A North-East Asian perspective

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It is worth recalling at the outset of this article that even before the Anglo–Japanese alliance of 1902 was concluded in light of the British inability to wage two major wars internationally—namely the Boer War in South Africa and a possible contingency in the Far East—Australians were worrying about the threat coming from 'the North'. This was understandable when one recalls that in 1900–1901 the Boxer rebellion was raging in northern China and that major external power interventions, spearheaded by Britain, were taking place there. The Western powers' tripartite intervention in 1895, against Japanese acquisition of territorial gains from the first Japan–China war of 1894–1895, infuriated the Japanese. This response, in turn, alarmed the Australians (Millar 1978).

When the Anglo–Japanese alliance was concluded, therefore, Australian policy-makers were relieved. If Japan were to free itself from its obligations incurred under the Anglo–Japanese alliance, they surmised, it might assert its power too readily and press what it viewed to be its national interests throughout the region. The consequences would be to the likely detriment of the British colonial system and to Australia itself (Nish 1982, 1985). Even when the Washington Treaty allegedly limiting Japanese naval capabilities was signed by the major powers after the first world war, Australians were far from assured about their own security (in contrast to Britain which accepted the 'Japan feet of clay' argument [Thorne 1979]). The infamous period when British forces were smashed by the Japanese Imperial Army in Singapore and Malaya (1941–1942) soon followed. From Japan's perspective, this was nothing more than an audacious yet successful military operation. From Australia's perspective, it was nothing less than the brutal confirmation of long-standing apprehensions about Japan's geopolitical designs that constituted a genuine 'northern threat'.

Hence, following the second world war, it was quite natural for Australians to voice their preference for a 'hard peace' with and occupation of Japan (Hosoya 1981; Buckley 1981; Rix 1986; Trotter 1990). Australia's posture was thought of as 'the cap on the bottle'—a quest for guarantees that the infamous days of Japanese domination over Malaya and Singapore would never be repeated. The Americans, Australian policy-makers insisted, should adopt a policy of not allowing Japan to keep its military forces and to conclude a treaty whereby the US would keep its armed forces in Japan. This would ensure Japan's continued strategic dependence on the United States. The United States, moreover, would need to use Japanese air and naval bases, port facilities and air space freely for regional security operations. Although Australians were far from being the most influential ally in

shaping the eventual framework of a peace treaty with Japan, the key documents that resulted from the discussions between the US, its wartime allies and Japanese officials reflected such Australian preferences. The postwar Japanese Constitution and the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST) together epitomised Japan's postwar reliance on US military power and American freedom of operations in Japan.

However, the advent of the Cold War affected substantially both the strategic role of Japan and the security policy calculations of the United States. Instead of keeping Japan a small and agrarian power (in General Douglas MacArthur's well-known words, Japan should be a 'Switzerland of the Far East'), the Americans found it necessary for Japan to develop a strong economy and the technological capacity to support and sustain American military operations in the Far East more effectively. Two key events materialised to test these requirements: the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Both conflicts revealed that Japan was more than able to fulfil the United States' expectations. During the Korean War, US military bases in Japan proved to be the key for the operations of UN forces in terms of supplying fuel, guns, food, medicine and rest and recreation. Even the de-mining operations in the waters around South Korea were partly executed by former Japanese naval de-mining engineering corps. During the Vietnam War, US military bases in Okinawa and Japan enabled area-bombing operations against North Vietnam and Vietcong insurgents to be conducted.

Australia's role as an American ally in these two conflicts was very different but no less significant. In contrast to the indirect participation of Japan in enhancing the US war effort in both of these conflicts, Australians fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans. What is most significant about such a comparison is that both Japan and Australia seemed to acknowledge the utility of each other's respective Cold War-related roles as US allies, both supporting American power and strategic objectives in the Asia–Pacific region.

Important in the development of their thinking of each other as fledgling security partners was their role in the region's economic development (Rix 1986). When one examined the Asia–Pacific's economic development circa 1975, it was clear that the high-income countries were Japan and Australia. In between these two industrialised economies lay smaller, developing ones, emerging from the dust of the Vietnam War in South-East Asia and with uncertain politico-economic prospects. The Vietnam War and the subsequent Watergate scandal traumatised the United States. Its economy was severely affected by the first oil crisis of 1973. Given this regional configuration, it was hardly surprising to see Australians and Japanese developing the kind of thinking that bonded both their countries closer together, beginning with economic ties and later in more comprehensive ways—including in their respective security and political roles (Drysdale 1989).

