World Order Debates in the Twentieth Century: Through the Eyes of the Two-level Game and the Second Image (Reversed)

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Introduction

This article presents a somewhat unconventional grand framework under which to understand world order, in particular the dialectic framework of international relations. By dialectics I mean approaches to world order, with emphasis on interactions among competing forces within international relations and domestic competition. My objective in applying the two-level game and the second image game and second image reversed to the state strategy of leading powers is to examine and analyze the long-term evolution of world order in the extended 20th century period 1890–2025. My aim is to enrich the existing picture of this evolution in international relations in the last century. More specifically, by focusing on the leading powers within different timeframes of this extended century—Britain in the 19th century, and the United States for the best part of the 20th century, especially the last quarter, and at the dawn of the 21st century—I present a broadly gauged picture of leading powers who, frustrated and challenged by dissidents at home and abroad (sometimes called have-nots), respond by modifying their state strategy by accommodating, placating, and/or suppressing dissident activities in efforts to prolong their leadership status.

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My intention is not to repudiate existing theories of international relations, such as realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism.[1] My modest aim is to contribute to international relations theories, in particular by extending the application of the two-level game, and the second image and second image reversed to certain hitherto neglected areas. The two-level-game theory refers to the two distinguishable and interconnected games played simultaneously at the international and intra-national fronts. Principal actors at international negotiations are adversaries of governments and representatives of the state. Those in domestic politics are interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and political parties. The government, meanwhile, plays the game concurrently on both levels. The second image concept refers to the causal argument about war occurrence, i.e. that domestic structures can ignite international conflicts; the second-image-reversed concept refers to the causal argument about war occurrence whereby war has impact on domestic structures. The second image is used to explain, for example, the expansionist/revanchist nature of fascist regimes. Similarly, the second image reversed is used to explain, for example, how core-periphery power configurations bring about the economic marginalization of certain economies.

By the state strategies of leading powers I mean balance of power, collective security, and primacy. Balance of power refers to leading powers siding with one of two competing power blocs, or blocking the ambitions of a fast-rising state. Collective security refers to leading powers forming a coalition of allies to block one challenger's ambitions (all for one) or forming a *cordon sanitaire* to counter an adversarial bloc (all against one). Primacy refers to the unchallenged position of a leading power.

Robert Putnam's two-level game is a valuable concept for analyzing intergovernmental negotiations among industrial democracies, because its

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[1] Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427–60; Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Columbus: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co Inc, 2002); Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, *NationalInterests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Margaret K. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Legalization and World Politics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001).

implicit analyses of international negotiations explicitly take into account domestic forces below the government. I propose to broaden this concept by capturing the two-level state strategies a national government uses when simultaneously dealing with governments abroad and dissidents at home. Given the depth and pervasiveness of globalization, thus broadening the concept is apt. Both the second image and the second image reversed are similarly critical concepts, but they presume a one-way causal arrow (though in opposite directions). This article proposes going a step farther by taking into account feedbacks into the system. Extensive penetration of globalization also presupposes combining the second image and second image reversed.

In the next section, I first cast the evolving state strategies of leading powers in the extended 20th century in a dialectic framework. I then spell out the three key state strategies often adopted by leading powers—balance of power, collective security, and primacy—in terms of the basic features and structural conditions on which each state strategy rests. Third, I examine key popular strategies—people's war, people power, and global terrorism—that 'have not' or economically marginalized states often develop, their basic features and the structural conditions upon which each state strategy rests. Fourth, I analyze three modified leading power strategies after taking into account the dissident strategies of colonial indifference, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention, their basic features and the structural conditions upon which each state strategy rests. Fifth, I spell out dialectic moments during which the key state strategies of leading powers metamorphose from balance of power to collective strategy and from collective strategy to primacy. In each case the two-level game and the combined second image games function to change the state strategies of leading powers. Sixth, learning from the historical insights of the Mongol imperium (13th century) and analytically comparing it with the American imperium (20th and 21st centuries), I speculate on the occurrence of a future dialectic moment, suggesting that a transition from primacy to global governance, featuring 'mirrored' human intervention and nuclear primacy (via nuclear disarmament), might take place.

Dialectics of Political Security

The 20th century was a critical epoch in many ways. First, and perhaps most important, was the phenomenal growth in the world population during that 100 years. It rose from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6 billion in the year 2000. Factors crucial to sustaining this phenomenal demographic were: the expansion of inhabitable land; increase in production, both agricultural and industrial; use of fossil and nuclear energy resources; and most directly the

diffusion of hygiene and medicine.[2] Second, the level of technology reached unprecedented heights. Industrial machines enabled the mass production of high-quality goods. Fast, large-scale, and long-distance communication became very easy, and transportation rapid and inexpensive. Third, knowledge increased by leaps and bounds. Radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and above all computers, created an information society. All these developments demonstrate just how critical a period the 20th century was in human history.[3]

It is a century that particularly stands out from a political security perspective. Mary Kaldor and Daniel Deudney both give well documented accounts of the growing lethality of weapon firepower during that period.[4] No less shocking are the human losses in wars over the past 100 years. Deaths from wars in ancient history through to 1900 are far fewer than those of the 20th century. The two World Wars account for no less than one-half of the hundred million killed in the past 100-year period. It was hence not a secure century but one in which conflict was rife. Conversely, the decline in war, as regards frequency and mortality, in the first few years of the 21st century, suggests stagnation of, or at least a relative decline in warfare.[5] This is not to say that war has become an obsolete, outdated institution, but that it persists in different forms and has taken on different characteristics.

When focusing on the state strategy of leading powers, their tactics are easily identified. They are: balance of power, collective security, and primacy. The first led to the outbreak of World War I; the second was envisaged as a mechanism to maintain the balance of power which, once it collapsed, led to World War II; the third strategy appeared after the end of the Cold War, when anti-terrorist wars began in Afghanistan and Iraq. These concepts, however, have been brought into play irrespective of that particular time sequence of events. The features and conditions of these strategies of leading powers are historically documented.

All three strategies are associated with antithetical and synthetic concepts. The antithetical concepts are: people's war, people power, and global terrorism, all of which are most often developed by the marginalized have-nots

[2] Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); William McNeil, *The Global Condition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[3] Carlo Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe* (London: Collins, 1972–1976).

[4] Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

[5] David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Ages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistica1 Handbook* (New York: Wiley, 1972); Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Human Security Center, *Human Security Report 2005*; Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Knopf, 1999); John E. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); John E Mueller, *Remnants of War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

of the world. By referring to the world system, I want to show that this article deals both with the struggle of international politics on the surface of inter-governmental relations and the structure of global politics at the grassroots. Again, the features and conditions of these antithetical concepts are historically documented, and all three strategies are associated with three synthetic concepts. They are: colonialist aloofness, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention. These synthetic concepts developed through interactions within the world system between the haves and have-nots. History once more illustrates the features and conditions of these synthetic concepts.

It is necessary here to clarify my somewhat unorthodox use of dialectics, which highlights the thesis posed by the haves. Synthesis, defined as the haves' response to the have-nots' challenge, or antithesis, is to accommodate, appease, placate, or suppress this antithesis. The thesis posed by the haves is privileged in my treatment of dialectics. After all, the elites primarily shape political security by virtue of their strength. Strength, however, can easily degenerate into weakness. The haves use their strength, in one way or another, to accommodate, placate, or suppress the have-nots' challenge. It is the way in which they use it that determines their longevity. My use of dialectics is hence evolutionary rather than revolutionary. History evolves top down, not bottom up. In this sense, I use the dialectics to elucidate the changing modalities and mentalities of political security in the 20th century.

I hence deal with both the international and intra-national levels, counselling directly between both the state strategies of leading powers and the counter strategies of grassroots-level dissidents. Countries' involvement in the two-level game and the second image game and second image reversed are always taken into account when formulating the argument of this article.

The concept underlying the dialectic is akin to that of conservation of catastrophe, as coined by historian William McNeil. Power hides its vulnerability, thus containing and prolonging the momentum of a potential catastrophe by keeping it under wraps for as long as possible, according to McNeil.[6] But this cannot go on forever; the system eventually crumbles and collapses. Lewis Carroll's Red Queen expresses exactly the conservation of catastrophe principle when she says, 'It takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.'[7] In other words, to keep intact their state strategy, whether balance of power, collective security, or primacy, leading powers must keep running, or in this instance maintain and support their

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[6]   William H. McNeil, 'Control and Catastrophe in Human Affairs', *Daedalus*, Winter 1989, pp. 1–15; 'The Conservation of Catastrophe', *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 48, No. 20 (December 20, 2001); Edward Tenner, 'Results Tagged "Conservation of Catastrophe"', *The Atlantic Wire*, April 27, 2009.

