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## The Personalization of Politics: Koizumi and Japanese Politics

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### 1. Introduction

The personalization of politics is defined as the salience of factors that emphasize individuals rather than organizations primarily in the context of national politics. In the context of subnational politics, individuals do often play an important role as the size of political units are not very large. In the context of national politics, individuals are normally placed in the institutional processes and thus the salience of factors that stress individuals is not normally exceedingly high. The personalization of politics I deal with in this chapter means the personalization of politics in the national context as revealed in Japan at the dawn of this century. To anticipate what follows, its key features are summarized as follows: (1) increasing attention of citizens to personal appeals and styles of political leaders; (2) gradual decomposition of interest organizations and associations and other nationally organized groups into fragmented and loosely organized individuals; and (3) advances of digital and televisual communications and interactions in politics. In what follows, I first explain the predecessor of the personalization of politics, i.e., the nationalization of politics. It enables readers to comprehend the large trend of politics as unfolding in the last and this centuries. Second, I turn to the personalization of politics in the Japanese context focusing on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (r.2001-2006). Third, I examine the personal power of the leader inside the party. Fourth, I examine the external power of the leader. Lastly, I make concluding remarks.

### 2. The Nationalization of Politics

The personalization of politics is not a new phenomenon. Against the background of the intense nationalization of politics in the 19th and 20th centuries, it is often felt anew. The nationalization of politics in Japan in two steps, in early modern and modern periods. (1) First, in 1534 a Portuguese ship landed on a southernmost island of Japan. Stunned by the might of a gun, its lord, Tokitaka, the Lord of Tanegashima, was able to get guns manufactured in his domain. Japan was amidst the warring period where each domain was fighting each other to militarily unify the country. Guns were quick to be manufactured and diffused in Japan. This

was one of the first steps of nationalization of Japanese politics. Nobunaga, a warlord known for his intense drive to unify the country, was the very person who utilized massive guns in a most innovative and systematic way to smash his rivals armed with the medieval style of fighting, horses, arrows and swords. He almost achieved his ambition in 1582 when he was assassinated in his midway. The first absolutist potentials were thus buried overnight. As a matter of fact, Nobunaga had much in common with Elizabeth I of the Tudor dynasty in England. First, medieval politics was centrifugal in both societies. Both aimed at establishing absolutism of sorts. Elizabeth succeeded whereas Nobunaga floundered in his midway. Second, religious conflicts permeated both societies. Elizabeth I created the Anglican Church and put an end to the fight between Catholics and non-Catholics. Nobunaga massacred militant Buddhist monks near Kyoto, then the capital of Japan. Third, both wanted to enhance revenue sources by encouraging foreign trade. There since Japan and England trod very different paths. But guns and Nobunaga paved the way for Japan to precipitate the nationalization of politics. Centrifugal medieval forces were so strong in Japan that two actions were necessary for Japan to establish the first nationalization, early modern style. First, external military campaigns to Korea were necessary to satisfy those warlords now working under the umbrella of Nobunaga's successor, Hideyoshi. Second, the major battle was necessary to determine Hideyoshi's successor, the victor of the battle in 1600, Ieyasu. The nationalization of politics, early modern style, was achieved by the military dominance of the Tokugawa shogunate, the monopolization of foreign trade and other interactions only to the Tokugawa, and the provision of autonomy to 300 odd domains in Japan. The nationalization of the economy was almost complete before the quasi-nationalization of politics. The technology of civil engineering in the construction of roads, bridges, ports and tariff ports was sufficiently high. Demographic and economic development precipitated the nationalization of transport and commerce.

The second phase of the nationalization of Japanese politics came in 1853.(2) The coercive diplomacy of the United States navy led the country to open itself to Western powers in 1853. In 1861 the commercial treaties were also concluded with Western powers. To meet the Western challenge, the Meiji Restoration took place in 1868 with the Tokugawa shogunate abolished and with the Emperor at Kyoto now ruling from Tokyo under which the modernizing government centralized power. The Tokugawa shogunate was hegemonic over 300 odd domains where autonomous power was enjoyed in each domain. Shortly after the Meiji Restoration all the Tokugawa and 300 odd domains were abolished and 50 odd prefectures were laid with their governors appointed by the central government.

Furthermore, the four class distinction, warriors, peasants, artisans and merchants in this order, was abolished shortly after that. Most negatively affected were warriors since they produced

nothing unlike the other three classes. Many of them sought to serve the country by providing bureaucratic service. Before meritocratically oriented bureaucracy was born, the leaders of the Meiji Restoration had to recruit bureaucrats from among like-minded men, meaning literally those unemployed warriors from the same domain. Hence the colonization of each bureaucratic agency by old domains. The Army was colonized by the Choshu domain; the Navy was by the Satsuma domain, the Accounting office was by the Nabeshima domain; the Police was by the Higo and Aizu Wakamatsu domains, etc. While the strong central bureaucracy under the Imperial Constitution modeled after Prussia was inevitable, and its centrifugal tendency was almost inevitable by the contingency of the abolishment of domains and warriors. They took refuge in newly created bureaucratic agencies by the same old principle of cronyism when meritocracy was yet to be born and when schools for producing bureaucratic elites were yet to be born. Rich country and strong army was an immediate slogan of the Meiji Restoration. Enlightenment and entrepreneurship was another. In doing all this the nationalization of politics was further accelerated.

However, the centralization of power was impeded constitutionally on a crucial point. Although the Emperor was Constitutionally sacrosanct, many actors were placed in a position to influence him: the Cabinet, the House of Peers, the House of Representatives, the Privy Council, the Imperial Army, the Imperial Navy, political parties, and all other actors. The Cabinet was one of them. Furthermore Prime Minister was only slightly more than a *primus inter pares* in the Cabinet. The Cabinet held the Constitutional principle of consensus; which means in effect that a cabinet minister's dissent from Prime Minister was sufficient to topple the Cabinet. Furthermore each minister carried under him each bureaucratic agency, whose autonomy and power were extraordinary, as explained above. Therefore the nationalization of politics was not at all thorough. And the centripetal tendency remains till today as the legacy of how the Meiji Restoration was carried out and how the Imperial Constitution was drafted.

