an arena where domestic checks prove insufficient.

Pooling Sovereignty – Europe

The post-war history of Europe is the seminal case of regional integration. The years following Second World War saw a continent of divided, heterogeneous, warring peoples establish lasting peace. France and Germany, rivals for centuries, became such close allies that conflict between them is now unthinkable, and regional problems are dealt with through mutual cooperation. The model of gradually expanding supranational power and pooling sovereignty used by the EU provides one possible way of looking at South Asian integration.

The origins of shared European sovereignty begin with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The rationales behind organizing the ECSC ranged from lowering prices, to deterring conflict between member nations, to explicitly calling to lay the groundwork for integration. The ECSC was formed in 1951 under the Treaty of Paris, creating a common market for coal and steel in France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, and the Netherlands.

In 1951, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC). Seen as continuing the spirit of the ECSC, the EEC built upon the integrative impulse of past reforms and started creating a common market and customs union. By 1993, the EEC built a full common market and expanded to include a growing number of European nations.

European integration entered its final phase in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon treaties of 1999, 2003, and 2009. The Maastricht Treaty created a common currency, as well as institutions to manage the European economy, foreign affairs, and intra-European justice.

The EU in its current form has unquestionably become more consolidated than its previous institutions. From 1951 until 2009, central EU supranational bodies have steadily accrued more autonomous decision-making power. The basic structure of EU governance is obligatory for all members, and edicts from Brussels govern many areas of commerce and industry. For example, competition rules in the European internal market are almost exclusively under the purview of the central EU government. Without pooling sovereignty, the EU's expansive scope of policy and enforcement would have not been possible.

Still, the European Union model for integration offers different methods of collaboration for member nations. Not all members have adopted the Euro as common currency, or the Schengen passport-free travel zone. This creates a certain latitude for European countries to integrate or not integrate based on their domestic situation or concerns about sovereignty. The resulting architecture is a hybrid of mandatory and opt-in features, where a certain amount of integration is standard and required, but beyond that nations have the freedom to choose the level of collaboration with their neighbors.

Cooperation Without Sharing – ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations presents a different, but equally successful model of integration. With over 600 million people and a total GDP of 2.8 trillion dollars, the ASEAN nations grew by an average 7 percent in their first 25 years of collaboration. In contrast with the European Union, ASEAN demonstrates a model for regional collaboration that does not rely on pooling sovereignty.

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand joined together to create ASEAN. By 1999, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam had also gained entry. The stated objectives of ASEAN are to 'accelerate regional economic growth' and 'promote regional peace', as well as to establish mutual respect for sovereignty and commit to conflict resolution.

Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not involve member nations relinquishing sovereignty to a supranational body. EU dictates are legally binding, because member nations have given up authority to Brussels. On the other hand, 'the element of sovereignty of Member States was sacrosanct in regional cooperation and there was no tolerance for the concept of pooling of sovereignty even when the ASEAN Charter was being drafted' (Pushpanathan, 2009). By treating sovereignty as a core value, ASEAN nations in Southeast Asia have cooperated without ceding authority to a central body.

The looser cooperation of the ASEAN model has shaped the way member nations interact. Decisions are made the 'ASEAN Way', a process of 'extreme-consensus'. The ASEAN secretary general is responsible for implementing and coordinating policies, but the actual decision making is conducted during annual meetings between member nations' heads of state or foreign ministers.

Even without a supranational authority, ASEAN nations have implemented free trade agreements abroad, vast reductions of tariffs, and even created the ASEAN University Network (Lee, 2011). The decentralized model for cooperation employed by ASEAN has managed to hit impressive benchmarks, despite its lack of juridical authority over member states.

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Attitudes Towards Integration – India and SAARC

Often called an ‘anchor’ or a ‘growth pole’, India’s attitude towards its neighbors (or neighborhood) has influenced its attitude/policy towards South Asian collaboration. As the largest nation in South Asia, any real effort at regional collaboration must include New Delhi. The India of today is a far cry from the India of 1947, and has over the years dramatically shifted its attitude towards integration. India’s changing security and political situation has created a climate more favorable to integration.

During the period following Indian independence, New Delhi’s leaders were mainly concerned with the consolidation of territorial integrity (Dixit, 2003). The partition had left India with a long list of internal issues, from refugee problems to the organization of the states. Adding to the troubles was the foreign policy challenge of integrating the Princely States, holdovers from the colonial period which had opted out of initially joining the Indian union. The government was also concerned about the possibility that the many ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural groups in the new nation would tear India apart. With more immediate concerns, the young government in New Delhi was more focused on territorial integrity than regional integration.