[7]   Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass* (London: Penguin Classics, 2003).

policy directions and commitments, despite the associated costs, until transition into a new regime of institutionalized political security occurs. Such a transition can be violent or non-violent. That from balance of power to collective security was violent—World War I. The transition from collective security of one kind to collective security of another kind was also violent—World War II. But the transition from the second type of post-World-War-II collective security to that of primacy—the end of the Cold War—was non-violent.

Three State Strategies Often Adopted by Leading Powers

Leading powers pose a thesis (Table 1). In examining major theories of international relations, it is immediately apparent that the theses posed by the haves dominate the literature. Michael Doyle gives in his book, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, of 1997 a comprehensive treatment of ideas in international relations.

Balance of Power

Basic Features of Balance of Power

A relatively small number of state actors—five or six—engage in this international game.[8] There is a higher likelihood of accord among a small number of involved actors. Although all Europe was shattered and the French dynasty eliminated in the course of the Napoleonic Wars, the key mission of the Congress of Vienna was the restoration of balance of power

Table 1 Balance of power, Collective Security, and Primacy in terms of Dialectics of Political Security

The state strategies of leading power (thesis posed by haves)	Grassroots-level game (antithesis posed by have-nots)	Images reversed (synthesis posed by haves to 'accommodate' have-nots)
Balance of power	People's war	Colonial indifference
Collective security	People power	Humanitarian assistance
Primacy	Global terrorism	Humanitarian intervention plus nuclear disarmament[a]
Global governance	Mirrored global terrorism	Mirrored humanitarian intervention plus nuclear primacy[b]

[a,b]Nuclear disarmament processes have been given momentum by US President Barack Obama. Note that he has made it clear that the United States keeps primacy, presumably including nuclear primacy.

[8]   Morton Kaplan, *System and Process of lnternational Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1957).

among the six actors that had prevailed prior to them. The six states were: England, France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Turkey. Turkey later came to be known as the sick man of Europe, but early in the 19th century it was both prosperous and powerful. The strategy of the time was to prevent one state, or one coalition of states, from becoming too strong. States generally try to increase their capabilities and engage in war when it is seems an appropriate way of preserving independence and/or achieving other objectives. The main axiom of the Congress of Vienna conference was to conclude wars in ways that preserve the sovereign independence of the major powers. In other words, it was to allow state actors back into the system.

The premise of this game is that the actors hold relatively similar ideologies. Any negative moves at the Congress of Vienna in efforts to restore the status quo *ante bellum* would have been at odds with the revolutionary ideas and institution of the French Revolution. The Congress at the same time avoided the excessively religious conflation as surreptitiously advanced by Alexander II of Romanov Russia. The intrusion of other than their own non-conspicuously held ideologies into the balance of power game was thus regarded as inhibiting actors' purely non-ideological flexibility and manoeuvrability. Henry Kissinger emphasized this principle in his analysis of the balance of power during the Congress of Vienna,[9] and employed it himself in 1971 as US national security advisor on the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.[10]

The axiom of the balance of power game is that restraint in one actor is conducive to restraint in others. Thus winners often make concessions to those vanquished to create a more durable and stable post-war world order. Punishing France was hence most assiduously avoided at the Congress of Vienna, whose key host, Austrian statesman Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, paid utmost attention to the realization of this key agenda.[11]

Balance of power is premised also on the relatively equal demographic, industrial, and military capabilities of major powers. Between the Congress of Vienna (November 1814 to June 1815) and the ascension of Wilhelm II (1888), relative equality among major powers more or less prevailed. It was on this structural basis that Britain during this period was for the most part able to play the role of an off-shore balancer. Britain was hegemonic

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[9]   Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2000); Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995).

[10] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*. In neither of his books does Kissinger have an index of religion.

[11] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948); Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2000). One might note that the American institutionalization strategy of building a liberal world order as argued by John Ikenberry resembles this aspect of balance of power strategy. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I only by virtue of the Continental power balance and its naval supremacy. Once one of these two conditions disappeared, British hegemony started to decline.[12]

Basic Structural Conditions of Balance of Power[13]

Balance of power among major powers is associated with the existence of marginalized space surrounding them, sometimes called colonies or spheres of influence. The major powers they surround are often called colonial powers. This space functions as an adjustment mechanism in the balance of power when adjustments on home ground are more difficult to make. The existence of a space unconstrained by the normative, prevailing concerns of major actors enables self-restraint to be enacted with more ease than if there were no such space. A variation of colonialist thinking which sharply distinguishes between sovereign states in the West and colonies in the non-West continues today, as exemplified by Robert Cooper's geo-temporal civilizational distinctions among the post-modern, modern, and pre-modern zones and their associated behaviour patterns.[14]

Balance of power functions well among major powers of fairly equal size. Once one in the group starts to excel, however, the balance of power is often questioned. When Wilhelm II of Prussia embarked on a naval race with Britain after ousting his prudent advisor, Otto Bismarck, the major powers scrambled to colonize Africa as part of their plans to consolidate their position.[15] The balance of power system has not worked well either during the age of imperialism or of unilateralism. In the period 1871–1906 imperialized countries were jockeying for pre-eminence in the big global land-grab of that time, their focus on large conflicts outside of central Europe. In 1906, when the colonial land-grab ran out of territory to gobble up in Africa, Polynesia, and Asia, the system whereby states usually achieved their ends by declaring war changed.

Balance of power resides in the internalized norm structure of major actors. Once the normative assumption of outlooks among major actors shows tangible variance, balance of power starts to be questioned. The radicalism of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars is an example, as are the new diplomacy offensives that Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson called for after World War I of open diplomacy, freedom, and national

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[12] Muriel E. Chamberlain, *'Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy, 1789–1914* (London: Longman, 1988); Gerald S. Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980).

[13] Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1984), pp. 121–142.

[14] Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Grove Press, 2004).

[15] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1–15.

self-determination and democracy. Adolf Hitler's war to attain *das Deutschland über Alles* (Germany above all) is another example. Hitler's adversaries wrongly assumed that he was acting in the broad balance of power framework.[16] In *Mein Kampf* Hitler criticized 19th-century German efforts at overseas imperialism, suggesting that adequate farming land through which German agricultural families could feed the German population lay to the East (and South), rather than overseas. He is reported at the end of his life, however, to have perceived World War II as a racial struggle to determine the survival of the fittest. As it seemed to him that the Slavic race had proved superior to the German race, the latter therefore deserved to die with him.[17] Hitler also thought of the Anglo-Saxons as superior, and hoped to make deals with them at various points. His thinking was that of militant racist Darwinism.

Collective Security

Basic Features of Collective Security

Collective security is an arrangement for coping with a major threatening actor. It comprises actors joining forces to defend against, deter, and dissuade one among them willing to threaten or challenge to the status quo. Collective security hence regards acting collectively, both in normative and operational terms, as a more effective action than separately coping with and meeting the challenges of an apparent threat.

Collective security harnesses a set of normative tenets that enables states to rally together once an incipient or imminent threat is identified, and which change in tandem with the *Zeitgeist* or prevailing spirit of the day. At the time of the Congress of Vienna, for instance, the shared normative beliefs comprised defence of monarchy and the sentiments of anti-revolution, anti-self-determination, and anti-liberalism. At the time of the Versailles Treaty, they were freedom, democracy, national self-determination, and non-aggression (i.e. an attack on one is an attack on all). At the Yalta Conference, freedom, democracy, anti-fascism, anti-colonialism, and human rights were the normative beliefs. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Allies' victory in the anti-fascist war, US President George W. Bush made clear in Riga, Latvia, that there had been a departure from the Yalta spirit of anti-fascism and anti-colonialism to one of democracy fighting against all forms of tyranny.[18]

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[16] A. J. P. Taylor, *English History 1914–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
[17] Albert Spier, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Proplyaen Verlag, 1969), cited in Hayward Alker, 'Twentieth Century World Debates: Geopolitics, Biopolitics, Ecopolitics', (forthcoming).
[18] Takashi Inoguchi, 'How to Assess World War II in World History: One Japanese Perspective', in David Koh Wee Hock, ed., *Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), pp. 138–151.

Collective security institutionalizes a set of operational schemes that makes joining forces effective. At the time of the Congress of Vienna, institutionalization took the form of classical diplomacy, whereby monarchs used mercenaries of the pen rather than of the sword to achieve the most effective diplomatic positioning and interactions. Scholar-diplomat Friedrich von Gentz, for instance, played such a role in his contracts with kings, princes, and politicians, both on the Continent and in England. At a time of balance of power, both mercenaries of the pen and of the sword were deployed to tip or restore the desired balance. This was a strategy that called for superb language skills and astute manoeuvring judgments. At the time of the Treaty of Versailles, institutionalization took the form of the League of Nations, which embodied operational devices specifying threat identification and assessment, advice and resolutions, and counter-threat operations. To the great dismay of its founders, however, the institution and its embodied values were non-effective when determined actors did not adhere to these norms. At the time of the Yalta Conference, collective security took the form of the United Nations (UN) Organization. The UN embodies operational devices such as resolutions by the General Assembly via the Security Council (SC) in which SC permanent members are allowed to exercise a veto on whether or not the UN takes specific actions vis-à-vis an ill-behaving actor or intolerable situation. The UN has mobilized its forces once in its history—on the Korean Peninsula battlefield between 1950 and 1953. This was possible primarily because the Soviet Union had boycotted meetings of the SC.

