Political Security:
Toward a Broader Conceptualization*

Takashi Inoguchi

World politics is best characterized by insecurity and chaos. Where there is no significant domination, the result is an "anarchical society", to use one of Hedley Bull's terms,[1] in which people are often forced to cope with insecurity. The pursuit for security in world politics has presented itself in various forms, which is accounted time and again in history. The problem here is that the word security, too often, is not precisely defined and therefore can be interpreted in a variety of ways. This article offers a broader but more precise conceptualization of the term political security and a typology thereof so that various political security policies and their transformations are better understood. The main argument here is that, because of the prevalent distinction between internal and external security in the definition of political security and the attitude that external environments need to be changed to increase political security, with the internal status quo taken for granted, our discussion on political security tends to suffer from the insufficient attention to internal mechanisms for shaping and restructuring political security policy. Hence we ought to broaden our conception of political security.[2] This perspective has gained increasing credence since the events of 11 September 2001 which underlined how governance in one country, however remote and small, can affect governance in the rest of the world so dramatically. One could attribute this insufficient attention to internal mechanisms to the following two major

The author is Professor of Political Science. Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, Japan.

[1] Hedley Bull. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

[2] This focus is indeed pervasive in many works in comparative politics. As for the literature on developing countries, see, for example, a series of books published by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics. For literature on the industrial countries, see, for example, Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); and Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1974).

reasons. One is the usual academic separation between comparative politics and international relations. In comparative politics, the development of the internal state apparatus against the potential and actual "anti-system" oppositions, the co-option and incorporation of citizens into, and consolidation of the support bases for, the political system tends to be focused.[3] In international relations, how to cope with external threats—especially nuclear threats—has led to politico-economic interdependence among nations which has resulted in a great deal of research.[4] The second relates to the somewhat natural psychological inclination to assume that it is "they" not "we" who cause security problems and that security threats are bound to come from outside. This tendency is often further reinforced by the following two facts: that the ruling elites normally do not want to see the internal values and institutions fundamentally questioned; and that a local or global hegemonial power does not want to see the values and practices born of the hegemonial structure fundamentally undermined.

Two Dimensions of Political Security Policy

Before I go on to discuss two dimensions of political security policy, I need to define political security. Political security can be defined as the reasonable freedom of action that enables one to pursue and achieve the objectives that national actors deem essential to defend even in the potential and/or actual presence of primarily external threats to national actors in world politics.[5] Three components in the definition need to be elaborated.

[3] The focus on external threats was pervasive especially during the Cold War period in most of the literature on international relations. See, for example, George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). As for the integration and interdependence literature, see, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "International Interdependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Palsby, eds, *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8, International Relations,* Ch. 5 (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975).

[4] Recent attempts to put more emphasis on internal mechanisms as the explanatory variables of foreign policy include Katzenstein in his attempt to explain differences in foreign economic policy of advanced industrialized countries and Rothenstein in his work on the foreign and development policies options the developing countries have in the international system. Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structure: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," *International Organization,* vol. 30, no. 1 (winter), 1976, pp. 1–45; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., "Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," Special Issue, *International Organization,* vol. 31, no. 4, August 1977; Robert L. Rothestein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Studies on political security abound. See, for example, the following: Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics,* vol. XXX, no. 2, (January 1978), pp. 167–214; and George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977).

[5] This definition is a modification of the definition used in Aimo Pajunen, "Finland's Security Policy," in The Finnish Political Science Association, ed., *Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy* (Vammala, Helsinki: Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1969), pp. 7–30. Economic security is not specifically considered here although it can be subsumed in our conception of political security. As for economic security, see, for example, Wolfgang Hager, *Europe's Economic Security: Non-energy Issues in the*

Presence of National Objectives

If there are no national objectives or goals that national actors wish to achieve or values that they wish to defend, then political security loses its meaning. The objectives, goals or values can be defined in many ways, depending upon the internal and external conditions national actors find themselves in. The modifier *national* is included in order to show that we conceive of political actors. The inclusion, however, does not prevent us from considering individual, subnational and transnational objectives, some of which are often hard to distinguish from national objectives.[6]

Potential and/or Actual Presence of Primarily External Threat

If there is no logical possibility of national actors being threatened, then it is not necessary to consider national security. In the absence of complete world domination by one power it is not hard to see why most of the national actors claim that there are potential threats in the world or in a region to justify their security policy in terms of major security threats to them. Threat perception and its justification are thus entirely dependent on each national actor. In other words, threat perception and its justification are mostly subjective, even to the extent of reflecting the complete fantasy of an insane dictator or the expression of the collective persecution complex of a small nation historically victimized by the greed of bigger powers. The modifier "primarily external" is used in order to show that our chief concern here is national actors coping with perceived threats emanating from outside national boundaries. The usage of this modifier does not, however, preclude the possibility of threat emanating from within for two reasons: (*a*) because a threat is perceived and justified by national actors who often fail to distinguish between internal and external threats; and (*b*) because threat from within may invite/cause threat from without and vice versa.

Pursuit and Achievement of Freedom of Action

When there are a number of national actors operating within a broad framework of dependence, interdependence and independence vis-à-vis each other, it is natural to see that the degree of freedom of action differs from one actor to another and that the degree to which they are successful in augmenting freedom of action also differs from one actor to another. Freedom of action means the political capability to take action and effectuate the desired outcomes by the action.[7]

International Political Economy (Paris: The Atlantic Institute of International Affairs, 1976); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Collective Economic Security," *International Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 4, October 1974, pp. 584–98.

