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A stylized graphic of the American flag, split vertically. The left side is blue with white stars and stripes, and the right side is red with white stripes. The stripes are wavy and have a textured, almost woven appearance.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

IMPULSES, STRATEGIES, AND IMPACTS

Edited by

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12 Three Frameworks in Search of a Policy: US Democracy Promotion in Asia-Pacific

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Introduction

American foreign policy wears many masks. As the sole superpower with the will and the ability to act globally, and as a nation required to deal with a vast array of problems occurring intermittently around the globe, the United States assumes a very different visage depending on the nature of the problems it faces. At times it looks like a guardian angel, at times like a monster. One cannot imagine any other country whose foreign policy could be characterized as ‘beautiful imperialism’.⁵⁴¹ The liberal democratic tradition with which the United States has been endowed from its inception seems to lead American authors to portray its foreign policy as either broadly in harmony with that tradition or betraying that tradition. In the historiography of American foreign-policy literature, the argument that American foreign policy must live up—or has lived up—to such a tradition is often called idealism, while the conviction that American foreign policy must adjust—or has adjusted—to the wicked outside world is known as realism.⁵⁴²

In the last half century, while the United States has been a superpower, with or without a self-proclaimed rival, the picture has been far more complex. The United States has encountered difficulties with its promotion of democracy because at times its apparently good intentions smack of ‘democratic imperialism’. To examine this difficulty, it is worth examining American foreign policy, not in terms of its intellectual origins and sources from the time of the pilgrim fathers, but in terms of major frameworks of foreign-policy thinking that govern its outlook toward the end of the twentieth century and

⁵⁴¹ David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1922–1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) .

⁵⁴² George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) .

beyond⁵⁴³—an international systemic explanation rather than a domestic explanation.⁵⁴⁴

In this chapter I will illustrate an understanding of American foreign policy within the three global currents determining world politics *fin de siècle* and beyond. There are two major justifications for this approach. First, the United States is involved in every corner of the globe. It is in no position to seclude itself from the rest of the world, protesting that it is the God-given land and that evil and villainy are invariably the work of outsiders. Second, to be effective, the United States must be conversant with major and often even minor currents of thinking the world over.⁵⁴⁵

In what follows I will first briefly introduce three major currents of global politics at the end of the twentieth century. Then I will characterize the three currents of the era in terms of geopolitical frameworks, geoeconomic foundations, and geocultural networks, starting with three works by Henry Kissinger, Francis Fukuyama, and Samuel Huntington, respectively. Third, I will illustrate how the three major currents help shape American foreign policy, citing US promotion of democracy in Asia-Pacific in the 1980s and 1990s.

Three Major Currents of Global Politics

Toward the end of the twentieth century, the framework of global politics can be seen to be modelled upon three legacies of sovereign power. Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the sovereign and territorial nation-state was considered the basic unit of action power. This so-called Westphalian legacy was the dominant model during these two centuries and especially during much of the cold war period. Its essence is state sovereignty premised on the prevalence of order within and anarchy outside.⁵⁴⁶ Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, two other legacies have made something of a comeback: the Philadelphian and what might be termed the anti-utopian. The Philadelphian legacy refers to the liberal union of American States starting in the colonial period and extending to the time of the civil war. The Philadelphian model, premised on the principle of popular sovereignty, was based on the legal procedures whereby states tried to resolve disputes

⁵⁴³ Takashi Inoguchi, 'Peering into the Future by Looking Back: The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Paradigms', *International Studies Review*, 1/2 (1999), pp. 173–94 ; also in Davis Bobrow (ed.), *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 173–94 .

⁵⁴⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) .

⁵⁴⁵ Takashi Inoguchi, *Global Change at the Dawn of the New Millennium: How Japan Interprets the Dialectics of the World* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming) .

⁵⁴⁶ Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) ; Stephen Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235–64 ; David A Lake and Donald S. Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) ; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) .

among themselves.⁵⁴⁷ Marginalized for a considerable period of time, the model has recently seen a revival among the liberal democracies, constituting part of the third wave of democratization. This is evidenced by the number of sovereign states that incorporate into their constitutions conventions and declarations on freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights.⁵⁴⁸ The anti-utopian legacy is, of course, very different and refers, basically, to the degeneration or collapse of former colonial states that had originally been based on the universal principles of national self-determination, human rights, and democracy. In spite of these noble ideals, many of these experiments in state creation became failed states, experiencing prolonged civil strife and prolonged hunger at home—and if they were held together at all it was through international aid and outside humanitarian intervention.⁵⁴⁹

These three ‘legacies’ are broadly speaking theorized in the work of Henry Kissinger, Francis Fukuyama, and Samuel Huntington.⁵⁵⁰ Let us briefly deal with each in turn.

According to Kissinger, state sovereignty and foreign policy are primary; all other things are judged according to whether they facilitate the realization of adroit exercises in the balance of power, that is, the maintenance of peace. American hegemony going back to 1945 is bound to slowly diminish, he argues, so its international leadership can be enhanced only by engaging in intermittent balancing acts. His central concern is with peace achieved by the skilful manipulation of balance of power politics among the major powers. Francis Fukuyama discusses the predominantly non-violent mode of conflict resolution among global actors that share common sets of norms and values such as those of democracy and liberalism. Advocates of this theory assert that by promoting democracy everywhere, the United States can diminish the likelihood of war. States that share common values can settle their differences without resort to armed violence. It is called the ‘democratic enlargement’ strategy. A more passive approach counsels limiting interaction with other states to liberal democracies. Contact with non-democracies only depletes resources and should therefore be avoided.

Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* focuses on regions of the world that are potentially resource-draining: the Islamic world and China. Huntington argues that many civilizations are fundamentally incompatible and that the world is rife with situations that could

⁵⁴⁷ Daniel Deudney, ‘Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems’, in Biersteker and Weber (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, pp. 190–239 ; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *The Republican Legacy in International Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) .

⁵⁴⁸ On the statistical trends/waves of democratization, see Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) .

⁵⁴⁹ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *World Disasters Report, 1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) ; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) .

⁵⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) ; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992) ; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) .

lead them to clash. As summarized by the titles of his own articles, he argues that international primacy matters, although without asserting that Western values are universal. Rather, he argues, they are 'unique'.⁵⁵¹ Huntington's primary perception is of the essential incompatibility of civilizations, and some combinations of religion, race, language, geography, and history, he believes, are destined to clash.

Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, Geoculture

Geopolitical Frameworks

The actors in the Westphalian framework are what are known as 'normal states', where the sovereignty of the state is the basic premise. In the Philadelphian framework, the actors are liberal democracies as politico-economic systems, and the basic premise is popular sovereignty.⁵⁵² In the anti-utopian framework, the actors are failed and failing states where sovereignty has been relinquished. Normal states are characterized as having strong state sovereignty and are especially sensitive to infringements of sovereignty and territoriality; they abhor 'interference' in the internal affairs of states. Liberal democracies are characterized by firmly entrenched popular sovereignty and broad acceptance of democratic norms and values. They downplay protectionism and state sovereignty. Failed and failing states are those that have 'hollowed-out' in terms of sovereignty and have become marginalized economically. They are vulnerable to global economic changes and prone to internal disorder and civil strife. They tend to be ripe for interference from outside, whether in the form of colonial-style domination, humanitarian relief, armed aggression, or economic penetration and exploitation.

The behavioural modalities of normal states are balancing and bandwagoning.⁵⁵³ Balancing is aimed at limiting the potentially explosive assertiveness of other normal states. To deal with a very powerful normal state, other countries may also bandwagon on the assumption that, if you cannot beat them, then why not join them? The behavioural modalities of liberal democracies are binding and hiding.⁵⁵⁴ Like-minded actors band together in order to achieve broader, stronger union. When faced with forces that jeopardize liberal democratic norms at their foundation, however, it is sometimes expedient to practice concealment. The behavioural modalities of failed and failing states are 'hollowing-out' and collapse. Failed states are no longer autonomous

⁵⁵¹ Samuel Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', *International Security*, 17/4 (1993), pp. 71–81, and 'The West: Unique, Not Universal', *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996), pp. 28–46.

⁵⁵² Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', *American Political Science Review* 80/4 (1986), pp. 1156–69.

⁵⁵³ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall Schweller, 'New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Walt's Balancing Position', *American Political Science Review*, 91/4 (1997), pp. 927–35.

⁵⁵⁴ Daniel Deudney, 'Binding Sovereigns'.

and are often the objects of pressure from without. However, these states are so amorphous that such intervention rarely makes much difference to their development over the long term.

How then should we characterize the United States? The United States is the acknowledged primary actor in global politics; and if we accept Waltz's category of normal states as those able to determine their own destiny, it is the world's only 'normal' state in the Westphalian sense. At the same time it is the original Philadelphian actor that later spearheaded economic liberalization and political democratization in the second half of the twentieth century. The US also purports to lead the world. Indeed, it is the only state that can do so when marginalized segments of the global market become volatile and instability erupts in peripheral areas of the international system. Whether it does so adequately or not is a moot question; and the US has been variously criticized as intervening 'too often', 'too hastily', 'not often enough' and 'not quickly enough'. Such are the travails of being a superpower.

Geoeconomic Foundations

The geoeconomic foundations of our three frameworks are articulated, respectively, in Alexander Gerschenkron's *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Robert Reich's *Work of Nations*, and David Landes' *Wealth and Poverty of Nations*.⁵⁵⁵

Gerschenkron's key concept is the national economy, which he applies to Germany and Russia in the late nineteenth century. In the late twentieth-century context, he could have extended his argument to the east Asian states; he might also have included the Napoleonic state with its strong element of state regulation, as well as the social democratic Nordic states of Europe. In all these groups the state played a key role in bringing about economic prosperity and social stability.⁵⁵⁶ Reich focuses on a world without borders where anonymous and omnipresent speculators are constantly on the lookout for opportunities to exploit. The global future, according to Reich, will be sustained by the fortunate few who can adapt to and excel in global mega-competition. His premise is that further liberalization will lead to the 'global cornucopia'. The majority, he argues, can be rescued only through massive training schemes financed by the privileged minority. Protectionism is impossible in Reich's universe, where the United States constitutes itself as the model for the rest of

⁵⁵⁵ Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) ; Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1991) ; David Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York: Norton, 1998) .

⁵⁵⁶ Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) ; Goesta Esping-Anderson, *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) ; Robert Boyer, *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) ; Manfred Bienefeld, 'Is a Strong National Economy an Utopian Goal at the End of the Twentieth Century?', in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache (eds), *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 415–40 .

the world.⁵⁵⁷ With Landes the main concern is economic development; the key actors in this are groups of entrepreneurs with the propensity to make the best use of technological breakthroughs. The attitudes and norms of such entrepreneurs regarding innovation and enterprise become the driving force in a favourable cultural environment. The critical variable, therefore, is the cultural orientation to invention and know-how in the context of economic development.

