



Evidence-Based Approaches
to Peace and Conflict Studies 13

Takashi Inoguchi
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Digitized Statecraft of Four Asian Regionalisms

States' Multilateral Treaty Participation
and Citizens' Satisfaction with Quality
of Life

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Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies

Volume 13

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This series aims to publish books on peace and conflict with evidence-based approaches, befitting an era best characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Even if occurrence of major wars among sovereign states has dramatically decreased, from 5 million soldiers killed between 1938 and 1945 per annum; through 100,000 soldiers killed between 1945 and 1989 per annum; to 10,000 soldiers killed between 1989 and 2019 per annum; many kinds of peace and conflict keep arising in the world, with extraordinary technological progress and unprecedented spatial coverage. All parts of the world now are so well connected and interdependent. At the same time, they easily and suddenly become sources of immense vulnerability and fragility, bringing one or another of them to the verge of collapse and destruction. The causes are diverse: climate change, migration, pandemic and epidemic disease, civil strife, religious dissonance, economic competition, arms races, terrorism, corruption—a virtual plethora of sources. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, calls these and many others “problems without passports.”

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Preface

World War II shattered Asia and filled the region with unprecedented domestic reverberations in both cruelty and historical human death tolls (Overy, 2021; Paine, 2012). The ensuing independence of Asian states diverged on timing: early for South Asia from British colonialism, late in Southeast Asia, very late in Central Asia, and, in East Asia, independence came after civil war or foreign occupation. War threats and wars—Japanese aggression in World War II, civil war threats in East and Southeast Asia, religious strife in South Asia—cast dark shadows over Asia. Development horizons then naturally diverged subregionally in Asia (Lee & Paine, 2019). Development performance is tied to multilateral treaty participation or there-without. World trends of geopolitics such as civil war threats, American military interventions, Soviet disintegration, and planetary trends like climate change and the spread of infectious disease are shown to have been no less tangible in impacting Asian politics. Subregional responses to such global change as democratic backsliding and hyperglobalization are examined. Development horizons are speculated with the concept of Pax Consortis, loose but resilient subregional connectivity and legacies may as well evolve on the basis of the present frameworks and legacies, British Commonwealth, ASEAN, post-Soviet Eurasian groupings, and The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the post-World War II liberal international order.

It is in the early Cold War years that the paradigm of distinguishing three levels of international politics started to permeate students of international relations. The prevalence of power politics had been at its height. Hans Morgenthau's early text was convincing: Power politics is most important, and it was meant for national interest (Morgenthau, 1948). In 1957, Kenneth N. Waltz gave the causes of war at three levels: man's mind (like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Declaration), the state's aggressive nationalism (like fascism) and the inter-war years' pervasive anxiety and apprehension about war, poverty, and death (like those prevalent in the former half of the last century). In 1961, J. David Singer set the paradigm of distinguishing three levels in analyzing international relations: individual, national, and international (Singer, 1961). This paradigm permeated

students of international relations in tandem with the rise of behavioral science in psychology, social psychology and medical science, and its permeation into political science (Inoguchi, 2015; Thompson, 2018). It looked as if this new toolkit would stay for a long time to come (Gourevitch, 1986; Grieco et al., 2019).

Then in 1977 a paradigm change took place. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye published *Power and Interdependence* (Keohane & Nye, 1977), arguing that times of power preponderance were gone with diplomacy dominated by embassies and omnipotently acting on behalf of king or president or prime minister while with commercial and non-governmental matters regarded as low politics exemplified by the much less importance attached to consulates. World affairs has become power politics on the one hand and complex interdependence on the other. The increasing marketization of the world economy created the dichotomy of world affairs, as the oil-producing and exporting countries (OPEC) stunted the developed North in the midst of the Arab-Israeli War. The Group of Seven (five, six, or eight each briefly) was born as its coordination body of the developed North in addition to the more universally institutionalized bodies as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Settlement, and other UN organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Both the developed North and the developing South must cope with the coordination needed for looking at two domains, power politics and interdependence politics, which looked as if the secret of the liberal world order lay here. While the preponderance of the United States at the end of World War II in terms of military power and economic power slowly declined, the United States kept consolidating its hegemonic position through such universally organized, institutionalized bodies surrounding the United Nations. Meanwhile, the alliance networks over the world with highly organized intelligence detecting most movements of weapons, personnel, energy resources, food resources, monetary transfer, and so on, highly advanced overseas airports and seaports, most advanced air forces and navies excelled at swiftly carrying out overseas missions at crisis points (Immerwahr, 2019). Concurrently, increasingly important soft power, i.e., the power to persuade others to act in sync with the United States (Nye, 2004) was exerted and vigorous civil societies increasingly acted globally to sustain freedom and democracy as ubiquitous forces of non-governmental organizations (Gourevitch et al., 2012; Hale et al., 2013; Hale & Held, 2017).

However, another challenge was coming. The increasing marketization of human life has not stopped within the West (including the developed North and the developing South). The East, mostly those in the developing South, has risen including some communist regimes metamorphosed, although retaining some key features of communist land ownership, party dictatorship, intellectual property, research and planning, and minimum privacy. Reorganizing the General Tariffs and Trade Agreement (GATT) produced the World Trade Organization in 1995 whereby creating some space to enhance the developed South, particularly China, especially in the coordination and settlement process within the World Trade Organization. What the World Trade Organization wanted from political communist members such as China

was to reform their domestic economy; but most communist features have been slow to accomplish those, while reform domains have been very swiftly carried out, like research and planning, utilization of state-owned land for privately owned business firms, digitization of *renminbi* (Chinese official currency, the yuan) to reduce its reliance on Chinese purchases of US dollar reserves. China's market size and high scores in scientific and technological agility make China the number one country of imports to as many as 193 countries. Here lies the rise of political capitalism (Milanović, 2019). The United States appointed herself as the leader of the liberal world order for the Cold War years and the post-Cold War years throughout (Ikenberry, 2020; Porter, 2020). Thus, the world was stunned by China's fast rise. Here the paradigm perhaps needs to be revised. An emerging paradigm would be the liberal world order versus the global complex disorder during the transitional period. Global politics in this emerging complex disorder is played out at three levels, not at individual, national, and international (Singer, 1961), but at societal, national, and global. Two words are important: not "individual" but "societal"; also not "international" but "global." When Americans analyze at the individual level, they tend most of the time to be American, sometimes Russian or Chinese. When Americans analyze at the international level, those actors tend to be mostly American. This brings us back briefly to mention the belief that the American conceptualization illuminates the importance of logic and the individual leaders Henry Kissinger and Georgi Arbatov in the talks on the intermediate range nuclear missile crisis in the 1980s.

Henry Kissinger warned in a speech at Brussels on January 13, 1984, that the Soviet Union must decide whether it is "a country or a cause" (cited by Roberts, 2010, p. 534). The Soviet Union gave up installing such missiles targeted at Western Europe but not at the United States. Along this road, Mikhail Gorbachev chose a country rather than a cause. Then, a few years later, the Berlin Wall fell and was followed by the Soviet implosions in 1989 and 1991. Ironically, Georgi Arbatov from the Soviet Academy of Sciences stated in the *New York Times* that the Kremlin was going to deprive America of "The Enemy" (cited by Fettweis, 2018, p.1). He meant that without The Enemy, the United States would face unforeseen problems (Inoguchi and Le, 2020, p. 129, and especially Part III: "Three Varieties of Global Politics After the Cold War," pp. 125–197). Indeed, the United States spent relaxed post-Cold War years only to be awakened by the 9/11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States at the World Trade Center in New York. Michael J. Boskin, US President H.W. Bush's Economic Advisors Committee Chairman, felt that the United States waited for Godot twice, one for Vladimir Putin and another for Xi Jinping, only to be further awakened and betrayed (Boskin, 2022).

Important to note here is the tendency that international relations consisted mostly of individual Americans as to whether they were at the individual or international level during the period when J. David Singer's paradigm reigned.

This book is an attempt to exemplify the potential utility of a global politics paradigm, taking the example of four Asian regionalisms. In the liberal world order paradigm, the paradigm frequently used has been that of West European regional integration. Ernst Haas coined this sub-paradigm where similarities and dissimilarities in economic interdependence played a key role looking at Western Europe as part of the

developed North (Haas, 1958, 2004). The developed “North” meant under the Cold War years an advanced industrialized economy and democratic governance. Both in terms of economic and political maturity, it was natural even though it was connected to the membership (or soft membership) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a security connectivity-conscious organization with the United States, a key leader. This paradigm has been partially metamorphosed with the threat seriously felt by the conservative Russian elite corps surrounding the ex-KGB officers headed by Vladimir Putin. This perceived threat of Putin’s aggressive old imperial Russia was manifested in the Ukrainian crisis of the Russian invasion (Sorokin, 2022). This perception has been counteracted by northern European NATO allies like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, and neutral states like Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland in terms of getting closer to more solidly enhanced NATO vis-à-vis Russia and Belorussia.

Glancing at the East, many states register themselves as Number 1 importers from China, headed by the United States, Japan, and most East, Southeast, and South Asian countries. With the rise of power in terms of market size and technological agility, neighbors have been coping with how to live with China’s territorial and security ambitions posed in adjacent seas and far-away oceans and China’s massive trade, investment and aid to North American, Western European, Asian, African, Latin American, and the Caribbean and Southern Pacific countries. Ukraine is compared to Taiwan in the East.

Given the occasionally changing paradigms, this book attempts to look at the evidence-based global politics as exemplified by global treaty participation of 193 sovereign states and citizens’ satisfaction about quality of life in 29 states and societies east of the Middle East and the Caucasus in terms of how 29 states joined 600 global treaties between 1945 and 2019. First, global politics participation is measured as follows: the number of years taken from the promulgation year to the ratifying year at each of 600 treaties joined by 193 states; they are then multiplied by the inverse in the number of delayed years plus 1 for each treaty and each state. This measure is called the willingness to participate. Along with this measure are factor analyzed two other measures: six global policy domains of health and labor, human rights, commerce, trade and communication, intellectual property, the environment, peace and disarmament; and ten world regions: Old West, New West, Reformed West, Returned West, Orthodox East, Islamic East, Indic East, Sinic East, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the proclivities of 193 states are obtained. The first dimension is speed (cautious versus agile), the second dimension is angle (global commons versus individual interests), and the third dimension is strategy (aspirational bonding versus mutual binding). This measurement has eight types, called legislative types. If legislative types are similar in each of the four Asian regionalisms, then each of those regionalisms’ outward look is high (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021).

Against this measure of proclivity are six societal types. Factor-analyzing individual satisfaction about quality of life of each of the 29 Asian societies yields six types: The first dimension is that of survival, the second is social relations, and the third is public policy preponderance. Here is an important point. Factor analysis

has been carried out for each of the 29 Asian states, but we are not interested in the similarities, as is the case of the World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart, 2018), which is concerned with the similarities and differences across 193 societies on the same set of two dimensions, survival, and social relations or materialism versus post-materialism. We are interested, instead, in societal types to be shaped by individual satisfaction about quality of life in the 16 life domains, aspects, and styles. Therefore, to see which dimensions—survival, social relations, and public policy preponderance—come up with the order of eigenvalue size of each dimension and shape societal types for each society is of utmost importance for our purpose. If societal types are similar in each of the four Asian regionalisms, then such regionalisms' similarities are high (Inoguchi, 2019, 2022; Inoguchi and Le, 2022, this volume).

If the liberal world order is replaced by a global complex disorder in the coming years, then our next task is to ponder whether such replacement will be likely to take place or not, especially focusing on those societies which might join or withdraw from each of the current regionalisms' members. This book spends its early chapters trailing the modern history of 29 Asian countries as a preview of colonialism, war, and globalization, country by country. Besides determination of societal types, our operational task is to ponder the double sub-Asian regional belongings in the future. In Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongol are the two bi-regional states/societies: Central Asia and South Asia for Afghanistan and Mongol for Central Asia and East Asia. In South Asia, Afghanistan is for South Asia and Central Asia. In Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste might as well become members of Southeast Asian regionalisms, instead of being, as now, members of the South Pacific regionalism. In East Asia, Vietnam and Singapore might as well become more independent from membership in ASEAN regionalism, and Mongol might as well become members in the East Asian regionalism.

On the basis of our speculation, we would explore the future scenarios of the four Asian regionalisms under possibly turbulent and tortuous hyperglobalization. The key tone of our scenarios is basically conservative in that the four Asian regionalisms will adhere to the traditional categorizations of instincts and institutions and under colonialism (and often even pre-colonial times) and will be constrained from adapting fast and effectively to globalized environments. That will fit the image of our futures of four Asian regions, seemingly long stable but occasionally bursting out the breakdown of "conservation of catastrophe" (Ferguson, 2022; McNeil & Kindleberger, 1989). After all, Central Asia was all a tribally dominant community of sorts under the name of a former republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Southeast Asia was mostly under European and American colonialism which were broken up by Japan's violent and cruel aggressive invasions. South Asia was mostly under the British East Asian Company's as a side-business, which for its last 90 years was managed by the British state post-1857 and pre-1947. East Asia was kept under Western (not excluding American and Russian) and Japanese colonialism. Japanese violence and aggression triggered them toward independence. To answer whether a paradigm shift has been from the liberal world order to a global complex disorder is not easy to answer here.

There has been much talk about democratic backsliding, but much of this might as well be little more than the continuation of the tenacity of old instincts and institutions of their communities (Kasuya, 2022; Lee & Paine, 2019; Weiss, 2020) being unable to adapt them to incredibly fast hyperglobalization. Lee and Paine (2019) analyzing the consequences of decolonization conclude that “although European colonial empires created deteriorated long-term effects, decolonization exhibited less-pronounced political consequences than many thought.” Rather, the West or the East, the developing South or the developed North should be examined with an evidence-based approach. Those who make a sharp distinction between despotism and democracy tends to forget how time passes fast under hyperglobalization. How different societal types make differences and how different legislative types makes differences should be examined empirically and seriously (Inoguchi, 2019; Mikami & Inoguchi, 2010). Forces of globalization should not be considered to stop here with wars, infectious disease, climate change, and decoupled and divided world markers. As long as humankind stays alive and active, we cannot assume the end of globalization (Eichengreen, 2019). In the long run, it is of utmost importance to keep “conservation of catastrophe” from blowing up (McNeil & Kindleberger, 1989).

After the historical galloping chapters in Part I (Cook & Stevenson, 2017; Overy, 2021; Paine, 2012), Part II rehearses the two key measurement tasks for us to check how legislative types and societal types, given the accelerated tempo of hyperglobalization, irrespective of states–societies belong to the developed North and the developing South, the capitalist West and the communist–political capitalist East. Part III examines the possible replacement of regionalism’s membership and prepares for drawing future scenarios of four Asian regionalisms and of Asia itself. Asia is extremely diverse yet similar in two respects: Asia will move to further prosperity for the four quarters of this century with the economy, science, international law, and ethics; it will be said that the twenty-first century is the Asian century, beset by frequent wobblings as well as occasional implosions and explosions (Pempel, 2021). However, into the twenty-second century, the Asian century will be replaced by the African century as long as demographic weight is concerned (Beckley, 2020; Rajah & Leng, 2022).

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Table 5.1 Six variables of the factor analysis on multilateral treaties data

Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 66.

Table 5.2 Factor analysis using Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation and Kaiser Normalization: Rotated Component Matrix

Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, pp. 67–68.

Table 9.3 Types of societies

Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 139.

Table 9.2 Eight typologies of global quasi-legislative behavior

Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 139.

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Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, pp. 141–142.

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Inoguchi, T., & Fujii, S. (2013). *The Quality of Life in Asia: A Comparison of Quality of Life in Asia*. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 23.

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Inoguchi, T., & Fujii, S. (2013). *The Quality of Life in Asia: A Comparison of Quality of Life in Asia*. Dordrecht: Springer, p. 35.

Table 2.1 List of multilateral treaties covered in the dataset

Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 16.

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Prelude

It would help readers to go through the key threads of this project succinctly. We were not particularly happy about the apparent confusion over the level of analysis in international relations, especially interstate relations, international relations, and global politics (Singer, 1961; Inoguchi, 2021). Once globalization deepens, it permeates local (or national) society internally, then local (or national) society permeates international society with its own proclivity and peculiarity. This is sometimes called glocalization (Inoguchi, 2009). Having gone through the world economy and international security issues like the Plaza agreement of 1985, the Tianmen protests of 1989, the Berlin Wall fall of 1989, the Soviet collapse of 1991, the Japanese bubble collapsed in 1991, the World Trade Organization established in 1995, the Maastricht Treaty agreed on one united currency in 1995, the Asian monetary crisis of 1997–1998, the Association of Southeast Asian Treaty nearly doubled its membership in the 1990s, the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center towers in New York in 2001, the Iraq war (2003–2011), the Afghan war (2001–2021), the Lehmann Brothers’ triggered global crisis of 2008 onward, and the Russian annexation of portions of Ukraine of 2014. The Russians further attempt to integrate portions of eastern and southern Ukraine using the pro-Russian residents with the Russian Federation. The Xi Jinping autocracy and coercive defense in South China and East China sea, the Trump illiberal authoritarianism 2016–2021 in violence, the Putin illiberal autocracy in Chechenia (1994), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014 onward). Without prematurely conceptualizing these and many other events as democratic backsliding, big powers’ external interventions, and institutional reinventions, our approach is evidence-based, i.e., data and conceptualization come hand in hand and with such empirical data.

Thus, this book started by examining two indices at the societal and global level with the citizens’ satisfaction with quality of life and the states’ multilateral treaty participation. The former index was based on the Asia Barometer Quality of Life Survey executed in 2003–2008, while the latter index was constructed with the United Nations Secretary General Depository of multilateral treaties covering 1945–2019.

We have hypothesized that the higher the former index captures the satisfaction with 16 daily life items, then societies’ stability is better conserved *ceteris paribus*.

The latter index is constructed with treaty promulgation year and ratification year and the number of states having joined treaties by the ratification year. We have hypothesized that the better factor-analyzing three-dimensional values—speed, angle, and strategy—along with six global policy contents and ten global world regions are in sync with states' participation behavior, then states' adaptability to globalizing environments enables those states to navigate through ever-globalizing environments better. Societies' stability and states' adaptability are not necessarily harmonious. If societies are sticky to stability first, then they may as well implode or explode. If states do not flexibly navigate, then they may as well end up with the conservation for catastrophe, be it steady decline and sudden demise (Ferguson, 2021, McNeil & Kindlebergber, 1989). We must note that the three books we have published together cooperatively is the luckiest outcome in our life besides our encounter with our respective partners.

Our explanation and interpretation of these two indices require us to make good use of international history and area studies as the wheel, the kind of work which we have carried out with joy. Thus on the former, such works as Overy, 2021 and Paine, 2012 have been immensely useful in giving key threads of the time of the entire twentieth century in the world and in Asia.

On the latter local or national development, one-country-focused historical works on 32 societies and states are hugely helpful in highlighting deeply embedded pictures, for example, the reality of *kokka no yohaku* (the intangibles of the state) of Cochinchina or southern Vietnam or the French colony or current deep Mekong Delta residents living in the empty space of state governance, e.g., communal migrants between Mekong Delta residents practicing communal migrations, be they Vietnamese, Cambodians, Chinese, Hmongs, or Chams (Shimojo, 2021).

Our possible weakness in data construction is that in the former it is only during a short period of 2003–2008. Given the immense costs of collecting citizens' satisfaction level on 16 daily life items in 32 societies by face-to-face interviewing allowing 6000 respondents and 6 million observations on a quality of life survey, we had better call it not weakness but strength for two reasons: (1) This collection and construction of quality of life survey in Asia had never been carried out with this immense scale before our works (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021, and 2022, i.e., this present book). Most quality of life works have focused on Western quality of life even now. Non-Western quality of life works has been not cross-cultural but focused on one country or a few societies. (2) I have been immensely lucky in getting grants from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). But once mostly data collection was over, i.e., in 2008, most of the data analysis stage through book manuscript writing stages were carried out by a much smaller amount of grants per year. This is a major reason that the data collection stage and book publication stage (2022) are so far apart, i.e., 12 years. Nevertheless, we are eternally grateful for all the grants from the JSPS. A possible weakness in data collection on 193 states' multilateral treaty participation is that it covers 1945–2019, i.e., 75 years. For the above-noted reasons, many of our tasks will be left for others. Country by country analysis and region by region analysis beyond Asia would be natural. We are proud of the fact that we

have started to carve the stone with our books. This would transform our possible weakness of data collection into strength.

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Praise for *Digitized Statecraft of Four Asian Regionalisms*

“*Digitized Statecraft of Four Asian Regionalisms: States’ Multilateral Treaty Participation and Citizens’ Satisfaction with Quality of Life* is remarkable scholarship that transcends any singular summary. It is at the same time a reminder of major changes in international relations, of paradigm shifts and understandings of world politics, of increasing complexity of interstate relations, of mutual and uneven interpenetration of influence and awareness – and of the emergent attention to, and importance of, expressed perception of people. These are among the most salient features of this book. It is innovative in its orientation—conceptual, contextual and empirical, as well as well as situated in broad historical context. The authors are to be congratulated for work that brings to the fore new knowledge in robust and compelling form.”

—Nazli Choucri, *Professor of Political Science, Senior Faculty at the Center for International Studies (CIS), and Faculty Affiliate at the MIT Institute for Data, Science, and Society (IDSS)*

“This important book, by prominent scholars Takashi Inoguchi in Japan and Lien Thi Quynh Le in Vietnam, provides a unique perspective on Asia and subregional development, and future scenarios. The book discusses the history of the Asia region from WWII during colonial era to the 21st century, before focusing on subregional development. Two important indices and data sources are discussed in sub-regional Asian contexts—citizens’ satisfaction with quality of life measured in the Asia Barometer Quality of Life Surveys in the mid-2000s, and the states’ multilateral treaty participation from 1945 to 2019. This study is important reading for everyone interested in the understanding the region and possible future scenarios.”

—Holli A. Semetko, *Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Media & International Affairs, Professor of Political Science, Emory University*

“This ambitious volume leverages original survey data on citizen satisfaction and country-level data on treaty accessions to characterize the trajectories of countries in four regions of Asia as they adapt—or fail to adapt—to the challenges of globalization in the 21st century and beyond. Readers will learn much about politics from the basic

level of the individual citizen to the most comprehensive level of the global system - and about the interactions of politics at all levels.”

—Andrew J. Nathan, *Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University*

“A wonderful attempt to link a country’s domestic development and its adaptation to the global politics. The authors masterfully construct a quality of life measurement that is applied to two dozen of Asian societies, and examine its relation with these societies’ participation in international treaties. It is truly eye-opening and the findings are likely to significantly shape our understanding of life and global politics.”

—Zhengxu Wang, *Ph.D. Distinguished Professor, Department of Political Science, Fudan University*

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About the Authors

Takashi Inoguchi is an award-winning prolific writer and educator on the topics of Japanese politics and foreign policy, East Asian international relations, and Asian comparative politics, and Dr. Inoguchi celebrates a career that has allowed him to impact his industry on the topics of quality of life in Asia, evidence-based typology of Asian society, and transnationalism and global politics as manifested in the form of multilateral treaties through his publication of more than 150 books (of which 110 are in Japanese and 40 are in English). His recent authored and co-authored publications include “*Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Asia: Individual Choice under 32 Asian Societal Umbrellas*,” “*Trust with Asian Characteristics: Interpersonal and Institutional*,” “*The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global*,” “*Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*,” “*Japanese Politics in Comparative Politics: From the East to the West, and Then Whither?*,” “*Japan’s International Relations at the Crossroads: Wars, Globalization and Japanese Theorizings in the Extended Twentieth Century*,” and contributed an essay to “*The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory, Vol. 4*.” Currently, Dr. Inoguchi finds success as the editor-in-chief of the *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, as the editor of *The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy*, 2 vols., (2019), and as an eminent scholar-professor of political science at the Institute of Asian Cultures at J. F. Oberlin University in Tokyo, Japan. He is regarded within his industry for his previous work as a professor for the University of Tokyo, the senior vice rector of the United Nations University (an assistant secretary general of the UN), the chancellor and the president of University Niigata Prefecture, a professor of Chuo University, and an associate professor at Sophia University. As an academic editor, he has been the founding editor of the *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, the *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, and the *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*. As an academic editor of book series, he has been one of the co-editors along with G. John Ikenberry for “Asia Today” and the editor of “Trust: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” and the editor-in-chief for “Evidence-Based Approach to Peace and Conflict Studies.”

In addition to his academic work, Dr. Inoguchi is recognized for his past involvement in projects that directly impact his industry. He was the president of the Japan Association of International Relations, the counselor for the International Trade and Investment Foundation, the counselor for the International Economic Exchange Foundation, a committee member for the U.S. Social Science Research Council, a member of the Japan-United States Educational Commission, a member of the Japanese Government Legislative Council, a distinguished visiting professor for the National University of Singapore, a visiting professor for the SciencesPo in Paris, and a visiting professor for the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. For his incredible work, Dr. Inoguchi was the recipient of numerous grants from the Ministry of Education, and he was honored as a Fulbright visiting scholar by the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Further, he earned an International Communication and Research Excellence Award, a Suntory Academic Award, a Japan Association of Public Policy Best Book Award, and a Distinguished Research Fellow Award from the International Society for Quality of Life Studies. Dr. Inoguchi notes that the greatest honor of his life occurred successively when the International Society for the Quality of Life Studies established the “Takashi Inoguchi Endowed Track on Quality of Life and Well-Being in East Asia” award in his name and when the World Association for Public Opinion Research conferred on him with “the Helen Dinerman Award” for his life time contributions to public opinion research.

A graduate of the University of Tokyo, he earned a Bachelor of Arts in 1966 and a Master of Arts in 1968. Thereafter, he attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he earned a Ph.D. in 1974. To remain at the top of his field, Dr. Inoguchi is a member of the Science Council of Japan, the Japanese Association of International Relations, the American Political Science Association, the International Political Science Association, the Japanese Political Science Association, the Japan Association of Public Policy Studies, the Asian Consortium for Political Research, and the Japanese Society for Behaviormetrics. Looking to the future, Dr. Inoguchi intends to continue in his work while taking on new opportunities that come his way.

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Part I
After Colonization

Chapter 1

World War II Impacting Colonized Asia



On June 22, 1941, when German armed forces attacked the Soviet Union, thus starting the cruelest human war ever undertaken, registering the largest death tolls in the whole of human history, Asia was then mostly colonized by major powers. Central Asia was mostly part of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). South Asia was mostly part of the British Empire. Southeast Asia was mostly colonies of Western powers, led by the United States, Britain, France, and The Netherlands. East Asia was mostly semi-colonies of the West (including the USSR) and Japan. In Central Asia, Outer Mongolia was semi-independent. In South Asia, Nepal was semi-independent. In Southeast Asia, Thailand was semi-independent. In East Asia, Japan was independent and China was semi-independent. World War II ended in May 1945 in Europe and in August 1945 in Asia. World War II impacted the world on an extraordinary scale (Overy, 2021; Paine, 2012). The German advances into the Soviet Union caused Joseph Stalin to relocate those populations that were suspected to be pro-German and pro-independence, i.e., dissident Russians, Soviet Germans, Soviet Jews, Soviet Koreans, Soviet Mongols, Soviet Turkic, and others, from Soviet Europe to Soviet Asia. The Soviet war economy was initially semi-consolidated and eventually half-ruined. Soviet Asia was transformed to be the suppliers of energy resources (oil and natural gas), mineral resources, and food and cotton resources for the Soviet Union's survival. This transformation was one of the great legacies of the Soviet Union on Central Asia after the Soviet Union collapsed and dissolved in 1991. No less directly important from the impacts of World War II on Asia was the logistic luck of Stalin. In May–September 1939, the Outer Mongolia–Manchukuo skirmishes ended with a Soviet victory in the Soviet–Japanese conflict, involving large-scale tanks and air battles. With confirmation from a Soviet spy that the Japanese Army would not plan to attack the Soviet Union in the near future, Stalin concentrated his war efforts on the Eastern Front in Europe against Germany. Stalin's victory in the European war against Germany enabled him to keep and consolidate his sphere of control over Central Asia intact thereafter. Its direct impact on East, Southeast and South Asia was of immense order. The Japanese Army shifted the battlefield in its

plan from north (the Soviet Union) to south (French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, British Malaya, American Philippines, and the South Pacific) in its quest for energy resources needed to wage a war against the United States while the Japanese Navy planned and executed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The former's invasion into French Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, British Malaya, American Philippines, and the South Pacific took place in tandem with the latter's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. By mid-1942, Japan was on the defense after its decisive defeat at the Battle of Midway in the South Pacific between Japan and the United States, leaving most Japanese aircraft carriers sunk. Meanwhile, the war in China became a prolonged conflict without any victor, be it Japan, the Kuomintang government, or the Communist guerilla forces between 1937 and 1945 (Paine, 2012).

The Japanese advances into Southeast Asia triggered some nationalists to move toward independence with Japanese help. In Singapore, British Malaya, the Indian National Army, led by Subhas Chandra Bose, was formed with the slogan of "On to Delhi!" and it struggled alongside the Japanese into British Burma and further into British India. After Japan surrendered, the court in British India reached a guilty verdict for war crimes by those leaders of the Indian National Army, to which nationwide Indian protestors rose. Britain declared that India's independence would be given in 1946. It was given in 1947. The Far Eastern Tribunal held in Tokyo also reached a guilty verdict for Japanese war leaders. The only dissenter in the court was Judge Radhabinod Pal, who argued for the position of not guilty. In Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, a longtime communist leader, declared national independence after Japan surrendered. Yet Vietnam and France waged a long war, ending with the French defeat and resulting in the Geneva Accord in 1955. After that accord, South Vietnam and North Vietnam entered a long war that ended in 1975 with the latter being victorious. In Jakarta, after Japan surrendered, nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Hatta declared national independence and launched a war against The Netherlands. Indonesia won independence in 1949. In British Malaya, Malayan communists commenced in a long civil war against Britain when Britain delayed giving national independence to 1957. The Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946, after Japan surrendered and after a tortuous half-century of American suppression of the Philippine Republic from 1898 and three years of Japanese occupation (1942–1945), resulting in the largest death tolls among Southeast Asian battlefields. In East Asia, the two Koreas each declared independence in 1948, contesting the other's right to govern. The Soviet army advanced to Pyongyang right after confirming two atomic bombings, on the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hasegawa, 2006). Their contestations throughout the Korean peninsula prompted North Korea to try to militarily unify the country. The war also involved the United Nations, the United States, and China from 1950 to 1953. Since the armistice in 1953, both North Korea and South Korea have contested it. In China, in 1945–1949, the Kuomintang government and the Communist party resumed their conflict following World War II (Paine, 2012). It resulted in the communists' victory in 1949. After some 30 years of trial and error with a communist planned economy, which caused massive famines, political persecution, and denial of basic health and welfare along with income equality, Deng Xiaoping returned to power, bringing with him

his style of “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time,” leading to China’s global ascendance (Vogel, 2011). In 1949, the Kuomintang forces fled to Taiwan where they remain today. In South Korea, the first dozen years were marked by authoritarian rule, followed by a stern military government focused on economic development, with democratic rule for the past 30 odd years. In North Korea, the hereditary communist dictatorship has continued for some three-quarters of a century. In Taiwan, Chiang Kaishek inherited a wartime dictatorship, with his son and successor, Chiang Chingguo, gradually moving the political system in a democratic direction. In 1996, Lee Donghui, the first popularly elected president, took power, steadily moving Taiwan to become fully democratic. In Vietnam, communists have continuously ruled, but after the Chinese military intervention in Vietnam in 1979, Vietnam dramatically began moving toward political capitalism (Milanović, 2019). In 1986, Vietnam introduced the economic reform policy of *Doi moi*, making Vietnam one of the fast-developing economies. In South Vietnam, authoritarian governments ruled until 1975, when the North unified with the South. In Japan, the US-led allied powers occupied it from 1945 to 1952, transforming the country by excluding extreme right-wing and left-wing forces in electoral politics, by curtailing the power of monopolistic *zaibatsu* groups, by drafting a new constitution whereby the Emperor was stripped of power and prestige as the symbol of the nation, by disbanding the Imperial Armed Forces, and by limiting the national military’s role to one of self-defense (Inoguchi, 2012). For two decades after 1945, Japan’s foreign relations and commerce were maintained mostly with the United States. Most Asian states had barely achieved national independence and were not ready for large-scale commercial interactions with Japan, and the communist states, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had neither a peace treaty nor diplomatic normalization with Japan.

To sum up, the impact of World War II was immense on Asia. Central Asia has inherited the Soviet war economy of supplying energy and agricultural resources to its political capitals, and after 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union caused the authoritarian system to become further consolidated. Its regional picture is like nomadic contestation, continuously difficult and slow to forge something within the region and to reject influence from outside forces. Most of the Central Asian states are newly independent states. They inherited the old Soviet bureaucratic system of economic management, including the center-periphery relations in terms of electricity supply, energy supply, mineral and agricultural resources production, and migration in Moscow and key cities (Izquierdo-Brichs & Serra-Massansalv, 2021).

South Asia gained national independence relatively early after World War II, and India, the leading country, inherited the British colonial style of small armed forces and a small diplomatic corps. South Asia is known for “the region without border” (Pande, 2019). Having experienced massive division and resettlement in the early days before national independence between India and Pakistan, the Punjab-dominated Pakistani army invaded West Pakistan where all were Bengali and Islamic. Migration within the region and abroad has been massive, and to such an extent that the current US Vice-President Kamala Harris, former US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, and UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak are of South

Asian in origins (as of August 2022) (Basrur & De Estrada, 2021; Pardesi, 2022; Rudolph, 2009).

Southeast Asia has a mix of diverse civilizations, ethnic groups, and colonial heritages. Its regional organization, ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, established in 1968, is well known for focusing on the economic growth and stability of the region as a whole, respecting national sovereignty, and maintaining ASEAN priorities as central objectives. In the past, ASEAN was jokingly said to be an organization resembling NATO, meaning “no agreement, talks only.” However, after its 50th anniversary in 2018, two changes are clear: First, ASEAN economies have registered very high annual economic growth rates. With economic weight and strength, ASEAN has become something to be reckoned with. Second, with the Sino-US trade and technology war flare-up, ASEAN states need to be diplomatically strong and cannot afford to be shy of taking a position and policy on such issues as Chinese freedom claims in the South China Sea and Burmese persecution of Rohingyas and protestors (Acharya, 2001; Davidson, 2018; Egretau, 2016; Mietzner, 2021; Morgenbesser, 2020; Tan, 2018; Un, 2019; Vasavakul, 2019).

Forging a regional organization has been difficult in East Asia. Its core countries China, South Korea, and Japan have established a trilateral conference, but it is often cancelled even after the meeting’s space was constrained with three entrance doors and the triangular-shaped table (Berger, 2021; Drahos, 2021; Gueorguiev, 2022; Morris-Suzuki & Soh, 2017; Read, 2012; Rozman, 2022; Yeo, 2021). Only in 2021 did it succeed in establishing two mini-multilateral organizations, which involve these three East Asian states as well: the Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership (RCEP), made up of 15 members, mostly from East and Southeast Asia and the South and Western Pacific. The other regional organization is the, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP11). RCEP is estimated to generate 2.25% GNP growth for Japan. CPTPP is a tighter multilateral treaty whose members must abide by a number of binding clauses. China, for one, has been positive in its membership while the United States withdrew from the organization under the Trump presidency. As for the Biden administration returning to the CPTPP, the assumption is that the ongoing Democratic-Republican division makes it difficult for confirmation of this treaty by both houses of Congress. President Joseph Biden needs affirmative majority votes to the proposed treaty, which he might not be able to manipulate in both houses within his term. When his internal policy priority takes the highest importance, he may have to go with an executive agreement. With the trade–technology war between China and the United States, the traction with the CPTPP has increased. The UK submitted to the CPTPP its proposal to join after the BREXIT (Britain’s Exit from Europe) process with the EU ended. Furthermore, China and Taiwan successively applied to their respective membership. The Sino-US competition and cooperation prompted the Biden-led United States to mobilize US allies to collect strength vis-à-vis China: the US has encouraged the traditional Four Eyes scheme of sharing intelligence among the US, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Now, the US has started to widen and enhance the joint military exercises among the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), i.e., the US, Australia, India, and Japan; some of the EU members like France and Germany have joined

military exercises with Asian states; no less surprisingly, East and Southeast Asian states have geared military buildups. Australia has decided to use nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the US and the UK. South Korea has started to equip their submarines with French-made submarine-launched missiles. Japan has started to equip its more than 1,000 long-range cruise missiles in southwestern islands and the Kyushu region. Interdependence has been weaponized (Farrell & Newman, 2019), as developing interdependence has become systematized in a negative direction under hostile environments.

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Chapter 2

Sub-Regional Developmental Divergence Widened



How newly independent countries face the task of handling initial troubles or hiccups given varying levels of endowment and impediments is one of the most important issues. They are: (a) government self-empowerment, (b) developmental strategy, and (c) foreign relations (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Inoguchi, 2019; Paul et al., 2022; Pekkanen et al., 2014). The galloping narratives are summarized by Table 2.1.

To make comparison easier, two indicators—one, the Liberal Democracy Index (Nazifa et al., 2021) and the other, the Economic Freedom Score (Miller et al., 2021)—are listed by region and by country. Table 2.2 makes numerical comparisons to indicate where each of 29 Asian societies are located by the degrees of freedom, political and economic.

Two reasons for starting with these two broad indices are: (1) that Lee and Paine (2019) have shown that aside from “deleterious long-term effects, decolonization exhibited less pronounced political consequences than sometimes thought” and (2) that many local politics of fragmentation and fluctuation (elementary corporatism-like ethnic and tribal community-based) have tended to show themselves to be wobbling along and thus are limited in articulating and aggregating interest representation in a democratic fashion. These two broad indices merely indicate the relatively low freedom of expression and assembly and the relatively low freedom of market related transactional and entrepreneurial activities in comparison to advanced industrial countries where such indices have been used to describe their own relative standings. As our description of war threats, development bias, and planetary crisis proceeds, we would like to highlight some features specific of one or a few sub-regions.

Governance empowerment is not an easy task. For Central Asia, newly independent countries used to be components of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For South Asia, they used to be components of British India. For Southeast Asia, they used to be the American Philippines, Dutch Indonesia, British Malaya, British Burma, and French Indochina. For East Asia, Korea and Taiwan were Japanese colonies. Some parts of China were a semi-colony of the West (including Russia) and

Table 2.1 Sub-regional divergence in regime, development and diplomacy

	Governance empowerment	Developmental strategy	Foreign relations
Central Asia	Inherited from Soviet rule; local tribal community bosses turned presidents	Role of supplier of energy, mineral and agricultural resources, remittance from migrants	Two big neighbors, Russia and China, many multinational investors
South Asia	Inherited from British rule especially in army and diplomacy	Poverty reduction, agricultural productivity increase (seeds, chemical fertilizers), remittances from migrants mini banks with entrepreneurship	Non-alignment, protectionism India “firstism” exhibit poor trade and investment performance
Southeast Asia	Inherited from Western colonies	Ethnic, religious frictions conducive to intervention from outside, energy, mineral and agricultural resources exploited with enhanced state power, managing foreign investors improved	Non-interference in internal affairs and ASEAN centrality keeping positive and defensive policy
East Asia	Semi-colonial status with high foreign direct investment, conducive to civil war ideologized by Cold War, post-Cold War political capitalism	Protectionism for import substitution to light technology manufacturing to heavy technology manufacturing further to high technology service manufacturing through well-connected international supply chains through business firms across states	State sovereignty firstism, enhanced by incessant verbal wars and by parochial self-assertions, thick and dense non-governmental interactions

Source Authors

Japan. Those territories north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River were taken by Russia in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively (Mancall, 1971, 1984).

For Central Asia, key industries were energy, mineral, and agricultural resources that used to supply Moscow and the entire Soviet Union. Post-USSR Russia’s demand for such resources fluctuated as its economy rose and fell. Central Asian governments had to identify and develop new buyers as well. Central Asia’s governments now lure new investors to their energy and mineral resources. Those territories in Inner Mongolia, East Turkestan, and Tibet that were sinicized by China, both Republican and Communist in the last century, now present themselves as areas of vigilance and

Table 2.2 Two indices of sub-regional states and societies: Liberal Democracy Index (V-Democracy) and Economic Freedom Score (Heritage Foundation)

Regions	States and societies	Liberal Democracy Index (V-Democracy)	Economic Freedom Score (Heritage Foundation)
a. Central Asia	Mongolia	0.50	62.4
	Kyrgyzstan	0.29	63.7
	Afghanistan	0.19	53.0
	Kazakhstan	0.14	71.1
	Uzbekistan	0.10	58.3
	Tajikistan	0.05	55.2
	Turkmenistan	0.04	47.4
b. South Asia	Bhutan	0.46	58.3
	Nepal	0.45	50.7
	Maldives	0.44	55.2
	Sri Lanka	0.38	55.7
	India	0.34	56.5
	Pakistan	0.25	51.7
	Afghanistan	0.19	53.0
	Bangladesh	0.10	56.5
c. Southeast Asia	Timor-Leste	0.46	44.7
	Indonesia	0.45	66.7
	P.N. Guinea	0.34	58.9
	Singapore	0.31	89.7
	Malaysia	0.28	74.4
	Philippines	0.28	64.1
	Myanmar	0.27	55.2
	Thailand	0.17	69.7
	Vietnam	0.11	61.7
	Laos	0.009	53.9
	Cambodia	0.007	57.3
	Brunei	N/A	66.6
d. East Asia	South Korea	0.79	74.0
	Japan	0.73	74.1
	Taiwan	0.72	78.6
	Hong Kong	0.25	N/A
	Vietnam	0.11	61.7
	China	0.04	58.4
	North Korea	0.001	5.2

Sources Liberal Democracy Index; V-Democracy (Nazifa et al., 2021); Economic Freedom Score; The Heritage Foundation (Miller et al., 2021)

suppression. No less important, the government had to empower itself in terms of bureaucratic skills and abilities to lead enlarged government tasks. Furthermore, the governing elite corps needs to mobilize the public's support. Governments used to look to Moscow for leadership and bureaucratic implementation. After independence, their policy scopes broadened to include domestic public preferences and concerns as well as those of their Central Asian neighbors and non-neighbors. That means the tasks of democratization and foreign policy. The Russian-Ukrainians war has impacted some of the Central Asian states to indicate the inclination to align with the United States: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan by participating joint military exercise with the United States especially after Russia briefly intervened to suppress Kazakh protestors of price rise and internal turmoil using the Eurasian Economic Union's article clauses in 2022.

For South Asia, key dominant industries were agriculture (wheat, rice and teas), elementary manufacturing like cloth, shoes, and canned fruits, and power-generation, infrastructure for transportation and communications service, and light and heavy manufacturing. South Asia's independence came relatively early but its massive migration prior to independence cost not only a lot of energy and human suffering but slowed the speed of industrialization. South Asia is a "region without borders" (Pande, 2019), where migration from India (Uttar Pradesh etc.) to Nepal (Himalaya's southern plains), from Bangladesh to India (West Bengal and Assam), from India (Tamil Nadu) to Sri Lanka has been steady. Just as critical is the migration to the United States and the United Kingdom, which is as steady and where caste-free societies produced eminent South Asians like the US Vice-President and the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and a few dozen business CEOs. India has not joined the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership when many Southeast Asian states have joined because India needs more time not to be dominated or destroyed by economically developed states but has joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to gain more strong posture vis-a-vis China with the US, Australia and Japan while India has purchased a lot of weapons and oil cheaply from Russia. The United States has made it sound more developmental, alluring India by presenting QUAD in Economic Framework.

For Southeast Asia, key dominant industries are agriculture (rice, teas, fruits) and energy resources (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia) and mineral resources (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand). When Japan invaded Southeast Asia during World War II, its objective was to exploit energy resources (oil, natural gas), developed by Britain and The Netherlands respectively prior to World War II, to carry out its war against the United States and Britain. For Indonesia, independence was preceded by an independence war against colonial powers and, for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Myanmar, independence was then followed by civil war or anti-government dissident suppression. Thailand remained independent through World War II by aligning with Japan. French Indochina experienced the colonial return of powers after World War II, which led to Vietnam's splitting into North and South Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos aligned with North Vietnam till the end of the Vietnam War, and since 1973 Cambodia has struggled with the combination of communist internal strife, involving the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Sino-Vietnamese War, and the

internal implosion of the Khmer Rouge government. In contrast to the initial difficulties after independence when major countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) were often at odds with each other, ASEAN has strictly prioritized the policies of state sovereignty and its own organization's objectives. The ASEAN has strengthened the position of non-alignment vis-a-vis the US and China, avoiding the charge of human rights violation, which have tended to come from the US and non-governmental organizations.

For East Asia, key industries were agriculture; light industry like cotton, wool, clothing, and shoes; heavy manufacturing in special steels, automobiles; petrochemicals; precision machines; and electric and basic infrastructure industries before 1941. As Japanese colonies, Taiwan, Korea, and Manchukuo acquired the basic know-how of agricultural and industrial infrastructure like river control for agriculture and power generation by water and coal. Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers between 1945 and 1952. Until the mid-1960s, Japan's only friend in the region was the United States. Japan had no substantive or substantial interactions in communications, transportation, investment, or trade, let alone a peace treaty, with others in the region. China was waging a civil war with a semi-colonial status being sloganeered. The two Vietnams waged their war toward independence from 1945 to 1975 when North Vietnam militarily unified the country. With peace treaties concluded in 1965 and 1972 with South Korea and with China, respectively, the basis was set among the regional core three to establish a trilateral conference. However, their annual conference has been often canceled.

Even Asian communist states, China, become political capitalist (Milanovic, 2019). So has Vietnam become political capitalist with the new economic policy of Doi Moi starting in 1986, yet avoiding clash with China whether it is about South China Sea or about Chinese penetration of economic and political influence into Cambodia and Laos.

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Part II

States' Multilateral Treaty Participation and Citizens' Satisfaction with Quality of Life

We must note, if briefly, why historical backgrounds are provided before entering indices of sovereign states' multilateral treaty participation and civil society citizens' quality-of-life satisfaction. Although one of the present authors (T.I.) strongly believes in evidence-based approach, he no less strongly believes in diplomatic and international history as an indispensable wheel or context-clarifying tool-kit. Likewise, he strongly believes in the often-neglected area studies as the wheel to comparative politics, which has been dominated by the Western theorizations which stress the Atlantic democracies without almost scant familiarity and close to zero knowledge as its wheel of other regions such as Asia.

Chapter 3

Four Sub-Regions' Key Features



3.1 Central Asia by Six Domains

3.1.1 *Afghanistan*

See Sect. 3.2.1.