Basic Structural Conditions of Collective Security

Collective security comes into play in face of threatening actors who flout the normative tenets enshrined in the collective spirit. It is the way in which a group of states deals with one actor or group of hostile actors. In other words, it comprises collective security devices and an ideological armoury created in response to 'bad guys'. Such was the case with the French Revolution, the German Imperial Reich, and the Axis alliance.

Collective security needs a set of ideological banners around which action is organized, sometimes called the *Zeitgeist*. These banners must be simple, clear, and point in the direction in which the world seems to be evolving. They must hence be both reflective of a nightmarish past and prophetic of a bright future. In the case of World War II these banners were anti-fascism and anti-colonialism. Since 2001 the main banner has been that of global antiterrorism. The most recent addition in 2005 was democracy against all forms of tyranny. This was the theme clearly and emphatically reflected in President George W. Bush's speech at Riga, Latvia, on occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Allied victory against fascism.[19]

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[19]   Takashi Inoguchi, 'How to Assess World War II in World History', in Koh, ed., *ibid.*

Collective security needs military power sufficient to deter and dissuade the threatening actor and defend those in danger. How military power is mobilized, through which institutional devices and with how many troops are key focal structural components of collective security. Hence Winston Churchill's comment, 'We have won the war,' after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941; he saw immediately the critical linkage that US participation would bring to the European and Asia-Pacific theatres of war. Who acts as commander of joint forces, however, is one of the most difficult propositions within collective security. A notable example is that of France objecting to the United States taking command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops. The intervention in Kosovo by NATO forces also gave rise to the question of who commands. Given the military predominance of the United States, as regards advanced weaponry and troop training, it has been normal practice for US armed forces not to bring the troops of other countries under their command.[20]

Primacy

Certain Basic Features of Primacy

Primacy has a penchant for announcement. It expects others, after consultation, to comply. Metaphorically speaking, according to secretary general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Pascal Lamy,[21] the United States makes announcements at multilateral forums by megaphone, in contrast to the telephonic negotiations among Western European member countries at such gatherings. Japan, meanwhile enters into tête-à-tête discussions among a delegation of representatives of bureaucratic agencies representing different domestic interests. This makes for a strong unilateral United States, an adroit multilateral Europe, and an occasionally 'nullilateral' (that is, no vector) Japan.[22]

Primacy often acts according to convictions. Rooted in a firmly held belief system, primacy pays small heed to costs, because unquestioning faith in a particular value system can often blind the actor to them. This is evident in the United States' tendency to act regardless of cost. Such faith-based action has much to do with the United States being the sole superpower and trying to maintain that status. From this perspective, the determination of the United States to pursue a global anti-terrorist war at any costs might be compared with Winston Churchill's determination in World War II to achieve 'victory at any cost'. Primacy has faith in the power of its own invincibility to prevent any possible or premature decline of its predominance. This is exemplified by the so-called Boer War that Great Britain waged

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20   Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*.
21   Pascal Lamy, 'Beikoku daitouryou sen go' ('After the U.S. Presidentia1 Election'), *Mainichi Shimbun* (November 20, 2005).
22   Takashi Inoguchi, 'How to Assess World War II in World History'.

in southern Africa, which incurred high costs and consequently accelerated the British decline.[23] It is sometimes suggested that the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have accelerated the pace of US decline.

Actors exercising primacy act according to national interests. As this is a state strategy based primarily on a national interest calculus, multilateral diplomacy is not a priority. Multilateral institutions and forums are used merely as instruments to promote policy objectives. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN (2005–2006), made clear that the US regards the UN as little more than an instrument of diplomacy which is at its disposal. The US inclination towards multilateral institutions is characterized as negative when these institutions are seen as constraints on its actions, and positive when seen as instruments that enable the United States to act globally. This characterization does not preclude the United States from being perhaps one of the most multilaterally equipped countries alongside the Netherlands, Canada, Scandinavian countries, Iran, and Hungary, all of whom place the best and brightest of their diplomatic corps at the forefront of multilateral diplomacy.

Certain Basic Structural Conditions of Primacy

The indisputable military supremacy of the United States gives primacy a most congenial background to its expression. It is common knowledge that the largest air force in the world belongs to the United States. But it is not so widely known that the second largest air force does not belong to Russia, China, France, Britain, or Japan, but that it is actually the US navy. This military predominance is backed up by the overwhelmingly vast expenditure of the United States on researching and developing weapons, which constitutes 85% of world total expenditure on research and development of military weapons and systems. It is expenditure of this magnitude that will sustain the United States in its position as predominant military power for the next 20–30 years, no matter what mistakes it commits or what mishaps occur along the way.

The tradition of America's search for primacy constitutes the most enduring historical basis for American unilateralism. America is different from and untainted by the old ideas of discrimination and exploitation based on race, class, wealth, and religion, at least according to American exceptionalism.[24] There is a certain tendency to see the United States as a unique source of such ideals, but this anti-historical, missionary idealism/realism is certainly not a unanimous view, and appears willing to sacrifice much of these so-called US 'rights' to the war on terrorism, for instance by virtue of the Patriot Act. But the United States nevertheless presents itself as a land of freedom and opportunity which continues to welcome immigrants, traders,

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[23] Leopold Scholtz, *Why the Boers Lost the War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[24] Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism* (New York: Norton, 1998).

and investors. The United States also offers the enduring ideas of freedom, capitalism, democracy, and human rights to countries eager to reap these benefits through importing them from the United States, again, according to American exceptionalism. This is the ideational basis of the US promotion of democracy throughout the rest of the world.[25]

This obsession with primacy is a reflection of the American psyche, whereby the United States must act to socialize world citizens and institutionalize arrangements before it goes into decline. Most noteworthy among symbolic indicators of the US slow decline are: (i) the delinking of the US dollar with gold in 1971; the massive dollar purchases by other currencies since 1985, and hence the practice of its balance being supported by major foreign countries (Britain, Germany, Japan, and more recently by China), as well as the birth in 2001 of the Euro, an international currency backed up by the largest amount of trade transactions; (ii) the steady scientific progress of other major countries as apparent in journals such as *Chemical Abstracts*; (iii) the facile use of unilateralism and the grandiose slogan of a global anti-terrorist war, pursued somewhat recklessly and entailing astronomical expenditure.

Three Popular Strategies Often Developed by Marginalized Have-nots

Marginalized states develop certain antithetical strategies to make their voices heard. They are: people's war, people power, and global terrorism. With the notable recent exception of Karma Nabulsi's *Traditions of War: Occupations, Resistance and the Law*, the ideas of international relations held by marginalized have-nots have not been well articulated in the context of international relations theories.

People's War

Basic Features of People's War

People's war is a strategy often adopted by states humiliated and marginalized by the invading, occupying, and colonizing regular army. It is also sometimes called guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla is a Spanish word of High German origins denoting irregular and small-unit resistance to invaders/occupiers. It was a feature of the Napoleonic conquest of Spain, when leading continental powers tried all means possible to counter Napoleon and his military plans. The guerrilla war in occupied Spain became a 'bleeding ulcer' for Napoleon and cost the lives of 300 000 French soldiers. Resistance by

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25   Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the World-Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Michael Cox, G. John lkenberry and Takashi lnoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

American Indians in the First Nation Wars in North America, during both the pre-independence and post-independence periods, manifested features of guerrilla warfare before the term was actually coined.[26] The guerrilla form of people's war warfare recurs when basic conditions are ripe for it.

People's war takes place at peripheries; leading powers' war takes place at the core. The Boer War was hence also a people's war. It broke out because the colonizing power, Britain, wanted to eradicate Boer resistance to confiscation of their land. The Boers met British regular army aggression with determination and tenacity.[27] Among the most well-known examples of guerrilla warfare are those of Chinese resistance against the 2-million-strong occupying Japanese army in China[28] and the Vietnamese resistance against both the French and Americans, both of whom tried to prevent the Vietnamese from achieving independence.[29]

People's war uses violence, hence Mao Zedong's saying, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. To execute this principle, people's war needs space, usually on difficult terrains such as mountains, deserts, and forests that give guerrilla strategists the chance to retreat for recuperation and reorientation. This is exemplified in the people's war in China, when the Jinggan Mountains straddling Hunan and Jiangxi provinces and the hills of Yan'an in Shaanxi province were instrumental in winning the war.[30]

Basic Structural Conditions of People's War

To be effectively executed, a people's war is best fought on terrain such as deserts, mountains, and jungles that hamper the armies of invading, occupying, or intervening powers or governments and provide geographical sanctuaries for dissident armies. As rebels, dissidents, and revolutionaries are normally overwhelmed by the level of invaders' or governments' military weapons, both qualitatively and quantitatively, such sanctuaries are essential. Che Guevara found them in the jungles of Bolivia, and The Shining Path (sendero luminoso) of Peru also began in deep mountainous peripheries.