India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, treated India’s neighbors as an extension of India’s civilizational neighborhood. Although he accepted partition and sovereign boundaries of South Asia, Nehru viewed India’s neighbors as part of New Delhi’s common culture and sphere of influence. As an extension, Nehru did not consider India’s neighbors as threats, opting to sign ‘Friendship Agreements’ with Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal around 1950. Like the British, Nehru kept some of India’s smaller neighbors in their status as buffer states, hoping to keep them closer while focusing on other neighbors/states which posed more tangible security concerns such as China and Pakistan. Indeed, in 1959, Nehru visited Nepal and spoke of how Nepal would benefit immensely if India were secure: ‘If we escape this dangerous war, the problem before us is how to harness our strength for the eradicating all wants, troubles, and diseases of the people. This problem is before us in India, before you in Nepal, and before several other countries.’ Here, Nehru suggests that the growth of the small states would come as a result of (and after) Indian security.

Subsequent Indian forays into foreign policy revolved less around integration with regional neighbors, instead concentrating on India's emerging role in global affairs. Prime Minister Nehru's strategy of non-alignment focused on keeping India at arm's length from the great powers of the Cold War. Nehru famously said 'Peace is not only an absolute necessity for us in India in order to progress and develop but also of paramount importance to the world', stressing the importance of India's security project within the national agenda. Regional integration was less important than building the 'non-aligned' movement and extending friendship to nations emerging from colonial rule. Early leaders also recognized that talk of integration would be viewed skeptically by smaller neighbors, who would be afraid that such discussion was a front for Indian expansionism and domination. Friendship with South Asian nations was certainly part of Nehru's agenda, but integration and serious efforts at creating growth-links was not.

Indira Gandhi's tenure as prime minister was characterized by a more active stance in South Asia, but not one which emphasized unity so much as Indian strength. Often termed the 'Indira doctrine', Prime Minister Gandhi sought to pull the neighboring states into India's sphere of influence. In an article to *Foreign Affairs* (October 1972), Indira Gandhi wrote 'Our first concern has been to prevent any erosion of our independence.' In 1971, India intervened in the secession of East Pakistan, and in 1975 Indira Gandhi presided over the incorporation of Sikkim into India. The Indira doctrine held that India was to be the sole arbiter of disputes in the region, and that meddling from external powers would not be tolerated. This more assertive foreign policy gave India a more active role in South Asia, but still one that prioritized India's national interests over its neighbors. While India still had not achieved parity in strength with the world's major powers, the Indira doctrine marked New Delhi's desire to be seen as the region's power broker.

The formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 marked a significant effort at regional integration. SAARC included Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and in 2007 Afghanistan joined as well. SAARC was founded with the aim of promoting South Asian economic, technical, and cultural integration. Led by the heads of state of the member nations, SAARC decisions are made by unanimity. SAARC also excludes bilateral discussions from the agenda. Decisions are coordinated and implemented from the SAARC secretariat in Kathmandu. SAARC's emphasis on consensus means that without full member cooperation, projects cannot move forward.

India's attitude towards the creation of SAARC was reluctant at best. In his speech at the first SAARC summit, Rajiv Gandhi said 'We have not sought to melt our bilateral relationships into a common regional identity but are to fit South Asian cooperation into our respective foreign policies as an additional dimension.' Considering India is the only nation in South Asia to share borders with five other SAARC members, New Delhi was initially concerned that the

supranational authority could pressure India into resolving contested borders. Much of India's initial reluctance to commit to SAARC came from New Delhi's adamant stance that SAARC would not be used to arbitrate political disputes against India (Dixit, 2003).

India's attitude towards cooperation manifested itself in hamstrung schemes for integration. SAARC has failed to achieve its own fairly modest aims of restoring common transit infrastructure between member nations. India's reluctance to commit to intra-regional integration limited the success of the South Asian Free Trade Area which was agreed upon at the 12th SAARC summit in 2004. SAFTA was unable to meaningfully reduce non-tariff barriers and India's list of exempted goods was so long that it prevented serious liberalization (Dubey, 2007).

Much of India's reluctance to invest in SAARC stemmed from security concerns. In insecure environments, even joint-gain agreements are frowned upon because they enable belligerent nations, in this case Pakistan, to grow and prosper (Dubey, 2007). This objection is partially political, integration is often seen by the public as appeasement or concession to partner states. India's relatively recent independence, internal threats, history and conflict with Pakistan, and rivalry with China meant that security concerns crowded out the discussion over integration.