3.1.2 *Kazakhstan*

Kazakhstan used to be a component of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. It is geographically large and ethnically diverse, with Kazakhs being the most dominant group, followed by Russians and Germans. Oil and the natural gas sector produce 60% of GDP. The combination of large tax burdens on foreign direct investment (Heritage Foundation), not uncommon with oil-producing states on par with Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia and elite corps strength, leads Kazakhstan to attract foreign direct investment, part of its multi-vector foreign policy. Kazakhstan joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Eurasian Economic Council on the one hand, and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization on the other. Also, instead of using the Kazakh alphabet, Kazakhstan has switched from it to the Latin alphabet. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the founding dictator, laid the basis of an independent republic from the status of subordinate republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Shortly after Nazarbayev's death, his successor, Kassym Jomart Tokayev, was confronted with large-scale mass protests against the government over high prices. Russian military forces were invited to suppress these protesters, showing the readiness of Russian strength vis-à-vis a former Soviet republic or a neighboring state. This has also maintained the equilibrium between Russia and China in Kazakhstan, with the former keeping political strength and with the latter, economic

strength. In terms of the liberal democracy index score (V-Democracy, University of Gothenburg), Kazakhstan is rated on a par with Singapore and Vietnam, and for its economic freedom index score (Heritage Foundation), it is one of the highest, on a par with South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia. It is the only country that has registered continuously its participation in the highest number of treaties in the policy domain of communications, trade, and commerce among Central Asian countries. Not only trade but also five other policy-tasked multilateral treaties have registered a similarly upward-increased pattern. The Russian-Ukrainians war erupted in 2021 again after 2014. In autumn the new Kazakhstani President Tokayev to allow Russia to briefly enter into Kazakhstan to quell protesting mobs using the Eurasian Economic Union commitment. Shortly after that President Tokayev joined the military exercise with the United States along with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for fear of Russia's further military influence in the former Soviet Union. Earlier In 2021 when Afghanistan was withdrawn by the United States and thus the Taliban government took power, Uzbekistan took initiative to consult with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan whether it is possible or feasible to set up an airport outside Afghanistan, i.e., Pakistan, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Tajikistan keeps an airport open with China watching the air and human traffic with its eye carefully at possible Islamic terrorists passing into the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous region.

3.1.3 Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan used to be a former component of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. It was a multiethnic commercial center when Mongolian-Turkic-Persians established their empires in what is now Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan is next door to Tajikistan in Central Asia. Dushanbe, the capital city, is a commercial center where non-ferrous metals and rare minerals are traded, leaving the rest of the country very unequal in terms of income level. This is often one of the sources of internal strife. At one point, caught up in one of the "colored revolutions" (called the Tulip Revolution), Kyrgyzstan's founding president, Askar Akayev, was forced to resign. Kyrgyzstan registers the second largest remittances after Tajikistan from Moscow among Central Asian states. Kyrgyzstan's liberal democracy index score is on par with Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India, and its economic freedom score is on par with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. Perennial internal instability seems to lead Kyrgyzstan to defensive postures with respect to multilateral treaty participation. Health and labor form the most frequently joined pattern similar to that of Tajikistan. In descending order, policy domains in intellectual property and human rights increase in tandem. Then the environment, trade, and peace policy domains increase in tandem, albeit more slowly than health, intellectual property, and human rights.

3.1.4 *Mongolia*

Mongolia is the exception in Central Asia, in that firstly, it gained national independence from the Qing dynasty in 1911 and established the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924 and membership was achieved in the United Nations the earliest, in 1956. The latter membership was begotten at the same time as Japan. It is not a coincidence that Mongolia has initiated the club of democracies and been active in co-leading it. The V-Democracy Score (University of Gothenburg) registers Mongolia as the highest among Central Asian countries as well. Secondly, its industries are not energy and agricultural production. Until recently, Mongolia has not been resource-rich countries like its neighbors—Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—in energy and mineral resources. Most recently, Mongolia has found that it is rich for uranium and other mineral resources (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 2021). It has registered a mid-score in terms of economic freedom (Heritage Economic Freedom Score) of Central Asian countries. For Mongolia's participation, the number of multilateral treaties has been the largest in peace and disarmament. First of all, for policy concerns, Mongolia must equilibrate itself between two giants, Russia and China. Mongolia depends on Russia's oil supply and on China's infrastructure construction; but it cannot be too dependent on bilateral treaties. Leaning to one side can be dangerous. Bilateral dependence can become easily bilateral vulnerability. Multilateral treaties are critical. Hence, its top policy concerns have been about peace and disarmament, labor and health, and human rights. These three policy concerns have further strengthened with the end of the Cold War and, no less importantly, the internal regime change (peaceful revolution in 1990) from communism to democracy in a soft and steady fashion. By 1995, the regime change was established with all six policy concerns, including the newly highlighted three policy concerns of communications, trade and commerce, the environment and intellectual property, making a leap upward in the 1990s. Mongolia's most important milestone must be the end of the Cold War and the subsequent regime change in 1995. Unlike some former components of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which experienced the "colored revolution", Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and possibly some others, Mongolia did not receive such accusations from Russia (Cox et al., 2000). It does not mean that there have not been small skirmishes, like the 2008 riots. "Sparked by allegations of vote-rigging, left five Mongolians were dead and Mongolian People's Party headquarters [a] charred hulk." President Khaltmaagiin Battulga of the Democratic Party issued a decree outlawing the Mongolian People's Party. After leaving office, he faces possible perceptions for abuse of power and even corruption (*The Economist*, 2021, April 24).

3.1.5 *Tajikistan*

Tajikistan was one of republics of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the poorest and geographically smallest country in Central Asia. Mountainous and land-locked, it borders China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The country is poverty-stricken, unstable, and full of internal strife. A civil war raged between 1992 and 1997. It is the most remittance-dependent economy with one-half of GNP coming from migrant remittances (from Moscow and some major cities in Russia). Therefore, it is no wonder that Tajikistan registered a speedy extreme upward jump in terms of the number of multilateral treaties in the domains of labor and health from 1991 onward. Policy advice and assistance from the World Health Organization is of immense scale. A similar pattern can be noted for many other multilateral treaties in Tajikistan's participation in the domains of the environment and communications, trade, and commerce since the 2000s onward. Policy concerns about peace and disarmament, human rights and intellectual property joined by Tajikistan registers its awareness of the importance to go with the UN-announced *zeitgeist* to join multilateral treaties of all these six policy domains as a member of the least-developed countries. The end of civil strife in 2007 is a landmark in Tajikistan's developmental path, however tenuous it continues to be. Tajikistan keeps the Russian-controlled airport in its territory and so does Armenia, vigilantly watched by Azerbaijan and Turkey. It is most important to find Tajikistan in the concerted action with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to execute their joint military exercise with the United States in summer 2022 after Kazakhstan allowed Russia to suppress the Russia's brief intervention in Kazakhstani mobs against price rise in early 2021.

3.1.6 *Turkmenistan*

When the United States had President Donald Trump, one critic called the United States the Turkmenistan-on-the-Potomac, just as another critic of the United Kingdom in the early pre-exit days of Boris Johnson's prime ministership called the UK Singapore-on-the-Thames. Whereas Turkmenistan thrives on oil and natural gas production, politics is for one person, President Saparmurat Niyazov, who died in 2006 and was succeeded by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Niyazov declared Turkmenistan to be constitutionally a country of eternal peace, whereby Turkmenistan adopts an eternal disentanglement policy of having no ally. President Berdimuhamedov most recently has developed a new constitution of a monarchy, having his son in mind. That would be a third monarchy in Central Asia (Tajikistan) and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan). The liberal democracy index score indicates that Turkmenistan registers 0.04, which is on a par with North Korea registering 0.01, whereas its economic freedom index score is 47.4, which is on a par with Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Laos. Turkmenistan has joined the least number of multilateral treaties, registering 100. This is comparable to the US: of the 600 multilateral

treaties, the United States has joined 133 multilateral treaties (1945–2019) whereas Turkmenistan has signed and ratified 100 such multilateral treaties (1991–2019). Of the six policy domains of multilateral treaties, Turkmenistan has joined those treaties on peace and human rights the most, although still registering the lowest participation rate among Central Asians. With Niyazov's death, other policy domains related to multilateral treaties started to increase cautiously.

3.1.7 Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan used to be a republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. It is a doubly land-locked country surrounded by Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. Uzbekistan produces oil, natural gas, and cotton. It is a country known most famously for cotton production that has caused the Aral Sea to shrink by one-third. The liberal democracy index score is 0.1 on par with Bangladesh and Vietnam whereas the economic freedom index score is on par with Bhutan, Papua New Guinea, and Cambodia. Uzbekistan is led by Islam Karimov, founder of independent Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is often compared to Kazakhstan in Central Asia for being the opposite. Where Uzbekistan is nationalistic, protectionist, and isolationist, Kazakhstan is known sometimes for being cosmopolitan, having open trade and being international. Karimov passed away in 2016, succeeded by Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The succession is sometimes called the Uzbek Spring. In 2021 when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, it was Uzbekistan to call for consultation with the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to establish an airport where the US can use.

3.2 South Asia by Six Domains

3.2.1 Afghanistan

Afghanistan under King Amanullah Khan (1919–1929) gained independence after the third Anglo-British war by refusing the British offer of subsidies, even though Afghan itself had been defeated. King Amanullah issued the Constitution in 1923 and embarked on modernization with a handful of elite corps advisors who had been educated abroad. King Jaheel Shah (1933–1973) implemented modernization through neutrality during World War II. In 1945, Afghan entered the United Nations. During the Cold War both the United States and Soviet Union sent aid to Afghanistan. In 1964, under Prime Minister Daoud Muhammad (1909–1978), the new constitution enhancing freedom of expression and publication was promulgated. His top priority was to secure the return of the Pashtun territory of Pakistan to Afghanistan. Pashtuns, as Afghan's largest ethnic group, account for some 70% of the population.

In 1973, Daoud Muhammad declared the establishment of the Republican State by staging a coup against King Muhammad Zahir Shah. In 1978, Marxists killed Daoud Muhammad and took power, ending his dictatorial modernization program. The Afghan public resisted the new Marxist government, prompting the Soviet Union to militarily intervene until Moscow withdrew in 1989. The Soviet Union then collapsed soon after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen fiercely resisted the Soviet forces, receiving assistance from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and China. The Taliban, homegrown Islamic forces, heavily resisted the Afghan armed forces and, between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban controlled three-quarters of Afghanistan until the United States militarily intervened in 2001. The United States under Joseph Biden's presidency announced August 31, 2021, as the deadline for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan after 20 years of futile military intervention. It was executed in a confused fashion.

Returning to multilateral treaty participation, it is very clear that war-torn Afghanistan has continued to receive assistance from the United Nations through the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, among others registering its steady upward participation in the policy task of health and labor. It is also very clear that Afghanistan has been active in participating in multilateral treaties on human rights. Being a small number of the founding members of the United Nations from the developing South along with the Philippines, the Declaration of the United Nations and the Declaration of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization have been in sync with the modernizing drive of a small aristocratic elite corps, Marxist returnees from abroad, and reform-oriented Islamists. Policy tasks of trade in multilateral treaty participation started to increase from the 1970s onward. Since the United States military intervention in 2001, Afghanistan's participation in multilateral treaties in the following six areas has been moving upward steadily: health, human rights, peace and disarmament, trade, environment, and intellectual property. As of 2020, its liberal democracy index score is 0.19 (V-Democracy, University of Gothenburg) and economic freedom index score is 53.0 (Heritage Foundation).

3.2.2 Bhutan

As of 2020, Bhutan's liberal democracy index is 0.46 whereas economic freedom index score is 58.3. Bhutan developed from Tibetan tribes residing in the Lesser Himalayas, bordering India (West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, and Sikkim). The Anglo-Bhutani War halted Bhutan's further expansion in 1865 with the conclusion of Bhutan's eternal peace treaty. In 1907, Bhutan's constitutional monarchy was established and became independent from Britain. A century later in 2008, Bhutan was established as a constitutional republic. In 1971, Bhutan joined the United Nations. Bhutan is known as an autarchy whereby Tibetan Buddhist-style ecological cycles are respected. King Wangchuk's concept of "gross national happiness" is located in

this autarchic thought, grounded in Tibetan Buddhism. In 1999, as Bhutan's King spoke of "gross national happiness" in a speech, the ban on TV and Internet was lifted. Around 1999, Bhutan's participation in multilateral treaties jumped upward. Those treaties related to the environment took priority, followed by those related to trade, health, intellectual property, peace, and human rights. Befitting a country of autarchy and "gross national happiness", Bhutan has joined a total of 60 multilateral treaties as of 2019.

3.2.3 *Bangladesh*

Bangladesh is 98% Bengali. The impetus of independence came from the suppression exercised by Pakistan's army, most of whom are Punjabi, over the Bengalis of West Pakistan. The Bengalis rose up against West Pakistan. India joined East Pakistan and attacked West Pakistan in 1971. The ensuing Liberation War in 1971 resulted in the sovereign independent state of Bangladesh. In all, India and Pakistan went to war three times. First in 1947–1948, when the Hindu and Muslim populations of the newly independent India and Pakistan clashed over the division of Punjab and Bengal along two religiously demarcated lines. Second, in 1965, when the governing elite of Jammu and Kashmir wanted to join India even though their population being largely Muslim preferred to join Pakistan. On the issue of how to demarcate Jammu and Kashmir, both India and Pakistan waged their second Indo-Pakistani War. The third Indo-Pakistani conflict occurred during the Bangladesh Independence War in East Pakistan between 3 December 1971 and 16 December 1971, on the latter of which Pakistan capitulated in Dhaka. Although there are both Muslims in east and west Pakistan, West Pakistan took a leading role running Pakistan with a Punjabi-dominant Pakistani army and government, and economic productivity focused on the Punjabi plain. India allied with the Bengalis of East Pakistan and fought a Bangladesh Independence War against West Pakistan.

Bangladesh in its first two decades joined multilateral treaties mostly in the policy domains of health and labor and peace and disarmament. Only after the end of the Cold War did Bangladesh increase its participation in treaties related to such policy domains as trade, human rights, the environment, and intellectual property. It coincided with the birth of the two-party system in which both the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party claimed ties to the origins of Bangladeshi independence, placing emphasis on Islamism or nationalism. The liberal democratic score on V-Democracy (Nazifa et al., 2021) as of 2020 is 0.1 whereas the economic freedom index score (Miller et al., 2021) is 56.5, with India registering 56.5 and Pakistan registering 51.7. Bangladesh is known for frequent flooding in the delta from Himalayan-origin rivers, which periodically cover a huge percentage of its land with water. The young population raised in the *sangham* (meeting points of rivers in the delta) have a high literacy rate and very high aspirations to move up (Inoguchi & Fujii, 2013, pp. 151–154, 221). The annual rate of economic development in recent years registers very high, comparable to those in Vietnam, both emerging at the top.

3.2.4 *India*

India gained independence in 1947. After World War II, the Indian National Army (INA) was organized by volunteers from the surrendered British Indian Army, a scheme planned by Colonel Iwaichi Fujiwara of the Japanese Army in 1942. Initially led by Colonel Mohan Singh, dissatisfaction emerged in 1943 with Congress's line of seeking independence by cooperating with Britain. Subhas Chandra Bose stepped forward to reorganize the INA with 40,000 forces strong and with the slogan of "Onto Delhi." The Indian National Army joined the Japanese Army on its way to India. Defeated in Burma, the Indian National Army retreated. With the Japanese surrender in 1945, a British court found the leaders guilty of war crimes. The verdict sparked protests across India. In turn Britain withdrew the guilty verdict and to grant India independence in 1946. Devastated and weakened by Tory Prime Minister Churchill's war at any cost, Britain made the best decision under Labor Prime Minister Attlee. However, within India, the division between Muslims and Hindus that first started in Punjab and Bengal spread nationwide, ultimately leading to Pakistan and India separating from each other in 1948 (Paul, 2005; Tudor, 2013). Although India's independence was won with blood, India's development was slow and steady with bureaucratic socialism and a foreign policy of non-alignment. Its industries were cotton, wheat, rice, and tea. Productivity was low as traditional industries, symbolized by Mahatma Gandhi's hand-woven cotton and part of non-violent resistance against British colonialism, were typical. Only with the Green Revolution and the adoption of modern techniques in water supply, chemical fertilizers, and labor supply did productivity rise from the 1970s onward. With the end of the Cold War, India's non-alignment policy loosened, leading to increased trade with Western countries. The improvement of the quality of life, especially with infant mortality rate significantly declining, has provided India strength in its demographic profile. These positive changes also mark a steady increase in the number of multilateral treaties India joined in such domains as health and labor, human rights, the environment, and intellectual property. The advance in participation in these domains has helped to loosen caste-ridden biases and inefficiencies to a certain extent. The years 1991 and 2015 are important benchmarks to the liberalization of the economy as urban populations, relatively free from caste-binding biases, and the advance in regional political parties have adopted more pragmatic policies for each region in parallel with the more bureaucratic National Congress Party's decline. As of 2020, the liberal democracy index score is 0.34 whereas economic freedom index score is 56.5. As globalization deepens, nationalism and protectionism increase, leading to one step backward. Yet as globalization penetrates and liberalizes society, two steps forward are envisaged in the longer run. *The Economist* (2022) asks: "The world needs a new economic motor. Could India fit the bill?" India has declined in joining the Regional and Comprehensive Regional Partnership for fear of its traditional protectionism be repudiated by the open trade market-oriented RCEP. While India has taken confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Chinas, India has prompted to enhance its increased weapons and weapon technologies like its first aircraft carrier both from Russia while India has been

allured by the Quad's Economic Framework provided by the United States because its economic framework is security-related but more developmental oriented.

3.2.5 The Maldives

The Maldives gained independence in 1965 from Britain and entered the United Nations in 1965. It is composed of hundreds of islands in the midst of the Indian Ocean. The population numbers in the hundreds of thousands and comes from various ethnic and religious backgrounds: Indian, Arab, Persian, and African. Since the mid-1960s, the Maldives has participated in multilateral treaties in the peace domain. Until 1990, the Maldives annually participated in the five peace-related multilateral treaties. After the end of the Cold War, peace-related multilateral treaty participation by the Maldives kept increasing. Since the late 1980s, the Maldives has started to participate in multilateral treaties in the policy domain of trade. The Maldives' main industry is tourism and its supporting industries are agriculture and the service sector. With climate change becoming more dramatic and menacing, there is a real possibility that the islands may sink under the Indian Ocean. This impending disaster has prompted the Maldives to become one of the leading states to jointly call for global solutions to climate change. Health and human rights domains have also gained in salience in the Maldives' participation in multilateral treaties. Important to notice is the steady increase in the number of those multilateral treaties in the environment domain and intellectual property domain since the mid-1990s. The activation of party politics in the 2000s, has led to the activation of multilateral treaty participation. A new constitution was declared in 2008, and since 2013 until 2018 President Yamin focused his country's foreign policy toward China. His successor Ibrahim Mohamed Solih has been changing his predecessor's pro-China policy somewhat. But the key policy agenda on climate change has remained as the most important.

3.2.6 Nepal

The 1860 treaty between Nepal and Britain brought peace, the deployment of Gurkhas to the British army, and promised protection by Britain against Nepal's potential enemies. After India's independence from Britain in 1947, Nepal adopted a constitutional monarchy in 1955. It was also in 1955 when Nepal joined the United Nations at the height of non-alignment in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Landlocked between India and China, Nepal slowly engaged with multilateral treaty participation in the 1960s. The first priority was peace. From 1965 to 1990, Nepal joined 18 multilateral treaties in the peace domain. Nepal is bordered by India (Assam, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim), Pakistan (Jammu and Kashmir), and China (Aksai Chin). The second priority of the Nepalese

government was health. The economy is centered on agriculture (wheat, rice, buckwheat, among others), tourism, and mountain sports, and as such the quality of life is low as the high infant mortality rate indicates. Also, migration from Uttar Pradesh, India, to the plains of the lesser Himalayas in southern Nepal has added to the poverty and caste-bound biases associated with Hindu society, which has accelerated these challenges (Pyakurel, 2021). In the 1990s and the early 2000s, civil war continued, and in 2008, the monarchy ended. In 2015, Nepal was declared the Republic of Nepal. With a now democratic multi-party system adopted, the Communist Party of Nepal has been the largest party in the coalition government. The liberal democratic index score (V-Democracy, the University of Gothenburg, 2021) registers 0.45 or 75th in the world and seventh in Asia. The economic freedom index registers 50.7 (Heritage Foundation, 2021).

3.2.7 *Pakistan*

Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge University, coined Pakistan's name in 1933: the name is an acronym for Punjab, Afghanistan (its northeastern edge where Pashtuns resided in British India), Kashmir (most Kashmiri residents are Muslims), and Indus-Sind, combined with the -stan suffix in Baluchistan. Pakistan's name was used in the heightened mood of national independence of a separate country from India before Britain declared India be given national independence in 1946. Muhamad Ali Jinnah was the key proponent for a Muslim Pakistan separate from India. In 1947, Punjab and Bengal were each divided into two, Muslim Punjab and Hindu-Sikh Punjab, and Muslim Bengal and Hindu Bengal. Massive migration took place in both directions. A lot of misery ensued, killing at least half a million people. A demographically large country, Pakistan's population is now well over 200 million. Its major task has been feeding the population with a fractious regime often under military rule. In 1956, the constitution was ratified to become the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In 1958, Ayub Khan established a military government by coup, lasting till 1971. From 1971 to 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, born in the merchant city of Karachi, Sind, south Pakistan, served as both president (1971–1973) and prime minister (1973–1977) of Pakistan. Non-military governments led by Benazir Butto, hailed from the major merchant city in Karachi, Sind (1988–1990, 1993–1996), and military governments were led by Zia ul Haq, originally from Punjab, north Pakistan (1977–1988), and Nawaz Musharaf also from Punjab (2013–2018). In 2018, Imran Khan (2018–2022), of non-military origin from Punjab, won the national election. Boasting itself of a global power, three ingredients being possession of nuclear weapons, connectivity with the International Monetary Fund, and Islamic passion), Pakistan drowns herself when the paradigmatic change seems to have taken place: the Sino-US trade and technology war, the Russian war against Ukraine, and global economic turmoil and worldwide infectious disease. Three wars were waged against India over Kashmir and the division of British India. The first took place in 1947–1948 over Kashmir and the division; the second in 1965 over Kashmir

(a decision taken by Ayub Khan, leading the military); and the third in 1971 over Kashmir and East Pakistan (decision taken by Yahya Khan, also with the military). Also, it should be noted that during the non-military leadership periods 1972–1977, 1988–1990, and 1993–1996, Pakistan’s multilateral treaty participation rose in the trade domain compared to the periods under military rule. In contrast, Pakistan joined multilateral treaties in the peace domain more visibly during the military leaderships of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Nawaz Musharraf. It is also worth mentioning that Pakistan registers a steady demographic increase with a steady decline in infant mortality. That means that the agricultural harvest has grown in tandem with population growth. Bilateral solutions are worth mentioning. Pakistan leaned toward the United States as confrontation with India sharpened in 1965 and 1971. Pakistan received bilateral assistance from the United States, especially when Washington had cool relations with non-aligned India and the Marxist-leaning, Islamic dominant Afghanistan, whether it is Mujahedeen, Islamic Al-Qaeda, or Taliban. Also noteworthy is Pakistan’s ability to borrow from the International Monetary Fund, accruing substantial debt. It is noteworthy that Pakistan despite being a fractious and fragmented country has been resilient (Lieven, 2012). In Pakistan so many oppositions to the government do exist. But they are often tailored to their often narrow and sharply supportive respective supporters’ interest and ideology. Thus adding oppositions often does not lead to topple the government. Economic hardships felt widely have prompted protestors to rise, oppositions have suddenly united with one voice (anti-Imran Khan). The military communicated its wish to him. Imran Khan in turn called for general election. Then the court told that Imran Khan’s action was invalid and that he has to go. Exceptions take place when the military does not support the government and prime minister’s action is not accepted by the court. By 2021, Pakistan had emerged as a very large producer of cotton cloth with a similarly large cotton spinning capacity (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 2021).

3.2.8 Sri Lanka

Britain ruled Sri Lanka a little differently from British India. British India used to be run by the East India Company, which was headquartered in the large port city of Calcutta, good for a trading company. After the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, led by dominant Bengalis in Uttar Pradesh, the British state to directly rule British India by the Ministry of Colonies with Delhi as its headquarters. However, the British government did not change much with regard to Sri Lanka. The reason this historical fact is noted is that the contemporary development of Sri Lanka needs to be traced back to 1857–1858, the Sepoy mutiny, leading to the bankruptcy of the East India Company. With the success of the tea industry in Sri Lanka, a growing labor force was required. Tamil Nadu, southern India, located across the channel, was deemed a good source for such kind of migrant workers. The British Overseas Ministry encouraged Tamil migrant aspirants there. However, in Sri Lanka, the Ministry of British India continued to run Sri Lanka. The state policy of Tamil Nadu, a very poor

state in southern India, had inherited its state's policy from the Ministry of Colonies. The hilly plantations of eastern Sri Lanka were relatively sparsely populated by native Sri Lankans, but western Sri Lanka was mostly populated by Sinhala-speaking Buddhists, not Tamil speaking and neither Hindu nor Islamic in religion. Migrant Tamils in general worked harder than the native Sri Lankans, causing some irritation toward the Tamils among the Sinhala-speaking Sri Lankans. Newly independent Ceylon now renamed Sri Lanka had a fairly progressive scheme for its "universal pro-poor healthcare system." Because of this scheme, life expectancy of 77.8 years was 10% higher than the world's average and the literacy rate was 98.8%. Both were very high for postwar Asia. The per capita income level was similar to that of the Philippines, then ranking number one in the post-independent period of Asia. In terms of the liberal democratic index score (V-Democracy, University of Gothenburg), Sri Lanka registers 0.38, ranking 88th in the world, and in terms of the economic freedom index (Heritage Foundation), it registers 55.7, or 131st in the world.

3.3 Southeast Asia by Six Domains

3.3.1 *Brunei*

Brunei was Britain's protectorate until 1984 when Brunei gained its independence. During World War II, Japan occupied Brunei. Japan's interest was in oil, the discovery and exploration of which in Brunei took place as early as 1929. As a British protectorate, the sultan was constitutionally defined an absolute monarch in the 1959 constitution. It was Brunei that first adopted *sharia* law (Islamic penal code) in Southeast Asia. Brunei's per capita income is the highest in Asia thanks to the production of oil and natural gas. Its population is a little more than 300,000. Along with independence from Britain, Brunei joined the United Nations and ASEAN. Multilateral treaties in the health and trade domains steadily increased after independence. From the late 1990s onward, multilateral treaties in the peace domain increased dramatically. From the late 2000s onward, those treaties on the environment and intellectual property increased in number steadily. Human rights is the one domain where Brunei is slow to register and proceeds at a sluggish pace in joining multilateral treaties. It is within the political landscapes of Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia that sultans seem to have revived their power recently. In Malaysia, the sultan makes the decision regarding who the prime minister is to be. In Indonesia, the sultan heavily influences the choice of provincial governors. The liberal democracy index score for Brunei does not exist in V-Dem's 2021 report and the economic index (Heritage foundation) registers 66.6, ranking Brunei 57th in the world.

3.3.2 *Cambodia*

France started to colonize Cochinchina (southern Vietnam), Annam (central Vietnam), Tonkin (northern Vietnam), and Cambodia in the mid-1860s. In 1896 the French Federation of Indochina was born. Laos was added to it in 1893. Cochinchina was a direct French colony and the rest were French protectorates. During World War II, Japan occupied French Indochina. Upon the French return in 1945 civil wars started in Vietnam. The 1954 Geneva Accords brought peace to North Vietnam with France. Shortly after 1954, a civil-cum-international war started, which led the United States to militarily intervene in 1966. It withdrew in 1973. Two years later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam militarily unified Vietnam. In 1975, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge (radical communists) established the Socialist Republic of Kampuchea. Before the Khmer Rouge captured power, Lon Nol, a military general, carried out a coup d'état in 1970. Before General Lon Nol took power, Prince Sihanouk ruled the country after Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953. In 1979, Vietnam militarily intervened in Kampuchea and only withdrew from Kampuchea in 1989. As if striking back, Kampuchea's enemy China intervened militarily in Vietnam in 1979. In Cambodia, it was only in 1989 when Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia. From then, there was a power struggle between the monarchy and right-wing forces to run the government. The Khmer Rouge, which continued until 1993, when under the auspices of the United Nations, an election was held between contending political parties and political forces. King Sihanouk also emerged in 1993. Prime Minister Hun Sen emerged from these struggles in Cambodia. Hun Sen, once a Cambodian communist, then Khmer Rouge member, and then under the pluralistic party system, has been prime minister since 1985. The Cambodian-Vietnamese Peace Accord was reached in 1991. Cambodia joined ASEAN along with Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Brunei in the 1990s. The liberal democracy index score is 0.07, ranking Cambodia 167th in the world and the economic freedom index score is 57.3, ranking 118th in the world. Most recently, Cambodia's inherently pro-Chinese position has irked Vietnam, an occupier of Cambodia at one time, 1970s and 1980s because Vietnam is to confront itself with enemies in the north, China, and in the south, Cambodia.

With such a turbulent history following independence from France in 1953, it was only natural that there was a marked increase in Cambodia joining multilateral treaties in all six domains after it joined ASEAN in 1999. Prior to 1999, Cambodia joined those multilateral treaties in such domains as peace, trade, health, and human rights slowly and steadily. After Cambodia joined ASEAN, its treaty participation steadily increased. ASEAN's two most important mottos are (1) not to intervene in internal affairs, or national sovereignty first must be adhered and (2) ASEAN centrality or an ASEAN consensus position must be observed to enhance the power of solidarity among ASEAN members. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are much more likely to dissent from what ASEAN's consensus positions are on such issues as China's loans, South China Sea issues, and Russian issues. Thus it has given a small surprise to see that the Asean annual conference in September 2022, chaired by Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, has issued the joint statement marvelously in

sync with the Asean centrality and non-alignment abode by. The liberal democracy index score is 0.07, ranking Cambodia 167th in the world. Its economic freedom score is 57.3 or 118th in the world.

3.3.3 *Indonesia*

Japan occupied Dutch Indonesia, which opened World War II in the Asia–Pacific in 1941. Upon Japanese surrender, Indonesian nationalists Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia's independence. Dutch Indonesia started war by trying to suppress independence, which ended in Indonesia's independence in 1947. Although the constitution was promulgated in 1950, it was suspended in 1959 with President Sukarno proclaiming a policy of a “guided democracy” (Feith, 2007). The Indonesian National Army strengthened its power. Competing with the Indonesian National Army, Sukarno moved closer to the Indonesian Communist Party. Meanwhile, the Indonesian National Army invaded and annexed Western Irian (Dutch Western Papua New Guinea) in 1961 and 1963. Sukarno continued his policy of confronting Malaysia and declared an exit from the United Nations in January 1965. The Indonesian National Army quietly carried out its massive anti-communist massacre in 1965–1966. The hero of independence, Sukarno, lost power with Suharto from the military becoming president in 1968. While the independence war continued and Sukarno's aggressive nationalist policy swayed, not much was done in terms of participation in multilateral treaties. Indonesia only joined a modicum of treaties in the health and trade domains. Indonesia did not sign any treaty in the peace domain when Sukarno was active; instead it confronted Malaysia, pursued an aggressive non-alignment axis with Phnom Penh and Beijing, exited the United Nations, and annexed Irian Jaya. With the military's capture of power, Indonesia's participation in multilateral treaties increased. Those in the peace domain increased dramatically from the 1970s onward. So did those in the trade and health domains. Three decades of Suharto's rule, which started with the dramatic upward increase in the number of multilateral treaty participation, ended with the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, hitting Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea hard—and with Suharto's downfall. The end of the Cold War highlighted the importance of all six domains of multilateral treaty participation for Indonesia, and this trend has been continuing through the 2010s.

After Suharto, movements for democracy and globalization challenged Indonesia. From 1998 onward, democratization proceeded in the country with some difficulties. These are the Indonesian presidents since the late 1990s: B. J. Habibie (1998–1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), and Joko Widodo (from 2014). The extended period of Joko Widodo's time in office and his working-class background demonstrate that democracy is reasonably well consolidated in Indonesia to the extent that it is cited as one of the three Asian democracies, along with India and Japan. (*The Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, of which Takashi Inoguchi is editor-in-chief, has published a special issue on elections in India, Indonesia, and Japan, the three largest

Asian democracies.) Habibie was an aeronautical engineer close to Suharto, and his administration was a stopgap after Suharto. Wahid was a representative of the Islamic religious party. Yudhoyono (2004–2014) was ex-military, and Widodo was the first president from outside the military or political elites. For Widodo, one problem that plagues him is religion. In the Jakarta mayoral election, the co-running candidate for deputy mayor was Chinese-Indonesian and Christian. The Constitution has a clause in which an Indonesian citizen must have a religion; an atheist is not allowed. Thus Indonesian Chinese tend to choose Christianity with their first name often being Christian. The slowly growing influence of Islam in Indonesian society has often aroused opposition to non-Islamic candidates. Another growing influence is that of sultans wanting to get things done. This is especially true in local elections where local sultans in each province have elevated visible profiles. In Malaysia, another Islamic society, the sultans chose Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin in 2020. After a short while, he lost majority support in the parliament due to turmoil related to scandals. A new prime minister, Ismail Sabri Yako, was able to get majority support, to which the sultans gave nodding support.

Globalization poses another challenge. Achieving targets in this hyperglobalized world is not so easy for Indonesia, which still has a low-per-capita-income society despite its high profile. The Indonesian bid for high-speed trains from China encountered debt accumulation problems and slow infrastructure building from the Chinese, causing the Indonesians to switch to the Japanese offer of fast trains. The call for the implementation of *sharia* law (Islamic penal code) is gaining traction in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Particularly troublesome is the Islamic concept of debt in *sharia* law that can create large bottlenecks to development (Sukma, 2003). The year of 2022 is the year in which Indonesia has been hosting the Group of Twenty, G20, the big members of both the developing South and the Developed North. President Joko Widodo has stretched his compass of activities abroad to visit G20 states one by one as his motto in politics is: “*bebas dan aktif*, free and active.” He disliked formalities of diplomacy and public speaking. Most importantly, he thought that, just as with democracy, foreign policy should be put to work to boost his overriding obsessions: “the economy, infrastructure, and his personal bank of political capital” (Bland, 2021, p. 123). He will whelm both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in Jakarta in November 2022 and this will bring him a success of non-alignment with stability and prosperity yearned for by all Indonesians. The liberal democracy index score is 0.45, ranking Indonesia 73rd in the world. The economic freedom score is 66.9, placing it 56th in the world.

3.3.4 Laos

In 1893, Laos was a protectorate in French Indochina. Under King Susawan Won (1904–1959), elites were educated in French and the French administrative structure was adopted. Japan occupied Laos in World War II, but France returned in 1945 and tried to retain its Laotian monarchical protectorate. In 1953, after the French defeat at

Dien Bien Phu, Laos got independence. A civil war erupted between the monarchical and neutral nationalists (non-aligned) and the Vietnamese Communist-leaning Pathet Lao. During the Vietnam War, the United States also inflicted heavy damage on Laos due to its close ties with the Viet Cong. After 1975, the communists took control, and in 1978, Pathet Lao strengthened its grip on Laos after collectivizing agriculture. Since 1986, President Phoumi Vongvichit (1986–1991) has pursued a liberalization policy, coinciding with the Vietnamese adoption of the *doi moi* policy of opening to the world and internal reforms. After abolishing agricultural collectivization, the 1991 Constitution declared the Lao Communist Party the ruling party. Throughout the 1990s, Thai economic influence over the Lao economy steadily increased. The Asian Financial crisis of 1997–1998 saw the Lao currency fall dramatically, Thai economic influence strengthened, and Lao poverty dipped to extremes. In the dawn of the New Millennium, Chinese economic influence has become tremendously large through its Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Construction Fund carrying out large projects, one of which is the Yunnan-Vientiane railroad link between mountainous southern China and mountainous Indochinese heartland along the Mekong River.

The pattern of joining multilateral treaties basically resembles the pattern observed in Singapore and Thailand. For the first 15 years after 1975, the domain of health was dominant in Laos' multilateral treaty participation. Then, treaty participation in the domain of peace started with a jump in the 1960s. The order of priority in terms of multilateral treaty participation is peace, health, human rights, the environment, and intellectual property. The difference from Singapore and Thailand is that the domain of trade does not increase as the Laos economic environment improves. It is only since Laos joined ASEAN in 1997 has it joined multilateral and relevant bilateral treaties in tandem.

3.3.5 *Malaysia*

British Malaya was slow in gaining independence for two reasons: (1) Britain was wavering between the principle of giving the privilege to Malays and the sultan and the principle of according equal citizenship to Chinese and Indians; (2) the former anti-Japanese Chinese guerrillas set anew targeting British Malaya for privileging Malays and sultans to continue old British interests in mining (oil, natural gas, and tin) and agriculture (gum, tea, and fruit). Britain was devastated by its war participation for the combined longest days in the world in World Wars I and II (Singer & Small, 1972). A fatigued Britain under Labour Prime Minister Attlee wanted colonies east of Suez to go away. But his policy of privileging Malays and sultans aroused strong resistance among Chinese with guerrilla strategies. British Malaya's suppression of these guerrillas took a dozen years (1948–1960). Hence, Britain accorded independence to the Malay Union in 1963 and the Malay Federation in 1964. Those Singapore publics, led by Lee Kuan Yew, raised their dissent about the Malay Federation, saying that the system would favor Malays and sultans even though citizenship

was supposed to be equal for Chinese and Indians. The conclusion was that Singapore had better quit the Federation to become an independent republic. Singapore became independent in 1965. In 1965–1966, Malaysia was confronted by Indonesia and by Singapore.

Malaysia followed the pattern of low-to-middle income countries for the first half-century in multilateral treaty participation: its priority went to securing peace; then human rights as a good member of the non-aligned developing countries; and then to health. The 15 years after independence followed the traditional Malay scheme in running the regime with the United Malaysia National Organization (UMNO) as the leading party joined by not only Malays but also Chinese and Indians. Also important to note is that communist revolts continued (1968–1989). And oil and natural gas brought in government resources when industrial development was slow, making extra resources available for the government to use. Mohamad Mahathir (1981–2003, 2018–2020) ran the cabinet based on the motto of “Learn from the East.” When Japan proposed the Asian Monetary Fund idea for the 1998–1999 Asian monetary crisis, Mahathir was one of the strong supporters of the Fund idea. It was, however, not until Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–2009) and Najib Razak (2009–2018) came to power did the Malaysian economy become far more tightly knit with many developing and developed countries through multilateral and bilateral treaties, especially in the domain of communications, trade, and commerce. Whereas the number of multilateral treaties for ASEAN countries in the trade domain tends to be around 20–40, Malaysia from 2005 onward registers 160–180. Hence, the total multilateral participation by Malaysia 265 exceeds that of Japan 243. Post-Cold War domains like the environment, intellectual property, and human rights have steadily increased.

3.3.6 Myanmar

The British gave independence to Burma in 1948. Aung San, a nationalist hero, once tried with the Japanese Army in its Burmese campaign for Burmese independence. However, after Japan’s defeat and then surrender in 1945, Aung San actively worked against British Burma toward his country’s independence. A few months after Burma’s first general election in 1947, Aung San was assassinated. He is considered the Father of modern Myanmar. U Nu, an independent activist and friend of Aung San, was prime minister twice (1948–1958 and 1960–1962). U Nu was president of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League and is credited with transforming Burma’s nationalization policy, agricultural reform, and welfare policy. Above all, U Nu was best known for his non-alignment position. The third United Nations Secretary General, U Thant (from 1961 to 1971) was born in Burma and served at the UN during the heyday of the non-aligned movement. During U Nu’s time as prime minister, he rejected the demands of autonomous status for the Shans and Karens, sizable ethnic minorities, within the Burmese Federation, causing revolts to break out in these two provinces. U Nu had to rely on the military leader, General Ne Win

to put down the revolts. When General Ne Win became prime minister after a coup d'état in 1962, he called his policy line Buddhist socialism, a sort of agriculturally dominant, low-income developing country path, shunned by foreign countries. Under a new situation in 1974, Ne Win installed himself as president. With protectionist economic policy, poverty deepened extraordinarily and the demand to open to the outside world increased by protestors on the streets. In 1988, a coup d'état took place with General Saw Maung in the military. Massive protesters took actions on the street. Saw Maung resigned from office and jailed. In 1989 The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won the general election in 1989. The military has applied constant pressure to curtail the influence of the NLD. In 2021, persistent overwhelming protestors on the streets were met with the military banning the NLD. In 2022, Aung San Suu Kyu was jailed.

Myanmar's military government has been one of the targets of human rights abuse by non-governmental organizations and Western states. Most other ASEAN states do not like some of ASEAN members to deviate from the ASEAN's mainstream. But the current Myanmar government, a de facto monopolistic business company with traditional Buddhist bureaucratic socialism, has been suppressing oppositions and minorities alike.

Myanmar's multilateral treaty participation has been passive. Health and human rights are the minimally necessary domains when multilateral treaties have a low participation rate. With the end of the Cold War, participation in such domains as trade, peace, and the environment increased. Intellectual property has shown a much less active increase.

3.3.7 *Papua New Guinea*

Papua New Guinea was the colony of many Western powers. First there was Britain, which in 1902 was replaced by Australia for the southern half and Germany for the northern half. In World War I, Australia occupied the German colony on the northern half. The western part of New Guinea was The Netherlands' colony until the end of World War II. During the interwar period, Papua New Guinea was a League of Nations Trust Territory in the South Pacific, the task of which was carried out by Japan. During World War II, Southwestern Pacific became battlefields between Japan and the United States and other Allied Powers (Britain, The Netherlands, and Australia). Australia gave independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975. Bougainville gained its autonomy from Papua New Guinea in 2001. Western New Guinea became Indonesia's interim administrative territory after the 1962 New York Agreement. After a while, western New Guinea became Irian Jaya, consisting of two provinces into which Indonesia's state policy encourages demographically populous Javanese to migrate en masse.

Papua New Guinea joined the United Nations in 1975. In Papua New Guinea, there were numerous ethnic-linguistic tribes among whom communications were difficult and whose eating habits were considered primitive. With its entry into the

United Nations, the most critical among the multilateral treaties signed were in the health domain, which increased at a striking speed. The World Health Organization, the World Food Program, the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and many other UN agencies have been of enormous help to this state. Other domains of peace, trade, the environment, human rights, and intellectual property have followed the health domain steadily. The liberal democracy index score (V-Democracy, the University of Gothenburg) is 0.34 or 98th in the world, and the economic freedom index score is 58.9 or 103rd in the world.

Papua New Guinea is adjacent to Indonesia's Irian Jaya, whereas Timor-Leste got nominal independence from Portugal, then real independence from Indonesia. It is surrounded by Indonesia. These two states are not members of ASEAN. Given that both are very small, newly independent nations that sit next to Indonesia, demographically 100 times as big, industrially expanding at a steady pace, and technologically ambitious, how Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste design their policies with larger forces like Indonesia, ASEAN, Australia, China, the United States and the European Union attract our attention. The Solomon Islands concluded an agreement with China whereby China sends its military forces to the Islands, where minority tribes stage urban disturbances. Australia's on-going general election made it one of key election issues in May 2022. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Micronesian states to issue a minilateral agreement in May 2022, but it was not issued.

3.3.8 *The Philippines*

The Philippines' prelude to independence was unusually long. It took half a century after the United States defeated Spain in 1898 and vaguely promised the Philippines independence. The United States suppressed the Philippine revolts between 1898 and 1945. In World War II, the Philippines registered one of the highest death tolls in the Japanese attack because Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander in the Pacific War, had his headquarters in Manila, and once defeated by Japanese forces, he withdrew from the Philippines by promising "I shall return." In 1945, when the United Nations was established, the Philippines was one of the 45 founding members to sign the UN documents, even though it was not yet independent. Before the United States, Spain had colonized the Philippines in the mid-sixteenth century. The Spaniards governed the Philippines through local power bosses-cum-big landowners on their behalf. Even after independence, this traditional practice has continued. For instance, the Philippine Senate is composed of 23 members who are most likely an inherited feudal chief of her or his province. Turning to multilateral treaty participation, the Philippines registers a fairly standard pattern for low-middle-income developing society, i.e., multilateral treaty participation in the domain of health has been mostly the highest over time. As of 1950, the Philippines was one of the richest countries in Asia, along with Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The domains of peace and human rights are no less important in reflecting a vast number of developing countries in the

United Nations. This is the pattern of Philippine participation in multilateral treaties in the reign of President Ramon Magsaysay (1945–1955) and his successors. The picture changed with the ascent of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986), who was called a doyen of developmental dictatorship. He saw the potential of the Philippines in economic development along the line of Japan emerging from the ruins and ashes of World War II. Most distinctive of the Marcos presidency was that participation in multilateral treaties in the domain of trade started to go upward steadily. The Philippines' weakness in relation to trade is that the Philippine economy's strength was in the elementary manufacturing sector of shoes and sandals, fruit and canned fruit, shirts and clothes, etc. as contrasted to the heavy manufacturing sector, like steel, chemicals, and high-tech communications service sector. Another strength is the remittances from those working abroad, e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, Gulf societies, and the United States. Marcos was neither a Park Chung Hee nor a Deng Xiaoping, who geared their countries in the direction of annual double-digit economic development. After 1986 People Power protests in Manila, Marcos and the whole family fled to Honolulu. Marcos' exit was well-planned and well-implemented with substantial help from the US Embassy headed by Ambassador Stephen Bosworth (1984–1987). During the Aquino presidency, multilateral treaty participation in the domain of human rights went upward continuously, especially in conjunction with the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, participation in treaties in the domain of the environment increased and the domain of intellectual property was newly added. On the whole, the Philippines has registered its multilateral treaty participation in the order of health, peace, human rights, trade, the environment, and intellectual property with the participatory accumulation registering 181 in Asia, Number 5 after Malaysia, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia.

3.3.9 Singapore

World War II in Asia began with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. It should not be forgotten that Japan advanced into Southeast Asia to destroy the economic embargoes and sanctions against it, placed by the United States, Britain, The Netherlands, and China. Japan's objective was to explore and secure energy and mineral resources to be used in its defense against the soon-to-come massive US offensive against mainland Japan. In Singapore, Britain surrendered to Japan after the Prince of Wales battleship was sunk to the great surprise and disappointment of Singaporeans and Britons. A large number of Chinese were punished in Singapore and in Malaya. This caused them to have long-lasting enmity toward Japan (Lee, 2000). Once Japan surrendered to Allied Powers in 1945, Britain returned to British Malaya of which Singapore was a part, British Hong Kong, British Burma, and British India. India was accorded independence early in 1947 because, when the British court gave the guilty verdict to three leaders of the Indian National Army, led by Subhas Chandra Bose, who joined the Japanese Imperial Army to march from Singapore with the slogan "Onto Delhi!", India-wide protests rose against the verdict,

frightening war-devastated Britain under Prime Minister Attlee. So was the case in Britain according early independence to British Burma and British Ceylon. It was different in British Malaya. British Malaya generated energy and mineral resources and agricultural resources like gum, then already well developed. Britain wanted to maintain its Malaya colony for a while unless delaying it would be too costly. British Malaya's demographic profile was 60% Malays, 30% Chinese, and 10% Indians. Chinese and Indians had been brought there as migrants to work. While British Malaya was peacefully preparing for independence from Britain, Chinese anti-Japanese guerrilla forces kept fighting the British Malaya forces after Japan's surrender. British anti-guerrilla forces eventually suppressed them, but it took more than a dozen years to do so (1948–1960). So Malaysia's independence came late in 1964. The British scheme initially gave Chinese and Indians the same rights as Malay citizens while reducing the power of sultans. This represents the scheme of the 1948 Malay Union in which Malays and sultans were very disgruntled. The new British scheme gave the privilege to Malays and sultans of having the state president chosen from among them. In 1957, the Federation of Malaysia gained independence and became Malaysia in 1963. Malaysia and Indonesia confronted each other in 1963–1965 and Malaysia faced Singapore's exit to its own independence in 1965. In making an exit option a reality, Lee Kuan Yew played an important leadership role. Working vigorously and tenaciously, Lee Kuan Yew, as a community leader in Singapore argued that the British scheme of giving privileges to Malays and sultans, if it accords citizens' rights to them, would not be just and agreeable to Singapore citizens. He was one of those to work closely with socialists and communists. But once Singapore's departure became a reality, he and his regime distanced themselves from the left-leaning side of his People's Action Party (PAP), and developed an astute social policy package of micro-managing and meritocratically implementing a social policy on education, housing, income, and welfare.