Initially there were the visionaries: Saburo Okita and John Crawford. Both envisioned a joint Japanese–Australian role of nurturing regional trade and developmental institutions. The map of the region drawn in terms of per capita income gave the vivid impression to interested observers that the region was to be led by the two developed economies in both hemispheres, sandwiching the rest. This and

other strands led to the formation of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a body with the slogan of 'open regionalism'. By this was meant that APEC did not bind its member countries with some supranational authority but instead sought to help them liberalise trade and marketplaces at a pace that suited its individual members. Only by pronouncing the voluntary and market-led liberalisation principle of advancing free trade and open markets was APEC able to mobilise a viable solidarity. Some countries like Malaysia wanted to form an East Asian Economic Caucus, excluding non-Asian countries like Australia and the United States. Indeed, the United States did not favour a regional economic organisation equipped with its own binding rules, because it was suspicious of the emergence of regional economic entities that might undermine the American economic preponderance in the region. The result was APEC—an organisation that was deliberately fluid and lacking the mandate to propel it into something bigger and more powerful. Yet APEC played the very positive role of nurturing a sense of 'region' and facilitating the Asia–Pacific region's trade and market liberalisation that was strongly fuelled by the idea and practice of the 'developmental state'. APEC was in the business to engineer and facilitate economic development by pro-active economic policies. In this sense, both the Japanese and the Australians played immensely positive roles in the region, because they were neither domineering nor threatening. Also, the fact that they were not merely following the United States was a positive factor in the institutional development of the APEC (Kikuchi 1995; Hellman and Pyle 1997; Bergsten 1998).

Second, in tandem with the development of economic transactions within the region, there emerged an awareness of political and security roles, especially in the post-Cold War era that began in 1989–1991, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Rix, 1999). More directly, the political vicissitudes of the region such as the massacre at the Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Cambodian peace-building process in 1991–1992, Asian involvement (primarily via logistical support) in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, the widening of bilateral security dialogues in the region throughout the early 1990s, the brinkmanship between North Korea and the United States in 1994 and the showdown between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait during 1995–1996 were all instrumental in leading Australians and Japanese to reconfirm and redefine their respective security roles in the region. Observing this process, former Australian Ambassador to the United States Rawdon Dalrymple pronounced the 'two anchors' doctrine in 1996. In his words, 'Japan and Australia were often referred to as respectively the Northern and Southern Anchor of the "Free World" or as the "Western" position in the Western Pacific'. This concept was derived from the Cold War context (Dalrymple 1996: 38; Sajima 1997).

It is important to note that both Japan and Australia reconfirmed and redefined their security roles with the United States around the same time. It is particularly useful to compare the joint pronouncements and communiques between Australia and the United States and between Japan and the United States following President Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1996 and the forging of the 'Sydney Statement' the following July. Both parallel and diverse trends in alliance politics emerge from

these documents, illuminating some important nuances in the Australian–American–Japanese security constellation (Sajima 1997).

First, Australia and the United States, via the Sydney Statement, expanded ANZUS's coverage from the Pacific to a broader Asia–Pacific circumference. Japan and the United States likewise expanded the MST's coverage from a deliberately ambiguous 'Far East' to encompass a much wider ' de facto' Asia–Pacific spectrum (although to what extent the revised zone covers Taiwan remains debatable). Unlike the expansion of ANZUS's treaty scope of operations, however, the projected expansion of the MST was contested by political opposition in Japan and by criticism from abroad (most notably from China). Subsequently, the Japanese government declared that any revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines would not be earmarked for a geographically specific security but would merely continue to serve as the foundation for stability and prosperity in North-East Asia from the Japanese–American perspective. This contrasted with Australia's stated posture at the time, which made it clear that while the Howard government was still determined to defend Australia by means of 'defence self-reliance' it also remained committed to deploying Australian forces at greater distances in support of US forward-deployment strategy and to participating in regional military exercises to demonstrate its strategic resolve (Joint Security Declarations 1996).

