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Voice and Accountability:
The Media and the Internet in Democratic Development

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1. Good Governance

It has become a cliché to argue that genuine economic development can be envisaged only when it is accompanied by good governance (Kaufmann et al, 1999). Francis Fukuyama has argued that only in high trust societies can capitalism of higher order prevail (Fukuyama, 1995). Capitalism in low-trust societies can be vigorous at times but it cannot sustain itself for long at a level where good governance is observed. Trust is crucial in the sense that only with high level trust prevailing in business communications and transactions, in investment decision and implementation can one envisage achieving minimum communication and transaction costs and maximum profits. Robert Putnam (1993) has argued that in making democracy work, social capital is essential in facilitating and enabling joint discussion about, planning and implementation of public policy and institution building. Only when such social capital is embedded in civil society and mobilizes for democracy can one envisage democracy functioning well in society.

Good governance is defined as consisting of rule of law, openness, and accountability by Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin (2001). By rule of law is meant impersonal rule and denial of arbitrariness. By openness is meant that the avenue is universally accessible to citizens to know about what is being done, will be done, and has been done about the conduct of governance. By accountability is meant that the conduct of government needs explanation whenever such explanation is demanded by citizens. Until the recent past the

list of requirements for what was then called advanced democracies consists of rule of law, civil liberties and political rights. Freedom House follows this more or less old-fashioned but more precise usage of freedom (2001). The argument for good governance is that good things go together and when good things are somehow assembled to make democracy work, good results are bound to come (Norris et al, 2002; Kaufmann et al, 1999). However simple it might sound at a first glance, these requirements often are heavy ones for many new -- and often old -- democracies. The point is very important, especially when the steady deepening of globalization has been widening the disparities between the rich and the poor, between the privileged and the disadvantaged.

Globalization as symbolized by instant transmissions, communications, and transactions the world over has been transforming the ways in which economic development has to proceed and in which democratic political development has to proceed. Globalization stresses the primordial importance of technological innovation as a key to competitive survival in a good contrast to the three classical key components of capitalist development from the mid-19th century through the whole 20th century, i.e., capital, labor and resources (Inoguchi, 2002). Globalization stresses the primordial importance of openness, impersonal rules and accountability as a key to good global governance (Rose, 2001; Rose/Shin, 2001) in a good contrast to the three classical key components of democracy, i.e., rules of law, civil liberties, political rights (Hall, 19 ; Freedom House, 2000)

Globalization means forces that work across borders and have an increasingly defining character of human interactions (Held et al, 1999; Iqbal/You, 2001). Its impacts on economic equality have been relatively well examined. Globalization seems to aggravate economic inequality often in short term. The gaps in income level have increased. Whereas until the recent past nationally segregated and thus in a sense protected environments

enabled many workers to be employed by firms which may not expect them to be highly skilled from top to bottom. But for the last decade or so, the galloping pace with which globalizing technologies are adopted and used in running business activities has dramatically been changing the employment and earning patterns of many workers. Some skilled and adept to new technologies and new systems get richer and richer, others who are not get poorer and poorer (UNDP, 2001, World Bank, 2001). Thus it is clear that globalization integrates nationally segmented markets more deeply into a global market. But it sharpens distinction between the competitive and the non-competitive and between the thriving and the marginalized. Hence anti-globalization zealots intermittently crowd the gatherings of such richmen club organizations as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the Group of Eight, the International Monetary Fund. Hence the extremely marginalized, despaired and deprived intermittently resort to terrorism. It is not a coincidence to hear many policy prescriptions to prioritize extinguishing extreme poverty on the earth in order to achieve human development, development on the basis of facilitating and enhancing development of each and every individual on the globe, as contrasted to the nationally segmented and largely focused on collective material well-being (Sen, 2000; UNDP, 2000).

The impacts of globalization on democratic politics have not been given a sufficient empirical examination of it (Iqbal/You, 2001; Rose/Shin, 2001; Norris, 2001). Is the use of new globalizing technologies conducive to democratization and democratic consolidation? Is it conducive to the empowerment of those disadvantaged and poor? It seems that the deepening of globalization has been coincided with the accelerating birth of a new democratic regime on a massive scale in the last quarter of the twentieth century from some 35 up to 120 democratic regimes out of 189 United Nations member states (Freedom House, 2001; Vanhanen, 1997; Huntington, 1993). The basic logic underlying the prospective

democratizing effect of such new technologies is that the openness, impersonal rules and accountability associated with these technologies especially as used by the governments and citizens alike are bound to lead to encouraging good governance in the sense that the government gets more self-disciplined about its behavior and the citizens use feedback mechanisms toward the government (Rose, 2001). Therefore, goes the logic, corruption gets curtailed, human rights violation alleviated with such technologies in use. Their impacts would be compared to the application of universal suffrage in elections. At the same time, it also seems that globalization has been intermittently giving birth to bankrupt economies and failed states in tandem with, and in the wake of, such high-pace democratization waves.

I focus here on the relationship between the media and the internet and political beliefs and actions in democracies and quasi-democracies, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore. The data examined here are derived largely from the project on globalization and political cultures of democracy in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia, led by myself and funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Cultures, Sports, Science and Technology for the period from 1999 till 2003 (project number 11102000). In 18 societies in both rims of the Eurasian Continent, the survey was conducted by the Gallup Association led by its Japanese member, the Nippon Research Center, in October 2000 with the random sample of 1,000 in each society.