Once gaining independence, Singapore executed its program of reaching from the Third World to the First World, as a tropical island with a tiny population of three million, a non-sizable military force, an absence of natural water resources, and a measurable industrial basis, it transitioned in less than half a century (Lee, 2000). From the start of 1965, Singapore steadily joined multilateral treaties: for the first 15 years, four domains in peace, human rights, trade, and health were packed in the order of Singapore's priority of securing independence without entanglement, of respecting citizens' rights and being respected by the rest of the world, of yearning for more trade and investment, and of upgrading the quality of life by improving health and labor. Here is one episode about Singapore's high priority placed on international relations: in February 1979, China militarily intervened in Vietnam, demanding Vietnam withdraw from Cambodia, which Vietnam had invaded and occupied since 1978. Lee Kuan Yew was quite surprised by the news because there had been no prior warning from Foreign Minister Rajaratnam or the intelligence chief who would have prepared him for the Chinese action. Already by 1979 Singapore was in the midst of an upward jump in terms of increasing multilateral treaty participation, anticipating the thaw taking place ahead, with the US-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese

diplomatic consolidation and peace and friendship treaties. Singapore kept participating in multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties on free trade and related treaties thereafter. Most noteworthy is the spectacular rise in Singapore's joining of multilateral treaties in the domain of intellectual property, defining rules and regulations of intellectual property, essential for Singapore to develop and survive as a global monetary hub for trade and investment. Singapore's decision to join multilateral treaties in the domain of the environment is a testament to its sharp concerns about the deteriorating global climate crisis.

3.3.10 Thailand

Thailand is an old and new settler society, a society developed surrounding a new port after its devastating destruction brought about by the Burmese military ransacking it in the mid-eighteenth century. Its absolutist monarchy was transformed into a constitutional monarchy in 1932 by a military coup. Thai society is built on the bases of monarchy, Buddhism, the military, and business. Seventy percent of Thai wealth generation is concentrated in Bangkok while 20% comes from government expenditure. Its Northeast was annexed by Thailand from French Indochina (Laos) and its East was annexed by Thailand from French Indochina (Cambodia) during World War II. Its West borders Myanmar and its South borders Malaysia. Its South is mostly inhabited by Islamic Malays. Thai society experienced 16 military coups d'état or abortive coups d'état between 1932 and 2016, the latest coups taking place in 2014, ousting Thaksin Sinawatra, and in 2016, ousting Ingluck Sinawatra, both representing Northeastern poor peasants. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that has remained independent throughout the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries.

Thailand's multilateral treaty participation resembles Singapore's in that its joining multilateral treaties in the health domain dominated the rest in the first 15 years. Thereafter, the peace domain started an upward increase in the 1960s, befitting Thailand's old reputation of "bending with the wind" or flexibly adapting to the environment. When Japan started double-digit economic growth in early 1960s, Thailand surfed its wave steadily making upward increases in joining multilateral treaties in the trade domain, despite the encounters with the Japanese bubble collapse in 1991, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, and the Lehman Brotherstriggered the great depression of 2008. After the Cold War, those new domains, the environment, human rights and intellectual property are highlighted by Thailand as well but not so sharply as Singapore in the environment and intellectual property domains.

3.3.11 Timor-Leste

In 1974, Portugal's dictatorship was overthrown and multiparty politics was opened. Socialists and communists there gave independence to Portuguese African colonies.

Democratic Portugal inspiring Timor-Leste toward decolonization, Timorese tried to move in that direction. However, Indonesia under General Suharto occupied Timor-Leste and in 1976 Indonesia annexed Timor-Leste before its aspiration for independence was materialized. Time for Timor-Leste's aspirations for independence was realized when Indonesia along with the whole of Southeast and East Asia were hard hit by the Asian monetary crisis (1998–1999), forcing Indonesia's developmental dictator, General Suharto, to resign in 1998. In 1999, Timor-Leste gained independence at long last. Most noteworthy of Timor-Leste's multilateral treaty participation is that the domains of human rights and peace have occupied the first and second places among the six domains. Also, environment and health have occupied the third and fourth places out of the six domains. Trade and intellectual property have occupied the fifth and sixth places among the domains. This ordering of domains participated in by Timor-Leste befits its forced priorities. After long-aspired-for independence was cut short by Indonesia's invasion, occupation, and annexation of 1975–1999, whose goal had been the decolonization (i.e., annexation) of the whole of Indonesia as Sukarno propagandized, from Irian Jaya through Aceh and beyond. In May 2022 President Jose Manuel Ramos-Horta expressed the country's desire to join ASEAN.

3.3.12 *Vietnam*

Vietnamese history has been filled with wars of all kinds, especially until 1986 when *doi moi* reform policy was declared. As the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Japanese Army invaded French Indochina, British Malaya, American Philippines, and Dutch Indonesia. The Japanese army extracted tons of rice in the Red River Delta for their food supplies during their anticipated and decisive confrontation on the Japanese mainland with the United States. In 1942, large-scale famines had taken place. In 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers, Ho Chi Minh declared national independence while the French returned to Indochina. The independence war started soon. At Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam defeated France. In 1953, the Paris Accord between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and France was signed. Because the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had not signed the accord, civil war resumed soon after. In order to help the Republic of Vietnam, the United States became involved in this civil-cum-international war in the mid-1960s. The United States gave up on winning the war as anti-war public opinion at home spiked in 1973, and in 1970–1972, secret talks were undertaken for Sino-American rapprochement toward normalization. The United States wanted to get closer to China as a strategy to counter the menacing Soviet arms buildup. Once the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam militarily unified the country in 1975. In conjunction with the events in Vietnam, communist forces (Pathet Lao) took power in Laos and radical communists (Khmer Rouge) took power in Cambodia. The newly unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam saw the danger of Khmer Rouge in its genocidal policy at home and incessant strife in the Mekong

Delta between Cambodians and Vietnamese (a bulk of southern Vietnam used to be the territory of the Khmer Kingdom before Vietnamese migrated into southern Vietnam especially during the years of French Cochinchina). A while after the military victory in unification in 1975, the Vietnamese Air Force landed at the Phnom Penh Airport loaded with massive military tanks, which rolled out all over Democratic Kampuchea and occupied it (renamed Cambodia in 1991) until Vietnam started liberalization and reform policy in the mid-1980s (1978–1989). In 1979, the Chinese People's Army militarily intervened in Vietnam to punish Vietnam for occupying Democratic Kampuchea. China was repulsed shortly by Vietnam. Turning to Vietnamese multilateral treaty participation, it is crystal clear that when Vietnamese were at war, Vietnamese multilateral treaty participation was not very active until approximately 1980. First, after 1975, Vietnamese participation in multilateral treaties in the trade domain started to rise as if after war, construction of peaceful intentions needed massive amounts of food, energy, mineral resources, and technology via foreign trade. Second, human rights became a recognized need. To demonstrate that Vietnam is a member of good standing in the United Nations, especially in relations to liberalization and reform policy, it was important that Vietnam joined those multilateral treaties in the domain of human rights. Third, Vietnam after almost continuous wars, one after another, everybody's quality of life had to improve. Hence, the domain of health moved upward dramatically after those multilateral treaties in the domains of peace and human rights were well received. Fourth, the environment and intellectual property are those important domains when Vietnam must appeal to the rest of the world that they do recognize and want to manage climate change, infectious disease, sharing scientific and technological advances, and all other kinds of human follies.

3.4 East Asia by Six Domains

3.4.1 *China*

China was long semi-colonized before 1949. Western powers and Japan encroached on Qing China from the mid-nineteenth century onward. For nearly two decades, military cliques controlled the Republic of China, born in 1911, the Nationalist Party in coalition with the Communist Party took power in 1928. Once Chinese unification was in sight, Japan became very apprehensive of Japan's territorial and economic interests in Manchuria and northern China, which could be taken away once China unified. In 1928, the Japanese Army assassinated one of the military clique bosses, Zhang Zuolin. In 1931, the Japanese Army occupied Manchuria and shortly after, the new Manchukuo and Pu Yi, the last descendent of the Qing dynasty, became the emperor of the puppet kingdom. In the unified Republican China, the Nationalist government sought to defeat the Communists. The Communists avoided fighting against the Nationalists while the Japanese army chased nationalist forces and communist guerillas to no avail most of the time. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in

1941. Almost simultaneously, Japan invaded British Malaya, American Philippines, Dutch Indonesia, and French Indochina. It was an all out war against the Allied Powers. In 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. Once World War II was over, the civil war resumed in China between the Nationalist government and the communist forces. War-fatigued Chinese were attracted slowly to the Communists who sold the tale that Communists were real representatives of the people who seek honesty and unity. The United States was disappointed by the corrupt Nationalist government while the Soviet Union gave arms and other assistance to the Chinese communists. In 1949, the Communists won over the Nationalists who fled to Taiwan.

Turning to multilateral treaty participation, China started building the state with priorities placed on nationalism, protectionism, and socialism, shutting the door down beyond national borders. China was not a member of the United Nations although the Republic of China (Taiwan) had veto power with the Security Council. Thus, China's multilateral treaty participation was rather limited in the mid-twentieth century. Health and human rights were two major domains, and as such the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) were two of the United Nations organizations allowing China to join. Three decades passed with this scant level of international and multilateral activities allowed to China. Only the brief border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, and the US war in Vietnam in 1966–1973, led the United States to detach China from the Soviet Union. The rapprochement and normalization were carried out in the 1970s with Japan and with the United States. After signing four major bilateral treaties with Japan and the US, the 1971 and 1972 diplomatic normalization with Japan and with the US and the 1978 and 1979 treaties of friendship and cooperation with Japan and with the US did China open its door to the rest of the world. Deng Xiaoping's return from the Southern Lecture (*Nanxun jianghua*) marked the start of China's reform and opening up to the world (Vogel, 2011). With this policy change, China's participation in multilateral treaties steadily moved upward in the latter 1970s. The most important domains were peace, health, and trade in this order. Post-Cold War favorite domains were human rights, the environment, and intellectual property. No less important in terms of molding China's economic profile was China's joining the new World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. It enabled China to seek numerous ways to increase free trade under a less rigorous, more flexible format. In the new WTO, more space for dispute settlement facilities were available (if mostly not with good results to the United States) and more opportunities to have diverse trade treaties than the strict GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) formula had allowed. As a matter of fact, bilateral free trade dramatically increased and regional trade blocs also increased. With China in the WTO, the world was experiencing dramatic changes. Its consequence is the rise of China in two decades. This has led to the trade and technology war between China and the US. China's rise has been explained by two major factors: internal mechanisms of using state-owned land as capital to promote entrepreneurs and business companies, and inventing state-collected capital on foreign investment and active government diplomacy with foreign firms, governments and international organizations, not only at upper levels but also at bottom and lower levels. Of the

East Asian trio, China, South Korea, and Japan, China is Number 1 in terms of the number of foreign languages taught by native speakers at Beijing University of Foreign Languages (117), South Korea is Number two, registering 45 at Korea University of Foreign Studies and Japan Number 3 registering 27 at Tokyo University of Foreign Languages and Studies. These statistical figures show that China and South Korea have developed their respective trade and investment heavily in the developing South vigorously. Japan has focused mostly on the developed North as well as on East Asia's trio and Southeast Asia's ten members.

3.4.2 Japan

Prior to 1945, Japan participated in wars, one after another, in nearby vicinities as opportunities arose. Threatened by Western powers to open the ports and the country with gunboat coercion, Japan managed to comply with Western powers by accepting two inequalities: giving Western privilege of not needing to comply with Japanese laws in Japan and of Japanese tariffs being determined by Western powers. Overcoming these two inequalities while adhering to international law was the Japanese goal. The former was achieved after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. The latter was achieved in 1921. Drowned in victories, albeit most being Pyrrhic, Japan forgot strict adherence to international law and focused on getting war benefits as Japan was accorded major power status. Japanese public opinion was perturbed and angered by two issues during the interwar period of 1918–1931: naval arms reduction and racial inequality. The 1930 London treaty of disarmament had to do with the ratio of naval tonnage among the three powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. It was agreed among the three state actors that the ratio should be in the order of 5:5:3. Disarmament was one of the major policy pledges of the two peace treaties, Versailles and Washington, and subsequent disarmament treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the London Disarmament Treaty of 1930. Racial inequality was one of the most sensitive issues in the Versailles and Washington treaties. It kept arising in Japan because both peace treaties propounded national self-determination (a Wilsonian principle), which was understood by Japanese that Japan was a good example of achieving national self-determination whereas Wilson and the Western powers meant by national self-determination that those East and Central Europeans whose empires had disappeared, i.e., the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, and the German Empire. Furthermore, those Chinese and Korean territories under Japanese control understood that Wilson's and the League of Nations' national self-determination meant that they were encouraged to be free from Japanese colonization. Endeavoring to learn from the West was not just about how to wage war to become a proud great power but also to grow rich. The complete defeat of Japan in World War II ironically enabled Japan to grow rich. All the industrial development Japan had achieved without much outside help was all in ashes and ruin at the end of World War II. Yet the seven-year occupation by Allied Powers helped Japan. First, extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing forces were excluded from active political

participation. Ultra inflation was effectively tamed. The United States was preoccupied with waging the Cold War and suppressing rebellious dissidents the world over. Those bureaucratic agencies were kept intact except for those militaries and political police that worked toward Japan's re-invention with the US-drafted new Constitution that limited fully-fledged armed forces (Inoguchi and Le, 2022).

Turning to multilateral treaty participation, the most impressive aspect is that it has been vigorous in terms of the number of those multilateral treaties Japan has joined between 1945 and 2019, i.e., 243 multilateral treaties. Especially noteworthy are three: (1) those domains such as peace, health and trade have been given utmost priorities; (2) those domains such as human rights, intellectual property, and the environment have been joined by Japan from very early on without major lapses; and (3) multilateral treaty participation in the trade domain exemplified an impressive jump upward from 1998 onward. This continuous steady upward rise is worthy of special recognition. Given the constraints of the Constitution in terms of the state's security role, Japan was scared, in a sense: In 1985, the United States geared the G-5 for the US dollar so that it no longer maintained a high exchange rate with other major currencies. This was onerous work for the Japanese yen. Four years later the Cold War ended. Six years later the Soviet Union collapsed. Also in 1991, the Japanese economic bubble burst. In 1998–1999, the Asian financial crisis raged across all of Southeast and East Asia with Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea hardest hit. In 2001, the effectiveness of the reformed World Trade Organization in handling economic turmoil was close to nil. And in 2008, the Lehman-Brothers triggered a depression that affected the entire world. From 1991 onward, Japan has suffered from three-decades-long deflation, which continues. Since the 1998–1999 Asian monetary crisis onward, the Japanese government and business have been alert. Furthermore, the World Trade Organization's dismal ineffectiveness must have shocked them. Until then the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT's) principle of the Most Favored Nations Clause was effective, more or less, causing Japan not to worry much. But GATT's trade liberalization talks ceased to be effective because the subject went into agricultural commodities, not just industrial products, thereby rendering GATT's principle of consensus decision making almost impossible. Hence, GATT's Uruguay Round turned out to be an agreed failure, sparking the establishment of the WTO in 1995. However, the WTO has turned out to be very ineffective because the principle of consensus decision-making was replaced by majority decision within the WTO appellate. Within the WTO appellate, the United States has not been necessarily inside the majority. And the membership of the WTO has enlarged to have many developing countries that have important agriculture producers and exporters. For all these reasons, Japan has been endeavoring to work harder in rearranging trade rules and regulations. Multilateral agreement schemes, like the Tokyo Round, have been difficult for years. Bilateral and regionally confined bilateral free trade agreement schemes, like economic partnership agreements, have been increasingly fashionable and more frequently created. Hence, more manipulative and maneuvering actions have increased, leading to more complicated politics. This dramatic upward jump of Japanese participation in multilateral treaties on free trade makes sense (Inoguchi, 2007). By 2021 Japan had been successful in launching two mini-multilateral treaties

on free trade, the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership (CPTPP), thus establishing two more engines of free trade under the globally economic turmoil.

3.4.3 *Mongolia*

See Sect. 3.1.4.

3.4.4 *Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

North Korea is widely thought of as one of the least participatory countries in the world. It joined the United Nations in 1992 together with the Republic of Korea. North Korea has some interesting and unique qualities in its interactions with the international community. (1) If the number of years as a UN member state is to be taken account into, North Korea has been more participatory than the United States. (2) Unlike many developing UN member states, North Korea is not very participatory in the health domain. North Korea abhors United Nations field operations like the World Food Program humanitarian assistance in delivering food to famine-affected populations. North Korea seems to suspect the UN agencies of spying for Western powers. North Korea's anti-Corona policy has been most disastrous (Vu, 2022). After the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's birthday, the number of those negatively affected by the Corona virus has increased from the self-claimed "zero" to 280,000 (DW, 2022; Vu, 2022). (3) North Korea is perhaps the only UN member state that prioritizes its participation in the domain of intellectual property most highly, followed by the environment out of the six policy domains. North Korea's participation rate in multilateral treaties jumped when the six-party talks (North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan) discussed light-water reactors and when North Korea was planning and implementing its own nuclear missiles and bombs. North Korea promised to abandon all the nuclear weapons and extant nuclear programs in the joint communique of the Six Powers' Meeting in September 2005. But in 2006 North Korea tested nuclear missiles and nuclear bombs, thus de facto it quit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been building nuclear missiles and bombs. Multilateral treaty participation in the intellectual property domain coincided first with the jump in military expenditure (Kim Jong-il), then with increasing concentration of resources focused more on nuclear weapons (Kim Jong-un), and economic reform to loosen regulations for *jangmadang* (small semi-free black market) from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. Satoru Miyamoto (forthcoming) categorizes the North Korean regime as having adopted "gradualism" along with Cuba and Vietnam. Miyamoto categorizes the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party as adopting "radicalism" whether it has to do with farm collectivization or nuclear arsenal development.

3.4.5 *Republic of Korea*

Korea was colonized by Japan from 1911 to 1945. When Japan surrendered in 1945, both the United States and the Soviet Union moved into the Far East. Two declarations of national independence came out: one from Rhee Syngman, the other from Kim Il-sung. The former was an emigre from Hawaii, vehemently nationalistic, vehemently anti-communist, and vehemently anti-Japanese. The latter was brought in by the Soviet army after Germany surrendered in May 1945. Kim was also vehemently nationalistic and vehemently anti-Japanese. The Soviet Union's declaration to participate in the war in the Far East abrogated the Neutrality Pact with Japan. Both Rhee and Kim were dictators par excellence. Until the early 1990s, South Korea had limited participation in some UN agencies like the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. South Korea joined very few multilateral treaties on health and human rights before 1992 when both Koreas joined the United Nations. Bilateral agreements were signed with Japan in 1965 and thereafter. But bilateral agreements are beyond the scope of this volume. In the post-oil crisis period, the G7 (Group of Seven) were frustrated by the low economic growth rate of developed economies. Taking advantage of this, the four flying tigers of the Far East, namely, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, came to be highlighted as emerging developed economies, following Japan. South Korea was a most noteworthy development. Thus, South Korea's participation in multilateral treaties in the trade domain dramatically shot up from the mid-1970s onward. Along with those multilateral treaties in the trade domain, those in the peace domain increased no less dramatically. It was before Park Chung Hee who called steel (production) the means of the state, and his dream of South Korea developing through heavy chemical industrialization (electronics, shipbuilding, machinery, petrochemical, and non-ferrous metals), was assassinated in 1979. In 1980, the brutal military crackdown killed over 200 protestors in the city of Gwangju, Chollado. Chun Doo Hwan, another military dictator, took the helm of the country and launched *Nordpolitik*, which basically opened the door to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the 1980s. That was how multilateral treaties in the domains of trade and peace kept jumping upward from the 1970s onward. Since the Asian Monetary Crisis of 1998–1999, South Korea, along with Indonesia and Thailand was kept under the IMF's strong influence. The IMF has played a key role in restructuring South Korea's development path since then. Due to excessive deficits in export and imports accumulated over the years, the IMF must control the purse of the government and business firms. South Korea must import large volumes of oil and mineral resources and food and agricultural products from abroad. Without exporting and investing in foreign firms, South Korea could not sustain itself. It tended to import from some developed countries special steels, chemicals, specialized machines, semi-conductors' lithium batteries, and export massive final products to developing economies. At the start of the third millennium, South Korea was very active in trading with developing economies and investing in developing economies. President Lee Myung-bak says: "South Korea is not territorially great. However, its trading space the world over is

number one in terms of the bilateral and multilateral free trading space in the whole world in terms of kilometer squared.” South Korea’s eagerness to explore ways of engaging with developing economies is attested by the number of foreign languages taught regularly by native speakers in the Korean University of Foreign Languages, which is 45, whereas in contrast the Tokyo University of Foreign Languages and International Studies is 27. After 2008 when the Lehman Brothers triggered a great depression the economic outlook has become worse because the US market demand for Korean export items has shrunk further. In addition, the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has made trade more difficult as the huge markets in the United States, the European Union, China, and Japan have all contracted. The catch-up process of newly emerging economies like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Myanmar has squeezed the used-to-be good Korean market. The Sino-American trade and technology war has negatively impacted South Korea, making economic and political policy choices very difficult. Both the United States and China have threatened to impose difficult options that are hard to accept. Most recently the Russian military invasion in Ukraine have exposed South Korea to no less difficult options. The Western and Japanese strong sanctions against Russia has led South Korea to remain silent about Russia, with large exports to and large investments in Russia, South Korea has been pulled by the pro-US option and pro-Russia option. The former means that China takes over Korean investment in Russia while the latter means the United States demands tough security cooperation with the United States (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 2022).

Turning back to South Korea’s multilateral treaty participation, three key features stand out: (1) A long, nearly isolated endeavor of working out trade expansion was very hazardous, including the devastation of the internal-cum-international war in both Koreas. Moreover, the division of right-wing and left-wing forces in democratic electoral politics has had somewhat negative effects on the democratic stability of South Korea, especially in regards to the constitutional limit of presidential terms to one five-year term, which has made each president’s end a little mysterious: they tend to leave office with either going to jail (Park Geon Hee, Lee Myung Pak) or committing suicide (Roh Moo Hyun) and leaving an odious smell of bribery behind (Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam). In the last months of President Moon Jae In, the Parliament passed a new law whereby the power of Investigator’s Office be reduced, anticipating that incoming President Yoon Sun-yeol might punish outgoing President Moon Jae In. That South Korea enjoyed the status of the four flying tigers has made it necessary for it to upgrade from manufacturers of light goods like shoes and sandals, cotton and cloth, and some heavy industrial products manufacturers to then quickly move into high-tech communications and service industrial products with more, value-added, more tailored to the developing economies market in Third World countries. The large four markets for Korean exports have declined as developed economies have shrunk and societies stalled, aggravated even more by the Sino-American trade and technology war and the Russian-Ukrainian war. (2) South Korean inequalities between citizens are troubling. There are the billionaires and then the poverty-stricken have-nots (Lee, 2020). There is also a very select group of mammoth *chaebols* that expanded with foreign capital takeovers in 1998–1999 and further

expanded with the decline in number of small-to-medium sized enterprises in the post-Lehman depression of 2008, the size of their huge net profits are sometimes comparable to considerable portions of central government revenues.

3.4.6 Vietnam

See Sect. 3.3.12.

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Part III

Four Regionalisms' Sustainability: The Combination of States' Multilateral Treaty Participation and Citizens' Satisfaction with Quality of Life

This third part examines the feasibility of what we call four Asias, i.e., East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, and whether they can sustain themselves in light of states' multilateral treaty participation and citizens' quality-of-life satisfaction. These indicators are examined at two new levels: global and societal. These levels are different from the well-established levels of analysis in international relations (Singer, 1961): individual, national, and international. Two points need to be noted: (1) The Singer paradigm focuses on the individual level in part perhaps because the permeation of behavioral science and in part because of the American penchant for individualism; (2) the Singer paradigm focuses on the international level in part perhaps because what those phenomena like interstate wars (Singer & Small, 1972) were more familiar and visible. The notion at the global level was only simply used in the early 1960s (Guetzkow, 2018; Kelman, 1965). The striking exception is Russett, 1993 dealing with world democracies directly with the thesis on democracies rarely fighting wars with each other, i.e., a pair of democracies are less likely to wage wars than a pair of "democracy vis-à-vis non-democracy" or a pair of "non-democracy vis-à-vis non-democracy". As worldwide globalization has deepened in the third millennium (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021) and (Inoguchi and Le, 2022), this volume directly deals with the phenomena at the global level. We have factor-analyzed (1) the treaty participation index, (2) ten world regions: Sinic East, Indic East, Orthodox East, Islamic East, Old West, New West, Reformed West, Returned West, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) six global policy domains: human rights; peace and disarmament; labor and health; commerce, trade and communications; intellectual property; and the environment. Secondly, the citizens' quality-of-life satisfaction indicators are factor-analyzed scores of each of the 29 Asian societies, i.e., society-based factor-analysis score. It is important to note that (1) the core of treaty participation index is the difference between the ratification year and the promulgation year, (2) ten world regions deal with what we call the state's global neighborhoods, and (3) six policy domains deal with global policy contents directly. Important to note here is that research at the individual level analysis has made astounding progress when we include those analyzed at the sub-individual

levels: for instance, neurology and micro-biology. In this volume, we leave those works at the sub-individual level to others.

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Chapter 4

Societal Types, Legislative Types, and Legislative Types Salience Defined?



Societal types are defined as the matched accumulation of citizens' satisfaction with quality of life in daily lives as responses to 16 items: housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, spiritual life, public safety, conditions of the environment, social welfare system, democratic welfare system. These sixteen items are based on Maslow's (1943) idea of materialism and post-materialism whereby survival and social relations are depicted as the two most important dimensions of human activities. Inglehart's (2018) applications of Maslow's idea to human values and norms have yielded splendid inspirations to many social and behavioral scientists. We have revised the way of asking a question in the following way: Instead of asking respondents, how satisfied are you with your life?, we ask respondents how much they are satisfied with each of the 16 items of life domains, aspects, and styles. These items are neither too abstract nor too concrete. Satisfaction about life comes differently each person. Also satisfaction comes differently from item to item. Furthermore the degree of satisfaction differs due in part to individual persons' proclivity and particularity. Leo Tolstoy's most widely read *Anna Karenina* starts with the famous line: "Happy families are all alike. Every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." This sentence is all right since in the most lengthy novel many stories are told about many happy families and unhappy families. The first sentence is meant to lure readers. Tolstoy did not mean that happy families are all rich and unhappy families are all poverty stricken.

Our innovation is to respond with Richard Nisbett (2004) *The Psychology of Thought* in which he argues that Westerners and East Asians think differently: Westerners see the woods whereas Asians see the forests. In other words, when they both see a lot of people gather, Westerners try to comprehend who is a leader and whose speech is logically clear to her or him whereas Asians try to see masses' eyes around quietly. Unfortunately, there have been far fewer works in first-rate English academic journals published. Comparing Westerners and Asians as respondents and the authors

noted therein is doubly unfortunate: mostly Western university students as respondents and mostly Asian academics as authors. Our data have been a rarity in that so many Asians act as respondents in 32 Asian societies east of the Middle East (plus Americans, Australians, and Russians are the residents of Asia's adjacent neighbors for comparative purposes) with face-to-face 52,215 interviewed and about 60 thousand observations. No less noteworthy is that our project team have published many works in English. The World Association for Public Opinion Research conferred on me The Helen Dinerman's Award in November, 2021 for lifetime contribution to public opinion and opinion survey research. Amongst those books highlighted are:

1. Use of AsiaBarometer Quality-of-Life-Survey data

Inoguchi, T. (2022) *Typology of Asian Societies: Bottom-Up Perspective and Evidence-Based Approach*, Singapore: Springer Nature.

Inoguchi, T. (2017) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Asia: Individual Decision under 32 Societal Umbrellas*, Dordrecht: Springer.

Inoguchi, T. & Tokuda, Y., eds. (2017) *Trust with Asian Characteristics: Interpersonal and Institutional*, Dordrecht: Springer.

Inoguchi, T. & Fujii, S. (2013) *The Quality of Life in Asia: Comparing Quality of Life in Asia*, Dordrecht: Springer.

Shin, D.T. & Inoguchi, T., eds. (2010) *The Quality of Life in Confucian Asia: From Physical Welfare to Subjective Wellbeing*, Dordrecht: Springer.

2. The works below use data both from the AsiaBarometer Quality-of-Life Survey and the Multilateral Treaty Participation Survey

Inoguchi, T. & Le, T.Q.L. (2022) *Digitized Statecraft of Four Asian Regionalisms: States' Multilateral Treaty Participation and Civilians' Satisfaction with Quality of Life*, Singapore: Springer Nature.

Inoguchi, T. & Le, T.Q.L. (2021) *Digitized Statecraft in Multilateral Treaty Participation: 193 Sovereign States' Quasi-Legislative Behavior*, Singapore: Springer Nature.

Inoguchi, T. & Le, T.Q.L., (2020) *The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global*, Singapore: Springer Nature.

Legislative styles are defined as the proclivity to vote as a quasi-legislative behavior of a sovereign state in a quasi-world assembly setting of the United Nations multilateral treaty system. It is operationalized as follows: The difference between the ratification year of a sovereign state and the promulgation year is basic to the operationalization of willingness to voting "yes". Then this metric (after plus one) be transformed to create the inverse (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, pp. 54–59). For each of 193 United Nations quasi-polls inversed accumulations are called the treaty participation index. With multilateral treaty participation of 600, five key variables are factor analyzed: the ratification year, the year of the treaty becoming effective (the deposit year), the number of current members countries of a treaty as of 2014, treaty

participation index, modified Welzel regional grouping (one of the ten geo-historical-cultural groups by Christian Welzel, 2013) in its modified form by the Le/Inoguchi scheme, and one of the six policy domain categorizations based on the main purpose of a treaty. Factor analyzed through principal component analysis. Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization yields to three dimensions, the naming of which are speed, angle, and strategy. Speed is cautious versus agile. Angle is global commons versus individual interests. Strategy is aspirational bonding versus mutual binding. The set of three dimensions is called digitized statecraft of 193 sovereign states. How skillfully and ably to handle and process global environments through executive offices, legislative branches, public opinion at home and abroad, non-governmental organizations at home and abroad, cyber communications, intelligence networks, economic changes (communications and transportations of words, goods, money), migratory flows, commuting flows, arms flows, drugs flows and so on.) and whatever is taking place in science and technology, whatever is taking place on planets. Whatever is taking place in infectious disease infection over the Earth, for instance. Then how to focus in terms of weighing global commons and other factors like individual interests, alliances, regional groupings, or personal networks. No less importantly, strategy matters: one must choose either candidate for a yes vote, abstain, or the vote no. Focusing on the nature of a treaty: obligatory clauses often making the yes vote somehow difficult (as 70% of 193 states feel); aspirational bonding strategy focuses regional and other groupings such as transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization whereby consensus decision making was nullified, making it easier to focus on those non-concessionary assistance offers and weapons providing states with whom realigning can be more easily done etc.; how to see large changes in the nature of superpowers from being democratic to rogue (Beckley, 2020).

In order to evaluate the sustainability of regionalism, first we examine societal types, second, legislative types, and third, legislative types' salience by six policy domains.

Our initial hypotheses are as follows:

- A. Societal types: If types of societies on the basis of three dimensions, i.e., survival, social relations and public policy predominance, are similar *grosso modo*, then such regional member candidates tend to be good candidates, *ceteris paribus* (Inoguchi & Fujii, 2013; Inoguchi & Le, 2022, this volume).
- B. Legislative types: If types of sovereign states' global quasi-legislative behavior on the basis of the three dimensions, i.e., speed, angle, and strategy are similar *grosso modo*, then such regional member candidates tend to be a good candidate, *ceteris paribus* (Inoguchi & Le, 2020; Inoguchi & Le, 2022, this volume).
- C. Legislative types by policy domains: If values of regional states' z-scores of six policy domains are similar in each domain, i.e., labor and health, human rights, environment, peace and disarmament, intellectual property, trade, commerce and communication, then such regional candidate member states are a good candidate. Here z-score is defined as $z = (TPI - \mu) / \sigma$ where TPI is defined as treaty participation index and μ and σ are used to standardize the values of each sovereign state's treaty participation index (Inoguchi & Le, 2020).

Societal types: the types of society examine the similarity of societies as measured by people's daily life satisfaction in society. The types of society are generated by the societal level aggregation of people's daily life satisfaction. Typologizing societies is carried out by factor-analyzing people's daily life satisfaction with 16 items of life domains, aspects, and styles: housing, standard of living, household income, education, job, friendships, marriage, health, family life, leisure, spiritual life, neighbors, public safety, conditions of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system.

Three methodological cautions are important. (1) When one asks about satisfaction, happiness, and well-being, one had better add some cues to satisfaction-related contexts and backgrounds rather than asking directly "How happy are you about your life?" (See Richard Nisbett, about how Westerners are different from East Asians when they answer the same question, especially if the question is created by Western or American psychologists). See also Joseph Henrich (2020) about the WEIRDers (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) who think analytically whereas non-WEIRDers or non-Westerners think holistically. (2) As life has many domains, aspects, and styles, those items used for such a question should be as many as 10–20. The number of such items should not be too many or too few. Also, the nature of such items should include varieties of daily life satisfaction. Not only those items necessary for minimum human survival but also some items allowing one to enjoy extra-curriculum social activities. Also, not to forget those items related to one's larger society or state. In other words, instead of focusing on values and norms, include forces and influences coming from above, e.g., tax, social welfare, environmental degradation, or public safety. These two considerations tend to enable one to mitigate the danger of misusing what Agner Fog (2021) calls the superfactor when the respondents' responses are factor-analyzed. The superfactor's appearance tends to hide many dissimilarities and to highlight similarities. If the purpose is to dissect and highlight dissimilarities in typologizing, then avoiding practices or methods that lead to its over-appearance need to be encouraged. Factor-analyzing the satisfaction level regarding 16 life items among national respondents has generated three dimensions: survival, social relations, and public policy predominance. Generated from factor-analyzing are the six types of Asian societies: *Abc*, *Acb*, *Bac*, *Bca*, *Cab*, *Cba* in the order of eigenvalues in each dimension where *A* and *a* refer to survival dimension, *B* or *b* refer to the social relations dimension, and *C* or *c* refer to the public policy predominance dimension. When *a*, *b*, or *c* comes to the first dimension with the largest eigenvalue, *a*, *b* or *c* is capitalized in denoting the type of societies. Richard Nisbett alarms the serious differences between Westerners and Asians in cognitive psychology and thought psychology. Westerners focus on trees whereas Asians see forests. Westerners focus on leaders' pronounced logic in speech whereas Asians look around masses' mostly silent eyes. (See also Henrich, 2013) for their differences. Nevertheless, no survey had been carried out other than that of Inoguchi (2019), Inoguchi and Le (2020, 2021, 2022) with the entire 32 Asian societies (plus Americans, Australians, and Russians being neighbors) with nationally random samplings with interviews in the AsiaBarometer "quality of life" survey with 600,000 respondents and 6 million observations in the 2000s. See Shin

and Inoguchi, eds (2010), Inoguchi and Fujii (2013), Inoguchi (2017), Inoguchi and Tokuda (2017), Inoguchi (2019), Inoguchi (2022) in the above set of volumes about the Asian quality of life satisfaction volumes along with the set of multilateral treaty participation books, i.e., Inoguchi and Le (2020, 2021, 2022, this volume).

Second, factor-analyzing 193 sovereign states' multilateral treaty participation modes (i.e., early joiner or latecomer) and some attributes like their geo-historico-cultural regions and those policy domains of multilateral treaties generates the types of quasi-legislative behavior on the three dimensions: (1) speed (cautious vs agile), (2) angle (global commons vs individual interests), and (3) strategy (aspirational bonding vs mutual trust) and the eight types of Asian societies. All of these data analyses are done at the global level and at the societal level. They distinguish themselves from other works mostly working at the inter-state level such as Singer and Small, 1972. It must be noted that Russett (1993) is the only work done at the global level in the 1990s. Categorizing democracy or non-democracy remains to be done once the violence-prone Trumpian presidency has been experienced. "A rogue superpower" might as well be a possibility in the near future of the US strong demographic profiles and still high migration from other countries according to Michael Beckley (Beckley, 2020).

Third, those factor-analysis results of three dimensional proclivity and particularity of states' multilateral treaty participation should not be taken in terms of causal directionality. Those dimensional values indicate correlational relationship. Also those factor-analysis results of three dimensional values proclivity and particularity of citizens' satisfaction with quality of life should not be taken in terms of causal directionality. Those dimensional values of citizens' satisfaction with quality of life indicate correlational relationship.

4.1 Who Are Regionalisms' Members or Candidate Members?

East Asia: Vietnam, Singapore, Mongolia, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea.

Taiwan is not a UN member at least since 1973. Vietnam is a member of ASEAN but traditionally and culturally the country has been East Asian as well. Vietnamese tribes used to live in what is called southern China, i.e., Guiling, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hunan, Guanxi Zhuang autonomous province when Chinese kingdom was strong enough to stem mother tribes like Turkics, Persians and Mongols from: penetrating into Han Chinese terrains forming Han-northern tribes hybrid dynasties starting Sui and Tang dynasties. From then onward, those Han Chinese disposed their home land basis migrated toward southern China, where they fought both against original Han Chinese and non-Han tribal minorities for arable land space. The latter of which included a large number of Vietnamese, Thais, and other minority tribes even further toward south and some of them migrated to current Vietnam and Thailand. Before Thais and Vietnamese migrated into the Mekong River and the Chao Phraya river,

Burma and Cambodia used to be strong empires in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese carrying strong East Asian heritage is vindicated by the use of Chinese ideograph and Confucian ideology and institutions until France colonized Indochina during of which Vietnamese started to use Latin alphabet in late nineteenth century and after France, the United States, and briefly Japanese one by one defeated, and withdrew, Vietnamese have used communist ideology in the mid-twentieth century (Woodside, 2006). Mongolia has been traditionally and geographically East Asian as well as Central Asian. Singapore is a member of ASEAN but traditionally and culturally it is also viewed as East Asian as well as Southeast Asian.

Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.

Papua New Guinea is not a member of ASEAN but is closely tied with Australia and South Pacific nations. Singapore has been East Asian traditionally and culturally as well as Southern Asian. Timor-Leste is not a member of ASEAN, but it gained independence from Indonesia in 2002.

Vietnam is a member of ASEAN but it has been traditionally and culturally East Asian.

South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

Afghanistan has been South Asian as well as Central Asian.

Central Asia: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

Afghanistan has been South Asian as well as Central Asian. Mongolia has been East Asian as well as Central Asian.

What we do is to test the two hypotheses above when four regionalisms' candidates change.

4.2 Four Regionalisms

4.2.1 *Test A (Societal Type) and Test B (Legislative Type)*

Central Asia (Table 4.1):

South Asia (Table 4.2):

Southeast Asia (Table 4.3):

East Asia (Table 4.4):

Table 4.1 Social type and legislative type: Central Asia

	Societal type	Legislative type
Afghanistan	Abc	ABc
Kazakhstan	Cab	Abc
Kyrgyzstan	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out in proper fashion	Abc
Mongolia	Acb	Abc
Tajikistan	Abc	Abc
Turkmenistan	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out in proper fashion	Abc
Uzbekistan	Abc	Abc

Table 4.2 Social Type and Legislative Type: South Asia

	Societal type	Legislative type
Afghanistan	Abc	ABc
Bangladesh	Acb	ABC
Bhutan	Cab	ABC
India	Acb	aBC
Maldives	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out	ABC
Nepal	Acb	aBc
Pakistan	Cab	abC
Sri Lanka	Cba	AbC

Table 4.3 Social type and legislative type: Southeast Asia

	Societal type	Legislative type
Brunei	Cab	ABc
Cambodia	Acb	abC
Indonesia	Abc	abc
Laos	Acb	aBC
Malaysia	Bac	AbC
Myanmar	Acb	ABC
Papua New Guinea	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out	abC
Philippines	Cab	abC

(continued)

Table 4.3 (continued)

	Societal type	Legislative type
Singapore	Cba	abc
Thailand	Bac	abC
Timor-Leste	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out	ABc
Vietnam	Bac	ABc

Table 4.4 Social type and legislative type: East Asia

	Societal type	Legislative type
Vietnam	Bac	ABc
Singapore	Cba	abc
Mongolia	Acb	ABc
China	Acb	abC
North Korea	* AsianBarometer Survey on quality of life was not carried out	ABc
Japan	Abc	abc
South Korea	Acb	AbC

4.2.2 Test C (Legislative Type Policy Salience: Z-Score in Treaty Participation Index)

See Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10

Table 4.5 Legislative type policy salience: Z-Score in treaty participation index: Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia

	Labor	HR	Environ	Peace	Intel	Trade
Central Asia	-0.670	-0.329	-0.603	-0.575	-0.476	-0.486
South Asia	-0.047	0.535	-0.338	-0.132	-0.314	-0.248
Southeast Asia	-0.321	-0.553	-0.576	-0.397	-0.424	-0.294
East Asia	0.043	-0.149	-0.083	-0.408	0.137	-0.185

Table 4.6 Six variables of the factor analysis on multilateral treaties data

Variable	Description
Year of membership [YrMember]	The year when a state ratified a treaty is identified
Year of Deposit [YrDeposit]	The year when a treaty is deposited to the relevant international body
Number of Current Members [CurrentMember]	The number of current member countries of a treaty as of 2014
Treaty Participation Index [TPI]	A quantitative index to measure how quickly a state participates in a treaty and is calculated based on the number of elapsed years between the promulgation of a treaty and a state’s ratification act
Modified Welzel Regional Group [Region]	A country is classified in one of the ten geo-historico-cultural groups by Christian Welzel (2013) in its modified form by the Le/Inoguchi scheme (see <i>Appendix VIII</i>)
Policy Domain [Domain]	The six policy domain categorizations based on the main purpose of a treaty

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2020). *The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 66

Table 4.7 Factor analysis using principal component analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization: Rotated component matrix

	Component		
	1	2	3
Year Of Deposit	0.904		
Year Of Membership	0.923		
Number Of Current Members		0.804	
TPIndex			0.943
Region		0.513	-0.376
PolicyDomain		-0.777	

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, pp. 67–68

Table 4.8 Types of societies

Societal Types	1st Dimension	2nd Dimension	3rd Dimension
Abc	1. Materialism	2. Post-materialism	3. Public sector dominance
Acb	1. Materialism	2. Public sector dominance	3. Post-materialism
Bac	1. Post-materialism	2. Materialism	3. Public sector dominance
Bca	1. Post-materialism	2. Public sector dominance	3. Materialism
Cab	1. Public sector dominance	2. Materialism	3. Post-materialism
Cba	1. Public sector dominance	2. Post-materialism	3. Materialism

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 139

Table 4.9 Eight typologies of global quasi-legislative behavior

Types		Speed	Angle	Strategy
1	abc	Agile	Global commons	Mutual binding
2	aBC	Agile	Individual interests	Aspirational bonding
3	aBC	Agile	Individual interests	Mutual binding
4	abC	Agile	Global commons	Aspirational bonding
5	Abc	Cautious	Global commons	Mutual binding
6	AbC	Cautious	Global commons	Aspirational bonding
7	ABc	Cautious	Individual interests	Mutual binding
8	ABC	Cautious	Individual interests	Aspirational bonding

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, p. 139

Table 4.10 Daily life satisfaction and multilateral treaty participation across Asia

East Asia		Society types Daily life satisfaction	Global quasi-legislative behavior types multilateral treaty participation
1.	Japan	Abc	Abc
2.	China	Acb	abC
3.	Vietnam	Bac	ABc
4.	DPR Korea		ABc
5.	R Korea	Acb	AbC
6.	Taiwan	Abc	
7.	Hong Kong	Bac	

Southeast Asia		Society types Daily life satisfaction	Global quasi-legislative behavior types multilateral treaty participation
1.	Philippines	Cab	abC
2.	Thailand	Bac	abC
3.	Vietnam	Bac	ABc
4.	Laos	Acb	aBC
5.	Cambodia	Acb	abC
6.	Myanmar	Acb	ABC
7.	Singapore	Cba	Abc
8.	Indonesia	Abc	Abc
9.	Timor Leste		ABc
10.	Malaysia	Bac	AbC
11.	Brunei	Cab	ABc

South Asia		Society types Daily life satisfaction	Global quasi-legislative behavior types multilateral treaty participation
1.	India	Acb	abC
2.	Pakistan	Cab	abC
3.	Nepal	Acb	aBc
4.	Bangladesh	Acb	ABC
5.	Sri Lanka	Cab	AbC
6.	Maldives		ABC
7.	Bhutan	Cab	ABC
8.	Afghanistan	Abc	ABc

Central Asia plus Orthodox East		Society types Daily life satisfaction	Global quasi-legislative behavior types multilateral treaty participation
1.	Kazakhstan	Cab	Abc
2.	Kyrgyzstan	Bac	Abc
3.	Tajikistan	Abc	Abc
4.	Uzbekistan	Abc	Abc
5.	Turkmenistan		ABc
6.	Mongolia	Acb	ABc

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized Statecraft In Multilateral Treaty Participation: Global Quasi-Legislative Behavior of 193 Sovereign States*. Singapore: Springer Nature, pp. 141–142

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Chapter 5

Four Regionalisms: Societal Types Comparison



Regional integration attracted attention for academics when European states registered the largest ever number of death tolls in World War II (Singer & Small, 1972) and as a result when most European economies were devastated to their nadir even long after the end of the war. The advent of the Cold War prompted them to hold together to get strong and united. Regional integration in Western Europe evolved along two lines: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community. Both evolved under the post-World War II US-led liberal world order (Ikenberry, 2021). Seen from the American perspective of its isolation and involvement in world affairs, the direct impetus of the American turn to more emphasis on involvement started in the inter-war period of World Wars I and II, when unemployment, poverty, inward economic policy, and isolationist foreign policy amidst global turbulence prevailed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt turned the gear toward government-led investment policy called the New Deal and then toward the engagement in World War II. In other words, the scheme was to bring the United States formally to the domain of the world and international security under the pursuit of the hegemonic and democratic United States. The US-led liberal international order since 1945 seemed to continue for a long while. A series of change was the Vietnam War, the oil crisis triggered by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the developing South's rise, and the relentless Soviet military buildups. Academic jargon was now ready to grasp beyond the pursuit of national power (Morgenthau, 1947/1985). Power and interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977) have gone together in the two domains: security and political domain called traditionally high politics and economic and monetary domain traditionally called low politics, which was long regarded as not ambassadors' responsibility but consulate-General's. In the post-World War period when the direct legacy of the Allied victory brought about the US-led liberal world order without much new endeavor on the US part. Keohane and Nye (1977) set the framework of similar-minded academics interested in anatomizing world order and regions. Joseph Nye (2014) examined East African regional integration where the passion of Pan-Africanism was incredibly strong to

unite. Yet barriers are strong. As the Nigerian Ambassador to the UN gave his United Nations General Assembly speech dwelling on how difficult it was to live with the Western colonialist-demarcated national territorial borders amidst February 2022 when Russia started to militarily invade Ukraine.