The third phase of the nationalization of politics came with the war execution and economic recovery from the devastating defeat.(3) Both war execution and recovery from the defeat needed the centralization of power. The Japanese economic system since the Meiji Restoration was rather of laissez faire type contrary to the image of 'rich country and strong army' conveyed. The lack of tariff autonomy placed on Japan by Western powers in 1858 reigned the Japanese economy until 1911. That was the time of free trade in the Western sense of the word. For instance, British cotton cloth should have penetrated the Japanese market since it was of high quality and reasonably priced. Yet Japanese stuck to those cotton cloth traditionally manufactured at home and did not swing immediately to British cotton cloth. Meanwhile Japanese cotton industry developed and started to produce cotton cloth as good as British around World War One. Unable to resort to state protectionism in cotton cloth industry,

Japan executed market oriented industrialization. Initially established state enterprises were soon privatized. Initially massively hired foreign engineers were disemployed after *bumi putra* Japanese engineers were born one after another. This market oriented economy was not in perfect harmony with the centralization of power and the nationalization of politics. Hence it was only in the 1930s and 1940s that the centralization of power and the nationalization of politics accelerated in tandem with the advancement of world protectionism and war economy. It is called state developmentalism. Destined to be a late comer, Japan perhaps should have practiced state developmentalism from the beginning. But that was not the case. Free trade reigned supreme in the Western sense. Only when tariff autonomy was achieved and only when world protectionism prevailed, Japan assiduously practiced state developmentalism. (4) State developmentalism was interrupted by World War Two but was resumed immediately after the defeat under the occupation of Allied Powers. Such economic ministries as the Economic Stabilization Board, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance --and their predecessors and successors--acquired and exercised enormous power under state developmentalism in the 1930s through the 1970s. The Allied occupation purged major actors and institutions politically tainted for their wartime activities. This has made the Japanese state slightly more centralized without having the absolute sovereignty with the Emperor and those imperial actors like the Army, the Navy, the Privy Council, and the House of Peers. Constitutionally as well, Prime Minister has gained more power vis-à-vis cabinet ministers and the National Diet. Thus the heydays of state developmentalism in the third quarter of the last century the nationalization of politics reached its peak on the basis of the nationalization of the economy.

The personalization of politics comes back only after the nationalization of politics was heightened in tandem with the formation of the nation states, the national economy and national culture in many parts of the world, most notably in Western Europe and North America. Political parties were in a sense the product of the nationalization of politics in the 19th and 20th centuries. (5) What we are witnessing is the personalization of politics in an era of globalization. Globalization is a brutal force, weakening the national organic unity of the economy, politics and culture, and slowly but steadily shaping the global economy, governance and culture in a hybrid form. Since the national economic unity has been eroding, the dynamics of class formation has been changing from economic and social differentiation to individualized lifestyle and belief differentiation.(6) To advance clearly identifiable class and sectoral interests and ideologies, one needed the political agencies. One of the instruments was a political party. In other words, political parties were constructed at the time of the nationalization of politics. One of the key factors of how political parties have been losing the erstwhile solid organizational and programmatic features is the loosening of classes, sectors and other nationally self-sufficient bodies. Many of them have lost unity and solidarity

on a national scale. Many of them have been globalized. What has emerged instead is the personalization of politics. Even if political parties do exist, their roles and functions have been changing steadily. One cannot spend time comfortably by relying on organizations. Electorates have been increasingly individualized and atomized, and floating and flowing, departing from their blocs of erstwhile ancestral class- or religion- or ethnicity- or interest- or belief- or area-based preferences. What is increasingly evident is that electorates throw their support to those leaders who are adept at swimming in the sea of uncertainties. Japan's representative case is Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister between 2001 and 2006, who has demonstrated that he is distinctively not one of those politicians who are consensus-based in decision making, district-oriented in terms of primary attention, and respectful to bureaucrats. He disregards consensus; he pays little attention to his district; he despises bureaucrats. He is a *rara avis* in Japanese politics.

### 3. The Personalization of Politics

Against the historical background of the nationalization of politics, I now turn to the personalization of politics. I will deal with Japan. The leader I deal with is Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister and President of the Liberal Democratic Party, 2001-2006.

#### 3.1. Biography of Koizumi

Koizumi is a *rara avis* in Japanese politics. (7) First of all, he is a lonely wolf, sort of. He belonged to the Fukuda faction like his father and, before he was elected as a member of the House of Representatives, as Fukuda's secretary. But he was not an active member at all. Particularly, he did not like meetings or dining with fellow politicians. He does not conspire with fellow politicians very much. He acts alone. When he dined collectively, he was most of the time with his secretaries. When he dined, his subjects tend to be non-political. For example, when a lunch menu was salmon, he asked why the Pacific salmon comes back to a home river two years after while the Atlantic salmon comes back to a home river one year after. He likes to reach conclusions alone without consulting anybody. Koizumi surprises are normal because he keeps everything in his mind until the last moment when he takes action. For example, when he was Health and Welfare Minister, a certain pharmaceutical hazard had not been acknowledged as such by the Ministry of Health and Welfare for long despite the local court rulings that the Japanese government was guilty. When the higher court ruling came out to the effect that the Japanese government was guilty, the Ministry decided to bring the judgment to the Supreme Court. But Minister Koizumi, overriding the Ministry's preference, dramatically announced that the government was guilty and that the government accepted the higher court judgment immediately. He overrode the bureaucratic decisions

sometimes when he disagrees, like the pharmaceutical decision. He did not want to create his followers. After 5 years of Prime Ministership, he was alone. He was uneasy and did not speak much in meetings or during dinner. He did not spend time in his district. He does not bring pork barrels to his district. Unlike former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, whose power came from the barrel of pork to the districts, Koizumi is not interested. His district looks shabby and is not filled with shining and dense road networks, let alone with bullet trains. He does not amass his fortunes. He does not seek political donations very much. His political money account is of small scale, collecting 100,000 yen a month from 200 odd companies a year.

He divorced from his wife early in his career. Almost through his career, one of Koizumi's three elder sisters, Nobuko, who has also been single, and Koizumi's right hand arm, Isao Iijima, carry out what must be carried out as secretaries of a politician for him. They have three sons the last of whom was born after his parents divorced. Koizumi raised two sons alone. The eldest is a film actor. The second will succeed his father who will not seek his reelection in 2008 or in 2009 when his term ends. He returned earlier in 2008 as a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Washington, D.C.

