

# American Foreign Policy and Global Opinion

## WHO SUPPORTED THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN?

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What affects global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy? The authors examine this question using a cross-national survey conducted during and immediately after the 2001 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. They propose three models of global public opinion—*interests*, *socialization*, and *influence*—and discuss their empirical validity. Socialization variables (e.g., Muslim population and past terrorist incidents) tend to exhibit significant effects. A variable measuring shared security interests, North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, has significant effects in favor of U.S. policy, but other mutual defense pacts with the U.S. have a backlash effect. Shared economic interests, represented by levels of trade, also have a positive influence. Variables measuring conflicting security interests as well as those measuring U.S. efforts to influence foreign public opinion have insignificant or weak effects.

*Keywords:* foreign policy; global public opinion; terrorism; Afghanistan; United States

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Global public opinion is not a new concern for U.S. foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson often referred to it, even stating that it “ultimately governs the world” (cited in Ninkovich 1999, 67). But it has gained attention recently, as globalization proceeds, on one hand, and the U.S. economic, political, and military dominance in the world becomes apparent, on the other.<sup>1</sup> The George W. Bush administration appointed a former advertising executive as undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs to “rebrand American foreign policy” (*The Economist*, February 23, 2002) and established at least two new offices devoted to shaping perceptions about the United States around the globe (*New York Times*, February 19, 2002). Obviously, it is assumed

1. There are a growing number of empirical studies of global public opinion. For example, Millard (1999) studies global opinion about the United Nations. Rusciano (2001) and Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano (1990) examine perceptions of world opinion in newspapers around the world. Wilcox, Tanaka, and Allsop (1993) study world opinion about the 1990 Gulf War.

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that public opinion abroad matters for the success or failure of U.S. foreign policy and that the United States can influence it. But do U.S. behavior and efforts at persuasion indeed influence foreign opinion about the United States and its international role? More generally, what affects global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy? Despite their growing importance, these questions have not been subjected to much empirical investigation.<sup>2</sup> This article develops a relevant theoretical framework and presents an initial empirical analysis of factors affecting global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

In what follows, we first discuss our general theoretical framework. Considering implications of existing theories, we propose three models of global public opinion: *interests*, *socialization*, and *influence*. Second, we introduce our data and statistical method. Third, we introduce testable hypotheses derived from our three models. Fourth, we present the results of empirical tests. We found that socialization variables (e.g., Muslim population and past terrorist incidents) tend to exhibit significant effects. A variable measuring shared security interests, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, also has significant effects in favor of U.S. policy, but in general a mutual defense pact with the United States has a backlash effect. Shared economic interests, represented by levels of trade, also have a positive influence. Variables measuring conflicting security interests as well as those measuring U.S. efforts to influence foreign public opinion are found to have insignificant or weak effects. Conclusions are drawn, in the last section, regarding our broader understanding of international relations. We acknowledge that our study examines the factors affecting global opinion about just one (important) policy recently undertaken by the United States, but we believe that the logical framework has general relevance and that our conclusions are unlikely to be anomalous.

## MODELS

Existing theories of international relations have paid some attention to transnational linkages involving public opinion about foreign policy, but it has never been an

2. There are a limited number of studies examining the relationships between *foreign* public opinion and foreign policy of another country. Cheeseman and McAllister (1996) find that party affiliation in Australia is related to attitudes toward relations with the United States. Isermia, Juhasz, and Rattinger (2002) provide evidence for negative European reactions to some U.S. cold war policies. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) find no significant effect of statements by foreigners in the U.S. news media on U.S. public opinion. Wilcox, Tanaka, and Allsop (1993) and Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop (1996) study the relationship of individual-level factors and opinion about the 1991 Persian Gulf War among residents of eleven major cities around the world.

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issue of central concern (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977; Putnam 1988; Rosenau 1969).<sup>3</sup> In this section, we propose three models of public opinion in country B with regard to country A's foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> We also discuss important connections to several existing theories of international relations.

The first model, which we call an *interest* model, rests on an assumption that publics are aware of state-level "material" interests. This model is most consistent with realist theories of international relations, which assume that states pursue power. Although most realists do not expect that public preferences have much influence on foreign policy, this model would allow realist theories to incorporate public opinion unproblematically. For example, Munton (1992, 237) argues that on issues of nuclear security, the U.S. public thinks like "conventional military strategists." In addition, realists might assume that public opinion is malleable (e.g., Payne 1994), and therefore domestic public opinion about foreign policy is shaped along the lines of "national interests" by leaders through their access to mass media (Hill 1996; Morgenthau 1978).

Such interests are usually grouped into security and economic issue areas, but few would argue they are sufficient guides to the foreign policy orientations of states and their leaders. Even some realists concede this point (e.g., Waltz 1979). This should be even more so for mass publics. Interests matter, but so do perceptions (Jervis 1976). Thus, in our second model, which we call a *socialization* model, we focus on the role of socialization of mass publics to certain perceptions—beliefs, values, and expectations about politics. Such socialization occurs through long- and short-term historical experiences, as well as underlying social factors, such as democracy, religion, and economic development. We believe that these factors are most usefully subsumed under the general category of political culture. Duffield (1999) argues that political culture is the most useful framework for understanding the effects of cultural factors on foreign policy.

Finally, if public opinion matters for foreign policy, and if transnational influence on public opinion exists, the leadership of country A would be interested in influencing public opinion in country B. Therefore, while material interests and socialized perceptions may be important, we also believe that states seek to influence foreign public opinion to their advantage. This is our third model, which we call an *influence* model. This model also draws on existing theoretical frameworks, particularly second-image

3. Relevant examples of research based on Rosenau's "linkage politics" model are James and Rioux (1998), Jensen (1969), and Lohmann (1997).

