Filomena Maggino   *Editor*

A Life Devoted to Quality of Life

Festschrift in Honor of Alex C. Michalos

Springer

Chapter 14
Quality of Life Research in Asia

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QOL research in Asia was limited until recently to demographically small societies, such as Hong Kong (Chua et al. 2014) and Singapore (Tan and Tambyah 2014). Then the research focus shifted to South Korean (Shin and Spina 2014; Park 2014) and Taiwanese (Hsiao and Wan 2014; Yao 2014) QOL, followed in the 2000s to Chinese (Xing 2014) and Japanese (Inoguchi 2014a, b; Iwai 2011) QOL, then Macau (Davey and Rato 2014) and Malaysian (Abdullah 2014) QOL came to the fore. In the 2010s all of Asia appeared on the research radar. Daniel Shek in Hong Kong spearheaded it. In Singapore S.J. Tan and S.K. Tambyah have been steady and vigorous in developing QOL research in Singapore. Moving to Taiwan and South Korea, we have seen Grace Yao, Michael Hsiao, Chong Min Park and Doh Chull Shin become pace setters of sorts in terms of subject focus and methodological advance.

While those research areas have remained active in the 2000s and 2010s, Japanese and Chinese QOL research has also become activate. Noriko Iwai (2011) spearheaded a collaborative four-society QOL research project on East Asia that concentrates on Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea. The four research teams are from Osaka University of Commerce, Chinese Renmin University, Korea University, and Taiwan Chengchi University. Then Takashi Inoguchi pioneered a research project on the QOL of all societies in Asia, meaning East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, with the two notable exceptions of North Korea and Timor Leste and with the notable inclusion of adjacent societies of Australia, Russia and the United States.

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In terms of academic discipline of major authors, Asia is no exception to diversity. Daniel Shek is a social psychologist, S.J. Tan and S.K Tambyah (2014) are experts of marketing and business research. Grace Yao is a psychologist. Michael Hsiao is a social anthropologist. Chong Min Park is a social psychologist. Doh Chull Shin is a political scientist. Noriko Iwai is a psychologist. Takashi Inoguchi is a political scientist. Thus quality of life research in Asia is no exception in the richness of disciplinary mingling.

In terms of analysis, the more recent academic undertakings in this area have explored subjects beyond what first generations of QOL scholars touched on and have yielded enormously revealing and stimulating results. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Po-san Wan (2014) have analyzed "public attitudes toward the state in Asia-Pacific region". Yoshinori Kamo and Makiko Hori (2014) have analyzed "marital and family satisfaction in 32 countries". Shinya Sasaoka and Katsunori Seki (2011) have analyzed democracy and quality of life in Asian societies. Doh Chull Shin and Nichaolas Spina (2014) have analyzed faith in democracy. Seoyong Kim (2014) has analyzed cultural capital and quality of life in Korea.

Then, I give a summary portrait of what is the AsiaBarometer survey and what aims and with what scope and methods. I focus on wide-raging analyses of the AsiaBarometer survey data to highlight the project's profile and some analytical thrusts into such topics as trust, democracy, civilizational clash and societal types.

AsiaBarometer Survey's Profile "AsiaBarometer" in Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd Edition (Inoguchi forthcoming)

The AsiaBarometer Survey conducted over 50,000 face-to-face interviews in 29 Asian societies and 3 Western countries. Its objective was to examine and better understand the quality of life in Asia. Survey topics ranged from personal health to trust and confidence in social institutions to political orientation to international relations. Given the varied and diverse social, economic, and political conditions of the region, the secondary questions provide useful insight to the nature of response when viewed through a wider lens to society and overall quality of life. Through its investigation, the survey and the ensuing analyses also made achievements in the areas of methodology, theoretical impact, and substantive contributions.

In the area of methodology, the survey researchers could pursue four types of comparative analyses: comparison within each participant society, comparison within and between Asia's different sub-regions, and comparisons between Asian and Western countries. A significant accomplishment is that although 27 or the 29 Asian countries have non-democratic systems, the government's agreed to the survey because the focus was on the daily life of ordinary citizens. In terms of theoretical contribution, the survey enabled the researchers to test theories, such as modernization, globalization, clash of civilizations, and the Asian value hypothesis.

For substantive contributions, the survey focuses on three key areas. (1) The happiest people are not the high-wage earners of democratic Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, they are, in fact, the least happy group of respondents. The happiest people are in the poor regions of South Asia, which suggest that family, religion, and community are critical components of happiness. (2) Five key typologies of society are identified through the analysis of materialism, post-materialism, and public sector dominance. (3) Influences that are deeply rooted and affect social relations then impact quality of life. These influences include interpersonal trust and confidence in social institutions. Historical experiences and accumulated patterns of political culture are at the center of these influences.

Analytical Thrusts into Trust, Democracy, Clash of Civilizations and Societal Types

Asia, Quality of Life (Inoguchi 2014a, b)

Quality of life in Asia is one of the areas on which the AsiaBarometer Survey focuses (Inoguchi and Fujii, 2013). Asia covers a wide expanse of countries with very different economic, political, and social conditions. The region also includes five of the eight civilizations that Samuel Huntington identifies—Hindu, Chinese, Islamic, Christian, and Japanese—in his volume Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). To cover such an expanse of societies makes the AsiaBarometer Survey the most comprehensive survey in the world.

In the AsiaBarometer, the respondents are asked to rank different parts of their life, and the top-five domains or lifestyle aspects are in descending order of importance, health, home, diet, job, and family. Placing physical conditions (health, home, diet) over job and family is understandable. Other domains that ranked in the top-five lifestyle aspects for a few societies include income, absence of crime, medical care, and being devout. To gain more insight and a more nuanced appreciation of these societies, the survey examined the domains of family, job, and being devout as they relate to the family dimension, occupational dimension, and spiritual dimension.

The family dimension figures most prominently in Japan and Korea, followed by Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. In this second set of societies, they are located in maritime regions with have experienced immigration, resulting in the cohabitation of varied races. In these circumstances, family is the smallest unit of human existence. The occupational dimension is strongest in Vietnam and Kazakhstan, followed by China and Japan. Of these four countries, three can be classified as Northeast Asian (Kazakhstan is the exception), known for being diligent, and three are or have been communist (Japan is the exception). The spiritual dimension is greatest in Myanmar (Buddhist) and Bangladesh (Islam), followed by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia (all Moslem). There is a high correlation to this finding with a low level of per capita income, regardless of religion.

The AsiaBarometer also attempted to measure happiness. A difficult concept to define and measure in one language, the survey also faced the challenge of articulating the concept with a constant meaning through many languages and cultures. The English question as respondents: "On the whole, do you think you are very happy, quite happy, neither happy nor unhappy, quite unhappy, or very unhappy?" To quantify the responses, the survey used a percentage difference index (PDI) to obtain the average for each society. To obtain a PDI average, the first two positive responses are added together, then the two most common negative responses are added together, and finally the negative responses are subtracted from the positive ones. The five happiest countries in the survey are Brunei, Maldives, Malaysia, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka; the five unhappiest places are Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan. The happiest regions are Southeast Asia, followed by South Asia; the unhappiest regions are East Asia, followed by Central Asia. According to Human Development Index (HDI) scores, the PDI scores of Southeast and South Asia are higher than what HDI indicators suggest, and conversely, the PDI scores of East and Central Asia are lower than what HDIs suggest. In large part, the self-assessment of happiness for Southeast and South Asians appears to be based on religiosity, that is Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. For East Asians, who seek social harmony and collectivism, neuroscientists place anxiety as a central trait for this regional group 9 (Chiao and Blizinsky 2010). For central Asians, who still have nomadic tribes, a predominant quality is suspicion that is triggered by scarce water and grass resources (Matsui 2011).

Interpersonal Trust and Quality of Life: A Cross Sectional Study of Japan (Tokuda et al. 2008)

The connection between positive attitudes and quality of life (QOL) or subjective well-being is important. Psychosocial factors, such as interpersonal trust, optimism, and sociability, impact QOL. As a case study, Japan provides insight into the link between interpersonal trust and QOL. In Japan, subjective well-being is poor and interpersonal trust is relatively low.

Many factors are behind subjective well-being: genetics, demographics, lifestyle, environmental factors, and socioeconomic factors (income, education, occupation). Research has shown that moving from an impoverished situation to the middle class improves QOL but a higher income after that does not impact QOL. Also, being gainfully employed adds to subjective well-being.