The mechanism that brings about transformation in Gerschenkron's view is massive input of capital and labour. The most effective systems will depend on stockholding to collect capital, state-led industrialization to guide entrepreneurs, and long working hours in exchange for permanent employment status or high wages. As Paul Krugman correctly points out, a good deal of the east Asian miracle can be explained in terms of the massive input of capital and labour.⁵⁵⁸ The transformative mechanism according to Reich is the straightforward input of technological innovation. In the process, technology itself is endogenized in the market, in contrast to the Gerschenkron view, where technology tends to be treated as exogenous. The global market began to flourish after telecommunications devices became available to all speculators and after the Plaza Accord of 1985, dramatically amplifying opportunities for currency trading. It will further flourish as telemanufacturing and teledistribution devices are invented and come into use around the world. The transformative mechanism in Landes' view is Weberian. He portrays the inner values and attitudes that guide a population as fundamental in preparing the way for, advancing, and sustaining economic development. Certain values and attitudes cherished by a population are more conducive to invention and innovation and to enterprise and development than others.

These three mechanisms coexist in the late twentieth century. The Gerschenkron world continues to flourish in east Asia despite diminished self-confidence triggered by the recent financial crisis. The Reich world is rapidly on the rise almost everywhere. The remarkable spread of telecommunications technology around the world and the availability of instantaneous global financial services associated with that technology are the basis of this expansion. The Landes world prevails almost indefinitely because fundamental differences in the inner values and attitudes inculcated and inherited across cultures are more durable than the technology-driven, cultural-convergence thesis allows.

The Gerschenkron scheme corresponds roughly to the Kissinger world, the Reich scheme to the Fukuyama world, and the Landes scheme to the Huntington world. Geopolitics has its geoeconomic basis in each of the three frameworks.

⁵⁵⁷ For a discussion of Robert Reich's influence on the Clinton administration, see Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission?* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 26–7 .

⁵⁵⁸ Paul Krugman, 'The Myth of Asia's Miracle', *Foreign Affairs*, 73/6 (1994), pp. 62–78 .

Geocultural Networks

The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-utopian frameworks each have geocultural networks of their own. These are depicted in the works of Benedict Anderson, Benjamin Barber, and Robert Kaplan.⁵⁵⁹

Benedict Anderson shows how the state radio network of Indonesia played a primary role in nation-building. Benjamin Barber describes the starkly different networking technology and strategy of the Philadelphian and anti-utopian worlds. They are symbolized by McWorld and Jihad, respectively. CNN and Samizdat (*Samoizdatel'stvo* or self-publication) symbolize another aspect of the contrast between these two different networks. Kaplan focuses on networking techniques and the strategy of the anti-utopian world. Networks nurture and cement sharing and solidarity, and are therefore self-strengthening. The rise or decline of the three frameworks depends in part on the degree to which these three networks flourish, compete, or go into decline.

In the Anderson network, the state and state-owned radio and television play key networking roles. Indonesia provides an example of how such networks are forged. Indonesia consists of 17,000-odd islands; it is a country where countless mutually unintelligible native languages are spoken. The language chosen as the national *lingua franca* for Indonesia when it became independent from the Netherlands was a somewhat artificial and very local language spoken mostly in the Malay peninsula coastal areas and the surrounding area for commercial purposes. A sort of Creole or pidgin form of Indonesian, Bahasa Indonesia can be described as a Malayo-Polynesian Esperanto. The leaders deliberately chose Bahasa Indonesia instead of Javanese, the dominant language of the island of Java, which was the origin of most of the Indonesian founding fathers. For the sake of the unity and solidarity of the Republic of Indonesia, it was decided not to impose the dominant language of the dominant population on all the rest. Efforts are made to disseminate the national language on all possible occasions through the public network Radio Indonesia. Bahasa Indonesia is the symbol and tool of nation building. Children begin to learn Bahasa Indonesia formally after they start primary school, so it is expected that in time this language will become the national standard of communication, solidifying communications throughout the diverse archipelago.

McWorld and CNN are symbols of global penetration. CNN specializes in global on-the-spot reporting calculated to provide dramatic visual effect. At the time that the Liberal Democratic Party was trounced in the June 1993 general elections in Japan, I appeared on CNN with Diet member Wakako Hironaka. I soon noted that everything was recorded live, without prepared scripts or rehearsals. CNN Tokyo's Eileen O'Connor simply appeared shortly

⁵⁵⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edn. (London: Verso, 1991) ; Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1993) ; Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy, From Togo to Turkmenistan, From Iran to Cambodia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997) .

before broadcasting time and said that she would ask certain questions. The setting was also deliberately chosen: a building of one of the Japanese television stations where CNN Tokyo has its offices where monitoring of the vote count was going on. The discussion, held against the background noise of the vote-monitoring room, was clearly calculated to give the strong visual impression that Japan was experiencing a dramatic change and that TV viewers were witness to it. Perhaps this is what the United States government wanted to see in the context of the ongoing trade negotiations and in view of Japan's limited participation in the Gulf war.

Samizdat is the symbol of dissident communication, although, today, fax and e-mail are the main devices of dissident communication. They are used for underground or subversive operations or for clandestine intelligence activities. Back in 1989, I received a fax message some weeks after the 4 June Tiananmen massacre, when anti-Chinese government demonstrations and meetings were taking place in Tokyo. The message was a call for solidarity from Chinese students at the University of Tokyo. I knew the name of one of the students, who had come to me a couple of years earlier with a letter of recommendation from Yan Jiaji, then director of the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I had known Yan through correspondence regarding the publication in Chinese of a book series in political science put out by the University of Tokyo Press, of which I was editor. In my introduction to the Chinese edition, I acknowledged the efforts of a number of colleagues, including Professor Yan Jiaji. The massacre took place before the Chinese translation started to come out, and, when it appeared in late 1990, my reference to Yan Jiaji had been deleted.

The three frameworks, as shown by the above anecdotes, display three different styles of networking featuring state-run media, private entrepreneurial networks, and personal—sometimes underground—networks, respectively.