The problem we are going to tackle is the levels of analysis in international relations. When regional integration or regionalism is a subject, analysis is conducted mainly at two levels of analysis: national and regional. First, sharing coal and steel among the Schengen Five states, the original founders of the European community in a fledgling form (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, West Germany, France) came. Then preferences on the extent of free trade divided Western Europe into two groups, oceanic and continental. The United Kingdom was declined by France twice before its membership was accepted. Regional integration in Western Europe reached at its highest when the single unified currency was carried out by the invention of euro while the Deutsche mark disappeared. Some states like the United Kingdom did not join it. Likewise the free movement of people in the European community has been allowed among those states opting to adopt the rule. The regional integration of the European Union became very comprehensive in the third millennium in the sense that the Union-wide policy decisions have become wider covering parts of free trade, currency, energy, education and training, health, labor, science and technology, the environment, intellectual property, gender, children, the handicapped, human rights, measurement and rules, agriculture, fishery, forestry and migration etc. Some states have become somewhat unhappy because of this. Other states quit like the United Kingdom in 2021. Most recently, the Ukraine–Russia crisis has emitted a few million refugees from Ukraine to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Moldova. Hardship of accommodating refugees is immediately felt and long-term consequences on each member state will be huge and deep. The policy domains these states, mostly EU member states, manage cover the whole range of national sovereign states. As long as UN member states and non-member states alike live on this Earth, not only national, regional, and no less importantly global levels of analysis must be set up. Here, the problem of the level of analysis in international relations (Singer, 1961) must be adjusted. A new paradigm must be established.

J. David Singer's levels of analysis are: individual, national, and international. His paradigm has been in sync with the analysis of the world order of the last century but not since the new millennium. A new paradigm must be: societal, national, and global. We will explain this:

Singer (1961)'s emphasis on the individual level of analysis has four major reasons: (1) American proclivity for individualism, (2) the American penchant for political leadership, (3) harmony with the heyday of the US-led liberal world order. (1) Americans are known for their individualism whether it is manifested in the form of self-hurting suicide and macho-driven violence in hard times, (2) among key words in public opinion surveys' questions about the leaders and governments include prominently: political leadership and trust, (3) Singer (1961) coincides with the heyday of the US-led liberal world order without implicating that the decline of the US-led world order, 4) the heyday of behavioral science in the third quarter of the last century behavioral science permeated medical science, psychology, social

psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology with the American war efforts starting with the American Soldiers Morale Survey (Stouffer et al., 1949) during World War II. Singer (1961)'s emphasis on the international level has been natural for three reasons: (1) the international level of analysis is most harmonious with Americans who were most strongly influenced by Morgenthau (1947/1985) pursuit of power for national interest, (2) the Christian belief in God guiding America in navigating itself in the US-led liberal world order. One of the excellent textbooks of international relations, Grieco et al. (2015, 2019) asks the level of analysis question, the individual, the national and the international, at the end of each chapter with some good examples of explanation. My answer is that we ought to establish a new scheme of level of analysis questions.

(1) the societal level of analysis and (2) the global level of analysis. Both levels of analysis have been very strong and important but they have not given much thought, let alone practiced very much, even in the third millennium. One might as well think who play agency functions at the global level reasonably well. I answer straight: (1) global institutions, (2) transnational and non-governmental organizations and (3) global scientists right away. (1) The United Nations comes to mind immediately. Alker and Russett (1966) factor-analyzed the UN General Assembly voting showing which issues and which groups of states stand close or apart from each other. Bruce M. Russett (1993) analyzed a pair of states since 1800. Pairs of democracies rarely fight each other in comparison to a pair of "democracy vs non-democracy" and a pair of "non-democracy vs non-democracy". Nevertheless, the United Nations General Assembly is not an authoritative and legitimate institution for action. Most recently, the Security council permanent members called the Permanent Five (P5) seems to nullify itself by one of the permanent members by not being present in vetoing on its own invasion in another state. (2) non-governmental organizations are powerful these days. But Held et al. (2013) and Hale and Held (2017) have shown that the decline of activities by non-governmental organizations has been correlated with the decrease of multilateral treaties. (3) global scientists along with global institut

ions carry out multilateral treaty drafts and circulating them among those concerned. Most recently, Shukuro Manabe (Manabe & Broccoli, 2020) was awarded the Nobel Physics Award in 2021 for his contribution linking carbon dioxide and global warming on the basis of those data on land, ocean, and atmosphere which are regularly measured by joining states in multilateral treaties on the World Meteorological Organization's rules and guidance. Immediately after the withdrawal of the United States from Kabul, the Taliban government set three new places to measure what the World Meteorological Organization expects these treaty members to carry out. Our preceding works on multilateral treaties (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021) have shown that both multilateral treaties and participating sovereign states in multilateral treaties play the role of agency. In other words, multilateral treaties and sovereign states both play the two roles of the vehicle and agency functioning together. Most spectacular of them in East Asia, for instance, is the upward jump of economic development and multilateral treaties' increase in commerce, trade, and communications global policy domain in Japan, China and South Korea; the focused increase of multilateral treaties in the intellectual property domain in Singapore and

North Korea. Six hundred factor-analyzing multilateral treaties along with six policy domains and 10 world regions yield three dimensions of speed (cautious vs agile), angle (global commons vs individual interest), and strategy (aspirational bonding vs mutual binding).

Turning to the societal level of analysis, I take society collectively with individual satisfaction with quality of life in 16 life domains, aspects and styles shaping the type of society. Asian societies have six types, depending on which dimension comes first, second, and third determine societal type; in terms of eigenvalue each dimension gains. For instance, take Hong Kong. Hong Kong is an old and new settler society; many residents came into Hong Kong some centuries ago as Northern nomads invaded Han-dominant China (Qin and Han dynasties) and were assimilated with Han Chinese forming Sui and Tang dynasties. Some Han Chinese fled from the Sui and Tang dynasties period toward the south where land was scarcer and more competitive. They constitute the Hakka Chinese from the north. During the Qing Manchu-Han hybrid dynasty period (seventeenth to twentieth century) Some Han Chinese migrated to the south including Hong Kong, Singapore, Southeast Asia, avoiding incessant turmoil associated with Western and Japanese intrusions to China. They are linguistically and geographically differentiated like Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Sichuan, Hunan. Into the mid- and late twentieth century when communist power became dominant in China itself, the migration grew frequent as the communist regime has repeated the tight and loose periods alternately in terms of political and economic control: the early socialist collectivization (1950–1954), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1959), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1974), the Tiananmen Square protests (1989), Hong Kong returned from Britain to China (1997). Then in 2020 the Chinese Communist Party got direct control steadily taking legislative power. This has changed their direction of migration away from Hong Kong. Hong Kong residents live inside their communities. A glance at these multiple geo-linguistic communities can be partially taken, for instance, the university cafeterias where local food cues are separated: Cantonese, Fukienese, vegetarian etc. Daily life can be lived only with strong ties with each community. Thus satisfaction derived from social relations–related participation is not only strong but also it is critically tied with survival needs. Not only household income, job, and housing and other survival necessity items but also social relations like community activities such as family, friends, marriage, leisure, and health stand very high and give satisfaction in daily life. Hong Kong’s dimensional order is social relations, survival and public policy predominance, as of 2006, when the AsiaBarometer quality of life survey was carried out. Since 2020 Hong Kongese daily life has been changing steadily.

Take Pakistan. Pakistan is a fragmented, fractured society in a very real daily life sense. It is a deliberately constructed state along the Muslim line in competition with the Hindu line of demarcation at a time of independence from British India when two big Muslim concentrations were located at Punjab and Bengal. In 1947–1948 within these two states boundaries were artificially drawn and more than a few millions migrated to the other side within the same states. In 1971 Punjab and Bengal parted ways from Muslim Bengal got independent as Bangladesh. The only passion that unites Pakistan is Islamic religion and associated practice. Economically, Punjab is

the center of agriculture along the big plain on the Indus River which expanded its outputs due to the mechanization and fertilizers use during the 1970s onward and Sind, a southern state, is a commercial center near the Indian Ocean. The population is mostly dominated by Muslims in Pakistan. But near abroad, those countries with larger Muslim populations are Indonesia (world number 1), India (world number 3) and Bangladesh (world number 4). Punjabis and Bengalis represent two groups in British India and the twenty-first century South Asia and beyond. Pakistan has been often effective in getting hold of the loans from the International Monetary Fund. Also Pakistanis are often deployed by the United Nations Peace Keeping Activities along with Malaysia and Nigeria. No less underestimated is the role of Pakistan's scientists in quickly producing nuclear weapons out of smallish GNP. In which dimensions do Pakistani got satisfaction in daily life in terms of 16 life domains, aspects and styles? Survival naturally comes first. Poverty remains a number one issue. Second, public policy prevalence comes. Because Pakistani society is fragmented and fractured, there must be some things that knit together. Their belief in Islam comes atop all. Secondarily important is public policy prevalence. The military occasionally directly captures government (Zia-ul-Haq, Pervez Musharraf). Vis-à-vis tense situations with India and Afghanistan there are reasons for the military to think about their turn and expand their power. One cannot hope to become prime minister unless one can get the military's nod. Non-Military taking power in the government has also many good reasons. They join multilateral treaties and Pakistani economy's upward turn is visible and tangible in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Imran Khan. Cotton crop production increased and so does cloth-related manufacturing outputs. In the twenty-first century the thirdly important dimension is social relations. As long as poverty remains a key issue, as long as industrialization and urbanization come on a large scale, this order of public policy prevalence, survival, and social relations may as well continue for some time.

Take a glance at Singapore. Singapore's order of key dimensions are: public policy prevalence, social relations, and survival. Why public policy prevalence? Major reasons for it are as follows: (1) Singapore is a smallish state in terms of population and territory; (2) Singapore is meritocratic in education and recruitment. Education is up to your grade in school. How your occupation is navigated by school grade and thereby how you are assigned to which occupational job market to search is more or less determined by the government; (3) Singapore is a monitoring democracy to take care of housing, social welfare, and politics (Keane, 2021). Since it is meritocratic and monitory, the Singapore government is bound to be a big government as the size of population and GNP grow. Blending government and market in public policy management requires good brains and muscles. The possible weak Achilles of Singapore is demographic and of its longer-term consequences. Most recently, Prime Minister Lee Xien Long decided to approve half a million new immigrants of Chinese origins in perfect proportion with the ethnic Chinese group (5 millions) in the entire population (7 millions). The total fertility rate of Singapore has been in slow but steady decline. This is most dramatic in South Korea registering 0.84. So follow China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore with so

far higher total fertility rates than South Korea. Because of this society configuration, people are satisfied with public policy related life domains, aspects and styles: public safety, conditions of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. Social relations-related dimension, social relations, register medium–high values like friendships, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, spiritual life, and standard of living. Survival is the third dimension, providing medium–high values like household income, health, education and job. One might say that the above three examples, Hong Kong, Pakistan and Singapore, tend to represent extreme examples distinguishing themselves as small population, settler society and artificially demarcated society respectively. I would say that every society to get minimally satisfied as a whole should try to distinguish itself in one way or another. One might as well disagree with us on this point. Our answer is that readers are so accustomed with the way of comparing people, institutions, and societies as Ronald Inglehart (2018) and the World Values Survey show their analysis and presentation of universalism like survival and social relations, or materialism and post-materialism with the idea-founder Abraham Maslow (1943). Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2013) and many others including myself have been searching for universal value changes not only in advanced industrial society but also more demographically and increasingly no less important developing the South. But this book searching for similarities and dissimilarities among Asian societies adopts the approach of factor analysis not to the entire sum of sampled population in Asian societies. Rather we factor-analyze the random sampled respondents in each of the 29 Asian societies. Whereby shaped society types clearly present themselves in relation to each of the 16 life domains, aspects, and styles (Inoguchi, 2019; Inoguchi & Le, 2022, this volume).

5.1 Central Asia

Afghanistan with the type of Abc, Mongolia with the type of Acb, Tajikistan with the type of Abc, and Uzbekistan with the type of Abc are similar in that given the low population density and the low government revenue for public policy means that populations are separate from each other (Alison, 2008; Reeves, 2014; Heathershaw et al., 2019).

Kazakhstan with the type of Cab is slightly different from other Central Asian societies in that the socialist bureaucratic spirit and institutions have maintained government intervention, which would place an upper case C first. In Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, the AsiaBarometer Survey was carried out but with somewhat inappropriate implementation.

5.2 South Asia

Afghanistan with the type of Abc, Bangladesh with the type of Acb, India with the type of Acb, and Nepal with the type of Acb are similar in that governing elite populations is relatively small due in part to the influence of British India, British Burma, and British Ceylon. In the case of Afghanistan, due to continuous intervening foreign forces, including British in the late nineteenth century, Russians in the 1980s, and Americans in the 2000s until 2021, controlling the capital city, Kabul, there are many locally dominant tribes inside the capital region like Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras as well as Pashtuns, a dominant ethnic group. Public policy intervention takes place as necessary, yet its effectiveness is often limited, and thus accordingly the government tends to resort to authoritarian measures.

Bhutan with the type of Cab, Pakistan with the type of Cab, Sri Lanka with the type of Cba are similar in that populations are largely fractured, fragmented, and that no strong forces tie them together other than a Buddhism of sorts for Bhutan and Sri Lanka, and Islam for Pakistan.

5.3 Southeast Asia

Who are likely future candidate regionalist members? They are Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. Neither society has participated in the AsiaBarometer Surveys. Therefore, there is no data from the AsiaBarometer. It seems that ASEAN has had a good record of accommodating dissimilar societies within the association, especially among Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in the formative years of ASEAN. So, it might as well be unrealistic to think that Indonesia and Timor-Leste might take actions also to moderate their positions under the ASEAN's umbrella. The Constitution of Indonesia does not allow atheists to be Indonesian citizens (thus Chinese Indonesians' given names tend to be Christian names). Two beliefs seem to be connected: Chinese make and use money more effectively than native Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians can be connected with China (People's Republic of China). The National Indonesian Army's actions vis-à-vis pre-independence Timor Leste and vis-à-vis Papua New Guinea seem to be prompted by the thought of which the unrest and weakness of East Timor and Papua New Guinea should not be allowed to be manifested in the independence movement thus possibly promoting Chinese to help consolidate Timor Leste or Papua New Guinea (Cf. Yanai, 2022). It seems to be similar to the thought that encouraged the Indonesian military to carry out the massive suppression of alleged Indonesian communists in 1965–1966. In 1985–1966 President Sukarno was preoccupied in enhancing the ties among Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Beijing. The Indonesia military headed by General Suharto to wanted to cut the tie between Jakarta and Beijing. Now in May 2022 President José Ramos-Horta of Timor Leste expressed the will to join ASEAN and to strengthen the tie with China, saying China's Belt and Road scheme is most welcome, with no need to

worry about debt accumulation. On Papua New Guinea, it may be more difficult as it has been in the orbit of Australia in the Oceania region in the Southern Pacific Ocean since the end of World War II. But of course, the growing influence of China of late in the Southern Pacific might as well help Papua New Guinea to enter ASEAN, leaning it more toward China's orbit, thereby making it easier to loosen Australian and US influence. However, the evolving future of the Indo-Pacific vision and/or strategy is so murky that it is too early to tell how its course will unfold.

The current ASEAN membership is full of diversity in terms of the types of societies. Brunei with the type of Cab, the Philippines with the type of Cab, and Singapore with the type of Cba are similar in that relatively small societies are run by an extremely small elite corps. Brunei has a population of 300,000 with dozens of sultans running it. Singapore has some 7 million people, with the People's Action Party, the longest running party, actively recruiting highly educated young people with agility and dexterity. It has been allocated in consideration of the proportionality of Chinese, Malays, and Tamils vis-à-vis the total population. One recent recruitment of half a million Chinese has been carried out in view of the steadily declining Singaporean demography by Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister. Long-term impact with this policy action is that all of them are highly educated, highly upward aspirational, and communist-trained in China. The Philippines has 70 million people, but with family and landownership connections closely tied to those in power, the 23 senators and slightly more governors have continuously kept their positions. The latest Philippine Presidential election in May 2022 ended with Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos Jr. for President and Sara Duterte for Vice-President. The former is the son of Ferdinand Marcos and a senator from Ilocos Norte and the latter is the daughter of Rodrigo Duterte and the Mayor of Davao, Mindanao, a southern province. In the Philippines presidential and vice-presidential elections are carried out separately on each list of candidates. The election was separately listed and voted. The victory of the two families combined, one from the north and the other from the south, was predicted (Ferreira-Marques, 2022).

Cambodia with the type of Acb, Indonesia with the type of Abc, Laos has the type of Acb, and Myanmar with the type of Acb, are similar in that governing diverse populations in difficult terrains with a relatively small size of self-appointed elites. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are Acb societies and Indonesia is an Abc society. Cambodia and Laos used to be or currently are run by communists and ex-communists whereas Myanmar's military holds power against its democratic citizens and against minorities-tribes, the latter occupying 50% of the total population. Myanmar's development path features slow industrialization and strong protectionism, and is against fast liberalization, knowing the consequence which would evolve into a society where the military, as the stakeholder of protectionism, would break down in the longer term. Of multilateral treaty participation small b states in Southeast Asia, (i.e., their angle is global commons), Cambodia and Singapore have been committed to international peace support and stability operations and Vietnam aspires to do so despite domestic difficulties making it hard for the country to move fast (Aoi & Hong, 2014).

Malaysia with the type of Bac, Thailand with the type of Bac, Vietnam with the type of Bac have been confronted with the reality of a new settler society. Malaysia and

British Malaya have been the mix of original inhabitants and new migrants (Indians and Chinese, serving colonial interests). New migrants worked in mining, manufacturing, and the service industry. Now, new migrants keep coming from neighboring countries, such as Indonesians who speak a similar language. Vietnam, having united North and South Vietnam after 1975, has found south Vietnam, due to its diversity, to be attracting new migrants from Cambodia, Laos, China, and Thailand. *Doi Moi* policy has been accelerating that trend. Thailand used to be an ally with imperial Japan, which annexed portions of Cambodia, larger portions of Laos, with Vichy France and small portions of British Malaya during World War II. Because of work opportunities in elementary manufacturing, the tourism industry, and agriculture, many migrants from Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and southern Malaysia are lured to Thailand. The rise of newly emerging Asian migrants is due to increases in foreign direct investment in the third millennium that has accelerated new migrations within Asia.

5.4 East Asia

Future possible candidates for East Asian regionalism are Vietnam, Singapore, and Mongolia. The current possible members are Japan, China, North Korea, and South Korea.

Types of societies for the current possible members, Japan, South Korea, and China are Abc, Acb and Acb, respectively. In Japan, South Korea, and China the survival dimension is most important. For the social relations dimension to occupy the number two position, it is limited to Japan. Japan has come to this stage through Allied occupation with a democratic constitution (1945–1952) and through more or less center-right one-party dominance (1952–2022) (Inoguchi, 1998). For the public policy predominance to occupy the second dimension, this pattern is limited to South Korea and China. In other words, the weight of public policy is registered to be larger than the weight of social relations in South Korea and China. South Korea has come to this stage after going through personal dictatorship (1948–1960), military dictatorship (1961–1988) to third-wave democracy (1988–1998), and to the current fully-fledged democracy (1998 to the present). China has come to this position through communist party dictatorship (1949–1978), and from there to a moderately inclusive and open dictatorship (1978–1989, 1991–2012) to the current stage of a tight dictatorship (2012–the present).

Which states are future candidates? They are Mongolia with the Acb societal type, Vietnam with the Cba type, Singapore with the Cba type, and North Korea with an unknown type because social surveys have been forbidden there. But my best educated guess of the North Korean societal type is that of the Bca type. Mongolia has come to this stage through communist party dictatorship (1956–1991) to partial democracy (1991–the present). Mongolia is of the same societal type as South Korea and China.

Vietnam has come to this stage of the type Bac through communist party dictatorship (1945–1986), a moderately inclusive and open dictatorship (1986–1995), and to the current stage of being a good member of ASEAN. Singapore with the Cba type has come to this stage through one-party dominant electoral democracy (1965–the present). Singapore is sometimes called monitory democracy (Keane, 2009, 2022) because public policy intervention has been solid.

Who are the likely future candidates? Mongolia? Singapore? Vietnam? North Korea? I will return to this question after I have examined all “disputed” states regarding regionalisms.

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Chapter 6

Four Regionalisms: Legislative Types Comparison



Multilateral treaties have grown as globalization permeates domestic societies. Globalization has two steps of permeating domestic society (Inoguchi, 2011a, 2011b). In the early step, MacDonald was thought to be a good indicator of its permeation into each domestic society. Thus, Thomas L. Friedman (2000) once optimistically said that the more McDonald's branches increase, outside the United States, war is less likely to erupt. Michael J. Boskin reflected his years as H. W. Bush's Council of Economic Advisors (1989–1993) that the “West's failed gamble on Russian and Chinese reform” (Boskin, 2022). In other words, the West misread the impact of the *glasnost* and *perestroika* in Russia and of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 in China, i.e., autocracy of Russia's Vladimir Putin and China's Xi Jinping. The later stage goes deeper into domestic society, which is called glocalization, i.e., local society partially accommodates portions of global forces. A domestic society has different capacities to accommodate globalization. Take Japan. Japan does not produce most mineral resources like oil, coal, iron ore, nuclear energy resources, and agricultural products like wheat, beans, corn, meat, and milk. Thus for Japan to sustain itself, Japan needs to export a lot of advanced manufactured goods like good automobiles, special steel, petrochemical products like fertilizers, paper, ink, precision machines, and comprehensively service-oriented packages of infrastructure construction like assisting financing, liaising parts-producing factories, designing roads, ports, and airports. Most monetary transactions go through US dollars. Thus US Federal Reserve policy of interest rates and ever-changing world commodity prices must be paid careful attention to. Furthermore, to live harmoniously with the United States as well as to show the United States that Japan is a reliable stakeholder of the US-led liberal world order, Japan has been trying its purchase of US Treasury bonds, stable and effective at high order. This configuration of how Japan has been dependent on the rest of the world by vigorous exports has not been changing very much. Thus Japan pays good attention to tariffs and trade since its coerced opening of the country in 1853 and 1858. Western powers coerced Japan with those bilateral treaties with high tariffs on many commodities from Japan and no tariffs on many

commodities to Japan. When Japan's silk products, its top earner of Japan's export fees, were traded free of tariffs, Western powers' products were imported with high tariffs by Japan. These unequal treaties on tariff autonomy was rectified in 1921, only after Japan's participation in World War I. After World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade adopted the universal principle of most favored nation clause, whereby on a same commodity the most favored tariff rate is universally applied to all states. In 1964 Japan joined the OECD, a club of the developed North along with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of International Settlement. The same year all the debt to the World Bank was paid back and the Tokyo Olympic Games were successfully held. No one would have thought that Japan was one of those countries to which the GATT principle was not applied. In 1994, one year the renewed World Trade Organization was established, the Franco-Japanese commercial treaty was revised on this exception of the most favored nation clause in that treaty (Yanai, 2022).

In the third millennium deep globalization kept digging deeper and deeper. Not only the United States but also many states waved the flag of globalization with their niche goods and services competing to permeate other societies. The once-a-decade-kind of cycle of busts taking place somewhere on the Earth, Japan in 1991, East and Southeast Asia in 1997, the US and the entire world in 2008, and Europe in 2014, and the entire world in 2022, the last of which was triggered by the combination of the global warming of land, ocean and atmosphere due to vast emission of carbon dioxide (Manabe & Broccoli, 2020), the China-US trade and technology competition (Bergsten, 2022), the global diffusion of Corona affected death tolls easily registering higher than the US death tolls in World War II (Singer & Small, 1972) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US-led sanctions thereupon (Kawato, 2022). It looks as if the global liberal order were gradually replaced by the global complex disorder. In many countries the combination of protectionism, isolationism, racism, and authoritarianism occasionally reign supreme. US President Donald Trump calling for global decoupling against China on trade and technology has been negatively affecting the world economy (Solingen, 2021). But the global market forces seem to indicate the strength of recovery and reconfiguration as Australia's example working through market forces effectively against China's sanctions. Into the millennium globalization has become hyper-globalization. Globalization has reached and permeated wherever it is possible to make a path through barriers and overcoming decoupling, sanctions, countersanctions, protectionism, isolationism, authoritarianism, racism, through market forces. But once market size poses difficulties like those of the United States, Japan, Russia, and China, market forces exacerbate other problems such as widening income gaps within and across nations and creates many serious problems.

We conceptualize multilateral treaty participation, i.e., promulgation and ratification as a quasi-legislative vote to a quasi-parliamentary body to the institution and agency of multilateral treaty participation. It is very important to stress the point that multilateral treaty participation is an institution to enhance many of its functions in domestic society and global society and at the same time is a vehicle and an agency to design, implement, and adapt both to domestic society and global society, both of

which change under hyper-globalization, i.e., science and technology, democracy, international law, and human rights. Thus our first volume has a title: *The Development of Global Legislative Politics: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global*. Until our works have come out (Inoguchi, 2022 this volume; Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021), there was no similar work with conceptualization, measurement and implementation by solid and systematic empirical data and simple statistics.

More operationally, the difference of ratification and promulgation inverted after that difference plus one constitutes the key of our formulation. Not only one or two states but the 193 United Nations member states are involved in the multilateral treaty participation system of voting a quasi-legislative vote in a quasi-parliamentary body call the United Nations multilateral treaty system. Hence the sub-title of our first volume: Rousseau and Locke Writ Global. This is called the willingness factor. Willingness is simultaneously taken into consideration by the state and the parliament along with the six global policy domains: human rights, labor and health, commerce, trade and communication, environment, intellectual property, and the ten world regions: Sinic East, Indic East, Islamic East, Orthodox East, Old West, New West, Reformed West, Returned West, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America. The former gives some treaty joiners the freedom of voicing aspirational bonding (solidarity call) and some other joiners reconfirming the obligations of abiding by certain practices and registering measurements (mutual binding). The World Health Organization make it an obligation to report, say, infantile death rate and total fertility rate. The World Intellectual Property Organization makes it obligatory to register patents, scientific inventions and technological innovations. The ten geo-cultural regions indicate the affiliation of one of ten groups. Affiliated groups give benefits and demerits of being of an affiliated membership. The legislative types are the factor-analyzing score of each of the 193 states and three major dimensions are (1) speed (cautious vs agile), angle (global commons vs individual interests) and strategy (aspirational bonding vs mutual binding). What matters in this exercise is that the result makes sense enormously well especially in light of some findings as follows:

6.1 Central Asia: Legislative Type

Central Asia is thinly regionally institutionalized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan). The latter has evolved to the Collective Security Treaty Organization founded in 2022 with the mission of peace-keeping covering a larger member of the former Soviet Union. The former is constituted by mostly Central Asian states in Central Asia. The latter comprises Russia and Belarus, and some central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. As long as Central Asian states here examined work in unison even if these institutions do not have much in agreement or discussion. All are cautious and slow and they are suspicious of one another as well as internally. Their speed is of capitalized A. Most surprising is their angle: all are of

b, interested in global commons. Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are full of mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas. Without global eyes wide-open and careful at global investment firms in those states, one cannot sustain themselves well. Their strategy is again of mutual binding type. People live in small tribal communities separately with horses and most recently drones and for postal delivery and with PCs for internet and email giving them a modicum of connectivity. But their basic suspicion outside their tribal communities leaves at the equilibrium between Russia in politics and security and China in economics and financing. Russia's intervention in the latest Kazakhstani upward price protest, Russia's intervention in Kyrgyzstan's "colored revolution", Mongolia's party political disturbance where the Mongolian President burnt the Prime Minister's party headquarters buildings, Turkmenistan's succession moving toward establishing a hereditary monarchy, etc.

6.2 South Asia: Legislative Type

The regionwide institutional body representative of South Asia is the, South Asian Regional Council (SAAC), which has existed for long years but the substance of meetings is rather empty with discussions very limited. Most of the regional members are cautious and slow. They are of capitalized A in terms of speed: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. The exceptions are of non-capitalized a, represented by India, Nepal, and Pakistan. India is a big country with British-style smallish but reasonably meritocratic bureaucracy; Nepal is a parliamentary republic with the government led by the coalition recently headed by the Nepali Communist Party dealing with all the problems facing a small country sandwiched between India and China, two giants. Pakistan is a fragmented society and its politics is full of their passion. Their decision is fast and agile relatively speaking as long as the military (single-minded) or non-military (like those headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto and Imran Khan (resigned in May 2022) handle matters with good logic and passion and as long as they do not override what the military speaks or the radical Islamists preach, their destiny is determined by myriads of daily life and economic difficulties). As for angle, only Pakistan is of non-capitalized b instead of capitalized B. Pakistan is of global commons keenly interested in global policy trends of climate change, religious awakening (Islamic), American or Russian or Chinese decline. As for strategy, only Afghanistan and Nepal are of type non-capitalized c representing mutual binding instead of aspirational bonding. Afghanistan has been in incessant civil-cum-international wars to capture power back; the Taliban now is in power but needs a good strategy.

6.3 Southeast Asia: Legislative Types

Southeast Asia is most diverse in legislative type. Those belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is accustomed relatively speaking to abide by two big principles: ASEAN centrality and non-interference in internal affairs. Many of those like the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos follow this in terms of speed, i.e., fast and agile. They act in unison like most European Union members in its East and in its South do. Those with A are resource-rich (Brunei, Malaysia), or young (Timor-Leste) or unstable (Myanmar), or communist. Those with the global commons angle are of resource-rich (Indonesia and Malaysia, Papua New Guinea), dexterous in financing and consulting services (Singapore), or good old bureaucracy (the Philippines, Thailand). Those with non-capitalized c in the three characters are resource-rich (Brunei, Indonesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea), or Timor-Leste (isolated), or Singapore and Vietnam (meritocratic). They are very careful about what is necessary to join in the multilateral treaty system.

6.4 East Asia: Legislative Types

Three types exist in East Asia. Legislative type ending with non-capitalized c include Vietnam, Singapore, Mongolia, North Korea, and Japan. They prefer multilateral treaties with mutual binding type. They belong to those groups who find it harmonious to their instinct and institutions to clarify joiners' obligations. They are respectively communist, or meritocratic, or mineral resource-rich, or natural resource-poor. Legislative type with non-capitalized b in the middle of three characters are those whose angle of looking at the world is global commons, not individual interests. They are Singapore, China, Japan, and South Korea. They are big powers with their respective roles as being interested in enhancing the scope of global commons. Legislative type starting with non-capitalized a in the first of three characters are those whose speed of thinking and handling matters of multilateral treaties is fast and agile rather than cautious and slow. They are Singapore, China, and Japan. Relatively they have relatively good bureaucracy and meritocracy (Calder & Ye, 2010; Pempel, 2021; Rozman, 2004, 2022).

6.5 Central Asia

Current member Afghanistan's legislative type is ABc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Kazakhstan's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Kyrgyzstan's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle,

and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Mongolia's legislative type is *Abc*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Tajikistan's legislative type is *Abc*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Turkmenistan's legislative type is *Abc*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy.

Except Afghanistan with the legislative type of *Abc*, meaning cautious speed and individual interest asserting angle, all the rest are with the legislative type, *Abc*, meaning cautious in speed, global commons in angle, and mutual binding in strategy. In other words, the speed is that of old bureaucratic socialism, the angle is up to the global prices of mineral resources, the protectionist economic system, the strategy is that of mutual binding, not having affordable government revenue, and sensitive to not easily predictable and controllable mineral resources global pricing.

6.6 South Asia

Member candidate Afghanistan's legislative type, *Abc*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Bangladesh's legislative type, *ABC*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Bhutan's legislative type, *ABC*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member India's legislative type, *aBC*, meaning that (1) agile in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member the Maldives's legislative type, *ABC*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Nepal's legislative type, *aBc*, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Pakistan's legislative type, *abC*, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Sri Lanka's legislative type, *AbC*, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy.

South Asia is full of A-type and B-type legislative types. A-type is cautious in joining treaties, in part because of difficult situations, especially poor infrastructure for handling them. B-type seems to be caused by the overall protectionist system prompting those countries to tenaciously assert themselves rather than trying to seek global solutions. There are six countries out of eight, choosing the strategy of aspirational bonding. Those countries choosing mutual binding strategy are Afghanistan and Nepal. Afghanistan's government revenue relies heavily on Kabul receiving aid from the United States and its allies roughly 6 million dollars worth and the government controlling only 15% of Afghanistan, which is mostly Kabul and those northern areas bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 25, 2021, p. 3). Nepal is governed by a coalition government, frequently headed by the Nepali Communist Party.

6.7 Southeast Asia

Member candidate Papua New Guinea's legislative type is abC, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual bonding in strategy. Member candidate Timor-Leste's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Brunei's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and mutual binding in strategy. Current member Malaysia's legislative type is AbC, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Myanmar's legislative type is ABC, meaning that (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member the Philippines's legislative type is abC, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Singapore's legislative type is abc, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Thailand's legislative type is abC, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member Vietnam's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy.

Southeast Asia is full of diversities. Those endowed with fossil and mineral resources seem to be characterized with small b-type legislative types: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. Those strong at human resources given per-capita-income level seem to be characterized with small b-type: Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand. Cambodia and Laos export migrants to Thailand. The Philippines exports nurses, medical doctors, and domestic workers to Gulf countries, the United States, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Many of these countries are geopolitically swing states. Just as they are sensitive to global commons, they swing to the changing military balance. Thailand for one is sensitive to the rise of China. So is Singapore, balancing all major powers, including the tide of global market forces.

6.8 East Asia

Member candidate Vietnam's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Member candidate Singapore's legislative type is abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Member candidate Mongolia's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) Individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member China's legislative type is abC, meaning (1) agile in speed, (2) individual interests in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy. Current member North Korea's legislative type is Abc, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) Individual interests in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member Japan's legislative type is abc, meaning (1) agile in speed,

(2) global commons in angle, and (3) mutual binding in strategy. Current member South Korea's legislative type is AbC, meaning (1) cautious in speed, (2) global commons in angle, and (3) aspirational bonding in strategy.

East Asia's legislative types are most distinguished by c or C, meaning the third strategy dimension is either mutual binding strategy or aspiration bonding strategy. Japan and Singapore belong to the former c-type and those belonging to its variant are Vietnam and Mongolia with C-type. The former is based on strong capitalism with the flavor of late-comer state capitalism or monitory capitalism (Keane, 2009, 2022) whereas the latter is based on former bureaucratic socialism or political capitalism (Milanović, 2019). China and South Korea have the common element of aspirational bonding strategy, economic and political.

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Chapter 7

Four Regionalisms: Legislative Types Salience



Six global policy domains consist of three kinds of policy domains: (A) Those domains that contain certain percentages of clauses that would bind signatories to abide by them and which are old in the history of multilateral treaties and whose specialized organizations routinely monitor such issues as working hours, health conditions, trade volumes and violations, and dispute resolutions: labor and health, and trade, commerce, and communications. (B) Those domains that contain certain percentages of clauses that are meant to bind signatories with aspirational solidarity and that are old in the history of multilateral treaties: human rights, and peace and disarmament. (C) Those policy domains that are relatively new, that is, came after the Cold War and in the third millennium and that require those high levels of scientific, legal, ethical, economic and global knowledge and expertise, and that require personnel adept at handling issues with authority and sensitivity. They are the environment and intellectual property.

We have six policy domains in 600 multilateral treaties: labor and health, human rights, the environment, peace and disarmament, intellectual property, trade, commerce and communications. We use z-score by sub-regions. Z-score, based on TPI or treaty participation index, $z = (TPI - \mu) / \sigma$ is used for profiling each member state. The score is standardized with zero mean and one standard deviation for 193 sovereign states. In other words, if the z-score is negative, it means the sub-region is not active in treaty participation. If the z-score is positive, it means that the sub-region is active in treaty participation. We have six domains: labor and health, human rights, the environment, peace and disarmament, intellectual property, trade, commerce and communication.

Labor and health domain treaties and trade, commerce and communications treaties tend to have those clauses that would discourage a certain kind of state from joining such treaties. Such labor and health treaties participants are required annually to report the state of working hours and health conditions to the World Health Organization and achieve minimum levels of labor and health in light of categories of participatory states. Such trade, commerce, and communications treaties participants

need to adhere to a certain set of criteria to promote liberalism and to curtail protectionism in trade and investment. The average of participants in the former kinds of treaties is about 30% of 193 sovereign states. The average of participants in the latter is about 20% of 193 sovereign states. The average of participation in 600 multilateral treaties is about 30%. Those treaties whose clauses contain many aspirational bondings of sovereign state participants do so without issuing constraining clauses. They are human rights and peace and disarmament. Those policy domains highlighted anew in the third millennium, i.e., the environment and intellectual property tend to contain a certain set of clauses discouraging those “free riders” in alleviating climate change and promoting innovations and inventions.

Two rich countries, China and South Korea, have avoided being categorized as part of the group of the developed North. They are ranked world number one and nine in terms of GNP. The average z-score on the human rights domain is negative, largely because The United Nations Declaration and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization mostly because these organizations started to be open to all Third World members. The Philippines and Papua New Guinea were not independent when the UN Declaration was issued. The People’s Republic of China inherited UN membership when the Republic of China ceased to be an UN member. Both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea joined the United Nations in 1992. The Socialist Republic of Mongolia joined the United Nations in 1956, along with Japan as a new representative of the Eastern and Western bloc respectively. Mongolia changed its name and regime thereafter. Vietnam changed its regime and its name after it unified militarily the entire North and South Vietnam in 1975 and joined the United Nations in 1977.

7.1 Central Asia

Central Asia registers negative z -scores mostly in the six policy domains, that is, Central Asia is passive in the labor and health domain, the environment domain, the trade and commerce and communications domains, the intellectual property domain, the human rights domain and the peace and disarmament domain. With the exception of Afghanistan and Mongolia, most of Central Asia used to be the Soviet Union’s constitutive republics, where they used to have strong ties with Moscow. Mongolia departed from perfect subjugation and protection much earlier than the rest. Afghanistan has been under incessant foreign country interference: Britain in the late nineteenth century, the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, and the United States, in the 2000s and the 2010s until 2021.

Looking through all the scores of Central Asia, it is immediately clear that they are negative and close to zero. It means that Central Asian states’ participation in multilateral treaties are passive and sparse. It befits the sparse populations, deserts, plains, and mountains of Central Asia. Two exceptions are Mongolia and Afghanistan. Mongolia moved to a pluralistic party system or electoral democracy in 1991 with a former

socialist bureaucratic system's legacy visible here and there, though. This is why z-scores tend to be negative but almost close to zero. More recently in June 2021 election, Mongolian president Khurelsukh of the Mongolian People's Party and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to continue enhancing strategies related to the mineral industry to mineral sectors especially the uranium industry (Symeonidis, 2021). In 2019 an informal understanding was reached with then Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev that Russia would help facilitate Mongolia's nuclear power generation. Whether Mongolia turns to China or Russia in developing nuclear capacity is an issue Khurelsukh has to face. First, Mongolia after 1989 has committed itself to an anti-nuclear policy at the United Nations. Also the recently announced *Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C* (IPCC, 2018) was declared to promote the defossilization worldwide. Khurelsukh faces a dilemma.

Afghanistan registers positive z-scores on labor and health and human rights. After all, Kabul used to be the crossroads enabling merchants to prosper and militarized tribes to conquer the surrounding areas and further toward India. The Taliban-controlled Kabul used to be protected by US armed forces, plus Tajiks and Uzbeks who manned Kabul and its vicinity while those areas east of Kabul (leading to Pakistan), west of Kabul (leading to Iran), and south of Kabul (deeply Pashtun territory and further to Iran) are inhabited by the ethnic majorities, Pashtun, and Taliban and other Islamic forces like al-Qaida throughout Afghanistan. The Shia-minority Hazaras are persecuted by Pashtuns and by the Taliban. Once the US forces have withdrawn, Afghanistan's z-scores will be close to other Central Asian countries.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan can be called the core of Central Asia. Unlike Mongolia and Afghanistan, they constitute the former Soviet Union's mineral, agricultural, infrastructural, and commercial centers in Central Asia. Mineral resources abound there, especially in Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan rich, in abundant water resources, excels in cotton and cloth production. Uzbekistan is also rich in petroleum and gas resources around the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in competition for leadership in Central Asia. Kazakhstan has recently added infrastructure to strengthen its position: (1) Kazakhstan is a signatory to the Eurasian Economic Union along with Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. More recently, Kazakhstan has been established as the key station on the Belt-Road Initiative of China to Europe, with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, attached thereto. Kazakhstan's inclination to lean to Europe is evidenced by this active membership and the shift from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet. At the same time, Kazakhstan ranks as the number one borrower within Central Asia for a huge amount of money for infrastructure enhancement from China. When the Russia-Ukrainian military war caused the rise of prices leading to large protesters to go anti-government wildly, President Tokayev asked the Russian military to put them down by the treaty of the Eurasian Cooperation and Security Organization. Yet in a week or so, Tokayev ordered the Russian military to pull back to Russia. Most recently in August 2022, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan executed joint military exercise with the US. Kyrgyzstan has adopted a pluralistic electoral democracy, like Mongolia, albeit occasional instabilities arise due to difficulty within the leadership to exert executive control. Kyrgyzstan registers a huge number of remittances

coming from those working in Moscow or Almaty (Kazakhstan). Income inequality has been very high and political instabilities have often taken place. Tokayev became president after the founding president Akayev resigned due to the Tulip revolution. Kyrgyzstan registers a positive z-score in intellectual property. This shows they have a strong interest in making the best use of innovations and inventions associated with foreign investors in mineral and other resources. (2) Uzbekistan has most recently joined the agreement with the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to consult where an US airbase could be located after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2021. Uzbekistan is located north of Afghanistan and constitutionally it has banned foreign countries from establishing military bases within their national borders. Since 2013 when President Kalimov was succeeded by President Mirziyoyev, the successor started cautious reform and especially with regard to the accommodating of foreign investment in Uzbekistan, and promoted economic development and allowed currency exchanges transactions and moderating mass media regulations. Whether Mirziyoyev will further promote democratic reform depends on to what extent he can successfully satisfy people who live daily life with strong ties with tribal community groups. Once migration from Afghanistan increases in number and strife over who will get reform's benefits most and least, the government will be forced to be high-handed on suppressing such strife (*Mainichi Shinbun*, November 28, 2021, p. 7). Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are located in the peripheries of Central Asia. Turkmenistan is located by the Caspian Sea and is endowed with vast reserves of petroleum and gas. It is run by a dictatorial system. When US President Donald Trump wielded power, his leadership style was caricatured as Trumpmenbashi after Turkmenistan deceased dictator Niyazov, known as Turkmenbashi (leader of the Turkmens). Succeeding Saparmurat Niyazov, *Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov* appointed his son, Serdar Berdymukhamedov as Deputy Prime Minister for Economy and Finance. Then this seems to be a first step to establish a monarchy in Turkmenistan. Tajikistan is a tiny mountainous state adjoined by China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan. A large number of Tajiks migrate to Moscow and work in restaurants and low-wage jobs. Tajikistan has contracts with China to build infrastructure. One of China's aims seems to be building roads with monitoring systems whereby the Taliban and other terrorists are deterred from penetrating into the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region where the Chinese government has been suppressing Islamic people's religion as being harmful to the national harmony of the People's Republic of China.

7.2 South Asia

South Asia is very populous and demographically expansionary. South Asians are known for their passion and aspiration, the z-score of which on the human rights domain manifests itself very positively. The z-score on the labor and health domain is negative, which reveals that most populations have not been benefitting enough from multilateral treaties in the labor and health domain.

South Asia is often characterized as the “region without borders” (Pande, 2019), meaning that national borders are neither tight nor solid. People can migrate to neighboring states like many Indians migrate to Nepal and terrorists come to India from Pakistan. China and India have had territorial border disputes for a long time and so have India and Pakistan. Although Bangladesh won independence from Pakistan in 1971, it was called a “garbage bin” of the world for years. Yet Bangladesh has become an emerging fast-developing country in the third millennium. Its performance has been much better than India’s and Pakistan’s, despite handicaps of unfavorable conditions like seasonal floods of the Ganges Delta, where two large rivers, the Brahmaputra and then Meghna, meet (the space where two rivers meet is called *sangham* in Hindi), monsoon-related occasional land disasters (especially where high hills meet the sea within limited land space like Chittagon), lower per-capita-income level, and the arrival of one million Rohingya from Myanmar after years of persecution. In India, people have speculated, half-jokingly, that since the East Bengal state (i.e., Bangladesh) has positively managed its economic development post-independence, some other regions and ethnic groups within India like West Bengali, Sikhs, Punjabs, and Tamils can also easily aspire to national independence. They manifest a strong sense of identity and action-prone behavior, such as rejecting the dominance of the Indian National Congress party and prompted a Sikh terrorist to assassinate Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. Now the aggressive policy of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led the Dalits, one of the lowest castes, to organize their union workers in Haryana, a neighboring state to Uttar Pradesh and New Delhi, to refuse to supply water to New Delhi. The BJP government policy has kept Bengal communists, a majority party in the state parliament of West Bengal against the BJP federal government policy of allocating a big amount of money of disaster relief to BJP-dominant, demographically much smaller adjacent states other than West Bengal state, a disaster-prone state. The South Asian Regional Cooperative Organization has been functioning for a long time. South Asia has a variety of identities that holds members together. Arundhati Roy’s novel, entitled *Kings of Small Things* (Roy, 1997) has vividly and skillfully illustrated how Indians carefully keep their sub-national identity alive and active. In the United States and in the United Kingdom, these groups have produced the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley (a Sikh), the US vice-President Kamala Harris (a Tamil mother and a Jamaican father), many CEOs in the giant information service industry, 80% of the US truck drivers union dominated by Punjabis, and UK cabinet ministers, including the two successive chancellors of the exchequer.

India inherited from British India the practice of maintaining a relatively small group of military officers and diplomats in comparison with the total population. Yet India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, all former British colonies, participated in multilateral treaties in the heyday of the non-alignment movement, above what most other states with comparable levels of GNP did. They experienced pre-independence politics and diplomacy under British colonial years. That is why these states register positive z-scores in the domains of labor and health, human rights, peace and disarmament. In contrast, Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives register negative and low figures on the whole. Nepal has undergone frequent regime change, and currently is practicing

multiparty parliamentary politics with a coalition government, frequently headed by communists. Bhutan's politics is monarchical authoritarian and its economic policy is protectionist, thus z-scores registered negative and passive. The Maldives is a multi-ethnic oligarchical family-dominant democracy. The key agenda of the Maldives is climate change. It faces an existential threat that has accelerated (IPCC, 2021). Not in 30 years, but in 5–10 years, all the islands of the Maldives may be covered by rising seawater, the IPCC report estimates. No wonder the Maldives' participation in those multilateral treaties in the environment domain is very positive. In the Climate Summit at Glasgow, Scotland, in November 2021, the Maldives representative's protest conveyed its message very strongly.