Second, Australia and Japan both reaffirmed that their respective alliances with the US were predicated on democratic principles. Given this foundation, both allies committed themselves to fulfilling approximately thirty policy and logistical tasks as part of meeting their respective alliance agendas. Both joint communiques mentioned above were very similar in underscoring such topics as regional security, economic challenges and global issues. An exception to this trend was that the Japan–US joint communique failed to mention the task of democratisation in Myanmar.

Third, Australia and the United States reaffirmed Australia's vigorous diplomatic security roles in the national, regional and global arenas. The Sydney Statement particularly highlighted Australia's distinctive contributions in developing its political and economic ties with Asia–Pacific states via the development of strong bilateral relationships and its strong participation in such regional institutions as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). American officials have also extended their support to Australia's continued leadership role within the Five Power Defence Arrangements (involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom), its initiative to forge a bilateral security treaty with Indonesia in December 1995, its activities in the South Pacific Forum and, most recently, its spearheading of the Intervention Forces in East Timor (INTERFET). Such American praise underscores an often understated but critical difference between ANZUS and the MST. US–Japan security relations are often defined in terms of how Japan should define and limit its 'proper' security role within the context of alliance relations. Australian–US consultations are often characterised either by the Americans praising Australian security contributions at all levels or urging its Australian ally to do even more. No real strategic constraints are tied into the public rhetoric associated with ANZUS; the MST must inevitably come to

terms with how Japan is inhibited by its national identity as something other than a 'normal power' with little sovereign discretion on how to project power autonomously.

Fourth (and extending the previous point made above) are Australian–American pronouncements in an alliance context of precisely how ANZUS can be strengthened through the expansion and enhancement of overt military cooperation between the two allies. US–Japan defence cooperation has also become far more comprehensive in recent years but with much less fanfare. Recent ANZUS initiatives include the inauguration of *Tandem Thrust*, a large-scale military exercise first conducted in early 1997 and integrating 21,500 American and 5,700 Australian forces into interoperable units operating under intense combat conditions. Indeed, this exercise comprised the largest joint military manoeuvres between the two countries since the end of the second world war. Separate and smaller military exercises were also accelerated. US Marines, including those stationed in Okinawa, now regularly deploy in Australia's Northern Territory (six times a year) to exercise with their Australian counterparts. The American use of the joint facility at Pine Gap was recently extended until the year 2008. That facility has assumed many of the early warning intelligence functions previously carried out at Nurrungar which was closed in 2000. Similarly, the revised Japan–US Defense Cooperation Guidelines were designated as facilitating the preparedness and readiness of Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF) for meeting emergencies in areas surrounding Japan and as complementing a new Japan–US Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that would strengthen the two allies' logistical coordination. But these measures were tempered by a contraction of the US basing operations in Okinawa—a response to the political sensitivities of the local populace rather than to the primarily technological factors that had been applied to justify the shutdown of Nurrungar. With George W. Bush's accession to power, however, the United States may well effect a contraction of US forces in East Asia based more on its own policy interests and preferences (Armitage *et al.* 2000).

Two different anchors

The policy adjustments described above took place at a time of significant structural changes in the Asia–Pacific's balance of power: the rise of China as a major regional power, the ascension of economics as a key security determinant and the testing of sovereign legitimacy within the boundaries of many Asia–Pacific states that had decolonised during the postwar era. What remained consistent was that despite pressures in both Australia and Japan to 'do more' in terms of building up their own self-defence capabilities, both allies ultimately remained dependent on US power for their own survival in conditions of general war. Nevertheless, both of these American allies also tried to advance their preferences for becoming more autonomous and independent within the confines of their respective alliance relationships. They did so by pursuing diplomatic strategies of engagement throughout the region. Australia concentrated on South-east Asia and the South Pacific while Japan focused on both North-East Asia and South-east Asia.

Within this general context, there were, of course, basic differences in how the two countries moved to reinforce their status as strategic and diplomatic 'anchors'. Historical and identity factors clearly played a role as well in both cases.

Australians, for example, have never fought against Americans but have been 'comrades in arms' during four major wars fought in this century (the two world wars, Korea and Vietnam). The Japanese did fight against American troops in the second world war, but, as will be noted below, quickly adapted to postwar realities and embraced 'the American century' following their defeat. Australians have thus enjoyed a 'cultural comfort zone' with the US that Japan has not.