The United States and the Promotion of Democracy in Asia-Pacific

In Asia-Pacific, the United States was directly involved in the democratization of the Philippines and Japan in the immediate post-war period. Japan was the direct target of American promotion of democracy during the US-led occupation. In the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, the US promotion of democracy generated a third global wave of democratization in the region. In the Philippines this was manifested in the US-engineered 'people power' revolution of 1986 that brought Corazon Aquino to power. In South Korea the United States also gave its blessing to the end of military rule and the adoption of democratic elections, first bringing former military leaders and eventually civilian leaders to power. In Taiwan, too, American influence favoured the abolition of the one-party rule of the Kuomintang and the emergence of

opposition parties. In the 1990s, movements for protecting human rights and for promoting democracy were mounted in other countries of Asia-Pacific—most obviously China, Indonesia, and Myanmar, countries which according to Washington had poor human rights records.

In analysing US efforts to promote democracy in Asia-Pacific, it is important to grasp the historical and contextual setting of each policy thrust. In the case of the Philippines and Japan, it was occasioned by direct American occupation. The Philippines in fact was the first republic in Asia-Pacific, and Japan the only practising liberal democracy in the region for half a century. Later, American involvement in the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos from the presidency of the Philippines had a massive impact on the rest of the region. Witnessing how the US had behaved, Taiwan's Jiang Jingguo—rather grudgingly—began to experiment with democratic forms. Similarly, the South Korean military regime headed by Roh Taewoo moved to democratize politics. In all three countries democratic elections were held and democracy has been observed in practice there ever since.

In the 1990s, the targets of US promotion of human rights and democracy have been mainly China, Indonesia, and Myanmar. An array of different sanctions have been imposed at different times. However, the US has never been entirely consistent and US criticism has often been less strident where it has major commercial and security interests.

Our three frameworks of global politics coexist side by side in Asia-Pacific. We may compare, for example, China, Japan, and Cambodia as targets of US promotion of democracy. Before examining American strategy toward the three, it is important to note that the three countries do have particular preferences as to how they wish to be seen. China portrays itself primarily as a normal state in the Westphalian framework. China abhors interference in its internal affairs. Japan portrays itself as a liberal democracy in the Philadelphian framework and is bewildered when it is criticized as an abnormal semi-sovereign state, since it is content with being a semi-sovereign state as far as security is concerned. Cambodia has no choice but to follow outside advice when it is told that a fair and free election is the key to nation-building. The aim of the US promotion of democracy differs from one framework to another. In the case of China, a key component is the protection of human rights. The US government acts strongly in the Philadelphian framework; but, needless to say, all US action is based on the undeniable reality of its being the world's prime hegemonic power in the Westphalian framework.

In Japan, the US has pursued a policy designed to foster genuine political competition in a two-party system. But again, even though its purpose is Philadelphian, the reality of power always underlies US actions there. To this extent, the framework governing relations between the two countries remains very much Westphalian. Thus, if and when the US cannot get its way on many issues, it often threatens to take punitive economic sanctions. Examples include the US government's 'soft ultimatum', conditional on the pledge of achieving numerical quotas for Japanese imports of US semiconductors;

demanding that Japan allow the United States to act more freely in Japan in the case of a military emergency; and demanding that it implement drastic financial and banking-sector reforms in tandem with the US cooperative intervention in the financial market to prevent the drastic decline of the value of the Japanese yen.

In the failed state of Cambodia, United States actions have aimed at paving the way for free, multiparty elections. Here, however, it has not acted alone but more often than not delegated all the civilizing actions to international organizations or to the United Nations—and especially those members of the UN having a regional presence like France, Australia and Japan—as well as a range of non-governmental organizations.

Human Rights in China

The general prospects for progressive political change in China looked rather optimistic in the 1980s.⁵⁶⁰ Deng Xiaoping's reform policy began in late 1978 and the general liberalization of Chinese society and economy could be observed throughout the 1980s. Intellectuals started to speak more freely. Democratic consciousness was on the rise. Even the government itself gradually shifted position on the issue of human rights in such international forums as the United Nations. To a degree it even became part of the human-rights regime.

However, the Chinese government became alarmed by the sudden development of national mourning occasioned by the death of Hu Yaopang, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-1980s, reminiscent of the mourning over Zhou Enlai's death in the mid-1970s. Underlying this alarm was the growth of a nascent, indigenous, pro-democracy movement. In 1989 the pro-democracy movement became increasingly influential, to the point that it began to bring pressure to bear upon the Chinese government. The leadership group led by Deng Xiaoping, however, supported by the military and party hard-liners, struck back sharply and on 4 June ordered the actions that led to the massacre in Tiananmen Square.⁵⁶¹ The pictures of the newly erected Statue of Liberty rising above the thousands of students in the Square, then being torn down by agents of a 'communist' state—not to mention the image of one lone protestor facing down a tank—did more to change American images of China than any sort of military adventure or high-level diplomatic dispute. Moreover, these events were then televised around the world by CNN and other television networks. In this way, the actions taken by the government in China immediately assumed global significance, and, naturally enough, changed the character of US-China relations, possibly for ever.

⁵⁶⁰ Ann Kent, *Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993) .

⁵⁶¹ Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and Struggles for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) .