A victorious people's war can only be accomplished through the support of the people. As Mao Zedong said, 'The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.' Popular support is often the reward of a good

[26] Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: Norton, 1975); Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Surviva1: A Population History Since 1492* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987).

[27] Archibald Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: Study in British Power* (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1959).

[28] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[29] George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974); Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1985); David Marr, *Vietnam 1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[30] Philip Short, *Mao: A Life* (New York: Owl Books, 1999).

attitude and good policy, such as treating people with respect and courtesy and distributing food to those in the greatest need. Chinese Communists were probably the most successful at projecting this image at Yan'an and other sanctuaries, not only at home but also abroad. Among the Western sympathizers they won were the journalist Agnes Smedley, who portrayed the Chinese communists as almost akin to morally-equipped reformers.

For people's war to be successful, it needs a foe who is an obvious 'bad guy', such as a state that has a corrupt and weak government. To quote Mao Zedong again, 'Who is our enemy? Who is our friend? This is one of the most important questions in the expansion of the revolutionary movement.' Giving the impression that they have rich and powerful friends enables rebels and revolutionaries to mobilize new recruits and sympathizers. Once in power, however, leaders of people's war often punish such followers as anti-revolutionaries.

People Power

Basic Features of People Power

People power uses non-violent action, according to the principle that the use of violence usually provokes governments into taking strongly suppressive measures and is, therefore, counter-productive. The canon of people power is hence to remain calm in the face of provocation by opposing forces of overwhelming military power. There were many reasons why Mahatma Ghandi was successful in freeing India from British colonization, but one was obviously his holding to the principle of passive resistance.[31]

People power needs competent leaders. By competent, I mean charismatic enough to attract followers, articulate and passionate in oratory, skilled in translating words into outcomes, equanimous vis-à-vis difficult situations, and magnanimous towards failings in its followers. Corazon Aquino played such a role, more or less, in the People Power movement of the Philippines that brought about the downfall of President Ferdinand Marcos.

People power needs good international environments. By good I mean those that are reasonably friendly and benign. People power should also make any barbarous actions committed within its borders by governments, occupiers, or invaders known to people throughout the world, because it can benefit from highlighting such wrongs. An example is that of June 2002, when two American soldiers in the Second Infantry Division stationed in South Korea hit and crushed to death two local high school girl students while driving an armoured vehicle. The soldiers, in accordance with an agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea, met a court martial. When, however, the military court found them not guilty

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[31]   Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Non violent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

the Korean people took to the streets to protest the court decision. Presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun milked the prevailing anti-American sentiment and won the election, albeit with a narrow 2% majority. In this instance, therefore, people power effectively swayed the politics of South Korea.[32]

Basic Structural Conditions of People Power

Non-violent action can only take place when both the governing and the governed recognize the virtue of self-restraint and understand the merits of not resorting to use of violence. In other words, those who govern understand that killing people tends to exacerbate conditions and inflame anger, and those who are governed know that confronting the government might only result in a massive military response. This was the situation in British India in 1930–1931, when Mahatma Ghandi led a nonviolent protest against the British salt tax in the form of the *Satyagraha* or salt march, at least until such equilibrium collapsed.[33] The National Congress led non-violent action while supporting Britain in the war against Japan through to the 1940s. Indian Communists meanwhile supported the Soviet Union. Subhas Chandra Bose organized the National Indian Army, which chanted the slogan 'On to Delhi!' in a main square in Singapore, in British Malaya, which had been occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army, and as it fought its way through Burma, part of British India, where it entered into hostilities with the British Indian Army.

Non-violent action is associated with bargaining between those governing and those governed in hopes of ameliorating and resolving conflicts. Non-violent initiatives confront those governing with the alternatives of whether or not to respond with violent counter measures. Mahatma Gandhi's demonstration of passive resistance in 1930 was largely reciprocated by the non-violent legal procedures adopted by the colonial government. Clearly both sides realized the virtue of non-violence, one in providing a way of expressing discontent, the other as a means to preserving political stability in the colony.[34]

Non-violent action is associated with a civil society in which the rule of law is reasonably sound. A civil society can exist even under a colonial government as long as a vast number of indigenous colonial elites are reasonably embedded within it. Even though discriminatory practice is common under a colonial government, the relative non-saliency of arbitrary rule helps a civil society to emerge in an embryonic form. In this respect, as

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[32] Byung-Kook Kim, 'To Have a Cake and Eat it too: The Crisis of Pax Americana in Korea', in Jorge Dominguez and Byung-kook Kim, eds., *Between Compliance and Conflict: East Asia, Latin America and the ''New'' Pax Americana* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 219–50.

[33] Gene Sharp, *Gandhi as a Political Strategist* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979).

[34] *Ibid*.; Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Non violent Conflict*.

James Stuart Mill argues in his *History of India*, the colonial government's tenacious civilization of British India actually engendered a fledgling civil society.

Global Terrorism

Basic Features of Global Terrorism

Global terrorism takes the form of violent action instigated by transnational, nongovernmental terrorist groups.[35] Terrorists reserve the use of violence for protest activities and do not lightly engage in such behaviour. Terrorism is based on strong religious, political, environmental, or humanistic convictions. Certain profiles of convicted terrorists bear extraordinary resemblance to those of environmental activists in their adoption of direct, collective, and sometimes violent action, on such occasions as meetings of the WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Trilateral Commission, and the Group of Eight. Terrorists are often ordinary, well-behaved citizens in their daily life, but capable of radical acts if their self-appointed missions call for them.

Global terrorism takes the form of globally networked groups with shared convictions that plot terrorist acts. Transnational networks, globally built and locally acted upon according to specific beliefs and missions, are fundamental to global terrorism. They sometimes take over and colonize the entire state apparatus, such as in Afghanistan, creating scattered enclaves which operate as local independent chiefdoms. The Hezbollah organization in Lebanon, for instance, is deeply rooted in Lebanese society. It has its own social service facilities and its own political party which is represented in the national government. It is, however, also heavily armed with advanced weaponry, such as long-range missiles supplied by Iran.

Global terrorism challenges what its perpetrators regard as a specific source of human misery and injustice. It takes the form of killing and harming civilian populations, thus questioning the responsibility and capability of the governing elites to protect the people. It is engineered on the recognition of power disparity and despair. Global terrorism does not confront the overwhelmingly powerful armies of its targets. It resorts instead to the strategy of embarrassment. The terrorist target is regarded as so tightly and structurally embedded within global politics and economics that only the most courageous and committed action, collectively and effectively engineered, can make any lasting impact on the infidels in power.

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[35] Adams Roberts, 'The Changing Faces of Terrorism', http:/www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/ sept_11_changing_faces_02.shtml (2002); Bernard Lewis, *Assassins* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1987); Lawrence Freedman, *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

Basic Structural Conditions of Global Terrorism

Global terrorism is born of the global structure characterized by what its perpetrators regard as oppressive suffocation. By this I mean that the overwhelming hyper-power dominance that militarily, politically, economically, and culturally neutralizes the capacity of other powers to counterbalance it. The global embeddedness of the world economy makes it difficult for the marginalized have-nots to disentangle themselves from the ties, rules, and practices that have been largely shaped and shared by the privileged citizens of a hegemon. Oppressive suffocation is a subjective perception of the reality confronting the person(s) engaging in global terrorism. Many are no less a product of advanced industrial democratic societies than of developing societies under oppressive regimes. They express themselves more visibly in democracies than under authoritarian regimes, because the suppression of mass media embedded in the latter magnifies the difficulty of ensuring that an act of terrorism achieves maximum global impact.

Global terrorism needs good communications networks that can be mobilized instantaneously to raise targets, train adherents, and execute plans. To obviate the need to mobilize regular or guerrilla troops, it also requires access to high-tech, high-mortality weapons.

Global terrorism must have theoretical/theological creeds that ensure the most effective targeting. As the strategy is to embarrass and if possible partially and temporarily incapacitate the perceived governing elites, as well as to inspire and recruit global terrorists, its analysis of global politics and economy must be precise and punctilious enough to enable selection and execution of a target that achieves maximum impact.