[6] See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[7] As for the behavioural conceptualization of power, i.e., control over resources, over men over outcomes, see Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International

In my discussion, I would emphasize only two of the dimensions of political security policy, even foregoing some of the important dimensions which are normally dealt with.[8] The first is the *focus of attention*. Political security policy is either *outward-looking* or *inward-looking*. It is outward-looking when the primary focus of attention and primary objects of security policy are external. In other words, one tries to change other external actors and/or cope with environments assuming that no large-scale transformation in internal values and institutions is necessary, or desirable, or possible. In contrast to this perspective, the inward-looking security perspective tries to bring about and/or cope with changes in internal values and institutions rather than effectuate, and/or cope with, changes in international environments in order to augment national security. The distinction is, needless to say, a matter of degree. However, by making this distinction we like to broaden the too often narrow political security conceptualization. This distinction should not be taken as external security *versus* internal security orientation. Rather my basic thrust is to emphasize that internal and external security are closely interrelated and that it is unwise to sharply posit internal security orientation vis-à-vis the external one. Indeed, it is the policy target—by the changes in which one tries to enhance national security—that makes an important difference.

The second dimension is the *level of activity*. Political security policy can be *active* or *passive*. This distinction should not be confused as extrovert versus introvert orientation. 'Extrovert' implies that it is both outward-looking and active whereas 'introvert' implies that it is both inward-looking and passive. The active versus passive dimension concerns only the level of activity, neither the focus of attention nor the target of policy. One can be outward-looking and passive, or alternatively inward-looking and active simultaneously.

On the basis of the above conceptualization, two main points may now be recapitulated. I have maintained that internal and external security are not easy to distinguish empirically and thus any framework for conceptualizing security should not sharply distinguish between them. Internal self-restructuring is one mode of augmenting political security and should be incorporated into the wider framework of security studies.

Internal versus External Security

The quasi-monopoly on coercive apparatus by the ruling elite provides a strong argument against the oft-made sharp distinction between internal and external

---

Relations," *International Organization*, vol. 39, no. 2 (spring), 1976, pp. 289–305. As for the structuralist conception of power, see, for example, Nicos Poulantzs, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973). A broader overview of power can be seen in Tom R. Burns and Walter Buckley, eds, *Power and Control: Social Structures and Their Transformation* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976).

[8] See, for example, K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); and Edward L. Morse, *A Comparative Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy: Notes on Theorizing*, Research Monograph, No. 36 (Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1971).

security. In most societies a vast amount of money is spent for military purposes, with the time-honoured justification of external threats. The point, however, is that in many heavily-armed societies, the problem of internal security looms large—sometimes even larger than external security—in the minds of the controlling elements of society. However, their successes or failures are dependent not simply upon the repressive capacity of the state but also upon the state's ability to satisfy the various demands of the people in terms of wealth, liberty, affection, health and respect (Lasswell). In some countries the controlling elements of society are fearful whereas in others they rely more upon their political performance in terms of realization of human values. To the ruling elite, security often means their own security, both political and personal. This distinction between internal and external security gets blurred especially when the ruling elite is not quite representative of the people. In this kind of situation the distinction does not make much sense. Even in the relatively "healthy" situation in which there exists less reliance on the state's repressive capacity, internal and external security are neither logically nor empirically separable.

Internal Self-Restructuring

The frequently made distinction between internal and external security tends to reinforce the heavy attention paid to external security when one deals with political security in world politics. As will be seen in my subsequent discussion on the classification of security policy, the manipulation/manoeuvring syndromes are paid attention to most often and the conquest/hegemony syndromes come second in terms of preference (see Figure 1). The others are considered only occasionally. However, if we broaden our perspective slightly to include the possibility of augmenting or sacrificing some (or all) of the internally preserved values and institutions, then we can have a broader conceptualization of political security. That is, the possibility of internal restructuring. If we conceive of security on the basis of the assumption of no societal transformation, that leads to a distortion of the reality. For not only war and diplomacy (primarily external) but also revolution and politics (primarily internal) alter the security position of a state. World politics is, literally, transnational politics. I will turn now to the explication of eight security syndromes.

Eight Types of Political Security Policy

I propose the following taxonomy of political security policy along the two dimensions I have clarified in the preceding section (see Figure 1).

Conquest/Hegemony

When one is outward-looking and active, we can find the syndromes of conquest/ hegemony. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the conquest

Figure 1
Eight Types of Political Security Policy

	Focus of Attention	
	Outward-looking	Inward-looking
Active *Level of Activity* **Passive**	A1 Conquest 　　　A2 　　　Hegemony	B1 Revolution 　　　B2 　　　Finlandization
	C1 Manipulation 　　　C2 　　　Manoeuvring	D1 Seclusion 　　　D2 　　　Submission

Note: *"1" stands for a strong form and "2" for a weak form.*

syndrome whereas in a weak form it assumes the hegemony syndrome. National actors with either one of these syndromes attempt to extend internal values outside national boundaries whether it is by direct rule or by indirect rule.

