



OXFORD JOURNALS
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Source: *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001), pp. 167-172

Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/26156526>

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Organizing hypocrisy and transforming sovereignty

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This special issue originated in a highly successful conference which was held at the University of Tokyo, on 30–31 January 2001. A distinguished group of scholars was identified and given a wide brief to consider the changing nature of the state. Instructively, a majority of the participants independently took this opportunity to engage the arguments advanced by Stephen Krasner (a conference participant) in his recent, highly acclaimed and influential book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (1999). Organized hypocrisy and the transformation of sovereignty were the themes that dominated our discussions and disagreements; accordingly, we have used these themes to order our presentation of the papers in this Special Issue of *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific: A Journal of the Japan Association of International Relations*.

Krasner's central argument is that the significance of sovereignty has been exaggerated. The features most associated with the sovereign state – territory, autonomy, recognition and control – are inaccurate descriptions of the reality of statehood throughout history. Krasner offers an account of what state sovereignty has in practice 'actually' meant, by identifying four main usages of the term sovereignty: domestic sovereignty (authority within the state), interdependence sovereignty (how governments control the flow of information), international legal sovereignty (based on mutual recognition) and Westphalian sovereignty (the traditional principle of non-interference). Krasner focuses on the latter two of these. By international legal sovereignty, Krasner means that recognition is extended to territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty entails the exclusion of external actors, whether *de facto* or *de jure*, from the territory of a state.

Krasner suggests that the absence of authoritative international institutions, and power asymmetries between states means that Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best conceived of as 'organized hypocrisy' on a grand scale: powerful leaders abide by these forms of sovereignty only when it is in their interests to do so. Krasner's primary agents are power-preserving rulers, who are prone to forsake what is appropriate when it is in their interests. As a result, principles of sovereignty have been enduring but violated. Westphalian sovereignty in particular has in practice been disregarded via either inter-state coercion and imposition (violation by intervention) or voluntary contract and conventions (violation by invitation).

Krasner draws on the work of March and Olsen who develop an account of social and political action around logics of expected consequences and logics of appropriateness. 'Logics of consequences see political action and outcomes . . . as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of unexplained preferences. . . . Logics of appropriateness understand political action as rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in given situations' (p. 5). Krasner's claims that 'the international system is an environment in which the logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness' (p. 6). Constructivist and English School approaches base their analysis on the logic of appropriateness, and thereby 'understate the importance of power and interest and overemphasize the impact of international, as opposed to domestic, roles and rules' (p. 6). Leaders are constrained by their multiple roles (both domestic and international), international rules are often inconsistent (e.g. non-intervention versus human rights) and domestic roles take priority.

Of all the social environments within which human beings operate, the international system is one of the most complex and weakly institutionalised. It lacks authoritative hierarchies. Rulers are likely to be more responsive to domestic material and ideational incentives than international ones. Norms are sometimes mutually inconsistent. Power is asymmetrical. No rules or set of rules can cover all circumstances. Logics of consequences can be compelling. Organized hypocrisy is the norm. (p. 42)

In his contribution to the Special Issue, Steve Smith, after David Held *et al.*, argues that there are three schools of thought on the impact of globalization on the state: hyperglobalizers, sceptics and transformationalists. Hyperglobalizers focus on economics, and argue that the state is being swept away by the rise of a single global market. Transnational networks of production trade and finance are emerging. State governments are declining in importance, relative to increasingly powerful local, regional and global forms of governance. In this increasingly borderless economy the authority

and legitimacy of the national state is challenged, and autonomy is eroded; states lose the power to regulate the flow of industry, investment, individuals and information.

Sceptics effectively offer the opposite view to that of the globalizers. Their main argument is that there is nothing which is fundamentally new about globalization. They argue that contemporary levels of economic interdependence are by no means unprecedented. The term globalization implies the existence of a perfectly integrated worldwide economy; sceptics suggest that it would be more accurate to describe the system as highly internationalized, but that the interactions take place between economies which are predominantly national in nature. National governments still have the power to regulate international economic activity. Governments are not the passive victims of internationalization, but rather they are its primary architects.