Three Modified Strategies of Leading Powers Often Taking Place as a Synthesis

Next I summarize the three modified strategies that appear in the struggle between theses and antitheses. They are colonial indifference, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian intervention. Colonial indifference denotes the callous colonialist orientation of those it places at the nadir of destitution and misery. Humanitarian assistance denotes the urgent help extended without political strings to those badly in need of it. Humanitarian intervention is the active deployment of military power in places where human disasters occur regardless of the sovereignty of the affected country. These three modified strategies are a synthesis of the haves' thesis and the have-nots' antithesis. But it is a synthesis that essentially comprises the haves' accommodation, appeasement, placation or suppression of the have-nots' challenges within a framework of political security that the haves have primarily imposed. The ideas of international actions (and non-actions) that leading powers and international organizations have adopted, although

well articulated, fail to relate to the have-nots' challenges, or to debates on world order.

Colonialist Indifference

Basic Features of Colonialist Indifference

Colonialist indifference implies that colonialism does not typically view its colonized peoples as equal and is hence generally callous to their needs, wishes, and life conditions. Disasters and strife among them do not necessarily prompt the colonialist state to act on its responsibility to care for its colonized population. Colonialism has often been justified as the civilizing mission of advanced peoples. James Stuart Mill, for instance, portrays in his *History of India*, the progression to a more civilized India from the Hindu period, to the Muslim period (under the Mughal empire) through to the British Raj period (under the British empire). Colonized peoples, however, are not given the freedom to take responsibility for their own wellbeing. Consequently, as Amartya Sen observes,[36] during the colonial period India experienced great famines, but since independence has not suffered one. This is because since independence the Indian government has monitored local situations and spread information on the conditions of crops and food stock levels. Indian statisticians' success in correctly estimating the required levels of food production in the initial phases of independence signifies the care that independent India has taken to safeguard its peoples from famine.

In a similar vein, colonial powers do not intervene in civil strife unless the stakes are very high. When civil strife raged in Persia in the early 20th century, for example, the colonialist attitude was, in the words of one British officer, 'let them stew in their own juice'.[37] Instead of standing between the two factions, colonialists merely stood on the sidelines and waited for the fighting to end. To take another, albeit vastly different example, major powers showed a similar disinterest in taking action over the hundreds of thousands massacred in Cambodia in the 1980s and in Rwanda in the mid-1990s. The situations in Cambodia and Rwanda, however, pose a stark contrast to that in Kosovo in the mid-1990s, when the major powers actually took intervening action to stop so-called ethnic cleansing.

Colonialists, however, do not hesitate to intervene in and suppress any attempts stemming from famine, civil strife, demonstrations, or labour strikes to undermine the foundation of colonial rule. One obvious example

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[36]   Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
[37]   Robert Axelrod, *The Structure of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

is that of the Sepoy mutiny in 1857;[38] another is that of French Algeria in the 1950s.[39]

Basic Structural Conditions of Colonial Indifference

Colonies are not an area of preoccupation among major powers. This distinction must be made explicit if colonial indifference is to be a principal modality of one of the three syntheses. Colonies are viewed as areas allowing space for adjustment when major powers fail to find other suitable resolutions to conflicts. Colonies steadily disappeared during the 20th century, a decline that occurred in three waves. They were: (i) after World War I, (ii) after World War II, and (iii) during the last quarter of that century.[40] The architect commissioned in 1945 to design the UN headquarters did so on the understanding that there would be no more than 50 UN member states. By the end of the 1950s, UN membership had already exceeded that number, and by the end of the 1960s amounted to more than 100. 2010 UN membership stands at 192.[41] More than 80% are former Western colonies.

As colonialists, mostly from Europe, regarded colonized peoples as inferior, such peoples were widely perceived as second-class world citizens and, in the view of colonizing states, did not merit attention. This concept of social Darwinism and its politically bastardized versions has prevailed among political, business, and colonial elites until as recently as the 1930s and 1940s.

Access to high-level technology is limited to colonial elites, who monopolize communications and military technologies. Disaster and strife are the natural outcome of a situation in which there is a colonial monopoly on communications and weapons and colonialist disdain for and indifference to the misery of the indigenous people. These factors, however, neither justify nor legitimize the situation.

Humanitarian Assistance

Basic Features of Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance is above politics. It appeals to the commonality of human beings when political divisions otherwise constitute formidable barriers to such undertakings. Humanitarian assistance is hence extended even to regimes that are oppressive and arbitrary in the interests of alleviating the suffering of their peoples under such situations as famine or natural disasters such as earthquakes or tsunami.

[38] David Sau1, *The Indian Mutiny: 1857* (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
[39] Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (New York: Penguin USA, 2006).
[40] World Statesmen, 'Index of Colonies and Dependencies', http://www.worldstatesmen.org/COLONIES.html.
[41] United Nations, 'Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945–present', http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.

Humanitarian assistance is extended to a regime by national governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A focal point of the exercise is that there exists a regime that concurs with the non-political help that is offered out of humanitarian compassion. When a regime does not exist, as was the case with Somalia in 2006, humanitarian assistance is extended by NGOs and international organizations.

Humanitarian assistance strives to be both non-intrusive and effective in its mission to help the vulnerable. A politically sensitive regime might be wary of the intrusiveness of donors and their methods of delivering medicine and food aid directly to the people in need. North Korea's refusal in 2005 of humanitarian assistance from the World Food Program exemplifies this mindset.[42] The North Korean government regarded as intrusive and offensive the World Food Program's monitoring of delivery and apportionment of food in efforts to ensure it went to specific destinations where people were most in need.

Basic Structural Conditions of Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance needs a local regime, however incompetent, oppressive or arbitrary, able to stand on its own feet. Without a central government there is no focal point of delivery for materials and services to people in need.

Humanitarian assistance is based on humanitarian compassion. If compassion-motivated humanitarian assistance does not bring about a reduction in the misery and destitution of the people in need, but instead prolongs the regime's survival and indulges its oppressive and privileged elites, then the just cause of the entire undertaking is undermined.

Humanitarian assistance is based on the idea that a regime cannot be left to its own devices, even if it is oppressive, arbitrary, or incompetent. Positive engagement such as humanitarian assistance ensures that such a regime can be monitored from within. It was this idea that prompted North Korea to suspend food aid from the World Food Program in 2005. Humanitarian assistance hence sometimes overlaps with the functions of political and business intelligence.

Humanitarian Intervention

Basic Features of Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention takes the form of forcibly deploying outside troops in troubled spots and compelling ill-behaving actors to cease their behaviour. It is in effect outside military intervention that goes beyond coercive diplomacy and off-shore balancing. Humanitarian intervention, in

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42   Bradley Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty* (Toronto: Griffin Press, 2005).

other words, constitutes surgical operations. In the Kosovo crisis, NATO intervened to halt Belgrade-despatched Serbian Kosovars and forces from persecuting Albanian Kosovars. US and British commanders of NATO-led troops differed, however, on the philosophy and strategy through which to achieve this end. The United States wanted to carry out the operation through a full deployment of land troops, whereas the British-led Europeans wanted to use airstrikes. The form that humanitarian intervention was to take was hence in dispute, its pros and cons evenly divided in public opinion and among academic circles.[43]

Humanitarian intervention gives precedence to popular sovereignty over state sovereignty and to the protection of human rights over state rights. State sovereignty hence enjoys no sanctuary. That is to say, humanitarian intervention is grounded in the ideals of universal human rights. The Afghan War, for instance, was waged owing to the need to stamp out global terrorism. Terrorists having attacked buildings symbolic of US power on September 11, 2001, the United States launched in return assaults on Kabul and other military bases that global terrorists had captured and used to consolidate their power years earlier. The US government legitimizes its action on the principle that global terrorists violate human rights and security and that they must be stopped.

Humanitarian intervention takes the form of organizing an *ad hoc* coalition of states willing to execute collective military action in the short term, the legitimacy of which is sometimes accorded by international resolutions, albeit buttressed on the sheer political will and military predominance of an executing actor. Humanitarian intervention tends to be under-institutionalized at this stage of global political development.

Basic Structural Conditions of Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention is based on the global structure under which relentless market forces give rise to failed states in the peripheries which constitute a destabilizing and disruptive influence. Weak states with fragile economies are often unable to sustain the tenacious and ingenious efforts necessary to keep abreast of the tide of globalization. They hence rapidly decline and fall. The incentive for the United States and Russia to intervene in developing countries has diminished since East-West confrontations ceased, even when non-intervention jeopardizes the survival of client states. Certain client states were abandoned after the Cold War because US stakes in them did not carry high priority. Thus there are in the early 21st century between 30 and 50 failing and failed states.[44]

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[43] David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2006); Ann Holohan, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

[44] See the special issue of *Foreign Policy* on failed states in 2005.