Instead, India has traditionally opted to pursue bilateral deals with its partners, especially on security issues. Bilateral negotiations give India the flexibility and directness needed for the leaders in New Delhi to cut deals without creating the political problems associated with multilateralism. For instance, India has pledged billions of dollars in support to the government of Afghanistan in aid, and has a longstanding friendship agreement with Nepal that has involved troop training (Wagner, 2014).

India's attitude towards integration has evolved considerably in recent years. The past decade has seen a growing interest on the part of the Indian government in regional integration and an increasing willingness to try liberalization schemes to increase trade. For example, 84 percent of recent Indian foreign aid has been directed towards South Asia, and the overall aid budget has grown considerably. India has made efforts to reduce the list of goods it exempts from SAFTA, bringing South Asia closer to genuine free trade. India is also pursuing efforts to create regional transit corridors and integrate SAARC countries with their ASEAN neighbors. India's shift towards favoring a more collaborative South Asia is a promising signal for the future of cooperation in South Asia.

What caused this shift in Indian policy? One factor is that security concerns have shifted from the homeland to all of Asia. The India of today has to worry much less about its immediate security. The year before SAARC began, 1984, saw both a dramatic increase in terrorism in Kashmir and Operation Blue Star in Punjab, which is considered the flashpoint for the Sikh separatist movement. India as a state was also much weaker, with less than a tenth of its current GDP.

Similarly, the 2004 SAFTA negotiations were conducted on the backdrop of a rise in Kashmiri violence and the recent memory of the 1999 Kargil conflict.

As India has grown fonder of regional integration, SAARC has touted a number of impressive successes. In 2007, a SAARC food bank was ratified in order to reserve grains to prevent famine. In 2010, SAARC opened a development fund which aims to increase economic growth and poverty reduction in areas overlooked by traditional capital financiers. Projects include supporting female entrepreneurs and increasing child vaccinations efforts. SAARC has also extended observer status to a number of nations such as Japan and the United States, with the aim of encouraging foreign investment and cooperation in South Asia.

While the prospect of a successful SAARC is exciting – especially with increasing Indian interest – the organization is facing a series of limitations which constrain its utility. One major barrier towards integration through SAARC is the massive economic inequality between member nations. For small states like Bhutan and Nepal, the prospect of free trade agreements may be premature, because their still-developing local industries would be at risk when exposed to industrialized foreign competition. In addition, India is the only country that shares a border with more than two other SAARC nations, which puts the majority of the burden of developing common infrastructure and customs on its shoulders. Lastly, the SAARC charter explicitly rejects the discussion of bilateral and contentious issues, which limits the subjects over which cooperation can take place. Understandably, South Asian nations have many issues that are either bilateral or contentious in nature, and not being able to discuss them in a regional context through SAARC places constraints on the amount of cooperation which can take place (Jiali, 2012).

In the past decade, India has grown substantially more stable, allowing it to refocus its foreign policy from questions of immediate territorial integrity to building a strong, stable South Asia. Conflict casualties in Kashmir have declined since their peak in the 1990s, and India's per capita GDP and military spending have made it clear that New Delhi is the sole power broker in South Asia. At the same time, concerns about a rising China have led to the desire to forge closer bonds with South Asian nations. When dealing with neighbors like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka in contested areas, regional cooperation is an important part of India's new geopolitical security architecture.

India's new market-oriented economic model also makes integrating a more appealing prospect. In 1991, New Delhi began to experiment with privatization, reducing non-tariff barriers, and free trade. India has denationalized many sectors of its economy, allowing in foreign firms that benefit from supply chains which cross the border into other South Asian nations. Indian firms that once faced extreme tariff barriers to incorporating neighbors in their supply chains are now freer to export parts of their production process and sell their finished goods abroad.

Market-oriented reforms create natural advantages to easy international commerce, and create incentives to solve regional issues that might spill over into India. This is because liberalization makes Indian industry freer to sell goods abroad and access the greater regional market. In turn this creates opportunities for joint economic gains between India and its neighbors by linking their economies. Economic Liberalization has paid dividends for India, making it the fastest growing economy in Asia and an attractive destination for investors.