Australians have retained the mentality of thinking about security issues globally and in terms of what military action Australia can take. This is arguably one of the historical legacies from Great Britain of which Australia was a colonial and commonwealth affiliate for a long time. This mind-set has been retained with Australia being a dependent ally of the United States since 1951 (Bell 1988). One can recall Prime Minister John Howard's words to the effect that Australia was acting as a 'deputy sheriff' for the United States when Australia sent its forces to East Timor under United Nations auspices. By contrast, Japan, since 1945, has adopted the posture of staying out of wars and conflicts, delegating to the United States the responsibility of defending its own national security. The Japanese electorate has thus never been at ease with manufacturing, exporting or using weapons. Japanese have been more inclined to think about security issues in terms of international stability and market access.

Moreover, there still seems to be one unsettled aspect in Japan's and Australia's thinking about each other. Australians, for example, have still not come to terms with Japan as part of a larger challenge of coming to terms with Asia as a whole. Australia did, of course, conclude a security treaty with Indonesia as an effort to demonstrate its own 'Asia-centric' security credentials. But it does not view Japan and South Korea as virtual allies of its own. This is not necessarily a precondition of effective alliance cooperation. After all, Japan and South Korea are not quite at ease with the image of a virtual triangular alliance featuring the United States, Japan and South Korea (Inoguchi 1999; Cha 2000). There is instead, from the Australian vantage point, a clear demarcation drawn between Australia and the rest of Asia as participants in the American-managed regional alliance network (Dibb 2000).

Australians also see the US–Japan Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program, undertaken by mutual agreement between the two countries in 1998, as best pursued by the mounting of TMD on US ships. They worry about Japanese TMD-capable vessels provoking China, especially if such ships were to be deployed near Taiwan. A related Australian concern is that Japanese forces are not regarded as yet able to deploy or operate cutting-edge weapons systems or to do so with sufficient interoperability relative to US forces deployed in North-East Asia (Harris and Cooper 2000).

Japan entertains some reservations about Australian intentions and strategic behaviour but they are more suppressed. It senses that the West may be 'striking back' at Asia on the wave of that region's financial crisis for challenging Western

demands that democratisation in their region proceed according to Western pre-scriptions (L. H. L. Ling, forthcoming). On the other hand, Tokyo welcomed Australia sending its forces to East Timor to neutralise the clearly genocidal actions occurring there and as an example of the need to implement human security through humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances. This was a case where the imperatives of international security and order clearly superseded the self-inter-ested motivations usually associated with relative gains strategy and of positioning oneself within alliance politics.

A key factor for realising greater comfort and more systematic collaboration between the two anchors, then, will be how successful both Australia and Japan are in reconciling their history and identities. Australians still appear caught between departing Europe and entering Asia. They have retained historical memories of and affinities towards Britain and (more generally) West Europeans. Yet these images have negative as well as positive connotations. After all, the Japanese take-over of Singapore occurred in 1941 despite Australia's strong dissent—a warning not to underestimate Japanese military power. During the Cold War, the British withdrew from 'East of Suez' despite all the sacrifices their Australian brethren had made since the first world war. The British refusal to assist Australia's early postwar attempts to develop nuclear weapons despite Canberra's fears that such weapons were needed in an increasingly conflict-prone Asia still grates upon Australian sensitivities (Reynolds 2001). So too does Britain joining the European Community which turned out to be a fortress against Australian grain and meat imports. In short, Australians have increasingly wanted to say 'farewell' to Europe.

But entering Asia has been far from easy. Australia's 'Engage Asia' school has been somewhat overwhelmed by the 'Good Ally of the United States' faction in Australian politics in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. This change took place shortly after John Howard's Coalition government assumed power. A similar pattern was discernible in 1945 when Japan attempted to detach it-self from Asia in favour of entering the West. The Japanese have since retained memories of their experiences with the Asian continent over the past century with somewhat negative overtones. After all, the Japanese foray into the Asian continent from 1894 to 1945 led Japan to a calamity. Just as it has not been easy for Australia to enter Asia, Japan's quest to gain entree into Western circles has not been so easy. Accordingly, a 'Japan in Asia' school of thought has been regaining strength in Japan, especially after perceptions hardened over the West's (and mainly the United States') seemingly exploitive or opportunistic behaviour during the financial crisis. By the West 'coming back' to Asia, I mean that Western capital has made a 'forward deployment' of sorts (increased direct investment) in the Asia–Pacific in the wake of that financial imbroglio and that the US has elicited greater strategic compliance from most Asia–Pacific govern-ments in the wake of two quasi-coercive diplomatic episodes in the mid-1990s: the North Korean confrontation in 1993–1994 and the Taiwan strait confrontation in 1995–1996.