The focus of academic inquiry has now shifted to psychosocial factors. A significant positive predictor of QOL is interpersonal trust. Trust can be defined as a belief that others can be relied on to act with good will and with sincerity. Trust an indispensable component in developing an integrated personality that deals successfully with social adjustment. The opposite qualities of mistrust, hostility, suspiciousness, and cynicism are negative attributes associated with poor psychological well-being. Mistrust is the belief that others will put themselves first and will even victimize

others to achieve their goal. Mistrust also negatively impacts the creation and use of social support networks. A vicious cycle can develop between the mistrusting individual and the rest of society: one where mistrust prompts adverse reactions from others, thereby justifying beliefs with the potential to spiral into paranoia, which also brings a higher risk of suicide.

Industrialized societies are showing an increasing trend toward social disconnection and poor subjective well-being. Japan is no exception. The AsiaBarometer Survey shows that Japan has comparatively low levels of interpersonal trust. Also, the international values survey also registers Japanese as poor in subjective well-being or the most unhappy among industrialized societies.

Methods

Study Participants and Data Collection

The 2008 study used face-to-face interviews to survey 1000 persons from Hokkaido to Kyushu. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 69 years. The data collection included demographics, marital status, socioeconomic factors, health-related QOL, and interpersonal trust. The survey also covered political, environmental, and social issues as connected to the AsiaBarometer Survey.

Age groups were broken down into decades, 20–29, 30–39 all the way to 60–69 years. Education was categorized into three levels: high (post-secondary education), mid (high school completion), and low (elementary or junior high completion). Occupation was categorized as: self-employed, homemaker, employed or unemployed. Students, retirees, and unemployed were placed in the last grouping of unemployed.

The Japanese version of the WHOQOL-BREF served to assess QOL. The WHOQOL-BREF has 26 items that cover four domains that include physical, psychological, social and environmental QOL. The only item excluded from this undertaking was sexual satisfaction. The concern was that it might provoke an emotion response. The scores were transformed into a scale of 1–100.

To measure interpersonal trust, the survey focused on trust in people, human fairness, and human nature. Question posed: "Would you say that (1) most people can be trusted; or do you think (2) you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Respondents chose on a scale of 0–10. If they chose the first part of question, then they received a score of 10 (highest level of trust), and if they chose the second part of the questions, then they received a score of zero (lowest level of trust).

The survey question to assess human fairness asked: "Do you think that (1) most people would try to be fair; or do you think that (2) they would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance?" To assess human nature, the survey asked: "Would you say that (1) most of the time people try to be helpful; or that (2) they are mostly looking out for themselves?" The same method to score respondents' responses to the first question about trust in people was followed in these two questions.

Statistical Analysis

SPSS 15.0J was used in all statistical analyses. Two-tailed p-values _0.05 were treated as statistically significant.

The three trust scales were positively correlated with all QOL domains. Adjusting for age, gender, size of residence, income, education, and occupation, we constructed multiple linear regression models for QOL and the main component score of the trust scales.

Results

The socioeconomic features of the survey participants are: mean age 45 years; 49 % female; 78 % married; 34 % lived in the Kanto region; 33 % had an annual household income under five million Japanese Yen (2008 average exchange rate to 1 US dollar was 100 JY); and 7 % indicated a low level of education, that is, junior high or less.

In a general examination of trust scales according to socioeconomic factors, trust is greater among women than men, the oldest age group (60–69 years) is more trusting than those in the youngest age group (20–29), and a higher income impacts trust positively. In reviewing each of three scales of trust investigated, women have greater trust in all three than men. In comparing age groups, participants over 60 years have a better assessment of human fairness and nature, whereas those in their twenties have a low level of trust in human nature. Income is also a factor. Of those with an income of eight million JY, trust in people and human nature is higher. In terms of occupation, specifically the employed groups, homemakers show greater trust in human nature. Size of residence and education levels does not display any meaningful difference in trust scales.

The mean scores of QOL domains by sociodemographics show that: women have a higher social QOL than men; greater environmental QOL is indicated in the 60–69 age bracket and a lower environmental QOL for those in the 40–49 age bracket; participant residing in cities of 100,000 have a greater environmental QOL and those residing in metropolises have a lower environmental QOL.

In terms of income, the participants with a five million JY household income have a lower physical QOL and those with an eight million JY household income have a better physical and environmental QOL. A similar picture appears for education levels, that is, those with a junior high level or less have a lower physical and psychological QOL. Occupation does not have a significant impact on QOL domains.

The correlation coefficients between QOL and trust scales as well as among trust scales are significant. Moderate positive correlations exist between all QOL domains and the three trust scales and a high positive correlation among the three trust scales.

In multiple linear regressions for QOL domains of sociodemographics and interpersonal trust, a positive and significant association exists. This analysis shows that higher interpersonal trust are linked to greater scores in the QOL domains (physical, psychological, social, and environmental).

In considering the other variables of gender, age, size of residence, and income that are associated with the QOL domains, the results show that: women are have a greater social QOL than men; those in the 40–49 and 50–59 age brackets have lower physical and social QOL than those in the 20–29 age bracket; those in the 50–59 age bracket also have lower social QOL than the youngest survey participants. In a comparison of city size with the major metropolises as the standard, participants residing in a city over 100,000 people have a greater environmental QOL; those living in a city of 100,000 or less have greater psychological and environmental QOL. In terms of income, those with a household income of eight million JY have a greater physical, psychological, and environmental QOL than those in households of five million JY. Educational levels and occupation make no significant difference in al QOL domains.

Discussion

In this case study of Japan, research shows that participants who have a greater sense in interpersonal trust are more likely to have greater QOL in all domains than those participants who have a lower sense of trust. The results confirm other studies that show that greater interpersonal trust is linked to better individual health assessments. The present task is to conduct a controlled interventional study that confirms that such a causal relationship exist between interpersonal trust and QOL. The objective is to move toward designing public health policies that promote improved interpersonal trust, and ultimately, improved global QOL.

In examining the relationships between sociodemographic factors and QOL, some findings bear speculation on the reasons behind them. For example, environmental and physical QOL is better in moderate sized cities than in larger metropolitan areas. Such cities may have less air and water pollution, noise, traffic volume, and living cost than their larger counterparts. Moderate sized cities may also provide better access social and commercial services, such as public transportation, theatre, and shopping malls.

Other studies in Europe also confirm this study's finding that higher income is associated with greater physical, psychological, and environmental QOL. Those in a higher income group are usually less inclined to partake in high-risk behavior, such as drugs and alcohol, are more likely to have regular health check-ups, and may have a better job that allows control and decreases the potential for accompanying stress. Hence, the "healthy" Japanese probably resides in a moderate sized city, is female, is either in her 20s or 50s, has a high-income household, and has a high level of interpersonal trust.

Greater interpersonal trust may prompt a better QOL for multiple reasons. First, trust of others is related to more robust connections with friends, family, and society, providing an overall sense of community support. The social ties and network also contribute to a sense of well-being. The concept of well-being is associate with pleasure, engagement, and meaning in life. Engagement with others is the most critical component. Second, interpersonal trust can also contribute to greater health

of neighbors and communities, which leads to greater support and sources of mutual respect. Third, innovative ideas spread easier when others trust each other and share in the diffusion of innovative ideas in the health field. Fourth, access to resources, services, and amenities is better when community interpersonal trust is high because of a higher level of local groups lobbying on behalf of the community.

Further research is required as the current study has inferential limitations. A long-term study is needed in this experimental study to strengthen the current findings by accumulating evidence to support causality. Our conclusion is that interpersonal trust is related to better QOL for Japanese. Strengthening interpersonal trust on a larger level is difficult, but the first step is to identify the qualities of civic associations and public policies that are more likely to promote common interests and that will lead to greater interpersonal trust.

Social Capital in East Asia: Comparative Political Culture in Confucian Societies (Inoguchi et al. 2007)

Does globalization weaken or strengthen traditional types of social capital? As a concept, social capital often refers to the social infrastructure of business, politics, and community (Coleman 1990; Lin 2001; Putnam 2000; Stolle 2007; Inoguchi 2007). Social capital performs a critical role in bringing together the business community and in bringing together the political community. It is a necessary component in networks that face barriers and bottlenecks as they move forward. Social capital also allows actors in business, politics, and other areas to act with confidence in times of uncertainty or risks.

