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Citizens and Regimes

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THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Kenneth Waltz (1959) first explicitly raised the awareness of three levels of analysis in international relations, especially in explaining war and peace. They are the level of individuals, the level of domestic society, and the level of the international system. This awareness has prompted new types of investigation into the causal direction of the three variables, individual, national, and international.

The examples used to advance his argument are: 1) war springs up in the minds of people, according to the Charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. If people keep peace in mind, then the likelihood of peace prevails in the world; 2) war springs up in the peculiar characteristics of domestic society. Nationalism of a narrow-minded and aggressive bent tends to resort to solutions prompting external war in order to divert the attention of people who are dissatisfied with daily livelihood; 3) war springs up with the malfunctions of the international system, whether it is the breakdown of balance of power or hegemonic decline.

J. David Singer (1961) made a further step forward in raising the awareness of the levels of analysis of war and peace. Riding on the behavioral revolution in psychology and social psychology, the social sciences have been heavily influenced. The third quarter of the last century witnessed a steady advance in scientific research in economics, sociology, political science, and international relations.

In linking the different levels of analysis, especially between the national and international levels of analysis, two important works are those of Barrington Moore (1993) and Peter Gourevitch (1978). Barrington Moore is interested in the

divergent paths adopted in the 1930s by major powers whose fate was determined by how each major power handled the agricultural sectors. He argued that those powers which adopted fascism resorted to external aggression through diverting opposition from within in the agricultural sector. External aggression through fascism is called the second image. The first image is so called because individual aspiration is targeted directly toward the international level. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Charter says that peace is borne in the minds of each individual. For instance, while Germany kept a cautious diplomatic policy line under Bismarck, Wilhelm II who succeeded him adopted an aggressive war policy. The third image portrays war coming from the international system itself. The sovereign state system, the Westphalian system, does not necessarily keep peace because the balance of power among the major powers sometimes breaks down, as hegemonic powers' decline sometimes prompts an aspiring hegemon to resort to war.

Peter Gourevitch (1978) argues that 'the second image reversed' is no less important than the second image whereby the forces at the national level are targeted at the international level, just like Barrington Moore's fascist-led external aggression. By 'the second image reversed' he means that forces at the international level prompt forces at the national level to transform themselves within domestic society to better cope with forces at the international level. Peter Gourevitch's example includes isolationist America transforming itself into a war state by the advent of fascist Japan and Germany in order to beat them. Ayse Zarakol (2013) gives the illustration of Turkey and Thailand transforming themselves within through forces at the international level. Self-transformation is that of turning to more authoritarian regimes led by 'a modernization-generated statist/bureaucratic social middle class that justifies its skepticism of democratization on the basis of norms upheld by the international society itself' (Zarakol, 2013).

In this chapter I examine three examples of analysis across levels in a scientific fashion: 1) individuals directly and indirectly influencing multilateral treaties' participation; 2) daily life satisfaction in life domains and lifestyles shaping types of domestic societies; 3) a national election of a hegemonic power impacting many countries' regimes.

The tide of globalization and digitalization has fast been permeating Asia because Asia is one of the most dynamic regions of the world in which the conventional conception of the self-contained sovereign nation-states has been getting more difficult to sustain, especially in Asia. Technological advances, financial flows, and economic interactions have been metamorphosing dynamic Asia from within. The Economist Group has published recently about the importance of the rising digital wave in Asia (The Economist, 2018). Having just over half of the world's online population, Asia has been riding on rising incomes, massively produced affordable Chinese smartphones, highly ranked patent filings in Asian technology hubs (for example, Tokyo–Yokohama and Shenzhen–Hong Kong), and steadily advancing Big Data movements whereby interconnecting

information *sans frontiers* provides integrated data insights into business operations and strategy. We take three illustrations: 1) multilateral treaties pushing invisible globalization *sans frontiers*; 2) changing life satisfaction and expressed dissatisfaction with daily life molding types of society; and 3) the hegemonic strength of the United States leading non-US citizens to global quasi-democracy with the slogan of 'no taxation without participation'.