4. The relationship between public opinion in country A and country A's foreign policy has been extensively studied. Many scholars recognize the effect of *domestic* public opinion on U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Holsti 1992; Monroe 1998; Nacos, Shapiro, and Isernia 2000; Payne 1994; Risse-Kappen 1991; Sobel 2001; Strobel 1997) and that domestic public opinion on U.S. foreign policy responds in "rational," "prudent," or "sensible" ways to events and new information (e.g., Holsti 1992, 1996; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Munton 1992; Nincic 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Shapiro and Page 1988). A number of studies also point to similar stability and rationality of public opinion about foreign policy in Western Europe and Russia (e.g., Eichenberg 1989; Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger 2002; Munton 1992; Zimmerman 2002). And it has been shown that television news coverage, as well as "spin" efforts by popular presidents, can move U.S. public opinion (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Jordan and Page 1992; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Powlick and Katz 1998).

reversed and two-level games. The second-image reversed approach (Gourevitch 1978) is concerned with effects of the international environment on domestic political structures and processes. Gourevitch's (1978) examples, however, also imply that country A's influence to affect things such as domestic coalitions and elite beliefs in country B has foreign policy relevance. This is closely related to what Putnam (1988) calls "reverberation" within his two-level game model of diplomacy. While the emphasis is on elite-level transnational influence, there is also recognition that reverberation can "mobilize and/or change public opinion" (Dieter Hiss, cited in Putnam 1988, 455). Trumbore (1998) has used this two-level game framework to study British and Irish public opinion in the Northern Ireland peace process. It is important to note that Putnam's concept of "negative reverberation" also recognizes possible backlash or unintended consequences of foreign attempts at persuasion or pressure.

To summarize our three models: (1) state-level interests shape public opinion in country B with regard to country A's foreign policy (interest model), (2) political culture and historical experience shape public opinion in country B with regard to country A's foreign policy (socialization model), and (3) foreign pressure of country A shapes public opinion in country B about country A's foreign policy (influence model).

## DATA AND METHODS

To evaluate global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, we need a cross-national survey that satisfies at least two conditions. First, the survey must ask a question (or questions) relevant to U.S. foreign policy. Second, to represent "global" public opinion, the survey must be administered in as many countries as possible and/or in randomly sampled countries. One of the few cross-national surveys that largely meet these conditions is the Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001, conducted by Gallup International and its member companies between November 7 and December 29, 2001. For this survey, more than 60,000 individuals from sixty-three countries and regions were interviewed about the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan.

We could obtain only the county-level aggregate results of this survey. Although the interpretation of findings based on such data requires some caution, this is not necessarily a critical limitation. Page and Shapiro (1992) make a strong case that the use of aggregate opinion data on foreign policy is more appropriate than individual-level data. As they argue, what matters both for foreign policy makers and studies of public opinion and foreign policy is *collective* public opinion, rather than *individual* public opinion.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, if we use individual-level data, we may suffer measurement problems, which "could lead to unstable responses by individuals even while the same surveys were accurately measuring real and stable *collective* public opinion" (Page and Shapiro 1992, 8; also see 15-34). It is also important to note that we do not attempt

5. The two studies that use individual-level data to assess world opinion about another U.S.-led conflict (the Gulf War) find significant national (i.e., aggregate-level) variation while controlling for a number of individual-level demographic and attitudinal factors (Wilcox, Tanaka, and Allsop 1993; Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996).

to make any “ecological inference” (King 1997) about relationships between individual attributes and individual responses to a survey question. Our interests are contextual effects on collective public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, and analysis of such effects is only meaningful, both politically and theoretically, at the aggregate level.

There are, however, other limitations of the survey. First, the countries included may not necessarily comprise a representative sample of “global” public opinion.<sup>6</sup> For example, Arab countries in the Middle East are not included. This could distort our analysis, as the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan seemed to be strongly opposed in these countries. We also need to caution that only four African and seven Asian countries are included. Second, nationwide sampling was not undertaken in some countries. For example, in Azerbaijan, Poland, and Russia, samples were drawn only from urban areas. Third, the survey modes were also not consistent across countries. In some countries, telephone surveys were used, while in others, there were face-to-face interviews.<sup>7</sup> And finally, because the survey was conducted in the midst of a specific international crisis, there may be unique or idiosyncratic features to our findings. We acknowledge these limitations but believe that these survey data, including roughly a third of all countries in the world, are among the best available on global public opinion and are reasonably reliable. And while the war in Afghanistan was unique in certain ways, general effects based on our theoretically grounded models ought to be evident even in atypical conditions. In fact, Arian and Olzaeker (1999) show that public opinion about foreign policy during an international crisis and during periods of “routine” international relations is not substantially different. Future research should attempt to ameliorate data problems with techniques to control selection bias and by checking whether our findings are robust to the countries selected or the presence of a crisis involving the use of force.

The dependent variable of ultimate interest for us is *global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy*, but we recognize that there is probably no single variable that can validly measure this concept. For this study, we focus on U.S. foreign policy during one particular crisis and use answers to four different survey questions as indicators of either explicit support for the specific policy or general levels of trust in the United States during such a crisis. These questions and available answers are the following:

1. “Do you personally agree or disagree with the United States military action in Afghanistan?” Answer (single choice): “Agree with the U.S. military action,” “Disagree with the U.S. military action,” or “Don’t know.”
2. “Some countries and all NATO member states have agreed to participate in the military action against Afghanistan. Do you agree or disagree that (your country) should take part with the United States in military action against Afghanistan?” Answer (single choice): “Agree, country should take part in,” “Disagree, country should not take part in,” or “Don’t know.”

6. But what such a sample would be is not a simple question, as is clear from definitional discussions in Hill (1996) and Wilcox, Tanaka, and Allsop (1993).

7. For information about each individual country’s survey (i.e., the mode of a survey, the type of samples, the sample size, fieldwork dates, a contact person and his or her e-mail address), see [http://www.gallup-international.com/terrorismpoll2001\\_methodology.htm](http://www.gallup-international.com/terrorismpoll2001_methodology.htm).

3. "Which aspects of this war are you most concerned about?" Answer (multiple choice): One of seven items, and our focus in this study, is "Bombing of Afghan civilians."
4. "Broadly speaking, this is currently a war between the U.S. and its allies against terrorism, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Are you worried it may grow into a broader war against Islam?" Answer (single choice): "Yes, worried," "No, not worried," and "Don't know/No response."

Respondents' answers to questions 1 and 2 comprise two measures of the degree of support for the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in particular. We assume that agreement with the war indicates at least a *moderate* level of support, while agreeing that one's own country should take part in the war is evidence of a *higher* level of commitment to the U.S.-led effort.