I will proceed as follows. I will first argue that in discussing democracy in relation to good governance, one needs to be sensitive to the differences emanating from their historical origins of democracy. (1) classical type of democracy, (2) late-comer state-led democracy, and (3) third-wave democracy and to identify where the weakness of each type is located in relation to those requirements of good governance.

Then I will relate these three types of democracy to the development of the media from newspapers to radio and television through cable televisions and the internet and locate the weakness of each type of the media in relation to those requirements of good governance, especially in view of the ability of the media to create the space for the voice by the poor and the disadvantaged and to enhance the accountability of the government to the poor and the disadvantaged.

Thirdly, I will summarize the empirical proxies of voice and accountability in East and Southeast Asia, using the Freedom House indicator of freedom for voice, and the Cyberspace Policy Research Group's indicator of government website figures for accountability and Transparency International's indicator of corruption for transparency.

Fourthly, I will examine empirically whether use of new media technologies help move closer to good governance by using the survey data on new media technologies in relation to political beliefs and actions in East and Southeast Asia. Focusing on how people think of their government's role and performance, I will examine whether the use of new technologies is related to a certain set of political beliefs held by respondents. In other words, this section will reveal the respondents's beliefs about what roles their government should play and how their government has performed in this or that policy area might be related to their use or non-use of new media technologies. Then, focusing on the range of political actions, I will examine whether the use of new technologies might be related to the ease with which a certain type of political action is envisaged and chosen to advance their cause. In other words, these new technologies might be responsible for the popular propensity or inclination to resort to certain political actions or non-actions that are politically highly significant in terms of organizing and mobilizing those population

affected by those informationally globalizing forces.

Lastly, on the basis of preceding empirical examinations, the conclusion will be drawn as to the relationship of new technologies and the advancement of voice and accountability. My conclusion is that all the virtuous-circle kind of argument about good governance can claim its overall validity but that without situating the historical contexts of new media technological and democratic development in each society under examination such claim cannot operationalize its policy program adequately.

2. Three Types of Democracy: Strengths and Weaknesses

At least three types of democratic development may be discerned (Potter 2000; Inoguchi, 1996): First, the classical development of democracy amongst a small number of privileged elites in the initial yet fairly long stage; second, the 20th century development of democracy under state-led economic development and war mobilization; third, the fin-de-siecle development of third-wave democratization in the 4th quarter of the 20th century. Their features and their relationship with the press and mass media will be examined.

First, classical democracy can be found in the somewhat idealized American development of democracy. It is said that this type of democracy is characterized by societal liberalism and political democracy (Lipset, 1998; Rose/Shin, 2001; Freedom House 2001). It is Alexis de Tocqueville who wrote that press censorship and universal suffrage are hard to coexist for a long period of time (Tocqueville, 1945, vol.1, p.190; Kasza, 1988, p21). Here press censorship means societal liberalism while universal suffrage means political democracy. It is not coincidental that Alexis de Tocqueville was observing American democracy where

liberalism was practiced fairly widely as far as free population were concerned. Liberalism practiced among privileged strata became more widely practiced step by step, first by the abolition of slave institutions in the mid-19th century, second by the universal suffrage by early twentieth century as far as men are concerned, third by the citizen rights granted to minorities in the mid-1960's, fourth by the fairly pervasive striving for gender equality in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. By societal liberalism I mean the generally high level civic liberty enjoyed among the population who tend to exhibit law-abiding and others-trusting nature. By political democracy I mean the generally high level political rights granted to everyone above a certain age and exercised as a normal routine.

Second, mass democracy of latecomers can be found, say, in the Japanese development of democracy (Yamamoto, 1981; Kasza, 1988). It is symbolized by the coincidence of press censorship and universal suffrage, an anti-Tocqueville phenomenon. This took place in the form of the simultaneous legislation of the internal security preservation law and the universal suffrage law in 1925 in Japan. Characteristic of this type of the relationship between mass media and democracy is that while democratization steadily made progress, control of mass media in terms of not allowing mass media expressive "subversive" and "disturbing" ideas to the government was enhanced. Restrictions on freedom of press and expression went hand in hand with consolidation of democracy in terms of mass inclusion into the political system (Banno, 1996). Japan since 1945 departed from this type considerably because of the defeat and the occupation reforms of its political and economic arrangements. But what has remained alive with respect to mass media is the relatively firm grip of power by the Post and Telecommunications Ministry over mass media in terms of authorization of mass media firms. With the spirit of upholding public interests prescribed in the Telecommunications law, mass media tend to exercise self-restraint and moderate themselves with respect to "subversive and disturbing ideas" This pattern of

democracy is alive and well in such polities as South Korea and Malaysia, where democratization has deepened itself significantly in terms of participation and contestation in a democratic framework but where societal liberalism has been somewhat feeblers largely because of the retention of the internal security act from non-democratic or colonial days (Zakaria, 1995).