At the crux of social capital and social infrastructure is a set of agreed norms and common networks. Defining and measuring the extent of social capital is difficult because human actions are not limited to certain community interactions or groups. The most accepted definition of social capital centers on interpersonal relations. Social capital is the variable that determines how smooth and efficient interpersonal relations flow. It can be viewed as a collective good that promotes understanding, efficiency, and effectiveness within business, politics, and community.

Just as defining social capital is challenging, measuring the concept is equally problematic. How to measure something that is difficult to define? We argue that the line of inquiry into social capital is limited by the emphasis placed on interpersonal relations that then extends into research probing human nature and tolerance. The line of inquiry comes from the relative homogeneity of Western societies in terms of Christianity, democratic values, and free capitalist market practices. Western literature on social capital appears to frame its research questions around human nature and its ability to be good or evil. Instead, we propose that by examining Asia and its diversity of religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam), political systems (of 29 surveyed countries, only nine are qualified as democracies by Freedom House), and economic systems (only six governments have adopted a floating exchange rate system), the line of inquiry into social capital goes beyond

interpersonal relations, human nature, and the subsequent presumption of a relative homogenous population.

In Asia, the Confucian tradition is a strong influence. It teaches that the starting point is the individual and her values, and that it starts at the individual level and builds to the greater world level. Confucian teachings stress that peace and stability starts with the individual who nurtures her own development of a virtuous self that leads to peace and stability in the family, then radiates outward toward the state and world. The focus is on the virtuous self and the development of being a good-natured individual, which then extends to the assumption that others are similar in nature. It is through this discussion that a commonality with social capital is made.

Our objective is to examine the relationship between globalization and social capital through the lens of traditional Confucian teachings. Does globalization reinforce or weaken social capital in Asia? For insight into this research question, we review data from the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey that includes seven "Confucian" societies: China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam.

To pursue this line of research we look at four questions from the 2006 AsiaBarometer Survey. The first two questions are numbered 11 and 13 in the survey. The first question is about a general sense of trust, whereas the second question is about goodwill toward others. Both questions deal with interpersonal relations but are approached from opposite sides of receiving and giving.

Question 11: Generally do you think people can be trusted or do you think that you can't be too careful in dealing with people (that it pays to be wary of people)? Possible responses: (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can't be too careful in dealing with people; (9) Don't know.

Question 13: If you saw somebody on the street looking lost, would you stop to help? Possible responses: (1) I would always stop to help; (2) I would help if nobody else did; (3) It is highly likely that I wouldn't stop to help; (9) Don't know.

The next two questions are numbered 37 and 44 in the survey. While the first set of questions focused on trust, which is an important element in ensuring that interpersonal relations work efficiently and smoothly, the second set of questions acknowledges that personal connections are also significant in navigating daily obstacles. This question also explores perceptions about fairness of rules and trade in a globalized world. The last question probes how Confucian virtues of benevolence, care for others, mindfulness, and thoughtfulness, which keep a society functioning, are prioritized in a globalized world that emphasizes competition. If competitiveness is sought, then that requires a strength and self-sustainability that conflict with mindfulness toward others.

Question 37: What should a person who needs a government permit do if the response of the official handling the application is: "just be patient and wait"? Possible responses: (1) Use connections to obtain permit; (2) Nothing can be done; (3) Wait and hope that things will work out; (4) Write a letter; (5) Act without a permit; (6) Bribe an official; (9) Don't know.

Question 44: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Please select two you consider to be the most important. Qualities are: (1) Independence; (2) Diligence; (3) Honesty; (4) Sincerity; (5) Mindfulness; (6) Humbleness; (7) Religiosity; (8) Patience; (9) Competitiveness; (10) Respect for senior persons; (11) Deference for teachers; (12) Don't know.

Data

Three types of variables are recognized: dependent, independent, and control. Dependent variables are the responses to the questions that reflect: general trust toward others; willingness to help others voluntarily; reliance on personal connections to resolve public dealings; and the value placed on teaching the personal traditional trait of mindfulness to children at home.

The independent variables are divided into individual-level predictors and societal-level predictors. Individual-level predictors include: attitudes toward globalization; familiarity with modern technology that connects people at a distance, i.e, Internet; interactions with foreign people; and English proficiency. Societal-level predictors include an index of economic freedoms from the Heritage Foundation that are scaled from 0 to 100 with 100 being the maximum freedom and Internet users per 1000 people. The higher the values, the more globalized a country is viewed. The economic freedoms are: business freedom, trade freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from government, fiscal freedom, property rights, investment freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom (www. heritage.org).

Control variables are important as they could affect the respondent's social capital. At the individual level, we controlled for gender, age, marital status, education, income, and religious membership. At the societal-level, we controlled for fragmentation due to ethnicity, language, and religion and the extent of political rights and civil liberties (Alesina et al. 2003).

Results and Discussion

We used a two-level logit regression with a random intercept model. The results show that globalization has a positive impact on the general sense of trust. The coefficients are all positive and statistically significant. The respondents are 1.14 times more likely to select "Most people can be trusted" than to select "Can't be too careful in dealing with people" and "Don't Know."

Globalization appears to increase goodwill and volunteerism. The coefficients are all positive and statistically significant. Respondents indicated that they are 1.14 times more inclined to select "I would always stop to help" than the other choices.

Globalization also strengthens social capital as defined in the Western social science literature as related to interpersonal relations and human nature. Results also

show that globalization undercuts social capital in the area of transparency and competitiveness. This tide of global connectedness also threatens the values of familialism and communitarianism. Respondents are 0.90 times less likely to choose "Mindfulness" over other choices, which indicates that globalization undermines the Confucian traditional value of mindfulness.

Trust, goodwill, familialism, and mindfulness are all about the traditional side of social capital. Trust and goodwill refer to interpersonal relations and human nature. Our results show that even with the tide of globalization, traditional types of social capital will continue. In contrast, familialism and mindfulness will disappear in the face of increasing globalization and the related values of competition, transparency, and accountability that accompany its development.

The follow-up question to these findings is why does globalization have this effect. Increased interactions and dealings with people in different countries allow genuine growth in human relations and understanding. In the process, preconceived ideas of others fall to the wayside. Trust is a by-product of globalization. People learn to appreciate the strengths and weakness of their country and other countries and learn that different comparative advantages of countries lead to trade. The accumulation of knowledge about other cultures and traditions on an international level leads to the accompanying development of goodwill, volunteerism, and cooperation.

In the immediate surroundings of family, daily problems may best be managed by family or close friends, a tradition referred to as familialism or family-related communitarianism. In a more negative form, it is nepotism or clientelism. Yet away from this intimate setting, the approach changes to one of caution, vigilance, and prudence. Increasing globalization means that for global trade to flourish the trust of business partners and customers must be earned through practices of fairness, equal access, and accountability. Francis Fukuyama (1997) notes that when trust is high, business benefits as transactions are quicker, less costly, and more dependable. Conversely, if trust is low, then business transactions suffer and become slower, more costly, and less dependable.

Mindfulness may result in a good society, but in a globalized world of rapid financial markets and competitive markets, other values of strength, competitiveness, and self-sustainability trump the traditional Confucian value of mindfulness toward others.

Democracy and Quality of Life in Asian Societies (Sasaoka and Seki 2011)

Does democracy affect quality of life? Many academics have studied this relationship. In particular, they try to determine if democracy leads to a good quality of life. The type of political regime determines the political rights and civil liberties of its citizens, which in turn can impact how citizens' view their opportunities in life, their

satisfaction and subjective happiness with life. Political rights and civil liberties also determine the citizens' ability to participate in the political arena and to have their voices heard in the formation and reform of policies, especially in the context of enhancing public welfare. If these rights and liberties are compromised, then public frustration levels rise. Hence, the nature of the regime, in our focus—democracy— plays a significant role in the development of the individual's quality of life.

Cross-national studies indicate that democracy does have a positive effect and that it does not have a positive effect on the quality of life. The contradictory research results suggest that it depends on the type of variable applied in the studies. In the first set of studies, both objective and subjective indicators of quality of life are examined. The objective indicators measure quality of life through indices of human basic needs that are derived from indicators in the Physical Quality of Life Index and Net Social Progress. The subjective indicators of quality of life are from an international public opinion survey (ISSP 2007). This research also uses Freedom House scores, Polity IV score, and Bollen's democracy index to measure "objectively" a regime's degree of political democracy.