One can find many historical and contemporary examples of the conquest syndrome. The Ch'ing conquest of the Jungar Mongol empire in the mid-eighteenth century is one example. The Ch'ien-lung emperor, annoyed with the most important enemy of the Chinese empire, the Mongols, who continually threatened the states under Chinese suzerainty and China itself, took advantage of the internal strife in the Jungar empire and exterminated the last nomadic empire in the 1760s. The emperor imposed his rule over the area, though through the "loose reign" policy.[9] The Israeli occupation of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights after the 1967 war is another example. The fact that the state of Israel feels extremely insecure about its own survival in the face of persistent Arab hostility makes the argument convincing enough to many Israelis that Israel is safe only when there are enough territories to absorb the shock of Arab strikes for effective counter-offensive.[10]

---

[9] The best account of the Jungar empire is found in I. Ya. Zlatkin, *Istoriia Zungarskogo Khanstva* (A History of the Jungar Khanate) (Moscow, 1964); and Saguchi Toru, *18–19 seiki higashi Torukisutan shakai shi kenkyu* (A Study of the Social History of Eastern Turkistan during 18th and 19th Century), (Tokyo, 1963). Also see Takashi Inoguchi, *Wars as International Learning: Chinese British and Japanese in East Asia*, Ph.D. Dissertation, (MIT, 1974), Ch. 8.

[10] For Israeli security policy and its underlying logic, see, for example, David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967: A Study of the Conflict from the Perspective of Coercion in the Context of Inter-Arab and Big Power Relations* (New York: Pegasus, 1967); Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977); Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).

The British empire controlling the seven seas throughout most of the nineteenth century is an example of hegemony. It was based on the principle of "informal rule if possible; formal rule if necessary".[11] Palmerston, a prime minister in mid-Victorian England, took pride in the least-vulnerable security position Britain enjoyed then. With such a belief Britain resorted to occasional naval bombardment, or "dressing", to force the "less civilized" to conform to the wishes of Britain.[12]

American hegemony during the period 1945–71 is another example, even though it is sometimes called the shortest-lived empire in human history. *Pax Americana* also preferred indirect control to direct rule or direct manipulation.[13] Thus the utmost effort was made to promote and maintain capitalist governments in the non-Communist world during this period, with the back-up of its then overwhelming nuclear and naval power and communications and intelligence networks. One such effort ended with a forced withdrawal in the face of a determined enemy, camouflaged by the self-deceptive slogan of "peace of honor".[14] In cases of unchallenged hegemony, the hegemon finds it comparatively easy to maintain it. But once it is challenged, the hegemon requires the support of its allies to maintain the hegemonial network. This results in loosening the grip the hegemon has over its allies, with the eventual disappearance of hegemony.[15]

[11] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, vol. VI, no. 1, 1953, pp. 1–15. For the debate on the imperialism of free trade, see also the following: Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1966); Oliver MacDonagh, "The Anti-imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, vol. xiv, no. 3, 1962, pp. 489–501; D.C.M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, vol. XXI, 1968, pp. 296–306; B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Economics of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750–1850* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Michael Barratt Brown, *After Imperialism*, revised edition, (New York: Humanities Press, 1970); W.R. Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson-Gallagher Controversy* (New York: Watts, 1975); C.C. Eldridge, *Victorian Imperialism* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978).

[12] Inoguchi, *War as International Learning*, chs 11–16.

[13] Franz Schurman, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Michael T. Klare, *War without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams* (New York: Knopf, 1972).

[14] On Vietnam, see, for example David Haberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett, 1973); Frances Fitz Gerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Gareth Porter, *A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Peace Agreement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). On Angola, see, for example, John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 3, April 1976, pp. 407–25.

[15] A vivid account of the Nixon years is provided by Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978). Also see Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). As for the process of imperial decline, see, for example, C.M. Cipolla, ed., *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London: Methuen, 1970).

Revolution/Finlandization

When one is inward-looking and active, we find the syndromes of revolution/Finlandization. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the revolution syndrome whereas in a weak form it is called the Finlandization syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes question their internal values and institutions and attempt to alter, wholly or partially, internal arrangements to develop a better security position.

Revolution can be considered as one type of security policy. It is sometimes believed that only when polity undergoes an internal metamorphosis can it revive its secure position among nations. The policy is directly targeted at the internal values and systems, both of which are now openly questioned. When external security policy does not secure its objectives, the internal values and objectives which express themselves in external security policy must also be questioned. In order to bring about the changes in external security policy, the whole fabric of the polity, society and economy is transformed. In other words, revolution is called for. It is not hard to find historical and contemporary examples to illustrate internal transformation of the polity in relation to the considered inadequacy of external security policy, if not solely because of it.

The Russian revolution of 1917 is one such example. The revolution called for peace, for an end to serving the interests of the Entente against the Axis, which required the overthrow of the government with its dominance by landlord-bourgeois coalition.[16]

The Turkish revolution of 1923, headed by Ataturk, is another example. The Ottoman policy of defending its imperial territory and protectorates against Balkan nationalist movements supported by Russia became increasingly untenable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the empire was dealt severe blows in one war after another. The wastage of resources for the purpose went against Turkeys own interest, if not the interest of the ruling elite. Ataturk called for relinquishing the Ottoman legacy of imperial adventurism, for confining Turkish efforts to Anatolia and for the peace and development of the country. Indeed, as Ataturk himself stated: "What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the state. Thus it is necessary that foreign policy should agree with the internal organization."[17]

The Portuguese revolution that started in 1974 provides yet another example. The Armed Forces Movement (MFA) led the revolution to bring about two fundamental changes in Portugal and its African colonies: a socialist revolution in metropolitan Portugal and the decolonization of Portuguese Africa. The MFA relinquished its role as "the tools of a stagnating, imperialist strategy" to restore