Third, third-wave democracies of the fourth quarter of the 20th century (Huntington, 1993; Rose/Shin, 2001) can be found in the penetration of transnational media and the partially hollowed participation in local politics. Satellite television and electronic communications such as internet and email have effectively undermined the old style of state-led mass media penetration of the second type (Barber, 1993). In the Philippines the English speaking privileged elites watch transnational CNN news whereas the Tagalog -speaking masses watch news in local Tagalog news. President Joseph Estrada was criticized by the former group of people for his not-so-good command of English. His response was that what is wrong with that, citing Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi who was not known for his English. The linguistic unity of the nation has been undermined as far as the first official language for the last one-century is concerned. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt appeared on CNN, saying that he cannot spend a day without watching CNN news reports. And he is not alone among Third World leaders about CNN news reports although most do not say so publicly. Democratic participation is skewed in the per capita income level. In China direct elections of village and other types of local leaders have been held in many places (He, 2001). Judging from a number of studies, it looks as if places at a medium-income level such as Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian exhibit the higher participation level whereas places at a low-income level such as Guizhou and Shanxi and places at a high-income level such as Zhejiang and Guangdong manifest the much lower participation level. People stricken by poverty cannot afford organizing such an activity even though poverty

may need some political action whereas affluent people do not need to resort to rely on public policy very much. Only places at a medium-income level want to make use of democratic instruments to effectuate policy change.

In the United States, those moderate electorates occupying the Downsian centre (Downs, 1957) of the political continuum of right (tax reduction and strong defense) and left (social policy and engagement policy) tend to be alienated by excessively negative advertisements on television. They tend to become an apathetic and indifferent abstainer by staying away from voting participation. It is true that party politics in the United States encourages candidates to move toward the Downsian centre since the centre is most densely populated. But in addition to less educated strata who do not participate in democratic politics very much, those highly professional and high-income strata at the Downsian centre have shown much weaker inclinations to participate in politics, further contributing to the United States registering the lowest participation rate among the electorates in the United States, the European Union and Japan ('Ansolabehere/ Iyengar, 2000). Although neither China nor the United States is a third-wave democracy, their partially hollowed participation seems to be resonant with third-wave democracies (Rose/ Shin 2001).

3. Old and New Terminology of Mass Media: Enabling and Facilitating

Freedom of press has been widely regarded as a benchmark of any democratic form of government. Without freedom of press, the government finds it difficult to know popular preferences. Without freedom of press people finds it hard to keep its criticism of the government heard and its demands to the government pressed. Freedom of press is thus an

essential element of and foundation for democracy. It symbolizes both political right and civil liberty.

At a time when the notion of freedom of press was articulated in West European writings in the 18th and 19th centuries, the level of technology was still relatively low in order to see mass media flourish on national and international scales (DeFleur/Ball-Rokeach, 1989). It was only in the late nineteenth century that newspapers came to be circulated in a relatively large number. Also it was only in the early twentieth century that radio appeared as a mass medium of communication. About a half a century later in mid 20th century television started to become a most effective mass medium. Yet again half a century later computer technology has realized yet another mode of mass communication, internet and e-mail.

It is most important to notice that the difference in the characteristics of technology of mass media has affected the nature of democracy in a profound way. (Katz, 1998; Zaller, 1992). When first-generation newspapers were circulated in the late nineteenth century, they were considered as targeted at a relatively small number of elites. Printing and distribution technology was limited to enable massive nation-wide circulation. Democratic politics at a level beyond privileged elites was only beginning to be envisaged. Newspapers were considered both as a watcher of government conducts and as an articulator of views of elites whether they were in the government or in the opposition camp. They were oftentimes instruments of elites in the game of politician's politics. The government used them for enlightenment and support mobilization. The government exercised its influence sometimes through subsidies to and bribery of the press. The opposition used them for criticism and sometimes blackmailing the government to make a deal (Sasaki, 1999). Newspapers did certainly strengthened national self-consciousness and national identity

especially when its circulation was coincided with the period of nation building (Yamamoto, 1981; Inoguchi, 2000b). Yet newspapers contributed to encouraging a growing number of parliamentary elites thinking much more highly of themselves vis-à-vis the king, prime minister or president (Katz, 1998). In that sense newspapers contributed to both nationalism and democracy.

Radio was invented and used to communicate news on a nation-wide scale in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and it was regarded as the birth of mass media along with the development of massively circulated newspapers. Its target was an amorphous mass of people then becoming eligible to democratic elections. In many countries, governments for nation building, war mobilization, and other goals most effectively used radio. It was largely through Radio Republik Indonesia, for instance, that the newly independent Republic of Indonesia realized the population of 1700 languages to speak Bahasa Indonesia, a somewhat artificially constructed national language for the purpose of attaining and maintaining national unity and solidarity in the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson, 1972; Kitley, 2000). Other than nation-building purposes, radio did enable national leaders directly outreach men on the street and thereby bypass parliaments in exercising power (Katz, 1998). Sukarno of pre-and post-independence Indonesia most effectively used the newly found power of radio, and so did Franklin D. Roosevelt. So did a number of dictatorial leaders in the very countries Allied Powers faced antagonistically in the Second World War. Oftentimes national leaders who effectively used radio were able to obtain parliamentary support as well as popular support.

It was this formidable installation of mass media in society that led pundits to seek countervailing institutions and practices in coping with the onslaught of mass media on what were then regarded as an amorphous and atomized set of people in forming their

views and sentiments.