Looking ahead

It is very clear from the brief survey of Australian–Japanese relations offered above that Australia and Japan have been two dependent allies of the United States for half a century. Yet the story of how Australia and Japan have been interacting with each other still needs some amplification. In the era of 'uni-multi-polarity' (to use the words of Samuel Huntington), the story of how 'dependent allies' do, and do not, communicate and coordinate with each other is important and must be examined. I focus here on how the ANZUS Treaty may affect security politics in North-East Asia. I do so by examining the following four topics: (1) the impact of the ANZUS Treaty on Japanese calculations and policies in regard to Indonesia; (2) China and TMD; (3) China and Taiwan; and (4) the revised US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines as they affect regional alliance planning and operations.

The impact of the ANZUS treaty on security politics in South-east and North-East Asia waxes and wanes. Australians were part of the Allied Powers occupying Japan in 1945–1952. As mentioned above, Australians fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Americans in the Korean War of 1950–1953. They did so again in Vietnam during 1968–1973. Australian forces also participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1991–1993—their first visible deployment in Asia following the Vietnam disaster (Findlay 1994; Doyle 1995). Japan accepted Australian military intervention in this case because Japan via UN and regional diplomacy initiated the UNTAC process and because the UNTAC consisted of a fairly large number of countries.

Australian troops spearheading the Intervention Force in East Timor (INTER-FET) was another matter. While the East Timor operation represented merely one of several Australian peace keeping operations (PKOs) in such places as Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and extra-regional PKO contributions in such locales as Kosovo and Palestine, Tokyo could hardly watch Indonesia's territorial sovereign authority challenged so directly by Australia and other parties (notwithstanding the Habibie government's willingness to hold a free and fair election in that troubled province under UN auspices and its acquiescence to INTERFET when the situation in East Timor eroded beyond Indonesia's own ability to reverse it). It should be noted that despite such concerns, Japan, ultimately, welcomed Australian leadership in INTERFET given that Japan was only able to send a handful of civilians for non-combat purposes to facilitate East Timor's difficult transition to independence.

Of longer-range concern to Japanese policy-makers was what implications the INTERFET episode might have for future Indonesian unity and overall regional stability (Matsui 1999; Shiraishi 2000). East Timor's move toward independence coincided more or less with an intensification of those secessionist voices coming from Irian Jaya and Aceh within Indonesia. If that country fragmented, what would become of ASEAN itself? Irian Jaya could well provide the next test and there is a linkage in this situation to the strategic context of Australian–Japanese relations as well. If Irian Jaya, the inhabitants of which are predominantly Christian (along with the East Timorese), achieves independence the previous dormant Japanese

apprehensions about Australia's strategic role in the South-East Asian/South Pacific 'arc of crisis' might intensify. Japan would be reminded sharply of Australia's predominant position and presence in that vast area of which East Timor and an independent Irian Jaya (West Papua New Guinea) are integral components. AS-EAN would hardly be in any position to counterbalance this trend unless it could rebound more quickly from the effects of Suharto's last troubled years in Indonesia, the negative economic consequences of the Asian financial crisis and the difficult processes of adjustment related to admitting the Indochinese states and Myanmar into the Association. South-East Asia has yet to define—much less shape—a new regional identity and order of its own. Without doing so, it will be unable to interact with a more self-confident Australia or, if need be, balance it in geographic areas of common concern. Indeed, an enfeebled and crippled ASEAN would lead to substantial changes in Japanese strategic calculations underlying its own Asian diplomacy. Over the short term, however, Japan has been content to busy itself with constructing a new supplementary structure of money and currency in the Asia–Pacific region, enabling regional governments to cope better with sudden and massive short-term capital flows (Inoguchi forthcoming).