---

[16] The best account is given by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, in Thomas D.M., *Alexander Solzhenitsyn: A Century in his Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

[17] Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

"the dignity of the military as the defenders of the freedom of their citizenry".[18] It was a symbolic revolution in which both the accumulated inner contradictions in the corporatist order created and defended by Salazar Caetano and the repression against nationalist movements combined and reinforced each other, only to create a new order which ultimately negated both of them.[19]

People's war, considered as one form of revolution, is a security policy. To put an end to the dominance by the old ruling class which vacillated between Sihanouk's neutralism and Lor Nol's reliance on the United States, without fundamental self-restructuring to cope with the historical threats both from Vietnam and Thailand, the People's Liberation Front of Kampuchea waged a people's war against the forces which defended the old order by relying on diplomatic manipulation and manoeuvring,[20] and transformed the society to effectively overcome threats from the neighbours. Whether the new forces now in power would be able to do so is of course another question. What is important to note here is that the new ruling elite seem to believe that it is the only way for the survival of the Khmers, who have been exploited and oppressed by the two powerful neighbours for centuries, although the way in which the whole society is being restructured seems to have been shaped by the suspicion and mistrust held by the new ruling elite during the decades of hardship of underground existence.[21]

Finlandization is a term which is used with a pejorative connotation. In my discussion, however, the term has been used to denote the security policy of a state which attempts to maintain and/or augment its security by the partial restructuring of its internal and external policies for the sake of securing its survival.

Finland is clearly such an example.[22] Recognizing Russian security interests has been considered by the Finns as essential for their survival as a country. Rather than seeking to avoid great power conflict through non-committal neutrality as

[18] Rona M. Fields, *The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement* (New York: Praeger, 1976); William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West* (London: Penguin, 1972); Michael Harsgor, *Portugal in Revolution*, The Washington Papers, Vol. III, (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1976); Phil Mailer, *Portugal: The Impossible Revolution* (New York: Free Life, 1977).

[19] Tad Szulc, "Lisbon and Washington: Behind Portugal's Revolution." *Foreign Policy*, no. 1 (winter), 1975–1976, pp. 3–62. As for the general development of Portuguese society and politics, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1977).

[20] Michael Leifer, *Cambodia: The Search for Security* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967); Milton Osborne, *Politics and Power in Cambodia* (Camberwell, Australia: Longman, 1973); Michael Leifer, "The International Dimensions of the Cambodian Conflict." *International Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 4, October 1975, pp. 531–43.

[21] George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Vietnam: Enmity or Alliance," *Pacific Community*, vol. 9, no. 3, April 1978; Karl D. Jackson, "Cambodia 1977: Gone to Pot," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 76–90; Francois Ponchaud, *Cambodge Annee Zero* (Paris: Julliard, 1977); Anthony Paul, *Murder in a Gentle Land* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977).

[22] George Maude, *The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in the Shadow of Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Finland pursued in the pre-1945 days, in the post-Second World War period it pursued neutrality through commitment, i.e., without jeopardizing Soviet security interests in Finland. After recognizing Soviet security interests, Finland attempted to minimize the chances that would compel the Soviet Union to resort to force vis-à-vis Finland by seeking to create internal and external conditions which made the Soviet Union less secure. For the purpose of maintaining political security, the state-controlled radio and TV network refrained from making unfavourable comments on the Soviet Union and its neighbours in Eastern Europe.[23] The internal political equilibrium had to be meticulously preserved not to allow the dominance of either anti-Soviet political forces or Communist forces in Finland.[24]

Nepal provides another example, though of a somewhat different kind. The Gurkha kingdom of Nepal had a conflict of interests with British India since the British ascendancy in India. One of the British expansions was directed to North India, towards which Nepal was also trying to expand. In 1814–15, there was a war between the British and the Gurkhas which resulted in the defeat of the latter. After that the Gurkhas developed cordial relationships with the British in India, who guaranteed the survival of Nepal as a state. Four factors were responsible for this development. The first was that British India's hegemony coincided with China's loss of interest in Himalayan politics after the 1791–92 campaign and subsequent internal and external troubles throughout the nineteenth century. The loss of China's presence in Himalayan politics made it difficult for the Gurkhas to use their special relationship with China as a leverage against British India. The second was that the Gurkhas had proved themselves as a tough adversary who could pose a serious threat to the British presence in India twice, i.e., in 1814–15 and in 1875. The third was that the Gurkhas provided the British with soldiers who fought in the defence of British imperial interests. The fourth was the Gurkhas' self-conscious efforts not to encourage or express anti-British sentiments internally.[25]

Manipulation/Manoeuvring

When one is outward-looking and passive we can find the syndromes of manipulation/manoeuvring. When this perspective takes a strong form, it assumes the

---

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[24] Contrasting interpretations of Finnish foreign policy can be seen in Maude. *The Finnish Dilemma* and John P. Bloyantes, *Silk Globe Hegemony; Finnish-Soviet Relations, 1944–1974: A Case Study on the Theory of the Soft Sphere of Influence* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1975). See also Max Jacobson, *The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1940* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[25] The evolution of Nepali foreign policy is described in, for example, Leo Rose, *Nepal: Struggle for Survival* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1971); Suzuki Chusei, *Chibetto o meguru Chu-In Kankeishi* (History of Sino-Indian relations with respect to Tibet: From the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century), (Tokyo, 1962); K.C. Chaudhri, *Ango-Nepali Relations till the Gurkha War* (Calcutta, 1960). See also Inoguchi, *War as International Learning*, ch. 12.

manipulation syndrome, whereas in a weak form it becomes the manoeuvring syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to cope with environments without questioning internal values and institutions.