India's growth has created a new set of national concerns – but unlike the security dilemmas which impeded efforts at integration during its early years, India's current position makes cooperation with its neighbors an appealing prospect. As it has become a global power, India has needed to forge closer links with its neighbors and demonstrate leadership within South Asia. In 2015, Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar declared that in a departure from India's historic neglect of the interests of South Asia, 'you cannot be a leading power if your neighborhood is not with you. You need your neighbors to root for you' (Shah, 2017: 34). From a more aggressive foreign policy in Afghanistan to new plans to boost trade with Africa, an increasing international presence requires India to have its affairs closer to home in order. Growing relevance on the international stage has given India new interest in integration, while simultaneously making collaboration with its neighbors more valuable.

Attitudes Towards Integration – Pakistan and SAARC

Pakistan's attitudes towards integration are a crucial part of efforts at regional cooperation. As the second largest economy in South Asia, successful efforts at integration require a strong buy-in from Pakistan. Pakistan also separates Afghanistan from the rest of the SAARC nations, which means cooperation from Islamabad is a prerequisite to including Kabul. However, Pakistan's elites have consistently resisted efforts at regional integration, citing security concerns and issues with the competitiveness of domestic industry.

The guiding force behind Pakistan's resistance to integration lies in its national security situation. As a smaller power with large neighbors, Pakistan has occupied a place of perpetual insecurity. To the north, Afghanistan has historically been a security concern, particularly through an on-and-off support for claims for an independent 'Pashtunistan'. Here, Pakistan has longed for a weak, pliant regime that can lend Islamabad 'strategic depth' in its fight against India. To this end, many members of Pakistan's elite prefer a low level of instability in Afghanistan to a regime in Kabul that is aligned with India.

More present in the minds of Pakistani strategists is the specter of conflict with India. From independence, Pakistan has been in India's ever-growing shadow. Pakistan's leaders worry that New Delhi did not accept the creation of Pakistan and seeks to 'undo partition'. This translates into the belief that India is behind insurgency in Baluchistan, terrorism inside Pakistan, inflaming Pashtun

nationalism, and generally constitutes an imminent existential threat to the country. These fears and insecurities have over time led to the consolidation of power in the military and erosion of civilian rule. Often described as ‘a military with a state’ or ‘a garrison state’, Pakistan’s decision-making process has been guided by and focused on security concerns (Shah, 2014: 9). This consolidation in turn has created skewed Pakistan’s policy away from issues such as trade and development towards military spending.

Since partition, Pakistan’s security apparatus has shaped a national narrative of Pakistan as alone in a ‘sea of enemies’ (Fair, 2014: 16). Pakistan’s textbooks fuel nationalism by painting the history of South Asia as an enduring Hindu–Muslim rivalry (Haqqani, 2016: 29). Pakistan’s national education curriculum emphasizes the injustice done to Pakistan by India, and the irreconcilability of the conflict, creating an expectation that foreign policies serve the primary national interest of security. Every leader of Pakistan has similarly echoed that until the Kashmir conflict is resolved, trade and development with India will not progress. This has over time created a zero-sum mentality within Pakistan’s elite, where policies that help Pakistan’s enemies (namely India) cannot be in the national interest.

The ideology of Pakistan makes joint-gain projects difficult. A mentality of perpetual war creates enormous political costs for politicians who attempt to pursue integrative policies. For example, as Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988 to 1990, 1993 to 1996) attempted to ease tensions with India, and open Pakistan up to foreign trade she was decried for being ‘soft on India’, even though trade cooperation would benefit both countries. This story is emblematic of a larger culture within Pakistan which seeks to enable and justify militarism by creating a narrative of endless conflict. In such an atmosphere, bargains with neighbors are toxic because Pakistan’s military establishment generates legitimacy from its distance from India.

Despite the slow progress towards integrating Pakistan into the broader South Asian economic and political environment, evidence suggests that the region would benefit immensely from collaboration. The Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), a league of South Asian businesspersons, claims that reforms could massively increase the volume of trade from 2 billion dollars to 12 billion dollars per year (CUTS, 2016). For instance, Islamabad does not allow uninterrupted transit trade between Afghanistan and India over Pakistani territory, even though such trade would also likely bring economic activity to Pakistan. This opposition is explainable solely through the zero-sum mentality that is created by Pakistan’s nationalism. This mindset finds the prospect of Indian growth with Afghanistan intolerable, as it might converge the interests of the two countries. More broadly, India’s gains from trade make the Pakistani military considerably more likely to oppose it.