Junichiro Koizumi's father was a member of the House of Representatives and Defense Minister briefly in the 1970s and his grandfather was a member of the House of Representatives before World War II. His father was married with a daughter of Koizumi's grandfather. Koizumi's, his father's and his grandfather's district is Yokosuka, a naval port near Tokyo, where the United States navy has its largest facilities in East Asia. Koizumi was studying in London at the London School of Economics after graduating from Keio University. By his peers or mentors at Keio University, he is not remembered well for his diligence or interest in economics. Upon his father's sudden demise, he returned to Tokyo and stood for election to succeed his father in his district. He was humiliated and started to work at his father's factional boss, Yasuo Fukuda, who later became Prime Minister. He commuted to Fukuda's house daily despite its long commuting time, 1.5 hours every morning from Yokosuka. Once he was elected in his father's and his grandfather's district, he started to exhibit his distinctive style.

Koizumi's curriculum vitae was not full of positions he occupied in the Party or in the government. He was Health and Welfare Minister and Post Minister. He stood three times for the Party's presidential election without strong backing by any faction or other kinds of grouping. Until 1993 most Japanese prime ministers experienced a number of important party executive and cabinet minister's positions. His party executive positions were far less major than any prime ministers experienced. His cabinet position was only three times, i.e., the

minister for health and welfare (twice) and the minister for postal service. Internationally, he did not hold any positions or play any roles except as a deputy or as a secretary to his bosses like Prime Minister Fukuda. Koizumi is a man of pithy words. In press conference, which he held twice a day, his style is casual but filled with well calculated, pithy sentences. They were sometimes like haiku. To exaggerate, if Tony Blair's response has 20 sentences per unit time, Junichiro Koizumi's response has two sentences. He has never been regarded as a man of books. Reading or writing books is not something he particularly likes. He hates reading briefing documents. His calligraphy is not bad, though, conveying his willful, forceful and adroit style. He hates his bureaucrats cautioning his policy line and thus brusquely notes, "That's irrelevant." He hates his secretaries asking for details of what he regards minor things by saying "I leave it entirely to you." (8).

Before his rise to Prime Ministership, his positions in the opinion polls were not bad. But after taking office, his popularity surged to as high as 78 percent. When he sacked popular female Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, his popularity dropped considerably. But it recovered soon and continuously held the high popularity (50 percent on average) until his departure in October 2006. His district is his kingdom since his grandfather. That is why he does not spend much time in it and why he does not bring back pork barrels to it. Therefore patronage and clientelism seem to have been remote to him.

### 3.2. Who Exemplify the Personalization of Politics Other Than Koizumi?

The key features of the personalization of politics are (1) increasing attention of citizens to leaders' appeals and styles; (2) increasing decomposition of organized groups into fragmented and loosely organized individuals; (3) increasing importance of digital and televisual communications and interactions with citizens. Looking through the post-1945 prime ministers of Japan, Koizumi is the best fit with these three key features. Who else? Shigeru Yoshida (four times between 1946 and 1954), Kakuei Tanaka (1972-1974), Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), and Morihiro Hosokawa (1993-1994), Shinzo Abe (2006-2007), and Taro Aso (2008-) are examined one by one. Yoshida, a key player of Japanese politics in the period of the Allied Powers' occupation (1945-1952) and a tough individualist acting during the wartime for peace against the Tojo-led government, was not very popular. He was aristocratic and very loyal to the Emperor, always signing as His Majesty's subject, Shigeru. Comparing opinion polls of all the prime ministers since 1945 places him in the lower half on average. He relied for his power internally on his Liberal Party and bureaucratic agencies including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where Yoshida spent his former career and externally on the United States government. He was dismissive of mass media reportings of him. So clearly he does not fit the picture of the personalization. Tanaka was very popular



until he was disgraced by his scandals. He was a self-made man and climbed up the ladder from a modest background. His book, *Reconstructing the Japanese Archipelagoes*, was a best seller, detailing his policy platform in a most visual fashion. But his power derived internally from his Liberal Democratic Party and bureaucratic agencies and externally from popular grass roots level support who enjoyed his pork barrel expenditures. Though he had a charismatic appeal and populist flavor, he does not fit the picture of the personalization of politics because ultimately he relied on organizations. Although Nakasone was a populist leader, waving the Japanese national flag in his first election campaign in 1946 arguing against the Occupation by the United States, he did not fit the picture of the personalization of politics. He was a good player of organizations and attentive to the power of mass media. He was known for the first Japanese prime minister who was at ease with being photographed next to US President. His power ultimately derived from organizations, however. Hosokawa fits the picture of the personalization of politics. He was governor of Kumamoto prefecture for ten years before he embarked on national politics. Amidst a chorus against the corrupt and incompetent government by the Liberal Democratic Party in the late 1980s and in early 1990s Hosokawa built a new party on which he rode successfully into Prime Minister's position in 1993. His mobilization of grass roots level support and mass media were most impressive. He was charismatic, stylish and youngish. He called for re-inventing Japan. It was an astounding achievement. He is from an aristocratic family with his uncle being Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe (1891-1945) who committed suicide when he was called upon by the Occupation authorities for suspected war crimes. He resigned abruptly after less than a year in power. Since then he left politics and has been immersed in pottery art. Abe fits the picture of the personalization of politics to a certain extent. He was Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party when Koizumi was Prime Minister who visited Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in 2002 and 2004 to resolve an array of problems including those abducted by North Korea. Abe criticized Koizumi who was about to give his signature to the Pyongyang communiqué between him and Kim Jong Il in which both resolved to move forward toward the diplomatic normalization of both countries resolving a number of issues standing before them including the abductees issue. Abe took the position that without complete resolution of the abductees issue there should be no diplomatic normalization. Abe got instantaneously very popular at home. Anticipating Koizumi's end of his terms (two terms successively in the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party), Abe mobilized his followers outmaneuvering his rivals. He became Prime Minister on the basis of the making the issue popular. But he is not particularly charismatic. He is from a generations long political families with his father being Foreign Minister and his grand father being Prime Minister. He resigned abruptly within one year in power. Prime Minister Taro Aso succeeding Yasuo Fukuda in September 2009 does not quite fit the pattern. At his assumption of his position his popularity was not very high, registering slightly higher than 50%, 10% lower than Fukuda, 15% lower than Abe. To sum up, Koizumi

is the best exemplifier of the personalization of politics in Japan. Next are perhaps Hosokawa and Abe.