For its part, Australia has had a deep interest in the perpetuation of a calm and yet prosperous North-East Asia. Yet the current situation there does not necessarily elicit confidence in regional stability over the more distant future. If one is an Australian 'pessimist', North-East Asia's political environment has elements not all that dissimilar to those that marked the region in 1900. China, for example, is troubled by deep-seated political corruption. Chinese leaders have no other course of response or basis of legitimacy than to resort to chauvinistic policies and to moralising rhetoric. The dissidence of organised religions like Falun Gong, said to boast a membership of 70 million, has alarmed the Chinese leadership immensely. Such dissent has recently been manifested in collective suicides as a means of protest against the Chinese government in Tiananmen Square in January 2001 (*Asahi Shimbun* 2001a). By way of comparison, a religious dissident organisation called the *Yihetuan* (Boxers) crippled Peking in 1900, precipitating military intervention by major external powers.

Australia must also be concerned that Japan has been in recession too long, undercutting trade growth and, more importantly over time, entrenching Japan's political drift and inaction in ways that increase the danger that any resultant frustrations will be directed outward. This has been evinced by Governor Shintaro Ishihara's intermittent anti-American and anti-Chinese statements expressed at Davos and elsewhere (*Asahi Shimbun* 2001b).

Quite aside from these dour indices, Australia has an interest in keeping Japan and China friendly toward each other as it shares the view enunciated by Deng Xiaoping that one half of heaven would fall down if China and Japan waged war yet again. The Howard government actually has been quite careful, as noted above, in lending qualified support to the US–Japanese agreement on the TMD program and it hardly favours the triggering of an arms race between the US–Japan alliance and China.

Nor does Australia wish to see Japan become technologically too sophisticated

as a co-implementer of the TMD program's research and development (R&D) base. Although the United States has not said so explicitly, it intends first to obtain financial commitments from Japan for the whole TMD program and only later to restrain Japan from further development of the most advanced components of that technology for its own strategic purposes. The precedent for this policy approach is the co-development of the Fighter Support X in the 1980s (Inoguchi 1991). In relation to this factor, one program which Japan's SDF has budgeted for development in 2001 and which might invite Washington's objection at a later stage is an intermediate-sized transport vessel which could be used for a small-scale aircraft carrier. How Australia might have a policy impact on this dimension of Japan's TMD is difficult to say. The new defence strategy outlined by President Bush in the near future will be decisive in determining the modality of TMD's R&D (Lindsay and O'Hanlon 2001).

On the China–Taiwan issue, both Australia and Japan have been more or less pursuing the same position—a 'one China policy' broadly in harmony with that observed by the United States and by China itself. Like Washington, Japan and Australia extend moral support to democracy in Taiwan. But Japan and Australia do differ on various and significant aspects of the Taiwan issue. Australia places itself in a position of not ruling out the alignment of its military capabilities with the United States in the event of Beijing trying to forcibly unify Taiwan. Japan, as it stands, cannot do this constitutionally. From Australia's 'worst case' viewpoint, Japan's posture may become more problematic in the future as anti-American and anti-Chinese public opinion in Japan has been steadily on the rise (although neither has thus far represented the majority view). How the new Bush Administration positions itself on this issue is going to be a priority item for both Australia's and Japan's policy formulation. If the Japanese choose to move ahead in revising their national constitution to enable their Self Defence Forces to act like those of a 'normal power's' in five to ten years time, then Australia would be more likely to encourage Japan to adopt 'global-oriented' rather than 'region-centric' force postures (i.e. peace keeping missions over deterring China). This could also be translated as an Australian effort to preclude Japan from re-orienting its military power southward on the pretext of deterring growing Chinese offshore military capabilities and, incidentally, presenting Australian policy planners with a new and complex power factor in the arc of crisis area.

In terms of facilitating security-related dialogues and confidence building among actors in the region, Australia, along with Canada, have been quite pro-active and resourceful in promoting multilateral diplomacy. Australia has initiated bilateral dialogues like the annual Canberra–Tokyo and Canberra–Beijing talks and has also supported multilateral processes like the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (among Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom), APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Although broadly pro-American, Australia wants to be seen as being more or less autonomous and independent, as a middle power. It views its own diplomatic strength as being situated half way between great power and small power interests and thus an actor that presumably understands both lines of thinking. Like Singapore, Australia in the APEC and the

ARF often uses its English proficiency in drafting initiatives, communiques or minutes for an entire organisation, thereby enhancing its own diplomatic influence in the region. However, Australia's strengths within and service to Asia–Pacific institutions may be scaled down somewhat if the new Bush administration prefers traditional bilateral alliance politics to the multilateral approach and chooses to engage non-allies in the region less vigorously than did the Clinton administration.