Pakistan’s quest for security and rivalry with India has spilled over into SAARC, limiting cooperation. Pakistan has blocked SAARC initiatives on expanding connectivity and opposed efforts to build and launch a SAARC satellite. Because SAARC requires that decisions be made by consensus, Pakistan’s efforts to stall regional integration have demonstrably slowed cooperation.

Pakistan's concern for security has led it to focus on external support, rather than South Asian development. Pakistan's politicians and leaders have spoken about their desire to counterbalance rising Indian influence within South Asia with assistance from abroad, most notably with China and the United States. China and Pakistan share the mutual interest in balancing against India, and so Pakistan has been receptive to cooperation with Beijing. Pakistan's military frequently spins sunny relations with China as a means to create a powerful anti-India coalition. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and development assistance from around the world, including the United States, are used by Pakistan to offset India's natural advantage in size (Fair, 2014). By raising rents from abroad to attempt to achieve its goals without contributing to growth that would also benefit India, development within South Asia holds limited utility to the Pakistani establishment.

Integration Beyond SAARC

SAARC is not the only attempt at regional cooperation in South Asia. Although the most well-known, SAARC has demonstrated limited potential because of competing political agendas and conflicting national interests. In particular, SAARC has had difficulty addressing Human Rights.

SAARC has also suffered from an inability towards addressing human rights issues. South Asia is the only region in the world whose institutions for regional cooperation lack a dedicated human rights mechanism. One issue is that many South Asian nations disagree about what constitutes fundamental human rights. For instance, few South Asian countries have serious protections for the right to due process, in large part due to differing attitudes towards the role of the state in protecting social order (Dhaliwal, 2008). Differing attitudes between South Asian nations and the rest of the world towards the use of armed force in politics, hereditary hierarchy, and the numerous armed conflicts which permeate the region make a single, universal human rights framework difficult. At most SAARC summits, pressing human rights issues are barely mentioned.

In the meantime, other organizations have emerged to pursue integration. Different arrangements of nations bring to the table different groups of national interests, and therefore different avenues for possible collaboration. Sub-regional groups may provide one alternative to integration through SAARC. Over time, the apparent inability to make progress through SAARC has led to a disillusionment on the part of member nations. Sub-regional groups can help avoid the need to satisfy the wide variety of interests present in SAARC, and generate more momentum by focusing on specific policy problems.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) includes India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal. In 2014 when Mr Modi took over as Prime Minister he invited all South Asian (SAARC) heads of state for his inauguration. In 2019 all BIMSTEC heads of state were invited. In 2016, India hosted a

BIMSTEC outreach meeting in Goa, demonstrating a willingness to pursue integration through other means. Another sub-regional grouping that shows promise is the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Program, which invests in trade, energy, and economic development. Founded in 2001, SASEC was founded without Pakistan, making it more likely to find the political will to implement projects. SASEC was created between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in order to invest in regional connectivity and infrastructure. To date, SASEC has contributed almost 10 billion dollars to regional economic development.

Cooperation is possible through the steady expansion of smaller groups and bilateral or trilateral partnerships. By slowly reducing barriers between neighbors and increasing interconnectivity, South Asian nations have sought to build ties even in the wake of the failure of larger cooperative organizations like SAARC. Different groups of nations can also avoid the need for total consensus which is present in SAARC, and move forward more quickly with integrative policies. For example, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal (BBIN) have signed a motor vehicle agreement (MVA) designed to allow for easier cross-border transportation. Dealing with a smaller grouping of four nations gives the participants more room to voice their individual concerns and act at their own pace without sinking the entire operation: for instance, while India has pressed ahead with increasing transport funding for roads between the other three nations, Bhutan has been skeptical of the deal. In another example of sub-regional cooperation, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives have worked together to boost trade from Bangladesh's Chittagong port facility in the hopes of boosting trade between the six nations.

Perhaps, like the EU and ASEAN, successful sub-regional groupings may be scaled up by adding more members once they have proven their viability. By focusing more on local issues and specific policies, sub-regional cooperation creates a plausible alternative to SAARC for South Asian integration. BIMSTEC, BBIN, and various other groupings of South Asian states creates opportunities for cooperation that can satisfy the aims of different parties while over time drawing the region together by expanding trade in shedding barriers. If successful, these models can incorporate other South Asian nations and gradually evolve more powers to enhance regional cooperation.

INTEGRATION AS POLICY

Overview

Having reviewed theoretical approaches towards collaboration as well as the historical attitudes of India and Pakistan, it is important to look at the policy areas where integration is the most useful. Efforts to connect South Asia have

been concentrated along building common infrastructure and institutions, such as transit, electricity, and trade.