1) In Asia as well as in the rest of the world, multilateral treaties have become the most frequently demanded vehicles for dispute settlement and conflict resolution. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement among 11 countries hailed against the tide of rising protectionism stemmed from Pacific Asia. The UK has recently taken the initiative to join the TPP11 amid its post-Brexit chaos. The Paris climate change accord, a multilateral treaty, has been focused on Asia, with China the largest CO_2 emitter and the United States possibly the largest cost-bearer in the pre-US-exit accord. The United States–China tariff war has invigorated the initiative to reform the World Trade Organization, one form of a multilateral treaty. After North Korea and the United States almost rattled the saber over the former's nuclear missiles, initiatives are slowly being taken as to which alternatives are feasible: North Korea returning to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty or North Korea choosing a variant of the Israeli option of stating that North Korea or a confederated united Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, without allowing intrusive inspection. The beauty of multilateral treaties is that once the sovereign states join multilateral treaties, they must sometimes legislate new domestic laws or revise them, appropriate budgets, and change standards and criteria accordingly. In other words, multilateral treaties have transformative potential in domestic society; the level of analysis cannot stay put in the same place.

2) Changing life satisfaction and dissatisfaction are the basis for types of societies. Asia has been metamorphosing itself steadily; its economic activities are the most dynamic in the world with huge population size, rising incomes, patent filings being registered steadily, and interconnecting information and integrated insights coming from fintech dramatically changing corporate operations and strategy. These social changes have been taking place increasingly beneath, beyond and across sovereign states. That is why the pattern of satisfaction with daily life matters. It changes the type of society. The level of analysis cannot stay put; it has to cross over levels. Take North Korean society, for example. The chairman of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong Il, executed the military first policy line, which means that the military budget has the highest priority and economic welfare, second priority. All the earnings from selling mineral resources and selling hard labor abroad, for instance, went to the military budget. Massive famines resulting in 2–3 million deaths in the mid 1990s on top of the persistent complaints about daily survival prompted Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il's successor, to change the policy line to i) the two wheels policy line of taking care of weapons and welfare; yet ii) of all the military weapons, priority was given to the development and production of nuclear weapons especially intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBMs); iii) allowing black markets to mushroom in many places to give people hope for survival and small luxuries (Baek, 2016). Kim Jong Un's policy change has yielded spectacular success in prompting US president Donald Trump to talk to him while US-led sanctions have not loosened except that China has relaxed sanctions to a significant extent. The new-found national pride of nuclear weapons and the generally loosening regulations of economic sanctions have further enlarged the role of black markets in North Korea. Here daily life satisfaction increases as the black markets mushroom. This is how the type of society starts to change from within. Once the ICBM is perceived as a big success, and the loosened economic sanctions continue or stop in their entirety, what life satisfaction patterns will emerge in North Korea? The level of analysis changes here; these two new changes make it necessary to analyze all levels, that is, individual, domestic, and international. First, domestic policy change was the starting point. Second, one of its policy consequences, pride, has been nurtured. Third, another of its policy consequences, black markets, have mushroomed. Fourth, daily life satisfaction is bound to improve. Fifth, with the improvement of satisfaction, the type of society will change slowly.

3) Strength or exercising power entails added vulnerability (McNeill, 2001). First, the United States was very successful in constructing the US-led liberal world order by sheer military strength in World War II (Ikenberry, 2000, 2012). Second, the sense of responsibility to spread freedom, democracy, economic development, free trade, and universal institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has been amazingly strong. Its sense of responsibility to shoulder is so strong that in due course the United States, the Gulliver, has accumulated troubles and vulnerabilities (Hoffmann, 1968; Walt, 2018). Third, in response to the US influence, the rest of the world sometimes calls for 'no taxation without representation' as if the world keeps its assembly where the global citizens vote for the US president. That is why I call it global quasi-democracy. My provisional analysis of the 2016 US presidential election shows that those countries inclined to support Donald Trump included Russia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the BRICs countries (India and China are two of the big pillars of the group) and that those countries inclined to support Clinton included Japan and Bangladesh (Inoguchi et al., 2018). In sum, the Asian countries play a big role in this global quasi-democracy.