One positive view set forth by Paul Lazarsfeld et al (1944) was that opinion leaders should be identified to let them to play the role of digesting mass media contents and helping the mass to formulate their opinions in a certain direction. Here opinion leaders were folksy pundits at grass roots level. Mass communication channels are to be mediated by pundits in the community so that mini communication can be installed in a positive constructive fashion. This is the standard answer to the question of mass media's potentially atomizing and dehumanizing effects on what should be interpersonal communication with human face.

In reacting to the "bowling alone" phenomenon of diminishing communitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s, Robert Putnam (2000) tries to resuscitate the spirit of community in American society. In a good Tocquevillian fashion, Robert Putnam prescribes the revival of trusting each other, associating with each other, and forming social institutions may be the first step of preventing society from collapsing into a completely individualized space with no trust, no association and no social institution tying them together. He does not necessarily ascribe the 'bowling alone' phenomenon to the effects of mass media. However, his prescription resembles very much to Paul Lazarsfeld in the sense that his critical variable is social capital, something that binds people positively whenever social action and public policy are to be needed (Putnam, 1993, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996; Woolcock, forthcoming; Serageldin and Grootaert 2000).

Naturally there are negative views of mass media effects. One representative is Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann(1984). Her view is that once the distribution of opinion is known publicly through opinion polls or otherwise, then what she calls the spiral of silence takes place. In other words, the majority of opinion leads the minority to silence itself. Mass media report

opinion polls, editorials, letters to the editor, articles and comments, through which people know the profile of preferences and views on certain issues. This, she argues, stifles the lively discussion among populace precisely because they soon realize that they are either majority or minority. In other words, the tyranny of the majority prevails in a mass communication society in a much more pronounced fashion.

Television is another medium. It has had another set of impacts on democracy. Politicians can now talk directly to people through television. Not only national leaders on the capital city but also all candidates for parliamentary elections can outreach the populace, not only in their districts but also nation-wide. In the United States as well as in other countries, the freedom of expression and the freedom of speech are regarded as more important than the need tightly to regulate money for electoral campaigns on a level playing field. The US Presidential Elections in 2000 was waged with the highest ever money spent for campaigns, but the argument for freedom of expression seems to have surpassed the argument against it. In Japan, for instance, a different thinking prevails as to which is just in the use of mass media in electoral campaigns. The television exposure per candidate is equal in terms of minutes and free of costs as television time is provided free by a quasi-governmental TV station; the number of candidate's posters is equal; the number of words that can be used to express a policy platform for each candidate, which is printed free of charge on major nationally circulated newspapers, is equal. But this type of regulation tends to favor incumbents and give more hurdles to new comers who normally need to be exposed longer than incumbents for being voted for.

Irrespective of television favoring those candidates full of money or those incumbents, television seems to have the effect of diluting the power of political party organizations (Katz, 1998). It focuses much more on personalities and styles of politicians than anything

else. Rather than intricate arguments full of details, the beauty of simplicity and clarity tends to prevail. In Japan as well as in other countries, TV debate programmes abound, giving opportunities to give the sense of virtual participation to TV audiences, as such programmes are participated both by well-known and/or high-ranking national leaders and parliamentarians and by popular figures of high name recognition outside the government. In US presidential elections two major candidates have debates in front of television. In Japan almost every week, such live discussion programmes expose parliamentarians of all walks of beliefs to the public so that major politicians are exposed to public scrutiny intermittently and perhaps excessively. By exposing the weaknesses of politicians through mishaps and unintended facial expressions that do not hide their internal thoughts and sentiments, it seems that political distrust deepens. (cf, Nye et al, 1997).

In the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, another instrument of mass media was born. That is an internet and an email through a computer, a television or a mobile telephone. This media allows users to conduct both mass communication and mini communication. Through email one can reach a large number of people of similar sociological attributes all at once and alternatively one can construct a seemingly intimate in-depth communication channel with another body. Through internet one can broaden the realm of information almost infinitely. This represents a revolutionary change in the conduct of human communication. This might as well be called mass-mini communication because after all it enables both mass communication and mini communication. At least those skillful users of internet feel that they have access to what is equivalent to Library of Congress catalogues and Central Intelligence Agency files in their respective field of knowledge. At least those skillful users of email can feel that they conduct both a grand orchestra and a mini-symphony. Computer technology allows one to use targeting in human communication. In sum, targeting makes electronic communication an intriguing device the overall effects of

which have not yet been fully examined.

One area where targeting's effects have been empirically examined is negative TV advertisements. TV ads enable targeting to be fully utilized with effects on electoral participation and voting. Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar (1995) did it. Through quite imaginative use of experimental methods and data analysis as applied to negative ads, they have come up with a striking conclusion. That is that relentless attack of adversaries in negative ads alienates a large number of open-minded and highly educated independent voters. They are repulsed by the entire system and easy to become apathetic and indifferent non-voters. By attacking a relatively small number of holders of an extreme view, negative ads create a large space of non-partisan educated open-minded electorates to vacate their original participatory location into that of apathy and abstention by their extremity and absurdity while not affecting the target electorates themselves very much.