When looking at these policies it is important to remember the logics of integration, and how they might apply to these projects. Whether or not these initiatives will indeed draw the region together has yet to be seen, but looking at them through the lens of theory and history can help frame them within the broader context of integration.

Regional Transit

Access to fast and easy transportation is intimately linked with regional integration. Economically, transportation lowers logistics and transaction costs. Politically, transportation allows for the diffusion of different ideas and cultures. It is no surprise that integrated regional transportation networks have been a goal of integration advocates since the inception of SAARC.

The lack of integration in South Asia has in large part been due to a physical isolation between neighbors. Only 4 percent of South Asia's trade volume came from intra-regional trade, one of the lowest in the world. NAFTA and the EU by contrast boast figures over 20 percent. The total cost of investment is daunting, as the Asian Development Bank estimates that the cost to link South Asia to its eastern neighbors alone would total at least 62 billion dollars.

Despite individual nations having substantial investments in transportation infrastructure, the region remains un-linked and cross-border infrastructure remains a distant promise. Indeed, the World Bank estimates that in order to keep up with the demands of economic growth, South Asia requires 108 billion dollars in infrastructure investment every year. Because of an unconnected South Asia, experts have said that the 'cost of doing trade in South Asia is higher vis-à-vis the trade with Europe and North America' (Bose, 2016). Even India's North-East, which is connected to water and several regional neighbors is said to be 'landlocked' due to a lack of real transportation infrastructure. India has considered opening up the region by investing in 'Asian Highway' projects, which are joint ventures with neighboring countries that attempt to link all of Asia through a comprehensive road network. Some areas of the India–Thailand–Myanmar highway have been completed, and the Indian government in 2017 allocated an additional 270 million dollars to the project. Unfortunately, progress to date has been slow, and coordination has not produced a unified model for unifying transit across South Asia.

Aside from increasing economic growth and welfare, trade plays a significant part in regional integration and problem-solving. After all, European integration was built on a foundation of regional trade and commerce, which over time, built institutions that made joint-gains and collaboration over political problems easier. Trade creates an international architecture where no actor benefits from instability, and national problems become regionalized. For example, if Bangladesh faces

a national crisis which threatens to impact firms which fragment their production line between multiple nations, all parties have an incentive to make sure that the issues are addressed promptly. By giving every actor a stake in the other's welfare, international trade helps to align the interests of the region closer together.

The issue of limited transportation is partially physical, and partially bureaucratic. The former is a matter of too few roads, different national rail networks, and a lack of money to complete new projects. For instance, only three broad-gauge rail corridors can carry cargo between India and Bangladesh, restricting the volume of trade that can flow across borders.

The construction of physical infrastructure is a necessary but, by itself, insufficient step towards creating unified regional transit. The second barrier to transportation integration is the result of restrictions over land use and transnational trade. For example, even if trade can physically move from India to Bangladesh, there is no agreement in place that allows Indian firms to use the Chittagong port in Bangladesh, which would cut travel times by 60 percent (Rahmatullah, 2016). Thus, physically creating strong transportation links is necessary but alone insufficient to forge regional trade, and must be accompanied by political reform as well.

Existing schemes to improve regional transit must be hastened and built upon to integrate South Asian trade. India is currently in the process of constructing road and rail links in its North-East, connecting its historically isolated provinces with the rest of South Asia and eventually ASEAN nations as well. The South Asian Subregional Economic Cooperation road connectivity program represents billions of dollars of financing by the Asian Development Bank to build roads between South Asian nations, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal.

India is undoubtedly the most crucial player in the game of regional infrastructure. Aside from its size and economic draw, India shares borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Therefore, unifying access to transit almost certainly means a substantial investment on the part of the Indian government in domestic roads and rail networks, especially in underdeveloped areas such as the North-East.

Port infrastructure must also not be neglected. A strong maritime infrastructure makes South Asian exports more competitive, by lowering shipping costs to other regions. Here, much like with road infrastructure, South Asia faces the dual problem of physical and political deficits. For the former, port capacity has lagged behind ship-size, restricting the amount of goods that can be traded in the region. The largest container port in India, the Jawaharlal Nehru port, can hold less than 5,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units), while ports in Malaysia and Singapore hold 11,000 and 30,000 TEU respectively. For the latter, harmonizing customs and standards for shipping between neighbors would make trade much easier for firms that currently have to worry about overly complicated logistics. A 2016 World Bank report on the competitiveness of South Asia's container ports concluded that the change in value-added from modernizing ports would be massive:

shipping costs could be cut by 9 percent and the value of exports could increase by 7 percent.