GLOBAL CITIZENS SHAPE MULTILATERAL TREATIES

Inoguchi and Le (2016) first validated the insight of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract by examining the empirical and statistical link between two variables: global citizens' preferences of values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other. They simultaneously validated the insight of John Locke in Two Treaties of Government by a

similar examination with the two key step links: 1) global citizens' preferences are aggregated into sovereign states' participation or non-participation and 2) sovereign states join multilateral treaties, first by signing and then by ratifying.

Until the 20th century, the conventional idea was that without a world government there would be no world assembly. Without a world assembly, representative democracy on a global scale is not possible. Likewise, without face-to-face discussion in a reasonably small well-knit community, direct democracy is not possible. Therefore direct democracy on a global scale would be near impossible. By the dawn of the new millennium, the tide of globalization and digitalization had made the world unprecedentedly tightly connected. The end of World War II left the globe full of ruins and ashes. The advent of the Cold War made industrial democracies highly interdependent, largely across the Atlantic on the basis of military alliance and heightened production. Once the Cold War was over, the movement of goods and services was accelerated. Furthermore people moved across borders in an unprecedented fashion. Perhaps most importantly, digitalization swayed and transformed the globe (Lessig, 1999; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). Currency trade has overtaken the trade of goods and services. People have stopped using the words 'international economy'. Instead, the term 'world economy' has become commonly used. The consequences of these trends have yielded a situation of the end of democracy (Guehenno, 2012) in the sense that the sovereign state has become less powerful and national citizens have less allegiance to the state (Dalton and Welzel, 2014), while transnational business firms, social movements, and organizations have come to act *sans frontiers*. The advent of digitalization and globalization, however, has given these two kinds of democracy dramatic opportunities to exploit. Digitalization and globalization have enabled individuals to communicate with anybody in the world face-to-face on Skype and other similar devices. They have enabled representation of sub-national, non-governmental, supra national, regional, and international organizations along with the representation of sovereign states on a world scale, a reality again on Skype. They have given surreal opportunities for opinion polls to know the distribution of views and sentiments worldwide with their results kept downloadable anywhere and anytime. When ideas are articulated and emotions emitted, their diffusion and reception worldwide becomes easier. Thus quasi-direct democracy and quasi-representative democracy have both become a reality on a global scale, in a sense.

Sovereign states' participation in 120 multilateral treaties is the registered outcome of global quasi-legislation in the United Nations system since 1945 (Inoguchi and Le, 2019). These treaties come under six policy domains: labor, health, intellectual property, human rights, communications and commerce, peace and disarmament, and the environment. No less important than policy domains are the differences between the date when a sovereign state signs and the date of ratification when citizens' representatives lend support to the treaty. Also the manner in which other countries and your country participate is another variable. How can the modes of participation be aggregated? Using factor analysis with

varimax rotation, three key dimensions emerge: 1) agile versus cautious; 2) global commons versus individual citizens' interests; and 3) aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. 'Agile versus cautious' is the speed with which they participate in multilateral treaties. 'Global commons' are elements such as climate change and marine commons. 'Aspirational bonding' is declaring solidarity with signers toward the unattained goal, while 'mutual binding' is to declare universal abiding. What about the link between the two, that is, between global citizens' preferences and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties? The correlation coefficients are high between emancipative and protective, and agile and cautious, and between sacred and secular and between aspirational bonding and mutual binding. Also important is the similar locations of countries on these dimensions. Noteworthy are the low-level locations (very secular) of the New West, especially the United States, in terms of sacred versus secular. No less noteworthy are the high-level locations (mutual binding) of the Sinic East regarding aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. To sum up, global citizens' preferences and sovereign states' participation in mutual treaties show a strong linkage.

The policy domains of multilateral treaties have also expanded in leaps and bounds. The six policy domains of a) peace and disarmament, b) health and labor, c) communications and commerce, d) intellectual property, e) human rights, and f) the environment are major domains. During the fledgling inter-war period, the policy domain of peace and disarmament dominated, however small the number of multilateral treaties in that domain. Since 1945, and especially since 1989, each of these six policy domains has become full of such treaties.