We interpret answers to questions 3 and 4 as indicators of more general attitudes of trust of U.S. policy motives and execution. We assume that higher percentages of respondents concerned with "bombing of Afghan civilians" during the war in Afghanistan correspond to lower overall trust in the United States to conduct the war with respect for the human rights and welfare of innocent Afghans. And we assume that greater levels of concern about the war against terrorism straying into a war against Islam are an indicator of lower levels of trust in U.S. motives after September 11, 2001.

An important note in choosing the method is that there is wide variation in the percentages of respondents choosing the "don't know" option in each of the three single-choice questions (questions 1, 2, and 4). For example, in question 1, this percentage is lowest in Peru (2 percent) and highest in Japan (41 percent), and it is higher than the percentage "agree" or "disagree" in five countries. This implies that the percentage responding "don't know" should not be treated as a consequence of randomness. Thus, to avoid wasting information about "don't know" responses, we separate positive and negative responses in questions 1, 2, and 4. More specifically, we use the percentages of positive and negative responses as two dependent variables and run two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each of these questions. With regard to question 3 (a multiple-choice question), we use the percentage of respondents who are concerned about "bombing of Afghan civilians" minus the average of the percentages of those who are concerned about the other four issues ("chemical or biological weapons," "nuclear weapons," "terrorist bomb attacks in public places," and "planes being hijacked and crashed"). We use this specification to measure the *relative* level of concern about bombing Afghan civilians in each country. See Table 1 for a list of countries and the values of all dependent variables.

## HYPOTHESES

Now, we derive hypotheses from the three models introduced earlier. The appendix contains the information on the coding and source of data for each independent variable. The first model focuses on common interests with the United States. We examine variables representing shared military and economic interests among the United States and countries in the survey. Alliances are one obvious indicator of shared security interests (although we recognize that some allies are also prone to conflict and war; see

TABLE 1  
List of Countries and the Values of Dependent Variables

	Q1a		Q1b		Q2a		Q2b		Q3	Q4a		Q4b
	U.S.-Led Military Action in Afghanistan				Your Country Should Take Part with the United States					War against Islam		
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree		Concern (Relative)	Warrior	
Albania	83.0	11.0	54.0	32.0	-24.5	25.0	62.0					
Argentina	14.0	76.0	7.0	89.0	-14.8	67.0	25.0					
Austria	36.0	43.0	6.0	85.0	-8.3	41.0	46.0					
Azerbaijan	14.0	72.0	11.9	71.3	6.8	64.0	21.0					
Belgium	52.0	34.0	50.5	42.4	-1.3	44.0	49.0					
Bolivia	22.8	71.3	14.0	83.0	-27.3	73.0	20.0					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22.0	60.0	9.0	74.0	-4.3	44.0	36.0					
Bulgaria	33.7	40.6	14.0	63.0	-13.3	54.5	19.8					
Cameroon	28.0	58.0	14.0	75.0	32.5	57.0	29.0					
Colombia	41.0	49.0	25.0	70.0	-18.8	75.0	21.0					
Costa Rica	42.0	49.0	NA	NA	-17.5	73.0	26.0					
Croatia	39.6	44.6	18.0	70.0	-25.0	62.0	23.0					
Czech Republic	68.3	22.8	48.0	41.0	-22.0	51.5	31.7					
Denmark	66.0	19.0	64.0	30.0	-10.5	52.0	45.0					
Dominican Republic	44.0	53.0	27.0	69.0	-18.5	75.0	25.0					
Ecuador	36.0	55.0	12.0	83.0	-13.3	59.0	21.0					
Estonia	52.0	41.0	27.0	71.0	-2.5	74.0	23.0					
Finland	52.0	23.0	7.0	84.0	-13.3	43.0	41.0					
France	73.0	20.0	67.0	28.0	-6.0	55.0	43.0					
Fyr Macedonia	28.0	58.0	13.0	74.0	-16.8	59.0	27.0					
Georgia	35.6	31.7	14.9	63.4	9.3	46.0	23.0					
Germany	65.0	28.0	58.0	38.0	-12.3	43.0	54.0					

Greece	9.0	81.0	7.0	86.0	-13.0	55.0	28.0
Guatemala	46.0	51.0	45.0	53.0	-12.5	60.0	37.0
Hong Kong	45.0	46.0	24.0	69.0	0.3	40.0	52.0
Iceland	59.0	26.0	NA	NA	NA	47.0	49.0
India	70.0	27.0	85.0	12.0	-11.3	51.0	41.0
Ireland	48.0	34.0	22.0	59.0	-8.5	55.0	25.0
Israel	83.0	8.0	36.0	58.0	-19.0	44.0	54.0
Italy	60.0	31.0	57.0	38.0	-15.0	47.0	48.0
Japan	33.0	26.0	21.0	39.0	-5.0	22.0	33.0
Kenya	56.6	37.4	32.0	63.0	-19.8	65.0	32.0
Korea	43.0	44.0	39.6	48.5	-21.3	46.5	37.4
Kyrgyzstan	47.0	44.0	21.0	72.0	-13.3	61.0	32.0
Latvia	40.4	33.3	24.0	66.0	-10.0	60.0	27.0
Lithuania	54.5	33.3	16.0	73.0	-18.8	71.7	20.2
Luxembourg	61.0	31.0	57.0	37.0	0.0	59.0	37.0
Malaysia	13.0	67.0	4.0	77.0	-5.8	58.0	23.0
Mexico	21.0	73.0	10.0	89.0	-15.3	78.0	17.0
Netherlands	75.0	17.0	66.0	25.0	-6.5	46.0	47.0
Nigeria	40.0	44.0	22.0	63.0	3.0	50.0	32.0
Norway	54.5	34.7	52.5	41.6	-2.3	51.0	44.0
Pakistan	8.0	82.0	12.0	71.0	21.8	61.0	22.0
Panama	43.0	45.0	17.0	80.0	-20.3	78.0	21.0
Peru	38.0	60.0	19.0	78.0	-27.8	79.2	13.9
Philippines	57.0	39.0	34.0	64.0	-18.5	78.0	21.0
Poland	61.0	28.0	48.0	41.0	-31.8	42.0	35.0
Portugal	59.0	29.0	45.0	47.0	-15.5	58.0	32.0
Romania	53.0	29.0	39.0	42.0	-27.0	59.0	21.0
Russia	39.0	50.0	11.0	79.0	-11.5	52.0	38.0