#### 4. The Personal Power of the Leader inside the Party

4.1. The major change in party presidential election rules that were inactivated since 1994 is that the electoral college has enlarged to contain local chapter party members in addition to parliamentary members of the party. (9) Prior to that, presidential elections were much more predictable. Given the magnitude of a district ranging from one to five, candidates of the same parties, especially the largest party, the Liberal Democratic Party, belonged to different factions. There were two to three large factions and three to four minor factions reflecting the number of those districts in which those elected range one to five. The rule of thumb in the coalition formation in the presidential election was that of minimum winning coalition. Ideology or policies did not matter much, it seems. After the amendment of party rule in presidential elections, they have become slightly more unpredictable. Votes may swing to more fashionable agenda setters. Votes may be affected much more by TV programs in which candidates are requested to make appeals to audiences and debates with rivals all live. Here TV performance matters immensely. Here Koizumi stood on an advantageous position. He is simple, clear and forceful in making statements.

4.2. The party's direction is constructed by the party. (10) When its President is Prime Minister, which is almost always the case with the Liberal Democratic Party, the party's direction is handled by the three executives: Secretary General, Policy Affairs Council chairman, and General Affairs Council chairman. Secretary General is a key man shaping the party's direction in harmony with that of the cabinet by linking the party to Prime Minister. Policy Affairs Research Council chairman articulates and aggregates the party's interests and ideologies in each committee in close consultation with the bureaucratic agency concerned and business, associational and regional interest representatives so that the party can work at parliamentary sessions most effectively vis-à-vis the opposition. General Affairs Council is the last decision making body of the party. Its decision making principle used to be based on consensus. In other words, one member's dissent from the drafted party line means could destroy the draft concerned and immobilism takes place. But most recently, Koizumi changed the rule dramatically. He used a majority vote in pushing through the postal privatization bill in 2005. Consensus is as anathema to the kind of leadership needed to be intermittently exercised in an era of globalization.

Factions do exist. The presidential election rule prescribes that to become a candidate, it is necessary to obtain at least 20 parliamentary party members' endorsement. Though factions have lost considerable power since 1993, they do matter. To briefly summarize the party's

factional history, the party consisted of two major groups reflecting the history of the party's birth of uniting two center-right parties in 1955. Once developmental momentum and state developmentalism went in tandem with each other, the Tanaka faction swayed. Its platform included high economic growth, vigorous infrastructure construction, increasingly high social policy expenditure, pro-alliance with the United States, moderate defense with non-use of force. Even after both faded in the 1990s, the Tanaka faction or its allies or puppets nearly continuously monopolized Prime Ministership until 2000 although it lost power briefly in 1993-1994. When Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi passed away abruptly in 2000, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was chosen out of the consensus/conspiracy in the dark. Mori resigned in disgrace a year later. The presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party chose Koizumi in an overwhelming fashion. The faction Mori and Koizumi belonged to is the Mori faction, which is the continuation of the Fukuda faction when Tanaka was in his heydays. The Fukuda faction's platform consisted of moderate economic growth, anti-inflation, pro-alliance with the United States, nationalism, and patriotic education. The former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe used to belong to the Mori faction. But Abe departed from the Mori faction in his midway to premiership. The point here is that once one of the two major factional groups took power, it is not uncommon to see broadly the same faction members to continuously capture power. After the loss of power in 1993-1994, both Prime Ministers Ryutaro Hashimoto and Keizo Obuchi belonged to the Takeshita faction along the line of the Tanaka faction. After Obuchi's sudden death, Mori, Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda (Jr) belong to the Fukuda faction or the Mori faction. Though it is not called a faction, the House of Councilors' members of the Liberal Democratic Party keep their presence felt to the much more powerful House of Representatives with its leader Mikio Aoki, who used to belong to the Tanaka faction and who keeps low-profile but is adroit and agile in maneuvering. Aoki has ceased to be leader by the humiliating setback in the House of Councilors elections in 2005. The current Prime Minister Taro Aso belongs to the Kohno faction, but was able to get good support from the Mori faction.

How to handle organized opposition within the party has seen a dramatic change. (11) In the process leading to the party approval of the postal privatization bill to be legislated in 2005, the principle of consensus required to obtain in the Council of General Affairs of the governing party was broken. President Koizumi wanted to pass this last barrier in the governing party removed by adopting the majority vote principle before it was presented to the National Diet. Its major consequence was to prompt organized oppositions to vote against the bill first in the House of Representatives and then in the House of Councilors. The former voted for it whereas the latter against it. Prime Minister Koizumi's immediate action was to call for general election by claiming that if the National Diet as a whole is against Prime Minister Koizumi's preference on the postal privatization bill, he must ask for citizens' votes

for confidence or non-confidence in him. In the process of nominating the governing party's candidates for general election, he expelled from the party all the House of Representatives members who voted against the bill. In the general election most of the expelled members lost the election. One half of those opposed to the privatization bill in the House of Councilors faced the verdict of election in July 2007. At any rate under Koizumi's presidency, how to handle organized oppositions has changed dramatically. Before 2005 organized oppositions normally forced the party leadership to postpone the handling the issue concerned, waving the flag of the revered principle of consensus. If the leadership concedes then organized oppositions often demand further concessions like cabinet reshuffling that would reflect some power reconfiguration.

How to manage organized oppositions depends much on the leader. If the leader depends heavily on the good coalition of relatively cohesive factions, he or she is most likely to resort the consensus approach, not the confrontation approach. If the leader depends much on the good support of public opinion in and outside the party, he or she is most likely to resort to the mobilization approach to the civil society, not the conciliation approach inside the party. The former was adopted by folks like Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi whereas the latter was adopted by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. It looks as if the latter approach were getting more frequently resorted to. The key factors are (1) the steadily felt impacts of the tide of globalization, which among others have been enfeebling interest associations, business firm federations, trade unions, and fragmenting the erstwhile strong economic blocs under state developmentalism and (2) the growing ubiquitous influence of mass media in which the media-savvy presentation of the leader and the party and the positive projection of the party are prerequisites to any success in running the government.

#### 4.2. Internal Support for the Party Leader

Prime Minister Koizumi's power inside the ruling organizations of the party depended critically on his decisively beating other candidates in the party presidential election in 2001. Since he was not a factional leader, he cannot rely on the factional coalition. He must rely on the party's local chapters which constitute one important component of the electoral college in the party presidential election. Local chapters are often regarded by the governing party more or less synonymous with national public opinion. In comparison to former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi who was criticized as being poor in his vocabulary and former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori who was criticized as being improper in using grammatically incorrect adjectives of sorts, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was lucid, pithy and forceful in using words and sentences and giving speeches with moving stories. Party officials are no less important in that they are amplifiers of public opinion as the mediators between party leaders and local chapters.