Manipulation is perhaps one of the most frequently used types of security policy. Manipulation as security policy is important for two reasons: one is that most national actors consider their security policy with internal values and institutions as given or something not to be altered; the other is the fundamental difficulty in changing the attitude of other actors in accordance with one's wishes. Hence national actors resort to manipulation and manoeuvring. Balance of power is a phrase traditionally used to describe the essence of diplomacy, which often resorts to manipulation and manoeuvring. Though outward-looking in its focus of attention, its activity level is passive. Manipulation is a stronger form than manoeuvring in that the former assumes that the action is taken toward other actors whereas the latter takes other's actions as givens. In the conventional discussion of foreign policy and even defence and security policies, one often tends to narrowly focus on this type of policy.

Vietnam is an example of the policy of manipulation. It perennially confronted two big powers, China and the former Soviet Union. The Vietnamese perceived both the powers as having an inclination to interfere in Vietnam's internal affairs. As a result, they used manipulation in a very complex manner. Dynamic power-balancing may be a better term for the Vietnamese policy. Vietnam, though basically self-reliant, could not offend the two big powers due to their war-time help and other reasons, even though both China and the Soviet Union were at odds with each other. After the war, Vietnam needed economic assistance for reconstruction and development. During the famine of 1977, for example, Vietnam kept balancing them to increase its bargaining leverage and to sustain its independence and self-reliance. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese did not hesitate in using the Russians to cope better with the historic enemy, the Chinese, and vice versa, and made use of capitalist countries to counterbalance the pressure emanating from the two big neighbours.[26]

The US policy in the post-1969 period is another example. Having lost its overwhelming hegemony, Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy attempted to rebuild its

---

[26] See, for example, Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow* (Peking, Hanoi, New York: Pegasus, 1967); and Takashi Inoguchi and Motoo Furuta, *18 seiki matsu Betonamu no Seizan undo no rekishiteki hyoka: Betonamu no rekishika Van Tan shi no saikinsaku ni kanrenshite* (Various Interpretations of the Tay-Son Movement in late Eighteenth Century Vietnam—With Special reference to Recent Works by Van Tan), Research Monograph C-6, (Sophia University Institute of International Relations, 1976). A similar phenomenon can be found in North Korea's foreign policy. See Wayne S. Kiyosaki, *North Korea's Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–1976* (New York: Praeger, 1976). See also Takashi Inoguchi, *Kokusaikankei no suryo bunseki, Peking, Pyonyang, Moscow, 1961-nen-1966-nen* (The quantitative Analysis of International Relations, Peking, Pyonyang and Moscow, 1961–1966), (Tokyo: Gannando Publisher, 1970); and Takashi Inoguchi, "Measuring Friendship and Hostility among Communist Powers: Some Unobtrusive Measures of Esoteric Communications," *Social Science Research*, vol. 1, no. 1, April 1972, pp. 79–105.

position on the basis of what they called "multipolar reality". Manipulation policy was preferred to hegemonial policy. Its most spectacular manifestation was the US rapprochement with China in 1971. In the East Asian balance of power, the US saw less possibility of the area being dominated by one hegemonial power, with China and Japan restraining each other and with the Soviet Union competing with China. In the field of nuclear balance, the US was once contemplating to deploy the military and check the Soviet Union on its eastern borders and more importantly in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).[27]

Manoeuvring is a type of security policy often used by actors with less resources for survival and security, especially when the internal status quo is not questioned. Thailand provides such an example. Two drastic changes in its environment gave rise to its manoeuvring policy or the policy of "bending with the wind". One was the Japanese advance into the Indo-China peninsula in 1941. By joining the Japanese camp, Thailand obtained a large territory of two western provinces of Cambodia in return. However, as soon as it became clear that Japan was losing, Thailand altered its position. The other related to the American retreat from the Indo-China peninsula in 1975. When it became obvious that Hanoi was the quasi-hegemonial power in the Indo-China peninsula, Thailand ensured withdrawal of the American military forces from its soil so as not to provoke Hanoi.[28]

Another example is the apartheid regime of South Africa. Despite its apartheid policy, the creation of unviable *bantustans* and exclusiveness in the power structure, South Africa defended the Orwellian Garrison state by manoeuvring big power influences. Despite all the accusations and opposition against South Africa's Afrikaaner regime, it survived because of its manoeuvring, its clever non-commitment in Rhodesia and the covert but major help of international financial capital.[29]

Seclusion/Submission

When one is inward-looking and passive, we can find the syndromes of seclusion/submission. When this perspective takes a strong form, it becomes the seclusion syndrome whereas in a weak form it is called the submission syndrome. National actors with either of these syndromes attempt to confine the internal values and institutions within national boundaries and seek to minimize the extent to which they are undermined. Here political security is more internal than external.

[27] Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle," *Foreign Policy*, no. 23 (summer), 1976, pp. 3–23.

[28] See, for example, Sarasin Viraphol, *Directions in Thai Foreign Policy*, Occasional Paper No. 40 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).