(continued)

TABLE 1 (continued)

	Q1a		Q1b		Q2a		Q2b		Q3		Q4a		Q4b			
	U.S.-Led Military Action in Afghanistan				Your Country Should Take Part with the United States				Civilian Casualties				War against Islam			
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Concern (Relative)	Concern (Relative)	Worried	Not Worried	Worried	Not Worried		
Slovak Republic	53.0	37.0	32.0	58.0	32.0	58.0	32.0	58.0	-20.8	-20.8	58.0	27.0	58.0	27.0		
Spain	34.0	49.0	33.0	60.0	33.0	60.0	33.0	60.0	-15.3	-15.3	65.0	32.0	65.0	32.0		
Sweden	53.0	28.0	26.0	64.0	26.0	64.0	26.0	64.0	-20.0	-20.0	44.0	51.0	44.0	51.0		
Switzerland	47.0	37.0	12.0	76.0	12.0	76.0	12.0	76.0	-19.8	-19.8	46.0	38.0	46.0	38.0		
Turkey	16.2	69.7	14.0	71.0	14.0	71.0	14.0	71.0	-23.5	-23.5	46.0	34.0	46.0	34.0		
Ukraine	26.0	60.0	4.0	90.0	4.0	90.0	4.0	90.0	-5.8	-5.8	68.0	16.0	68.0	16.0		
United Kingdom	68.0	20.0	66.0	25.0	66.0	25.0	66.0	25.0	-7.3	-7.3	48.0	46.0	48.0	46.0		
United States	88.0	6.0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	36.6	54.5	36.6	54.5		
Uruguay	20.0	67.0	6.0	90.0	6.0	90.0	6.0	90.0	-12.3	-12.3	59.0	34.0	59.0	34.0		
Venezuela	53.0	38.0	29.0	62.0	29.0	62.0	29.0	62.0	-18.3	-18.3	69.0	24.0	69.0	24.0		
Yugoslavia	26.0	62.0	8.0	81.0	8.0	81.0	8.0	81.0	-21.8	-21.8	55.0	29.0	55.0	29.0		
Zimbabwe	17.0	51.0	7.0	65.0	7.0	65.0	7.0	65.0	-4.5	-4.5	49.0	16.0	49.0	16.0		
Number of countries	62	62	59	59	59	59	59	59	60	60	62	62	62	62		
Average	42.6	41.2	26.8	59.8	26.8	59.8	26.8	59.8	-11.3	-11.3	53.2	31.8	53.2	31.8		
Standard deviation	19.2	18.2	20.0	19.3	20.0	19.3	20.0	19.3	11.4	11.4	12.6	11.7	12.6	11.7		
Minimum	8.0	6.0	4.0	12.0	4.0	12.0	4.0	12.0	-31.8	-31.8	22.0	13.9	22.0	13.9		
Maximum	88.0	82.0	85.0	90.0	85.0	90.0	85.0	90.0	32.5	32.5	79.2	62.0	79.2	62.0		

SOURCE: Gallup International End of Year Terrorism Poll 2001.

NOTE: The United Kingdom excludes Northern Ireland, and Yugoslavia excludes Kosovo. Q1 (columns 2 and 3), Q2 (columns 4 and 5) and Q4 (columns 7 and 8) are in percentages. Q3 (column 6) shows the percentage of respondents who are most concerned about "bombing of Afghan civilians" minus the average of the percentages of those who are concerned most about the other four issues ("chemical or biological weapons," "nuclear weapons," "terrorist bomb attacks in public places," and "planes being hijacked and crashed"). NA = not applicable.

Gibler 2000). Here we restrict our measure to the most serious alliance commitments: mutual defense pacts. We use a dummy variable coded as 1 if a country has a mutual defense pact with the United States and 0 otherwise. We also include a dummy variable for membership in the most active and institutionalized of U.S. alliances: NATO. Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger (2002) find stable and highly positive attitudes toward the United States among publics in three NATO member states (Germany, Italy, and France) in the period from 1954 to 1990. Another indicator of shared military interests is the amount of military aid a country receives from the United States as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). To capture shared economic interests with the United States, we use a standard measure of total trade, the sum of imports from and exports to the United States as a percentage of GDP (in log).

Global public opinion may be shaped not only by *shared* interests but also by *conflicting* interests with the United States. We use a widely employed indicator of conflict, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) with the United States. Another possible source of perceptions of conflicting interests is a history of covert interventions. The United States may use covert action to achieve its desired (rather than stated) aims while probably harming or shortchanging the interests of others. For example, Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger (2002, 220) find evidence for a significant drop in favorable opinions about the United States among the Italian public due to widespread belief that the United States was planning intervention to prevent a Communist government from (legally) taking power.<sup>8</sup> We code this variable as 1 if a country has at least one (known) instance of U.S. covert intervention since 1945.

Our second model of global public opinion assumes that socialized beliefs, values, or expectations matter. To test this, we include variables measuring long- and short-term historical experiences, as well as underlying social and political factors. One type of experience that may be specifically relevant to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan is a given country's recent experience with terrorism.<sup>9</sup> Here we use an indicator of the total number of significant international terrorist incidents in 2001.<sup>10</sup> In addition to this variable measuring recent historical experience, we consider more fundamental factors related to political identity and political culture. First, Inglehart (1990, 291, 295-8) argues that postmaterialism is associated with decreasing emphasis on military security. As rising levels of wealth are highly correlated with such "postmaterialist

8. Of course, it is conceivable that covert action could be "successful" in that it makes a country's leadership friendlier to the United States. If this were the case, it could be that this variable would more appropriately be included under our "influence" model. However, since we use known covert operations (of necessity, obviously), we assume that these will cause the public in a target country to perceive the United States as a threat, even if it is the case that the covert operation was successful. We thank an anonymous reader for pointing this out.