In many ways, improving regional connectivity is a necessary precursor to more substantive regional cooperation. Both the EU and ASEAN have worked intensively to develop and maintain robust transit networks in order to create a strong framework for joint-gains. Fast, easy transportation aligns the incentives of member nations by making labor, capital, and goods flow easier. Policies that now affect one area may soon affect many because of increased mobility and trade. Regulations, taxes, and laws that operate in areas with unified transit networks almost inherently need to take a more collaborative approach towards governance as the people that they operate upon become part of a broader regional society.

Regional Energy

Much like transportation, energy is an area where South Asia faces common problems and would benefit from collaborative solutions. Energy is a prerequisite to economic growth because it is an input of production that is needed in virtually any industry or development. Similarly, energy security lowers the risks associated with investment by giving agents confidence that their capital can be used effectively, while energy insecurity deters cross-border investment into energy-scarce areas.

South Asia faces a unique challenge in regards to energy. South Asia faces energy challenges on both the demand and the supply side of the equation. First, with the fastest population growth of any region in the world, no country in South Asia will be able to meet its energy needs with domestic production alone in the near future (Singh, 2013). As South Asia's population grows more prosperous, consumption per capita will rise as well, because higher incomes will allow more people to access and use energy. The dual rise in population and energy consumption per capita will put enormous pressure on South Asia's energy infrastructure, which is expected to grow at a rate of 5 percent every year.

Second, the supply of energy in South Asia faces problems with generation and distribution. Production infrastructure is largely outdated, and problems with distribution such as theft are widespread. For instance, Pakistan relies on thermal energy plants which were constructed decades ago and have lost much of their efficiency. In Bangladesh, over 30 percent of rural homes lack electricity. Even in the more prosperous India outages are regular, with 300 million of India's 1.25 billion people living without power. With no end to population growth in sight, major changes are needed to ensure that the gap between demand and production does not widen.

One major step in the energy future of South Asia is connecting national power grids. Having a single grid allows unexpected shortages to be filled from across the border, greatly improving the reliability of power. Economically, single

grids are more efficient because they allow power generation to take place in larger, more centralized facilities (Matin, 2015). In terms of integration, unifying national grids would allow South Asian countries to send energy from different areas of the region to each other. This would greatly reduce the risk of doing business in energy-scarce areas, and make it easier for firms to fragment their supply chains between South Asian Nations. By connecting the power grid between nations of varying energy production levels and demands, a more unified grid gives each nation an incentive to look after their neighbor's affairs and assist in cross-border problem-solving to ensure a reliable flow of electricity.

Cooperation is also important for increasing power generation. South Asia needs to work together to find mutually beneficial ways to boost production, by constructing more energy infrastructure and linking the region to a diverse set of power producers. Some progress has already been made in this area, but mostly on the bilateral level. For instance, India has reached a number of agreements with Bhutan and Nepal to fund and provide technical assistance for the construction of new power plants, with plans to import the energy once construction is complete. These agreements will allow South Asian nations to divide energy production according to comparative advantage, building more plants in areas where energy costs are cheaper (Nepal and Bhutan have abundant sources of hydroelectric power), and generating investments in long-term cheap energy.

Aside from being an essential prerequisite to development, energy generation creates spillovers for more cooperation down the line. It is no coincidence that the seminal developments in European Integration occurred because of coal and steel collaboration. Unified energy policies give neighbors a stake in each other's affairs, to make sure that power continues to flow reliably. Such a system would mean that energy challenges would *have* to be tackled as a region, because production and distribution would involve all South Asian nations as stakeholders. Further, because every industry uses power, cooperation in energy generation creates incentives for standardizing a whole host of industrial, labor, and civil standards. For example, energy cooperation would require a method to resolve disputes, regulate power consumption and standards, incentivize the easy flow of cross-border labor, and give member nations a voice in the types of energy being generated.

Enhancing Free Trade

Free trade is an essential part of building the institutions of regional cooperation. Free trade increases economic growth by allowing for cheaper imports, specialization, innovation, and competition. By allowing for seamless trade between nations, free trade builds complex value-added supply chains that connect member nations. By reducing restrictions on foreign investment, free trade generates economic returns for both the donor and the recipient. By joining economies together, free trade promotes cooperative economic institutions

which require frequent contact in order to ensure compliance with rules and set trade or development goals. Over time, the economic and institutional dependence created by interconnectedness binds the cultures and lifestyles of a region together, making cooperation more likely and conflict unthinkable (Ikenberry, 2000).