No less importantly, transnational citizens and social movements (NGOs) have increased their participation in multilateral treaties. Sovereign states have ceased to be the sole signatories of the treaties, which means that citizens and regimes are often more directly linked.

Inoguchi and Le (2016; 2019) have presented the links between citizens' preferences about values and norms on the one hand and sovereign states' participation in multilateral treaties on the other, via factor analysis. These links can be interpreted by representative democracy à la John Locke as well as by direct democracy à la Jean-Jacques Rousseau, both on a global scale.

DAILY LIFE SATISFACTION MOLDS TYPES OF SOCIETIES

One's daily satisfaction with life domains, life aspects, and lifestyles is important in terms of one's quality of life. Its accumulation in society is important in showing the characteristics of the society where one lives. Aggregating all the respondents' satisfaction levels in a society shows the key dimensions that determine daily life patterns. Factor analyzing each of the 29 Asian societies yields three dimensions of materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. The size of the eigen value of each dimension differs as well as the order in

which the three key dimensions determine the feature of a society. Empirically there are six types of Asian societies. When materialism is the first dimension, let me call this A. When post-materialism is the second or third dimension, let me call this a. When post-materialism is the first dimension, let me call this B. When materialism is the second dimension, let me call this b. When public sector dominance is the first dimension, let me call this C. When public sector dominance is the second dimension, let me call this c (Le et al., 2014).

With this notation, Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, Ca, and Cb are six types of Asian societies. In our empirical analyses there is no type Bc, which leaves five types of Asian societies. Ab society is determined primarily by materialism and secondarily by post-materialism. Ac is determined primarily by materialism, and secondarily by public sector dominance. Ba society is determined primarily by post-materialism and secondarily by materialism. Bc society is determined primarily by post-materialism and secondarily by public sector dominance. Ca society is determined primarily by public sector dominance and secondarily by materialism. An Ab society is represented by Japan, Ac is represented by India. A Ba society is represented by Thailand, Bc is represented by Pakistan, and Ca is represented by Singapore. Although empirically Cb does not exist among the 29 surveyed societies, a Cb society resembles North Korea.

Materialism is survival-oriented, post-materialism is social relations-oriented and public sector dominance is state-oriented. Materialism and post-materialism are derived from Abraham Maslow (1941, 2013 reprint edition) and further developed by Ronald Inglehart (1977) on the basis of the World Values Survey. Public sector dominance naturally looms large in contemporary society woven by a myriad of rules, regulations, and practices.

Ronald Inglehart first systematically analyzed the new trend of post-materialism which stresses the new lifestyle of going beyond survival and seeking leisure as at a dinner party. Post-materialism takes many forms: social relations encompass non-profit and non-government and associational activities such as leisure and sport. It encompasses private sector interest and pressure group activities. Francis Fukuyama (2015) defines political decay as the colonization of government by private sector interests when the government manifests instability and negligence of duties. Public sector dominance differs from society to society. Authoritarian society is often full of rules, regulations, and orders. When it attempts to tighten regulations to the extreme, post-materialism looms large in such forms as corruption, drugs, and underground markets. Unless good social relations can be crafted with security personnel, customs officials, police officials, gangsters, and the mafia, such post-materialist activities expand.

Let me provide two examples. The Ba society, Thailand, alternates democracy and military rule. Those representing certain private sectors push themselves into government, parts of which are colonized. If partisan strife goes extreme, sometimes the military resorts to a *coup d'état*. During the militarist period, rules, regulations, and orders tighten up. The Cb society, North Korea, has an acute

dilemma. It boasts itself as a powerful nuclear-armed state, whereby it wants to induce the United States to reach a peace accord. When it stood on the policy line of military-firstism during the Kim Jon Il period, military budgets were boosted and the subsistence-sustaining budget shrank. Chronicled floods and famines were rampant. Survival was at stake for one or two million people. After Kim Jong Un took power, the policy line changed to the 'walking on two legs' policy. The military budgets focused on nuclear weapons and missiles while tight regulations on food and energy provision were loosened and underground markets became dominant. Thus post-materialist activities and underground systems loomed large, leading some observers to argue that North Korea was becoming a capitalist system of underground markets (Baek, 2016; Ito, 2017).

