

Are there any theories of international relations in Japan?

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Abstract

This article argues that there are theories of international relations (IR) in Japan and that these theories are mostly of middle range type. I first give a brief survey of IR studies in Japan and its disciplinary backgrounds. On that basis, then I focus on the three outstanding cases of fledgling theories of IR as developed in the 1920s and 1930s, namely Nishida as an innate constructivist, Tabata as an international law theorist presupposing the natural freedom of individuals, and Hirano as an economist placing regional integration higher than state sovereignty, to develop the argument that there are indeed theories of IR in a fledgling form already before World War II.

1 Introduction

The key words in the question that this article addresses itself are the theory and the non-West. I must define these key words before tackling the question itself. Without defining them, my answer to the question can go either way, yes or no. Theory is broadly defined as an amalgam of proposition, paradigm, perspective, and ism. By proposition I mean a certain set of assumptions and premises and that are empirically verifiable. By paradigm I mean a self-contained research program which asks a set of key questions for research. By perspective I mean the angle from which one can take a look at a phenomenon concerned. By ism I mean the political, religious, or ideological lens through which the whole world should be looked at. By the non-West I mean those areas which have not been seriously affected by what is called modernity in the nineteenth and the former half of the twentieth century. By modernity

Received 16 May 2006; Accepted 27 June 2007

I mean the combination of secularism and rationalism and their associated individualism and industrialism (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

I do this exercise, albeit very briefly, because theories of international relations (IR) as used in the United States encompass almost anything of what I listed above, proposition, paradigm, perspective, and ism (Goldstein, 2005). Thus, the very operationally rigorous empirical testing exercise is often practiced to test some competing paradigms verging on ideological beliefs or religious creeds. This kind of exercise is easy to make, but difficult to drink, like a cup of coffee served seductively in an hostile environment. I do this also because the geo-cultural qualification attached to the question is somewhat difficult to swallow in an age of globalization. Rosenau (2002) aptly characterizes this age as the age of fragmentegration. Both fragmentation and integration take place simultaneously and ubiquitously. It is not the world of Huntington (1997) in the sense that the geo-cultural entities stand solidly and solitarily and they clash with each other. Every society is fragmenting itself and every component of society is being re-integrated on a global scale. It is a flat world (Zakaria, 2005). The West is ubiquitous in its cultural penetration. So is the fusion of cultures. Thus, I ask why are there any theories of IR in Japan?

Japan's IR theories (IRTs) are, in the case of positivist theories, of a middle range type, like a 'flying geese pattern' regional integration theory, or in the case of normative theories, of a philosophizing type, like a 'proto-constructivist' theory of identity formation, or in the case of security community formation, of a categorical imperative of transcending state sovereignty. The fact that my answer is a qualified yes has something to do with Japan having been an abortive regional hegemon in the past and being a second largest economic entity now. Great powers often produce theories of IR. But Japan occupies a somewhat ambivalent position in this regard. In the past, Japan was a failed regional challenger. Now Japan has been broadly embedded within the global governance system, run by the sole superpower. Furthermore, the relatively weak tradition of positivistic hypothesis testing in social science and the relatively strong tradition of describing details have tended to discourage Japanese IR scholars from producing big theories grounded on some empirical testing. For these reasons, they tend to be more inward looking than Japan's developmental stage and international profile should suggest.

What follows in this essay consists of three sections. First, I summarize the development of the study of IR in Japan for the period 1868–2005 (Inoguchi and Bcon, 2000; Inoguchi, 2002, 2003) and the four distinctive major intellectual currents, Staatslehre, historicism, Marxism, and positivism (Inoguchi, 1994). By Staatslehre I mean the study of how to rule the country from a state-centric perspective. Its influence can be seen in the first political science

textbook in Japan by Kiheiji Onozuka at Tokyo Imperial University (Kiheiji, 2003). By historicism I mean the methodology whereby everything must be studied historically on the basis of verifiable documents and materials. One of the best sellers broadly in this tradition is Tokutomi Soho's world history (Soho, 1991). By Marxism I mean a political and intellectual tenet which sees and examines the phenomena with a focus on dialectics of productive power and relations and their political manifestations. One of the best known works in this tradition is Shigeki's work on the Meiji Restoration (Shigeki, 2000). By positivism I mean the ideological tenet whereby everything must be empirically examined and tested. One of the best sellers in this tradition is ironically Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Gakumon no Susume* (Yukichi, 1978). This section is very necessary to demonstrate that positivism in the American style has not been vigorously or to put it more correctly, excessively implanted on Japanese IR soil despite the growth of the post-World War II academy of IR in Japan (Inoguchi and Shiro, 2002).