Parliamentary members of the party are most apprehensive about whether the party leader is weak in the projection of the party in elections. All major forces are reinforcing each other in the direction of the importance of grassroots support and the media-savvy support mobilization. Factions have lost weight, interest associations have lost cohesion, and parliamentary members' grasp of support at grassroots level have lost solidity. To have the leader at the top who fulfill all the requirements is their wish. They want to have an appealing umbrella under which they can win the election not only under the proportional representation scheme but also under the scheme of the single non-transferable vote in the district. In other words, they want their party leader whose coattail effects are the strongest. Coattail effects seem to be amplified in an era of weak bloc voting. Prime Minister Koizumi met all of them. He is slim, single and media-savvy. In mass media, he was called Jun-chan, as if his mother were talking to his son who is achieving something great in public. As a matter of fact, his mobilization of supporters in Metropolitan Tokyo registered a huge number of female electorates by tens of thousands in Shinjuku or Mitaka, or elsewhere.

The governing party and the government in Japan are not as close as they are in the British Westminster system. (12) In the Westminster system they are close to one and united with the party leader being hegemonic. In Japan they are separate. Prime Minister is mostly the chief of the executive with his power heavily relying on central bureaucracy each agency of which claims semi-autonomous power and does not shy away from exercising its power even vis-à-vis Prime Minister if deemed necessary to protect its semi-autonomy. As a matter of fact, when Koizumi was preparing the postal privatization bill, key bureaucrats in charge of the issue were waving the privatization flag in order to oppose the privatization bill, and immediately demoted to obscure positions by Prime Minister Koizumi once spotted out. In the civil service law, no civil servant should not be purged from office. The party's Secretary General is appointed by the party's President who is normally Prime Minister. Secretary General is normally from the same faction with Prime Minister's and expected to bridge the party with Prime Minister. The party interacts heavily with interest associations and grassroots whereas Prime Minister is kept as a hostage, sort of, of central bureaucracy. Thus sometimes some differences of their positions on the controversial issue concerned can be detected by those watchers with discerning eyes. In the 2005 postal privatization bill Prime Minister made it crystal clear that all legislators must be expelled from the party and those who are legitimate candidates of the governing party had voted for the postal privatization bill. Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe merely megaphoned the principle of selection and executed it. The legitimization of candidacy is associated with the public support by the party and the financial support to carry out the campaign.

The leader is inherently reliant on local notables or politicians for their electoral campaign. Local notables are often members of city and prefecture assemblies or mayors or governors, who constitute key pillars of local electoral support. Koizumi's strategy is, however, to penetrate those local notables and politicians directly through his powerful message, not via his potential rivals in the party headquarters. When his rivals are menacing the leader, Koizumi's strategy is to smash them in the head, i.e., expelling them out of the party, thus forcing local chapters to choose the leader, if reluctantly. The leader is sometimes reliant on right wing or left wing militants or extremes or marginals for his or her purpose of achieving his or her policy goals. Koizumi's strategy of keeping extreme right wing support is to pay a visit to the Yasukuni shrine where wardeads are buried including class A war criminals. Each time his message is simple and not implying any nationalistic overtone, i.e., to soothe the souls of wardeads. He wanted apparently to appease extreme right wing nationalists by paying a Yasukuni visit and at the same time to defy what he regards as the illegitimate interference in internal affairs by neighboring countries. During his tenure extreme right wing nationalists did never intimidate him. Toward the end of his tenure the Chinese government came to tone down, at least on the surface, the attitude of encouraging apologetic statements from the Japanese government on the history issues. This led apparently to his successor, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's surprise visit to Beijing for mending fences each other.

The party congress takes place late January every year. There Prime Minister cum President of the party gives a major speech outlining the policy program of the party for the coming year especially eyeing elections of the year, local and national. The party congress is not regarded as the place for debate. Rather party committees are the battleplace for policy debates. As in the National Diet, policy debates tend to be somewhat excessively decentralized in the governing party as well.

The tenure of Prime Minister Koizumi was coincided with the time of hitting the nadir of economic recessions while government deregulation was attempted with utmost determination. He focused on three policy issues: liquidation of bad performing loans, reduction of road construction by government money, and postal privatization. Sound financial service, reducing government expenditure and encouraging private initiatives and innovations are his key agendas. One by one in this order he tackled the issues. Each time he met substantial resistance. In the first two cases, big business split itself into two, manufacturing business came picked up while financial sector was slowly moving in the direction of liquidating bad performing loans by merging among themselves into mammoth banks. Hence he moved forward without inviting too strong internal dissents. But in the last case internal putsches and rebellions took place. First, in the Ministry of Internal Communications and Affairs, which contains the former Ministry of Post, open defiance took

place in the National Diet. Those post related high ranking officials contradicted Prime Minister in their reply to legislators's inquiries in the governing and opposition parties. They were immediately demoted into obscure positions. Second, in the governing party conspiracies were repeatedly built into a substantial number of nay voters from among the governing party in the National Diet on postal privatization. (13) The House of Representatives passed the bill with a surprisingly large number of no votes from the governing party. Koizumi decided to confront them head on, reciting the sentences of Donquixote in *La Mancha*. Immediately after the House of Councilors voted down the bill, Koizumi called for general election, claiming that if the National Diet does not place confidence in Prime Minister, he wants to ask the confidence vote in him by calling for general election. It was almost like *veni, vedi, vici*. He first expelled all those legislators of the governing party who voted against the bill in the House of Representatives. Then he put party candidates against all the expelled but incumbent legislators in the same districts. Furthermore, the audacious and tough minded Koizumi carried out the media-savvy and vigorous campaigns everywhere by rhetorically transforming the campaign issue from the postal privatization to the national confidence in Koizumi. The outcomes represented one of the most resounding victories since 1980, when Prime Minister Ohira passed away in the midst of election campaign and the overwhelming victory called *tomurai senkyo* (once a candidate passes away before or during the election campaign, his supporters appeal to the sentiments of people that he or she must be resurrected by victory) was obtained.