Humanitarian intervention is based on the belief that the doctrine of respecting individual freedom and human rights overrides the doctrine of non-interference in other states' internal affairs. The balance between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty steadily tilted in the latter's favour in the last quarter of the past century. Authors specializing in state sovereignty, national security, and national interest are diminishing. International relations textbook trends, however, show that there is a growing number of researchers who have devoted 30% or more of their written work to topics such as human rights, democracy, inequality, gender, and global energy and environment.[45]

Humanitarian intervention is based on a world structure in which the sheer brute force of the West combines with its fundamental and strong conviction in freedom and democracy. Although various arguments go back and forth, the reality is that US unipolarity is an enabling force in humanitarian intervention when the United States supports it with the indigenous ideology of promoting and universalizing freedom, human rights, democracy, and equality.[46]

Dialectic Moments

Looking back on the 20th century, there appear what might be called dialectic moments in which the modalities and mentalities of political security metamorphosed on a global scale. Such moments occur most naturally when thesis directly confronts antithesis and their interaction produces a synthesis. It is important to note, however, that the outcome of the haves' accommodation, appeasement, placation, or suppression of the have-nots' challenges is a synthesis different from that of systemic transformations triggered by a confrontation of thesis and antithesis; it rather represents the haves' response to this confrontation. Dialectical moments occur when the haves' response to the have-nots' challenges, that is, the synthesis, drains the haves' power resources. As William McNeil insists, modernity is both power and vulnerability, because power imbues the principle of undiminished 'conservation of catastrophe'. Colonial indifference to people's wars sows the seeds of imperial decline by allowing the contradictions of colonialism to ferment. Similarly, humanitarian assistance sets the pace for national liberation and independence by encouraging the target group to organize, help itself, and gain self-confidence. The draining of imperial resources concomitant with humanitarian intervention also sets the stage for imperial decline. Such situations come as no surprise, as Walter Benjamin reminds us, as long as 'state of emergency' is the rule in human history. The

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[45] Joshua Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005); Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (Belmont: Wadswort Publishing Company, 2002).

[46] Tony Smith, *America's Mission*.

critical point is that of how a powerful state meets intermittently arising challenges from peripheries at home and abroad, and how the routinization of its response to these challenges either undermines or upholds that state's systemic functioning. Systemic transformations of political security took place in the 20th century under this scheme.

Schematically, three major dialectic moments occurred in the 20th century. By the extended 20th century, I mean the period between 1890 and 2025. The year 1890 marks the rise of *das zweite Reich*, and 2025 will be the year in which the primacy of the United States either coalesces into global governance or collapses. The extended century begins with the balance of power system as its first thesis. The balance of power that prevailed in much of the 19th century was based on two historical developments. First, the Napoleonic Wars and the peace treaty at Vienna, which institutionalized the status quo among major powers of a demographically similar size that were ideologically similarly disposed (anti-revolutionary). Second, the naval supremacy of England was more or less acquiesced by Continental powers until the late 19th century. Germany's demographic expansion is most noteworthy; the Russian and other Slavic demographic expansions took place more or less simultaneously. France and England, the most advanced nations, however, experienced no dramatic demographic expansion. This was due partly to their limited territorial expansion to adjacent northern Europe as a result of advances in producing wheat and potatoes on what was considered agriculturally unfit land.

But only Germany posed an antithesis to the prevailing balance of power system, because of its ability to link iron and bread.[47] Germany utilized this link to undermine the balance of power system through its own military consolidation. The two empires east of Germany, Russia, and Austro-Hungary, were not able to link iron and bread; iron was not produced in either Russia or Austria-Hungary to anywhere near the same degree as in England or Germany. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires were moreover beset with domestic ethnic diversities and animosities. Simply put, these two empires were not sufficiently capable or agile to re-organize themselves in time. Second, in the late 19th century a newly unified Germany challenged British naval supremacy, and the long-kept status quo in Europe met a new scale of forces. They were: industrialization, nationalism, and rising colonialism. Industrialization changed the rules of the game of international relations, whereby if a state cannot empower itself through industrialization, it cannot be perceived as a world leader.[48] If industrialization changed what had been the superficial, international, and commercial game of international relations to one that was structurally national-economic,

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[47] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[48] David Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

then nationalism changed what had been the superficial, diplomatic game of international relations to one that was structurally domestic-body-politic. Similarly, colonialism changed the superficial intra-European game to one that was genuinely global.[49] All this led to World War I, an unprecedented event of great calamity and cruelty, and truly a dialectic moment in the 20th century.

If a metamorphosis took place from balance of power to collective security at the major power level, what metamorphosis took place at the grassroots level in which marginalized and exploited tried to find ways out of the status quo? People's war, or a more generally desperate collective resistance, both at the domestic and global levels, against hegemons was the antithesis of the balance of power. Given the sheer magnitude of heavily armed and professionally trained troops, however, a people's war could not hope to win. Moreover, the strategy of hiding among a sea of people and periodically harassing armed troops, whether foreign invaders or domestic rulers, is effective only when and where particular locales and times provide advantage. In the long history of the 19th century, therefore, only three major instances stand out as examples of robust armed resistance against invading and ruling hegemons. They are the Sepoy Mutiny in India; the Taiping rebellion in China; and the Boer War in southern Africa. The Sepoy mutiny was heavily armed because its participants came from within the British Indian Army. The Taiping rebellion, whose revolutionary goal was to topple the Qing dynasty, was both heavily armed and deeply rooted in Han Chinese society. The Boer War was a determined resistance by Dutch settlers in southern Africa against newly arriving British capitalists, mining companies and their professionally trained troops. Small-scale resistance was otherwise suppressed without leaving much of an impression on history.

People's power, however, was most acutely realized when certain major powers reached the limit of their capability to mobilize their peoples as resources. Three such major instances in the early 20th century are the collapse of four major empires in Europe—Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey. The drain on their resources of fighting World War I brought these empires down because they were shallowly rooted and unable to make the best use of their peoples. The four empires' limited attention to and ability to mobilize their peoples at the grassroots hence constitutes the essential stumbling block to the balance of power system.

As earlier stated, the antithesis to balance of power is people's war, which includes the refusal of people to be mobilized by arbitrary and ineffectual rulers. In other words, people's war takes the form of daily sabotaging the

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[49] Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, Vols 1 and 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1970 and 1980); Andre Gunder Frank, *Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

ruler's attempted mobilization. The parallel orientation of the privileged elite is colonial indifference, as long as disturbances or turmoil do not pose a critical threat to their rule. When comparing the British policy toward the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 and to Mahatma Gandhi's *Satyagraha* in 1930–1931, it is immediately clear how the thinking of the privileged elites evolved from brutal suppression to partial accommodation, on a parallel with their thinking on political security, that is, from balance of power to collective security.

What is most striking about the World War I dialectic is that a new thesis, collective security, was born of the reflection that World War I was an event of unprecedented calamity and cruelty for Europeans and, according to the European mindset, the world. It was hence crucial to deter, dissuade, and if necessary, defeat through legal and institutional measures any actor violating the norms and rules agreed among major actors. United against aggression, major signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 believed they could deter any potential aggressors from violent action. They believed that their use of multilateral institutional devices and emphasis on international isolation as a penalty could dissuade any recalcitrant states from resorting to military options. Bearing in mind the large number of member states who declared their willingness to abide by the agreements, treaties, and charters concluded among major powers during the 20 years of crisis (1919–1939), the prevailing idea was that the collective use of military force would defeat any aggressors.[50]

Looking back from the vantage point of the 21st century, collective security was effective for the period more or less from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles through to the end of World War II. There are undoubtedly many who disagree with this assertion, but the fact remains that World War II ended in the defeat of states that had challenged the preceding status quo. One possible argument is that the outbreak of war implies that the system did not properly function. My argument is that after 1945 the system metamorphosed and reappeared as a kind of collective security II by virtue of new elements. First, it went beyond Europe. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were ideologically new. Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin were ideologues and exponents of new thinking and belief in the power of ideas and values—Fordism and central planning—both of which acquired new ways of accumulating wealth. Second, both relied heavily on deterrence rather than warfare.[51] The idea of mutually assured destruction by strategic nuclear forces on either side was antithetical to the preceding, collective security I arrangement, in which collectively defeating aggressors on the

[50]   E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1939).
[51]   Bernard Brodie, *Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Ayer Company Publications, 1946).

field loomed large. Long peace was hence the essence of the Cold War.[52] Third, the setting up of the UN after 1945 bestowed new features on collective security II. One was that of protecting and facilitating networks of interdependence through a growingly comprehensive UN and other agencies that worked towards resolving global issues such as development, the environment, refugees, health, food, children, culture, poverty, and disease.[53] The Cold War hence insulated the warfare aspect of political security and also encouraged a shift to non-strategic aspects of political security, such as enhancing communications and interdependence through transnational institutions.