[29] R.W. Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (London: Macmillan, 1977); Martin Legassick, *Capitalism and Segregation in South Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1977); James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); John de St. Jorre, *A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future* (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977).

Seclusion is a type of security which is inward-looking but does not question the internal values and institutions. It is also passive and tries to dissociate itself from others. Even at the time of "interdependence" examples of seclusion are not lacking.

Albania is one such example. Reduced to dependence for long by great powers, including Ottoman Turkey, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and most recently China, Albania literally stands alone, with its foreign contacts and transactions kept at a minimum. Although deeply disappointed by the attitude of all the three Communist powers who extended "helping hands" to Albania to suit their own interests, the Albanians felt that associations with other countries would only jeopardize the nation's survival and sovereignty. The less-developed economy and tight control by the Communists enabled Albania to adhere to this type of security policy. Yugoslavia's territorial "ambition", the Soviet Union's "hegemonism" and China's "betrayal" of the cause of anti-American imperialism convinced the insecure yet determined ruling elites of Albania of the wisdom of seclusion or "honorable" isolation.[30]

A more appropriate example of seclusion policy is Japan during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Japanese commercial activity then flourished at home and abroad, extending as far as to the East and South China Sea. The sixteenth century coincided with the entry of the Portuguese and Spaniards into Japan, who introduced Christianity and the use of guns among other things. The religious-cum-political activities of the Portuguese and Spanish Catholics sought to convert a number of regional military warriors, called *daimyo*, into Christianity. These converts in turn were suspected of opening the way to the Christianization-cum-colonization of Japan. Regulations of external transactions were gradually stepped up in the early seventeenth century and by the mid-seventeenth century, all types of external trade, travel and migration were forbidden. However, there were two exceptions. One was the controlled trade with the Chinese and the Dutch at a small port on the southern edge of Japan. The other was the relationship with Korea. Korea sent missions to Edo (presently Tokyo) with the purpose of establishing friendship. But in reality these missions were sent to collect intelligence about the possibility of another Japanese invasion (after that of the 1590s). It also received the tributary missions from the lord of Tsushima, the survival of which depended largely on trade with Korea. The seclusion of Japan was almost complete and in the following 200 years it had virtually no foreign relations.[31]

Submission is not normally considered as a type of security policy, although in the absence of any other viable alternative it is often adopted. The submission policy is inward-looking and passive but faces partial or total restructuring of its

---

[30] Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albaniana* (London: C. Hurst, 1975); Nicholas C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968); W.E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963); Charles Gati, ed., *The International Politics of Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

[31] George Sansom, *The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures* (New York: Knopf, 1950).

internal values and institutions by conquerors.[32] However, since submission is never complete, there are possibilities of striking a bargain as to the terms of submission. Once this process is over and the terms of dependence[33] are settled then the possibility of the weak power exerting pressure on the strong opens.

Hungary provides an obvious example. In 1956 the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary to prevent the latter from deserting the Warsaw Pact. The rapid development towards a Western style of freedom in politics, i.e., the abandonment of the Leninist socialist path, led the Soviets to intervene. Janos Kadar who replaced Imre Nagy succeeded in his attempts to give the Hungarians freedom without deviating from the doctrinal discipline and foreign policy course that the Soviet Union set for Hungary to emulate. Soviet power was deeply felt since the events of 1956 and the Hungarians were convinced that there was no viable alternative to staying in the Soviet sphere of influence. In other words, as long as the Soviet Union existed, there was no other viable security policy for Hungary. Thus Hungary put emphasis on internal liberalization and economic reforms *without* trying to adopt a more conspicuous and independent foreign policy. In other words, "in order to be able to do more at home", it was "inclined to hold back in foreign policy, and to give way to pressure from Moscow".[34] In this way the Hungarians regained much of what they lost despite their submission in 1956.

Korea of the Yi dynasty is another example. Yi Korea was founded in the late fourteenth century and maintained friendly relations with Ming China which was taken over in 1644 by the Ch'ing which came from Manchuria. Before 1644, due to the Confucian loyalty to the Ming, Korea refused to succumb to the demands of the Manchus who were fighting against the Ming economic blockade against them. The Koreans, left with no viable alternative after a series of defeats of the Ming forces at the hands of the Manchus before and after 1644, created their policy of "serving the larger". Deciding not to exhibit their cultural pride openly, the Koreans showed their loyalty to the Ch'ing. Awed by the Manchus' military power, the Koreans sent almost annually their tributary missions to Peking, which cost more than what they received in return from Peking. Furthermore, the Koreans, who were resentful of the Manchus and acquired many guns for an eventual showdown were forced to use these guns against the Russians alongside the Manchus in the late-seventeenth century. However, the internal policy was left to the Koreans themselves.[35]

[32] Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[33] Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973).

[34] Peter Bender, *East Europe in Search of Security* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972). See also Ference Albert Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).

[35] Inaba Iwakichi, *Kokaikun jidai no Man-Sen Kankei* (Manchu-Korean Relations during the Kwanghaegun Rein), (Seoul, 1933); "Chosen Koso-cho ni okeru ryoji no Manshu Shuppei ni tsuite: Shin-Ro kankei chuki no shiryo" (On the Two Manchu Expeditions during the Hyojong Reign:

Major Problems and Change in Political Security Policy

I have so far delineated the eight types of security policy with some historical and contemporary illustrations. The next task is to identify major problems in them. In other words, one needs to identify the major difficulties national actors have to encounter with regard to their particular security policy which may force them to change it (see Figure 2).