Another area where targeting's effects are clearly seen is the fragmenting effects of satellite televisions like CNN. In the Philippines, for instance, those watchers of TV news in English through CNN tend to be privileged English-proficient elites while those watchers of TV news in Tagalog through more local stations tend to be less privileged, less English-proficient masses. One century after English was made the official national language, the Philippines seems to be fragmenting the linguistic unity of the nation through satellite televisions. When satellite televisions like CNN bring about what Americans think it right and fit for emission, the question naturally arises as to whether contents are really something local societies need (Katz/Weddell, 1977). First, authentic local culture might be sacrificed in favor of American globalist culture emitted through satellite televisions. This is especially true with entertainment programmes. Second, the American global interests are likely to prevail over more locally nuanced national interests

of various countries. If those local elites watch more American satellite televisions news programmes than local television news programmes, one of its consequences may be the increasing gap between Americanized elites persuaded by the American flavored globalist thinking and more bumi putra (sons of the earth) endogenous local elites.

4. New Media Technologies

I use the internet										
	Total	Japan	South Korea	China	Taiwan	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia	Thailand	Philippines
Total	9,160	1,129	1,010	1,002	1,002	1,006	1,000	1,011	1,000	1,000
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Apples	2,342	372	517	269	277	433	236	26	148	64
	25.6	32.9	51.2	26.8	27.6	43.0	23.6	2.6	14.8	6.4
Does not apply	6814	753	493	733	725	573	764	985	852	936
	74.4	66.7	48.8	73.2	72.4	57.0	76.4	97.4	85.2	93.6
N/A	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.0	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I often watch foreign news programs										
	Total	Japan	South Korea	China	Taiwan	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia	Thailand	Philippines
Total	9,160	1,129	1,010	1,002	1,002	1,006	1,000	1,011	1,000	1,000
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Apples	4,109	361	446	379	379	691	638	230	578	407
	44.9	32	44.2	37.8	37.8	68.7	63.8	22.7	57.8	40.7
Does not apply	5,048	765	564	623	623	315	362	781	422	593
	55.1	67.8	55.8	62.2	62.2	31.3	36.2	77.3	42.2	59.3
N/A	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.0	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I use email to communicate with other countries										
	Total	Japan	South Korea	China	Taiwan	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia	Thailand	Philippines
Total	9,160	1,129	1,010	1,002	1,002	1,006	1,000	1,011	1,000	1,000
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Apples	965	69	98	81	71	325	162	20	67	72
	10.5	6.1	9.7	8.1	7.1	32.3	16.2	2.0	6.7	7.2
Does not apply	8,193	1,058	912	921	931	681	838	991	933	928
	89.4	93.7	90.3	91.9	92.9	67.7	83.8	98.0	93.3	92.0
N/A	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.0	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I receive an international satellite or cable TV										
	Total	Japan	South Korea	China	Taiwan	Singapore	Malaysia	Indonesia	Thailand	Philippines
Total	9,160	1,129	1,010	1,002	1,002	1,006	1,000	1,011	1,000	1,000
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Apples	3,072	218	484	736	917	254	155	70	103	135
	33.5	19.3	47.9	73.5	91.5	25.2	15.5	6.9	10.3	13.5
Does not apply	6,085	908	526	266	85	752	845	941	879	865
	66.4	80.4	52.1	26.5	8.5	74.8	84.5	93.1	89.7	86.5
N/A	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.0	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Drawing from the survey data on globalization and political cultures of democracy done in 18 societies in East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe in October 2000, I focus on four such media technologies: the internet, email, foreign news programs and cable televisions.

(a) the Internet

Users of the Internet are more easily located at societies with higher per capita income levels. South Korea, Singapore, Japan and Taiwan are such examples. China is an exception to this observation with an Internet user's percentage roughly on a par with that of Taiwan. This is largely due to the fact that the Chinese sample, unlike most other samples, consists of a few large cities. Japan is sort of an outlier of this observation in that it has far less Internet-users per total population for the society which enjoys the regionally and globally highest per capita income level. Indonesia and the Philippines do not have many Internet-users

apparently in proportion to their per capita income levels.

(b) email

Users of email gives a different pattern from users of the Internet. Email users seem to be determined more strongly by the ease with which English is spoken. Singapore and Malaysia are a former British colony, British Malaya. The Philippines does not evince a high percentage of email users. It is a former American colony and its population is officially English speaking. But its low per capita income level and the income gap between the elite and the masses seem to push down the otherwise a slightly higher level. Indonesians use email least per population, which seems to be in proportion to its per capita income level.

(c) foreign news programs

There are less variations on this matter. On the whole, however, Southeast Asians watch foreign news programs more often than Northeast Asians. They are more sensitive to foreign news as they are much smaller countries. An outlier is Indonesia. Its low level of per capita income and its large country status may be preventing them from watching foreign news programs more often. Northeast Asians watch foreign news programs less often: many of them are not English-speaking; they have many local language TV channels.