It is therefore no surprise that the EU and ASEAN both led their integration efforts with expansive free trade networks. While nominal efforts for a free trade area in South Asia have been made, the region must make significant efforts to make do on tariff reductions and eliminate non-tariff barriers in order to make integration successful.

Some make the argument that South Asian trade is low because the member economies are oriented towards trading with developed nations. Yet even though South Asian countries do predominantly service developed nations, the measly 4 percent of total trade which intra-regional trade comprises is a far cry from its potential. By contrast, Southeast Asia, which is also oriented towards exports with developed nations spends 25 percent of its trade volume with its neighbors. This suggests that there is a massive volume of untapped South Asian regional exchange.

South Asia's existing free trade network, SAFTA, has failed to live up to expectations. SAFTA allows member nations to keep long lists of 'sensitive' items which they may exclude from tariff reduction. Though they vary by nations, these lists may include thousands of items, rendering SAFTA 'free trade' in name only. Items as common place as seeds and petroleum products are exempted from free trade. SAFTA has also not worked to overcome the significant logistics, information, and non-tariff barriers which act as tariffs by making cross-border trade more expensive.

In order to develop strong regional economic trade, South Asian nations must accept the short-term harms associated with cutting the number of items on their 'sensitive' lists, and make a collective effort to mitigate the impact on sector-specific industries that are rendered less competitive by free trade. This might mean allocating funding to small countries to compensate them for the revenue lost in tariff reduction, where the economic strain would be higher than their more prosperous neighbors. It also means collective investment in emerging industries to help transition workers into growing fields.

Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are one main obstacle to trade integration. Non-tariff barriers are obstacles to trade outside of formal taxes which increase the costs of conducting cross-border trade. For example, quality restrictions, labeling laws, certification requirements, and inadequate infrastructure all make trade artificially more expensive. Despite India having reduced formal tariffs considerably over the last decade, the volume of exports into India remains incredibly low. In India, goods that arrive at ports often must stray hundreds of miles from their original destination for additional rounds of testing and packaging. This suggests that nominal free trade alone is insufficient to actually economically integrate South Asia without also tackling non-tariff barriers.

Eliminating non-tariff barriers requires harmonizing cross-border standards and regulations. Some of the greatest causes of cross-border inefficiency result from redundant bureaucratic checks, different standards between nations, and packaging or labeling requirements that differ between nations. These issues force manufacturers to invest in costly new infrastructure when bringing their goods to new markets, making them more unwilling to do so. By streamlining regulations between neighbor nations, South Asia can increase the volume of trade and thereby economic interconnectedness.

CONCLUSION

Integration is a lengthy process, but one that is absolutely worthwhile. South Asia shares common languages, histories, and cultures. Contemporary South Asian economies face similar hurdles in development, security, and growth. In regions where integration has worked, economic growth has been shared and neighbors have created legitimate and deep-rooted institutions to resolve their problems. In places such as the EU and NAFTA, conflict between neighbors is unthinkable, and solving disputes happens through clearly established, impartial systems. Similarly, if South Asia can overcome nationalism and protectionist impulses, the benefits of integration will give South Asia a strong, unified approach towards problem-solving.

First, integration relies on an understanding of the overlapping national incentives that have led to the current low levels of interaction in South Asia. Security concerns, other preoccupations, and a focus on internal development have kept integration on the backburner for the better part of a century. As other regions focused on developing interstate ties, South Asia focused on decolonization, industrialization, and border disputes.

Then the question becomes how to change the status quo to build a more robust regional order. To do so it is important to look at the theoretical groundings for how and why nations work together. Understanding spillover and bargaining will build the context around which policies might help integration, and which are infeasible. At the same time, considering nationalism and security concerns and how they might prevent some modes of cooperation is foundational for eliminating unrealistic opportunities. It is clear that not every policy is appealing to every partner, and that efforts at integration must adapt in the face of resistance.

From past examples of successful collaboration, we know that finding willing partners and joint-gain projects take time. Integration in the rest of the world has taken decades, and has often been faced with setbacks. Yet, it seems as though a renewed willingness to try the integrative experiment is present in India, and small test projects have shown early signs of success. Future successes may be the start of a broader pattern of integration, a South Asia with a shared path towards development and a common vision for prosperity.¹

Note

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