The term of the president of the governing party is three years. Koizumi left the position at the end of his second term in October 2006. He became President in 2001 after Yoshinori Mori resigned from his office abruptly due to his continuous and excessive unpopularity. Koizumi won the party presidential election by beating two other contenders, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Takeo Hiranuma. Hashimoto was former Prime Minister and from the largest faction, representing the center-right of the party. Hiranuma was from a medium sized faction, representing a hard core right wing voice in the party. Electoral college consists of parliamentary members and local chapter deputies. The former constitutes two thirds while the latter one third. The election is based on the ballot vote. The political functions of the candidacies are many. You must demonstrate now and then your prime ministerial ambitions in order to keep the followers to be in your reach. You need to do so to impress a victorious contender that you are someone to be reckoned with: if you are underestimated by the victorious contender, he is bound to face trouble of enormous magnitude. In other words, give me a high ranking position in the cabinet or the party, or I would not give support to him. Defeated, Hashimoto passed away in 2006. Defeated, Hiranuma was expelled from the party and was sick and inactive politically for about one year.

### 4.3. Strategies and Programmes

The party ideology has shifted to the right. Koizumi has contributed to this ideological shift immensely. The longterm trend of party ideology changes is clear.(14) The relentless tide of globalization threatens the glory of state developmentalism which assigned key roles to the iron triangle, i.e., the central bureaucracy, the governing party and big business. The ascent of neoclassical liberalism in guiding economic management has been visible and tangible during the Koizumi administration. He first prompted city banks to sort out their mess. Then he reduced road construction expenditure radically. Lastly, he passed the postal privatization bill in the National Diet. Koizumi is a believer in small government. He abhors those state developmentalists led by the late Kakuei Tanaka and his company. He welcomes the liberalizing influence by the United States government and Congress as long as their suggestions come in *sotto voce*. His ideology befits the era of globalization. The neoclassical liberalism dubbed as the Washington consensus has triggered the counter strike of nationalism, patriotism, and sometimes protectionism Japanese style. His tenure evolved along with the 9/11 terrorism. He adroitly and astutely leaned to one side, the tighter alliance with the United States. Then using this leverage he signed the Pyongyang communiqué with Kim Jong Il of North Korea and the Azadegan oil exploitation agreement with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. Similarly he refused to "kowtow" to China and to South Korea apologetically and deferentially by saying that he prays solely from his soul for wardeads, and by visiting the Yasukuni shrine where wardeads including class A war criminals were buried since 1978.

Koizumi's electoral strategy befits the era of globalization. In a good contrast to the era of state developmentalism, during which the leader relied heavily on his troops and on allied interest associations and bloc votes, the era of globalization needs the simple, lucid and exciting message conveyed by the media-savvy leader and amplified by the skillful and tough-minded hard debates televised live. Koizumi exemplified this electoral strategy. Being no faction leader himself, he firmly believes like Charles de Gaulle, that in a battle, he relies solely on himself, his determination, audacity and vigor. Koizumi is a good contrast to his immediate predecessors. Obuchi was addicted by phone call from himself to those to whom he wanted to convey some praise or encouragement. Obuchi also wanted to see all the TV programmes where he was mentioned. He saw all the programmes in the evening even into the midnight. His public speech was underwhelming though. Mori was a witty and cunny speech maker. He remembers persons and events well and speaks with many jokes as if good old folks in rice paddies were listening to him with their hands temporarily taking rest. He is very talkative and unfailingly animates everyone within the range of five meters surrounding him. He alienated journalists who in turn voted him out, sort of. They were not ideal at an era of globalization.



Koizumi is an incarnation of one of the party's two major historical threads. One focuses on nationalism and local notables. They are primarily professional politicians. They formed the core of the Democratic Party. The other focuses on alliance and big business. They are often former bureaucrats. They formed the core of the Liberal Party. They merged together in 1955 to counter the newly united Socialist Party. Koizumi belongs to the first thread. His grandfather and his father were professional politicians at the grassroots and one of his sons, after honing his skill at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Washington D .C., is about to succeed him shortly. His grandfather was a legislator at Yokosuka, a naval port both for the United States Navy and the maritime Self Defense Forces. His father was an adopted son from Kagoshima where a largest *kamikaze* attack air base was constructed during World War II. His father was Defense Minister himself. Koizumi himself was known for his uncharacteristically having mourned and wept at Chiran, Kagoshima, where thousands of young suicide attackers left its air base in the operations called "the Returning to the Heaven" in 1945.

Koizumi heralded the new era of Japanese politics which used to be characterized by consensus decision making, clientelism, materialistic give and take, state paternalism and developmentalism. His is an era of individualistic Japanese politics. He is an individualistic politician, not interested in raising political money, in bringing pork barrels into his district, in forming groups and leading factions. He is an eccentric man, neither interested in policy being briefed by bureaucrats, nor interested in articulating his thought very much. He is said to be a politician by instinct. His most well-known policy actions have a strong element of surprise. When the higher court gave a verdict that the state is guilty of giving permission to the pharmaceutical company to manufacture and sell a certain medicine, Welfare and Health Minister Koizumi accepted its verdict and ordered his Ministry to take responsibility against the voice of all the high ranking bureaucrats of the Ministry. When he was opposed by a large number of legislators of the governing party, he called for general election and expelled them from the party. When the United States waged the war on terror and named Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil, he concluded agreements with North Korea and with Iran without eliciting President Bush's disapproval. When Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei asked Koizumi not to pay a visit to the Yasukuni shrine on August 15, the date of the Japanese surrender to allied powers, Koizumi did so on August 13, 2001, his first year in office, saying that he did not break his promise.

The governing party reiterates and elaborates the general manifesto primarily in conjunction with the party congress held normally in January every year. The party congress is managed by Secretary General and hence the general manifesto is in the hands of Secretary General. The general manifesto is produced in harmony with the party leader. Inside the party

organization the party leader may place the entire power with Secretary General. But Secretary General is often not his closest ally. Secretary General Yasuo Fukuda parted ways from Koizumi due in part to Fukuda's prime ministerial ambition. The next secretary general Tsutomu Takebe called himself a "great yesman" and was loyal to Koizumi throughout. When conflicts arise with the general manifesto, the previous year's manifesto is normally reproduced while conflicts might develop further in other forms. The legislative manifesto is produced by the chair of the National Diet Affairs Committee who is appointed from the governing party. Legislative drafts come from various bureaucratic agencies by 85 percent. They are examined and elaborated by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau. The rest come from legislators' coalitions. They are examined and elaborated by the Legislative Bureaus of both Houses. The former are called cabinet sponsored bills whereas the latter are called the legislators' sponsored bills. The batting average of the former is very high whereas that of the latter is low. Prioritizing legislative bills is a key instrument of legislative politics that is determined primarily by Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the chairs of the National Diet Affairs Committee dealing with committee session debates and the Parliamentary Management Committee dealing with plenary session debates. Koizumi was a clear headed man with legislative priorities executed in a most energy-concentrated and all-concerted fashion.