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS A GLOBAL QUASI-ELECTION

WIN/Gallup International carries out an annually worldwide poll on what is deemed the most attention-getting subject of the year. In 2016 it was the US presidential election. In 2011 it was the Japanese triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power meltdown. In 2016, 44 countries carried out surveys on seven questions from July to September 2016. The seven questions are:

1 *If you were to vote in the American election for president, who would you vote for?*
2 *How much in your view, is the impact of the American election in your country on issues such as economic progress, trade, peace etc. In other words, how much is the impact of the American president on what happens in your country?*
3 *Considering that America leads the global economy, should the new American president give priority to the economic interests of American people, the interests of the people of the world as a whole, or equally to both?*
4 *Would you advise the American president to pour more American resources into the war against terrorism (for example, ISIS)?*
5 *What in your view has been the overall impact of President Obama on the power of America in the world? Has he made it stronger, weaker or made no difference during his 8 years in office?*
6 *If Mrs Clinton becomes the next president, would she perform better than Obama, worse or just as well?*
7 *If Donald Trump becomes the next president, would he perform better than Obama, worse or just as well?*

What I've attempted to show is that given the tide of globalization and digitalization in the dawn of the 21st century, 'democracy in one country' is not tenable and non-US citizens are no less interested in the US presidential election and do express their preferences on candidates, issues, and policies in the poll even though voting rights are not given to them.

I analyzed all 44 countries' responses, including the United States, using a hierarchical Bayesian model. I focused on the question of which candidates they would support, Clinton or Trump, by key demographics of age, gender, household income, religion, employment, education, and country. A hierarchical Bayesian

model enables a global profile of respondents' preferences and the major determinants of the degree of leaning to Trump for each of the 44 countries in one shot. This method suits my purpose as I argue that it is time not for 'democracy in one country' but 'quasi-democracy', because non-US and US citizens revealed their preferences through the polls and thus participated in quasi-democracy. By quasi-democracy I mean that non-US respondents may not be entitled to vote in the US presidential election but can participate in it through the polls. The analysis in this section is still underway but the tabulations, cross tabulations, principal component analysis, and regression analysis enable me to discuss the results with some confidence (Inoguchi et al., 2018).

First, the dependent variable is defined as 'support for Trump' minus 'support for Clinton' for each country. Second, the independent variables are the demographics. Third, missing values are estimated by randomized figures. Fourth, the soft program used for the hierarchical Bayesian method is STAN (Matsuura and Ishida, 2016).

Thus countries leaning to support for Trump are Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. The strongest pro-Trumpian country is Russia. Those devastated by US military intervention, Afghanistan and Iraq, also show pro-Trumpian inclination as do the BRICS countries.

Looked at in terms of age groups, those aged 45 years and more register mildly pro-Trumpian in most countries. Two exceptions are Japan and Bangladesh, which register a strong pro-Clinton tilt.

Looking at education groups, those educated at university and show a statistically significantly higher tilt to Clinton in the following countries: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK, and the United States.

A single strong conclusion of this global analysis is that the US presidential election is not only a local phenomenon but also a global phenomenon. Non-US citizens do not vote in the US presidential election but do participate by expressing their preferences. In an era of globalization and digitalization, global quasi-democracy is in the offing. 'Democracy in one country' is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

President Obama, accusing Russia of hacking US election data for Clinton, ordered 35 Russian diplomats to be expelled from the United States. President Putin did not take any counter-action in retaliation, knowing President-elect Trump's position on the Russian hacking and the Crimea. President Trump commented that President Putin was intelligent and smart. All these interactions at the highest level between the United States and Russia are built on public opinion at the grass-roots level.

END OF THE THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS?

Seeking to gauge the link between citizens and regimes at the national and international levels, I have come to the conclusion that sharply distinguishing the three levels of analysis as Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer do might not be conducive

to better understanding the link between citizens and regimes. The distinction has become blurred and murky as the new millennium deepens. Robert Cooper (1995) recognizes the divergence of international norms and values among countries and argues that post-modernity is pervasive in Western Europe, modernity is pervasive among newly sovereign states in the 20th century, more primordial concerns are with territorial sovereignty and national interests, and pre-modernity is pervasive among some developing countries, especially those without fully functioning states.

