International security management and the United Nations

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Conclusion

Three frameworks of peace and security in the next millennium

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We have posed at the outset the two key questions whereby we can organize our thoughts on the nature of peace and security in global politics and the possible roles the United Nations could play therein. In the preceding chapters we have done our best to answer these two questions. Recapitulating them would be more tedious than necessary. Therefore, I would like to bring back a possibly more fundamental question and try to give answers in a slightly different fashion. The question is: what kinds of frameworks of global politics will compete and possibly prevail in the next millenium as global politics start to take a clearer shape from the current state of flux?

Let me start with three books of major importance which have been published in the last few years. They are Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy*, Bruce Russett's *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. I take them as representative articulators of three totally different streams of thought which according to them govern, ought to govern, and will govern global politics in the next millennium. Kissinger's *Diplomacy* is Westphalian; Russett's *Grasping the Democratic Peace* is Philadelphian; and Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* is anti-utopian. By Westphalian I mean a framework in which state sovereignty reigns supreme. By Philadelphian I mean a framework in which popular sovereignty stands firm. By anti-utopian I mean a framework in which the loss of sovereignty is the key feature. The presumption is that these three frameworks of global politics

are competing, and that it is not quite clear which one will prevail. I will briefly spell out the key features of these three frameworks in terms of key concept, systemic features, and behavioural modalities, and the key role of the United Nations in these frameworks.

The Westphalian framework has been predominant over the past three centuries, and especially over the past century and a half. The territorially-based nation-states and their competition in Europe and beyond intermittently created havoc globally and regionally. State sovereignty means order within and anarchy without. Systemic features are thus anarchy, and anarchy without can only be restrained by competition itself. Behavioural modalities are characterized by balancing and bandwagonning By balancing I mean the propensity of actors to defend the system by moving to counteract those actors who show their ambition to prevail. By bandwagonning I mean the propensity of actors to join the likely-to-prevail actors in the interest of maximizing their gains with minimum costs.

The Philadelphian framework has existed since the colonial period as a result of the American Civil War. It was a system in which legal procedures and amicable agreement prevailed when conflicts of interests needed to be resolved. There was order, but not necessarily hierarchy amongst different interests. Behavioural modalities are characterized by binding and hiding. By binding I mean the propensity of actors to shape agreements whereby actors are constrained. By hiding I mean the propensity of actors to move away from agreements whereby actors are constrained.

The anti-utopian framework has existed since the West started to colonize the rest of the world. It was a colonial framework. The key components of colonialism are civilizing missions and territorial aggrandizement. The latter disappeared in the mid-twentieth century, largely because of the diffusion of the Westphalian framework. When the United Nations was established in 1945, the number of member states was far fewer than 50. The headquarters building in New York was designed with the estimated number of member states reaching some 100. But the fact was that by the end of the 1960s the number reached more than 100, and by the end of this century it will reach 185.

The Westphalian framework has been on the steady rise for the last half-century, judging by the number of states of the United Nations. It is a clear departure, however, from the nineteenth century Westphalian framework, in which about five major European powers were engaged in balance-of-power politics. There are far too many states in which state sovereignty is not firmly exercised. Some of them are visibly failed states or failing states. Furthermore, in tandem with globalization and market liberalization comes the loosening of the Westphalian framework. State

sovereignty itself has become more difficult to claim with effectiveness as the state's legitimate space has become more easily encroached by businesses and non-governmental organizations which act across borders.

The Philadelphian framework has been resuscitated, with some of the Westphalian framework being incorporated. The extraordinary growth of economic interdependence, international organizations, and democratization for the last half-century is the driving force of the renaissance of the Philadelphian framework at the turn of the millennium. Relentless globalization makes it more difficult for states to pursue balance-of-power games, since the national interest has become more complicated to define. Binding networks of international agreements and organizations have become truly formidable. And the third wave of democratization has created an atmosphere in which resort to violence has become less frequent as the instrument of resolution of international disputes.

The anti-utopian framework has been revised, with some of the Philadelphian components incorporated. The Philadelphian framework stresses civilizing missions without territorial aggrandizement. Different vocabularies, such as humanitarian assistance, global governance, and human security, are used to motivate action on the part of major and minor states and international organizations which intervene in peace-keeping, building, and enforcing operations, disaster relief operations, and preventive diplomacy. As long as globalization rewards some and punishes others, those actors which are understood better with the anti-utopian framework go up in number. Some of them are failed states and failing states which have not been sufficiently agile and able to adapt to the global market.