Smith believes that Krasner's position is close to that of the sceptics. Krasner discusses globalization in the concluding chapter of his book as follows:

I do not want to claim that globalization has no impact on state control, but these challenges are not new. Rulers have always operated in a transnational environment; autarky has rarely been an option; regulation and monitoring of transborder flows have always been problematic. The difficulties for states have become more acute in some areas, but less in others. There is no evidence that globalization has systematically undermined state control or led to the homogenization of policies and structures. In fact, globalization and state policy have moved in tandem. . . . In sum, global flows are not new. Transnational activities have challenged state control in some areas, but these challenges are not manifestly more problematic than in the past.

(p. 223)

Smith disagrees with Krasner's claim that the logic of consequences dominates the logic of appropriateness. For him globalization, politics and sovereignty are best seen as social practices that are constructed and reinforced. From this perspective, there is no such thing as a material interest to guide unitary rational calculators, and there is thus no logic of consequences that exists outside of these processes. From this it follows that interests and identities cannot be assumed away; instead they get constructed by discourses, and these discourses include debates about norms and rules which both constrain state actors and reconstruct their identities and thereby their interests.

Transformationalists such as Smith believe that globalization is transforming contemporary world politics, and that the state is significantly

changed by this process. Some states are becoming increasingly enmeshed in the emerging global order, but others are being marginalized. Many other actors at local, regional and national levels are becoming more important than they were, but the state remains one of the most significant actors. States have to adopt and develop strategies which can deal with the pressures of governance in a globalizing world.

Raimo Väyrynen and Mehdi Mozzaffari also contribute distinctive transformationalist perspectives on the relationship between sovereignty and globalization. Väyrynen argues that globalization has eroded the divide between the national and international systems, with the result that states and their sovereignty are not disappearing, but that states do not have as much power as they used to. The internal dimension of state sovereignty has been transformed more thoroughly than the external one, partly due to the growth and proliferation of transnational social movements, which have also gained power in national societies. Therefore, Väyrynen concludes, the anti-globalization movement, although it is unable to prevent the process of economic integration, 'has been capable of redefining the terms of the globalization debate and influencing the responses by national governments and international financial institutions'.

Mehdi Mozzaffari argues that globalization is having a positive effect on the spread of human rights. He argues that liberalism and capitalism have combined to produce globalization, which is in turn giving rise to a new global civilization, based on universal human rights. He believes that Western-derived human rights ideas are universally relevant, and superior to Islamic or Asian values. For the first time in history the preponderant state is also democratic, and this is a crucial factor in the emergence of a new democratic civilization. As a result of this emergence of a new global standard of civilization, the culture of anarchy is accordingly transformed, although the anarchic ordering principle of the international system is unchanged.

The first theme of this Special Issue, then, is the debate between Krasner, who believes that sovereignty is enduring but violated, and Smith, Väyrynen and Mozzaffari, who, in their different ways, believe that sovereignty is being qualitatively transformed. The second theme entails the application of the idea of organized hypocrisy to other forms of international relations. In the conclusion to his book, Krasner remarks that

Sovereignty is an institutional arrangement associated with a particular bundle of characteristics – recognition, territory, exclusive authority and effective internal and transborder regulation and control. The analysis presented here suggests that other international arrangements – characterized by other bundles of principles – would, like sovereignty, also

not be embedded. Rulers operating in the European feudal system, the Chinese tributary state system, the Islamic system, or the Greek city-state system would like those in the sovereign state system, expound principles that they would also violate.