In the context of a homogeneous government, the government programme is almost the same as the legislative manifesto with an important proviso. The government programme focuses on budgets. The budgetary programme is produced fairly authoritatively by the Ministry of Treasury in dense interactions with each central bureaucratic agency. Bureaucratic dominance is here to stay in budget programme formation. Elaborating the government programme is handled by governing party committees in most microscopic fashions especially in the taxation commission where the scope for administrative discretion is not underestimated. The outcome of the governing party tax commission is further examined and elaborated by the government tax commission. The weight of power balance between the party tax commission and the government tax commission has been moving from the latter to the former. Parliamentary members and interest associations have been in ascendance vis-à-vis the central bureaucratic agency. In the context of a coalition government, the coordinating committee between the coalition members handles the matter often in the form of ad hoc summit meetings by Secretary Generals or party leaders. Koizumi paid utmost attention to keeping a coalition from being unnecessarily disturbed by conflicts of various sorts.

##### 5. The External Power of the Party Leader

Koizumi's power was based on various institutional factors.<sup>(15)</sup> Koizumi is sometimes called a Presidential Prime Minister in the sense that he wields an enormous power that is almost

akin to a President in such countries as the United States and France(Krauss/ ). Japan practices parliamentary democracy. Its cabinet is chosen by the parliament. It is getting closer to the Westminster system but it retains very substantial differences. First, central bureaucracy is semi-autonomous and decentralized along each agency. Central bureaucracy is not necessarily meek and loyal to the incumbent government. Second, the cabinet is pulled strongly to central bureaucracy whereas the governing party is partially but often densely embedded with interest associations and economic and ideological blocs. Prime Minister does not presume at all that the cabinet and the governing party are one and the same. Yet the predominant party system gives immense strength to the party leader. Bureaucratic semi-autonomy has been reduced considerably in recent decades. The electoral system changed in two steps, in 1982 and 1994. It used to be the system of the dominant use of the single non-transferable vote for one to five legislators in one district for the House of Representatives. Then the mixed system was introduced: (1) proportional representation on regional and/or nation-wide lists for both houses. and (2) the single non-transferable vote for one legislator in one district for both Houses has had great impacts on the support for the party leader. As long as the governing party is popular, it has become clearer that the governing party has been even longer in power. The power of the party leader has become stronger in negative proportion to reduced bureaucratic semi-autonomy and to reduced representation of state-protected sectorial interests in tandem with the steady tide of globalization.

Koizumi belongs to the right wing of the governing party. He stresses market liberalization, small government, alliance, patriotism. The ideological shift has been prompted by a number of factors: first, the governing party faces the dwindling support from erstwhile strong rural districts; second, business seeks profits and markets abroad; third, the decade long recession coupled with high level unemployment and demographic decline has reduced support level for the governing party. Koizumi focuses on the tightening of alliance with the United States steadily envisaging to move to the phase of making joint operations, the steady reduction of astronomical government deficits, enhancing inventions and innovations in science and technology, and consolidation of gender equality and demographic vigor. Public opinion pressures are strong. All the statements Prime Minister makes, all his appearances, all his meetings are reported on TV, newspapers, magazines and internets. Koizumi's savviness with mass media has been enormously rewarded: he meets twice a day with journalists, he expands the range of journalists he meets to those newspapers and magazines tailored to women and sports-fans, his sentences are short, lucid and unforgettable, his head hair is taken care of at a barbershop very frequently, his suits look fashionable, and after all, he is slender, smiling and single.

Parliamentary sessions, plenary and committee, are televised live in principle. Especially, budget committee sessions are most earnestly watched. The party leader appears most frequently. Relevant cabinet members and all the parties' representatives must be present in such sessions. TV cameras normally see to it that all the legislators appear on TV so that their district supporters can see their deputies participating in such sessions. Koizumi walks on the tight rope between being witty and naughty. An example: When the opposition leader asked him to answer the question, Is Samawa in southwestern Iraq (where the 600 strong troops of the Self Defense Forces stationed between 2003 and 2006) a combat area or not? Koizumi's answer is: Constitutionally, the Self Defense Forces troops should not be sent to combat areas; hence Samawa, Iraq is not a combat area. People sigh.

Koizumi does not listen to other persons. He listens to himself. Yet number one secretary of his, Isao Iijima, was highly trusted.<sup>(16)</sup> He was in charge of all logistics of Prime Minister. In other words, he nosed into every matter where Prime Minister was present. Highly experienced in politics from behind, he is most knowledgeable about political actors and their weaknesses, e.g., women (or men), alcohol, corruption, mishaps. Koizumi travels abroad very frequently, some 10 times a year on average for his tenure of 2001-2006. At home he does less frequently unless major elections take place. His private life has been printed in all sorts of magazines, newspapers and internets. He does not respond to letters or telephones or emails. He does not receive any gift and when it is sent, he sends it back to givers. He criticizes no one by name. His instructions are pithy and general. Koizumi was not so popular before.<sup>(1)</sup> As his speech performance became highly applauded, he got very popular. Koizumi was popular in all sectors but especially among women.

Koizumi participated not only in the general election but also House of Councilors and local elections. But Secretary General is primarily responsible for elections. Secretary General plays three major roles. First, he or she is primarily responsible for determining party candidates in each district or proportional representation lists. It used to be primarily determined by local chapters. But the centralization of the party has elevated the role of Secretary General very much. Second, he or she is primarily responsible for allocating campaign money to each candidate and for sending troops of speakers and campaigners to candidates. He or she assigns troops to report how many people are assembled for candidates' speeches and decides reinforcement or reduction of troops to be sent. Third, he or she assesses local and national opinion polls and give instructions as to which campaign slogans and sentences should be used besides more general election manifestoes. Here Koizumi was most forceful in projecting a positive image of the governing party among the electorates. Postal privatization is a response to globalization. It means that a number of employees are to be disemployed. It sounds negative. But Koizumi portrayed it as a positive way of reducing

government expenditures and thus relieving some tax burdens. He also portrayed it as a positive way of generating more GNP through competitively elevating skills and innovating technologies. Koizumi was the principal speaker during the electoral meetings. Koizumi's strategy was to appear in a big square to give a speech surrounded by tens of thousands of audiences. His speech was combative, fierce and determined, and normally about ten minutes long. Koizumi might remind one of Taisuke Itagaki, a statesman who fought the authoritarian government in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, who was known for his "give me freedom or death," or of Abraham Lincoln whose famous Gettysburg speech lasted only for two minutes.