Collective security II, therefore, metamorphosed through the Cold War. First, the overt emphasis on mutually assured destruction as the ultimate deterrent resulted in both sides going to extremes and overburdening themselves with stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. It was the idea of the Ronald Reagan-launched space defence initiative that put Mikhail Gorbachev into a corner and led ultimately to the abandonment of Cold War competition and moves in the direction of reform. Second, the steady integration of global financial systems made it difficult to carry on the closed system of central planning and caused the Soviet Union to collapse. Third, the web of interdependence encouraged the idea of cooperative security (evolving into a kind of global governance under the military predominance of the United States) rather than the confrontational security approach of the Cold War.

Global terrorism presented another dialectic moment. Its synthesis is the United States's renewed search for primacy, which has changed the emphasis from war deterrence to warfare capabilities. The overwhelming military predominance of the United States was apparent for some years after the Cold War. The US determination to use force if necessary, however, was confirmed only on September 11, 2001, after global terrorism hit New York, Arlington, Virginia and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. There are three main factors that have motivated the United States towards a rapid and renewed resolve towards maintaining primacy. They are: (i) as other major powers have been demoted to second-rank powers, the United States is more disposed to unilateral use of power. Its perception of other powers is that of complacent parasites basking in a world order within which the United States has primacy.[54] (ii) This coalition of the willing should be welcome, bearing in mind that the United States has experienced slow decline in many areas such as finance, technology, and economics and has thus become an

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[52]   John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
[53]   Harold Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence; International Organizations and the Global Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984); Davis Bobrow and Mark Boyer, *Defensive Internationalism: Providing Public Goods in an Uncertain World* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).
[54]   Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003).

incoherent empire.[55] In other words, the United States is an empire whose components of strength are mainly apparent in its military predominance, manifest in a massive arsenal of unparalleled precision weapons and war-fighting systems. (iii) The global functional integration of finance, industry, and technology has set the stage for what can be called global governance. The United States wants to make best use of *de facto* global governance networks, operating by virtue of myriad accords, business enterprises, government agencies, and international and transnational institutions, by transforming them into ostensibly global but actually US governance of the much vaunted knowledge-based society.[56]

And what kind of metamorphosis took place at the grassroots level of those marginalized and exploited? That from people's war to people power, on a parallel with the metamorphosis from balance of power to collective security. People came to realize that power of truth is sufficient to move the world and obviates resorting to marginalized collective violence. The critical point here is that of the growing self-confidence of masses that themselves have power—people power. No less critical in this metamorphosis is the change in the basic orientation of privileged elites. We have earlier noted the shift that occurred from ruthless suppression, exemplified in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, to partial accommodation as seen in the response of colonial powers to Mahatma Gandhi's *Satyagraha* of 1930–1931. Another example is the shift from colonial indifference to humanitarian assistance. The callous, aloof attitude as reflected in the telegram from a British colonial in Persia to the Foreign Office in London about the civil strife that erupted there early in the 20th century, to the effect that as far as he was concerned they could 'stew in their own juice', was the guiding policy behind colonial indifference.[57] Another good example, as raised by Amartya Sen,[58] is that of the large-scale famine during the period of the British Raj of which there has been no recurrence since Indian independence. This illustrates a change in the elite's orientation from colonial indifference to sympathetic preparedness and food distribution.

To recap, I have so far argued that there have been two dialectic moments in the extended 20th century. The first occurred in two steps, in 1914 and in 1939, and saw the dialectic turn from balance of power to collective security. The inter-war period of 1919–1939 was no more than a pause during which the same set of conditions replayed themselves, driving revisionists to push themselves to the fullest extent. The second, in 2001, saw the dialectic turn from collective security to primacy.

[55] Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).
[56] Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How the United States Has Become the World's Government* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).
[57] Robert Axelrod, *The Structure of Decision*.
[58] Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines*.

An Imminent Dialectic Moment from Primacy to Global Governance? A Mongolian-American Analogy

As the first dialectic moment has fully unfolded, we need to direct attention to spelling out exactly how the dialectic turn from collective security to primacy is taking place. As this dialectic turn has not yet been fully played out, I try to gather clues by drawing an historical analogy between the heyday of the Mongol empire (1206–1291) and that of the American empire (1945–2025). It must be pointed out here that the historical analogy I am about to use does not imply that the projection emanating from this analogy is likely to be played out in the near future; it is rather to highlight how the American empire might evolve according to plausible logics that have been historically observed in other historical settings. The historical analogy I use is based on a three-component model—comprising military, economics, and soft power—of imperial durability. In this model, military, economics, and soft power play their respective mutually complementary roles in sustaining empires. This three-factor model is derived from Michael Mann's four-component model,[59] but two of his four components, ideological and sociological, coalesce in my three-component model into soft power.[60] To simplify the comparison, in examining the phases of empires I focus on the other two of the three components—military and economics.

The Mongol empire, especially Genghis Khan's reign, is characterized as near-convergence of the Mongol empire and global governance. The Mongol empire was a Eurasian empire.[61] Given the technological level that prevailed during those times, it was very close to a world empire. Judging from the frequency of use of force (less than largely assumed), deft use of long distance communications and skilful management of currency in linking the empire, it came close to global governance. First, instances of wholesale genocide were less frequent than historians later recounted. Threats of wholesale massacres and genocide were most often used to scare and give a sense of horror and impotence to those about to be conquered. The Mongolian invention of stirrups enabled cavalry soldiers the free use of both hands while riding at a full gallop to fire arrows and catapults. Superior cavalry formations also allowed them to advance on their opponents at an intimidating pace. The Mongol cavalry deployment is comparable to United States' tactics in the Afghan war of 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003—and thereafter —of precise targeting and wholesale destruction of military units and facilities. Second, their use of rapid, horse-based communications gave the Mongols a decisive and critical advantage over their rivals in an empire encompassing the entire Eurasian continent. Third, the

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59   Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*.
60   Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
61   Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*; Taichi Sakaiya, *Genghis Khan* (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2006).

Mongols did not use an imperial unified currency for a good part of the 13th century, instead punctiliously administrating the issue of military coupons. Without credible demonstration that the issuers of these bills could achieve peace, they would have been worthless. The accepted supremacy of the Mongolians inspired confidence enough for these bills to be used in daily commercial transactions. Other currencies could otherwise easily have overridden them. The Mongols' military might and monetary credibility, therefore, is comparable to that of the United States.

The United States demonstrated its utmost military prowess to the world during World War II.[62] The rise of the United States is attributable to the scheme of collective security that came into existence as a direct result of the unprecedentedly calamitous World War I and which was reshaped into collective security II during World War II. Collective security II enabled all major participants in World War II to emerge as victors. The United States vindicated the success of the collective security formula deployed during World War II. Its slogans—anti-fascism, anti-colonialism, freedom, democracy, and independence—were comprehensive.[63] Their presumed achievement, or at least promise of achievement, in 1945, amplified the new schism of capitalist democracy versus communist dictatorship. The Cold War, however, remained cold, and never militarily heated up. The strategic doctrine that shaped the United States policy was called nuclear deterrence on the basis of mutually assured destruction. But the military supremacy of the United States was more or less maintained.[64]

As regards international currency, the Bretton Woods system of monetary management was formulated in 1945 with US dollars as a key international currency backed by the greenback's convertibility to gold. The United States was at this time at its height of power in terms of gross national product and foreign trade, and appeared likely to sustain its supremacy. But amid the ambitious goals of achieving the Great Society and winning the Vietnam War, it abandoned in 1971the core Bretton Woods system rule of gold convertibility.[65] The US dollar has since had no gold backing, and worked according to the principle printed on it of 'In God, we trust.' The Unites States' perennial registered deficits, in terms of external balance and fiscal balance, especially since the oil crisis in the 1970s, however, remained. The debate on whether or not the United States had started to decline was then so popular that both contending arguments about US foreign policy—either for the establishment of US hegemony[66] or for the initialization of

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[62] John Ikenberry, *After Victory*.
[63] Takashi Inoguchi, 'How to Assess World War II in World History,' pp. 138–59.
[64] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace*.
[65] Fred Bergsten, *The Dilemma of the Dollar* (New York: New York University Press, 1975); Susan Strange, *International Monetary Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
[66] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1982).

cooperative networks among major powers[67]—acknowledged an apparent or imminent decline of the United States. Under this scenario of self-caricature it seemed highly possible that whereas Pax Romana had lasted two centuries after the debate on imperial decline started, Pax Americana might begin to slide in tandem with the start of the debate on its decline.