Finally, the revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines, reviewed initially in 1996 and passed by the Japanese Diet in 1999, achieved something tangible in terms of enhancing Japan's strategic preparedness under emergency conditions. With regard to this issue, the Armitage Report (Armitage *et al.* 2000) advocated that Japan further enhance its military readiness. The report was particularly concerned that Japan seems to have shifted from an initial redefinitionist (revisionist) posture when the Guidelines were first reviewed to a subsequent reaffirmist or status quo posture some three years later. If so, it means that those who favour greater preparedness appear to have lost ground in recent debates over how far Japan can go militarily and logistically in assisting the United States in future regional crises. One specific recommendation advanced by the report suggested that Japanese bureaucratic and parliamentary paralysis during such crises needed to be avoided. This could be circumvented by the US upgrading its intelligence-sharing by means of disseminating intelligence and consulting actively not only with the Japanese Prime Minister and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also with key Japanese parliamentarians. By doing so, the National Diet would find it harder to undermine enhanced defence cooperation with the US. As the Bush administration's new Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage will have much to do with shaping US security policy toward Japan from the inside. If he can institute such measures as those stipulated above, the implications for military readiness in an alliance context would be significant.

As importantly, both the US and Japan need to make more efficient use of Japanese military bases. In this sense, reductions of US military personnel stationed in the region in tandem with altered force missions and structures could be highly significant for both future Australian and Japanese force planning (US Commission on National Security/21st Century 2001). A possible shift of US Marine units from Camp Butler and other sites in Okinawa (in 1999 there were over 20,000 US Marines and sailors still stationed on Okinawa) to Australian locations, for example, has been proposed by some American strategic analysts as a means of dispersing US amphibious assault capabilities more efficiently in line with gaining 'a useful hub for operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as well as virtually unlimited amounts of space for training'. Moreover, the Marine Corps expects its future combat mission to be characterised increasingly by urban operations throughout the world's littoral and these could 'just as easily be on the Indian subcontinent or Indonesia as in North-East Asia' (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 1998). Such arguments were rejected by US force planners in 1996 after the Howard government extended an offer to provide basing and training facilities but a similar Australian offer may be more attractive if political tensions over US forces stationed in Okinawa continue or intensify in future years.

Conclusion

Australia and Japan have registered a dramatic shift in their mutual security relationship—from an initial [Australian] 'cap on the bottle' outlook emphasising US occupation of and control over Japan to one in which Japan and Australia are viewed as the two 'anchors in the Pacific' for US strategy and forward force projection. Whether these two 'anchors' will begin to coordinate their strategies more systematically via their respective alliance with the United States is uncertain. Yet it is clear that both Australia and Japan have much in common in seeking security and prosperity in the Asia–Pacific region in broad concert with the United States. It appears unlikely that their respective strategies would diverge greatly from the basic policy line of the remaining two benchmarks for US regional defence strategy.

Although the 'cap on the bottle' school of thought may still exist within certain sectors of the Australian political environment (such as in Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party), the two anchors policy faction is clearly prevalent as we move further into a new century. This will continue to be the case, despite occasional dissent generated by the likes of Ishihara or Hanson. Nor does it appear likely that any effort by China or (less likely) by a more unified and assertive ASEAN would succeed in permanently dividing the Australian–Japanese tandem. Any Japanese apprehensions about Australian influence over the arc of crisis appear manageable given the bilateral and multilateral consultation mechanisms that have been initiated and that have matured substantially over time. This last factor solidifies the linking of Australian and Japanese interests to those of their common American superpower ally. The American connection should remain too strong for any regionally based attempt to break the anchors apart by tactics of 'divide and rule' to prevail. The risks for either Australia or Japan to adopt any independent strategy that eschews that kind of relationship with Washington and the strengthening of politico-security ties with each other are too great to be credible.

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