In the second group of cross-national analyses that reaches the opposite conclusion—democracy does not impact quality of life—scholars (Inglehart and Klingemann 2000) also use the Freedom House score to measure political democracy. However, for an indication of quality of life, this group turns to the World Values Survey (WVS) for its index of subjective well-being, which they use as an indication of happiness. The research concludes that democracy is not the critical component to improved happiness. Another study (Veenhooven 2000) that uses the Freedom House score to assess "freedom," not democracy, also relies on average poll data on happiness to indicate quality of life. The study's conclusion is that from a country-level perspective, freedom does not influence happiness in poor countries, but does positively influence happiness in developed, well-off societies.

The difference in research conclusions is due to the nature of the variable used. Four approaches are distinguishable: Approach 1 employs country-level variables as both the independent and dependent variables; Approach 2 employs the individual-level data as the dependent variable and the country-level data as the independent variable; Approach 3 is similar to approach 2 but reverse—the individual-level data is the independent variable and the country-level data is the dependent variable; Approach 4 employs individual-level data as both the dependent and independent variables. The existing literature as discussed in the above examples employs the first two approaches. To make the research findings more robust empirically, the causal relationship between democracy and quality of life must be confirmed by the analyses of the individual-level data. Moreover, because the research findings on this topic suggest different conclusions, we must test which hypothesis is valid. At the outset, we recognize that the relationship revealed through individual-level variables is not the same as that revealed through country-level variables. To bridge this difference, we use hierarchical modeling in our analysis to allow us to review the relationship between individual-level variables and, at the same time, consider country-level variation.

Democracy and Quality of Life in Asia

Asia is a good region to further probe the relationship between democracy and quality of life: four groups of regimes characterize regional governments, and regardless of the regime type, all pursue the public's well-being through policies centered on improvement of macro-economic conditions, increased infrastructure, increased household incomes, and improved livelihoods. The four groups are: (1) well-established democracies—Japan and India; (2) authoritarian regimes—China, Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, and Central Asian states; (3) "third-wave" democracies that transitioned to a liberal democracy in the 1980s—South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Mongolia; and (4) the regimes that go back and forth between democracy and autocracy—Thailand, Malaysia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.

Measurement Issues

Academics rely on the subjective assessment of happiness to measure quality of life (Dorn et al. 2007). Happiness levels are attributed to country-level economic performance (objective indicators) and personal feelings (subjective indicators).

It is also well established that citizens are not less happy because they live in a less prosperous country (Wangchuch 2007; Motobayashi 2006).

To measure democracy we rely on both objective and subjective measurements of the function of democracy. Objective measurements identify the regime as either democratic or non-democratic; subjective measurements are rendered by the citizen's own perception of democracy, that is, how the political regimes relates to her subjective happiness.

The Hypotheses

To verify that the citizens' perception of democracy impacts their sense of happiness we hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1a. The more satisfied the citizens are with the state of political rights they enjoy, the happier they are.

Hypothesis 1b. The more satisfied the citizens are with the state of civil liberties they enjoy, the happier they are.

The logic is that the more satisfied citizens are with political rights and civil liberties, that is the democratic system, the happier they be as opposed to those who are dissatisfied in these categories.

To test whether a regime types is the sources of happiness for its citizens, we examined country-level data of regime type as an independent variable.

Hypothesis 2: The citizens are in a democracy rather than a non-democracy.

If hypothesis 2 is true, this suggests that the policies pursued by a democratic government make its citizens happy.

Methods

For our data, we turned to the AsiaBarometer Survey from which we selected 39 surveys of 20 countries. The sample size was 25,661 respondents. We examined data from Bangladesh (2005), Bhutan (2005), Cambodia (2004, 2007), China (2003, 2006, 2008), India (2003, 2005, 2008), Indonesia (2004, 2007), Japan (2003, 2004, 2006, 2008), Kazakhstan (2005), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Malaysia (2003, 2004, 2007), Mongolia (2005), Nepal (2005), Pakistan (2005), the Philippines (2004, 2007), Singapore (2004, 2006), South Korea (2003, 2004, 2006), Sri Lanka (2003, 2005), Tajikistan (2005), Thailand (2003, 2004, 2007), and Uzbekistan (2003, 2005).

We used Hierarchical Modeling and followed a two-step estimation to run the model. The model specifications allowed for a varying intercept.

Variables

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is general happiness. Respondents were asked to identify their level of happiness on a five-point scale from very happy to very unhappy.

Individual-level Independent Variables

A. Perception of Democracy. In this study, the perception of democracy is the principal explanatory variable. To measure it, respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they are with political rights and civil liberties, specifically the right to vote, the rights to participate freely in organizations, and the right to gather and demonstrate. The responses, on a four-point scale, ranged from very satisfied to very dissatisfied.

Individual-level Control Variables

To the model we included six control variables: satisfaction with government performance, standard of living, gender, age education level, and religious affiliation.

Country-level Independent Variables

A. Democracy. As a dichotomous choice of regime type—democracy or non-democracy—we used conventional sources (Polity IV data) to classify political regimes. A regime is categorized democratic if the Polity IV score is more than seven (Epstein et al. 2006: 555).

Findings and Discussion

Based on our statistical analysis, we can make two conclusions. First, a strong explanatory factor of happiness is the individual-level of satisfaction with the two main components of democracy—political rights and civil liberties. In addition to the role played by the citizen's socioeconomic status, that person's assessment

about of politics also plays a critical part in augmenting the individual sense of happiness. Second, the country-level regime type is not statistically significant to impact the level of happiness. This result remains unchanged even when individual-level satisfaction about democracy is excluded. Our findings suggest that, at least in Asia, the regime type is a minor secondary consideration in increasing happiness, and that the critical element is the satisfaction levels of its citizens with the function of the political regime and with the political rights and civil liberties offered to them.

From this study, we can infer that, in Asia, the happiness of citizens is more closely connected to how well the government performs than in whether the government can be categorized a democracy. From this perspective, democracy as it manifests itself in political rights and civil liberties does affect the subjective quality of life in Asia.

Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Thailand, 2003–2007: Perceived Quality of Governance and Its Consequences on Political Beliefs (Mikami and Inoguchi 2008)

The Thai political system and its citizens experienced great political turmoil in the period leading up to, and with, the coup d'état against Thaksin Shinawatra on September 19, 2006. Given the political roil, we want to investigate two research questions. The first line of inquiry seeks to understand how the Thai people assessed the quality of governance during the Thaksin administration and with the provisional military government. The second prong of investigation seeks to evaluate the impact the populist style of the Thaksin government had on the political beliefs and attitudes of the Thai society and the impact the military coup had on these public beliefs and attitudes.

Why did democracy fail in Thailand in 2006? Some suggest that the quality of democracy was poor due to indulgent political elites, whereas others suggest that the emphasis on economic development placed the 1997 reforms in a tenuous position, and yet others suggest that the Thai democracy was fragile with a relatively high percentage of Thais favoring military rule. Although these factors help to explain the failure of Thai democracy in 2006, the other research question, which is equally important, is how did these tumultuous events affect popular political attitudes.

Data from the AsiaBarometer Survey in 2003, 2004, and 2007 shed insight from a bottom-up perspective on how those who are governed in Thailand think about their national politics. Institutionalized and regular collection of data about Thai political culture is very limited. For instance, the World Values Survey does not include Thailand as a target country. Consequently, the Thai data found in the AsiaBarometer Survey is rare.

In the next few sections, we present: an overview of Thai political history, in particular, the development of Thaksin's party, Thai Rat Thai (TRT), and its 2001

winning of the popular election; an outline of the five conceptual components of public perception and their internal relationships and how they can be measured through the AsiaBarometer Survey; and proposal of several hypotheses about the Thai situation, followed by a testing of these hypotheses. The findings indicate that from the public's perspective, the political setting deteriorated a great deal more between 2004 and 2007 than between 2003 and 2004, although the populist policies of Thaksin significantly biased the situation. In the ensuing period after the Thaksin government fell, the beliefs and attitudes of the Thai public were in a state of flux. These results impact the prospects for democratic consolidation in Thailand.

Background: Contentious Interpretation of the Thaksin Era and the Coup in 2006

The modern Thai political system has two principal actors lead the country: the first is the King who is politically active compared to other constitutional monarchies in the world; and the second is the military, which has played a political role since 1932. The military's hold on the political leadership strengthened with the 1947 coup. Thereafter, the military has controlled, either directly or indirectly, all successive civilian governments. In contrast, the monarchy has intervened only in times of crisis, such as 1951 and 1973.