## 5. Conclusion

The personalization of politics is increasingly visible and tangible in Japan. Junichiro Koizumi is its best exemplar of this emerging phenomenon in recent Japanese politics. A tough individualist, Koizumi paved his way through to the leader's position with his astute sense of public sentiments, adroit use of mass media and agile footwork of well-calculated action. Although authors of books on Koizumi varyingly characterizing him as a populist, a nihilist or an epicurean, Koizumi is best characterized as an individualist in the sense that he acts alone in the belief that his strong determination and well-calculated prose should move the hearts of people. Without resorting to consensus-ridden old style, without following rigid and time-taking seniority system, without infinitely entangling himself with clientelist networks, and occasionally strategically overriding the autonomy of central bureaucracy, Koizumi has brought the nation into an era of personalizing politics in tandem with the two universal forces that encroach the much-vaunted organic unity and solidarity of the national economy, culture and regime, i.e., the relentless tide of globalization and the ubiquitous beam of mass media. It is important to note at the end that Koizumi is merely a harbinger of something to come on a more spectacular scale.

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## Notes

1. See Takashi Inoguchi, *Japanese Politics: An Introduction*, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2005; See also Inoguchi Takashi, "Tanegashima Tokitaka kara Plaza Goui made (From Tokitaka, the Lord of Tanegashima to the Plaza Accord)," *Gakuishiin kaihou*. Koenkai tokushu, 1997, pp. 104-114.
2. See Banno Junji, *Meiji Democracy*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2006. The author portrays the two step revolution of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 as the first step of revolution from below in a couple of southwestern domains which were subsequently nationalized by a series of military battles and the second step of abolishment of class discrimination and of domain autonomy.
3. See Iokibe Makoto, *Senso, senryo, kowa* (War, Occupation, and Peace), Tokyo: Chuo koronshinsha, 2001
4. See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Economic Miracle*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.
5. See Meghnad Desai, *Marx's Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of Statist Socialism*, London: Verso, 2002.
6. Bloc Votes decreased visibly and steadily as seen from the number of votes obtained by interest associations in the house of Councilors Propositional Representation Scheme. See figure.

Sectoral Interest Associations	Candidates Pushed Back by Associations in the House of Councillors Proportional Representation Scheme		Bureaucratic Origins of Candidates
	2001	2004	
construction	278,521	253,738	X
war veterans	295,613	101,651	
medical doctors	227,042	250,426	
war vetrans' families	264,888	171,945	
land improvement	207,867	167,350	X
pharmaceutical	156,380	96,463	X
dental/medical doctors	104,581	-----	
dental engineers	-----	82,146	
nurses	174,517	152,685	
transport	94,332	196,499	X
local governments	156,656	105,737	X
facilities for the aged	-----	199,510	
agriculture and fisheries	166,070	118,540	
food	-----	51,664	X
fishermen	-----	-----	

'Kanryo yori jimae koho' (LDP Candidates Better Recruited from Those Sectors Concerned than Those Bureaucratic Agencise)), *Asahishimbun*, 15 November, 2006, P.4.

7. See a set of representative works on Koizumi are reviewed in Inoguchi Takashi, "Kaiko sareru Koizumi Administration (Reflecting on the Koizumi Administration), *Ronza*, April 2007, pp. 325-327. As for Koizumi's biography and personality, see Iijima Isao, *Koizumi kantei hiroku* (A Secret History of Koizumi's Prime Minister's Office), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 2006; Asakawa Hirotada, *Ningen Koizumi Junichiro sandai ni wataru henkaku no chi* (The Man in Koizumi), Tokyo: Kodansha?, Kinoshita Eiji, *Shosetsu Koizumi Junichiro* (Biography of Koizumi Junichiro), Tokyo: Gentousha, 200?; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, *Kantei shudou Koizumi Junichiro no kakumei* (Koizumi's Revolution), Tokyo: Nihon keizazi shimbun, 2005.
8. Nakajima Yoshihiro et al, *Koizumi Seiken no kenkyu* (A Study of the Koizumi Administration) Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2008: See also Yoshida Takafumi, "Koizumi naikaku 5 nen 5 kagetsu:seisaku yori kosei de miseta Gekijou seiji (Theater Politics as Played Out by Personality rather than Policy, Five Years and Five Months of the Koizumi Administration), *Asahi Soken Report*, No.198, November 2006, pp.176-189; Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, "The Koizumi Revolution," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol.XL, No.1 (January 2007), pp. 79-84.
9. See Steven Reed and Michael Theis, "The Causes of Political Reform in Japan and "The Consequence of Political Reform in Japan," in Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed Member Electoral Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 152-172 and pp.380-403. Allen Hicken and Yuko Kasuya, "A Guide to the Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of Asia," *Electoral Studies*, Vol 22, No.1 (2003) , pp121-151.
10. See *Rippogaku* (Legislative Studies), Kyoto: Kokusai shorinkan, 2005; Takashi Inoguchi, "Parliamentary Opposition in (Post-) One-Party-Dominant Regime," *Journal of Legislative Studies*, forthcoming.
11. See Takenaka Harukata, *Shusho shihai* (Prime Minister's Leadership), Tokyo: Chuokoron shinsha, 2006; Otake Hideo, *Koizumi Junichiro Populism no kenkyu* (A Study of Populism: Koizumi Junichiro), Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimposha, 2006.
12. See Margarite Abe, "Japan's Shift Toward a Westminster System?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2006), pp 632-651.
13. See Takenaka Heizo, *Kozo kaikaku no shinjitsu* (A Truth of Structural Reform), Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbun, 2006. See also, Takashi Inoguchi, "Federalism and Quasi-Federal Tradition in Japan," in Baogang He, Brian Gallighan and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *Federalism in Asia*, London: Edward Elgar, 2007, pp. 266-289.

14. See Kabashima Ikuo, *Ideology*, Tokyo: *University of Tokyo Press*, forthcoming in 2008.

15. See Takenaka, op.cit.; Shinoda Tomohito, *Kantei gaikou* (Diplomacy by Prime Minister's Leadership), Tokyo: Asahi shimbun, 2004.

16. Iijima, op.cit.

17. Yoshida, op. cit.