India has been proclaiming “neighborhood first diplomacy” for years in Narendra Modi's diplomatic efforts. Yet compared to other regional powers like China, the slogan has remained only slightly more than a slogan until 2022. Taking advantage of India's industrial power as exemplified by such manufacturing such as steel, electric automobiles, smart phones, aircraft carriers, with Japanese (Suzuki) and American (Apple) direct investment and Russian military assistance respectively, India has become successful in making India's power as an aspirant global power imprinted in such meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, G7 and the Quad in Economic Framework in 2022 without their pushback (Mashal, 2022). China has been pushing its infrastructure building projects and its vigorous export product policies. Of the infrastructure construction projects, the military and commercial ports construction standout: Gwarda links Pakistan and such oil-producing states as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Cooperation Council states, thus opening oil imports from the Middle East without having to bother too much with the Malacca Straits and other straits in Southeast Asia where the US Navy is predominant. The Ham Bantora port in Sri Lanka is a key midpoint in the Indian Ocean. The Rakhine state in Myanmar is the closest link with China at ports skirting US-dominant Southeast Asia and East Asia. Rakhine is the disputed area of Myanmar where a vast number of Rakhine people, about half a million, have been persecuted by the Myanmar military and people. They have been driven out of the Rakhine area to Bangladesh's southern most small islands. China has been consolidating its maritime silk road since the Indo-Pacific strategy, shaped by President Joe Biden but including major actors, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), i.e., the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, who are not quite ready to constrain China with resolve. The very reason why the United States has issued this strategy is that the resolve of the United States has been to enhance her own internal economic and social recovery. The United States is correctly aware that immediately dispatching US power in the Indo-Pacific areas is no match against China in the short term without help from its allies. NATO allies, like the UK, France, and Germany, sensing the enormous economic markets in East and Southeast Asia plus South Asia and Central Asia, have rushed to send whatever naval vessels such as fighters, destroyers, frigates with and without air force carriers to Asia to conduct joint naval exercises and to visit Asia for a show of force, with the QUAD. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan started without fanfare, focusing on the full takeover by Taliban forces of the Kabul government, not backed up by the United States, but by two minorities in Afghanistan, the Tajiks

and Uzbeks, which heavily constituted the Kabul government. The Taliban forces attacked remote cities, quickly advancing on Kabul and its takeover, not allowing US troops to control the Bagram Airbase to execute a full withdrawal. The United States, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan started to consult about the creation of another US airbase in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan's constitution, allowing foreign armed forces to control its air ports is prohibited.

Despite all the stories, pessimistic in the short run, the long-term strength of South Asia is its population prospect. Mark Haas (2007) shows that in 2050 only two major powers will boast potential demographic bases, i.e., India, with a high total reproductive ratio, and the United States, helped by an incessant flow of immigrants to its country. China has started to manifest accelerated trends of demographic decline. China under Deng Xiaoping waved the banner of a one-child policy per couple. Then Xi Jinping recently announced a shift to a policy allowing three children. However, the popular reaction, particularly among the young people, was very negative. With the current income level, they cannot afford to raise more than one child. The aging population is living much longer, with the result that couples are feeling the heavy burden of caring for two sets of elderly parents. On top of this filial responsibility, raising more than one child in an extremely competitive educational system is not possible. Their answer to coping with life's burdens, half jokingly, is not to work hard but to spend more time sleeping. This alarms Chinese strategists.

7.3 Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is number 2 next to East Asia in terms of GNP. Yet multilateral treaty participation is not exceedingly active. Its sub-regional organizations have been proliferating themselves since the Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) established in 1989. Although ASEAN was established in 1968, it took time for it to boast of the ASEAN Centrality in one of its principles. Because of its own diversity and because they are surrounded by major powers, ASEAN puts forward non-interference in domestic affairs and the ASEAN Centrality. Although it is a little odd to say, the ASEAN posture sounds a bit like the US doctrines of George Washington's disentanglement policy and the Monroe Doctrine. Singapore has joined one of the fewest multilateral treaties per year within this group.

Southeast Asia boasts of its diversity. Looking back to one of the original impetuses in the establishment of ASEAN there are the disputes among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore as to whether a loosely federated entity could be constructed. When the idea naturally occurred that British Malaya, British Sabah, British Sarawak, British Brunei, and British Singapore might get together, British Brunei, run by strong sultans and lured by the promise of petroleum riches from British-led companies, decided it did not want to support the idea. British Singapore agreed first to the idea, but a year later opted out for independence. Indonesia, under Sukarno, long aspired to make Indonesia greater by creating a federation with Eastern Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak, and Labuan) on Borneo's big islands. Sukarno

portrayed the imagined geographies of Indonesia as being far greater than Indonesia. It would stretch from the Galápagos Islands where Charles Darwin did fieldwork off Peru in the southern Pacific to Madagascar, 400 km off the coast of East Africa in the Indian Ocean. Indonesia, under Sukarno espoused fervent nationalism as well as support for the non-alignment movement. The Sukarno axis of the non-alignment movement was Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Beijing. Sukarno was totally immersed in foreign affairs, neglecting domestic politics. Underneath his leadership, Indonesian communists expanded as a Sukarno ally and as executors of grassroots-level social policy. Alarmed, the military under General Suharto suppressed alleged communists steadily by carrying out massacres, village by village in 1965–1966. The Philippines had territorial disputes on northern Borneo and was steadily becoming more involved in the Vietnam War. Malaysia was in the mood of preparing for independence after the long anti-Chinese communists' suppression of 1948–1960 while internally debating with some bitterness Malay privilege and sultans' primacy and their roles in the formation of a Malaysian Federation. Thailand, one of the five founding fathers of ASEAN, was busy with one coup d'état after another as the equilibrium of the monarchy, the military, and the millionaires of Bangkok dwindled with the impacts of social and economic changes and the Vietnam War. They witnessed all these experiences on the eve of the birth of ASEAN. The Bangkok Declaration or the ASEAN Charter was announced in this atmosphere. In other words, ASEAN was born primarily as defensive, constraining themselves from acting unilaterally. After 1967, another five members joined: Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

Turning back to participation in the six policy domains and the latest joiners to ASEAN. Brunei is on the whole passive in joining multilateral treaty participation. With a population of 300,000, its massive petroleum and natural gas resources provides good care to its citizens and as a typical rentier state the sultans do not need to tax the people. Cambodia shows positive z-scores in peace and disarmament and intellectual property. It is a state that has experienced many years of turmoil under monarchy and brutal communist rule, eventually evolving into an authoritarian electoral democracy under the United Nations-guided election in 1991. The two domains that register positive z-scores are symbolic in that Cambodia positively participated in the peace and disarmament domain and in the intellectual property domain. The former shows that the UN-guided peace settlement was effective and the latter shows that despite the dwindling water levels of the Tonlé Sap Lake and the Mekong River, which symbolizes the further decline of the Cambodian empire sitting in the center of the Indochinese Peninsula, Cambodia strives to seek innovations and inventions with positive participation in the domain defining intellectual property and regulating costs and benefits registering intellectual property-related innovations and inventions. Laos' z-score registers positive for peace and disarmament. Sandwiched by major powers Vietnam and Thailand and most recently by China, Laos cannot afford to overlook how the Mekong River and currencies flow. The level of the Mekong River has been dwindling measurably fast because of the sudden acceleration of climate change and because of upper-stream states constructing power station dams. The currencies that used to be dominant were Thai and Vietnamese currencies. Now the Chinese

currency has been competing with the other two. Myanmar, the former empire of Burma, has been registering multilateral treaty participation z-scores all passively. Myanmar gained independence from British Burma early after World War II. From Myanmar came U Thant as the third United Nations secretary general. The state was run by Buddhist socialist rhetoric until General Ne Win took power by a coup d'état. By Buddhist socialism is meant the slow economic development with thinly manned bureaucracy with a Buddhist mindset. Myanmar's biggest problem, then and now, is that minorities represent about 50% of the total population that do not support the idea of the Burmans running Myanmar. As the largest group, the Burmans govern the state with a numerical majority and without federal arrangement at the center (then Rangoon and Yangon, now Nepideau). The military was and is the sole social group that answers to Ne Wu. When ethnic minorities rebel, which social groups can cope with them effectively? General Ne Win answered the military. Since then onward, the military has been holding power without attempts at a federal arrangement (He et al., 2007). The military à la British colonial government is an army tiny in number and its equipment old-fashioned, its training was not modernized, its morale is not high enough thus it has become a mere stakeholder. Given the long period with no war vis-à-vis foreign states, the army has become a small-scale business company as many business firms were not born under Buddhist socialism. When the democratically elected New Democratic Party was born, it became the enemy of the military as it is bound to reduce the military's business. Nevertheless, it has two domains, labor and health, and human rights, which register a negative score but with a very small number. Since Myanmar joined the UN early, they joined the key declaratory treaties (UN, WHO, UNESCO). Vietnam, another latecomer to the UN, has three noteworthy z-scores in labor and health domain, the environment domain, and the trade, commerce and communications domain. The labor and health domain is one of the most important domains that would enhance the entire population in physical and mental health and strength. The environmental domain is another important domain that would enhance the physical basis of space and its utilization. The trade, commerce, and communication domain is another critical domain as Vietnam strives to achieve highly competitive industries. Timing is apt. First, since the confrontation between the United States and China has been escalating, foreign investment in China has flowed from China to third countries, including Vietnam. Second, Vietnam has been endeavoring to use socialist bureaucratic northern Vietnam and capitalist-leaning southern Vietnam more effectively. Since the start of the *Doi Moi* policy in 1986 and since peace on the two fronts, northern vis-à-vis China, against which Vietnam fought in 1979 and with which Vietnam agreed peace in 1984, and southern vis-à-vis Cambodia, which Vietnam occupied for nearly a decade (1978–1986), was achieved.

Turning to ASEAN's founding members, Indonesia has been quiet since it joined the association in 1967. In a contrasting manner to Sukarno, Suharto his successor has remained quiet about Indonesia's foreign policy and has focused on domestic affairs. Indonesia's quasi-legislative behavior type is abc, meaning that speed is agile, angle is that of global commons, and strategy is that of mutual binding. In other words, mutual binding means to join multilateral treaties whose primary aim

is to commit itself with multilateral treaties whose participants are equally bound by certain clauses. Indonesia's strategy is the same with Singapore, Vietnam as well as Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia. The strategy of ASEAN has been defensive: centrality of ASEAN and non-interference in internal affairs. Singapore takes it seriously as it was born out of turmoil with its neighbors, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as within Singapore itself, which was sharply split between those leaning to socialists-communists and the rest of the People's Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew (2000). Vietnam was a newcomer to ASEAN and Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978–1986 delayed its joining the association (its military occupation of other states is against the Bangkok Declaration of 1967) and its reform policy that formally started in 1986. Japan had been hesitant to join many multilateral treaties until the third millennium because its key alliance has been with the United States, which was probably long suspicious of a multilateralist Japan that might jeopardize the security alliance between the two states (hence the slogan of “bilateralism at any costs” held tightly by Japan until around the mid-2000s (Inoguchi, 2007)). Also, the economic prosperity of Japan has long been regarded as critically dependent on US-Japan trade relations, the US dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis the Japanese yen, US sanctions on certain countries, certain business firms, and certain individuals, the US's ability of setting guidelines and criteria on a number of multilateral issues, and more vaguely on the soft power of the United States. In economic diplomacy GATT-based universalism was announced a failure and the newly constructed WTO-based new rules have been found to be ineffective. Thus in Asia jump-starting on bilateral and mini-multilateral regional groupings have flourished: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Central Asian states aforementioned are a former ally or former constitutive republic of the former Soviet Union, and, hence, it is no wonder that they make it a rule of a sort to pay utmost attention to Russia's direction. Once China emerged as a rising power in Central Asia and the other regions, more multilateral treaties have garnered attention. Once the Belt and Road Initiative was launched by China (Calder & Ye, 2010; Ye, 2020), once the South China Sea and the East China Sea disputes were highlighted (Corr, 2018; Hayton, 2014), once racial minority issues were highlighted for Xinjiang-Uyghurs and others, the US-China trade-technology confrontation came to the fore. The Indo-Pacific vision and strategy have been slowly conceptualized by Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, other Western powers, the UK, France, and Germany, were brought in. Once Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States consulted on the need to locate an airbase in Central Asia after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, multilateralism is bound to have more space. Uzbekistan does not accommodate constitutionally these air bases of foreign countries. Indonesia's participation in multilateral treaties has not been so positive. Yet two policy domains are specially noteworthy: intellectual property and the environment. These two are relatively new to the United Nations. As Indonesia's democratization after Suharto, B.J. Habibie, Abdulrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Joko Widodo accumulate more experience, economic and technological advances will become

highlighted. Although still domestic affairs-oriented, the environment is a big issue in Indonesia, with huge swaths of forests being burned for development, extended coastlines possibly threatened by rising seawater, huge land space needing massive infrastructure consolidation, including rapid trains between Jakarta-Bandung and between Jakarta-Jogjakarta, and a new planned capital city on the Kalimantan or Borneo Islands, *Nusantara*, as well as the need to meet the ICPP's target of decarbonization by 2050 in order to attain a 1.5 °C reduction in temperature. President Joko Widodo has been keen on a new planned capital city, *Nusantara*, on the Borneo islands. Jokowi was a wood-retailer in Solo, Central Java before he experienced the mayor of Solo, the governor of Jakarta, and the President of Indonesia successively. Having coped with Jakarta's myriads of problems, e.g., vast slam areas, daily traffic congestions, fast—train construction between Jakarta and Bandung, and the rise of sea level threatening good portions of Jakarta, it is not surprising that Jokowi has come up with a new capital city to be constructed *de novo* after deforesting jungles on the Borneo islands (Bland, 2021). No less important, intellectual property is a priority policy domain. The first president after Suharto was Habibbi, who was keen, in part because of his background in aeronautical engineering, on manufacturing passenger airplanes to connect more than 17 thousand Indonesian islands. Malaysia has been positive in its participation in multilateral treaties. Malaysia has joined 265 multilateral treaties, the highest in Asia, even higher than Japan, which registers 243. Most noteworthy is that in 1988, Malaysia joined 20 multilateral treaties in the trade, commerce and communications policy domain in one year. Malaysia has experienced many years of racial antagonism (Chinese Malays have been hugely unhappy about the *bumiputera* policy in which Malays are given preference in public jobs and promotions and about the federal structure of a Malaysian Federation where Malays at the traditional highest level, i.e., sultans play a certain political role). More than 10 years were spent suppressing a Chinese-centered communist guerrilla war. Then prosperity ensued and has continued with one political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), dominating elections. The UMNO includes Malays, Chinese, and Tamils and has competed in elections against the non-UMNO Malay parties like the Islamic People's Party and the non-UMNO socialists and those representing some local states like Kelantan and Penang. Malaysia's export economy is centered on petroleum and natural gas, refined chemical products, gum products like rubber tires for automobiles, and all sorts of consumer products. In 1988, Malaysia joined multilateral treaties related to trade, but other policy domains are also important to Malaysia, such as the environment and peace and disarmament. Rising Malay industrial capacity paralleled the need and growth in joining intellectual property policy domain multilateral treaties. No less important to Malaysia is the peace and disarmament policy domain. Malaysia has been upholding the policy line of non-alignment where once Asian leaders like Nehru, Zhou Enlai, Sukarno, and Ne Wu were some of its prominent agitators and supporters. Malaysia has been passionate in encouraging Africans, Middle Easterners, Latin Americans and others to rally and support issues like Responsibility to Protect, humanitarian assistance, and nuclear weapons prohibition. Malaysia has positive participation scores in: labor and health, human rights, peace and disarmament, and intellectual property rights.

Prior to Filipino independence being crushed by the United States, its citizens were exposed to such ideas as national independence and human rights. The Philippines was the only Asian founding member of the United Nations in 1945 (although its independence was conferred in 1946). Even during US colonization, the Philippines was exposed to methods on how to improve labor and health under the World Health Organization via the United States. Thus, after independence, the UN Charter, the UNESCO Declaration, and the WHO Philadelphia Declaration were internalized among the small number of educated elites. Hence, the Philippines has positive z-scores in the following treaty domains of labor and health, human rights, peace and disarmament, and intellectual property. The per capita income in 1950 for the Philippines was the highest in all Asia. However, Philippine politics has been dominated by oligarchies all along, and is clearly evident in the senate and its 23 senators, each of whom represents largely hereditary local boss families of mestizo or mixed-race lines. It is only recently that presidents come from non-hereditary rich families. Thailand's z-scores are noteworthy in three policy domains: labor and health, trade, commerce and communication and peace and disarmament. Siam recovered after the Burmese invasion and destruction of the capital city and the kingdom of Siam in the third-quarter of the eighteenth century. It was in the mid-nineteenth century when the current kingdom was established. Thailand is often characterized as consisting of monarchy, military, and millionaires. Those incomes from Bangkok residents dominate the expenditure of the state government. The amount of the state revenues assembled from Bangkok constitutes some 30% of the state revenues. Thailand is known for its strong interest in hygiene and crime. Their interest in hygiene has much to do with tropical weather and diseases from mosquitoes and other tropical parasites. Their interest in crime is related to the promotion of opium and other drugs, in which poverty-stricken peasants who cannot afford seeds to grow rice and vegetables and have no fertilizers tend to grow opium and other drugs. This occurs mostly among the poverty-stricken peasants in the northern and northeastern and southern areas of Thailand. These areas were taken from French Indochina and British Malaya when Thailand was an ally of imperial Japan and thus strong vis-à-vis the Vichy regime and British Malaya, respectively. Thailand is known for bending with the political winds of the time. In other words, when the Japanese wind was strong, it bent its position to the Japan side: when Japan was defeated, it realigned to the allies side. Bending with the wind is the Thai way of finding peace. In 2019–2021, when Covid-19 and its variants swept the world, Thailand was one of the quickest to ask and receive the vaccine Sinovac from China. Trade, commerce, and communications is another important policy domain in which Thailand shows strong interest. Singapore has one noteworthy policy domain: intellectual property. As an island country of 7 million with no mineral and energy resources, or agricultural and industrial products to export, Singapore has developed a meritocratic society and a monitoring state (Keane, 2013, 2022) whereby dexterous elites in government and business make profits by consulting on and guiding investment in Singapore, China, the United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, Gulf countries, the UK, France, Germany, and in general worldwide. Singapore tends to join multilateral treaties with the strategy of

joining only with mutual binding clause, i.e., only participants committing themselves to abiding by those clauses. On this point, Singapore finds itself on a par with Indonesia and Vietnam in ASEAN. Two South Pacific states, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, are included here because ASEAN might expand to these states and beyond. Alternatively, Australia might tighten its relations along with some South Pacific states. China has been vigorously and steadily encroaching on South Pacific states. Most recently in spring and summer 2022 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited some southern Pacific countries successively with “a ‘Common Developmental Vision’, to be signed in the Solomon Islands and other countries he was successful in a separate security deal that allowed China to build a port for commences and possible military use.” “But those countries did not sign on these documents.” “It’s an uncertainty that pervades China’s diplomat.” “They think they can walk in as everyone is going to bow down. They didn’t understand that money is not everything.” Said Dorothy Wickham, founder and editor of Melanesian News Network (Perlez, 2022). Timor-Leste is a tiny country winning a victory in its long independence war from Indonesia. It does not have a particularly strong z-score in any of the six policy domains.

7.4 East Asia

East Asia contains both rich and poor groups. Cancelling each other out, the average z-score is close to zero. Richer are China, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore while North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia are poorer. On the whole, however, East Asia is richer than any other sub-regions and many other world regions. The z-score on labor and health domain is close to zero but positive, plus there is evidence of within-nation wealth disparity as well as between-nation. The z-score on the trade, commerce, and communications domain of within-nation health disparity as well as between nation wealth disparity is close to zero but negative.

In shifting from Central Asia to East Asia in terms of participation in multilateral treaties in one of the six policy domains, it is clear that those hexagons of each country in Central Asia are smaller whereas those in East Asia are larger and those disparities between the larger and smaller qualities are wide. East Asia contains a diverse group of states, within and between states. The disparities between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and North Korea and Vietnam, on the other, are very large in terms of treaty participation. Japan and South Korea each register some negative z-scores along with generally positive high z-scores. Japan’s z-score in the human rights domain is registered negative. Two major reasons account for it. They are based on the fact that Japan has been stigmatized in the United Nations for the vanquished state it represented along with Germany (Overy, 2021; Berger, 2012). Clear evidence of this is that neither has been able to participate as a permanent member of the Security Council, despite Japan’s continuously large contributions thereto. Five victors, the United States, Russia (the Soviet Union),

the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China (before 1945–1949 the Republic of China) have kept those positions. Relating most directly to the dismally hesitant z-score in human rights-related multilateral treaty participation, there is one historical fact. The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, General Douglas McArthur, adopted what is called indirect governance. The Allied occupation concerned themselves first with punishing those convicted of war crimes by capital punishment, and secondly with the Cold War-related Korean War. Internal disturbances were tasked as internal governance issues and as such were delegated to Japanese governments elected through universal free elections since 1946, which was assured in the new Japanese Constitution drafted by the Allied Occupation Forces in 1945–1946. Its consequence on Japan's human rights related participation in multilateral treaties is that most civil, penal, administrative, commercial laws have been maintained and are considered effective, except those laws governing the army, the navy and the police agency's internal security bureau as well as other ministries' that have assisted with war-related tasks before 1945. Japanese lawyers and professors of law in the former Imperial universities seems to take the basic position that to keep the integrity and consistency of Japanese laws is important and that as long as public opinion and its representative voices in the Japanese Diet, based on the new constitution along with the Ministry of Justice's Legislative Council as well as the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, has the majority voice, revising some human rights related laws would be slow. The affected areas include: gender equality in family, school, and employment; inheritance of assets and family debt; nationality assignment for those 20 years old and above whose parents are from different countries; gender equality in commercial laws; equality among different races and discriminated Japanese sub-groups, etc. Secondly, Japanese jurists and policy-specific scientists, and experts who directly handle human rights issues may not be familiar with the way in which transnational issues, such as those seeking refugee status are sometimes kept in custody for a long time without a decision on status, or how female applicants to competitive schools are often slashed to a certain lower number of applicants as compared to male applicants. The stigmatization labeled against Japanese by Westerners that Japanese are callous and barbarous vis-à-vis divorced females who return home and are often judged to be unfit mothers to their children backed by a binational, two states which divorced couples may come from, and jury decision (Kaneko-Iwase, 2021). The percentage of Japanese females not reunited with their children seems to be unusually high (Kaneko-Iwase, 2021). Although Japanese whaling is not a human rights issue, the stigmatization of Japanese for this activity by the Western-dominated process in which the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and non-governmental groups exert power in sync with their stigmatization: being harsh toward Japanese and not so harsh vis-à-vis Norwegian whalers although Norwegians and Japanese catch a similar number of whales. Norwegians objected to the IWC decision for much longer while Japanese became compliant to the IWC much sooner (Kolmas, 2021). In other policy domains, Japan has registered high figures.

South Korea registers positive and high scores in such domains as labor and health, intellectual property, and trade, commerce and communications. This befits

a high economic growth- registering state. Without a sufficiently healthy labor force, South Korea's export-led economy and competitive innovations industries would not survive long. As proof of improved female health, South Korea registered an increased average height among their female population after World War II, registering number one in the world, along with improvement in Iranian males' height, also registering number one in the world the Non-communicable Diseases Risk Factor Collaboration, 2016 (NCD-RisC). Another indication of strength and reported statistic is the exit rate of Korean women from the home country. In order to liberate themselves from societal gender inequality constraints, they go to the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom to get a higher degree and a better career. Also, as a way of sidestepping Korea's super-competitive university entrance examination process, mothers relocate with their children to other countries to push and encourage their children to be competitively educated. Fathers remain at home, sending money and cooking meals for themselves. Human rights, the environment, and peace and disarmament register medium-level z-scores. The total reproductive ratio of South Korean couples registers one of the lowest in East Asia, registering 0.84 (Reuters, 2021), meaning that a little less than one person per couple is born. In East Asia, reproductive ratios have been on a steady decline including in South Korea, Japan, and China. The future prospect of East Asian populations is a steady decrease and the resulting consequences will be felt through societal changes over the next 25 years on top of the other mega-trend, climate change.

Singapore is an island country of seven million people. Its politics is monitory democracy built on one-party dominance (Keane, 2013, 2022). Its economy is neither agricultural nor mineral resource based. When the United Kingdom was preparing its exit from the European Union, it was caricatured as "Singapore on the Thames" and that it will lose not only the European Union but also Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, leaving the tiny corner of London, the city on the Thames, shining alone. Singapore lives on managing money flows, steadily becoming an Indo-Pacific center of information flows. It is a tiny corps of People's Action Party working with business firms and bureaucratic agencies, cycling meritocratically chosen elites, who dexterously manage foreign investment in and out of countries and institutions. One of the strategies of Singapore in joining multilateral treaties is that of mutual binding. Singapore is not really interested in joining multilateral treaties with the bravado of aspirational bonding spirit. Multilateral treaties have two types: mutual binding whereby clauses have mutually constraining power so that without firm commitment one cannot join. The other type is called aspirational bonding whereby signatories bond together to achieve their aim and dream. The same strategy, mutual binding, has been the favorite strategy of Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore (Inoguchi/Le, 2020; Inoguchi/Le, 2021; Inoguchi/Le, 2022, this volume). China and South Korea adopt the strategy of aspirational bonding whereby friends and comrades are lured to join multilateral treaties, helped by offering incentives such as low-interest infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance in instances of floods, fires, earthquakes, and tsunamis, as well as donations of COVID-19 vaccines.

Vietnam has metamorphosed many times after so many wars since France colonized Vietnam along with Cambodia and Laos in the mid-nineteenth century. In late

1941, Japan attacked the United States (Hawaii and the Philippines), Great Britain (British Malaya, British Burma, British India), the Netherlands (Dutch Indonesia), and France (French Indochina and South Pacific) almost simultaneously. Vichy France governed French Indochina, with the French European power being conciliatory to Germany. Japan needed Vietnamese rice for its wartime supply of food for its military, which resulted in huge famines in northern Vietnam. Japan destroyed the British Navy in Singapore. Japan needed Dutch Indonesia and British Malaya for petroleum in its war execution. Thailand was an ally of Japan at that time. In return for cooperation with Japan, Thailand took territory from French Cambodia, French Laos, and British Malaya. This planted the seed for trouble later on in Thailand. In 1945, Japan surrendered and withdrew. Vietnamese Communists had taken the lead already by 1941, and in 1945, declared independence after Japan's withdrawal, immediately starting to fight against French Indochina. In 1953, after France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu the Geneva Accord was signed. The accord broke down and the national liberation war under communist leadership restarted in southern Vietnam. In 1966, the United States militarily intervened against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which ended in 1973 when the United States withdrew from Vietnam. In 1975, the Vietnamese communists won militarily against the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). National unification was achieved. Vietnam was ready to wage wars even after all the violence of the war, invading and occupying Cambodia in 1978. The legacy of the Cambodian empire, then writ large at the center of the Indochinese peninsula, was southern Vietnam (Cochinchina), which was the direct colony of French Indochina and into which new settlers kept coming. Many Cambodians, many Chinese, some Chams, some Hmongs (many of whom were employed by the US CIA during the Vietnam war against North Vietnam and now reside heavily in the US state of Minnesota (*The Economist*, 2001)). Many smaller tribes resided in the area, and troubles among them were not rare. Vietnam did not want this two-front situation to continue: Chinese to the north and Cambodians to the south, each anxious about increasingly no less anxious neighbors. Chinese and Russians fought a war in 1969 on a small island on the Amur River. Vietnam was allied with the Soviet Union ideologically and geopolitically in the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, China put an end to Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping emerged at the top of the party and the military in late 1978. Like many Chinese wars against its neighbors in the past, Deng Xiaoping had two objectives for the war: He wanted to punish Vietnamese against its military occupation of Cambodia and to reduce the size of the military, especially those military for the ideological and military police purposes which expanded during the Cultural Revolution period (1966–1976) and those military long serving in local and provincial same home-like bases as the old military cliques. Those Chinese bosses were assigned to punish Vietnam with miserable outcomes. Immediately after the victory against the United States, the well-equipped and well-tested Vietnamese Military Forces performed very well. But Deng's aim was perfectly implemented in his larger aim of reducing tensions with neighboring countries, most importantly the United States and Japan. China wanted to have a friendly United States when a hostile Soviet Union was threatening in the north. In the south, Vietnam invaded an occupied Cambodia for reasons of

being anti-China and pro-Soviet and frequent strife in Vietnamese territories along the Mekong River (south Vietnam).

Both Japan and the United States assisted China and invested in China for the ensuing five decades through the four treaties: rapprochement for diplomatic normalization in 1972 for Japan and in 1973 for the United States for substantiating friendship and cooperation in economic assistance and investment in China in 1978 for Japan and in 1979 for the United States. No less important for Deng was demoting those anti-Dengist Chinese military bosses for their miserable performance. Vietnam took time to reach a peace agreement with China. It was only in 1984 that the accord was achieved. In 1986, Vietnamese *Doi Moi* policy of reform formally started. Looking at the z-scores of Vietnam in multilateral treaty participation does not give the impression of a post-*Doi-Moi* new Vietnam. The z-score on labor and health started to improve steadily with efforts to actively interact with the WHO and so did the z-score on trade, commerce, and communications in tandem with the reform policy. These values had not gone up when Vietnam was one of the early members of the UN. The point is that the end of the Vietnam War (1975) and the Chinese intervention in Vietnam (1979) and the start of the reform policy (1986) ran parallel to what is called the “Long Peace of East Asia” (Kivimäki, 2014; Tonnesson, 2019). One of the leading reasons that Vietnam has been navigating seemingly seamless since 1986 is that Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1999. Branko Milanović (2019) has called it political capitalism. The two issues about political capitalism are (1) the state owns so much land whereby the state makes huge profits for renting. The provincial and other local levels of private firms have rented so much in the new millennium that extraordinary debts have been accumulated and that has reduced China’s economic growth rates steadily lower (Krugman, 2022). (2) the state has gone so far as to its fledgling digital currency could be suspected to be transformed de facto hegemonic in the world: digital currency if China will achieve its goal by 2050 and if the United States will stumble and is still in this underdeveloped state of the digital dollar.

East Asia, especially its core, i.e., China, Japan, and South Korea, has been characterized as not enjoying institutionalized connectivity. Compared to Southeast Asia, non-institutionalized connectivity is high and concerted activity is dense. Once East Asian economic, financial, and technological connectivity, especially among the core three is closely looked at, it is immensely high. This high non-institutionalized connectivity is real and solid because they are all competing and cooperating at the business firm level as well as the scientists’ and engineers’ level and the state level. This should not be underestimated. Five decades have passed there since the surprise Nixon visit to China, the rapprochement and heavy assistance and investment in China, the United States under Donald Trump has initiated the trade and technology war, which Joe Biden has followed and enhanced with nuanced differences and Japan under Fumio Kishida has basically followed the US, with reluctance remaining about going nuclear, and found itself completing its financial assistance to China in March 31, 2022. No less astounding is the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 4, 2022, to which Joe Biden confronted Vladimir Putin with the G7’s joint economic sanctions against Russia and with the NATO-backed military vigilance. The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has added the US trade and technology war with the incredible

complexity to planning immediate analysis, making decisions and foreseeing the future.

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Chapter 8

Responses to Hyperdemocratization and Hyperglobalization



8.1 Two Driving Forces in the Third Millennium: Hyperdemocratization and Hyperglobalization

In the new Millennium, two major forces that disturb the old Western ways of keeping middle class-focused or tribal community focused politics at home and of adjusting balance of payments through non-discriminatory free trade principles are “hyperdemocratization” and “hyperglobalization”. By hyperdemocratization is meant the emergence of “excessively self-assertive” sectors in middle-class-focused societies or tribal community-focused and by hyperglobalization is meant that the deep permeation of external movements of money, products, people into domestic societies and vice versa where the boundaries state sovereignty is getting murky if its scope gets wide and its role expands.

Hyperdemocratization is driven by keener awareness of self in society either in alienated direction (anarchism) or state-centrally affected direction (nationalism). Hyperdemocratization drives a society fragmented and fractured in all directions: In the May 2022 French presidential election, President Emmanuel Macron’s frequent key phrases were: (1) “Avec vous” (“With you”) and (2) “Nous tous” (“All of us” to forge the Macron-center majority in spite of his toxic campaign “mixed with genuine worries, half-truths, and outright lies (*The Economist*, 2022). Hyperdemocratization is manifested by the high expectation of government accountability like a West Bengal state parliamentarian pointing to the Narendra Modi-led federal government answer on the definition of disaster-proclivity and the resultant amount of budget offered to a couple of states with far smaller populations and far less disaster-prone states as making no scientific sense. She argued that it does not make any scientific sense but it makes political scientific sense, i.e., blatant corruption to the pro-Narendra Modi-led excessively and primitively pro-Modi state governments (Kumar, 2017).

Hyperglobalization is driven by sharper consciousness of a globalizing planet in either neo-protectionist or neo-liberalizing directions. Decoupling supply chains across nations by China vis-à-vis Australia: barley, beef, wine, wheat, wool, lobsters,

sugar, copper, timber and table grapes, coal and cotton do not bear fruit. Rather Australia has expanded further in these products importers (Cf. Eichengreen, 2017; Solingen, 2021; Wilson, 2021).

8.2 Equilibrium of Society: Societal Type

Our argument on the equilibrium of society is built on the Maslow (1943) theory and further elaborated by Inglehart (1997 and 2018). Inglehart's theory is that when survival at stake, the survival dimension emerges as the most important dimension. Survival is also called the materialist dimension. Once food, clothing, and dwelling are more or less satisfied, human desire seeks satisfaction in the post-materialist dimension. Social relations or leisure dimension gets important as income level goes up.

My methodological innovation is that when 16 items of life domains, aspects and styles are shown to answer respondents' degree of satisfaction on each item, another dimension has emerged. Not only survival and social relations dimensions, but also public policy prevalence dimension carries an important dimension. As the government role in economy and society expands, it is quite natural that government intervention in what used to be mostly non-governmental spheres increases. Examples are industrial pollution, social welfare, global warming, migration and global diffusion of virus-affected population. Especially in the third millennium, human life cannot be discussed adequately without talking about expanded government roles and without taking up of steadily enhanced roles of global politics especially in the form of multilateral treaty participation (*The Economist*, 2021). Hyperglobalization requires the government to carry out a huge number of public policy interventions. Furthermore, those ideas of public policy force the government to tackle them often in harmony with global solutions.

Government roles have expanded especially in relation to gross domestic product statistically (OECD statistical figures). Government roles have also expanded in relation to multilateral treaty participation (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021).

My methodological innovations listen to Fog's advice (Fog, 2021) along with Nisbett's advice (Nisbett, 2004). He argues that those factor analysis exercises that deal with more or less similar data like quality of life or happiness or trust tend to yield what he calls the super factor, i.e., the first dimension tends to carry the predominant eigen value. This might as well discourage some from such analysis to be carried out. In fact, that is not the case. Because as long as cross-national quality of life is concerned, dimensional orderings differ. Some societies yield the dimensional order of survival, social relations and public policy prevalence (like Japan and Kazakhstan). Other societies yield the dimensional order of public policy prevalence, social relations and survival (like Singapore and Sri Lanka). Still other societies yield the dimensional order of public policy prevalence, social relations and survival (like Hong Kong and Pakistan). A certain set of items sits comfortably under the umbrella of public policy umbrella along with some otherwise belonging to survival

umbrella. Another certain set of items sits comfortably under the umbrella of social relations along with some otherwise belonging to public policy prevalence. Thus, the dimensional ordering changes flexibly as to accommodate societal characteristics. This feature enables us to propose the typology of Asian societies (Inoguchi, 2019; Inoguchi, 2022, this volume).

Once the types of societies are set, then I compare Asian societies in term of similarities and dissimilarities.

8.3 Equilibrium of Legislation: Legislative Types

Definition of legislative type: Legislative type is meant by sovereign states' proclivity to join or not join multilateral treaties. Some states like many West European states join multilateral treaties quite willingly or semi-automatically because the European Union and many members make it a rule of sorts up to X % to follow automatically the European Union's decision to join multilateral treaties. Other states like the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea join multilateral treaties minimally. Why are these two states similar? In fact, the United States is more extreme isolationist in that the number of joining multilateral treaties per number of years of UN membership is smaller than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States' first president, George Washington's dictum, disentangling the United States from the European mess, has been living even now with Donald Trump and Joe Biden being his followers. The United States relies on many instruments like the military, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank of International Recovery and Development (IBRD), the Federal Reserve, economic sanctions, importantly many domestic laws treated as international law-like by the US, and soft power. But the United States minimizes the entanglement with the global mess via multilateral treaties as much as possible. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been living with the motto of *juche dongnip* (making itself its master and independent) from Kim Il-Song, Kim Jong-Il through Kim Jong-Un.

Stability (Societal Type) and Adaptation (Legislative Type).

Societal Type: Abc, Acb, Bac, Bca, Cab, Cba.

Societal type represents six kinds of internal equilibrium of society where individual daily life satisfactions and dissatisfactions are expressed.

Six Societal Types (Abc, Acb, Bac, Bca, Cab, Cba): The dimension capitalized and the dimension non-capitalized are polar opposites on the same dimension. Societal Type consists of three dimensions: (1) Survival (materialist versus non-materialist), (2) Social Relations (post-materialist versus non-post-materialist), and (3) Public Policy Preponderance (public policy versus non-public policy).

Legislative Type: abc, aBC, aBc, abC, Abc, AbC, Abc, ABC.

Legislative type represents eight kinds of external equilibrium of society where sovereign states engage themselves with multilateral treaties.

Eight Legislative Types (abc, aBC, aBc, abC, Abc, AbC, Abc, ABC): Those words capitalized denote the left-hand side of the same dimension whereas those words non-capitalized denote the right-hand side of the same dimension. Legislative Type consists of Three Dimensions: (1) Speed (cautious versus agile), (2) Angle (global commons versus individual interests), and (3) Strategy (aspirational bonding versus mutual binding).

8.4 Central Asian Regionalism's Potentials

Typical of Central Asian societal types is Abc, meaning that the first dimension of daily life satisfaction is survival, that the second dimension of daily life satisfaction is social relations, and that the third dimension of daily life satisfaction is public policy prevalence. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are cases in point. Decentralized, fragmented, and individualistic, Abc is also characteristic of American society, as portrayed by David Riesman (1950) and C. Wright Mills (1956) in the 1950s. American society has retained many of its very early features from the late seventeenth through the early eighteenth century: vast space, sparse population, fragmented, and fractured society. Even the liberation of slavery helped its retention by shifting many of the former slaves' residence to the north where its late industrialization was helped by liberated slaves now residing and working in the Midwest and along the Appalachian hills. America has evolved to accommodate migrants despite all the difficulties associated with racial prejudice against Irish and Italian, Chinese, and Japanese, and now Latinos and Asians. Russell Mead argues that the three framers of America were molded in the early eighteenth century, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson (Mead, 2002) are still resilient. Late industrialization and accommodation of continuous massive incoming migrants go a long way to the present-day United States of America. However, its societal type would not be Abc as Central Asians or Japanese or Indonesians. Why? The academic predominance of the United States of America after World War II has brought about an ironical consequence. While the globally hegemonic America's exceptionalism has contributed to this, American exceptionalism has made the American model unique yet universally applicable to the rest of the world, at least so goes the American argument. It is W.W. Rostow's economic development model (1957). The combination of these two may be manifested itself in Ronald Inglehart model of materialism and post-materialism a la Abraham Maslow (1943). Inglehart focuses the 2-dimensional picture of materialism and post-materialism throughout half a century. If Inglehart had added our kind of factor analysis applied to each of the societies, if Inglehart had not stopped at analyzing world values but all human activities in 193 world societies, his picture would have been more persuasive to those questioning the combination of American exceptionalism and American academic hegemony. Those societies which experienced feudalism like Japan and Indonesia and Taiwan as a Japanese colony exhibit with similar societal type, abc. Important is the decentralized nature of such society.

The Central Asian country retaining most socialist-bureaucratic features is Kazakhstan. Public intervention and permeation are the strongest in society denoted by Cab. Kyrgyzstan is interesting in that social relations dominates Kyrgyzstani society, meaning that social interactions among governing groups are important determining the nature of Kyrgyzstani society. It has been a traditional and present commercial center of Central Asia. Mongolia de-communized itself most early of the Central Asian countries and yet transitional capitalist societal characteristics are retained and public policy intervention often takes an authoritarian flavor.

Typical characteristics of Central Asia in terms of multilateral treaty participation is Abc, meaning that the speed of joining multilateral treaties is slow, that the angle of looking glass is either that of global commons or of individual interests. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia are of global commons. Mongolia is sandwiched between Russia and China geographically and politically beyond Mongolia's borders, tribal kins are spread deep both in Russia and in China. No less important is that Mongolia is plentiful in mineral and energy resources, including newly discovered uranium. It is possible to see investments from which come assists in the direction global forces are heading. You must be attentive to such global forces. Afghanistan is similar in that you must be watchful at which global forces are ascending and receding most recently. Turkmenistan is very rich in oil and natural gas, and excessively defensive, Turkmenistan shuts its door, strictly cautious of foreign direct investment in fossil resources and prohibiting foreign military forces from using air bases. Turkmenistan's legislative type is the same as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both regimes are very autocratic despite the difference in resource poverty or abundance. The rest, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, are all of legislative type, Abc, meaning that their decision of whether to join multilateral treaties or not is slow, concerned about individual interests not and so much about global commons, and strict about mutual binding when joining multilateral treaties.

In terms of Central Asian regionalism's potentials, our looking glasses are on how Central Asia copes with destabilizing possibilities of hyperdemocratizing and hyperglobalizing trends. This task will be carried out after South Asian societal type and legislative type, Southeast Asian societal type and legislative type, and East Asian societal type and legislative type are comparatively examined with the same question of regionalist potentials for Asia's four regions.

8.5 South Asian Regionalism's Potentials

In terms of South Asian societal types, two types exist in South Asia. The first type is Acb, meaning that the first dimension is that of survival, the second dimension is that of public policy prevalence, and the third dimension is that of social relations. India, Nepal, and Bangladesh are of this type. The second type is Cab, meaning the first dimension is that of public policy prevalence, the second dimension is that of survival, the third dimension is that of social relations. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan are of this type. Common to the first type of societies is parliamentary democracy in

the making with the relatively small elite corps running the regime in a society with fragmented populations. Common to the second type of societies is that schisms real and latent in societies not only exist and but also often sharpen themselves with a qualitatively high level of regime and policy change taking place. Hence Cab with capital C on the top.

In terms of South Asian legislative type, two types exist. First, those states fast in joining multilateral treaties: India, Pakistan, and Nepal. They are alert and agile to the positional change of their countries in the world trends. Hence abc or aBc or aBc. The rest, i.e., Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bhutan are slow in joining multilateral treaties and prefer aspirational bonding rather than mutual binding, hence ABC or AbC. Noteworthy in the proclivity of mutual binding in South Asia is Nepal. Having survived the long history of Nepal coping with the special and yet semi-autonomous status of Nepal in relation to the British Indian era as well as the Republic of India era, Nepal's proclivity of mutual binding is the only one in South Asia. In East Asia, the proclivity for mutual binding is observed in Japan, Vietnam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

8.6 Southeast Asian Regionalism's Potentials

In terms of societal type, Southeast Asia is most diverse in that survival, social relations, and public policy prevalence can be what Agner Fog (2021) calls the superfactor, meaning that when factor analysis carried out, the first dimension tends to explain covariance most effectively, i.e., the first eigenvalue is overwhelmingly large compared to the second factor, the third factor, and beyond. Those societies with survival as the superfactor are Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Those societies with social relations as the superfactor are Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia; those societies with public policy prevalence as the superfactor are the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei. This is one of the most interesting characteristics of Southeast Asian societies. This feature causes Southeast Asian regionalism's potentials to be examined with excitement.

What is the most noteworthy historical background common to Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Indonesia? In my view, their pathways to the attainment of national independence vary. But they had to rely on themselves: Myanmar got independent in 1947 from Britain but their regimes at the core kept reproducing themselves by adopting a bureaucratic-protectionist-Buddhist nature of colonial days with the key task being protecting the majority ethnic group, Burmans, from the hostility and antagonism of many non-Burman minority groups by the military. Laos and Cambodia were under the yoke of Vichy France complying with Imperial Japan. Once the Democratic Republic of Vietnam defeated the French in Dien Bien Phu, and once the Socialist Republic of Vietnam repulsed the United States and unified militarily the whole of Vietnam, the invasion and occupation of Cambodia by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its withdrawal from Cambodia, Laos, and Cambodia kept running together with the stronger neighbors, i.e., France, Japan, the United States, Vietnam,

Thailand, and China. Indonesia proclaimed independence after Japan's defeat in World War II but entered the anti-colonial war against the Dutch and furthermore carried out the suppression of alleged Indonesian communists by the Suharto-led military.

Common to those societies whose superfactor is social relations is that Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia are all new and old settler societies. Many people's ancestors residing now in Thailand and Vietnam came from ancient China as Thai or Vietnamese. Settlers in Thailand are relatively new and they are from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, or southern Malaysia while settlers in Vietnam came as Vietnamese from ancient China. During French colonial times Cambodians, Lao, and Hmongs were relatively free to move into Cochinchina under France. Even in the twenty-first century, deep in the Mekong Delta, a sizable number of Vietnamese, Cambodians, Chinese, Hmongs and Chams have sort of institutionalized the frequent migratory and "seasonally commuting" practice between southern Vietnam and Cambodia. During the Indochinese long war period (1945–1989) many groups had hard times for survival and migratory practice was not uncommon among these people who lived to survive under weak and empty state governance. While the early socialist collectivization farm policy of the unified Vietnam was tight, such practice was not uncommon. During the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (1978–1989), this practice tended to be institutionalized even after the Vietnamese militarily withdrew from Cambodia (Shimojo, 2021). Settlers in Malaysia were relatively new since many were brought in by British colonialists to tea plants (mostly Tamils) and small commerce (mostly Chinese) and to tin mining (mostly Tamils). Thailand acquired Lao, Cambodians, and Malays by annexing parts of French Laos, French Cambodia and British Malaya during World War II when the Vichy France was a Japanese ally in name.

Common to those societies whose superfactor is public policy prevalence is that the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei were under American and British colonial rule for some long years when there was a primitive introduction to the colonies of a modicum set of civil participation in elections, social welfare, primary education, police, and infrastructure. Once independent, those public policy interventions have grown to of considerable size, thus shaping their societies. The Philippines used to be the richest in Asia circa 1950. Singapore has transformed itself from the third world to the top (Lee, 2000) and Brunei is the richest per capita in Asia due to the production of petroleum resources and mineral resources. In Brunei people pay no tax on education, medical welfare, and other such necessities.

8.7 East Asian Regionalism's Potentials

In terms of societal type, East Asia has two types: first, those societies whose superfactor is that of survival, meaning Abc or Acb. They are Japan, China, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. Second are those societies whose superfactor is that of social relations, meaning Bac. They are Vietnam and Hong Kong. Both are settler societies.

Vietnam is categorized in this volume as a member both of Southeast Asia and East Asia as its history and culture present themselves as such (Woodside, 1988, 2006). In terms of legislative type, East Asia has two types: first, those who join multilateral treaties fast, meaning that Japan, Taiwan, and China move fast. Second are those who join multilateral treaties slowly. They are Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Taiwan has no data on legislative type.)