During the government of Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–1988), Thai politics underwent a silent transformation to a technocratic system of governance, in which bureaucratic experts were in charge of policy formation. The military only retained veto power. Bureaucratic authoritarianism served Thai politics well, but the no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Prem, in 1988, led to Chatichai Choonhavan being the first democratically elected prime minister in 12 years. Despite the 1991 coup, democracy has maintained a popular basis and political hold on the Thai political system. The 2001 election marked the start of Thaksin's political ascent. TRT, the once fragmented political party, gained an unprecedented absolute majority in the lower chamber. The party and Thaksin's power grew as TRT regularly absorbed smaller parties, and by the 2005 general election, TRT secured about 70 % of the seats.

The political strength of Thaksin disappeared rapidly with the revelation of tax evasion in the sale of his family business. With growing public demonstrations, Thaksin called a snap election, but his strategy backfired when 38 seats did not win the necessary share of votes in uncontested districts. The ensuing constitutional crisis led to the military coup.

One possible interpretation is that the military had witnessed the emergence of the democratic system and its ups and downs through different leaders, and had decided that the unsteady hand of democracy had to end. Another interpretation is that the departure from democratic norms started with Thaksin's government. Hence, the 2006 coup is not democracy being destroyed, but it being restored. The military's explanation is that they had to step in because of Thaksin's abuse of power and corrupt practices. The military's claims can be substantiated with: the govern-

ment's neutral monitoring of key institutions through personnel placement, such as the Election Commission, the Constitutional Court, and the Bank of Thailand; the imposition of an emergency law that threatens basic human rights; attempts to stifle the media and government criticism. Also, the expansion policy of TRT through the absorption of opposition parties did a disservice to electorate choices.

The military has taken its own questionable actions after the coup, such as the abolishment of the democratic constitution, dissolution of legislative branches, and restriction of political activities. Yet the King, the Privy Council, and the People's Alliance for Democracy supported the military's decisions.

The presentation of these events supports the interpretation that the coup did not overthrow a democratic government, but a populist authoritarian regime. Hence, the coup was a prelude to a more consolidated period of democracy in Thai history. All the interpretations have merits but rather than judge from the top down, it is our intention to focus on the people and how they view the more recent political events and how these events have affected their political attitudes.

Hypotheses: Components of Public Perception and Their Internal Relationships

In studying political attitudes, we are specifically examining the public assessment of policy output, satisfaction with policy formation and implementation processes, a sense of political effectiveness, trust in political institutions, and a commitment to a democratic system. In examining these five concepts, we approach them as five components that make up a value system and that have internal relationships.

The starting point of our analysis is that people's assessment of the political processes should reflect, in some way, the nature of their government. For instance, public perceptions about domestic human rights conditions are influenced by the overall repressive measures of government. The more educated the public, the more critical the assessment. For these reasons, this concept is the main component in measuring Thai governance. Yet as a subjective indicator of policy processes, the personal level of support for a political regime biases the assessment. Those who are not as robust in their support for democracy may ignore undemocratic aspects and over-evaluate the quality of governance. Satisfaction with policy-making processes may be conflated with satisfaction of policy, which could also be influenced by whether the individual has benefitted from implemented government policies.

In the Thai study, the Thaksin administration targeted the poor in its populist campaign, and so households with lower incomes are expected to have a higher level of satisfaction with actual policies, and this in turn may cause an exceptional level of satisfaction with policy processes.

Satisfaction levels in policy output and processes can engender trust in political institutions. A causal relationship also exists between satisfaction with policy output and a sense of personal impact in the political system. The higher the level of satisfaction with policy output, the more the individual is convinced that they have the ability to impact national politics. Not all components influence each other. For

instance, the assessment of political processes and the individual feeling of political effectiveness are independent of the other, that is, expressing a preference and government receptiveness are not connected. Similarly, political effectiveness and trust in political institutions also do not interact with each other. Trust in political institutions depends on government performance, and even those with a strong belief in political effectiveness may distrust political institutions if they fail to work efficiently. Institutional trust does not indicate a commitment to democracy or the democratic process. Institutional trust does not apply to only democratic institutions. We view commitment to democracy or a leaning toward authoritarianism as a trait that is determined by early life experiences or a traumatic event, in the case of Thailand, the 2006 coup.

In examining the survey data, we look at the structured mean of a component and the difference, if any, between the survey years. For example, we find that the structured mean of the assessment of policy processes for 2007 to be statistically and significantly lower than that in the 2003 and 2004 surveys. This suggests that after the coup, the quality of Thai governance declined. To assess changes in political beliefs, we examine the structured means of political effectiveness and trust in political institutions. If the structured means are not statistically different, then this suggests that for the regular Thai person, it does not matter who is in power.

To test these hypotheses, we use structural equation modeling.

Results and Discussion

A. Policy output. The military government did not fare well in the public evaluation of its policy outputs, especially when compared to the Thaksin administration. The positive assessment of Thaksin's policies could be explained by his populist policies, but the surveys show that in 2003 and 2004, more than 80 % of the respondents highly evaluated the economic policies of the elected government. In contrast, the military government did not receive a positive evaluation on any single issue, and the 2007 assessment of economic policies decreased by more than 50 %. The results are proof of Thaksin's achievement.

B. Policy formation and implementation processes. Again, the military government did not do well in this assessment area. The majority of Thai respondents indicated that they were relatively satisfied with the civil liberties of both civilian and military governments, although satisfaction levels were dropping in almost all areas of political processes. Between 2003 and 2004, the category that asked about "freedom of speech" and right to criticize the government dropped significantly, reflecting Thaksin's policy of interference in the media. In terms of freedom to participate in organizations, the public perception remained somewhat unchanged in the three surveys, indicating a certain liberalness to the military government.

C. Sense of political effectiveness. The Thai people's sense of personal effectiveness in politics was enhanced during Thaksin's period in office. The percentage of respondents who concurred with pessimistic statements about power and

their own personal role decreased. The policies of the TRT to give money to villages to promote economic diversification, to provide a plan for medical care, and to give farmers a 3-year moratorium on debt probably contributed to the public's sense of power to change politics. The 2007 survey saw the levels of 2003 return in the area of political doubt and disinterest.

D. Trust in political institutions. Another consequence of the TRT policies is an elevated sense of trust in institutions in the first two surveys and a drop in the last survey. In contrast, trust levels for the media and nongovernmental organizations remained constant, suggesting that the drop in political trust is a direct reaction to the coup.

E. Commitment to a democratic system. The Thaksin administration appears to have impacted people's regime preference more than the coup did. The surveys reveal that prior to the coup, there was a significant spike in loose support for one-man rule and a military government. A technocracy appears to be the only regime type to suffer a drop in popular support after the coup. The results suggest that support for a leadership with few constraints was preferable, especially to those who benefitted from Thaksin's policies, and yet a segment of the population was more cautious about the unfettered style of Thai politics. The tense atmosphere prior to the coup appears to have made an indelible impact on regime preference.

The next step is to apply the hypothesized structural equation model to these five indicator variables that we have just discussed. The results corroborate the results. First, the 2003 survey shows that the authoritarian tendency among the Thai public is statistically and significantly lower than that found in the 2004 and 2007 surveys. This implies that the stronger psychological impact on regime preference came from Thaksin's populist policies, and not the military coup. Second, the assessment of political processes declined with each later survey, so the average assessment is lower in 2007 than 2004, and the 2004 average assessment is lower than 2003. This indicates that the public already felt that the quality of governance was declining during the Thaksin administration. For policy output and trust of political institutions, the 2004 survey revealed the highest degree of satisfaction for the former and the strongest average trust for the latter. For a sense of ineffectiveness, the 2007 survey displayed a statistically and significantly higher than average level compared to the 2004 survey. Between the 2003 and 2004 surveys, there was not any significant difference in averages for a sense of political ineffectiveness. This result suggests that Thai people felt more politically effective during the Thaksin government than under military rule.

In the next step, we examined the causality between the latent variables. Our conclusions show that the interrelationship between components was as we anticipated: authoritarian inclinations cause respondents to overestimate political processes; higher education leads to a more critical assessment; satisfaction with policy input was dependent on income level; satisfaction with policy output reduces sense of ineffectiveness and increases trust in political institutions; and trust in institutions is also enhanced with a higher degree of satisfaction with policy processes.