In this Special Issue Krasner develops his thesis and applies it to an international environment which was not governed exclusively by Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty. He argues that East Asian international relations in the nineteenth century provide an example of a situation in which the tension between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, between norms on the one hand and material concerns on the other, was particularly acute. Two international normative constructs clashed – the European sovereign state system of formal equality and autonomy, and the Sinocentric Confucian system of hierarchy and dependency. Krasner claims that the material interests of the protagonists were incompatible: China and Korea wanted to preserve their autonomy; Western states wanted economic access; Japan pursued autonomy and then expansion. For none of the major players were their own logics of appropriateness fully compatible with maximizing their material interests. In nineteenth-century Asia, as in many other situations, he argues, decision-makers resorted to organized hypocrisy. Norms were never taken for granted either by the indigenous rulers or by Western interlopers. In general, logics of consequences dictated behavior while logics of appropriateness were rhetorically embraced.

Masaru Kohno shares many of the basic premises of Krasner's position. In this volume he argues that the significance of the principles of Westphalian sovereignty has been exaggerated in conventional narratives which describe Japan's entry into the modern system of sovereign states. Kohno argues that the idea of organized hypocrisy is more helpful for our understanding of late Tokugawa Japanese history than Western conceptions of sovereignty and standards of civilization. The Japanese political system that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration, the so-called Tokugawa Baku-Han regime, was comparable with many modern sovereign states in its exercise of public authority and its ability to control border movements. Hence, in his view, it was the complex (hypocritical) nature of Japan's existent sovereignty, and not its absence, which explains how the Meiji Restoration occurred.

In the concluding article, Inoguchi and Bacon argue that states have different empirical degrees and qualitative types of sovereignty, ranging from the merely formal to the substantial to the popular. States have different dispositions towards sovereignty, and are liable to project their own in different ways in pursuit of conflicting objectives. Different groups of states attempt to impose their understandings and beliefs on the international system.

There are three ideal types which help us to understand the issue of sovereignty and the interactions of sovereign states. These are respectively Westphalian, liberal and anti-utopian. The Westphalian paradigm has the maintenance and protection of state sovereignty as its key concept. The liberal paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of popular sovereignty and controversies over the extent to which this ideal should be promoted and exported. Liberal states enjoy substantial degrees of popular sovereignty; they enjoy relations of complex interdependence with other republican states, and increasingly conceive of these interrelationships in late- or post-Westphalian terms. As well as being more prepared to conceive their relationships with fellow liberals in co-operative terms, they are also less likely to take claims to sovereign statehood as seriously as their Westphalian counterparts. Perhaps the key difference between Westphalian and liberal groups of states is the different views which they have about the acceptability of action with regard to failed states. The anti-utopian paradigm is conceived in terms of the concept of quasi-sovereignty or the loss of sovereignty, and in terms of resistance to attempts to impose globalization and liberal values on recalcitrant states and cultures.

All of the contributors to this Special Issue, then, problematize the simplistic opposition between globalization and sovereignty: Krasner argues that the significance of both has been exaggerated and that the practice of organized hypocrisy is more important; Smith and Väyrynen argue that they are mutually constitutive and develop in tandem; Mozzaffari argues that Western values are being globalized and the quality of anarchy transformed, even if the ordering principle of the system remains the same; Kohno argues that the idea of organized hypocrisy is more helpful for our understanding of late Tokugawa Japanese history than Western conceptions of sovereignty and standards of civilization. Finally, Inoguchi and Bacon conclude that states have different empirical degrees and qualitative types of sovereignty, and are liable to project sovereignty in different ways in pursuit of conflicting qualitative objectives. The Editors and contributors hope that this Special Issue stimulates debate and makes a helpful contribution to the burgeoning literature on the central but contested practices of sovereignty and globalization.

The Editors would like to extend their gratitude to Oxford University Press, the Japan Association of International Relations and the Asahi Shimbun, who kindly sponsored the conference. They would also like to thank all of the participants in the conference, especially Stephen Krasner, for his robust and constructive engagement with his critics, and Steve Smith, for his valuable editorial advice.