The Plaza Accord of 1985, when major powers such as Germany and Japan wanted to reduce foreign reserves by purchasing US Treasury bonds, however, changed everything. The amount generated by this unprecedented purchase of a currency by other currencies was massive. In 1986, for the first time in human history, the volume of currency trading surpassed that of goods and services, and has since maintained a volume which is 50- to 100-fold that of trade in goods and services. This led to the coining of the phrase, End of Geography, and the ushering in of global financial integration.[68] The Plaza Accord revolution hence clearly prolonged Pax Americana. Since then the US government has changed its statistical scheme of registering its external and fiscal positions in the world economy. Both look better now than they did some thirty years ago. The US monitoring scheme, moreover, is now becoming global. In other words, as long as money is brought into the United States, the US government does not worry too much about modest savings and vigorous consumption, whether government or household. Not having the security of the gold-dollar standard has thus enabled the United States to attract massive monetary inflows.

The birth and preparations for a European common currency in 2001 dramatically changed the whole picture of currency flow. The rise of China has also changed the picture. China makes massive purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds, and since 2005 has held the world's largest foreign currency reserves. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoelick coined the phrase 'a responsible stake-holder' in trying to persuade the Chinese government to behave as a trustworthy member of US-led global governance, and not to act as a mere bond-holder who might switch allegiances overnight.

Will the Plaza revolution remain as an institutionalized revolution in tandem with deepening global governance? The Pax Mongolia heyday lasted without coupon-gold convertibility for about 85 years after 1206. Since the dollar-gold convertibility was abandoned in 1971, this comparative analogy raises the question, will the year 2056 mark the end of Pax Americana? This might seem like a silly question, but in carrying out this exercise of comparative analogy it is important to define the durability of Pax Americana.

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[67] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
[68] Richard O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter, 1992).

A similar question regarding American military predominance is, how long will the United States maintain it? One indicator when predicting military predominance is the percentage of the world total a state expends on research and development investment. As earlier mentioned, the figure for the United States is 85%. With such a Gulliver-like investment US military predominance is likely to continue for the next 20–30 years.

An admittedly cursory examination of the military and currency dimensions of Pax Americana, therefore, implies that it will indeed continue, or at least for the next quarter of a century. And what is the third component of imperial duration? This introduces the dimension of soft power.[69] The soft power argument, as expounded by Joseph Nye, highlights what might possibly be a key dimension in discussions of the future of Pax Americana. Judgments on this question vary. Michael Mann[70] accords low significance to the role of United States ideological and cultural components in maintaining its empire. The unequal and biased emphasis on the military component that he raises in this regard is a key question that moreover casts doubt on its durability. Michael Mandelbaum[71] attaches higher importance to soft power by arguing that global governance is run *de facto* by the United States. Ann-Marie Slaughter[72] also gives higher credence to it by substantiating her implicitly positive answer to the soft power question with detailed and disciplined accounts of exactly how global governance is conducted.

Although far beyond the scope of this article, the natural question that arises is that of how the next dialectic moment will unfold, presumably from primacy to global governance. One of the scenarios that I speculate on in this connection is: while the military predominance of the United States continues for the next quarter of a century, the global integrative forces that have been ushered in since the Plaza Accord will enter into what Clyde Prestowitz[73] calls the third wave of globalization, the first having been West European-led (mostly in the 19th century), the second US-led (mostly in the 20th century) and the third non-West led and symbolically expressed by the G20 (mostly in the 21st century). In this third wave, primacy will be in the process of transition to global governance. There is, however, no empirical evidence of this as the reality has not yet fully evolved. One possible example that implies something might be in the offing, however, is that of the international efforts by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Energy Agency, the US government Department of Energy, and the Group of Eight meeting

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[69]   Joseph Nye, *Soft Power*.
[70]   Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*.
[71]   Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*.
[72]   Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*.
[73]   Clyde Prestowitz, *Three Billion Non Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East* (New York: Basic Books, 2006).

at St. Petersburg to institutionalize nuclear energy, non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, and global environmental sustainability. Daniel Deudney
calls it 'global nuclear Republicanism'. Three possible conditions support
prospects for a fledgling regime. First, the probability of a massive rise in
energy demand, especially in tandem with the rise of China, India, and other
Asian countries, means that fossil energy must be supplemented with nuclear
energy. Second, nuclear energy is inherently dual in use, that is, military and
non-military. The use of nuclear energy for military purposes must hence be
strictly controlled. Third, nuclear energy requires technologically sophisti-
cated and deft handling; it is the ultimate Prometheus unbound. All these
conditions apply on a global scale. A global regime or republic, therefore,
must handle nuclear energy with utmost care.

What about the metamorphosis at the grassroots level when the shift from
primacy to global governance takes place at the leading power level? Again,
I cannot go beyond speculation when answering this question. But it does
seem that self-expression will occur in the metamorphosis from global ter-
rorism to inner-world. Just as what are known as mirror neurons are active
in the brain, global terrorism might take place cerebrally but manifest itself
in a non-violent form. In an era of 'genuine' global governance, national
borders are non-existent and the parochial mentality called nationalism
diminishes.[74] Best-selling novelist Richard Powers analyzes the universality
of Haruki Murakami, author of best-selling novels *Kafka on the Seashore*
and the *Norwegian Wood*, by suggesting that Haruki Murakami has been
writing novels in apparent knowledge of the existence of so-called mirror
neurons since before the 1990s when biophysicists such as Giacomo
Rizzolatti discovered the mirror neuron mechanism.[75] The mirror neuron
is the monkey-see, monkey-do neuron. The idea behind it is that of the
phenomenon of a monkey's neuron symbolically reacting to the muscular
movement of a human experimenter even when the monkey itself does not
move. In other words, the neuron memorizes the action, and seeing it per-
formed triggers the mirror neuron. Haruki Murakami uses this mechanism
in his works of fiction, and hence represents the *Zeitgeist* of globalization
whereby identities, both individual and national, become amorphous. Not
having the locations of inhabitancy, he is free-wheeling, and hence quintes-
sentially a post-nationalist writer.[74] The transition, however, will take time
because the drive for primacy is not dying out. Neither is global terrorism.[76]

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[74] Richard Powers, 'The Globa1 Distributed Self Mirroring Subterranean Neurologica1
Sou1-Sharing Picture Show', *Shincho*, May 2006, pp. 230–43.

[75] Stanislas Dehaeme, Jean-Rene Duhamel, Marc D. Hauser and Giacomo Rozzolatti, eds.,
From Monkey Brain to Human Brain (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005); Giacomo
Rizzolatti and M. A. Arbib, 'Language within Our Grasp', *Trends in Neuroscience*,
Vol. 21, No. 5 (1988), pp. 188–94.

[76] Fred Halliday, 'Terrorism and Delusion', *Open Democracy*, April 12, 2006.

The question of how such a transition might take place after primacy naturally arises. Arguments about the type of regime and its features and about a possible transition departing from primacy have appeared in all directions and dimensions. Those who characterize the current political security regime as United States-led primacy include Robert Lieber, Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press and, of course, Barack Obama. Those who characterize it as global governance include Anne-Marie Slaughter, John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney, and Michael Mandelbaum.[77] The coexistence of various of arguments on this question, that is, of unipolarity (meaning the United States), bipolarity (sometimes meaning sustained nuclear bipolarity with Russia, in terms of long-range nuclear missiles, or more often recently meaning a group of two, or G2, i.e. the United States and China), multipolarity (meaning the rise of the remainder, especially G20), and even of non-polarity, vindicate the ambiguity and uncertainty of the forthcoming political security regime. Non-polarity sounds like the confession of a leading power who has taken its primacy for granted for too long, and who now has a sense of helplessness in a world of growing anarchy. The point is, however, that the state strategy of keeping primacy intact, as President Barack Obama has stated, requires enormous amounts of money, blood, and time, but such efforts may still not prevent catastrophes from occurring. The overwhelming military capability of the leading power may hide its vulnerability for a while, because power is used to maintaining its prestige and reputation against all odds.

My own speculation is that of a transition from primacy to global governance. It is based on two points: first, the interactions between humanitarian interventions by leading powers and global terrorism by dissidents might evolve in the direction of what I call mirrored humanitarian interventions and mirrored global terrorism under the nuclear disarmament processes or, in other words, in a less violence-prone direction; second, the step-by-step, largely bilateral disarmament initiatives might lead to a situation in which only the United States maintains a minimum nuclear arsenal so as to be credible in ensuring world law and order or, in other words, again in a less violence-prone direction.

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[77] Robert Lieber, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, 'The Rise of U. S. Nuclear Primacy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 42–54; Barack Obama, 'The President in State of the Union Address', January 27, 2010. See also Nina Hachigian, 'The False Promise of Primacy: Debunking Robert Kagan's Nostalgia for Bush-Era Foreign Policy', Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/american_primacy.html (accessed January 21, 2010); Anne-Marie Slaughter, *The Idea That Is America: Keeping Faith With Our Values in a Dangerous World* (New York: Basic Books, 2008); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power*; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath*.