(d) cable TV

Taiwan and China receive a cable TV at a highest level in East and Southeast Asia despite substantially different income levels between the two. Next comes South Korea. Then come Singapore and Japan, two countries where per capita income levels are high but the government regulatory policy seems to make difference. After then come Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

The above examination of the survey data for the nine countries in East and Southeast Asia seem to suggest that the overall basic conclusion is that the kind of openness, impersonal rules and accountability associated with the use of new technologies related to good governance is likely to prevail in East and Southeast Asia as well. But the outliers to this basic conclusion must be taken seriously. There are five:

- (1) Singapore and Malaysia
- (2) China
- (3) Japan
- (4) the Philippines
- (5) North Korea

- (1) Singapore and Malaysia

These countries, especially Singapore, are quasi-democratic states of more authoritarian bent in East and Southeast Asia. Their governments seem to be successful in projecting the image of a strong monitoring and censoring state and thus the survey data do not seem to carry the same degree of authenticity when the question comes to how respondents think about the government. It is not a coincidence that both societies are highly equipped with new technologies and have a very large number of English speaking population. Even if corruption is effectively curtailed in Singapore, that does not translate itself into the prima facie evidence of good governance.

- (2) China

It comes of a small surprise to find that China has risen to a society highly equipped with new technologies under authoritarian rule. Internet population has grown very fast. Cable

TV has been received by a huge number of population. Even if the authoritarian government monitors email and the internet, this trend seems to prevail. It is not that one individual uses a few email addresses including care-of-X addresses to skirt government monitoring and intervention. It is not that the government bans a certain Internets from being used. But the basic trend is amply there. Naturally the question arises immediately: Where does this trend lead to in China? Is democratic regime change likely to take place in China within the next 5 to 15 years? Already per capital income level on the coastal China has achieved a very high level on which many other countries achieved democratic transition. And all the new technologies conducive to good governance have been most vigorously utilized in China even compared to most other East and Southeast Asian countries. After all if Mao Zedong established a class-based revolutionary state, and if Deng Xiaoping achieved triggering economic development, Jiang Zeming declared that China is becoming an all-people state, meaning that a proto-democratic state is in the offing.

(3) Japan

Japan is an enigma in the sense that the highest per capita income level and the highest level of civil liberties and political rights enjoyed in society do not seem to endow it with a more impeccable practice of good governance. New technologies in this regard have been a few years still behind a few regional countries in East and Southeast Asia.

(4) the Philippines

Between 1986 and 2000, that is, between the fall of Ferdinand Marcos and the fall of Joseph Estrada, one remarkable development has been taking place. Literacy of the population has risen to a remarkable level and Tagalog has been used much more vigorously among the masses in tandem with overall economic development and political democratization. The catch is that the income gap between the elite and the masses seems to be in parallel to the

differentiated use of language when they watch TV news programs. The elite like CNN (in English) and the masses like local channels (in Tagalog or some other local languages). This differentiated choice has been evinced by the fall of Estrada, especially by the orientation of the elite and the masses about the desirability or undesirability of the resignation of Joseph Estrada. The elite watched CNN and wanted to oust him with action mostly taken in mass media and the parliament. The masses watched local TV channel news programs in Tagalog and many of them wanted to retain him as President. Since the elite did not take mass marches and demonstrations in 2000 as we saw in 1986, the regime change in 2000 is often characterized as "people power phase two without people." This differentiation seems to affect the nature of democratic politics in the post-Estrada Philippines.

(5) North Korea

It is an extremely closed country. The population is isolated from the rest of the world. The possession of radio, for instance, is strictly forbidden. Once spotted to possess one, the possessor is bound to get punished severely. Media technologies, old and new, are simply not available to the people. Nevertheless, the accounts of North Korean society occasionally come out through foreigners and ethnic Koreans from China and Japan. Most recently, the exodus from North Korea has been more pronounced. But neither voice nor accountability exists.

5. Penetration of Democratic Politics

The extent to which democratic politics is practiced in East and Southeast Asia varies immensely. Two contrasting data are given by the Freedom House and by the Gallup Association. Freedom in the World is an annual publication of the Freedom House, which gives an annual rating of civil liberties and political rights on a number of quite detailed

items of these two matters as practiced in all the independent states and dependencies. Rating itself is done by its expert team. Since country ratings are amply annotated by expert accounts of civil liberties and political rights in each country, Freedom in the World has been used for quite a wide range of purposes despite such criticism as American, individualistic bias. The Gallup Association led by the Nippon Research Center conducted the Millennium Survey in 152 countries in January 2000. The Freedom House data are concerned about how experts think civil liberties and political rights in each country. The Millennium Survey data are concerned about how respondents in each country responded to the questions about the democratic performance of their government in a number of policy areas such as corruption, human rights, and the economy. The catch here is that the more authoritarian the government is perceived by respondents, the more praise comes from respondents. This seems to be clearly the case with Singapore and Malaysia.

I compare the results of these two data about the practice of democratic politics in East and Southeast Asia. The eight countries I examine are: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore. Most striking is that the Freedom House data and the Millennium Survey data are negatively correlated. Freedom House's rating among the eight countries is as follows in the descending order:

Japan	13
Taiwan	28
South Korea	28
the Philippines	33
Thailand	33
Hong Kong	46
Malaysia	53

Singapore	53
China	59

Millennium Survey ranking among the eight countries is as follows in the descending order.