8.8 Regionalism's Potentials

In our scheme of regionalism's potentials, societal type reflects how people's satisfaction and dissatisfaction with 16 life domains, aspects, and styles are in the rough equilibrium given the conditions as measured in the first decade of the Third Millennium when the basic task of the AsiaBarometer Survey was carried out. Legislative style reflects how states' willingness to go with multilateral treaty participation in terms of prospective costs and benefits are in the rough equilibrium given the conditions as measured in the first decade of the Third Millennium. In other words, societal type is the approximate measure of stability inside societies whereas legislative type is the approximate measure of adaptability to global change. The key variables perturbing these equilibria of societal type and legislative type are in our view hyperdemocratization and hyperglobalization. By hyperdemocratization is meant that individual freedom of expression and collective decision with membership equality and inclusion goes too far given the domestic ill-preparation and rejection. By hyperglobalization is meant that the universality principle as applied to multilateral treaties goes beyond domestic societal preferences (Farrell & Newman, 2019).

As we have seen in Inoguchi and Le (2020, 2021), multilateral treaty participation has been most densely by West Europeans where universalism has been widely applied both to the inside and outside of sovereign states. Although some like Guehenno (1997) argue that globalization could possibly jeopardize democracy, the trend inside the European Union in the Third Millennium has been that the increasingly EU-approved participation in multilateral treaties are approved also by EU-member states' parliaments, if not semi-automatically (Cf. Fukuyama (2022); Guehennot (1999)). Because drafting multilateral treaties is carried out by UN special agencies and organizations and world scientists and international lawyers, West European primacy in multilateral treaties has been maintained (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021). After the Napoleonic War in Europe, many Latin American states achieved national independence. They looked up to Western Europe, especially France, arguing that Latin American participation in international law required the reformulation of universalism as applied to international law, especially in relation with their new constitutions incorporating the spirit of the French Revolution (Nakai, 2021). The United States stuck to George Washington's disentanglement policy until World War II more or less. Even when the United States achieved allied victory, it did not throw away its traditional policy of disentanglement thoroughly. Instead, the US shaped the global strategy of organizing its military allies, military bases worldwide

with the air force, the navy, the marine and special forces with global intelligence networks nurtured everywhere. Weapons development and its required scientific and technological breakthrough have been prioritized in federal budgeting. Furthermore, the US has developed the federal, state-level, and non-governmental governing laws quite adroitly for its legal development. The consequences are that its domestic laws can be used universally even without relying on or resorting to multilateral treaties. For example, the war-illegitimizing treaty agreed on by major powers in 1928. It was then said critically that the treaty was a joke without teeth. It would be ineffective without a clause to seek compliance. The US legislated the law on economic sanctions (Alter, 2019; Hathaway & Shapiro, 2017, 2019; Mimaki, 2014). Nowadays sanctions have been used more widely and effectively against those states that violate human rights. Unlike the Western European conception of international law, the US conception of international law has been tailored to action at three levels of global politics, i.e., societal, national, and global. In other words, unlike the European international law, which started as the Law of Family of Nations of Europe (Oppenheimer, 1905), the US conception of international law has developed in a very different fashion. An example that Japan benefited the knowledge of the difference between the European international law as the international standard of civilized family of nations of Europe and the international law as practiced since the Latin American conception of international law gradually changed the European international law as the international standard of civilized family of nations of Europe (Gong, 1984) was that the friendship treaty between Mexico and Japan concluded did not contain those clauses that were deemed unequal to Japan, i.e., those American, British and other Western countries concluded those treaties with Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate (in 1853 and in 1858) with extraterritorial rights for Westerners and with non-autonomy rights on tariffs for Japan. It was the Mexican government that told the updated truth to the Japanese government that the 1853 and 1858 treaties with American, British, and other Western countries were conceived unequal to Japan in the new international law. When one of the co-authors, Takashi Inoguchi, gave a speech in the Embassy of Mexico in the early 2000s on its anniversary of Japan-Mexico concluding the equal treaty unlike those with Western powers previously concluded unequally, Mexican diplomats nodded to my speech, adding that as evidence, Emperor Meiji granted Mexico the nearest space to His Majesty's office in the Castle or *koukyo* (Imperial Family office and residence) in the middle center of Tokyo.

Multilateral treaties have developed very steadily with the United Nations Organizations born of the Allied victory in World War II. The United Nations Charter and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Declaration have spelled out the principles of equality and inclusion of humankind. Exceptions exist, however. The former Axis enemy states, Japan and Germany, have been discriminated against in the Charter. National independence of the developing areas under colonial status came in the order of first colonies under Japan and Germany; second, those colonies under Western states.

As war-fatigued Western states were slow in confronting the intensifying Cold War between the communist bloc and the capitalist bloc, the West was warned and did welcome the rise of Japan in 1962 and Japan became a rich club member of the

Organization for Cooperation and Development and the International Monetary Fund as well as the Bank for International Development and Cooperation by the mid-1960s. Those rich men's club members had the obligation to lend economic assistance, facilitate technological transfer, encourage direct investment to those developing areas. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade across nations, the negotiation on non-discriminant free trade and low tariffs repeated negotiation rounds found no other way to activate liberalizing trade and the economy by transforming the GATT to the World Trade Organization (WTO), whereby the developing world and the developed world found ways to resolve dispute settlements. After the end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989, the new WTO was born with new hope in 1995. The result was that despite the developing world's bumpy but steady economic development, the developing South had grown in number of UN member states and in the accumulated amount of the Gross Domestic Product, even their richest members, like South Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, and many others, have not given in easily to the WTO dispute settlement scheme proposals (Milanović, 2019). Meanwhile the 9–11 terrorist attack against the United States took place in 2001. After the terrorist attack on the New York twin towers in the United States, the Unilateralist America was born under Bush Junior. In 2005, China was allowed to join the World Trade Organization during the period of Unilateralist America, i.e., loose America without The Enemy (the Soviet Union) (Arbatov, 1987 as cited in Fettweis, 2018, p. 1).

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Part IV
Scenarios for Four Regionalisms

Chapter 9

Future Scenarios of Four Asian Regionalisms



In the preceding chapters we have attempted to carve out one of the important mechanisms of global politics with evidence-based perspective combined with bottom-up approach: How each of Asian states and societies attempt and achieve domestic stability in the tide of hyperdemocratization and the global adaptability in the tide of hyperglobalization. On these bases, our task now is to “predict” futures of four Asian regions and regionalisms and furthermore to “predict” futures of global politics, i.e., which states and societies help shape global politics with domestic stability thus gaining citizens’ trust and with adaptability thus coming up with global cooperative solutions. States and societies must cope with the human penchant to conserve the ways in which survival, social relations and/or public policy can be managed even amidst hyperdemocratization and hyperglobalization. Worst of human follies is to conserve catastrophe accumulatively, followed by the decline and demise of states and societies, and no worse is to invite to kill citizens on the globe, whether it is by wars, by the deterioration of nutrition, hygiene and health, by infectious diseases, by leaving global temperature steadily going up above 1.5 c, by not respecting dignity and rights of citizens, and by shutting out global cooperative solutions. Our predictions of futures deploy the multiple scenarios approach in terms of feasibility in shorter and longer terms.

9.1 Horseback: Central Asian Scenarios

Central Asia is often called the heartland in geopolitics (Mackinder, 1904). In terms of the space the region covers, Central Asia is graded high. But it is sparsely populated. The terrain is full of mountains and deserts. Rivers and lakes (or inland seas) are not particularly small or few. But drought-ridden dryland and cold winter weather make the land less useful. Then why heartland? For two reasons. First, horseback used to be the fastest way by which men with arms on horseback could move. Second,

if the conquest resulted in acquisition of big marketplaces, the conquerors could become hegemonic. Daily used commodities and exotic commodities are both there. Out of the meeting of products and cultures sometimes come great ideas and their diffusion. Mongol, Persian, and Turkish people moved around the Eurasian landmass; history tells us that. Some of them established world empires. The Mongol empire covered Central Asia, China, Russia, and Near Asia (Allsen, 2001; Rossabi, 1983). Vienna was about to be swallowed by Mongolians at the heydays of Pax Mongolia. But it soon de-federated itself and most of the de-federated ones vanished in less than a century. Then why did Sir Halford Mackinder say that those who control the Eurasian heartland control the world? Because he was short-sighted, and was too immersed in looking at British-Russian confrontation around the late nineteenth century. Persuaded by his war-mongering slogan, Britain sent armed forces to Afghanistan and got stuck in the mountainous and desert terrain. The death tolls of officers and soldiers in Afghanistan and in southern Africa amounted to too much of a sacrifice and accelerated the decline of the British Empire. If I add one more interesting fact, the Mongol Post in the third millennium uses drones when an addressee is moving across pastures and fields with his horses, goats, sheep, and cows. The drones are much faster than doves from Waterloo to London. However, if one looks back to the two most recent interventions in Afghanistan, one by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and the other by the United States from 2001 till 2021, there might be some truth in what Mackinder says. The proposition is that if Afghanistan is perceived to be the gateway to an emerging hostile country, intervention is more likely. The Soviet intervention was prompted by Afghanistan's regime change: the monarchy to an authoritarian regime led by Afghan communists. The US intervention was triggered by al-Qaida's infiltration into Afghanistan and the Taliban forces, which the US forces had financed, armed, and trained, and ultimately toppled the Kabul government in 2021. In the Soviet case, less than a decade later, the Soviet Union collapsed. In the US case, the US-guided Afghan government mainly composed of Tajiks and Uzbeks and pro-American Kabul residents fell immediately after the US Biden government decision to exit. In spring and autumn 2021 the Taliban all over Afghanistan were spotted searching eagerly to purchase Nike shoes, popular and prestigious to wear. They rose en masse in Kabul and elsewhere as September 30, 2021 drew close.

9.2 *Sangham*: South Asia Scenarios

The English philosopher James Stuart Mill (1817) published *The History of British India*. Its structure consists of three chapters: the chapter on ancient India, which is characterized as numerous kingdoms ruled by hereditary tribal heads; the chapter on medieval India, which is characterized as northern invaders (Turkish-Persian-Mongolian) unifying India; and the chapter on modern India, which is characterized as the British East Asia Company colonizing India by market forces helped by small arms. Curiously, James Stuart Mill uses another set of *zeitgeists* of three Indians:

Heads of ancient kingdoms were allowed to have as many wives as they wished; emperors of medieval empires were allowed by Islam to have at most seven wives; and governors under British colonialism were allowed to have one wife. Notwithstanding James Stuart Mill's insight into Indian history, it seems to me that geography and geology matter most in shaping India. In particular, the Indian Continent was split from a larger entity in very remote times and then it was pushed upward to the north and to the height of the Himalayan Mountain range. What happened in India is that it has many rivers and plains because of the Himalayan range. After all, the Indus River, the Ganges River, and other rivers created what Indians eat, wheat and rice. Small streams gather to become mid-streams and mid-streams meet at *sangham* (meaning the place rivers meet) or more generally the space to meet where two mid-streams meet. Not only do water flows meet but also people meet and carry on commerce. *Sangham* generates nutrition, where fish live; further down, *sangham* and deltas where water abounds and wheat and rice grow.

After independence, India in 1947 changed enormously, most significantly preventing any large-scale famines from taking place (Sen, 1999). The government and its statistical bureau have seen to it that food and water allocations are regularly and in a time-sensitive manner carried out whenever famines and floods threaten. During the ancient times of Kautilya (Jha, 1999) when he advised his master's ruling kingdom, the concepts of social welfare and irrigation did not exist. During medieval times, northern invaders and aggressors ruled the Indian continent, and are identified as Mongols, with Tibetan Buddhism as their main religion, Persians, with *shia* Islam as their main religion, and Turks with *sunna* Islam as their main religion. Islamic societies at those times enjoyed the highest level of science and technology. But they had no modern concept of social welfare and irrigation systems either. Hence, as Amartya Sen (1999) argues, only after independence was achieved has India been free of large famines. The same goes in modern British India. After all, India was run by the British East Asia Company until 1857 and from 1857 to 1947 by the British state.

In 2001, the Indian federal government under Narendra Modi claimed to have allocated budget on the basis of scientific measurement of likely-to-take-place disasters and the estimated size of negatively affected populations in a few states: it included a couple of lightly affected states, i.e., Bihar and Orissa, whereas West Bengal was usually seriously affected. The fact is, however, the amount of budget was far larger in the former, but far less than the necessary amount was sent to West Bengal. A senator from West Bengal argued, "You said that the allocation was carried out scientifically. I don't claim that I have science literacy sufficiently. But I did study and know political science very well. I know that your measurement was done in the sense of political science." She was correct. The Modi government under BJP wanted to expand the party's level of parliamentary strength in all states. But at the state level, regionalist parties are strong in southern and western states. In West Bengal, the state government has been run by a coalition government that is often headed by the Indian Communist Party (Kumar, 2017).

9.3 *Panchasila*: Southeast Asian Scenarios

Southeast Asia is fascinatingly diverse. They are fascinated by their own diversity. ASEAN was born out of a yearning for unity and solidarity. Why unity and solidarity? Because civilizational influence is strong and Indian, Chinese, and ingenious Malayo-Polynesian are mixed. Of eight civilizations (Huntington, 1997), Southeast Asia can boast five civilizations: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and Confucianism. Because sultans, oligarchical families, feudal lords, and tribal chiefs run governments, central governments talk a lot about unity and solidarity, but in reality, they are internally weak. ASEAN's establishment in 1967 evidences some reasons. Most states in ASEAN were internally fragmented and fragile. They were externally confrontational among themselves. Until the ASEAN agreement, most of them were troubled by territorial and related disputes. The ASEAN Declaration itself is designed not to rock the boat by declaring a guideline of non-interference in internal affairs, not to allow external states to exercise extraordinary influence on ASEAN, and to tightly guard ASEAN centrality and present a united position vis-à-vis external power. At the last stage of his political life, Indonesia's president, Sukarno was verbally fighting against Malaysia while internally his power was reduced by his two seemingly close allies: the Indonesian Communist Party (ICP) and General Suharto. Suharto dramatically reduced the power of the ICP and, at the same time, the power of Sukarno. The founding members of ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. All the founding members were in territorial and other disputes among themselves. Least tainted was Thailand. That is probably why the Declaration of the ASEAN was issued in Thailand, the least involved in territorial and other disputes.

The remaining members joined ASEAN about then in tandem with their gradual perception and the founding members' gradual perception that the rest would join ASEAN in agreement with the ASEAN Way without breaking the key aforementioned ASEAN principles. Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei joined ASEAN, in 1997, 1999, and 1997, 1984, respectively. Myanmar's participation in ASEAN triggered the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National Democratic Party's advancement, which would help cease perennial wars against minorities (the combined populations that comprise just short of one half of Myanmar's total population). Vietnamese participation in ASEAN (1995) promoted the then already formalized *Doi Moi* reform (1986), to be more fully executed, upon the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (in late 1989). The Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia turned out to be the beginning of the "Long Peace of East Asia" (Kivimäki, 2014; Tønnesson, 2019) until the emergence of China's revisionism called political capitalism (Milanović, 2019) and was China's first act of globalism, which led to the US-China global conflict on trade, technology, democracy, and rules and criteria of measurement (2014). Cambodia's UN-guided democratic election (1993) led to authoritarian electoral democracy. Laotian gradual democratization to authoritarian electoral democracy of a regime headed by the Lao People's Party moved forward in tandem with its environmental threats' reduction. On the Mekong project, hydro dams being built

in the upper stretches of the river and impacting on the flow of the river lower down require a lot of coordination and politics especially impacting negatively on agriculture and the fishing industry. Building the direct railroad between Yunnan, China, and Vientiane, Laos, on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative have been impacting both positively and negatively on the entire Indochinese Peninsula and Southeast Asia. Brunei's participation in ASEAN smoothed many of the differences of the rentier capitalist states' rules related to business on petroleum and natural gas, especially given Malaysia's protectionist stance until the late 1980s.

All, and some others, have a lot to do with the role played by *panchasila*, a slogan of spirit that emphasizes consensus, good discussion, and sincerity in working out differences among neighbors. *Panchasila* is an Indonesian local practice used to deal with differences. The central tenet of this approach is not to rely too much on logical discussions but to stress heart-to-heart communications and discussions like Antoine Saint-Exupery (1943) and possibly, a very unlikely source, the Second Letter to the Corinthians in the New Testament: "You cannot see what is most important through your eyes. Only through the heart can you see what is not visible and what is eternal (New Testament, 2, 4.6, Letters to Corinthians)." President Sukarno used this as a slogan to unite newly independent sovereign states under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement. ASEAN's use of *panchasila* is more articulated as the ASEAN Way, supporting its defensive approach to face major powers like the United States (during the Vietnam War and the US-China trade, technology, democracy, rules, and criteria of measurement disputes) and China's recent rise with the accompanying disputes in the South China and East China Sea as well as its maritime disputes arising with its infrastructure construction aid program, Belt and Road Initiative. To face major powers, ASEAN itself must unite tightly and friendly with each other first as members, so goes the ASEAN Way. How long the "Long Peace of East Asia" will last is a good question.

9.4 Zhonghua: East Asian Scenarios

Zhonghua means that after the Qin dynasty (221 BC–206 AD), the first official Chinese dynasty, placed its capital on the plain called Zhonghua in Shaanxi Province. To transform Zhonghua and beyond, the capital city was equal to expanding and civilizing China. However, the Chinese dynasties changed many times, each lasting on average 20–200 years. The Sui (581 AD–618 AD) and Tang (618–690, 705–907) Dynasties were said to be Han Chinese dynasties. But thereafter, waves of massive intrusions of Persian, Turkish, and Mongolian blood took place and some of them established Northern-Han hybrid dynasties, because once Northern "barbarians" conquered China, it worked well with Chinese names and Chinese were treated one rank lower than Northern conquerors. The Tang dynasty changed its governance style with the Northern conquerors using Chinese names. The current Chinese regime regards the Tang dynasty as the greatest period. Some of those northern Chinese of "purer" blood migrated to southern China during this period of Sui–Tang Dynasties

and were called Hakka, Chinese guests in southern China. They were discriminated against for land acquisition by southern Chinese and some of them further migrated to Southeast Asia. The next dynasty was the Song dynasty (960–1127) and the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279). The Song and Southern Song Dynasties were the period of prosperity based on the Yangzi River basin agriculture and the innovative use of technology for water supply on a large scale. The next Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) was a pure Mongol conqueror of mixed-race soldiers. In a century or so, they went back to their northern places. The Yuan dynasty was busy with foreign expeditions beyond China: Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Nepal, and Burma and no less importantly further to South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Europe. The conquest and commerce enabled the adoption and improvement of varieties of goods and diverse cultural materials throughout the vast Mongol empire. Also, the Yuan dynasty was innovative with machine tools. The Chinese were pushed down to southern China and were called the Southern Song dynasty, which prospered economically but militarily was conquered by the Yuan dynasty. The Song dynasty was economically prosperous and created original Chinese inventions, like gunpowder, printing and civil engineering (Needham, 1986). The commercial prosperity of China brought many people from around the world to visit China and brought new ideas from Europe and the Middle East. The Ming dynasty was a Han Chinese dynasty that pushed the Mongols back to the north. It was based on the Yangzi River basin agriculture: Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu. It was commercially prosperous but short-lived. The Qing dynasty (1636–1912) was a hybrid dynasty with the Manchus (an estimated population of some 3–5 million) conquering all of China with governance adapting to the traditional scheme of the Mongols, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Manchus. Thus, *Zhonghua* is a history of expanding and being conquered and re-uniting.

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Chapter 10

Pax Consortis on the Horizon



In Chapter 9, four Asian regionalism's scenarios are presented: horseback, *sangham*, *pancasila* and *zhonghua*. Horseback is a symbolic word of Central Asia. Living on horseback with foot stirrups to tightly connect your body to the horse body. Enabling your two feet solidly standing on stirrups, you can move fast on seasonally changing grass-rich places in a vast space of desert and mountains and exchanging wheat, bean, rice, milk, cheese, and meat for daily commodities in urban marketplaces. Riding on horseback with foot stirrups for forming convoys and battalions enables conquest into South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. South Asia's key symbolic word is *sangham*, meaning in Hindi a meeting place, where rivers from upper streams through a number of *sanghams* flow to deltas. A *sangham* is where people meet, where markets are regularly opened, where conflicts are settled, and where nearby ports enable commerce and diplomacy with foreigners to take place. Southeast Asia's key symbolic word is *pancasila*, in Indonesian a catchword of living enormous diversity without jeopardizing each other's way of life. *Zhonghua* is a symbolic word of how a small area of ancient China, *Zhongyuan*, around Shaanxi, has expanded or shrunk with Han Chinese conquering and being swallowed by, neighboring "barbarians" or non-Han ethnic groups, alternately producing a monstrous hybrid entity called China with Chinese characters being a broad cultural driving force.

The four scenarios do not stop here. Already two indices have been constructed: sovereign states' multilateral treaty participation and citizens' quality-of-life satisfaction (Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021, and 2022, or this volume's Chapters 7 and 5; Inoguchi, 2019, and 2022). The latter captures six societal types of Asian societies with three key dimensions yielded by factor analysis of each of the 29 Asian societies in 2003–2008: survival, social relations, and public policy preponderance. The former captures eight legislative types of Asian states with three dimensions yielded by factor analysis of the 193 sovereign states in 1945–2019: speed, angle, and strategy. These two indices are the basis of the evidence-based analysis and synthesis, extrapolated in the next quarter of a century as Chapter 10: Pax Consortis 2025–2050. In Chapter 2, there is historical backgrounds on World War II impacting

colonial Asia and regional divergence widened in the last century and the first quarter of the third millennium. We remind ourselves of the spirit of reinventing the wheel in international history, and we may as well add one more wheel, Asian Studies.

In carrying out the evidence-based approach to four Asian regionalisms, we have examined 29 Asian societies with six societal types focusing on the status quo and legislative types focusing on malleability. That is further extrapolated into 2025–2050 with equilibrium between stability and adaptability.

In my scenarios of futures (Inoguchi, 1988/1989), I adopted the scenario approach (Inoguchi, 2019) and compared four futures in 2025–2050: Pax Americana Phase II, Bigemony, Pax Nipponica, and Pax Consortis. Key distinguishing factors are: neutralization of strategic nuclear arsenals, scientific and technological dynamism, and the debt of history. My four scenarios in (Inoguchi, 1988, 1989) are that Pax Americana Phase II is a most likely scenario in the short-run and that in the longer-term the Pax Consortis scenario is a moderately likely scenario. Retrospectively in April 2022, Inoguchi (1988/1989) is remarkably close to my current thinking. The peak of the Pax Americana Phase II scenario seems to be over in 2008–2022 between the Lehman-triggered world depression; the confusing withdrawal by the US from Afghanistan, September 1, 2021; the US-China trade and technology war in the Trump and Biden presidencies; and the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the US-led economic sanctions with the worldwide impacts on the world economy. With all the above four taking place, Pax Americana Phase III is manifesting itself with three major features: (1) a call for neutralization of nuclear strategic arsenals is gaining ground in the UN and hesitancy is solidifying for the US and NATO to use such weapons vis-à-vis Russia; (2) the debt of history is measurably getting one inch feebler after witnessing Russia's blatant violation of killing unarmed civilians in Ukraine; and former Axis states, Germany and Japan, both have decided to expand their military buildups; and (3) the weight of soft power use among the US's power components has expanded significantly (cf. Blattman, 2022). Thus I argue that Pax Americana Phase II has been replaced by Pax Americana Phase III with American allies and aligned to play more important roles. If America's economic and military power further decline, it seems that the liberal international order has been partially replaced by a global complex disorder, whose entire future will be clarified in the succeeding quarters of this century (cf. Thompson, 2022).

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Conclusion

Two indices we have generated to assess the four regionalisms in Asia, whether these four regions can sustain themselves, are societal types and legislative types. Societal types are the degree to which citizens are satisfied with 16 items of daily life. Factor-analyzing 16 daily life items by each of 29 Asian societies yields three key dimensions: survival, social relations, and public policy preponderance with eigenvalues attached to show what kind of society is shaped by citizens. Legislative types are the degree to which the states are willing to join multilateral treaties despite constraints that come with the states' global neighborhoods and the treaties' global policy domains. Factor-analyzing 600 multilateral treaties which about 30% of 193 sovereign states have joined (1945 to 2019) yields three dimensions: speed (cautious vs agile), angle (global commons vs individual interests), and strategy (aspirational bonding vs mutual trust) with eigenvalues attached to show what kind of the states' engagements with external powers and with global tasks to generate global solutions. In other words, the crux of the matter is (1) how to conserve a well-liked society type by citizens and (2) how to adapt to global neighborhoods and generate global solutions. Our formulation of hyperdemocratization and hyperglobalization comes in here. In the third millennium, societies are shaped with high connectivity and high vulnerability. Hyperdemocratization comes with universalist principles: freedom in expression and assembly, free trade and investment, rule of law, and unit and measurement. Hyperglobalization comes not only with globalizing local societies like setting up MacDonald's in Moscow in 1980s but also new local schemes like globalizing the Belt and Road helping global neighborhoods with building infrastructure in the third millennium. As long as resources, parts, products, assembly factories, and global connectivity service firms exist in the global neighborhood steadily characterized as protectionism, regionalism, parochialism, antagonism, outright use of violence, and uncertainty, both citizens and the states must keep themselves in a state of connectivity suddenly becoming vulnerability and vice versa. Thus our key conclusion is that the international liberal order is steadily replaced by the global complex disorder. It takes years, quarters of a century, and a century.

Before we go into our regionalisms' scenarios and further global scenarios of the futures, we must touch on why our previous works (Inoguchi, 2019; Inoguchi & Le, 2020, 2021; Inoguchi & Le, 2022) are called "rarity" (Inoguchi & Le, 2021, Backcover). This work is doubly ingenious in itself: the evidence-based approach to the typology of societies often conserving itself for its catastrophe and to the typology of external–internal policies vis-à-vis hyperglobalization, adapting to global neighborhoods often with novel and self-claimed universalism. Instead of societal types, many academics focus on regime types. Instead of legislative types, many academics focus on power, economic and military. Many academics tend to adopt the top–down approach instead of the bottom–up approach. Ours is the bottom-up approach to societal types. Ours is the bottom–up approach in multilateral treaty participation. The roles multilateral treaty participation play are both a vehicle and an agency. More generally, many call their approach global. But instead of analyzing global variables, they analyze interstate relations. In not distinguishing global politics from international or interstate relations, many academics are mistaken (Inoguchi, 2021).

Inoguchi (1988/1989) presented the "Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future" in *International Affairs*. Since it was written in 1988, the level of analysis focused on the interstate level. Needless to say, my evidence-based indicators are global variables at the global level. Three driving forces I then envisaged are: neutralizing nuclear arsenals, scientific and technological dynamism, and the legacy of history. What happened before 1988? The Plaza Accord among the Group of Five was a critical event of instituting currency trade as a means reduce burdens on the US dollar. As a result, the Japanese yen soured to an historic height. *Japan as Number 1* (Vogel, 1983) was misread as Japan is becoming Number one. Thus America's decline and hegemonic transition became a catchword. My most feasible scenario was Pax Americana Phase II recovering from the developed North's second attempt after the termination of dollar–gold exchange in the early 1970s. With the rise of Japan, the positive and negative reactions increased. C. F. Bergsten came out calling for "Bigemony", meaning that the United States and Japan together manage the world economy (Inoguchi, 1988/1989). Negative voices were heard from the developed but stalled North, the debt of history, meaning Japan challenged the rest of the world and brought about ashes and ruins especially to Chinese, Koreans and Southeast Asians as well as Japanese themselves in the scenario of Pax Nipponica. In Pax Nipponica, manufacturing Japan excelled itself and Japan's GNP might as well purchase many of the American buildings. The Pax Consortis scenario was envisaged to be considered in the longer term scenario if neutralizing nuclear arsenals became feasible. Japanese kept envisaging a peaceful world scenario since 1945. As long as economic growth stayed high, the opposition kept flagging this scenario while benefitting from Pax Americana. At that time, the feasibility was widely considered to be not so high when Ronald Reagan flagged the Space Defense Initiative, challenging Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. Underneath the distribution of these scenarios and especially the high feasibility of Pax Americana Phase II was the scientific and technological dynamism.

In 2022, three decades later, this volume has examined the societal and global levels of analysis with citizens' satisfaction with their quality of life and with states' multilateral treaty participation. We have constructed two indices systematically and analytically. Two basic forces in our scheme are "hyperdemocratization", meaning the conservation or optimization of satisfaction, and "hyperglobalization", meaning the adaptation of self-transformation to the ever-changing world. Our image of the ever-changing world comes from the quality and quantity of human activities (Hidalgo, 2016), the largest cycle being called the Kondratiev economic cycle of one century with one half ascending and the other half descending (Kondratiev, 1925) and Joshua Goldstein's work (Goldstein, 1988). Living in the early 2020s, we have felt that the broad co-occurrences of the Corona war, the Sino-American war of trade and technology, with the global decoupling and re-coupling, and the Russian-Ukrainian war with American-led sanctions are broadly in sync with the Kondratiev and Goldstein cycles.

Based on two indices, societal types (2003–2008) and legislative types (1945–2019) and situating ourselves in the early 2020s the concurrences of (1) corona infectious disease diffusion, the consequence of which was colossal—almost one million deaths in the United States, a larger figure than the combined death tolls of American sailors and soldiers in World Wars I and II (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2022, May 14); (2) climate change with the carbon dioxide emission reduction endeavor only slowly moving forward (ICPS, 2021; Manabe & Broccoli, 2020); (3) China's rapid rise and the US-China technology and trade war; (4) the Russian invasion of Ukraine and US-led interventions with economic sanctions and weapons provisions, we find the convergence *grosso modo* of the Kondratiev economic cycles (Kondratiev, 1924) and the Goldstein war cycles (1988).

To summarize the economic and war cycles sequences over the last 300 years, the Napoleonic War, World War I, and World War II: First, a large worldwide war was preceded by three decades of recession which culminated with nearly a decade-long intensive worldwide war occurrence; followed by some three-decade-long recession; the tides of intensive war occurrence of a decade-long duration.

To illustrate one year-long cycle most simplistically, coronavirus, climate change, contestation with three plural self-claimed narratives, and culminating in worldwide war occurrence accelerated by the weaponized interdependence with economic sanctions and countersanctions.

In historical sequences, (1) Infectious disease diffusion took place during and after the Napoleonic War and the Crimean War, which gave birth to the Red Cross and the World Health Organization's predecessors (Hale & Held, 2015; Hale et al., 2013; Reinhard et al., 2015); (2) the industrial revolution commencing in late nineteenth-century England activated the emission of carbon dioxide despite oft-heard alarming voices (ICPS, 2021; Manabe & Broccoli, 2021); (3) power contestation with three powers' self-claimed narratives (Presidents Donald Trump and Joseph Biden's speeches on competition and cooperation with China, President Vladimir Putin's speeches on activities in Ukraine, President Xi Jinping's speeches on trade

and territories (Economy, 2022; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2022, May 15); (4) big, unprecedented wars called World Wars I and II took place (Ikenberry, 2020; Overy, 2021; Paine, 2012).

In our future scenarios we specify three driving forces: (1) infectious disease worldwide diffusion, (2) climate change carbon dioxide accumulation explosion, and (3) power contestation with three self-claimed narratives.

1. Infectious disease worldwide diffusion takes place when human collective activities go extremely high: Large wars, high economic growth, and other massive human collective meetings like the North Korean mass rally after the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Song's birthday on May 2022. The US accumulated death tolls in 2020–2022 because due to corona it has recorded one million deaths, which surpasses the combined death tolls of American soldiers and sailors in World Wars I and II.
2. Carbon dioxide explosion has not been effectively reduced despite many recommendations such as ICCP (2021), and Manabe and Broccoli (2021). Fossil-based power generation is planned to be reduced in Europe. The US and Indo-Pacific areas will continue to rely heavily on oil and natural gas and coal-based power generations. Power generation by uranium has been restrained by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Renewable power generation like water, sea water, sun, and wind are on a small scale given technological and financing difficulties except in the US and the EU.
3. Contestations with three major powers' self-claimed narratives bring about many half-truths, outright faked news, exaggerated announcements, possibly mutually empty understanding of others. Perhaps most seriously, many populations of these powers—the United States, China, and Russia, being self-proclaimed great powers or aspirant great powers, may not be hesitant of being utterly ignorant about themselves. One of them may claim to be universalist in general and thus others may be violating something covered by such words as “universalism” or “democracy” or “equality”. Elizabeth C. Economy's *The World According to China* (2021) vividly describes about the situation with China.

Yamauchi (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2022, May 15), discussing Pyotr Chaadayev (1794–1856)'s *Philosophical Letters* (1862) whose purpose was to bring about a good lesson from Russia's experience: to make Russia from the late-comer to civilization or from the equality between Russia and Europe, a virtuous lesson. His interpretation is that Russia experienced good and bad lessons that would trigger those actions that would revolutionize the world. At the beginning, they wrenched away the Romanov dynasty and established the Soviet Socialist States, the first in the world. Second, Russia became victors in World War II and thus made the best use of this victory to enhance their influence in Eastern Europe and to repress Russia below inhumanity under Joseph Stalin. Third, 1989–1991, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and opening of the path to civic freedom and national independence to constituting republics. Yamauchi adds that the Russia-Ukraine War has given bad lessons, waging wars without legitimacy and humanity.

Four futures are emerging:

- (1) Pax Americana Phase III G. J. Ikenberry + Charles Kupchan + Michael Buckley
Demographic decline, all-out automation
Pax Americana II with dark shadows of rogue hegemon and of isolationism
- (2) Sinamerica Fred Bergsten
Market size and connectivity-vulnerability determine basics
- (3) Pax Sinica Branko Milanović
Political capitalism, waiting for Godot again even without Putin or Xi Jinping?
- (4) Pax Consortis Takashi Inoguchi
Constructing global-center-focused alignment with “avec nous” and “nous tous”

(1) Pax Americana III succeeds Pax II in Inoguchi (1988–1989). The United States’ predominance in terms of military and economic power makes this scenario’s the most feasible future. The United States’ network power (Immerwahr, 2019) and transnational and non-governmental voice power (Hale & Held, 2015; Hale et al., 2013; Porter, 2021) are not underestimated. Soft power (Nye, 2004) gets its share of determinant of this scenario’s feasibility. The United States legislative branch and its states enjoy much more power than its executive branch as historical legacies especially on war, alliances, tariffs, tax, and racism. The United States multilateral treaty participation has been smaller than many UN member states. President George Washington’s principle, disentanglement from the European mess, has been alive. The legislative branch critically determines whether President Joseph Biden’s focus on domestic policy will be successful or not. In the legislative branch, the Republicans overwhelm the Democrats. Many Democratic states may not be in good harmony with President Biden with regard to mining states, agricultural states, coastal tech service innovative states in the West, the South, and the East. War has often been a bipartisan issue despite Washington’s legacy. Will Biden be successful with his domestic policies raising a lot of money that brings about highly bipartisan support for it? In the recent past, the US entered the Spanish-American War with bipartisan support. In World War I President Woodrow Wilson under a democratic presidency was not able to get bipartisan support. In World War II President Franklin Roosevelt got almost unanimous support from the legislative branch with the help of public policy works called the New Deal, turned around from deep depression followed by Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, arousing patriotic emotions (Beckley, 2022; Ikenberry, 2020; Kupchan, 2022, with differences and nuances). Beckley (2022) brings about a new dimension to Pax Americana III. It is entitled: a rogue hegemonic superpower. Not just hegemonic, but rogue in addition. On the basis of two indices, demographic rise and decline and auto machine deployment rate in manufacturing, agriculture, mining and service including innovation industries, both meticulously assembled, he includes that title. On these two indices the United States is already number one. Rivals China and Russia both have been on the steady decline. Automated machine deployment has been the highest of the three, the rise of the developing South is possible but not so soon in these two quarters of this

century. However, he does not exclude this superpower's shift to rogue democracy. Out of Republicans in both houses, anti-Trumpians have been out of the Republican nominee list. Furthermore, a bulk of democratic Congresspeople and Senators might shift to the Republican majority fearing the rise of left-leaning Democrats in the Democratic party. The possibility of another Trumpian presidency cannot be underestimated. In that case, the whole "liberal international order" will not include the adjective "liberal". And given the Trumpian tenet, America first, Washington's principle of small federal tax, protectionism, regionalism (the Monroe Doctrine), racism might as well become an underestimated feasibility.

(2) Sinamerica

Inoguchi's four scenarios of futures (1988/1989) include Bigemony and Pax Nipponica. The former means the United States and Japan together manage the world market since Japan was rumored to purchase entire buildings in big cities in the US when "Japan as Number One" is not Japan is becoming Number One (Vogel, 1983). Pax Nipponica had many small fans like the late Shintaro Ishihara, but it seems that once China's rise has been rumored, Pax Sinica cannot be excluded, as Pax Nipponica was not excluded from the futures in 1989. Sinamerica is one of the scenario's futures since once economic dimension or world market power declines, it is perhaps part of Americans' psychology that arouses in them a more patriotic dimension. Even after Japan's bubble burst in 1991, American public opinion was busy supporting tough protectionist measures to be most eagerly adopted while it was lukewarm to China's rise accelerated by the new World Trade Organization, even into the dawn of the third millennium.

(3) Pax Sinica

Into the Xi Jinping presidency, I had two chances to listen to his speech both at Tsinghua University, one in 2014 and the other in 2016. In 2014 his tone was a continuation of his predecessor's line: technocratic, pragmatic and realistic, especially in response to "marching forward with globalization abroad." When the invitation came to invitees, 50 from academics, 50 from government and 50 from journalists and free lancers in the whole world, a keynote speaker's name was not attached. Only one hour before his keynote speech delivered in one of the auditoriums of Tsinghua University, his name was announced: Xi Jinping. Prominent among world leaders who gave their speeches in the big auditorium included the Russian defense minister and the French foreign minister. The United States wanted to see how highly they were treated in many sessions. In 2016 the size was large with so many sessions and so many participants. Allocating representatives from various sectors and states were well done with two English-Chinese two-way simultranslators, excellent. The United States representatives included Mr. Armitage with whom I sat together during Xi Jinping's keynote speech session, with some 5 m between us and President Xi Jinping. Mr. Stephen Hadley, President George Bush Jr's former National Security Advisor from 2005 to 2009, was assigned in the session to which I was also assigned. Mr. Hadley was very articulate in argumentation and courteous in discussion. My general impression was that in 2016 Xi Jinping gained confidence in China's rapid rise and in Chinese preparations to portray its role in the world in self-assertive

but universally acceptable spirits and manners. Watching him speaking, with 5 m distance, I did not see him loosen his tightly held facial movement or expression for a moment.

(4) Pax Consortis

This is a continuation of Inoguchi (1988/1989), included because of a long-term scenario although nuclear arsenals might as well have moved 10 inches closer to the scenario's goals by a treaty banning nuclear weapons. The treaty opened for signature on 20 September 2017, and as of May 2022, 86 nations have signed it, and 61 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty. The Russian invasion and US-backed Ukrainian counterattacks have made the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons look remote when Putin does not preclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons. South Africa and Kazakhstan abolished nuclear weapons voluntarily. Those nuclear states committed to no first-use of the weapons do not increase much. The treaty banning chemical and biological weapons entered into force earlier. Furthermore, the treaty banning small arms entered into force with transnational non-governmental groups at work. The treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons has been meant to encourage non-nuclear weapons states to sign the treaty of nuclear non-proliferation (NPT) while persuading nuclear weapons states to further advance disarmament negotiations among the big two or three (the United States, Russia, and possibly China). Some Global South states have been eager to have the capacity to acquire power generation like North Korea or Iran. North Korea quit this scheme of the Six Party (the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan) Negotiations in the 2000s, and now it has been busy testing nuclear missiles and bombs. What would be Iran's positions?

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Epilogue

When we were considering forecasting our scenarios in longer terms like a century or two, we ran into the article in the *Journal of Historical Political Economy* on the indigenous resilience vis-à-vis two outside forces after the Spaniards' conquest of Mexico in 1548. The article titles itself as "Pandemic spikes and broken spears" (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2020). The argument is that the two explanations with one-driving force focused on have been dominated by (1) germs: Spaniards brought about pandemics, over some 250 years of their conquest and exploitation of indigenous populations that were shrunk dramatically because indigenous populations were not immune to many diseases; (2) guns and steel: Spaniards dominated indigenous populations by superior weapons and tactics with which indigenous populations were not familiar. But they were able to increase the populations' actual Conquest-era city-settlements from 1,093 in 1548 until 36% had disappeared entirely by 1790. Yet coercion and multiple pandemics that led average populations in those settlements to fall from 2,377 to 128 by 1648, 13% would still end the colonial era larger than they started. Their resilience was the combination of nonreplicable and nonexportable resources and skills from the pre-Hispanic period that would prove complementary to global trade. In other words, indigenous opportunities and agency played important roles in shaping their own resilience.

In the above-mentioned authors' words, germs are pandemics whereas guns and steel are weapons. What is important to the authors to know are demographic increase and decrease during the Conquest period 1584–1790. This reminds me of my past forecasting attempt. In 1988 when I published Inoguchi (1988/1989), it was before the end of the Cold War. Four scenarios are: (1) Pax Americana II, (2) Bigemony, (3) Pax Consortis, and (4) Pax Nipponica. Assessing the feasibility of each scenario, three requirements are identified: (1) neutralizing the nuclear arsenals, (2) scientific and technological dynamism, and (3) the legacy of history. After feasibility assessments of the four scenarios, I came up with the forecast that Pax Americana II is most likely in a medium term, and Pax Consortis in a longer term.

Retrospectively, it was foresightful before the end of the Cold War. The phrases like “power transition”, “after hegemony”, and of course “Pax Americana II” crowded mass media and academia. Three driving forces, neutralizing the nuclear arsenals, scientific and technological dynamism and the legacy of history, matched most with Pax Americana II although behind the shadow of Bigemony (US and Japan strong together) and Pax Nipponica there was the incredible rise of Japanese yen vis-à-vis the US dollar which caused the United States to call for allowing currency trade among the Group of Seven. The Plaza agreement of 1985 unleashed massive currency trade, which registered the highest ever in itself and surpassed the amount of trade on goods and services for the first time in human history. Those phrases like “power transition” (Gilpin, 1983) and “after hegemony” (Keohane, 1981) were crowding American academia. Having read in April 2022 Diaz/Cayeros, Espinosa-Balbuena, and Jha (2022), I have pondered more about choosing the right phrases for driving forces and manifested scenarios for the futures. The former set of driving forces should be more abstract while the latter should be more concrete, whereas the target to be forecasted remained to be the same, global regimes.

In 2022 when writing this volume, the task for the four Asian regionalisms part has a longer time span like a quarter of a century or two; the two indicators are used in preceding chapters on historical backgrounds and current contexts in multilateral treaty participation and civilians’ satisfaction about quality of life. The task has been carried out society by society, not sub-Asian regionalism by sub-Asian regionalism. These two datasets generated and used to see the sustainability of four Asian regionalisms, Central, South, Southeast and East Asian regionalisms are: states’ multilateral treaty participation is the product of 1945–2019 whereas citizens’ satisfaction with quality of life is the product of 2003–2008. To allow the imagination to work with ease, the task we have carried out is to characterize each of the four Asian regionalisms in one symbolic word:

1. horseback–Central Asia
2. *sangham* –South Asia
3. *panchasila*– Southeast Asia
4. *zhonghua*– East Asia

In this volume, the Epilogue is no less important in that human beings, neither “germs” nor “guns and steel” are decisive. Society shapes itself on the basis of citizens’ satisfaction with 16 life domains, aspects, and styles while the state listening to citizens’ voices, adapts to a multilateral treaty participation system. Their regime choice is secondary. Thus we venture to adopt the scheme of three driving forces imagined and four global regimes imagined:

1. Demographic expansion and decline
2. Hyperglobalization
3. Scientific and technological development

Four global regimes imagined:

1. Pax Americana III
2. Sinamerica
3. Pax Consortis
4. Pax Sinica

Three Driving Forces

(1) Demographic expansion and decline: Demography shows that human population increases and decreases. In 1584–1790, when Spaniards conquered the Americas, people died en masse because indigenous people were not immune to multiple germs Spaniards brought and diffused. Also people died because conquerors killed people en masse, not being able to effectively counteract guns and steel. Many communities vanished in their entirety. But 13% of such communities ended up with the larger population because, like global trade, people made use of opportunities to trade settlements and migrate into other remaining settlements. In the first quarter of this century, it looks as if all the developed North were registering the continuous demographic decline. Of all, the United States registers a total fertility rate of 1.83 while East Asian societies register lower total fertility rates, like South Korea registering 0.80. China has been catching up fast with South Korea. Most recently, alarmed by the drastic decline of total fertility rate, China has stopped the one-child policy per couple introduced some 30 years ago. Now the government announced that up to three children per couple are encouraged. Voices from below are the cry that only with one child plus a couple's two pairs of parents taken care of, a couple may as well give up hypercompetitive school entrance exams (*gao kao*) and no less hard job career competition. Most recently, two additional government policies have been added to the one-child policy: first, even if a couple can register divorce, reversing it can be allowed with much longer days after registration; second, abortion is discouraged. When Mark Haas (2007) examined demography and international security, India was been listed as the world-second favorable for total fertility rate as a couple on average had a few children. The United States then enjoyed a high total fertility rate in the developed North and so, in 2022, is in moderate decline. Haas (2007) argued that the US and India are the two societies in the whole world whose population groups could be ready for military deployment. But reading Michael Beckley (2020) "Rogue Superpower," (*Foreign Affairs*) arguing that a Trumpian presidential victory in 2024 is feasible has startled me. With his small government, anti-free trade, anti-tax hike, anti-migration, America first agendas, one thing about such a regime surprises me: the US can become a rogue state and the US is a superpower. If incoming migrants are reduced dramatically, Haas's (2007) conclusion would have to be revised. Under President Joseph Biden, Donald Trump's anti-migrant policy has been partially loosened, If the United States reverses itself more fully to George Washington's principle of disentanglement from the European mess, President Joe

Biden's strong policy line of avoiding the deployment of American military forces in the Russian war against Ukraine but of sending massive amounts of weapons and other military assistance for US allies and those aligned, like Slovenia and Poland, the Trumpian America does not need massive incoming migrants. The demographic equation would be altered dramatically. If Joe Biden encourages those allies and aligned to send massive amounts of money to Ukraine and their refugees in local societies, American citizens would be happier when the American economy shows the tumultuous road ahead.

(2) Hyperglobalization: Globalization means a standard setter influences local societies like MacDonal'd's in Moscow and permeates local society significantly like Hong Kong in the aftermath of the Opium War when Lord Palmerston uttered that Hong Kong would remain to be rocks and humble houses, not many disagreed with him. What would he say about Hong Kong before Executive Chief Carrie Lam resigned? In other words, some standard setters can help transform local societies with standards, criteria, measurements, global money transactions, global supply chains etc. Some standard setters can be oligarchs in local societies. If income gaps get extreme like the US and Russia and China, such oligarchs would be able to be inside final decision-making along with president, prime minister or king or sultan. If the Rogue Superpower's oligarchs choose which war to be financed next and when and how, if hyperglobalization becomes extreme, the places of products cover many societies, making it difficult to grasp the entire picture about how much benefit goes to societies. Here it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish key domestic society and other chained societies, especially when key manufacturing society makes a decision on locating key manufacturing factories abroad. South Korea has made a lot of investment in Russia for oil and natural gas. The United States has sanctioned Russia and other hostile countries. If South Korea joins the United States against Russia, Russia would sell the investments to China. If South Korea does not join the US in sanctioning Russia, the United States would enhance tougher pressure on South Korea, setting up THAAD missiles against North Korea and pro-American policy line in general.