9. Although the number of terrorist incidents might also plausibly be considered a measure of shared interests with the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, we feel it is better considered a measure of socialized sensitivity to terrorist violence. This is because the sources of terrorism vary and may have nothing in common with the Al-Qaeda group that was the object of the U.S. response after September 11. For example, British citizens may understand and support the war in Afghanistan based on their experience with Republican and Loyalist terror in Northern Ireland, but this does not have roots in shared interests.

10. We also tried a variable measuring the annual average terror incidents for the period from 1997 to 2001, which had a similar although slightly less significant effect. Apparently, the most recent terrorist incidents matter most for public opinion.

values” (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Baker 2000), we expect that the higher the level of wealth in a given country, measured by the GDP per capita, the less likely respondents will support the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup> Second, we also consider the degree of democracy because, consistent with Kantian theories of liberal peace, it may be expected that democratic states are less likely to see the actions of another democracy as threatening and more likely to consider them legitimate. Therefore, respondents in countries with higher levels of democracy are expected to be more likely to support the U.S. military action in Afghanistan. Some survey evidence indicates that citizens of democracies do see other democracies as more trustworthy (Russett 1993, 129-30). Finally, because Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda organization both claimed to be advocates of Islam, it may be expected that the war against them will gain less agreement from Muslims than those of other faiths (Atran 2003; Haddad and Khashan 2002). To operationalize this hypothesis, we include the percentage of the population that is Muslim.

For our influence model, we focus on provision of foreign economic aid and use of the news media. It is hardly surprising that donor countries might use development assistance or other economic aid as levers of influence (e.g., Hook 1995; Martin 2000, chap. 5; Wang 1999). Such influence may be in the form of overt threats to cut aid or simply implied by the value of that aid to the recipient country.<sup>12</sup> Thus, we expect that the level of U.S. aid, measured as a proportion of gross national product (GNP), should be positively associated with agreement with, and trust in, U.S. policy.

Another mode of influence is use of the news media to convey the U.S. “message” or “spin” internationally. We argue that a freer press regime will allow greater exposure to international news services, and it will allow the local press to cover more accurately, or at least more diversely, what the U.S. president and other officials do and say. A more restrictive press regime will not allow the U.S. message to penetrate. Therefore, we use a measure of press freedom as a proxy for this kind of persuasive influence. Although in general we expect the effect of press freedom to be positive, a note of caution is in order. If a restrictive government nevertheless supports the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, it may stifle *negative* views about U.S. policy but may allow the U.S. message to be heard or may present its own case for support of the United States. There is, however, no simple way to correct for the media bias of different closed regimes with different positions on the war. Since so much depends on the particular regime and context, we do not propose a fix for this in our analysis, but we note that if some regimes with low press freedom nevertheless use the media to convey the U.S. mes-

11. We considered including Inglehart’s postmaterialist values index but decided against it for several reasons. First, including a variable highly correlated with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita would introduce high multicollinearity into the model, but we were reluctant to drop GDP per capita as an important economic variable. Second, not all countries in our survey were covered in recent World Values Surveys. And third, Inglehart and Baker (2000, 29-30) themselves note that GDP per capita, measured using purchasing power parity as we do here, is so highly related to postmaterialist values that it correctly corresponds to their value categories for sixty-four of the sixty-five countries in their data set.

12. Our measure of overall economic aid is a rough one. Studies that distinguish between both different types of aid and aid given for different reasons (e.g., specifically for influence on foreign publics, purely for development, for influence on foreign governments, or for domestic bureaucratic or political reasons) may reveal different effects. We leave this for further examination in future research.

sage or otherwise support U.S. policy, this will reduce the hypothesized effect. Therefore, our indicator, although it may not account for this nuance, is a conservative measure and is likely to underestimate rather than overestimate the effect.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, we recognize that some countries may have exceptional experiences not accounted for by these independent variables. In our data set, we identified Israel and Albania as countries with special circumstances that might affect public opinion about the United States. Israel's relationship with the United States is widely recognized as exceptional (Lipson 1997; Ray 1985). Since the 1960s, the United States has consistently, though of course not unconditionally, supported Israel in conflicts with its Arab neighbors, and it receives an exceptionally large amount of aid, particularly military aid, from the United States (Organski 1990). Albania is also exceptional because of the 1999 U.S.-led war against Yugoslavia over the issue of Kosovo. The success of the United States in stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians and allowing Kosovo a large amount of autonomy under international protection is expected to have a large effect on Albanian opinion about the war in Afghanistan. In fact, as Table 1 shows, support for the war is strikingly high: 83 percent of respondents agree with the U.S. military action in Afghanistan. It is important to control for these two exceptions to correctly assess the effects of the other variables. We therefore dropped these two observations.<sup>14</sup> Note that we also exclude the United States because our interest is *non-U.S.* public opinion about U.S. foreign policy.

## RESULTS

The results of regressions and summary statistics of all independent variables are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Before interpreting coefficient estimates, let us first examine the potential problem of multicollinearity. When there is a high level of collinearity among independent variables, coefficient standard errors become large, and as a result, confidence intervals of slope coefficients become broader. To detect this problem, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF),  $1/(1 - R_i^2)$ , where  $R_i^2$  is the squared multiple correlation for the regression of an independent variable  $i$  on all the other independent variables. It is usually suggested that a VIF in excess of 10 (i.e.,  $R^2$  being higher than 0.9) may be worthy of further investigation. Some suggest a stricter rule that a VIF in excess of 5 (i.e.,  $R_i^2$  being higher than 0.8) needs remedies. In our estimation, the highest VIF is 3.91 (GDP per capita, Table 3).<sup>15</sup> Since this is clearly

13. In addition, the impact of press freedom ought to be distinguished from the impact of regime type in general. As mentioned, democracies may be more inclined to support the foreign policy of another democracy a priori. Our inclusion of a measure for regime type among the socialization variables controls for this effect.

14. An alternative way to control the effects of these two country-specific effects is to include two country dummy variables. But adding two dummy variables and dropping two observations produce the same regression coefficients.

15. This is based on fifty-nine observations. In some regressions, the number of observations is smaller due to missing values in dependent variables. But for all regressions, no independent variable has a variance inflation factor in excess of 5.