Even before the repression, the US had established contacts with opposition leaders, intellectuals and officials close to the group led by Zhao Ziyang in the party and government. But Tiananmen Square pushed human rights to the fore in US-China relations. Immediately after 1989 economic sanctions were imposed and the US made powerful statements in public denouncing China, even though it continued to engage in cautionary—and much-criticized—secret consultations with the Chinese government. Economic sanctions continued, but in 1991, following initiatives by the Japanese government, these were partially lifted.⁵⁶² The change from the Republican administration to the Democrat administration in 1992 did not lead to a major change in policy, in spite of President Clinton's apparent promise to take a much tougher stance on human rights. American business interests—indeed the wider foreign policy community as a whole—also began to question the wisdom of single-minded emphasis on the political dimension of the relationship, and in the end, it seems, forced the Clinton administration to adopt the policy of ‘comprehensive engagement’ that came to define US strategy thereafter.⁵⁶³

The strategy can be summarized thus. China, it was accepted, was far too important to be left out in the cold. Its large and expanding domestic market, its regional influence, the fact that it was a nuclear state and, moreover, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, meant that the United States would have to deal with China as serious power in its own right. It was simply too important a player to push around, and certainly far too important to allow human rights alone to determine bilateral relations between the two countries. Nor was there much chance that a policy of punishment would work. If anything it might make matters worse. The relationship between the two countries therefore had to be put on a sound, comprehensive basis. This would not ignore human rights, but would locate the issue within a wider framework. Over the long term, the best and most effective policy, it was therefore felt, was not short-term sanctions but the longer-term integration of China into the wider world system. In this way, through a gradual process of learning and adaptation, China, it was reasoned, would begin to adopt international norms and play by the international rules of the game, rules which included not only open markets and fair trade but also an acceptance of Western-style human rights.

Laying down a policy was one thing; implementing it was quite another, and not surprisingly the Clinton administration had problems in maintaining a steady course. This became only too apparent in 1994, when the United States faced a renewed threat from North Korea,⁵⁶⁴ and two years later when there was the stand-off between China and Taiwan during which China held military exercises in the Taiwan Straits to put political pressure on the

⁵⁶² Tanaka Akihiko, *Nihon kankei 1972–1991* [Japanese-Chinese Relations, 1972–1991] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992) .

⁵⁶³ See for the latter Ezra Vogel (ed.), *Living With China: U.S.-China Relations in the Twentieth-first Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997) .

⁵⁶⁴ See, *inter alia*, International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1996–1997* (London) .

government in Taipei.⁵⁶⁵ In both situations, the issue of human rights almost seemed to be irrelevant. Thus, when the US needed China's help to manage the crisis in North Korea, China's record in this area was not even mentioned, and was not likely to be when Washington required Chinese diplomatic support to contain Pyongyang; and when the US was forced to face down China in 1996, the big question then was not human rights but China's intimidatory tactics towards a key American ally.

A quasi-détente between China and the United States continued in November 1997 when President Jiang Zeming visited the United States. It looked as if business-as-usual was the predominant mood in Sino-US relations and as if the issue of human rights was an intense but not a priority issue.⁵⁶⁶ After his visit, the Chinese government also threw the US a sop and released Wei Jingsheng, an intermittently jailed dissident first arrested for appealing to the communist leadership for a 'fifth modernization', that is, democratization.⁵⁶⁷

Clinton's visit to China in July 1998 only confirmed that human rights was an important but not a priority issue in US-Chinese relations. Prior to the visit, the release of a prominent dissident, Wan Dan, was announced, while during the visit itself Clinton's speech and the questions and answers thereafter in the auditorium at Peking University were televised live on CNN. The US government, however, also used the occasion to reassure China about Taiwan with its 'three nots' principle: not allowing Taiwan to seek independence, not allowing Taiwan to become a member of the United Nations, and not returning to a two-China policy. This was accompanied by two other initiatives: enhancing the means of preventing further nuclear proliferation, and reassuring the democratic allies of the United States—Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—of its commitment to their security.

However, the United States stiffened its position on China's human rights practices only seven months after this 'honeymoon period'. First, the Asian financial crisis led to a major increase in the US trade deficit with China and a slightly sour note began to be sounded in discussions between the two governments. Second, the Chinese government sharpened its opposition to the US-led scheme of theatre missile defence (TMD) envisaged to be built by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Third, the Chinese government escalated its suppression of human rights activists and democracy movements at home. Under these pressures, America once again stepped up its political criticism, showing particular interest in human rights abuses and in the fledgling democracy movement, especially in the cultural realm and at the village level.⁵⁶⁸ This was

⁵⁶⁵ John W. Garver, *Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) .

⁵⁶⁶ David E. Sanger, 'Business Leads Diplomacy in Relations with Beijing', *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1997, pp. 1 and 10 .

⁵⁶⁷ Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe', in Goldstein and Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, pp. 139–72 .

⁵⁶⁸ Yali Peng, 'Democracy and Chinese Political Discourse', *Modern China*, 24/4 (1998), pp. 408–44 ; Jing Wang, *High Culture Fever: Politics Aesthetics and Ideology in Deng's China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) ; Baogang He, *The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1997) ; Andrew Walder (ed.), *Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) ; Anita Chan et al., *Chen Village under Mao and Deng* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984/1999) .

sustained by vigorous intelligence and research activities at all levels from the Department of State through to the academic world. Human rights simply would not go away.

Creating a Two-Party System in Japan

Japan is a liberal democracy. Yet the politics of Japan for the greater part of the postwar period was dominated by one party—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—which brought political stability to Japan and ensured that Japan pursued a foreign policy acceptable to the United States. While the cold war persisted, it was an arrangement that few in the US cared or even dared to criticize. The end of the cold war, however, and the increase in economic tensions between the two countries changed all this and led America to promote a new form of more open democracy in Japan—though less for political than economic reasons. The story bears some retelling.