In sum, the empirical data gave us some insight into the political beliefs and attitudes of the Thai people during this transitional, and somewhat tumultuous, period in their political history. The high ratings for the Thaksin government came from the government's populist policies. When these policies were removed from consideration the Thai public viewed the quality of governance offered by the Thaksin administration and by the military as similar. Populist policies also impacted positively the level of trust toward political institutions. Commitment to a particular regime also weakened between 2004 and 2007. Thai politics continues to be volatile and in a state of flux. The need for additional social surveys in Thailand remains high.

Is Globalization Undermining Civilizational Identities? A Test of Huntington's Core State Assumptions among the Publics of Greater Asia and Pacific (Collet and Inoguchi 2012)

Introduction

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating sources of conflict will be cultural… The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.—Samuel Huntington 1993: 22

Huntington's thesis, 20 years on, continues to generate discussion and academic research. Yet concerns remain about the empirical basis of his assertions about cultural differences and about whether his approach to world politics has merit. What defines post-Cold War conflict? According to Huntington, the source of conflict is fortified religious identities, revived traditions, and incompatible values. Many scholastic studies have focused on this explanation. In contrast, few studies have investigated his contention that conflicts arise from civilizational identities that are forged at the "micro-level" through increasing cultural affiliation with core states.

Our research seeks to fill this gap. Our study is built around two questions. (1) What is the extent to which publics demonstrate culturally based affinities toward core states? (2) As Huntington argues, is religiosity a primary factor behind these affinities or does globalization and nationalism mitigate its impact? Positive evidence to this line of inquiry would suggest that the distinction between "friend" and "foe" may have a civilizational consciousness and that globalization is having a boomerang effect of producing a cultural resurgence, the basis of the clash of civilizations thesis.

The Asia-Pacific region is at the center of this investigation. It is an understudied area in the probing of Huntington's provocative work. Termed the "cauldron of civilizations" by Huntington, the region is home to 60 % of the world's population, six of the ten most spoken languages, and seven of the nine world's civilizations as defined in Huntington's framework. The ensuing analysis draws on data from the AsiaBarometer Survey of 28 Asian countries, the United States, and Russia.

The Debate Continues

The events of September 11th and the U.S. foreign policy of intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) stimulate debate about this conceptualization of international affairs and conflict. The citation count for Huntington's thesis is well over 17,000 on Google Scholar. The discussion and debate has two sides. The first focuses on the concept of civilization as a unit to frame post-Cold War politics. The second focuses on the empirical/evidentiary component of the concept's expectation for conflict.

Three assertions underline Huntington's theory. (1) Religious differences have become the source for conflict, replacing the differences and tensions that came from a bipolar world in Cold War politics. Today, in Huntington's analysis, local conflicts with wider connections characterize conflicts (1996: 268). (2) The conceptualization of core states that serve as a "wider connection" and source of civilizational identity of culture to member states (1996: 135). The core states dominate at the macro-level and stand as a beacon at the micro-level, attracting those who are culturally similar and repelling those who are culturally different (1996: 155). Core states promote and reinforce civilizational identities, and so are essential to a civilizations-based world politics. (3) Globalization strengthens the power of core states as they provide a civilizational identity based on a resurgence of tradition and religiosity. Huntington does not view modernization as a Westernizing or homogenizing force, but rather views the economic, political, and military successes that accrue from this process as prompters for cultural confidence and cultural assertiveness. On the individual level, modernization prompts alienation as traditional social bonds are broken and religion can fill the space and provide answers.

Globalization strengthens civilization alignment. Increased travel and exchanges highlights differences, and brings a deeper sense of civilizational identity and consciousness, highlighting a dichotomy of "us" and "them" (1996: 129).

Many are critical about Huntington's "essentialism," categorization scheme of placing civilizations as regional über-states, and portrayal of a likely war between the "West," "Islam," and "Confucian" societies. Other critiques include: the apparent simplification in understanding identity, failure to account for transnational political identities, and neglect of nationalism and its subordination to religiosity.

Of the scholars who shared in Huntington's conceptualization of civilizations as political units, little is said about the role of core states, implying that the formation of civilization identities is taken somewhat for granted. Also, some treat inter-civilizational interaction as peaceful, not conflictual in nature. For this group of scholars, civilizations are malleable and weakly institutionalized social orders. Other studies are more nuanced, showing that modernization can lead to conflict, states with similar cultures tend to belong to the same international organizations, the chance of going to war is greater for the West as it tends to behave collectively as a civilization, and conflicts based on cross-cultural and religious conflict are increasing. In general, Huntington's clash thesis does not explain the past well, but sufficient evidence is available and sufficient speculation about future shifts in world politics, especially between the West and Islam, allows his ideas to maintain relevance.

Comparative studies after September 11th have failed to show that the United States, as the perceived core state of the West, has been significant in defining civilizational identities. The anti-U.S. sentiments that appeared after the U.S. Iraq invasion were equally palpable in Western Europe and the Middle East. Regardless of cultural zones, foreign assessment of the United States is similar. However, studies that examine foreign views of other core states are limited, although comparative surveys suggest that Islam and Confucian societies display inter-civilizational heterogeneity. The outstanding question is whether other core states are able to engender similar sentiments—both pro and con—to that of the United States and whether they are enduring and culturally based. The theoretical significance to this line of inquiry relates to civilizational identity.

Hypotheses

We have five hypotheses.

H1. In-civilization (member-state) publics will affiliate more strongly with the core state of their civilization than out-civilization publics.

The logic is that those publics in Asia that have more Western influence are more likely to view the United States as a positive and that Sinic publics are more likely than others to view China as a positive. The lack of a core Islamic state renders affiliation an open question, and so it then follows that:

H1a. Citizens in predominantly Islamic states in Asia will identify more closely with Iran and be more inclined to see it as a political influence than those in Sinic or Western-influenced civilizations.

Religion is at the center of Huntington's thesis. Religion strengthens cultural differences and civilizational identities, and so by extension the perception of core states should be affected by the degree of commitment to religion. Those most committed to religion are usually the ones most sensitive to menacing contrary values and will then view that core state as the best means to protect the integrity of the values.

H2. As religiosity within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will improve and perceptions of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decline.

H3. As nationalism within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will increase and perceptions of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decrease.

The final hypothesis addresses the anticipated impact of globalization.

H4. As exposure to foreign cultures within given member state publics increases, perceptions of in-civilization core states will increase and perception of out-civilization core states, ceteris paribus, will decrease.

Data and Findings

We again return to the AsiaBarometer Survey as our data source used to test our hypotheses. For this data set, we looked at 4 years of the survey from 2005 to 2008. In 2005, the countries surveyed included: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (predominantly Islamic states of the former Soviet Union) as well as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In 2006, the countries surveyed included: Japan, China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In 2007, the survey covered: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. In 2008, the survey returned to China, Japan, and India and extended its coverage to Australia, Russia, and the United States.

Interestingly, the surveyed countries include 11 predominantly Islamic societies, 7 Buddhist societies, 5 Sinic societies, 4 Western societies, 2 predominantly Hindu societies (India and Nepal), an Orthodox society (Russia), and Japan—representing a combination of 7 of Huntington's civilizations. The wide array of countries surveyed and the topics measured makes the AsiaBarometer a good tool to test Huntington's core state assertions. The limitations of a comprehensive comparative study remain, such as cross-cultural/national measurement equivalence, inconsistencies given the nature of the regime, and the anomalies that may arise in single-year studies.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is core state influence. The AsiaBarometer Survey asked, "Do you think the following countries have a good influence or bad influence on your country?" Respondents rated countries on a five-point ordinal scale from "bad influence" to "good influence" with the option of "neither good nor bad influence." Countries of influence include the United States and China in all 4 years and Iran as a regional influence in 2005 and 2006.

For U.S. influence in Asia, a wide range of opinion exists: of Asian countries, Cambodia and the Philippines have the most positive attitude, China views it as mostly bad, Japan is ambivalent; of Islamic states, most are neutral, Malaysia and Indonesia are negative, Afghanistan and Tajikistan are positive; Australia is ambivalent; and Russia has the most unfavorable attitude. For Chinese influence in Asia, responses again range: Mongolia and Japan have the most negative attitude; South Korea and Vietnam have both substantial and ambivalent attitudes; the United States and Taiwan tend to view it as bad; Australia and Russia are ambivalent; Islamic Asia has a more favorable attitude than other Sinic societies; and Pakistan and Afghanistan have more positive and consistent attitudes. For Iranian influence in the region: China is ambivalent; other Asian states are more critical of Iran than China, especially Hong Kong and Singapore; predominantly Islamic societies have the most favorably attitude; and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are more critical than their religious peers.