Takashi Inoguchi (1999) systematizes the increasingly salient divergence of guiding concepts in international relations. Inoguchi argues that instead of linking guiding concepts with geography, three paradigms, Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian, represent three major lines of thought and behavior in the new millennium. The Westphalian paradigm is state-centric, best articulated by Henry Kissinger in geopolitics, Alexander Gershenkron in geoeconomics, and Benedict Anderson in geoculture. The Philadelphian paradigm is global republican and best articulated by Francis Fukuyama in geopolitics, Robert Reich in the geo-economic foundation, and Benjamin Barber in the geocultural network. The anti-utopian paradigm is post-post-colonialism and multiculturalism and is best articulated by Samuel Huntington in geopolitics, by David Landes in the geoeconomic foundation, and by Robert Kaplan in the geocultural network.

In less than two decades since Inoguchi (1999) the increasing and varying mixture of the three paradigms have manifested themselves. Mark Leonard (2006) gives a wide array of examples. To take the example of the sovereignty borders. This was violated by the West in triumphant mood after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example upholding order in Kosovo and Sierra Leone; supporting government repression (Russia in Syria); ethno-religious proxy wars (Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East). Also take multilateral organizations which have been key to the post-1945 liberal world order; the World Trade Organization has not been functioning well for decades, the Climate Change agreement has been withdrawn by the Trump-led United States, and the marine commons concept enunciated in the Conference on the Law of the Seas in 1976 has been practiced differently in the South China Sea by China. In the longer term, Inoguchi (1999) identifies three world trends, that is, information-manufacturing technologies, demographic and environmental change, and the state's enhanced capacity to provide symbolic and cultural identity, a sense of stability and achievement for citizens, all of which affects the future links between citizens and regimes.

In conclusion, the level of problematique analysis seems to get murky and ambiguous decade by decade. The development of global legislative politics (Inoguchi and Le, 2019) shows that these all entail transformative roles whether it is about nuclear non-proliferation, free trade, climate change, intellectual property, or international terrorism. Global issues such as peace and disarmament, human rights, the global environment, health and labor, commerce and communications, and intellectual property are widely regarded as proper global issues; one country can never hope to give global solutions. People's perceptions

have changed dramatically at the dawn of the new millennium. At the domestic level, increasingly many sovereign states, social movements, supranational organizations, and non-governmental individuals are demanding global solutions, often by prompting international organizations and participating in multilateral treaties. At the international level, the number of international organizations and their offshoots has reached 8,000–9,000 and the number of multilateral treaties has registered around 580. The demand for solutions at the international level has been moving up while the supply of solutions at the international level has reached saturation and stalemate.

Table 13.1 Outline of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian legacies

Geopolitical framework	Westphalian (state-centric)	Philadelphian (global republican)	Anti-utopian (post-post-colonial multicultural)
Principal author	Kissinger	Fukuyama	Huntington
Key concept	State sovereignty	Popular sovereignty	Post-sovereignty loss of sovereignty
Institutional unit	Nation-state	Liberal democracy	Civilizational superstate & failed/failing state
Behavioral principle	Balancing/ bandwagoning	Binding/hiding	Fortifying, hollowing out/ collapsing
Peace	Peace by war	Liberal democratic peace	Neither war nor peace
Democracy	Indifference	Aggressive export or opportunistic silence	Military intervention or cynical neglect
Geo-economical foundations			
Principal author	Gerschenkron	Reich	Landes
Key concept	National economy	Global market	Economic development
Driving force	State-led industrialization	Market-driven megacompetition	World cultures that guide the inner values and attitudes of a population
Critical variable	Large input of capital and labor	Critical input of technology	Invention and know-how
Geocultural networks			
Principal author	Anderson	Barber	Kaplan
Key media	State-run radio/TV	Cable TV network	Underground network
Key purpose	Nation building	Global penetration	Antistate reaction & dissident communication, reconstituting order in cultural sphere
Key effect	Video legitimation	Video globalization Homogenization	Subversive operations Legitimization of civilizational superstates

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