TABLE 2  
Ordinary Least Squares Equations for Aggregate Public Opinion about War in Afghanistan

	<i>Q1a</i>		<i>Q1b</i>		<i>Q2a</i>		<i>Q2b</i>		<i>Q3</i>		<i>Q4a</i>		<i>Q4b</i>	
	<i>U.S.-Led Military Action in Afghanistan</i>		<i>Disagree</i>		<i>Agree</i>		<i>Your Country Should Take Part with the United States</i>		<i>Civilian Casualties Concern (Relative)</i>		<i>War against Islam</i>		<i>Warrior Not Worried</i>	
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Concern (Relative)</i>	<i>Concern (Relative)</i>	<i>Warrior</i>	<i>Not Worried</i>	<i>Warrior</i>	<i>Not Worried</i>
Constant	116.62 (2.36)	20.83 (0.39)	115.38 (2.34)	10.18 (0.16)	20.74 (0.60)	157.07 (3.32)	-24.33 (-1.01)							
Interests														
Mutual defense pact with the United States	-11.06 (-2.04)	13.93 (1.99)	-0.99 (-0.19)	3.65 (0.45)	-4.30 (-1.05)	8.88 (1.44)	-6.30 (-1.48)							
NATO member	24.12 (3.42)	-18.10 (-1.93)	33.84 (4.93)	-30.50 (-2.73)	4.11 (0.77)	-4.84 (-0.57)	8.89 (2.18)							
Military aid from the United States	-0.13 (-0.09)	-0.35 (-0.20)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.64 (-0.51)	1.25 (1.21)	-0.13 (-0.11)	-0.26 (-0.30)							
Trade with the United States	4.41 (1.69)	-2.34 (-0.79)	4.03 (1.76)	-2.97 (-0.95)	1.28 (0.77)	1.97 (0.91)	0.34 (0.22)							
Highest MID with the United States	0.13 (0.09)	1.75 (1.25)	-0.85 (-0.73)	1.51 (1.07)	-1.48 (-0.85)	0.35 (0.24)	0.80 (0.52)							
U.S. intervention	-6.09 (-0.43)	10.18 (0.74)	-5.91 (-0.40)	8.31 (0.58)	1.51 (0.54)	0.99 (0.21)	2.13 (0.37)							
Socialization														
Past terrorist incidents	0.65 (3.46)	-0.39 (-2.12)	1.55 (5.60)	-1.38 (-4.60)	0.18 (1.12)	-0.28 (-1.57)	0.45 (3.04)							
GDP per capita	-4.12 (-1.17)	1.05 (0.27)	-4.51 (-1.39)	1.51 (0.35)	2.59 (0.90)	-8.83 (-2.49)	6.30 (2.48)							
Polity score	1.21 (0.19)	-3.60 (-0.76)	-7.11 (-1.14)	6.64 (1.19)	-16.27 (-2.85)	-1.46 (-0.27)	-0.39 (-0.09)							

Muslim population	-0.29 (-2.21)	0.25 (2.53)	-0.24 (-1.85)	0.15 (1.27)	0.04 (0.40)	-0.11 (-1.29)	0.06 (0.98)
Influence							
Economic aid from the United States	-0.06 (-0.57)	0.04 (0.29)	-0.04 (-0.61)	0.04 (0.45)	-0.03 (-0.33)	-0.10 (-1.20)	0.07 (1.31)
Press freedom	1.34 (1.54)	-1.25 (-1.47)	1.25 (1.45)	-0.84 (-0.98)	0.44 (0.80)	0.18 (0.43)	0.72 (1.36)
Number of observations	59	59	57	57	58	59	59
Root MSE	13.82	13.41	13.33	14.78	9.76	9.99	7.85
R <sup>2</sup> (all variables)	0.50	0.50	0.65	0.54	0.42	0.44	0.56

NOTE: The *t*-statistics are in parentheses. The United States, Israel, and Albania are dropped from the analysis. See the note in Table 1 for specification of dependent variables. NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MID = militarized interstate dispute; GDP = gross domestic product; MSE = mean squared error.

TABLE 3  
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	VIF	1/VIF
Mutual defense pact with the United States	0.53	0.50	0	1	3.00	0.33
NATO member	0.27	0.45	0	1	3.32	0.30
Military aid from the United States	0.83	2.04	0	11.12	3.33	0.30
Trade with the United States	-9.79	1.05	-11.96	-7.18	1.73	0.58
Highest MID with the United States	0.20	0.83	0	4	1.21	0.82
U.S. intervention	0.07	0.25	0	1	1.22	0.82
Past terrorist incidents	1.17	5.14	0	38	1.22	0.82
GDP per capita	8.86	0.98	6.87	10.40	3.91	0.26
Polity score	2.75	0.43	1.10	3.00	2.51	0.40
Muslim population	13.65	26.18	0	99.80	2.46	0.41
Economic aid from the United States	10.62	27.35	0	144.59	2.94	0.34
Press freedom	4.36	3.10	1.31	14.29	2.31	0.43

NOTE: The number of observations (countries) is 59. VIF = variance inflation factor; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MID = militarized interstate dispute; GDP = gross domestic product.

below the commonly used criteria, we can safely include all variables in each regression. Thus, we do not report the results of regressions based on subsets of these independent variables.

The  $R^2$  statistics range from 0.42 to 0.65, and thus the model fits the data reasonably well. The coefficients should be interpreted with some caution, as we produce two sets of estimates for positive and negative responses to questions 1, 2, and 4. For regressions using these three questions, if at least one of the two coefficients for an independent variable reaches the conventional level of significance, we can conclude that it has some significant impact on our dependent variable. But we also pay attention to patterns of the independent variables' effects across all four equations.