During the 1980s the United States began to complain about what it viewed as the closed nature of the Japanese economy. The ratio of Japan's foreign direct investment abroad to foreign direct investment in Japan was just too unfavourable.⁵⁶⁹ Why, American critics asked themselves? Their reasoning went roughly as follows.⁵⁷⁰ The bureaucracy, they insisted, was too strong, regulating economic activities at home and denying reasonable access to foreign capital. Consumers, they also felt, were too weak. However, if they were to assert their rights, civic groups and political parties committed to the sovereignty of the consumer were needed. One-party dominance by the LDP—the friend of bureaucracy and business but not necessarily Japanese consumers—had to be moderated by a healthy opposition that was not only strong enough in its own right but capable of actually replacing the LDP as the governing party. What was also required, it was argued, was a change in business practices—practices that hitherto had encouraged closed networks between corporations and banks, government and business. These practices also encouraged the Japanese to stick together and exclude healthy competition. So, reasoned American analysts, we should try to crack open the outer protective shell by gradually persuading Japan to adopt certain global standards and in the process get rid of the barriers that prevent normal economic intercourse between Japan and the outside world.

The United States also sought to change the way decisions were made by the Japanese government. Often these were very slow and evasive. Indeed, the

⁵⁶⁹ Nakamura Yoshiaki *et al.*, *TaiNichi chokusetsu toshi wa naze sukumaika* [Why Is Foreign Direct Investment in Japan So Low?] (Tokyo: MITI Research Institute, 1997) .

⁵⁷⁰ The following is my selective summary of what the revisionists say. See Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York, Basic Books, 1988) ; Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) ; James Fallows, *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994) .

government seemed to outsiders at least like some multi-headed monster, such that it was impossible see where the ultimate decision-making authority lay. There were also too many decision-making units with veto power.⁵⁷¹ The American goal thus was to encourage the establishment of what it regarded as a 'normal state' where authority lines were clear. To achieve this goal, however, it had to first identify and then encourage those politicians who would challenge the old structure and lead the nation in a different way.

This new strategy of democracy promotion has to be set in the larger historical context. As we have already noted, the US was willing to live with the old order, which served its purposes well until the 1980s. The turning-point came in 1985 and 1986 when there was major liberalization of financial markets on a global scale.⁵⁷² One financial analyst called it 'the end of geography', meaning that in economic transactions, especially in financial market transactions, geographical distance had lost much of the significance it had hitherto held. The Plaza Agreement called for market-demand expansion and liberalization of the market along with measures that would lower the value of the US dollar.⁵⁷³ The Japanese government took the message seriously and the Maekawa Report, submitted to Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1985, proposed assiduous promotion of domestic expansion of market demand and market liberalization. The former, however, advanced much more rapidly than the latter, leading to an increased trade deficit. This in turn upset the US, which now demanded liberalization of Japan's market. A series of negotiations conducted between the two countries only added to the already bad feelings on both sides, among the elite as well as the general public. Japanese public opinion was dismayed at 'Japan bashing' and certain elite spokesmen argued that Japan could, and had every right to, 'say no'. The acrimonious debates that ensued did a great deal of harm to the bilateral relationship.⁵⁷⁴

It was at this stage that the US now linked its economic concerns with demands for political reform within Japan itself and called, as we have seen, for bureaucratic deregulation, the overthrow of one-party dominance and an end to consumer docility. The United States government may not have been the only actor engineering the 1993 dismantling of the LDP's one-party dominance; nevertheless, it played an important part. What was critical, of course, were problems within Japan itself. Inflation worsened in the late 1980s. Political scandals mushroomed. Noboru Takeshita, prime minister and head of the largest faction of the LDP, was forced to resign and his cohorts began to wonder what strategy they might avail themselves of to avoid the same fate. Half of them broke ranks with the LDP altogether, forming a splinter party

⁵⁷¹ Inoguchi Takashi, *Nihon Keizai taikoku no seiji une* [Japan: The Governing of an Economic Superpower] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1993) .

⁵⁷² Eugene Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) .

⁵⁷³ Ronald I. MacKinnon and Kenichi Ohno, *Dollar and Yen: Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and Japan* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) .

⁵⁷⁴ Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, *No to ieru Nihon* [Japan That Can Say No] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1989) .

headed by Ichiro Ozawa, who was portrayed favourably in former ambassador Michael Armacost's recent book.⁵⁷⁵

The public was also emboldened to voice their grievances and sense of injustice. The young and the ambitious rallied around the banner of Morihiro Hosokawa, former governor of Kumamoto and a member of a former aristocratic family related to the imperial family, to mobilize support for the Japan New Party which Hosokawa came to head. Meanwhile, the LDP changed prime ministers three times: Toshiki Kaifu, Sosuke Uno, and Kiichi Miyazawa. Miyazawa was defeated in a no-confidence vote on the framework for Japan-US trade negotiations. The subsequent election brought the opposition parties together to form a coalition government headed by Hosokawa. This was a brilliant victory on the part of Hosokawa and Ozawa—and some would say for the United States as well.

The political reform bills Hosokawa swiftly moved through the National Diet by the end of 1993⁵⁷⁶ were favourably received by the public. These changed the procedure for choosing candidates for seats in the National Diet, the way political donations could be legally gathered, and the method of allocating government subsidies to political parties. Most noteworthy was the change from the multiple-member district system—wherein two to five candidates were chosen in the same district with one vote—to the single-member district system—wherein one candidate is chosen with one vote: significantly, the Anglo-American system.

The period between 1994 and 1995, under the administration of a coalition government made up of the LDP, Social Democrats, and Sakigake, was an eventful time, but the populist upsurge of the early 1990s disappeared.⁵⁷⁷ Above all, the economy went into steady decline. The cumulative government deficit reached unprecedented heights. The tangible effects of globalization began to be felt in many sectors. Early retirement became more frequent. Once a modicum of political reform was achieved, popular attention was directed at the bureaucracy, where salaries were not negatively affected by the economic downturn, in contrast to the private sector, where white-collar workers began to feel its full force. Revelations of bureaucratic scandals and corruption in public offices filled the news. There was a succession of crises, from the North Korean 'crisis' to the tensions in the Taiwan Straits and the Kobe earthquake and the terrorist acts of Aum Shinrikyo cult members in Tokyo subways. Weighed down by continuing recession and assailed by one crisis after another, the political mood of the time became pessimistic.