Figure 2
Types and Problems of Political Security Policy

	Focus of Attention	Level of Activity	Major Problems
A1 Conquest	Outward-looking	Active	Resistance/Liberation
A2 Hegemony	Outward-looking	Active	Threat of the Weak
B1 Revolution	Inward-looking	Active	Counter-revolution
B2 Finlandization	Inward-looking	Active	Persuasion
C1 Manipulation	Outward-looking	Passive	Skill
C2 Manoeuvring	Outward-looking	Passive	Credibility
D1 Seclusion	Inward-looking	Passive	Enlightenment
D2 Submission	Inward-looking	Passive	Humiliation

Conquest

The major problem with conquest is the cost which actors have to pay to suppress/crush a resistance/liberation movement in a conquered area. Crushing a resistance/liberation movement often proves more difficult than conquering. Thus, to reduce costs, a conquest policy may give way to a hegemonial policy. The "loose reign" policy which Chinese dynasties employed to cope with "barbarians" adjacent to China proper is an example. Knowing very well the enormous costs that accompanied tight control over "barbarians", who were not in awe of the Chinese emperor or civilization, led the Chinese to develop the "loose reign" policy which allowed the "barbarians" to retain their quasi-autonomy in exchange for their acceptance of a formal suzerain status of the Chinese emperor.[36]

Materials on the Mid-Ch'ing-Russian Relations), *Seikyu gakuso*, vol. 15, February 1934, pp. 1–26 and vol. 16, March 1934, pp. 47–60; Chong Hae-jong, *Han-Jung kwangyesa yonggu* (A study in Korean-Chinese Relations), (Seoul, 1970). See also Inoguchi, *War as International Learning*, chs 6–7.

[36] John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) and Takashi Inoguchi, "Dentoteki Hgashi Ajia sekai chitsujo shiron—18 seiki matsu no Chugoku no Betonamu Kanshoo o chuushinto shite" (A Reconsideration of the Historical East Asian World Order: With Special Reference to the Chinese Intervention in Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth Century). *Kokusaiho gaiko zasshi (Journal of international Law and Diplomacy)*, vol. 73, no. 5, February 1975. pp. 36–83. The origins of the loose foreign policy is fully described in Ying-shih Yu, *Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1967). The economic aspects of the Chinese empires are ably presented in Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973). See also the distinction between suzerainty and sovereignty in Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

It is often the case that a conquest invites not only a resistance/liberation move-
ment but also an intervention by third parties which are closely or loosely allied
with the resistance/liberation movement within. This factor makes it more difficult
to sustain the conquest for a long period. When the cost of sustaining the conquest
is considered high, then the possibility of an open revolt arises. The Turkish
revolution of 1923, which we have mentioned earlier, can be cited in this context
as well. The revival of de Gaulle in 1958 to decolonize Algeria is another example.
Though it did not exactly take the form of a revolution, the constitution was
altered and the armed rebellion of some military men against the new Fifth Republic
took place.[37]

Hegemony

The major problem with hegemony is the cost of keeping allies acquiescent to the
hegemony. At a time when the hegemonial power is on the decline but still wants
to retain its overwhelming position, it has to increasingly rely on inducements for
maintaining the loyalty of the allies. However, the cost of inducements may prove
prohibitive when the power is in relative decline. In such a situation the challenge
posed by the acquiescing becomes credible. Alternatively, the hegemonial power
can reduce its commitments so as to minimize its problems. The American position
after the Vietnam war manifests both aspects. It was a combination of a partial
retreat and a continuation of commitment backed by financial support and manipu-
lative diplomacy.[38]

Revolution

The major problem in this case is the possibility of counter-revolution. It is normal
that a revolution sacrifices the interests of the old ruling elite. Thus the likelihood
of a counter-revolution exists unless there is ruthless suppression and at the same
time a systematic and vigorous effort towards (re-)education and co-optation. A
revolution tends to invite foreign intervention, especially when the overthrown
government has close relations and shared interests with outside forces. Adapting
the security policy to the requirements of revolution is not without its pitfalls just
like other security policies.

The Russian revolution of 1917 was succeeded by a civil war and foreign inter-
ventions. Similarly, the Cuban revolution invited an abortive invasion by counter-
revolutionaries abetted by the US and embargoes also led by the US. Looking
from another angle, when a revolution is brought about with foreign assistance,

---

[37] Stanley Hoffman, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s* (New York: The Viking Press,
1974).

[38] As for the post-Vietnam American foreign policy, see special articles "The Third Century,"
Foreign Policy, starting with no. 20 (February) 1975; Anthony Lake, ed., *The Vietnam Legacy: The
War, the American Society, and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York University Press,
1976).

then outside interference in internal affairs may become very serious, as in the case of many East European countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Finlandization

The major problem with Finlandization is persuasion. The government's ability to persuade a large section of the people is the crux of Finlandization policy. It all depends upon whether the people can accept some of the unpleasant aspects associated with it and give more weight to its positive aspects. However, there is always a possibility that some may demand the return of lost territories or others may openly accuse a Finlandizing power. Further, industrialization and urbanization may break the political equilibrium which has sustained the Finlandization security policy. There is also the possibility of some "deviating" elements in society, which may result in a stringent Finlandization and thus a less successful security policy.[39]

Manipulation

The major requirement of manipulation is skill. In world politics, with multiple actors playing interdependently, diplomatic skill makes a difference as to its outcomes. For instance, the departure of Bismarck, after Willhelm II's accession to power, heralded the Prussian *Weltpolitik* which was an expression more of single-minded ambition rather than of careful manipulation.[40] The active involvement of the US in the West Asia peace settlement embodied in Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy was replaced by the Egypt-Israeli direct talks, with the US playing a less important role.[41] Manipulative diplomacy needs its architect like an orchestra needs its conductor. Since the essence of manipulation is to bring about small changes in the environment in one's favour without great costs, even the most skilful manipulation probably cannot overcome the hegemonial determination of a great power.