Let us first look at variables for shared military interests with the United States. Most consistent with our expectations is NATO membership. It is positively (negatively) and significantly associated with agreement (disagreement) with the war in questions 1 and 2. The most prominent and institutionalized alliance involving the United States does indeed appear to significantly affect public opinion in allied states in favor of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Interestingly, however, mutual defense pacts in general are associated with *disagreement* with the war, the opposite of what might be expected if publics perceive common state-level security interests. The signs of all coefficients are the opposite of those for the NATO membership, and these effects reach the 90 percent significance level in question 1 (for both agreement and disagreement). This may suggest that non-NATO U.S. allies are *less likely* to evince public support than publics in states that are not allied with the United States. But we also need to

note that these “backlash” effects are significant in question 1 but not significant in question 2. Publics in non-NATO U.S. allies may disagree with the war generally and conceptually but do not necessarily disagree when they are asked a more realistic and practical question regarding their government’s decision whether to take part in the war. There is room to investigate such mixed opinions in these states.

When the issue of trust in the United States more generally is examined, publics in NATO member states are significantly more likely to trust U.S. motives, saying that they are not worried that the war against terror will be distorted into a war against Islam. But again there is some evidence for a backlash of mistrust among non-NATO allies of the United States, with the signs of the coefficients in regressions using question 4 indicating that alliance with the United States makes publics more worried about this happening, although the effects do not reach conventional levels of significance.

Military aid has no significant effect in any of the models when the Israeli case is controlled, and the signs of the coefficients do not follow a consistent pattern. By adding the Israel observation to the analysis, military aid shows strong and significant positive correlation with agreement with the war. But this result is highly biased due to the existence of an outlier—Israel.

Trade with the United States has the expected signs, based on our interpretation of liberal theories, in all equations measuring agreement and disagreement with the war (i.e., questions 1 and 2). It barely reaches statistical significance in two of them (question 1, agreement; question 2, agreement). But the effect for trade in the equations assessing general trust of the United States is not significant. In sum, shared economic interests with the United States seem to have some effect on foreign publics’ opinion of U.S. foreign policy, but this is not as robust as some of our other results and may not be associated with a general tendency to trust the United States.

Our indicators for conflicting interests are insignificant as well. A pattern consistent with our expectations for the effects of U.S. interventions does emerge in the equations assessing support of the war, but the significance levels are so low that little confidence can be placed in the direction of the effects.

Our interpretation of these results for the effects of state-level interests on public opinion distinguishes between economic and military issues. In the military realm, only the strongest and most institutionalized interests (NATO) appear to affect opinion about the U.S.-led war and the degree of trust placed in the U.S. conduct of the war on terror. But others have no effect or even an apparent backlash effect. Alliances other than NATO appear to condition publics to be more wary of U.S. behavior in Afghanistan. Somewhat surprisingly, conflicting interests measured by previous disputes or interventions do not appear to negatively affect public opinion about current U.S. policy. In the realm of economic interests, there is some evidence that higher levels of trade may translate into more agreement with the United States.

The second model focuses on socialization. Not too surprisingly, the effect of terrorist incidents is significant and quite substantial. Publics in countries that experienced terrorist incidents on their own soil in 2001 are more likely to support the war in Afghanistan.

We also hypothesized that underlying factors related to political culture would have an effect. Neither postmaterialist values, measured by GDP per capita, nor democracy

is significantly related to agreement/disagreement with the war. However, these variables do appear somewhat relevant to levels of trust in the U.S. conduct of the war on terror. Namely, publics in wealthier countries are less worried about the emergence of a war on Islam, and a higher level of democracy is significantly related to lower levels of concern about bombing civilians in Afghanistan. In fact, regime type is the only significant predictor of the level of concern about bombing civilians, lending some credence to the idea that democratic publics tend to trust the foreign policies of other democratic states more than publics in other types of systems.

We do find a significant effect on agreement/disagreement with the war in the predicted direction for populations with a greater percentage of Muslims, controlling for the exceptional case of Albania. Publics with a higher percentage of Muslims are less likely to agree with the war. The effect on answers to the question about sending troops from one's own country to support the war did not achieve the same level of significance, but the direction of the effect is the same. And the direction of the effect regarding concern for the war on terror turning into a war on Islam also indicates that publics with large Muslim populations are more concerned about this, although the effect does not achieve statistical significance. The negative sign of the coefficient for the level of concern for bombing civilians is somewhat puzzling, but the insignificance of the effect does not allow any strong conclusions to be made. Overall, these results are consistent with conventional wisdom.

Our third model of global public opinion focuses on U.S. influence. We find that the effects of economic aid are not significant at all, and the signs of the effects are not consistent across the equations. There is some evidence for a possible effect of press freedom on agreement or disagreement with the war. Higher levels of press freedom are consistently associated with higher levels of agreement and lower levels of disagreement (in questions 1 and 2). These effects do not reach statistical significance, but it is important to note that this pattern emerges despite the controls for the level of democracy and the level of wealth also included in the model. We prefer not to dismiss this variable completely based on these results. There is at least weak evidence of some consistent effect on opinion about the war (but not on the trust-related variables). It does appear that when a greater diversity of views, including the statements of U.S. leaders, can penetrate to the population, there tends to be more agreement with a controversial U.S.-led war.

## CONCLUSIONS

Global public opinion is quite diverse, ranging from 8 to 9 percent agreement with the U.S.-led war in Pakistan and Greece to 83 percent agreement in Israel and Albania (Table 1). But we expected that it is possible to account for this diversity through a combination of factors related to interests, socialization, and influence. This conjecture was supported by the ability of our variables to account for between 42 and 65 percent of the variation in responses to the four questions examined here. As discussed earlier, each of these three models has some connection to existing theoretical

approaches. Below we summarize our results and interpret them in light of the relevant theories.

It does not appear that public opinion consistently reflects state-level security and economic “national interests” as operationalized here. Foreign publics are not opportunistic in that they will not support U.S. action just because there are shared military interests or potential benefits. There may even be a backlash against security cooperation among non-NATO allies. We also found that publics do not seem to have long memories of conflicting interests, represented by disputes and interventions. There is evidence that levels of trade have some positive influence on foreign public opinion. And NATO countries do seem to be more likely to agree with U.S. action, at least in the case of Afghanistan, although more recent experience with the war in Iraq suggests that this closer identity of interests is not strong enough to be taken for granted.