(3) Scientific and technological development: National academia do cooperatively carry out their research projects. To carry out pioneering projects successfully, one needs money, lots of it. Research and development to promote discovery and innovation are often encouraged by the government—but only to some countries and for some purposes. In the United States, those for defense come from federal defense finance. In Japan, defense is not particularly welcome by the government because of the Constitution Clause 9, the “no war clause” except for self-defense. But the Russian war in Ukraine has led the Japanese government to double military budgets in 5 years, possibly not including those for scientific and technological development. The Chinese government has comprehensive scientific cooperation calls for many outstanding scientists in Japan as well, to which the government says utmost caution is necessary for defense-sensitive and thus constitutional issues. Japanese business firms are densely tied with Chinese private firms and more so with American business firms. Thus this driving force is bound to be here.

Four Global Regimes Imagined

1. Pax Americana III
2. Sinamerica
3. Pax Consortis
4. Pax Sinica

(1) Pax Americana III: Pax Americana III has been imagined in the sequence of Pax Americana Phase I, Pax Americana Phase II, and Pax Americana Phase III. The peaked predominance in American military and economic power Phase I was replaced by Pax Americana Phase II as the salience of diplomatic and soft power cohered itself with many allies and those aligned were replaced by Pax Americana Phase III. In this phase III, demographic increase has been moderated by immigrants' reduction by Donald Trump. In the Russian-Ukrainian war, deglobalization and decoupling and sanctions and counter-sanctions play an immensely important role. And to a small or large surprise, "a rogue superpower" has been applied to the United States (Beckley, 2020). Sending weapons via allies and friends to Ukraine and encouraging non-military assistance have been done without deploying the American soldiers in Ukraine. Pax Americana has been associated with liberal and international for Phases I and II; Phase III possibly introduces regime features like a rogue state.

(2) Sinamerica: In the first quarter of this century, China's rise and China's threats have crowded mass media and academia. Some like C. Fred Bergsten (2022) echo this policy line. In Inoguchi (1988/1989), Bergsten's name was associated with Bigemony (the US and Japan).

(3) Pax Consortis (loose connectivity and loose polyarchy): Loose connectivity and loose polyarchy are two key words. By loose connectivity is meant to be states that are not too strong while loose polyarchy is meant to be a global governance scheme that is not too strict.

(4) Pax Sinica: Bigemony and Pax Nipponica appeared in the list in 1988–1989 and 2022. In 1988–1989 Japan's rise and threats were so frequently mentioned that it led the Group of Seven to agree on currency trade, which would allow the US to work with a currency exchange rate incredibly high, yen vis-à-vis the US dollar from 1985 onward. In the 2010s China's rise and China as No. 1 crowded American mass media, which led Donald Trump to adapt increasingly protectionist, nationalist, regionalist, racist direction each time China publicized the Chinese goals for 2020, for 2050, and for 2100.

The Epilogue ends with cautionary words: We have started with the two seemingly innocuous indices, societal types and legislative types, to portray how Asian states navigate through their styles of daily life satisfaction and their styles of adaptation to global environments at home and abroad. Both derive from our belief in the evidence-based approach. Also both derive from our belief in the importance of the bottom up perspective rather than the oft-adopted top-down perspective in better fathoming the essentials of global politics. Two forces that have run through the period of this work (1945 and 2019) are hyperdemocratization and hyperglobalization as seen from each Asian society and state. Human beings have miraculously survived and lived

through all the hazards and impediments from the origins of the incredibly ancient African forests via African savannas and deserts and snow cold European wild fields and further to Asia's difficult diversities of mountains and deserts, rivers and plains. Guns and steel often prevail locally as in Mariupol, Ukraine. Germs often prevail locally as *Corona* in Wuhan and often diffuse globally. Old instincts and institutions often reemerge atavistically like the British trained Myanmar military vis-à-vis the defiant Karen minorities and the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National Democratic League in the third millennium. Also the current Indian federal government chief, Narendra Modi, so immersed with his religious mission of spreading it, uses the federal budgeting of disaster-mitigation or federal employment wage as an opportunity to do his business, i.e., his party's expansion in those states which do not have strong regional political parties or regionally concentrated caste-groups like West Bengal or Haryana. Also the current Chinese party-state emulates the Qing dynasty's governance as a guide in that the national flag consisting of five stars surrounding the central large star on the red-colored flag meaning Han in the Center with the other four stars Mongols, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Manchus attached. Hyperglobalization forces the Chinese state's assimilation of national minorities policy to cause some perturbing noises. These noises come from Developed North's non-governmental organizations and transnational organizations, as well as Western states especially the United States and the European Union. Globalism is bound to bring universalism along with it. The steady rise and dominance of the West since the late eighteenth century onward has made the Western-led international law, the Western-led business, the Western-led science, and the Western-led ethics normal features of human life. This work has shown that global lives as lived by Asian societies and states in terms of societal types and legislative types in daily life satisfaction and multilateral treaty participation are more diverse and more opportunistic about learning from the non-West. The liberal international order may be in a transition to the illiberal global disorder for some time. Our work has shown that only by learning from others and adapting to ever-changing global environments can *Homo sapiens* deserve its miraculously trod long history.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Legislative Types of 193 Sovereign States

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
AFG	Afghanistan	Islamic East	ABc
ALB	Albania	Orthodox East	Abc
DZA	Algeria	Islamic East	aBc
ADO	Andorra	Old West	AbC
AGO	Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	Latin America	ABc
ARG	Argentina	Latin America	aBc
ARM	Armenia	Orthodox East	Abc
AUS	Australia	New West	abC
AUT	Austria	Old West	abC
AZE	Azerbaijan	Orthodox East	AbC
BHS	Bahamas	Latin America	aBc
BHR	Bahrain	Islamic East	ABc
BGD	Bangladesh	Indic East	ABC
BRB	Barbados	Latin America	aBc
BLR	Belarus	Orthodox East	AbC
BEL	Belgium	Old West	abC
BLZ	Belize	Latin America	ABc
BEN	Benin	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
BTN	Bhutan	Indic East	ABC

(continued)

(continued)

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
BOL	Bolivia	Latin America	aBc
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Orthodox East	Abc
BWA	Botswana	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
BRA	Brazil	Latin America	aBc
BRN	Brunei Darussalam	Indic East	ABc
BGR	Bulgaria	Orthodox East	abC
BFA	Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
BDI	Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
CPV	Cabo Verde	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
KHM	Cambodia	Indic East	abC
CMR	Cameroon	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
CAN	Canada	New West	abC
CAF	Central African Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
TCD	Chad	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
CHL	Chile	Latin America	aBc
CHN	China	Sinic East	abC
COL	Colombia	Latin America	aBc
COM	Comoros	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
COG	Congo	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
CRI	Costa Rica	Latin America	aBc
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
HRV	Croatia	Returned West	AbC
CUB	Cuba	Latin America	aBc
CYP	Cyprus	Old West	abC
CZE	Czech Republic	Returned West	AbC
PRK	DPR Korea	Sinic East	ABc
ZAR	DR of the Congo	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
DNK	Denmark	Reformed West	abC
DJI	Djibouti	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
DMA	Dominica	Latin America	aBc
DOM	Dominican Republic	Latin America	aBc
ECU	Ecuador	Latin America	aBC
EGY	Egypt	Islamic East	abC
SLV	El Salvador	Latin America	ABc
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
ERI	Eritrea	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
EST	Estonia	Returned West	AbC

(continued)

(continued)

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
SWZ	Eswatini	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
ETH	Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
FJI	Fiji	New West	abC
FIN	Finland	Reformed West	abC
FRA	France	Old West	abC
GAB	Gabon	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
GMB	Gambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
GEO	Georgia	Orthodox East	Abc
DEU	Germany	Reformed West	abC
GHA	Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
GRC	Greece	Old West	abC
GRD	Grenada	Latin America	ABc
GTM	Guatemala	Latin America	aBc
GIN	Guinea	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
GUY	Guyana	Latin America	aBc
HTI	Haiti	Latin America	aBc
HND	Honduras	Latin America	ABc
HUN	Hungary	Returned West	abC
ISL	Iceland	Reformed West	abC
IND	India	Indic East	abC
IDN	Indonesia	Indic East	abc
IRN	Iran	Islamic East	abc
IRQ	Iraq	Islamic East	aBc
IRL	Ireland	Reformed West	abC
ISR	Israel	Old West	abC
ITA	Italy	Old West	abC
JAM	Jamaica	Latin America	aBc
JPN	Japan	Sinic East	abc
JOR	Jordan	Islamic East	aBC
KAZ	Kazakhstan	Orthodox East	Abc
KEN	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
KIR	Kiribati	New West	AbC
KWT	Kuwait	Islamic East	aBc
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	Orthodox East	Abc
LAO	Laos	Indic East	aBC
LVA	Latvia	Returned West	AbC

(continued)

(continued)

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
LBN	Lebanon	Islamic East	aBc
LSO	Lesotho	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
LBR	Liberia	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
LBY	Libya	Islamic East	aBc
LIE	Liechtenstein	Old West	AbC
LTU	Lithuania	Returned West	AbC
LUX	Luxembourg	Old West	abC
MDG	Madagascar	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MWI	Malawi	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MYS	Malaysia	Indic East	AbC
MDV	Maldives	Indic East	ABC
MLI	Mali	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MLT	Malta	Old West	abC
MHL	Marshall Islands	New West	AbC
MRT	Mauritania	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MUS	Mauritius	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MEX	Mexico	Latin America	aBC
FSM	Micronesia	New West	AbC
MCO	Monaco	Old West	abC
MNG	Mongolia	Orthodox East	ABc
MNE	Montenegro	Orthodox East	Abc
MAR	Morocco	Islamic East	abc
MOZ	Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
MMR	Myanmar	Indic East	ABC
NAM	Namibia	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
NRU	Nauru	New West	AbC
NPL	Nepal	Indic East	aBc
NLD	Netherlands	Reformed West	abC
NZL	New Zealand	New West	abC
NIC	Nicaragua	Latin America	aBc
NER	Niger	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
NGA	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
MKD	North Macedonia	Orthodox East	AbC
NOR	Norway	Reformed West	abC
OMN	Oman	Islamic East	ABc
PAK	Pakistan	Indic East	abC
PLW	Palau	New West	AbC

(continued)

(continued)

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
PAN	Panama	Latin America	ABC
PNG	Papua New Guinea	New West	abC
PRY	Paraguay	Latin America	ABc
PER	Peru	Latin America	aBc
PHL	Philippines	Indic East	abC
POL	Poland	Returned West	abC
PRT	Portugal	Old West	AbC
QAT	Qatar	Islamic East	ABc
KOR	Republic of Korea	Sinic East	AbC
MDA	Republic of Moldova	Orthodox East	Abc
ROM	Romania	Orthodox East	abC
RUS	Russian Federation	Orthodox East	AbC
RWA	Rwanda	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
WSM	Samoa	New West	AbC
SMR	San Marino	Old West	AbC
STP	São Tomé and Príncipe	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
SAU	Saudi Arabia	Islamic East	ABc
SEN	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
SRB	Serbia	Orthodox East	AbC
SYC	Seychelles	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
SLE	Sierra Leone	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
SGP	Singapore	Indic East	abc
SVK	Slovakia	Returned West	AbC
SVN	Slovenia	Returned West	AbC
SLB	Solomon Islands	New West	abC
SOM	Somalia	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
ZAF	South Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
SSD	South Sudan	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
ESP	Spain	Old West	abC
LKA	Sri Lanka	Indic East	AbC
KNA	St. Kitts and Nevis	Latin America	ABc
LCA	St. Lucia	Latin America	ABc
VCT	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Latin America	ABc
SDN	Sudan	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
SUR	Suriname	Latin America	aBc
SWE	Sweden	Reformed West	abC
CHE	Switzerland	Reformed West	abC

(continued)

(continued)

Code	Country name	Geo-historico-cultural region	Type
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	Islamic East	aBC
TJK	Tajikistan	Orthodox East	Abc
THA	Thailand	Indic East	abC
TMP	Timor-Leste	Indic East	ABc
TGO	Togo	Sub-Saharan Africa	ABc
TON	Tonga	New West	abC
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	Latin America	aBc
TUN	Tunisia	Islamic East	abC
TUR	Turkey	Islamic East	Abc
TKM	Turkmenistan	Orthodox East	ABc
TUV	Tuvalu	New West	AbC
UGA	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
UKR	Ukraine	Orthodox East	AbC
ARE	United Arab Emirates	Islamic East	ABc
GBR	United Kingdom	Reformed West	abC
TZA	Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
USA	United States of America	New West	abC
URY	Uruguay	Latin America	aBc
UZB	Uzbekistan	Orthodox East	Abc
VUT	Vanuatu	New West	AbC
VEN	Venezuela	Latin America	aBc
VNM	Viet Nam	Sinic East	ABc
YEM	Yemen	Islamic East	aBc
ZMB	Zambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc
ZWE	Zimbabwe	Sub-Saharan Africa	aBc

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized statecraft in multilateral treaty participation: Global quasi-legislative behavior of 193 sovereign states* (pp. 253–258). Springer Nature

Appendix II: Societies Covered by the AsiaBarometer

Table A.1: List of societies covered by the AsiaBarometer survey with years and sample sizes

	Society	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1	Afghanistan			874			
2	Australia						(1,000)

(continued)

(continued)

	Society	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
3	Bangladesh			1,008			
4	Bhutan			801			
5	Brunei		804				
6	Cambodia		812			1,012	
7	China	800	1,000		2,000		1,000
8	Hong Kong				1,000		
9	India	822		1,238			1,052
10	Indonesia		825			1,000	
11	Japan	857	825		1,003		1,012
12	Kazakhstan			800			
13	Kyrgyzstan			800			
14	Laos		800			1,000	
15	Malaysia	800	800			1,000	
16	Maldives			821			
17	Mongolia			800			
18	Myanmar	800	800			1,000	
19	Nepal			800			
20	Pakistan			1,086			
21	Philippines		800			1,000	
22	Russia						(1,055)
23	Singapore		800		1,038		
24	South Korea	800	819		1,023		
25	Sri Lanka	800		813			
26	Taiwan				1,006		
27	Tajikistan			800			
28	Thailand	800	800			1,000	
29	Turkmenistan			800			
30	United States						(1,002)
31	Uzbekistan	800		800			
32	Vietnam	807	800		1,000		
Total	52,215 (49,158)	8,086	10,685	12,241	8,070	7,012	6,121

Source Inoguchi, T., & Fujii, S. (2013). *The quality of life in Asia: A comparison of quality of life in Asia* (p. 23). Springer

Table A.2: Distinguishing life sphere of domain assessments

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Housing	0.46			0.67
Standard of living	0.69			0.66
Household income	0.72			0.60
Health	0.42			0.43
Education	0.51			0.42
Job	0.58			0.68
Friendships		0.49		0.63
Marriage		0.57		0.58
Neighbors		0.46		0.69
Family life		0.59		0.52
Leisure		0.44		0.52
Spiritual life		0.49		0.45
Public safety			0.65	0.58
Condition of the environment			0.66	0.53
Social welfare system			0.69	0.57
Democratic system			0.61	0.56

Note The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation. Loadings of greater than 0.30 were reported. The samples only after 2005 are used because Spiritual life was asked only after 2005. So, the Brunei sample is not included

Source Inoguchi, T., & Fujii, S. (2013). *The quality of life in Asia: A comparison of quality of life in Asia* (p. 35). Springer.

Appendix III

Table A.3: List of multilateral treaties covered in the dataset

Domain	Subdomain	Number of treaties	Source of data
Environment (52 treaties)	Environment	52	United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC)
Human Rights (53 treaties)	Freedom of Information	1	UNTC
	Human Rights	27	
	Slavery	3	
	Obscene Publications	5	

(continued)

(continued)

Domain	Subdomain	Number of treaties	Source of data
	Refugees and Stateless Persons	4	
	Status of Women	3	
	Traffic in Persons	10	
Intellectual Property (36 treaties)	Other IP-related	10	WIPO
	WIPO - Administered	26	WIPO
Labor and Health (110 treaties)	Health	13	UNTC
	ILO-Administered	78	ILO
	Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	19	UNTC
Peace and Disarmament (84 treaties)	Disarmament	13	UNTC
	Law of the Sea	10	
	Outer Space	2	
	Pacific Settlement of International Disputes	1	
	Penal Matters	21	
	Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular Relations	37	
	Commercial Arbitration	3	
Trade, Commerce, and Communication (265 treaties)	Commercial Arbitration	3	UNTC
	Commodities	13	
	Economic Statistics	2	
	Educational and Cultural Matters	5	
	International Trade and Development	24	
	Navigation	13	
	Telecommunications	8	
	Transport and Communications	197	
SUM		600	

Source Inoguchi, T., & Le, L. T. Q. (2021). *Digitized statecraft in multilateral treaty participation: Global quasi-legislative behavior of 193 sovereign states* (p. 16). Springer Nature

Appendix IV: Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Afghanistan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Marriage	0.38			0.74
Standard of living	0.41			0.61
Household income	0.45			0.67
Health	0.53			0.68
Education	0.41			0.77
Job	0.42			0.72
Neighbors	0.49			0.71
Housing		0.54		0.68
Friendships		0.31		0.77
Family life		0.39		0.74
Spiritual life		0.39		0.74
Public safety			0.58	0.59
Condition of the environment			0.63	0.56
Social welfare system			0.62	0.59
Democratic system			0.56	0.65
Leisure			0.38	0.73

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation. Loadings of greater than 0.30 were reported

Afghanistan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.728
Factor 2	0.752
Factor 3	0.544
Factor 4	0.488
Factor 5	0.397
Factor 6	0.192
Factor 7	0.117
Factor 8	-0.014
Factor 9	-0.038
Factor 10	-0.081
Factor 11	-0.117

(continued)

(continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 12	-0.149
Factor 13	-0.190
Factor 14	-0.232
Factor 15	-0.262
Factor 16	-0.293
n	534

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Bangladesh

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.46			0.73
Friendships	0.30			0.86
Standard of living	0.59			0.60
Household income	0.66			0.55
Health	0.42			0.79
Education	0.67			0.54
Job	0.64			0.59
Neighbors		0.29		0.78
Public safety		0.72		0.47
Condition of the environment		0.66		0.52
Social welfare system		0.69		0.51
Democratic system		0.60		0.63
Marriage			0.28	0.86
Family life			0.57	0.56
Leisure			0.54	0.64
Spiritual life			0.42	0.78

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Bangladesh

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.480
Factor 2	1.547
Factor 3	0.563
Factor 4	0.278
Factor 5	0.202
Factor 6	0.182

(continued)

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 7	0.056
Factor 8	0.021
Factor 9	-0.054
Factor 10	-0.073
Factor 11	-0.102
Factor 12	-0.144
Factor 13	-0.186
Factor 14	-0.207
Factor 15	-0.240
Factor 16	-0.275
n	525

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Bhutan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Neighbors	0.37			0.77
Public safety	0.71			0.46
Condition of the environment	0.57			0.65
Social welfare system	0.75			0.43
Democratic system	0.56			0.68
Spiritual life	0.32			0.76
Housing		0.37		0.76
Standard of living		0.70		0.48
Household income		0.67		0.48
Health		0.33		0.80
Education		0.46		0.74
Job		0.42		0.78
Friendships			0.43	0.74
Marriage			0.55	0.66
Family life			0.62	0.57
Leisure			0.43	0.72

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Bhutan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.710
Factor 2	1.187
Factor 3	0.610
Factor 4	0.550
Factor 5	0.307
Factor 6	0.195
Factor 7	0.095
Factor 8	0.035
Factor 9	-0.006
Factor 10	-0.069
Factor 11	-0.130
Factor 12	-0.167
Factor 13	-0.194
Factor 14	-0.203
Factor 15	-0.240
Factor 16	-0.305
n	424

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Brunei

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Job	0.66			0.40
Neighbors	0.59			0.39
Public safety	0.65			0.42
Condition of the environment	0.72			0.33
Social welfare system	0.72			0.33
Family life	0.72			0.34
Leisure	0.71			0.41
Standard of living		0.55		0.38
Household income		0.65		0.38
Health		0.61		0.46
Education		0.66		0.38
Housing			0.48	0.55
Friendships			0.56	0.39
Marriage			0.57	0.53

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Brunei

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	7.182
Factor 2	0.724
Factor 3	0.401
Factor 4	0.272
Factor 5	0.147
Factor 6	0.029
Factor 7	-0.015
Factor 8	-0.039
Factor 9	-0.068
Factor 10	-0.085
Factor 11	-0.110
Factor 12	-0.140
Factor 13	-0.161
Factor 14	-0.176
n	498

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Cambodia

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.40			0.78
Friendships	0.41			0.82
Marriage	0.35			0.85
Standard of living	0.53			0.70
Household income	0.44			0.72
Health	0.27			0.88
Education	0.28			0.87
Job	0.44			0.77
Neighbors	0.33			0.85
Family life	0.38			0.75
Public safety		0.52		0.72
Condition of the environment		0.57		0.65
Social welfare system		0.43		0.80
Democratic system		0.39		0.84
Leisure			0.54	0.68
Spiritual life			0.52	0.71

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Cambodia

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.710
Factor 2	1.187
Factor 3	0.610
Factor 4	0.550
Factor 5	0.307
Factor 6	0.195
Factor 7	0.095
Factor 8	0.035
Factor 9	-0.006
Factor 10	-0.069
Factor 11	-0.130
Factor 12	-0.167
Factor 13	-0.194
Factor 14	-0.203
Factor 15	-0.240
Factor 16	-0.305
n	660

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-China

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.44			0.75
Standard of living	0.71			0.41
Household income	0.74			0.39
Education	0.40			0.66
Job	0.49			0.61
Public safety		0.64		0.56
Condition of the environment		0.61		0.53
Social welfare system		0.63		0.47
Democratic system		0.62		0.58
Leisure		0.40		0.59
Friendships			0.46	0.70
Marriage			0.53	0.67
Health			0.43	0.74
Neighbors			0.41	0.75
Family life			0.54	0.57

(continued)

(continued)

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Spiritual life			0.50	0.56

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

China

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.066
Factor 2	0.836
Factor 3	0.565
Factor 4	0.293
Factor 5	0.204
Factor 6	0.061
Factor 7	0.043
Factor 8	-0.020
Factor 9	-0.063
Factor 10	-0.089
Factor 11	-0.121
Factor 12	-0.148
Factor 13	-0.163
Factor 14	-0.177
Factor 15	-0.178
Factor 16	-0.222
n	2,233

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Hong Kong

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Friendships	0.41			0.70
Marriage	0.45			0.66
Health	0.30			0.79
Education	0.35			0.73
Family life	0.64			0.51
Leisure	0.73			0.40
Spiritual life	0.73			0.39
Housing		0.44		0.69
Standard of living		0.67		0.45

(continued)

(continued)

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Household income		0.63		0.52
Job		0.40		0.64
Neighbors			0.28	0.87
Public safety			0.52	0.66
Condition of the environment			0.47	0.65
Social welfare system			0.41	0.72
Democratic system			0.33	0.81

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Hong Kong

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.696
Factor 2	0.647
Factor 3	0.480
Factor 4	0.365
Factor 5	0.240
Factor 6	0.190
Factor 7	0.102
Factor 8	0.032
Factor 9	0.017
Factor 10	-0.035
Factor 11	-0.073
Factor 12	-0.159
Factor 13	-0.192
Factor 14	-0.214
Factor 15	-0.247
Factor 16	-0.266
n	604

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-India

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.62			0.56
Friendships	0.53			0.63
Marriage	0.52			0.62

(continued)

(continued)

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Standard of living	0.66			0.51
Household income	0.62			0.57
Health	0.55			0.61
Education	0.58			0.62
Job	0.56			0.62
Neighbors	0.43			0.64
Public safety		0.62		0.57
Condition of the environment		0.65		0.58
Social welfare system		0.66		0.54
Democratic system		0.63		0.57
Family life			0.57	0.52
Leisure			0.51	0.62
Spiritual life			0.57	0.56

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

India

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.804
Factor 2	1.430
Factor 3	0.422
Factor 4	0.257
Factor 5	0.076
Factor 6	0.062
Factor 7	0.001
Factor 8	-0.012
Factor 9	-0.034
Factor 10	-0.091
Factor 11	-0.120
Factor 12	-0.127
Factor 13	-0.139
Factor 14	-0.157
Factor 15	-0.200
Factor 16	-0.246
n	1,202

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Indonesia

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Housing	0.58			0.59
Standard of living	0.71			0.45
Household income	0.79			0.37
Education	0.49			0.67
Job	0.67			0.48
Friendships		0.34		0.72
Marriage		0.60		0.54
Health		0.45		0.65
Neighbors		0.64		0.49
Public safety		0.48		0.57
Family life		0.48		0.53
Spiritual life		0.53		0.64
Condition of the environment			0.50	0.56
Social welfare system			0.61	0.49
Democratic system			0.55	0.60
Leisure			0.39	0.66

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Indonesia

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.274
Factor 2	1.228
Factor 3	0.500
Factor 4	0.274
Factor 5	0.182
Factor 6	0.165
Factor 7	0.068
Factor 8	-0.013
Factor 9	-0.061
Factor 10	-0.079
Factor 11	-0.108
Factor 12	-0.149
Factor 13	-0.167
Factor 14	-0.184
Factor 15	-0.204

(continued)

(continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 16	-0.223
n	704

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Japan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Housing	0.41			0.70
Standard of living	0.77			0.31
Household income	0.77			0.34
Education	0.44			0.64
Job	0.49			0.60
Friendships		0.47		0.69
Marriage		0.59		0.55
Health		0.36		0.69
Family life		0.67		0.47
Leisure		0.53		0.58
Spiritual life		0.63		0.44
Neighbors			0.38	0.66
Public safety			0.64	0.52
Condition of the environment			0.60	0.51
Social welfare system			0.71	0.44
Democratic system			0.70	0.46

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Japan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.640
Factor 2	1.097
Factor 3	0.645
Factor 4	0.291
Factor 5	0.239
Factor 6	0.173
Factor 7	0.083
Factor 8	-0.001
Factor 9	-0.056
Factor 10	-0.101

(continued)

(continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 11	-0.124
Factor 12	-0.140
Factor 13	-0.163
Factor 14	-0.172
Factor 15	-0.181
Factor 16	-0.209
n	1,352

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Kazakhstan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Public safety	0.64			0.49
Condition of the environment	0.59			0.57
Social welfare system	0.76			0.37
Democratic system	0.72			0.40
Housing		0.41		0.77
Standard of living		0.78		0.32
Household income		0.74		0.34
Health		0.47		0.65
Job		0.45		0.66
Friendships			0.56	0.63
Marriage			0.70	0.49
Education			0.36	0.70
Neighbors			0.37	0.76
Family life			0.66	0.54
Leisure			0.49	0.50
Spiritual life			0.57	0.44

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Kazakhstan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.394
Factor 2	1.245
Factor 3	0.739
Factor 4	0.490
Factor 5	0.356

(continued)

(continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 6	0.163
Factor 7	0.116
Factor 8	-0.019
Factor 9	-0.054
Factor 10	-0.067
Factor 11	-0.115
Factor 12	-0.120
Factor 13	-0.166
Factor 14	-0.180
Factor 15	-0.188
Factor 16	-0.251
n	447

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Kyrgyzstan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Friendships	0.38			0.81
Marriage	0.46			0.75
Education	0.38			0.71
Neighbors	0.29			0.91
Family life	0.56			0.65
Leisure	0.57			0.57
Spiritual life	0.61			0.56
Housing		0.31		0.81
Standard of living		0.62		0.51
Household income		0.63		0.52
Health		0.41		0.77
Job		0.46		0.73
Public safety			0.61	0.58
Condition of the environment			0.48	0.72
Social welfare system			0.63	0.56
Democratic system			0.62	0.59

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Kyrgyzstan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.500
Factor 2	1.191
Factor 3	0.541
Factor 4	0.357
Factor 5	0.275
Factor 6	0.215
Factor 7	0.087
Factor 8	-0.009
Factor 9	-0.019
Factor 10	-0.047
Factor 11	-0.149
Factor 12	-0.192
Factor 13	-0.208
Factor 14	-0.216
Factor 15	-0.231
Factor 16	-0.267
n	412

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Laos

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.47			0.75
Standard of living	0.66			0.52
Household income	0.60			0.62
Health	0.33			0.85
Education	0.34			0.84
Job	0.50			0.68
Family life	0.42			0.62
Neighbors		0.38		0.68
Public safety		0.54		0.70
Condition of the environment		0.59		0.63
Social welfare system		0.47		0.71
Spiritual life		0.41		0.66
Friendships			0.35	0.81
Marriage			0.37	0.81

(continued)

(continued)

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Leisure			0.39	0.74

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Laos

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.341
Factor 2	0.719
Factor 3	0.322
Factor 4	0.274
Factor 5	0.209
Factor 6	0.058
Factor 7	0.018
Factor 8	-0.043
Factor 9	-0.066
Factor 10	-0.099
Factor 11	-0.133
Factor 12	-0.168
Factor 13	-0.203
Factor 14	-0.231
Factor 15	-0.249
n	580

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Malaysia

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Friendships	0.60			0.57
Marriage	0.55			0.65
Neighbors	0.57			0.62
Family life	0.67			0.48
Leisure	0.56			0.56
Spiritual life	0.67			0.44
Housing		0.46		0.67
Standard of living		0.68		0.42
Household income		0.76		0.38
Health		0.39		0.72

(continued)

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	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Education		0.47		0.62
Job		0.65		0.53
Public safety			0.63	0.56
Condition of the environment			0.67	0.52
Social welfare system			0.69	0.47
Democratic system			0.45	0.73

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Malaysia

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.149
Factor 2	1.087
Factor 3	0.828
Factor 4	0.302
Factor 5	0.199
Factor 6	0.142
Factor 7	0.018
Factor 8	-0.006
Factor 9	-0.023
Factor 10	-0.063
Factor 11	-0.100
Factor 12	-0.143
Factor 13	-0.169
Factor 14	-0.192
Factor 15	-0.221
Factor 16	-0.231
n	560

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Maldives

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Standard of living	0.61			0.54
Household income	0.71			0.40
Health	0.65			0.46
Education	0.64			0.39

(continued)

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	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Job	0.59			0.43
Neighbors	0.48			0.48
Public safety	0.64			0.55
Condition of the environment	0.61			0.53
Social welfare system	0.55			0.64
Democratic system	0.11			0.98
Family life		0.75		0.31
Leisure		0.76		0.34
Spiritual life		0.78		0.35
Housing			0.40	0.68
Friendships			0.71	0.35
Marriage			0.57	0.50

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Maldives

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	6.179
Factor 2	1.173
Factor 3	0.714
Factor 4	0.607
Factor 5	0.278
Factor 6	0.179
Factor 7	0.124
Factor 8	0.045
Factor 9	0.024
Factor 10	-0.041
Factor 11	-0.074
Factor 12	-0.116
Factor 13	-0.136
Factor 14	-0.180
Factor 15	-0.215
Factor 16	-0.246
n	361

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Mongolia

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Standard of living	0.72			0.43
Household income	0.79			0.36
Health	0.46			0.64
Education	0.57			0.65
Job	0.58			0.65
Family life	0.39			0.68
Leisure	0.47			0.74
Spiritual life	0.53			0.59
Public safety		0.70		0.50
Condition of the environment		0.76		0.38
Social welfare system		0.68		0.50
Democratic system		0.60		0.61
Neighbors			0.40	0.70
Housing			0.43	0.72
Friendships			0.54	0.59
Marriage			0.57	0.63

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Mongolia

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.542
Factor 2	1.473
Factor 3	0.633
Factor 4	0.498
Factor 5	0.239
Factor 6	0.116
Factor 7	0.015
Factor 8	-0.017
Factor 9	-0.041
Factor 10	-0.067
Factor 11	-0.113
Factor 12	-0.147
Factor 13	-0.149
Factor 14	-0.198
Factor 15	-0.223

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 16	-0.237
n	443

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Myanmar

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.55			0.61
Friendships	0.38			0.71
Standard of living	0.62			0.52
Household income	0.67			0.52
Health	0.38			0.79
Education	0.51			0.71
Job	0.59			0.60
Neighbors		0.70		0.47
Public safety		0.78		0.38
Condition of the environment		0.70		0.49
Family life		0.46		0.57
Leisure		0.33		0.80
Spiritual life		0.17		0.97
Marriage			0.45	0.71

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Myanmar

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.679
Factor 2	1.100
Factor 3	0.382
Factor 4	0.182
Factor 5	0.093
Factor 6	0.071
Factor 7	0.048
Factor 8	-0.054
Factor 9	-0.089
Factor 10	-0.129
Factor 11	-0.154
Factor 12	-0.174

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 13	-0.213
Factor 14	-0.242
n	471

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Nepal

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.51			0.65
Standard of living	0.70			0.47
Household income	0.72			0.47
Health	0.42			0.79
Education	0.65			0.55
Job	0.59			0.63
Leisure	0.26			0.91
Spiritual life	0.19			0.93
Public safety		0.56		0.62
Condition of the environment		0.59		0.62
Social welfare system		0.70		0.50
Democratic system		0.62		0.61
Friendships			0.48	0.64
Marriage			0.40	0.70
Neighbors			0.42	0.70
Family life			0.47	0.69

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Nepal

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.667
Factor 2	1.341
Factor 3	0.511
Factor 4	0.303
Factor 5	0.190
Factor 6	0.173
Factor 7	0.060
Factor 8	0.015
Factor 9	-0.002

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 10	-0.068
Factor 11	-0.117
Factor 12	-0.129
Factor 13	-0.161
Factor 14	-0.197
Factor 15	-0.231
Factor 16	-0.317
n	380

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Pakistan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Public safety	0.67			0.47
Condition of the environment	0.73			0.43
Social welfare system	0.77			0.39
Democratic system	0.71			0.48
Housing		0.50		0.66
Friendships		0.43		0.66
Standard of living		0.55		0.50
Household income		0.74		0.41
Health		0.59		0.58
Education		0.51		0.66
Job		0.60		0.49
Marriage			0.50	0.62
Neighbors			0.40	0.75
Family life			0.56	0.60
Leisure			0.45	0.60
Spiritual life			0.58	0.64

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Pakistan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.745
Factor 2	1.563
Factor 3	0.754
Factor 4	0.415

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 5	0.186
Factor 6	0.096
Factor 7	-0.027
Factor 8	-0.046
Factor 9	-0.055
Factor 10	-0.093
Factor 11	-0.119
Factor 12	-0.129
Factor 13	-0.149
Factor 14	-0.194
Factor 15	-0.203
Factor 16	-0.214
n	579

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Philippines

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Materialist	Post-materialist	
Public safety	0.68			0.48
Condition of the environment	0.78			0.33
Social welfare system	0.74			0.40
Democratic system	0.67			0.49
Housing		0.52		0.63
Standard of living		0.62		0.48
Household income		0.65		0.50
Health		0.44		0.66
Education		0.62		0.53
Job		0.63		0.51
Friendships			0.41	0.77
Marriage			0.48	0.73
Neighbors			0.42	0.65
Family life			0.53	0.54
Leisure			0.47	0.53
Spiritual life			0.54	0.63

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Philippines

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.481
Factor 2	1.081
Factor 3	0.596
Factor 4	0.339
Factor 5	0.246
Factor 6	0.142
Factor 7	0.026
Factor 8	-0.015
Factor 9	-0.050
Factor 10	-0.098
Factor 11	-0.125
Factor 12	-0.138
Factor 13	-0.155
Factor 14	-0.181
Factor 15	-0.187
Factor 16	-0.217
n	764

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Singapore

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Post-materialist	Materialist	
Public safety	0.70			0.46
Condition of the environment	0.71			0.45
Social welfare system	0.73			0.42
Democratic system	0.71			0.45
Housing		0.44		0.71
Friendships		0.56		0.61
Marriage		0.58		0.51
Neighbors		0.34		0.72
Family life		0.65		0.45
Leisure		0.62		0.48
Spiritual life		0.56		0.56
Standard of living			0.44	0.64
Household income			0.67	0.48
Health			0.54	0.54

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	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Post-materialist	Materialist	
Education			0.62	0.55
Job			0.57	0.57

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Singapore

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.420
Factor 2	1.308
Factor 3	0.673
Factor 4	0.523
Factor 5	0.351
Factor 6	0.152
Factor 7	0.121
Factor 8	0.061
Factor 9	-0.053
Factor 10	-0.082
Factor 11	-0.104
Factor 12	-0.145
Factor 13	-0.151
Factor 14	-0.196
Factor 15	-0.208
Factor 16	-0.246
n	578

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-South Korea

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Housing	0.50			0.61
Standard of living	0.73			0.34
Household income	0.77			0.37
Health	0.49			0.72
Education	0.59			0.63
Job	0.62			0.57
Leisure	0.48			0.60
Spiritual life	0.44			0.61

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	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Public	Post-materialist	
Public safety		0.65		0.54
Condition of the environment		0.66		0.48
Social welfare system		0.63		0.51
Democratic system		0.60		0.59
Friendships			0.48	0.65
Marriage			0.53	0.49
Neighbors			0.42	0.70
Family life			0.49	0.49

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

South Korea

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.488
Factor 2	1.108
Factor 3	0.495
Factor 4	0.276
Factor 5	0.236
Factor 6	0.142
Factor 7	0.017
Factor 8	-0.021
Factor 9	-0.053
Factor 10	-0.068
Factor 11	-0.122
Factor 12	-0.127
Factor 13	-0.146
Factor 14	-0.183
Factor 15	-0.199
Factor 16	-0.215
n	689

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Sri Lanka

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Post-materialist	Materialist	
Public safety	0.69			0.50
Condition of the environment	0.76			0.39

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	Factors			Uniqueness
	Public	Post-materialist	Materialist	
Social welfare system	0.81			0.31
Democratic system	0.66			0.55
Leisure	0.39			0.64
Housing		0.47		0.74
Friendships		0.35		0.71
Standard of living		0.71		0.45
Household income		0.75		0.40
Health		0.43		0.66
Education		0.44		0.63
Job		0.54		0.61
Marriage			0.57	0.64
Neighbors			0.46	0.65
Family life			0.57	0.63
Spiritual life			0.49	0.68

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Sri Lanka

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.687
Factor 2	1.407
Factor 3	0.717
Factor 4	0.367
Factor 5	0.321
Factor 6	0.189
Factor 7	0.030
Factor 8	0.008
Factor 9	-0.062
Factor 10	-0.093
Factor 11	-0.114
Factor 12	-0.148
Factor 13	-0.175
Factor 14	-0.194
Factor 15	-0.228
Factor 16	-0.232
n	462

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Taiwan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Standard of living	0.65			0.45
Household income	0.70			0.41
Health	0.50			0.69
Education	0.59			0.61
Job	0.69			0.48
Leisure	0.45			0.57
Housing		0.49		0.66
Friendships		0.52		0.67
Marriage		0.64		0.52
Neighbors		0.48		0.73
Family life		0.67		0.47
Spiritual life		0.53		0.50
Public safety			0.60	0.61
Condition of the environment			0.54	0.56
Social welfare system			0.72	0.43
Democratic system			0.53	0.71

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Taiwan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	4.974
Factor 2	1.177
Factor 3	0.783
Factor 4	0.339
Factor 5	0.293
Factor 6	0.237
Factor 7	0.077
Factor 8	0.025
Factor 9	-0.069
Factor 10	-0.071
Factor 11	-0.108
Factor 12	-0.161
Factor 13	-0.176
Factor 14	-0.196
Factor 15	-0.209

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(continued)

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 16	-0.255
n	678

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Tajikistan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Housing	0.68			0.51
Standard of living	0.79			0.33
Household income	0.81			0.32
Health	0.41			0.72
Education	0.44			0.64
Job	0.65			0.45
Democratic system	0.47			0.60
Leisure	0.70			0.41
Spiritual life	0.65			0.42
Friendships		0.52		0.58
Marriage		0.69		0.49
Neighbors		0.45		0.77
Public safety		0.35		0.84
Family life		0.55		0.63
Condition of the environment			0.40	0.82
Social welfare system			0.51	0.60

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Tajikistan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.046
Factor 2	1.164
Factor 3	0.645
Factor 4	0.432
Factor 5	0.294
Factor 6	0.188
Factor 7	0.091
Factor 8	0.065
Factor 9	0.018
Factor 10	-0.055

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 11	-0.109
Factor 12	-0.123
Factor 13	-0.174
Factor 14	-0.204
Factor 15	-0.233
Factor 16	-0.265
n	390

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Thailand

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Housing	0.41			0.70
Friendships	0.42			0.75
Marriage	0.55			0.63
Neighbors	0.56			0.59
Family life	0.65			0.49
Leisure	0.57			0.57
Spiritual life	0.60			0.51
Standard of living		0.53		0.51
Household income		0.65		0.54
Health		0.38		0.72
Education		0.55		0.65
Job		0.65		0.52
Public safety			0.61	0.53
Condition of the environment			0.60	0.53
Social welfare system			0.66	0.51
Democratic system			0.59	0.62

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Thailand

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	5.001
Factor 2	0.974
Factor 3	0.659
Factor 4	0.451
Factor 5	0.303

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Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 6	0.204
Factor 7	0.141
Factor 8	0.029
Factor 9	-0.038
Factor 10	-0.104
Factor 11	-0.135
Factor 12	-0.162
Factor 13	-0.169
Factor 14	-0.205
Factor 15	-0.234
Factor 16	-0.248
n	701

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Uzbekistan

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Materialist	Post-materialist	Public	
Housing	0.36			0.77
Standard of living	0.70			0.44
Household income	0.72			0.44
Health	0.38			0.72
Education	0.27			0.87
Job	0.46			0.74
Neighbors	0.28			0.84
Leisure	0.50			0.69
Spiritual life	0.44			0.73
Friendships		0.36		0.81
Marriage		0.75		0.41
Family life		0.78		0.37
Public safety			0.56	0.65
Condition of the environment			0.55	0.67
Social welfare system			0.58	0.57
Democratic system			0.50	0.68

Notes The reported loadings were from a principal factors solution with orthogonal varimax rotation

Uzbekistan

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	3.986
Factor 2	0.983
Factor 3	0.643
Factor 4	0.407
Factor 5	0.292
Factor 6	0.215
Factor 7	0.127
Factor 8	0.046
Factor 9	-0.020
Factor 10	-0.076
Factor 11	-0.121
Factor 12	-0.168
Factor 13	-0.198
Factor 14	-0.209
Factor 15	-0.229
Factor 16	-0.282
n	376

Distinguishing Life Sphere of Domain Assessments-Vietnam

	Factors			Uniqueness
	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Friendships	0.35			0.73
Marriage	0.48			0.71
Education	0.39			0.70
Family life	0.61			0.51
Leisure	0.49			0.64
Spiritual life	0.58			0.57
Housing		0.43		0.76
Standard of living		0.69		0.49
Household income		0.74		0.42
Health		0.37		0.73
Job		0.37		0.72
Neighbors			0.49	0.62
Public safety			0.67	0.54
Condition of the environment			0.64	0.57

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
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	Post-materialist	Materialist	Public	
Social welfare system			0.61	0.55


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
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
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n	638


Appendix V: Hexagonal Profiles of 193 Member States of United Nations Towards Multilateral Treaties








































































































Appendix VI: 193 Countries’ Deviations from World Mean in Six Policy Domains (z-Score of Treaty Participation Index)

The above table indicates the scores of 193 states and 10 regional groups on average in terms of participation in multilateral treaties by six policy domains. For each domain, to measure how many standard deviations above or below the world mean a country exercised, we have calculated the z-score for each state based on its treaty participation measurement. A positive z-score represents a country that has participated in multilateral treaties faster than the world mean, whereas a negative score represents a country that has participated in multilateral treaties slower than the world mean. This score is measured by normalizing the treaty participation index and is used to capture the comparative evaluation among countries. In this way, a z-score represents a country’s relationship to the world mean; thus, it can illustrate whether

a country is leading in participation in multilateral treaties or not on a given global issue. For instance, if Country A has the z-score of 1.0, in the normal distribution, we can infer that Country A achieved better than 68% of countries in the world and ranked roughly among the top 60 countries (32% × 200). Similarly, Country B with z-score of 2.0 means that Country B achieved better than 95% of the countries in the world and is among the top 10 countries worldwide. Using the same type of interpretation, if Country C achieves better than 99.7%, Country C with the z-score of 3.0 will be the best performer in the world. With that scaling of measurement, it can be interpreted that a country having the z-score in a given regime domain of 2.0 or higher is outstanding and leads the world in that domain.

Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
Indic East	Bangladesh	0.261	-0.518	-0.079	-0.017	-0.448	-0.528
	Bhutan	-0.427	-0.882	-0.993	-1.045	-1.025	-0.865
	Brunei Darussalam	-1.249	-0.467	-0.125	-1.149	-0.470	-0.796
	Cambodia	-0.439	-0.612	-0.881	-0.835	-0.492	-0.693
	India	1.018	0.504	2.047	0.897	-0.068	-0.193
	Indonesia	-0.279	-0.551	0.315	-0.344	0.526	-0.223
	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.028	0.071	-0.934	-0.833	-0.469	-0.722
	Malaysia	-1.060	-0.215	0.008	0.054	-0.352	-0.332
	Maldives	-0.666	-0.523	-0.099	0.491	-0.503	-0.865
	Myanmar	-0.820	-0.307	0.578	-0.620	-0.501	-0.766
	Nepal	0.176	-0.625	-0.891	-0.383	-1.032	-0.622
	Pakistan	0.229	-0.054	0.678	0.276	0.106	0.215
	Philippines	2.129	0.846	0.896	0.618	1.221	0.620
	Singapore	-1.219	-0.454	-0.044	-0.469	-0.159	-0.501
Sri Lanka	0.029	0.109	0.552	0.111	0.227	-0.508	
Thailand	-0.657	0.605	0.265	-0.197	-0.458	-0.062	
Timor-Leste	-1.121	-1.389	-1.001	-1.233	-1.061	-0.791	
	REGION AVERAGE	-0.239	-0.263	0.017	-0.275	-0.292	-0.449
Islamic East	Afghanistan	-0.432	-0.424	-0.829	-0.699	-1.046	-0.242
	Algeria	-0.262	-0.394	-0.908	-0.413	-0.888	0.406
	Bahrain	-0.853	-0.810	-0.102	-0.538	-0.140	-0.616
	Egypt	2.300	-0.159	1.399	1.422	-0.136	0.388
	Iran	-0.326	0.248	0.220	0.071	-1.032	-0.415
	Iraq	0.302	-0.006	-0.007	0.165	-0.977	1.523
	Jordan	0.307	0.480	-0.615	1.383	-0.402	0.980
	Kuwait	-0.462	-0.072	-0.037	-0.661	-0.499	0.384

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Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
	Lebanon	-0.370	-0.083	-0.628	-0.006	-0.882	-0.134
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.187	-0.394	-0.883	-0.370	-0.952	0.349
	Morocco	0.066	-0.331	-0.006	0.134	0.204	-0.105
	Oman	-1.001	-0.477	-0.892	-0.574	-0.673	-0.649
	Qatar	-0.306	-0.462	-0.529	-0.800	-0.415	-0.530
	Saudi Arabia	-0.550	0.037	-0.850	-0.158	-0.996	-0.523
	Syrian Arab Republic	0.533	-0.562	-0.612	-0.015	-0.982	1.239
	Tunisia	1.115	0.049	0.005	0.869	0.912	0.827
	Turkey	-0.177	0.323	1.588	-0.226	-0.148	0.246
	United Arab Emirates	-0.693	-0.271	-0.531	0.477	-0.317	-0.615
	Yemen	-0.368	-0.744	-0.949	-0.760	-0.998	-0.403
	REGION AVERAGE	-0.052	-0.213	-0.272	-0.037	-0.546	0.111
Latin America	Antigua and Barbuda	-0.636	-0.670	-0.118	0.003	-0.468	-0.520
	Argentina	1.485	0.044	0.759	0.372	1.347	0.129
	Bahamas	-0.172	-0.524	-0.967	-0.253	-0.956	-0.560
	Barbados	1.161	0.019	-0.082	-0.525	-0.290	-0.319
	Belize	0.197	-0.835	-0.119	-0.511	-0.441	-0.436
	Bolivia	0.560	0.372	0.882	0.174	-0.435	-0.324
	Brazil	0.485	0.799	1.532	0.658	1.232	1.232
	Chile	0.662	0.555	1.627	1.231	1.439	0.230
	Colombia	1.082	-0.569	0.735	-0.215	0.791	0.082
	Costa Rica	2.520	0.482	0.366	-0.054	1.367	0.630
	Cuba	1.270	-0.329	0.409	0.491	-0.182	2.757
	Dominica	-0.263	-0.891	-0.126	-0.589	-0.450	-0.526
	Dominican Republic	-0.406	0.226	0.782	0.461	-0.094	0.661
	Ecuador	3.494	1.056	0.424	0.604	1.370	2.010
	El Salvador	0.919	1.207	0.503	0.474	0.826	-0.221
	Equatorial Guinea	-0.573	-0.745	-0.959	-0.755	-1.009	-0.568
	Grenada	-0.633	-0.369	-0.543	-0.866	-0.735	-0.633
	Guatemala	0.321	0.501	0.906	1.339	0.293	1.350
	Guyana	0.812	-0.370	-0.079	-0.600	-0.486	-0.250
	Haiti	0.483	-0.651	-0.124	0.224	-0.196	-0.288
	Honduras	0.482	-0.025	0.883	-0.126	0.727	0.271

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Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
	Jamaica	0.828	-0.289	-0.047	-0.399	0.679	-0.498
	Mexico	2.121	3.058	1.512	2.381	2.006	2.333
	Nicaragua	1.433	0.864	0.888	0.111	0.255	0.125
	Panama	1.809	1.061	-0.225	0.955	0.685	0.211
	Paraguay	0.168	0.480	0.973	0.227	0.848	-0.045
	Peru	0.829	0.701	1.107	0.142	0.821	-0.022
	Saint Kitts and Nevis	-0.411	-0.685	-0.568	-0.537	-0.739	-0.513
	Saint Lucia	-0.973	-0.705	-0.126	-0.280	0.663	-0.490
	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-0.335	-0.731	-0.128	-0.808	-0.394	-0.603
	Suriname	-0.827	-0.762	-0.105	-0.727	-0.404	-0.704
	Trinidad and Tobago	-0.691	1.125	-0.039	-0.176	-0.042	-0.515
	Uruguay	1.985	-0.006	0.277	0.693	-0.183	0.568
	Venezuela	0.444	-0.356	0.538	0.450	-0.355	-0.133
	REGION AVERAGE	0.577	0.089	0.316	0.105	0.220	0.130
New West	Australia	2.011	1.307	1.256	2.384	0.582	-0.245
	Canada	0.585	1.639	2.438	3.254	0.198	0.106
	Fiji	-1.061	1.140	-0.531	0.663	0.033	-0.504
	Kiribati	-1.247	-0.707	-0.987	-0.672	-1.061	-0.740
	Marshall Islands	-1.196	-0.784	-0.994	-0.074	-1.061	-0.865
	Nauru	-1.102	-0.675	-1.011	-0.529	-1.061	-0.865
	New Zealand	0.886	0.945	0.953	1.611	-0.193	-0.414
	Palau	-1.272	-0.814	-1.002	-0.934	-1.061	-0.865
	Papua New Guinea	-1.093	-0.713	-0.534	-0.229	-0.744	-0.469
	Samoa	-1.081	-0.500	-0.956	-0.455	-1.037	-0.740
	Solomon Islands	-1.154	-0.935	-0.545	-0.728	-0.789	-0.769
	Tonga	-1.028	-0.675	-0.953	-0.989	-1.034	-0.865
	Tuvalu	-1.241	-1.174	-1.006	-0.517	-1.061	-0.865
	United States of America	-1.033	1.599	2.958	3.136	2.755	-0.203
	Vanuatu	-0.823	-1.064	-0.957	-0.638	-1.044	-0.740
	REGION AVERAGE	-0.657	-0.094	-0.125	0.352	-0.438	-0.603
Old West	Andorra	-1.126	-0.936	-1.023	-1.349	-0.474	-0.865

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Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
	Austria	0.878	2.984	2.089	0.642	0.386	0.934
	Belgium	0.510	0.594	3.162	1.112	1.761	0.866
	Cyprus	0.336	0.596	-0.035	0.413	0.293	0.339
	France	1.244	1.520	3.034	2.040	3.084	1.223
	Greece	-0.196	0.777	1.917	1.277	-0.163	0.370
	Israel	-0.360	-0.010	0.555	-0.113	0.762	0.383
	Italy	0.227	1.058	2.351	1.123	1.436	0.664
	Liechtenstein	-0.942	-0.585	-0.162	-0.261	0.475	-0.757
	Luxembourg	-0.346	0.063	2.082	1.237	1.300	0.207
	Malta	-0.143	0.009	-0.070	-0.243	-0.259	-0.293
	Monaco	-0.334	-0.331	-0.996	0.438	0.898	-0.865
	Portugal	1.733	1.309	1.495	1.478	0.869	1.071
	San Marino	-0.522	-0.524	-0.985	-1.069	-1.001	-0.234
	Spain	1.902	2.248	1.657	1.413	3.372	2.554
	REGION AVERAGE	0.191	0.585	1.005	0.543	0.849	0.373
Orthodox East	Albania	0.141	-0.247	-0.823	-0.649	-0.158	-0.245
	Armenia	-0.642	-0.773	-0.944	-0.299	-0.675	-0.356
	Azerbaijan	-0.542	-0.653	-0.991	-0.849	-0.710	-0.563
	Belarus	1.660	1.205	-0.982	1.245	0.682	0.348
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.374	-0.590	-0.978	-0.828	-0.761	-0.008
	Bulgaria	3.573	2.491	-0.356	0.917	1.043	1.123
	Georgia	-0.928	-0.721	-0.849	-0.532	0.222	-0.633
	Kazakhstan	-0.870	-0.586	-0.980	-0.795	-0.509	-0.560
	Kyrgyzstan	-0.904	-0.429	-0.787	-0.814	0.372	-0.391
	Montenegro	-0.770	-0.664	-0.979	-1.060	-0.701	-0.572
	Republic of Moldova	-0.772	-0.571	-0.931	-0.586	0.737	-0.039
	Romania	1.576	1.306	0.939	0.616	1.669	0.568
	Russian Federation	1.766	2.201	0.841	2.230	0.442	0.446
	Serbia	-0.699	-0.033	-0.980	-0.887	-0.220	-0.272
	Tajikistan	-0.967	-0.527	-1.001	-1.020	-0.814	-0.571
	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	-0.704	-0.369	-0.943	-0.683	-0.603	-0.148
	Turkmenistan	-0.670	-0.142	-0.991	-0.846	-0.992	-0.737
	Ukraine	1.537	1.071	-0.942	1.276	1.239	0.464

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Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
	Uzbekistan	-1.013	0.296	-0.991	-0.630	-0.792	-0.732
	Yugoslavia	-1.167	-0.968	-0.446	-0.945	-0.913	-0.326
	REGION AVERAGE	-0.038	0.065	-0.706	-0.257	-0.072	-0.160
Reformed West	Denmark	1.085	2.615	2.415	2.567	1.947	1.220
	Finland	0.562	1.270	0.759	2.177	1.011	3.217
	Germany	0.411	1.914	1.683	1.879	3.415	1.520
	Iceland	0.424	0.683	0.902	1.028	-0.130	0.299
	Ireland	-0.579	1.012	0.342	0.964	0.524	1.170
	Netherlands	0.067	1.709	2.814	1.745	1.470	0.552
	Norway	1.983	2.624	3.048	4.178	0.319	3.940
	Sweden	2.850	3.130	2.253	3.183	2.288	8.243
	Switzerland	-0.259	1.410	1.833	1.907	3.534	1.593
	United Kingdom	0.478	2.629	2.849	2.304	4.132	2.608
	REGION AVERAGE	0.702	1.900	1.890	2.193	1.851	2.436
Returned West	Croatia	-0.016	0.019	-0.902	-0.221	0.265	-0.191
	Czech Republic	-0.585	0.324	-0.092	0.366	1.260	0.159
	Estonia	-0.256	-0.428	-0.815	-0.490	-0.662	0.016
	Hungary	2.697	4.262	1.610	1.557	1.811	1.849
	Latvia	0.054	-0.216	-0.815	0.205	0.400	-0.397
	Lithuania	-0.725	-0.404	-0.925	-0.508	0.327	-0.640
	Poland	1.735	0.880	0.797	0.374	0.174	0.956
	Slovakia	-0.696	0.095	-0.106	0.304	0.989	1.063
	Slovenia	-0.422	-0.323	-0.114	0.050	0.796	-0.215
	REGION AVERAGE	0.198	0.467	-0.151	0.182	0.595	0.289
Sinic East	China	0.194	-0.095	0.160	0.830	-0.726	0.049
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	-0.569	-1.201	-0.976	-0.707	-0.747	-0.865
	Japan	-0.762	1.680	0.434	1.149	1.966	0.691
	Mongolia	1.517	2.106	-0.691	-0.334	0.322	-0.485
	Republic of Korea	-0.190	0.055	0.059	-0.047	0.021	-0.254
	Viet Nam	-0.270	-0.520	-0.882	0.005	-0.882	-0.476
		REGION AVERAGE	-0.013	0.337	-0.316	0.149	-0.008

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Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
Sub-Saharan Africa	Angola	-0.450	-1.318	-0.544	-1.068	-0.733	-0.532
	Benin	0.274	-0.191	-0.488	-0.476	-0.405	-0.200
	Botswana	-1.103	-0.011	-0.104	-0.426	-0.191	0.036
	Burkina Faso	0.367	-0.389	-0.076	-0.246	0.772	-0.166
	Burundi	-0.368	-0.931	-0.085	-0.824	-0.444	-0.542
	Cameroon	0.062	-0.525	-0.042	0.126	0.202	-0.256
	Cape Verde	0.099	-0.676	-0.942	-0.692	-1.020	-0.535
	Central African Republic	-0.775	-0.685	-0.074	-0.888	0.098	0.331
	Chad	0.114	-0.390	-0.502	-0.645	0.309	-0.246
	Comoros	-1.150	-0.835	-0.981	-0.803	-1.017	-0.644
	Congo	-0.745	-1.157	-0.629	-0.839	0.310	-0.046
	Cote d'Ivoire	-0.775	-0.104	-0.040	-0.455	-0.349	0.014
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	-0.154	-0.503	-0.586	0.027	-0.668	-0.216
	Djibouti	-0.450	-0.876	-0.113	-0.744	-0.492	-0.589
	Eritrea	-1.157	-1.176	-0.987	-0.948	-1.041	-0.780
	Ethiopia	0.670	-0.671	0.013	-0.533	-0.982	-0.509
	Gabon	-0.059	0.024	-0.061	-0.728	1.764	-0.187
	Gambia	-0.298	-0.383	-0.512	-0.288	-0.703	-0.600
	Ghana	0.704	0.422	0.028	0.201	-0.174	1.221
	Guinea	0.932	-0.626	-0.066	-0.155	0.687	0.851
	Guinea-Bissau	-0.584	-0.728	-0.110	-0.827	-0.452	-0.677
	Kenya	0.183	0.342	-0.044	0.116	0.000	-0.435
	Lesotho	-0.458	0.364	-0.112	-0.604	-0.420	-0.454
	Liberia	-0.118	-0.061	-0.716	-0.355	-0.686	0.490
	Madagascar	-0.173	-0.457	-0.045	-0.651	0.065	0.650
	Malawi	-0.621	0.162	-0.074	-0.597	0.628	-0.107
	Mali	0.619	0.641	-0.090	-0.219	0.706	-0.252
	Mauritania	-0.419	-0.348	-0.046	-0.620	-0.337	-0.429
	Mauritius	0.167	1.382	-0.079	0.399	-0.391	-0.447
	Mozambique	-0.765	-0.799	-0.115	-0.725	-0.465	-0.634
Namibia	0.328	-0.898	-0.127	-0.604	-0.452	-0.510	
Niger	0.887	0.750	-0.501	0.045	-0.086	0.707	
Nigeria	0.661	0.183	-0.016	1.158	-0.380	-0.366	
Rwanda	0.089	-0.239	-0.509	-0.772	-0.704	-0.328	
São Tomé and Príncipe	-0.929	-1.109	-0.977	-1.053	-1.013	-0.531	

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(continued)

Region	Country	Human rights	Peace and security	Trade, commerce, and communication	Environment	Intellectual property	Labor
	Senegal	1.654	-0.120	-0.037	0.463	1.703	0.034
	Seychelles	0.327	0.794	-0.975	0.044	-1.017	-0.143
	Sierra Leone	-0.092	-0.547	-0.052	-0.854	-0.449	0.061
	Somalia	-0.788	-1.348	-0.942	-1.019	-1.019	-0.538
	South Africa	0.204	0.927	1.708	1.331	-0.327	0.192
	South Sudan	-1.378	-1.481	-1.018	-1.450	-1.061	-0.865
	Sudan	0.518	-0.571	-0.907	-0.388	-0.859	-0.512
	Swaziland	-0.915	-0.464	-0.115	-0.863	-0.443	-0.587
	Togo	0.464	-0.067	-0.066	-0.522	0.712	-0.308
	Uganda	1.340	-0.371	-0.072	-0.008	-0.346	-0.350
	United Republic of Tanzania	-0.125	-0.553	-0.041	-0.411	-0.443	-0.305
	Zambia	-0.144	-0.929	-0.097	-0.225	-0.416	0.362
	Zimbabwe	-0.247	-0.951	0.306	-0.471	-0.434	-0.212
	REGION AVERAGE	-0.095	-0.364	-0.264	-0.418	-0.260	-0.210

Appendix VII: AsiaBarometer English Master Questionnaire 2006

**I would like to ask you some questions about your living environment.
(Ask all respondents) (Show card)**

Q1 Which of the following public utilities does your household have the use of?
(MA)

1. The public water supply

2. Electricity

3. Liquefied petroleum gas or LPG

4. Fixed-line phone

5. Mobile phone

6. Facsimile

7. Cable TV

8. None of the above

9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q2 Please indicate how frequently you use the Internet and mobile phones.

Q2-1 How often do you view Internet web pages by computers? (SA)

Q2-2 How often do you read or write e-mails by computers? (SA)

Q2-3 How often do you read or write messages by mobile phones? (SA)

		Almost every day	Several times a week	Several times a month	Seldom	Never	Don't know
1. View Internet web pages by computers	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
2. Read or write emails by computers	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. Read or write messages by mobile phones	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q3 Which, if any, of the following statements apply to you? (MA)

- 1. A member of my family or a relative lives in another country
- 2. I have traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, on holiday or for business purposes
- 3. I have friends from other country who are in YOUR COUNTRY
- 4. I often watch foreign-produced programs on TV
- 5. I often communicate with people in other countries via the Internet or email
- 6. My job involves contact with organizations or people in other countries
- 7. None of the above
- 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q4 All things considered, would you say that you are happy these days? (SA)

- 1. Very happy
- 2. Quite happy
- 3. Neither happy nor unhappy

(continued)

(continued)

- 4. Not too happy
- 5. Very unhappy
- 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q5 How often do you feel you are really enjoying life these days? (SA)

- 1. Often
- 2. Sometimes
- 3. Rarely
- 4. Never
- 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q6 How much do you feel you are accomplishing what you want out of your life? (SA)

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Very little
- 4. None
- 5. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q7 Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life. (SA for each)

		Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dis-satisfied	Don't know
a. Housing	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Friendships	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. Marriage [if married]	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. Standard of living	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(continued)

(continued)

		Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dis-satisfied	Don't know
e. Household income	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. Health	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. Education	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. Job	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. Neighbors	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
j. Public safety	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
k. The condition of the environment	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
l. Social welfare system	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
m. The democratic system	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
n. Family life	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
o. Leisure	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
p. Spiritual life	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q8 How would you describe your standard of living? (SA)

- 1. High
- 2. Relatively high
- 3. Average
- 4. Relatively low
- 5. Low
- 9. Don't know

I would like to ask you some general questions.

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q9 Of the following lifestyle aspects or life circumstances, please select five that are important to you. (5MA)

-
1. Having enough to eat

 2. Having a comfortable home

 3. Being healthy

 4. Having access to good medical care if required

 5. Being able to live without fear of crime

 6. Having a job

 7. Having access to higher (beyond compulsory education) education

 8. Owning lots of nice things

 9. Earning a high income

 10. Spending time with your family

 11. Being on good terms with others

 12. Being successful at work

 13. Being famous

 14. Enjoying a pastime

 15. Appreciating art and culture

 16. Dressing up

 17. Winning over others

 18. Expressing your personality or using your talents

 19. Contributing to your local community or to society

 20. Being devout

 21. Raising children

 22. Freedom of expression and association

 23. Living in a country with a good government

 24. Pleasant community to live

 25. Safe and clean environment

 26. None of the above

 27. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q10 How would you like to see your son(s) and your daughter(s) grow up? Of the following accomplishments, please select two that you would wish for a daughter, and two that you would wish for a son. If you don't have a son/daughter please imagine what you would feel if you had. (Select up to two items only for each gender.)

	(a) For a son (2MA)	(b) For a daughter (2MA)
Become a great scholar	1	1
Become a powerful political leader	2	2

(continued)

(continued)

	(a) For a son (2MA)	(b) For a daughter (2MA)
Become very wealthy	3	3
Become a loving and charitable person	4	4
Become a person respected by the masses	5	5
Become more proficient in profession than I am	6	6
Follow in my footsteps	7	7
Become a person who cares about family	8	8
Find a good marriage partner	9	9
Become fulfilled spiritually	10	10
None of the above	11	11
Don't know	12	12

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q11 Generally, do you think people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be too careful in dealing with people (that it pays to be wary of people)? (SA)

-
1. Most people can be trusted
-
2. Can't be too careful in dealing with people
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q12 Do you think that people generally try to be helpful or do you think that they mostly look out for themselves? (SA)

-
1. People generally try to be helpful
-
2. People mostly look out for themselves
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q13 If you saw somebody on the street looking lost, would you stop to help? (SA)

-
1. I would always stop to help
-
2. I would help if nobody else did
-
3. It is highly likely that I wouldn't stop to help
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q14 If you had no descendants, would you think it desirable to adopt somebody in order to continue the family line, even if there were no blood relationship? Or do you think this would be unnecessary? (SA)

-
- 1. Would adopt in order to continue the family line

 - 2. Would not adopt in order to continue the family line. I think it would be pointless

 - 3. It would depend on the circumstances

 - 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q15 Suppose that you are the president of a company. In the company's employment examination, a relative of yours got the second highest grade, scoring only marginally less than the candidate with the highest grade. In such a case, which person would you employ? (SA)

-
- 1. The person with the highest grade

 - 2. Your relative

 - 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q16 If the main breadwinner of your household should die or become unable to work due to illness, how would your household maintain the household budget? Select up to two of the following measures. (2MA)

1. Another adult member of the family would become the main breadwinner	5. Would get support from members of my religious group
2. Would send one or more of the children out to work	6. Would get social welfare payments
3. Would get support from relatives	7. Depend on retirement allowance
4. Would get support from neighbors	8. Have an insurance policy to cover such a situation
	9. Other
	10. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q17 Throughout the world many people identify themselves by their nationality. For example, Korean, Indian, etc. Do you think of yourself as being [*YOUR COUNTRY'S PEOPLE**], or do you not think of yourself in this way? (SA)

-
1. [Japanese]

 2. Korean

 3. Chinese

 4. Other (specify:)

 5. I don't identify myself with my nationality

 9. Don't know

*[The categories are different for each country]

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q18 How proud are you of being [*YOUR COUNTRY'S PEOPLE*]? (SA)

-
1. Very proud

 2. Somewhat proud

 3. Not really proud

 4. Not proud at all

 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q19 Throughout the world, some people also see themselves as belonging to a transnational group (such as Asian, people of Chinese ethnicity, people who speak the same language or practice the same religion). Do you identify with any transnational group? (SA)

-
1. Asian

 2. Ethnic group that has common genealogy or ancestry

 3. Language group that I am speaking

 4. Religious group that I am believing in and practicing

 5. Other transnational identity (please specify:)

 6. No, I don't identify particularly with any transnational group

 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q20 Can you recite the national anthem by heart? (SA)

-
1. Yes
-
2. No
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q21-1 Which of the following social circles or groups are important to you? (MA)

Q21-2 Of those, which one is the most important to you? (SA)

	Q21-1 Important social circle/group (MA)	Q21-2 Most important social circle/group (SA)
Family	1	1
Relatives	2	2
Place of work	3	3
Club, hobby circle, etc	4	4
The school / university you attended	5	5
The area where you grew up	6	6
People who speak the same language or dialect as you	7	7
Agricultural cooperative, commercial cooperative or industry group	8	8
Neighborhood	9	9
Labor union	10	10
Political party	11	11
Religion	12	12
Other (specify:)	13	13
Don't know	99	99

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q22 Do you think that on the whole men and women are treated equally in your country? Please indicate which of the following is closest to your opinion. (SA)

-
1. Men are treated much more favorably than women
 2. Men are treated somewhat more favorably than women
 3. Men and women are treated equally
 4. Women are treated somewhat more favorably than men
 5. Women are treated much more favorably than men
 9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q23 How often do you pray or meditate? (SA)

-
1. Daily
 2. Weekly
 3. Monthly
 4. On special occasions
 5. Never
 9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q24 For each of the following events, please rate the importance of having a religious institution (such as mosque, church, temple, or shrine) or a religious professional (such as an imam, priest, or monk) involved. (SA for each event)

	Very important	Somewhat important	Not really important	Not at all important	Don't know
1. Births	1	2	3	4	9
2. Weddings	1	2	3	4	9
3. Festivals or Holidays	1	2	3	4	9
4. Funerals	1	2	3	4	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q25 Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry? Please choose all issues that cause you serious worry. (ROTATE card) (MA)

-
1. Poverty
 2. Economic inequality in your society
 3. Fair world trade
 4. Terrorism
-

(continued)

(continued)

- 5. Environmental destruction/pollution/problems relating to natural resources
- 6. Wars and conflicts
- 7. Natural disasters
- 8. Nuclear disasters
- 9. Globalization of human economic activities
- 10. Health issues
- 11. Economic problems in your country
- 12. Global recession
- 13. Crime
- 14. Human rights
- 15. Corruption
- 16. Lack of democracy
- 17. Illegal drugs and drug addiction
- 18. Refugee and asylum problems
- 19. Unemployment
- 20. Education
- 21. The social welfare system in your country
- 22. Ethics of scientists (ethics in science)
- 23. The aging of society (growing relative weight of senior citizens)
- 24. The decline in birthrate
- 25. The fast pace of change/technology is advancing too quickly
- 26. The threat of corporate power dominates human activities
- 27. Religious fundamentalism
- 28. Overpopulation
- 29. Moral decline/spiritual decadence
- 30. Other (specify: _____)
- 31. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q26 Do you think the following countries have a good influence or a bad influence on your country? Please select the response closest to your opinion for each country listed. (SA for each country)

Note to research agencies: Omit your country from the list (e.g. Respondents in China should not be asked to evaluate the influence of China).

		Good influence	Rather good influence	Neither good nor bad influence	Rather bad influence	Bad influence	Don't know
a. China	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Japan	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. India	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. USA	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. UK	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. Russia	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. Pakistan	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. South Korea	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. North Korea	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
j. Iran	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
k. Turkey	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
l. Kazakhstan	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
m. Indonesia	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
n. Australia	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q27 Any society has some kinds of inequality. In which of the following areas do you think equality should be most eagerly promoted in your society? Please indicate three that are most important to you. (3MA)

- 1. Gender
- 2. Age
- 3. Education
- 4. Occupation
- 5. Income/Wealth
- 6. Religion
- 7. Descent
- 8. Ethnicity
- 9. Other (specify: _____)
- 10. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q28 In your opinion, what are benefits of education? Please choose the three most important benefits from the following. (3MA)

-
1. Develops your humanity

 2. Enables you to obtain a job of your choice

 3. Enables you to earn more money

 4. Enables you to live in another country

 5. Enables you to gain higher social status

 6. Contributes to the development and prosperity of your country

 7. Enables you to contribute to your society

 8. Enables you to work internationally

 9. Other (Specify:)

 10. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q29 Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions to operate in the best interests of society. If you don't know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so. (SA for each institution)

		Trust a lot	Trust to a degree	Don't really trust	Don't trust at all	Haven't thought about it	Don't know
a. The central government	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Your local government	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. The army	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. The legal system	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. The police	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. Parliament, Congress	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. The political party	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. The public education system	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. The public health system	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
j. Large domestic companies	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
k. Multinational companies operating in [YOUR COUNTRY]	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
l. Trade unions/labor unions	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(continued)

(continued)

		Trust a lot	Trust to a degree	Don't really trust	Don't trust at all	Haven't thought about it	Don't know
m. The media	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
n. Non-governmental organizations (e.g., environmental, social advocacy groups or other non-profit organizations)	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
o. Religious organizations	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
p. The United Nations	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
q. The World Trade Organization	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
r. The World Bank	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
s. The International Monetary Fund	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q30 I'm going to mention some issues. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations (such as ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] and APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]), or by the United Nations? (SA for each issue)

	National governments	Regional organizations	United Nations	Don't know
a. Peace keeping	1	2	3	9
b. Protection of the environment	1	2	3	9
c. Aid to developing countries	1	2	3	9
d. Refugees	1	2	3	9
e. Human rights	1	2	3	9

I would like to ask you some questions about the central government.
(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q31 How well do you think the [*YOUR COUNTRY'S*] government is dealing with the following issues? (SA for each statement)

		Very well	Fairly well	Not so well	Not well at all	Don't know
a. The economy	→	1	2	3	4	9
b. Political corruption	→	1	2	3	4	9
c. Human rights	→	1	2	3	4	9
d. Unemployment	→	1	2	3	4	9
e. Crime	→	1	2	3	4	9
f. The quality of public services	→	1	2	3	4	9
g. Increase of immigration	→	1	2	3	4	9
h. Ethnic conflict	→	1	2	3	4	9
i. Religious conflict	→	1	2	3	4	9
j. Environmental problems	→	1	2	3	4	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q32 Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Please bear in mind that more spending may require a tax increase. (SA for each area of spending)

		Spend much more	Spend more	Spend the same as now	Spend less	Spend much less	Can't choose/ Don't know
a. The environment	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. Health	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
c. Policing and law enforcement	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. Education	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. The military and defense	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. Old-age pensions	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. Unemployment benefits	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. Public transport, telecommunications infrastructure	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. Culture and the arts	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(continued)

(continued)

		Spend much more	Spend more	Spend the same as now	Spend less	Spend much less	Can't choose/ Don't know
j. Improvement of the social status of women	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

**I would like to ask you some questions about elections and politics.
(Ask all respondents) (Show card)**

Q33 How often do you vote in each of the following elections? Please answer for each type of election. (SA for each election type.)

		Every time	Most of the time	Some-times	Rarely	Never voted (even though I have the right to vote)	Don't have the right to vote	Don't know
a. National elections	→	1	2	3	4	5	6	9
b. Local elections	→	1	2	3	4	5	6	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q34 I am going to read out some statements about society and politics. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (SA for each statement)

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
a. Citizens have a duty to vote in elections	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b. There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(continued)

(continued)

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
c. Generally speaking, people like me don't have the power to influence government policy or actions	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d. Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don't understand what's happening	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
e. Since so many people vote in elections, it really doesn't matter whether I vote or not	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f. Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the [NATIONAL PARLIAMENT] stop thinking about the public once they're elected	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g. Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h. [YOUR COUNTRY'S] traditional culture is superior to that of other country	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i. [YOUR COUNTRY'S] government should emphasize patriotic education to breed patriotism	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q35 When you shape your opinions about social and political issues, which of the following media influence your opinions most? Please choose up to five that are influential on you. (5MA)

- _____ 1. TV programs
- _____ 2. TV advertisements
- _____ 3. Radio programs
- _____ 4. Radio advertisements
- _____ 5. Newspaper articles
- _____ 6. Newspaper advertisements
- _____ 7. Magazine articles
- _____ 8. Magazine advertisements
- _____ 9. Books
- _____ 10. Internet news
- _____ 11. Internet bulletin boards / Mailing lists
- _____ 12. Internet advertisements
- _____ 13. Leaflets / Brochures
- _____ 14. Conversation with friends and neighbors
- _____ 15. Conversation with campaigners
- _____ 16. Meetings / Conferences
- _____ 17. Other (Specify: _____)
- _____ 18. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q36 I am going to read out some statements about economy. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (SA for each statement)

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
1. Central government should restrict the inflow of foreign workforce to protect domestic people's interests	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(continued)

(continued)

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
2. Women's employment should be promoted to attain gender equality	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
3. It is desirable that the people are equal, even if the economy is stagnant, rather than unequal but developing	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
4. It is natural that those who work harder get more money	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q37 What should a person who needs a government permit do if the response of the official handling the application is: "just be patient and wait?" (SA)

-
1. Use connections to obtain the permit

 2. Nothing can be done

 3. Wait and hope that things will work out

 4. Write a letter

 5. Act without a permit

 6. Bribe an official

 7. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q38 I'm going to describe various types of political systems. Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country. (SA for each political system)

		Very good	Fairly good	Bad	Don't know
a. Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections	→	1	2	3	9
b. A system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts (such as bureaucrats with expertise in a particular field) according to what they think is best for the country	→	1	2	3	9
c. Military government	→	1	2	3	9
d. A democratic political system	→	1	2	3	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q39 How satisfied are you with the current scope of the following rights in [YOUR COUNTRY]? (SA for each right)

		Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Don't know
a. The right to vote	→	1	2	3	4	9
b. The right to participate in any kind of organization	→	1	2	3	4	9
c. The right to gather and demonstrate	→	1	2	3	4	9
d. The right to be informed about the work and functions of government	→	1	2	3	4	9
e. Freedom of speech	→	1	2	3	4	9
f. The right to criticize the government	→	1	2	3	4	9

**I would like to ask you some questions about your daily life.
(Ask all respondents) (Show card)**

Q40 Please indicate your usual eating patterns for breakfast and the evening meal by selecting up to two of the following eating styles. (2MA for each meal type)

	(a) Breakfast (2MA)	(b) Evening meal (2MA)
a. I eat food cooked at home at home	1	1
b. I buy ready meals in a shop, or food cooked in a restaurant or at an outdoor stall	2	2
c. I eat instant* food at home	3	3
d. I eat out in restaurants	4	4
e. I eat out at food stalls and such like	5	5
f. Other	6	6
g. Usually do not eat this meal	7	7
h. Don't know	8	8

*Food that only needs to be heated or have boiling water added

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q41 Which of the following foods do you like to eat? Please choose all that apply. (MA)

- 1. Beijing Duck
- 2. Kimchi
- 3. Sushi
- 4. Hamburger
- 5. Curry
- 6. Pizza
- 7. Tom-Yum-Goong
- 8. Dim Sum
- 9. Pho
- 10. Sandwich
- 11. Instant Noodle
- 12. None of above
- 13. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q42 Which category does your current residence fall into? (SA)

1. Owner-occupied detached or semi-detached (duplex) house	4. Rented terraced house or unit in an apartment or condominium complex
2. Owner-occupied terraced house or unit in an apartment or condominium complex	5. Other (a room in a relative’s home, etc.)
3. Rented detached or semi-detached (duplex) house	9. Don’t know

**I would like to ask you some questions about your family.
(Ask all respondents)**

Q43-1 How many members of your family, including yourself, live in your household? (OA)

	person(s)
--	-----------

[Interviewers: “Members of your family living in your household” mean the family members who 1. live with you for more than 4 days in a week, and/or who 2. share the household budget with you. Thus, respondents should include their family members who are seasonal migratory workers who send money home, but exclude living-in helpers.]

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q43-2 Which of the following describe your family structure? (SA)

1. Single-person household	4. A parent(s) and child(ren) who is/are married (two-generation household) (Select this item even if only one child is married and the other unmarried children also live in the household.)
2. Married couple only	5. Grandparent(s), parent(s) and child(ren) (three-generation household)
3. A parent(s) and child(ren) who are not married (two-generation household)	6. Other
	9. Don’t know

(Ask all respondents)

Q43-3 How many, if any, members of your family who live with you are in need of special care due to illness, old age, or handicap? Fill in ‘0’ on the frame, if you don’t live with such persons. (OA)

	person(s)
--	-----------

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q44 Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Please select two you consider to be most important (2MA)

-
1. Independence

 2. Diligence

 3. Honesty

 4. Sincerity

 5. Mindfulness

 6. Humbleness

 7. Religiosity

 8. Patience

 9. Competitiveness

 10. Respect for senior persons

 11. Deference for teachers

 12. Don't know

**I would like to ask you some questions about your values.
(Ask all respondents) (Show card)**

Q45-1 If you have to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY. (SA)

Q45-2 And which would be the second most important? CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY. (SA)

	First Choice	Second Choice
Maintaining order in the nation	1	1
Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
Fighting rising prices	3	3
Protecting freedom of speech	4	4
Don't know	9	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q46 I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (SA for each change)

	Good	Bad	Don't mind	Don't know
a. More emphasis on the development of technology	1	2	3	9
b. Greater respect for traditional authority	1	2	3	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q47 Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do or would never, under any circumstances, do it. (SA for each action)

	Have done	Might do	Would never do	Don't know
a. Signing a petition to improve conditions	1	2	3	9
b. Joining in boycotts	1	2	3	9
c. Attending lawful demonstrations	1	2	3	9

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q48 There are two opinions about the role of chance in the world. In your opinion, which of the following two positions is more correct? (SA)

-
- A: Many things happen for no particular reason at all. It is just a matter of chance
-
- B: Everything happens for a reason. Even events that look like accidents have a hidden purpose
-

-
1. Closer to A
-
2. Closer to B
-
3. Neither
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q49 Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us? (SA)

-
1. Definitely I believe
-
2. Somewhat I believe
-
3. I do not really believe
-
4. I do not believe at all
-
9. Don't know
-

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

Q50 Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. READ OUT STATEMENTS. (SA for each statement)

a. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties

Never Justifiable					Always justifiable					Don't Know
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

b. Homosexuality

Never Justifiable					Always justifiable					Don't Know
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

c. Abortion

Never Justifiable					Always justifiable					Don't Know
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

Lastly, I would like to ask some questions about yourself.
(Ask all respondents)

F1 Please indicate your gender. (SA)

1	2
Male	Female

(Ask all respondents)

F2 What is your age? (OA)

	years old
--	-----------

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F3 What is the highest level of education you have completed? (SA)

1. No formal education	4. Professional school/technical school
2. Elementary school/junior high school/middle school	5. University/graduate school
3. High school	9. Don't know

***[The categories are different for each country]**

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F4 How well do you speak English? (SA)

- 1. Not at all
- 2. Very little
- 3. I can speak it well enough to get by in daily life
- 4. I can speak English fluently
- 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F5 What is your marital status? (SA)

- 1. Single
- 2. Married
- 3. Divorced/separated
- 4. Widowed
- 5. Other
- 9. Don't know

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F6 What is your occupation? Please select one of the following responses. (SA)

1. Self-employed in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries	8. Employed professional or specialist (hospital doctor, employed lawyer, engineer, etc.)
2. Business owner in mining or manufacturing industry of an organization with up to 30 employees	9. Clerical worker
3. Business owner of a retail organization with up to 30 employees	10. Sales
4. Vendor or street trader	11. Manual worker (including skilled and semi-skilled)
5. Business owner or manager of an organization with over 30 employees	12. Driver
6. Self-employed professional (self-employed doctors, lawyers, writers, etc.)	13. Other worker
7. Senior manager (company director, no lower in rank than a manager of a company section in a company with 300 or more employees, or a manager of a department in a company with less than 300 employees)	14. Homemaker
	15. Student

(continued)

(continued)

	16. Retired
	17. Unemployed
	18. Unemployed other
	99. Don't know

(Ask all respondents)

F7 How many people in your household work and earn an income? (OA)

	person(s)
--	-----------

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F8 What was the total gross annual income of your household last year? (SA)

[Japan] (Japanese yen)

1. 2 million or less	6. 6 to 7 million	11. 11 to 12 million	16. 16 to 17 million
2. 2 to 3 million	7. 7 to 8 million	12. 12 to 13 million	17. 17 to 18 million
3. 3 to 4 million	8. 8 to 9 million	13. 13 to 14 million	18. 18 to 19 million
4. 4 to 5 million	9. 9 to 10 million	14. 14 to 15 million	19. 19 to 20 million
5. 5 to 6 million	10. 10 to 11 million	15. 15 to 16 million	20. More than 20 million
			99. Don't know

*[The categories are different for each country]

(Ask all respondents) (Show card)

F9 Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? If yes, which? (SA)

1. Catholic
2. Christian religion other than Catholic
3. Muslim (Sunnah)
4. Muslim (Shiah)
5. Hindu
6. Buddhist (Mahayana)
7. Buddhist (Theravada)
8. Confucian
9. Jewish
10. Sikh
11. Taoism

(continued)

(continued)

12. Shintoism
13. Other (specify:)
14. None
99. Don't know

***Appendix VIII: The Welzel Category (2013)
and the Modified/Extended Welzel Category or Inoguchi/Le
Category***

ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
1	Afghanistan	AFG		Islamic East	Islamic East
2	Albania	ALB	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
3	Algeria	DZA	Islamic East		Islamic East
4	Andorra	ADO	Old West		Old West
5	Angola	AGO		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
6	Antigua and Barbuda	ATG		Latin America	Latin America
7	Argentina	ARG		Latin America	Latin America
8	Armenia	ARM		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
9	Australia	AUS	New West		New West
10	Austria	AUT	Old West		Old West
11	Azerbaijan	AZE	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
12	Bahamas	BHS		Latin America	Latin America
13	Bahrain	BHR		Islamic East	Islamic East
14	Bangladesh	BGD	Indic East		Indic East
15	Barbados	BRB		Latin America	Latin America
16	Belarus	BLR	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
17	Belgium	BEL	Old West		Old West
18	Belize	BLZ		Latin America	Latin America
19	Benin	BEN		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
20	Bhutan	BTN		Indic East	Indic East
21	Bolivia	BOL		Latin America	Latin America

(continued)

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ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
23	Botswana	BWA		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
24	Brazil	BRA	Latin America		Latin America
25	Brunei Darussalam	BRN		Indic East	Indic East
26	Bulgaria	BGR		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
27	Burkina Faso	BFA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
28	Burundi	BDI		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
29	Cambodia	KHM		Indic East	Indic East
30	Cameroon	CMR		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
31	Cape Verde	CPV		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
32	Canada	CAN	New West		New West
33	Central African Republic	CAF		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
34	Chad	TCD		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
35	Chile	CHL	Latin America		Latin America
36	China	CHN	Sinic East		Sinic East
37	Colombia	COL	Latin America		Latin America
38	Comoros	COM		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
39	Congo	COG		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
40	Costa Rica	CRI	Latin America		Latin America
41	Côte d'Ivoire	CIV		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
42	Croatia	HRV	Returned West		Returned West
43	Cuba	CUB		Latin America	Latin America
44	Cyprus	CYP	Old West		Old West
45	Czech Republic	CZE	Returned West		Returned West
46	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	PRK		Sinic East	Sinic East

(continued)

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ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
47	Democratic Republic of the Congo	ZAR		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
48	Denmark	DNK	Reformed West		Reformed West
49	Djibouti	DJI		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
50	Dominica	DMA		Latin America	Latin America
51	Dominican Republic	DOM		Latin America	Latin America
52	Ecuador	ECU		Latin America	Latin America
53	Egypt	EGY	Islamic East		Islamic East
54	El Salvador	SLV	Latin America		Latin America
55	Equatorial Guinea	GNQ		Latin America	Latin America
56	Eritrea	ERI		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
57	Estonia	EST	Returned West		Returned West
58	Ethiopia	ETH		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
59	Fiji	FJI		New West	New West
60	Finland	FIN	Reformed West		Reformed West
61	France	FRA	Old West		Old West
62	Gabon	GAB		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
63	Gambia	GMB		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
64	Georgia	GEO	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
65	Germany	DEU	Reformed West		Reformed West
66	Ghana	GHA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
67	Greece	GRC	Old West		Old West
68	Grenada	GRD		Latin America	Latin America
69	Guatemala	GTM	Latin America		Latin America
70	Guinea	GIN		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
71	Guinea-Bissau	GNB		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
72	Guyana	GUY		Latin America	Latin America
73	Haiti	HTI		Latin America	Latin America

(continued)

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ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
74	Honduras	HND		Latin America	Latin America
75	Hungary	HUN	Returned West		Returned West
76	Iceland	ISL	Reformed West		Reformed West
77	India	IND	Indic East		Indic East
78	Indonesia	IDN	Indic East		Indic East
79	Iran	IRN	Islamic East		Islamic East
80	Iraq	IRQ	Islamic East		Islamic East
81	Ireland	IRL	Reformed West		Reformed West
82	Israel	ISR	Old West		Old West
83	Italy	ITA	Old West		Old West
84	Jamaica	JAM		Latin America	Latin America
85	Japan	JPN	Sinic East		Sinic East
86	Jordan	JOR	Islamic East		Islamic East
87	Kazakhstan	KAZ		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
88	Kenya	KEN		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
89	Kiribati	KIR		New West	New West
90	Kuwait	KWT		Islamic East	Islamic East
91	Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
92	Lao People's Democratic Republic	LAO		Indic East	Indic East
93	Latvia	LVA	Returned West		Returned West
94	Lebanon	LBN		Islamic East	Islamic East
95	Lesotho	LSO		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
96	Liberia	LBR		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
97	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	LBY		Islamic East	Islamic East
98	Liechtenstein	LIE		Old West	Old West
99	Lithuania	LTU	Returned West		Returned West
100	Luxembourg	LUX	Old West		Old West
101	Madagascar	MDG		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
102	Malawi	MWI		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
103	Malaysia	MYS	Indic East		Indic East

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ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
104	Maldives	MDV		Indic East	Indic East
105	Mali	MLI	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
106	Malta	MLT	Old West		Old West
107	Marshall Islands	MHL		New West	New West
108	Mauritania	MRT		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
109	Mauritius	MUS		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
110	Mexico	MEX	Latin America		Latin America
111	Monaco	MCO		Old West	Old West
112	Mongolia	MNG		Sinic East	Sinic East
113	Montenegro	MNE	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
114	Morocco	MAR	Islamic East		Islamic East
115	Mozambique	MOZ		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
116	Myanmar	MMR		Indic East	Indic East
117	Namibia	NAM		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
118	Nauru	NRU		New West	New West
119	Nepal	NPL		Indic East	Indic East
120	Netherlands	NLD	Reformed West		Reformed West
121	New Zealand	NZL	New West		New West
122	Nicaragua	NIC		Latin America	Latin America
123	Niger	NER		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
124	Nigeria	NGA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
125	Norway	NOR	Reformed West		Reformed West
126	Oman	OMN		Islamic East	Islamic East
127	Pakistan	PAK	Indic East		Indic East
128	Palau	PLW		New West	New West
129	Panama	PAN		Latin America	Latin America
130	Papua New Guinea	PNG		New West	New West
131	Paraguay	PRY		Latin America	Latin America
132	Peru	PER	Latin America		Latin America
133	Philippines	PHL	Indic East		Indic East

(continued)

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ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
134	Poland	POL	Returned West		Returned West
135	Portugal	PRT	Old West		Old West
136	Qatar	QAT		Islamic East	Islamic East
137	Republic of Korea	KOR	Sinic East		Sinic East
138	Republic of Moldova	MDA	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
139	Romania	ROM	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
140	Russian Federation	RUS	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
141	Rwanda	RWA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
142	Saint Kitts and Nevis	KNA		Latin America	Latin America
143	Saint Lucia	LCA		Latin America	Latin America
144	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT		Latin America	Latin America
145	Samoa	WSM		New West	New West
146	San Marino	SMR		Old West	Old West
147	São Tomé and Príncipe	STP		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
148	Saudi Arabia	SAU	Islamic East		Islamic East
149	Senegal	SEN		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
150	Serbia	SRB	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
151	Seychelles	SYC		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
152	Sierra Leone	SLE		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
153	Singapore	SGP	Indic East		Indic East
154	Slovakia	SVK	Returned West		Returned West
155	Slovenia	SVN	Returned West		Returned West
156	Solomon Islands	SLB		New West	New West
157	Somalia	SOM		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
158	South Africa	ZAF	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
159	South Sudan	SSD		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
160	Spain	ESP	Old West		Old West

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(continued)

ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
161	Sri Lanka	LKA		Indic East	Indic East
162	Sudan	SDN		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
163	Suriname	SUR		Latin America	Latin America
164	Swaziland	SWZ		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
165	Sweden	SWE	Reformed West		Reformed West
166	Switzerland	CHE	Reformed West		Reformed West
167	Syrian Arab Republic	SYR		Islamic East	Islamic East
168	Tajikistan	TJK		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
169	Thailand	THA	Indic East		Indic East
170	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	MKD	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
171	Timor-Leste	TMP		Indic East	Indic East
172	Togo	TGO		Sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
173	Tonga	TON		New West	New West
174	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO		Latin America	Latin America
175	Tunisia	TUN		Islamic East	Islamic East
176	Turkey	TUR	Islamic East		Islamic East
177	Turkmenistan	TKM		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
178	Tuvalu	TUV		New West	New West
179	Uganda	UGA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
180	Ukraine	UKR	Orthodox East		Orthodox East
181	United Arab Emirates	ARE		Islamic East	Islamic East
182	United Kingdom	GBR	Reformed West		Reformed West
183	United Republic of Tanzania	TZA	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
184	United States of America	USA	New West		New West
185	Uruguay	URY	Latin America		Latin America
186	Uzbekistan	UZB		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
187	Vanuatu	VUT		New West	New West

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(continued)

ID	Country name	Country code	Welzel category	Inoguchi/Le category	Ten regional groups
188	Venezuela	VEN	Latin America		Latin America
189	Viet Nam	VNM	Sinic East		Sinic East
190	Yemen	YEM		Islamic East	Islamic East
191	Yugoslavia	YUG		Orthodox East	Orthodox East
192	Zambia	ZMB	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa
193	Zimbabwe	ZWE	Sub-Saharan Africa		Sub-Saharan Africa