Having spelled out, if briefly, the three competing framework of global politics, I now turn to the role of the United Nations. The United Nations is the product of the Westphalian framework. Nothing is clearer than the fact that member states reign supreme in the United Nations. The United Nations is one of the measures of war settlement. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council are a victors' alliance. It is there that the basic understanding of world situations is shared more or less among the five, and that the United Nations' military action is legitimated with the five's approval.

Yet the Philadelphian situation has become increasingly more common. Even if member states reign supreme, non-governmental organizations can move mountains, i.e. member states. The latest agreement on anti-personnel mines has been brought to success due in large part to the NGOs' success in persuading a number of key member states, including the host state, Canada, to acquiesce. In the first half of the 1990s three UN agencies stood out in terms of their vigour in getting donations, expanding the size of personnel, and enlarging their activities. They are

the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme. They were most skilful and successful in mobilizing world mass media, like CNN and the *Herald Tribune*, and getting money collected for their just causes. These three agencies happen to be headed by women: Sadako Ogata, Carol Bellami, and Catherine Bertini respectively. In other words, the United Nations is not strictly Westphalian but is also Philadelphian.

Another important point not to be overlooked with respect to the United Nations is the fact that the United Nations itself exists largely for those actors which cannot exercise influence in other arenas and markets, i.e. weak actors. Major powers in the Westphalian framework can assert themselves in ways normal to Westphalian actors, such as arms build-up, economic sanctions, and alliance. Major actors in the Philadelphian framework can shape norms and rules in ways normal to Philadelphian actors, such as a multilateral free trade regime, IMF regime, human rights regime, and global environmental regime. Yet those actors whose framework is more anti-utopian than other kinds are forced to rely on certain international forums such as the United Nations to voice their grievances and to oppose stronger and richer actors whose reliance on the United Nations is far smaller.

Looked at from these three angles, the United Nations is an instrument, an actor, and an arena at the same time. First, the United Nations is an instrument of major Westphalian actors. It lends to them the banner of legitimacy for actions which presumably serve the interests of major powers, especially the world leader, the United States. Second, the United Nations is an actor on its own when it can mobilize support and build power bases somewhat independent of member states. Its appeal to just causes and to correct banners often enables the United Nations to surmount the logic and power of Westphalian actors. Although the United Nations can enjoy neither the authority to tax nor the authority to conscript, it can sway. Third, the United Nations is an arena in which many weak actors express their complaints and submit their demands. It is a widely utilized space where words do matter, rather than might or money. Just like the frameworks of global politics, the United Nations does work under the three frameworks: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-utopian. Accordingly it has three faces: instrument, actor, and arena.

The question then is which framework is going to prevail in the next millennium. It is hard to answer the question in a straightforward fashion. But it is possible to identify two major parameters that give certain directions to global politics. One is globalization, while the other is state protection. Globalization weakens Westphalian actors, since it tends to reduce the relative scope and authority of state sovereignty. Globalization increases the number of those actors which are more than ever before at the mercy of market forces and security dynamics shaped out-

side the borders. In other words, globalization marginalizes many actors and creates many drop-outs and hollow-outs. Those weak actors then seek state protection and the umbrella of international organizations such as the United Nations. Yet globalization creates more resilient Philadelphian actors. And the force of globalization hinges in part on the presence of the global economy and the global hegemony. The excessive pursuit of globalization is bound to undermine the Philadelphian framework via the weakening of Westphalian actors and via the increase in the number of failed/failing states, since under the Philadelphian framework there will be no powerful federal world government and therefore many of the burdens of the Philadelphian framework fall on the shoulders of the United States. That could easily become too much for the United States in the longer term, especially because the force of the global market is too often beyond the power of the United States federal government to control, even in the short term.

Thinking along this line, I am somewhat agnostic as to which framework will prevail. What I can do is echo Deng Xiaoping, who declared that Hong Kong, after its return to the fold of Chinese sovereignty in 1997, will experience a ''one-country, two-systems'' scheme for half a century. Global politics in the next millennium will experience the three frameworks for at least the first half-century.