Yet these were also times of important change. Indeed, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, head of the Social Democratic party, achieved two major

⁵⁷⁵ Michael Armacost, *Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) .

⁵⁷⁶ Takashi Inoguchi, 'The Rise and Fall of "Reformist Governments": Hosokawa and Hata, 1993-1994', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 2/2 (1994), pp. 73-88 .

⁵⁷⁷ Steven Reed, 'A Story of Three Booms: From the New Liberal Club to the Hosokawa Coalition Government', in Purnendra Jain and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), *Japanese Politics Today* (Sydney: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 108-23 .

policy successes. His party changed its previous position on opposition to the Japan-US security treaty to acceptance, an action that eased the redrafting of the new Japan-US security guidelines in 1996. No less important was his statement of Japanese repentance regarding acts of war in the 1930s and 1940s. It was direct and forthright and left little room for doubt. The statement has subsequently become a very strong and standard statement of the Japanese government on that issue. Liberal Democratic Party Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto completed the new security guidelines and boldly initiated reforms designed to eliminate the primacy of bureaucrats over politicians. The basic tone of Japanese politics changed completely during the 1992–1997 period.⁵⁷⁸

With the growth of the newly inaugurated Democratic Party headed by Naoto Kan and the Japan Communist Party making an unexpected comeback to occupy much of the space once taken up by the Social Democratic Party, one might claim that a renewal of democratic politics in Japan has been achieved with significant results. The Upper House election of 12 July 1998 seemed to confirm this observation. The governing LDP experienced a disappointing result, leading to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's announcement that he would resign. Not only was the LDP unable to capture a simple majority in the Upper House; it also allowed three large opposition parties, the one-month-old Democratic Party, the Japan Communist Party, and the Komei Party to gain a large number of seats from the LDP. The LDP could not win one seat in its metropolitan constituencies in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Osaka, and Kyoto. This rendered somewhat uncertain the passage of the economic recovery package that Prime Minister Hashimoto managed to announce just before his resignation. The LDP's minority status in the Upper House meant that the LDP had to get legislative cooperation from other opposition parties or members. However, these to some degree were mere details. Far more significant was the much higher voter turnout—about 58 per cent—and the unexpected advances won by the opposition. These were important signs of changed times in Japan and seemed proof of the fact that Japanese party politics had at last acquired a degree of democratic competition.

Promoting Free Elections in Cambodia

Cambodia is the ultimate anti-utopia as far as the United States is concerned.⁵⁷⁹ After President Lyndon Johnson withdrew from politics in 1968, Richard Nixon sought to achieve 'peace with honour'. That meant massive bombing of North Vietnam and intrusion and pacification operations into the sanctuaries

⁵⁷⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, 'A Step toward One-Party Predominance: Japan's General Election of 20 October 1996', *Government and Opposition*, 32/1 (1997), pp. 48–64 .

⁵⁷⁹ Judy Ledgerwood, *Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia* (Armonk, N.J.: Myron E. Sharpe, 1996) ; William Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994) ; David Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds.), *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1983) .

of Vietnamese guerrillas, including Cambodia. The American intrusion broke the delicate bargain that Prince Sihanouk and the Vietnamese communists had struck. The consequences, as we know, were appalling in the short term and catastrophic in the long term when in 1975 the Khmer Rouge finally seized power in Cambodia.

Cambodians after 1975 experienced the most brutal of times that came to a conclusion only when Vietnam moved in and completely occupied Cambodia late in 1978. Shortly after, China invaded Vietnam—ostensibly to punish it for occupying one of China's allies. Vietnam, however, did not withdraw from Cambodia until 1985, leaving three principal actors—Cambodian communists, Royalist Conservatives and Khmer Rouge—in control of a devastated country. Into this breach was introduced the idea of achieving peace through multiparty free and fair elections conducted under the aegis of the United Nations.⁵⁸⁰ Two major steps were necessary to bring the three antagonists together for talks. A conference convened by the Japanese government was held in Tokyo in 1990, offering as incentives the promise of official development assistance once peace had been achieved. They came and talked, setting the stage for the subsequent Geneva conference. At Geneva, terms of peace were agreed upon and preparations made for mediation by the United Nations.⁵⁸¹

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) occupied and ruled Cambodia until a freely elected reconciliation government was formed. The UNTAC was the most ambitious such undertaking in the history of the UN, involving an investment of \$2 billion, the deployment of 16,000 troops and over 3,000 police officers, and the dispatch of 3,000 civilian officials who assumed control of key ministries. It was successful in achieving both the traditional UN functions of peacekeeping—disarmament and repatriation of refugees—as well as helping construct the basis of a functioning democratic system, including supervision and monitoring of elections, political mediation, and reconstruction of key institutions.

What was the role of the United States in all this? It is important to remember that the UNTAC emerged in the wake of the cold war and the Gulf war.⁵⁸² The latter, we should recall, was a coalition military campaign led by the United States and legitimized by various United Nations resolutions. The US role in the Gulf was direct. The US was also the dominant partner in the coalition, providing the intelligence, the leadership and the firepower that finally pushed Iraq out of Kuwait. In Cambodia, of course, the situation on the ground was quite different and the tools needed to do the job quite different

⁵⁸⁰ For the history leading to and beyond the UNTAC, see Michael W. Doyle and Robert C. Orr (eds), *Keeping the Peace: Lessons from Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) .