Malaysia	1
Singapore	1
Hong Kong	4
Philippines	10
Taiwan	15
Thailand	22
Korea	36
Japan	53
China	no response

Two more narrowly focuses indicators of good governance, those of accountability of transparency; one useful in locating each source on a certain continuum, especially in relation to the Freedom House ranking of freedom. The relatively small numbers of the www of government departments in Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore are a small surprise. Also I note that the authoritarian governments of Singapore and Hong Kong are highly ranked on the transparency scale.

Government Departments on the WWW

Taiwan	169
Thailand	136
Japan	128
Malaysia	105
Indonesia	52
PR China	44
Korea	40
Philippines	28
Singapore	27
Myanmar	4
Vietnam	2

Source: A count of government departments listed by name in the Cyberspace Policy Research Group web site report of web operations in all ministry-level organizations worldwide. See www.cyprg.arizona.edu, downloaded 11 July 2001. (Cited in Rose, 2001.)

Transparency International Index		
Highest Integrity		
<i>East Asia</i>	9.9	Comparators
		Finland(first)
<i>Singapore</i>	9.2	
Hong Kong est.	7.5	
	7.4	USA
Japan	7.1	
Taiwan	5.9	
	5.5	Italy
Malaysia	5.0	
R.of Korea	4.2	Greece
P.R. China	3.5	
Thailand	3.2	
Philippines	2.9	
Vietnam	2.6	
Myanmar est.	2.3	
Indonesia	1.9	
	Most Corrupt	

Source: Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index, 2001. www.transparency.org, Hong Kong and Myanmar estimated from regression of GDP per capita for TI Index. (Cited in Rose, 2001.)

5. New Media and Political Beliefs

In this section I will use new survey data on the relationship between new media technologies and certain political beliefs that are entertained by such users. I am interested in users of four new technologies, the internet, email, foreign news programs and cable television, as identified by the Asia-Europe Survey covering 18 societies in East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe conducted in October 2000, led by Takashi Inoguchi, and funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, for the period between 1999-2003 (project identification number 11102000). My interest is how the introduction of new media technologies might influence their political beliefs in certain directions. Since it is a one-shot survey, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to causally

interpret the cross-tabulated data. But one can indicate some plausible influences new media technologies might exercise on users's beliefs and actions related to "voice and accountability" in the vocabulary of good governance.

5.1 Internet

Looking at the response patterns in eight Asian societies to the authoritarianism question, it seems clear in most societies that internet users are more likely not to subscribe to political authoritarianism (i.e., the government is strong and people do not have a say in what the government does) and that they are more likely to subscribe to the view that what the government does not make much difference. The latter belief is the strongest in Korea. Also pronounced is the egalitarian belief among internet users. Again Korea is most pronounced in this respect. Singapore's internet users evince this same characteristic, albeit to a far lesser extent. All these make sense in that the internet brings new ideas often from abroad including democracy and equality. But compared to email users, this tendency is less pronounced.

5.2 email

The belief that the government does not necessarily make a difference is popular among email users. Especially pronounced in this regard is those in Singapore and Malaysia. The view that the government does not care the people is no less strong among email users especially in Singapore and Malaysia. The belief in egalitarianism is similarly very strong among email

users, again in Singapore and Malaysia. In a good contrast to those responses in Singapore and Malaysia, China and the Philippines manifest a diametrically different pattern. In China email users seem to hold an elitist view. Email users in China are more privileged and elitist, it seems. A similar tendency is found in the Philippines, albeit to a lesser extent.

5.3 foreign news programs

Watchers of foreign news programs in Indonesia and Thailand tend to hold the belief that the government may not be terribly strong whereas those watchers in Singapore and Malaysia regard the government to be strong. Those watchers who follow what the government says are the most salient in China, Korea and Thailand and the least salient in Singapore and Malaysia. The phenomenon in Singapore and Malaysia in this regard seems to indicate that exposure to foreign news programs tend to lead them to be somewhat critical of the government. Unlike in Singapore and Malaysia where English is widely used and where emission of foreign news programs is somewhat regulated, the Philippines and Thailand give a good contrast. The Philippine elites watch foreign cable television primarily in English and the masses watch local television primarily in Tagalog. Hence foreign news program watchers-cum-elites tend to subscribe to the belief that the government is strong, that they follow the government because they lead the government, and that egalitarianism is contested by them.

5.4 cable television

Those who receive cable television tend to believe that the government is

not powerful in the Philippines – and Indonesia. Many of them are the privileged elites. In Thailand and the Philippines those cable television receivers tend to give trust in the government and those who do not receive cable television tend to distrust the government. Those who do not receive cable television in Indonesia and Thailand do not subscribe to the view that one should follow what the government says. In China and to a lesser extent in Taiwan those cable television watchers tend to exhibit the most pro-government view. In Korea their response is totally divided. The egalitarian belief is strongly shared by cable television watchers in China and Taiwan. In other words, the privileged elites in China and Taiwan seem to be the enlightened elites who are more influenced by egalitarianism. In a good contrast to China and Taiwan, it is those cable television non-receivers in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines that hold their strong egalitarian belief.

To sum up, new media technologies should bring about enlightening effects on the poor and the privileged. But in a number of societies they seem to give further enlightenment and power to those privileged elites.

6. New Media and Political Actions

I will examine the relationship between new media technologies and political actions of those holders. Again the four technologies examined are the internet, email, foreign news programs and cable television. The kinds of political action examined are informal get-togethers, contacting politicians (on individual, local or national issues), petition, protest and joining a political party.