A. Core State Perceptions: Are They Zero-sum? For Huntington's assumptions about core states to have empirical traction, the expectation is that societies respond in a zero-sum pattern of identifying with the core state of their civilization and, in turn, reacting adversely to competing core states. In a scatter plot of country-level mean perceptions, such a pattern is not detectable. Only when perceptions of Chinese are regressed on the perceptions of Iran is a standard level of significance reached.

Independent Variables

In our study, we focus on three independent variables: foreign exposure, ability to recite from memory national anthem (yes or no response), and religiosity (frequency of daily prayer or meditation with one indicating never and five indicating every day). For foreign exposure we asked respondents about six areas for international interaction and then applied it to an additive index. Respondents were asked whether they have: a family member or friend living abroad; traveled internationally at least three times over the past 3 years; foreign friends in home country; watched foreign-produced TV shows; communicate with people in other countries through Internet or email; and job interactions with organizations or people in other countries.

The means of the three independent variables are plotted to flesh out the interplay between them in the Asia-Pacific region. In the Sinic civilizational grouping, societies generally feature low religiosity and high levels of nationalism. Of the respondents to show a low level of foreign exposure, notable inclusion is China, Japan, and Thailand with Singapore being the standout exception. In the predominantly Islamic societies, results have a wider range. In terms of religiosity or nationalism, low levels are found in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, whereas levels for both are high in Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. Afghanistan is strong in religiosity and weak in nationalism. Pakistan is similar, in that religion is placed over country. Uzbekistan is in the middle. In general, the Islamic respondents have low levels of foreign exposure with the relative exception of Maldives and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan.

Comparative findings for other societies include: the United States is more religious and nationalistic than Australia: Russia exhibits low religiosity and nationalism, whereas China has low religiosity but high levels of nationalism; Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India display strong religiosity and nationalism.

Core State Affinities: Is There a Micro-level Basis for a Civilizational Framework?

Next we examine the percent change in odds of seeing core states as "good" influences by civilization vis-à-vis the reference group (Islamic for the United States, Western for China and Iran). With regard to U.S. influence, Westernized states in Asia have a stronger affinity for the United States than the Islamic reference

group, but Buddhist and Sinic states outside of China have an even stronger U.S. affinity than the Westernized states in Asia. Respondents in China and Russia, in comparison to the Islamic reference group, are less inclined to consider the U.S. influence good.

With regard to Chinese influence, Sinic respondents display no noticeable difference from the Western reference group, but Islamic respondents display double the highest probability toward Chinese influence. Buddhist societies rank second in having favorable perceptions of Chinese influence. Respondents in Japan have the lowest impression of Chinese influence.

With regard to Iranian influence, respondents in Islamic societies are 156 % more likely than those in Westernized Asia to positively consider Iranian power. Respondents of Chinese, Buddhist, and Hindu societies are more positive about Iranian influence than the Western reference group. Sinic societies are not as strong in viewing Iranian influence positively, but they still meet a standard level of significance. Respondents in Japan view Iranian power less favorably than the reference group.

Explaining Core State Influence

A. The United States. Religiosity impacts perceptions of U.S. power in Asia. In China and Russia, religiosity and nationalism interact, causing positive perceptions about U.S. influence that are generated by religiosity to decline as levels of nationalism rise. In Japan, increased religiosity negatively impacts the probability of viewing U.S. influence as good. In Australia, as a predominantly Christian society, it is not surprising that increased religiosity positively impacts the assessment of U.S. power. Of the Islamic states, in 8 of the 11 societies, religiosity does not impact view of U.S. power. Foreign exposure also plays a positive role in improving perceptions about U.S influence.
B. China. In general, religiosity does not have a large impact on perceptions of Chinese influence. Singapore, Tajikistan, Maldives, and Bangladesh are the exception. For the first three states, increased religiosity affects negatively respondents' opinion about Chinese power. In Bangladesh, the effect of higher religiosity is opposite. In contrast, nationalism does impact respondents' feeling about Chinese influence. In Singapore, increased nationalist sentiments lowers opinions about Chinese power, whereas the opposite is the case among respondents in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Bhutan. Exposure to foreign interactions also improved impressions about Chinese influence. Indonesia is the one exception in this instance.
C. Iran. Religiosity positively impacts perceptions about Iranian influence in several Islamic societies. Nationalism is not a factor in this line of analysis. The one exception to this pattern is China. In terms of foreign exposure, the pattern for Iran is opposite that of the U.S. and Chinese case. As foreign exposure grows, respondents in India, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show a decline in opinion toward Iranian power.

Discussion and Conclusion

Based on Huntington's clash of civilization theory, several assumptions need to be empirically true. Societies belonging to different civilizational groupings should have a sense of "us" versus "them" and the dichotomy should be defined along geo-political terms. For Huntington, this is the foundation of civilizational identities that extends into how international affairs are structured. According to this understanding of world politics, societies have a stronger affinity to the core states of their civilizational grouping and a more negative assessment of core states that belong to other "rival" civilizational groupings. These bonds should be strengthened further by religiosity. And our third variable of globalization, measured in foreign exposure, should reinforce this sense of "us," as Huntington's resurgence model would underscore negative perceptions of core states of out-civilizations.

Our results indicate that the reality of the Asia-Pacific region is more complex than Huntington's model would suggest. Some survey results from predominantly Islamic states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan) support civilizational divisions between the United States, China, and Islamic states. Religiosity is a primary cause, although nationalism also plays a part, as does the interaction between the two. Our analysis also reveals that among the central Asian Islamic societies, Iran has the potential to be a core state. Religiosity is significant in improving the perception of Iranian influence in 50 % of the Islamic societies surveyed. We also find evidence to support some of Huntington's assertions about a Confucian-Islamic connection, in that several of these societies perceive China more favorably than the United States. China's views of Iran also serve to reinforce such a connection. Increased religiosity in Australia and Russian affect positively support for U.S. influence. These findings add weight to some aspects of Huntington's assertions regarding the evolution of the West.

Our research shows that the influence of core states is not a zero-sum game among civilizational groupings, that is, affinity for core states of an in-civilization does not translation into increased adverse feelings toward core states of an out-civilization. In reviewing how societies react to U.S., Chinese, and Iranian influence, some predominantly Islamic states view the United States and Iran as neutral or good influences; only Malaysia and Pakistan favor China over the United States; South Korea and Taiwan lean toward the United States over China; and Japan definitely supports U.S. power. Antagonism between China and Japan, regional territorial disputes with China, and nationalism sparked by these disputes cast doubt on the possibility of a cohesive Sinic civilization led by Beijing.

The effect of globalization presents the main challenge to Huntington's thesis. The overall pattern is that increased foreign exposure prompts perceptions of foreign state influence to improve. This is particularly noteworthy in some of the contentious inter-civilizational dyads, such as between the Chinese and Americans. Indonesia is the exception to this pattern and does reinforce Huntington's predicted resurgence. In the case of Iranian influence, foreign exposure undermined positive perceptions, especially in central Asia. The findings suggest that in the place of imminent conflict between the United States and China, competition in soft power

and development initiatives are increasing between these two powers, leaving space for potential improvement in U.S.-Sino relations at the micro-level.

The deterministic value Huntington places on religion as a key in identity formation is overstated. Civilizational identities have multiple influences leading them in different directions. Foreign exposure, rather than reinforce increasing religiosity and nationalism, serves to bolster outside perceptions of states and pull them away from the collision of values and culture that Huntington predicts. The potential of modernity to impact future identities, as Shmuel Eisenstadt suggest, should not be overlooked. The approach that appears as empirically plausible, if scholars in international relations and comparative politics choose to pursue the civilizational paradigm, is the one that Peter Katzenstein proposes—a middle ground that conceptualizes them as "weakly institutionalized orders." Core states may participate in defining politics at the macro-level, but globalization has blurred their role in defining publics at the micro-level.