⁵⁸¹ Larry Diamond, 'Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, and Issues', in Axel Hadenius (ed), *Democracy's Victory and Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 311–76 .

⁵⁸² Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 1990–1991* (London: Faber and Faber, 1993) .

too. The UNTAC was a genuine multinational coalition task force whose purpose was not to fight but to foster reconciliation and help build a coalition government in Cambodia. Moreover, whereas the US role was direct in the Gulf war, in Cambodia it was indirect. Indeed, in Cambodia the United States delegated substantial power and authority to the United Nations to do the job.

Occurring at a time of great optimism in the immediate aftermath of the cold war, both the Gulf war and the UNTAC represented important, possibly brilliant, innovations of the last remaining superpower. The US approach in this period might be summed up in the following way: use force only when necessary; seek allies when large-scale involvement of US military forces is required; only deploy force legitimized through the United Nations; use force only for limited periods of time; and delegate power and authority to the United Nations when such delegation is deemed feasible and desirable. It certainly worked in the case of the Gulf; and under difficult circumstances in Cambodia it also achieved some results.

However, the problems in Cambodia were enormous and illustrated only too clearly the difficulties outsiders would have in establishing democratic forms in countries where democratic norms were virtually non-existent. Here we simply sketch in the bare details to make the point clearer than the truth.

After several years of uneasy truce between the various political parties, in 1997 a mini-*coup d'état* took place, with Hun Sen, second prime minister, ousting Ranariddh, first prime minister. The Japanese government requested that Hun Sen restore the coalition government. Hun Sen in turn requested that the Japanese government provide assistance in order to conduct free and fair multiparty elections. The Japanese government agreed to do so. Parliamentary elections were then held in July 1998 under the supervision of a United Nations team and with the financial assistance of a few countries, including Japan.⁵⁸³ According to the electoral watchdog group, Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, the Cambodian People's Party headed by Hun Sen won 41.1 per cent of the votes, the royalist Funcinpec party headed by Prince Norodom Ranariddh 32.2 per cent, and the Sam Rainsy party headed by Sam Rainsy 14.4 per cent. Although the People's Party controlled the electoral process with security forces placed at the grass-roots level, its performance improved by only 3 per cent on the 1993 UNTAC-supervised election. The major difference from the 1993 race was that the Khmer Rouge did not stand. Hun Sen then pressured the other two parties to acknowledge the results and to join a unified government. The other two parties, however, refused to accept the results because they found evidence of massive fraud. As a result, Cambodia was not admitted to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at ASEAN's summit in Hanoi in December 1998. Nevertheless, the World Bank, Japan and 16 other countries held the Third Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia on 25–6 February 1999 in Tokyo and pledged new assistance of nearly \$470 million.

⁵⁸³ 'Nihon gaiko ichio no seika—Cambodia shonenba korekara' [Japan Achieves Results in Cambodia: The Real Test Is To Come], *Mainichi shimbun* (8 November 1997) .

Money alone, however, could not reconstruct what years of war and devastation had wrought on what was, after all, a traditional society. Yet the investment overall by the international community should not be underestimated. Cambodia was in its own way most fortunate. The eyes of the world were upon it. The UN decided to use it a test case. Both China and Japan for different reasons had an interest in Cambodia. And perhaps the US felt it had something to prove as well. After all, it had been its actions in the first place that led, however indirectly, to the terrible tragedy there. Hence the enormous investment of its time, effort and money. But whether this particularly unique experiment in nation-building would ever be repeated elsewhere remained an open question.

Conclusion

In my survey of Asia-Pacific I began not with a description of the region, the more obvious issue of Asian values, the impact of the financial crisis on democratic change or even a discussion of why America might promote democracy at all, but with what I term ‘the three legacies’: the Westphalian, the Philadelphian, and the anti-utopian. The argument I have advanced is that the three frameworks compete with each other to shape and determine the course and content of US foreign policy, both generally and towards Asia Pacific. The United States, like any country, wants to boast of, and if possible to export, what it regards as its virtues. In antimony to the old, vice-ridden states of Europe, the United States started anew and devoted itself to the ideals of freedom, democracy, and equality. To this extent it was the first new nation to develop a Philadelphian framework where binding and hiding were the key modalities, as opposed to the Westphalian where balancing and bandwagoning were the assumed norms. In many ways, the legacy of Philadelphia—with its stress on shared values, common rules, international agreements, the promotion of mutually advantageous commerce and increasing interdependence between nations—lives on and continues to shape American relations with the outside world in general and Asia-Pacific in particular.

Yet we saw that, in its dealings with China and Japan, the Westphalian framework still seems to be robust. Power remains at the heart of these relationships. But a substantial loosening of the criteria whereby a state is regarded as ‘normal’ in the Westphalian framework has taken place with the emergence of a series of failed or failing states. Cambodia is an excellent and tragic testimony to this. This complicates the situation for a Philadelphian actor like the United States. A Philadelphian actor must behave on the basis of universal principles and shared democratic norms and values, yet these values obviously cannot flourish where there are states in an advanced state of disintegration. The Philadelphian framework compels the United States, the founder of the framework, to act and not allow such states to ‘stew in their own juice’. Global governance is expected to have a human face after all. However, translating

fine ideas into practice can sometimes be very difficult. For one thing, it is very costly. America may also not have the will to act, especially if it involves the use of US troops abroad. The US may indeed have the power. But as long as the world remains a complex place—and the number of failed states keeps on rising—it would be naïve to think that it will promote democracy everywhere. It will continue to face multidimensional encounters of many kinds and more often than not it will fail to achieve what it wants; now and for the foreseeable future there will be suboptimal outcomes despite its overwhelming position of preponderance in the international system.