First, it is very important to emphasize that the level of political action is high if a society is free and democratic. Japan, one of the oldest non-western democracy, stands out in this regard. Next to come are Korea and Taiwan. In other words, once societal liberalism and political democracy blossom more or less fully, new media technologies seem to enhance voice and accountability.

Second, even if a society is not fully free and democratic, new media technologies seem to help to facilitate, prod and promote political actions, as long as chosen political action is not regarded as politically dangerous or subversive. In other words, other features set the basic framework for voice and accountability, new media technologies seem to set the parameters of voice and accountability more user-friendly.

6.1 Internet

Internet users seem to be more action-prone than non-users. Especially Korea is most action-oriented whether it is informal get-togethers, contacting politicians, petition, protest or joining a political party. Internet-users in Singapore are more cautious but they choose informal get-togethers more frequently than non-users. Although Japanese take political action most frequently in Asia, whether they are a user or non-user of new media technologies does not make too much difference. In other words the introduction of new media technologies does not seem to impact the voice and accountability very much in Japan.

6.2 email

Whether a user or non-user of email is does not seem to make too much difference. It seems that emails are used for bringing and socializing purposes in Asia but not so much for campaigning purposes unlike in the United States. But email users in Malaysia seem to take one type of political action with more ease, i.e., joining a political party.

6.3 foreign news programs

Those watchers of foreign news programs tend to take political action with more ease in Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Japan does not make too much difference whether they are a watcher or not. The Philippines are divided: the elites watch foreign news programs and the masses do not. The Philippine watchers of foreign news programs tend to contact politicians in a pronounced fashion.

6.4 cable television

Cable television receivers do exhibit a strong tendency to act politically in Taiwan and Korea. Both Korea and Taiwan are not only democratic but also good receivers of cable television. In a good contrast, Southeast Asian societies exhibit a less pronounced relationship between new media and political action. It seems largely because many of them are less free and less democratic. But at the same time, the income gap widens the digital divide and the privileged elites use new media technologies far more often than the handicapped masses in terms of access to new technologies.

7. Conclusion

It has been widely shared wisdom that to achieve development one needs good governance. Not just labor, capital, resources and technology, but rule of law, openness and accountability need to be consolidated in order to trigger and sustain the genuine development in the sense of striving at attaining the individual and collective betterment of human beings. The twenty-first century is not going to be the era of a crude capitalism, as was characterized by Karl Marx in mid-nineteenth century, but should be a more civilized capitalism, with the blossoming of each and every individual's potentials realized, with those handicapped and disadvantaged in dire need of safety net receiving warm attention and assistance from the rest of the world, and with freedom, equality, human rights and democracy enjoyed by increasingly large segments of the world population.

It is a never-ending struggle of pulling out the best out of human potentials by consolidating the civil and political infrastructure of norms, rules and values. In this sense, it is not enough to argue that genuine development requires good governance as a necessary condition. What is necessary for policy makers is to have the guidance to development and governance in ways that suit best the local conditions and contexts they are placed in. In order to do so, one needs a set of more historically grounded and context-sensitive developmental strategies. I have tried to show, albeit on an admittedly very modest fashion, that such a line of analysis of new media technologies in terms of their possible and real functions of enlightening political beliefs and encouraging political actions are helpful in drafting such a strategy of genuine development and good governance.

Democracy is a process of nurturing a certain set of values and instituting a certain set of rules and norms so that conflict of interests can be resolved without use of force and coercion. In so doing new media technology play so important roles. Building the sound relationship of new media technologies with democracy is a key to good governance. From the citizen's point of view, they play the role of enlightenment, i.e., informing people of important news and events that pertain to the citizen's exercise of power in influencing political outcomes. More functionally, they play the role of a midwife, facilitating the formation of the collective preferences of citizens by providing the forum for debates and discussions and setting the agenda for collective preference formation; at the same time, they play the role of an ombudsman, watching the conduct of the government. Conversely from the point of the government, they play the role of an agenda-setter, i.e., putting forward the direction of thinking and discussion on a certain policy formation. More functionally, they exercise moral leadership and conduct administrative guidance toward forming collective decision in tune with that of the government; at the same time, they play the role of a monitor, mapping out the distribution of individual preferences on a certain policy issue.

The roles of press and mass media on the one hand and of the government on the other must go hand in hand, checking and balancing potential excesses of these roles one another. Never the less, the broad historical legacies of various democracies die hard. Classical democracies retain certain legacies of various democracies die hard. Classical democracies retain certain legacies of participation gaps among social strata and the negatively aggressive advertisement seems to undermine the high participation rate of

highly educated and high-income strata, the core of classical democracies. Later-comer democracies retain a certain state-led orientation vis-à-vis mass media that may leave the role of press and mass media to be only insufficiently fulfilled for the purpose of creating good governance. At the same time the relentless wave of satellite television from abroad fragments the very neat unity of the nation state according to the model of state-led latecomer democracies. For many of third wave-democracies, the growing gaps between elites and masses in terms of their different conceptions of good governance especially one of its key components, i.e., the relationship of press and mass media with democracy seem to give hindrances to the further advancement of good governance.

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