These results are problematic at least for those versions of realism that assume public opinion is easily manipulated by national leaders. On the other hand, they lend support to theories that expect public opinion to have an independent stance regarding foreign policy, such as the rational-public approach and the liberal peace literature. Indeed, in our analysis, public opinion globally appears to be positively affected by economic interdependence (bilateral trade) and a well-institutionalized international organization (NATO), consistent with liberal theories (Oneal and Russett 1997). On the other hand, our results also caution against simplistic use of the liberal peace literature as a guide to global public opinion about U.S. foreign policy. Citizens of democracies were no more likely to agree with the war in Afghanistan than were those in other societies. There is some evidence that they are more trusting of the foreign policy of another democracy (question 3), and this is similar to the effect of postmaterialist values, which are associated with less concern over the war on terror transforming into a war on Islam. Why these two aspects of the most “advanced” societies are associated in this way with issues of trust of the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism must remain a question for further confirmation and exploration.

However, other socialized factors are clearly important—notably though not very surprising, direct experience with terrorism and the percentage of Muslims in the population. One inference that can be drawn is that socialized values, beliefs, and perceptions (or, in short, political culture) may not consistently and generally shape public opinion about U.S. action. Rather, they matter mainly in a context-dependent way; namely, the effects of socialized variables may change with their direct relevance to the particular U.S. policy in question. The war in Afghanistan clearly has relevance both to terrorism and to Muslims. Other actions, such as the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, would probably elicit different patterns of association among the same socialization variables. This points to a complex and context-dependent relationship between global opinion and international relations.

Regarding the scope for U.S. efforts to influence international public opinion, we find that while economic aid has no effect, there is at least a weak indication that the U.S. “message” does. Allowing the U.S. message to penetrate the airwaves and newspaper columns does increase support for the war in Afghanistan. There may be scope for transnational influence on public opinion, as suggested by two-level games and second-image reversed frameworks. Our results suggest at least that rhetoric is a more

powerful tool in this respect than economic levers. Of course, we were not able to examine the effect of specific messages on the publics in specific countries, nor were we able to control for the diversity of types and goals of economic aid provided by the United States (Hook 1995).

Overall, our analysis suggests important transnational factors that have consequences for the dynamics of international relations. The picture our analysis paints is one of a complex world in which a dominant power can gain support internationally but not consistently along simple parameters of state-level interests or basic factors of political culture. Publics outside the United States may be wary of it, or negatively affected by their state's interaction with it, but also are not entirely beyond the effect of trade ties, strong institutionalized alliances, or rhetorical persuasion. There is some room for agenda setting and for transnational influence on non-U.S. publics. This world bares striking resemblance to that described by Keohane and Nye's (1977) concept of "complex interdependence," although they do not directly consider international dynamics of public opinion. How global public opinion might be incorporated into their framework is one of our top priorities in future research.

We believe our findings have general significance beyond the context of the war in Afghanistan, but future research should test how robust these findings are with different survey data. Cross-national surveys are increasingly common in political science research. We should use these different sets of data to deepen our understanding of global public opinion and the dynamics of international relations. In particular, our three models and the related hypotheses should be tested using different survey data from different samples of states in both crisis and noncrisis periods.

## APPENDIX

### List of Independent Variables

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*Mutual defense pact with the United States:* A dummy variable coded 1 if a country has a mutual defense pact with the United States and 0 otherwise. Source: COW2 "Alliances" data file (v3.01/dyadic 3.02), <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/>.

*NATO member:* A dummy variable coded 1 if a country is a member of NATO and 0 otherwise.

*Military aid from the United States:* The sum of the military aid (in millions of U.S. dollars for 1997-2000) a country receives from the United States divided by real GDP in 1990 millions of U.S. dollars. Sources: Real GDP in 2000, "Foreign Policy Database, 1800-2000," <http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/staff/home/polbeg/>; the amount of military aid, "U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Online," <http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>.

*Trade with the United States:* A natural log of the sum of imports from and exports to the United States (the means for 1998-2000 in millions of U.S. dollars) divided by real GDP in 1990 millions of U.S. dollars. Source: "Global Market Information Database," <http://www.euromonitor.com/gmidv1>. For the data source of the real GDP, see "Military Aid from the United States."

*Highest MID with the United States:* The highest hostility level of MIDs (the scale ranging from 0 to 5) with the United States during the period from 1990 to 2000. Source: COW2 "Militarized Interstate Disputes" data set (version 3.01), <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>.

*U.S. intervention:* A dummy variable coded 1 if a country has at least one (known) instance of U.S. covert intervention since 1945. These are the Dominican Republic (1965-1966),

Greece (1947-1949, 1967), Guatemala (1954, 1966-1967), and the Philippines (1948-1954). Sources: Stephen Van Evera et al., "American Interventions in the Third World: An Overview," <http://www.mit.edu/afs/athena/course/17/17.40/www/interven.pdf> and Zoltan Grossman and Will Miller, "Over a Century of U.S. Military Interventions (revised 5.16.99, 4.6.03)," <http://www.uvm.edu/~wmiller/interventions.html>.

*Past terrorist incidents:* The total number of significant international terrorist incidents in 2001. The incidents included are those that have met the U.S. government's Incident Review Panel criteria and listed in Appendix A (Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2001) of the following report. Source: U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001," <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism>.

*GDP per capita:* A natural log of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP). Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2000).

*Polity score:* Source: "Polity IV," <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity>. Since the distribution of the original democracy score (ranging from -7 to 10 for the countries included in this survey) is highly skewed, we added 10 and took a natural log. The polity score for Hong Kong is unavailable, and we estimated it using six governance indicators (for 2000-2001) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoidi-Lobatón (2002).

*Muslim population:* The percentage of the population that is Muslim. Source: "Islamic Web," <http://islamicweb.com>. Countries not included in their list are assumed to have no Muslims.

*Economic aid from the United States:* The sum of the economic aid (in millions of U.S. dollars for 1997-2000) a country receives from the United States divided by real GDP in 1990 millions of U.S. dollars. Source: "U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Online," <http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>. For the data source of the real GDP, see "Military Aid from the United States."

*Press freedom:* The average of 2001 and 2002 scores of Freedom House. Source: "Press Freedom Survey," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm>. Since the original score shows the higher the value the less freedom, we recode it as 100 times an inverse of the original score.

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