Manoeuvring

The major aim of manoeuvring is to make gains without costs and without altering much, except one's own position. Thus the major problem with manoeuvring is credibility. In its extreme form, it sometimes manifests its lack of consistency and hence lacks credibility. Japan's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict during the oil crisis of 1973–74 illustrates the point. Japan which produced almost no oil and was dependent on West Asia for 80 per cent of its oil consumption, suddenly

---

[39] Maude, *The Finnish Dilemma.*

[40] Joseph Vincent Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1922).

[41] Quandt, *Decade of Decisions.*

changed from "neutrality" to a pro-Arab position although this manoeuvring made almost no difference to the amount of oil allocated to Japan.[42]

Seclusion

The increasing awareness of people is a major problem with the policy of seclusion. The control over inhabitants by the state which practices the policy has to be very tight in today's world. For instance when the blacks in South Africa became aware that the countries in their neighbourhood had gained independence, the policy of the Orwellian Garrison state, where the blacks did not enjoy basic human rights and which denied contacts with the outside world, was challenged.[43]

East Germany presented a different case of the policy of seclusion. East Germany put stringent restrictions on its citizens to prevent them from being exposed to Western ideas. It tolerated those who were not favourable to the government, communism and the Soviet Union. But it closed its doors to the West to prevent large-scale immigration. Despite the restrictions, there was a massive exodus of people from the country to a large number of vacant positions in the job sector elsewhere. This enabled many ambitious persons to climb the social ladder quickly. Such social mobility helped reinforce their loyalty to the state that was character-ized by great insecurity, both internal and external. It would seem that the tight security policy of the state vis-à-vis the West would in any case have undergone a gradual change when the ruling elite was convinced about its secure position.[44] In view of the substantial improvement in East Germany's per capita national income (almost exceeding that of Britain at one point of time) and the near perfect social welfare system, it was only a matter of time before the thaw between East Germany and the West would have taken place.

Submission

The major problem of submission is humiliation. Since the submission policy tries to alter the balance of dependence *after* submission, it is important to ensure that the feeling of humiliation among the people does not come in the way of bar-gaining the balance of dependence. If a security policy option is for rebellion and liberation, this problem does not arise. To illustrate the case, let us take the example

---

[42] Domestic aspects of Japanese foreign policy at the time of the oil crisis are dealt with in Kenneth I. Juster, "Foreign Policy-Making during the Oil Crisis," *The Japan Interpreter*, vol. xi, no. 3 (winter), 1978, pp. 293–312. Also see Akio Watanabe "Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style," *International Affairs*, vol. 54, no. 1 (January) 1978, pp. 75–88; and T.J. Pempel. "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for the International Behavior," *International Organization*, vol. 31, no. 4 (Autumn), 1977, pp. 723–74.

[43] Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?*

[44] Peter Christian Luds, *The Changing Party State in East Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972); Russell Hardin, "Stability of Statist Regimes: Industrialization and Institutionalization"; Burns and Buckley, *Power and Control*; and Jonathan Steele, *Inside East Germany: The State That Came from the Cold* (New York: Urizen, 1977).

of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia opted for submission twice in its recent history, one in 1938 and the other in 1968. On both the occasions, it did not attempt to resist the intruders. It was just "breaking and bending", to use one of the character-izations of the 1938 event by V. Mastny.[45] There was no preparation for a guerrilla warfare, as was the case with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1968, which illustrates the second case. They stationed their armed forces all over their countries to resist any intruder.

Conclusion

Security is an elusive concept too often revolving around preserving status quo. It takes for granted that internal and external dimensions of security are inseparable. The emphasis on the latter provides a pretext to the ruling elite to disguise their real security concerns, which are of an internal nature, by exaggerating external threats. A related aspect is that it takes for granted that external environments tend to be the sole focus of attention, the sole target of policy efforts to augment security. Underlying this conception of security is the view that the internal values and institutions are beyond questioning. The fact that national security affairs tend to be the quasi-monopoly of the ruling elite often creates a situation in which the "external-revisionism-and-internal-status quo" doctrine has a strong influence. There is also the fact that a local or global hegemonial power does not want its hegemonial structure to be questioned. Further, national security policies may be constrained by the hegemonial power reinforcing the strong influence of "inter-national status quo" doctrine. What we have argued in this article is that a value-loaded security conception such as those we have criticized should be replaced by a broader conception of security which takes nothing for granted, internal or external. We have emphasized the internal foundations of political security policy in which the focus of attention and the level of activity are the key dimensions and in which the eight types of security policy are also delineated both in the strong and weak forms, using historical and contemporary illustrations. The major internal momentum for self-transformation and self-restructuring for each of the eight types of security policy is also delineated. The main purpose is to provide a more adequate framework for a comparative study of the sources and trans-formations of political security policy.

December 2002

---

[45] Vojtech Mastny, *The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).