Multiple Modes of Well-Being in Asia: Typologies of Asian Societies via Satisfaction About Life Domains (Inoguchi 2014a, b)

Introduction

Asia, as a demographically dense and vibrant economic region of the world, also has a varied sense of well-being among its many societies and their populations. In this segment, I argue that Asia has multiple modes of well-being. To apply this concept, I use data from the AsiaBarometer Survey (2003–2008), which involved over 50,000 respondents in 29 states or autonomous regions (e.g. Hong Kong). Based on this data, I propose a typology of societies in Asia. I factor-analyze responses of each society with five societal types that uses two heavily loaded dimensions after varimax rotation: materialism (quality-of-life sustaining), post-materialism (quality-of-life enriching), and public sector dominance (quality-of-life enabling).

Well-Being

Well-being is a personal and subjective assessment of how you feel about yourself in society. Therefore multiple modes of well-being is a natural phrasing to qualify how a person feels about her or his existence in a society and what she or he may be prioritizing in this assessment, such as happiness, health, prosperity, or accomplishment. The data from the AsiaBarometer Survey that was used in evaluating well-being asked respondents to indicate their level of satisfaction along a five-point scale regarding 16 lifestyle domains. The rationale is that if a life domain provides a level of satisfaction, then the dopaminergic system of the body is activated. In so doing, this indicates a priority of life and/or a contributor to well-being.

A critical feature of multiple modes of well-being is that it can be identified beyond the national level to the individual level. That this concept can be assessed at the individual level allows it to undergo strict scientific empirical testing. In this analysis, multiple modes of well-being is also examined as possessing a pluri-potent quality, that is, it has multiple potentials in its growth. Although borrowed from biology and usually applied to the growth of cells, pluri-potent fits this stream of analysis that includes: individual well-being, group well-being, national well-being, supra-national well-being (regional well-being, well-being by religion, well-being by beliefs, well-being by gender, well-being by race, well-being by class, well-being by income level, well-being by educational level, well-being by language, etc.).

The AsiaBarometer Survey asked: "Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the following aspects of your life." Respondents answered on a five-point verbal scale of "very satisfied," "somewhat satisfied", "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied", "somewhat dissatisfied," and "very dissatisfied," with a "don't know" category. The lifestyle domains probed are:

1. Housing
2. Standard of living
3. Household income
4. Health
5. Education
6. Job
7. Friendship
8. Marriage
9. Neighbors
10. Family life
11. Leisure
12. Spiritual life
13. Public safety
14. Condition of the environment
15. Social welfare system
16. Democratic system

Method

To manage national diversities, my team factor-analyzed each country with a vari-max rotation, the pattern of life domain satisfaction. In the period from 2003 to 2008, each country had one to three surveys administered. The data was pooled and variations among the years are averaged. This method allows factor-analysis results to be more robust compared to those results that are based on a 1-year survey.

In this work, three factors emerged: materialist, post-materialist, and public sector dominance. Each of the three factors is influenced by different life priorities. The materialist factor is determined by priorities, such as housing, standard of living, household income, health, education, and work. The post-materialist factor is

decided by priorities in the area of friendship, marriage, neighbors, family life, leisure, spiritual life, and public safety. For the public sector dominance factor, this is shaped by conditions of the environment, social welfare system, and democratic system. These three factors also refer to three different quality of life factors (QOL). Materialist is also called the QOL-sustaining factor; post-materialist is the QOL-enriching factor; and the public sector dominance is also known as the QOL-enabling factor. A factor analysis for all 29 Asian countries shows the first factor's eigenvalue as 5.4, the second factor's value as 1.0, and the third factor's eigenvalue as 0.5. For Asia, the materialist factor ranks first with the other two QOL factors playing a secondary role.

In this study, each factor is assigned a letter that is capitalized if the factor is dominant and lower cased if the factor is secondary. In the case of dominance, the materialist factor is A, the post-materialist factor is B, and the public sector dominance is C. In the case of being an auxiliary factor, the materialist factor is a, the post-materialist is b, and the public dominance factor is c. The national diversity of the study is high. Many factors, both at the individual level and beyond individual control, determine how respondents prioritize their life. Hence, the materialist factor is not always the most significant, just as the post-materialist factor is not always second in value, and the public sector dominance is not third in this hierarchy. Not all countries indicated a strong dominance of the materialist factor. By examining the first two factors that are deemed important by a country, that is using the eigenvalue for each country, the following life priority types can be expressed: Ab, Ac, Ba, Bc, and Ca.

Typology of Asian Societies Based on Life Priorities

The collective view of ordinary people, followed by factor-analyzed data, provides a typology of societies.

A. Materialism is the most significant factor. In its pure form, it promotes a strong society.
B. Post-materialism is the most significant factor. In its pure form, it promotes a society that partially colonizes the state.
C. Public sector dominance is the most significant factor. In its pure form, it promotes a state that constructs and suppresses society.

The five types of society are:

Ab The dominant factor is materialism and the secondary one is post-materialism. This type combines a weak state and a strong society.
Ac The dominant factor is materialism and the secondary one is public sector dominance. This type combines a strong state and a strong society.
Ba The dominant factor is post-materialism and the secondary one is materialism. This type combines an enmeshed state and a strong society.
Bc The dominant factor is post-materialism and the secondary one is public sector dominance. This type combines a colonized state and a strong society.
Ca The dominant factor is public sector dominance and the secondary one is materialism. This type is a strong state.

This set of typologies can be further refined with the consideration of geography and history. In total, ten types of society exist in Asia.

Ab1   Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan: maritime peripherals in the Western Pacific
Ab2   Afghanistan: border state of South Asia
Ab3   Uzbekistan, Tajikistan: core states of Central Asia
Ac1   China, South Korea: core states of continental East Asia
Ac2   Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar: river-based continental Southeast Asia
Ac3   Bangladesh, India, Nepal: core states of continental South Asia
Ac4   Mongolia: border state of Central Asia
Ba   Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kyrgystan: clientelist new settler societies
Bc   Brunei, the Philippines, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan: state dominant clientilist societies
Ca   Singapore, the Maldives: small isthmus/islands societies

It is important to note that this study uses materialism and post-materialism as very different concepts from that used by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1989, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The use of these concepts in this study is justified because they are based on prioritized life aspects in Asia. They are more encompassing of various life satisfactions, thus they are more widely and universally applicable. The types of society emerge from a comprehensive, systematic, and empirical analysis of daily life satisfaction from below. The outcome of this academic endeavor is an evidence-based typology of societies.

Some Future Prospects

Having surveyed, albeit somewhat selectively, an array of quality of life research conducted in Asia and on Asia, I am now in a position to make a few remarks about some future prospects in terms of substance, data collection, sampling methods.

Substantively, topics of quality of life research have been expanding steadily and will continue to do so. In this respect, the quality-of-life-focused AsiaBarometer survey has made a big impact. It covers the entire Asian societies except the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Timor Leste. It allows open access to all the survey data and this fact not only enables researchers to make best use of AsiaBarometer data but also encourages researchers to execute new surveys full of original questions. As the definition of quality of life and well-being can expand in tandem with social change, this is inevitable. Asia's immense diversity and fast-changing dynamism make quality of life and well-being research in Asia to become a most alluring area of study.

New ways of data collection also encourages to expand the enlarged coverage of quality of life research. For instance, blood and neuron are two of the increasing attended human body components. Examining blood without blood-letting or -sucking is a daily routine now technically and safely carried out (Saito et al. 2012).

Examining neuron's change in brains is also a daily routine albeit with still expensive machinery (Wright and Schoff 2014). Quality of life and well-being are very delicate and sometimes difficult to measure. Progress in measurement technology enables now what was long regarded difficult to gauge, whether it is blood or neuron.

Methodologically, global sampling and national sampling methods should be re-constructed. Hitherto fore, the national sampling method has been used heavily since the 1950s. Yet progress in communication technology has blurred the distinction between population and sample. Random digital dialing (RDD) is a good example of such blurrification. Most seriously, when our interest lies in something only globally measured, the conventional procedure is to carry out national surveys and combine the results. When our interest is, say, interpersonal trust in social relations on the entire globe, global sampling is the correct way of choosing a sample of, say, 100,000 out of the entire global population of, say, 70 billions. Gilani (2014) has been testing national and global samplings to see whether global sampling is not only theoretically right but also right in terms of executing costs of sampling. I am moderately confident that use of Google Earth will be experimentally conducted in the near future for global sampling.

Thus, three lines of future prospects of quality of life and well-being research have been sketched out. Much remains to be done in all these areas.

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