Secondly, I focus on three authors during the pre-1945 periods to argue that there were fledgling theoretical developments on the Japanese soil as exemplified by Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano Yoshitaro. I suggest that, although constrained by circumstances of war and suppression, these authors did articulate quite robust a theory (in the broad sense).

Thirdly, on the basis of the preceding empirical observations of Japan's international relations academy in terms of its approaches and orientations and the three distinctive theoretical works, Nishida, Tabata, and Hirano, I argue that three vigorous strands of theoretical works have been developed, which can be legitimately characterized as 'a "constructivist with Japanese characteristics" (Ong, 2004; Jones, 2004), a normative international law theorist placing popular sovereignty, like Samuel von Pufendorf does, first before state sovereignty like Hugo Grotius does (Tetsuya, 2003) and a social democratic internationalist' (Tetsuya, 2004).

The observation that the American style positivistic approach to IR has not been developed as much as its IR community's size suggests should be taken cautiously, because it does not automatically suggest that there are no Japanese IRTs. Rather even during the inter-war and war periods, there were theoretical developments which arguably constitute an important basis of the post-1945 development of Japanese IR research.

2 The development of international relations in Japan

As in other societies, the field of IR in Japan has been greatly influenced by the major currents of the social sciences. They may be described as follows (Inoguchi, 1989, 1995, 2001). The first is in the *Staatslehre* tradition, which

greatly influenced military and colonial studies in the prewar period and remained strong in a metamorphosed form even after 1945. The feature of this tradition is emphasis on rich, descriptive details elucidating all sorts complexities. Top priority was given to supply ample historical–institutional backgrounds and describing events and personalities in contexts and their consequences in minute detail. This approach was valued in analyzing trends in international change that might affect Japan’s foreign relations. Even after 1945, however, the bulk of area studies have continued in the *Staatslehre* tradition, especially when conducted by government-related think tanks. In sharp contrast to the salience of this tradition in government-sponsored research, most area studies as practiced in academia are somewhat excessively humanistic, rather than relevant to social science or useful to government policy. The strong salience of area studies in Japan’s IR study is not unlike the Indian situation as characterized in Behera (2007). This reflects in part the reaction of academics to the domination of the *Staatslehre* tradition. One corollary of this strong *Staatslehre* tradition is the emphasis on law and economics as opposed to political science and sociology. Whereas the existence of schools of law and economy is common in Japan, there are no departments of political science or sociology. For more than a century, those disciplines are most likely to be found as an appendages to the faculties of law or of letters for more than a century. Even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Japan is one of the very few countries in Asia, which does not have an autonomous department of political science.

The second tradition is Marxism, which was very strong from the 1920s through the 1960s. This tradition is associated with the conception of social science as *Oppositions wissenschaft*, or opposition science. As if to counter the *Staatslehre* tradition, the vigorous Marxist school was clearly discernible from the 1920s through the 1960s. Marxist categories of political analysis imparted a critical coloring to the observation of political events and the recognition of the ideological biases of the observer. In the 1920s, when the term *shakai kagaku* (social science) first came to be used in Japan, it often denoted Marxism, rendering social science virtually synonymous with Marxism. Japanese social science had been literally marxise by 1930s. After 1945, in the absence of prewar internal security laws, Marxist influence became even more widespread without an internal security act of 1925, after 1945, and from the immediate postwar period through the 1960s the social sciences – economics, political science, and sociology – were often led by Marxists or Marxist leaning scholars. IR was no exceptions. Marxism was so influential and pervasive that many other social science theories, especially those non-Marxist theories, were literally crowded out. Within the Marxist framework, such IRTs as ‘the second image un-reversed’ and ‘the hegemonic destabilization’ propositions were put forward. Given the strong *Staatslehre* tradition and

the almost continuous one-party dominance observed for nearly half a century since the mid-1950s, it was considered natural or desirable for academics and journalists alike to form a sort of countervailing force critical of government conduct. After the Cold War, while most Marxists have become post-Marxist, many have retained their critical view of government policy. Some have transformed themselves into postmodernists, radical feminists, and noncommunist radicals in the post-Cold War and post-September 11th periods. Yet, it is safe to say that Japanese academics were *de facto* demarxise by the 1970s.

The third tradition is the historicist tradition. This current has been very strong, and as a result the bulk of scholarship in IR is akin to historical research, and therefore a branch of the humanities rather than the social sciences. In contrast to the *Staatslehre* tradition, historicists do not pay much attention to policy relevance and topics tend to involve events and personalities prior to 1945. The spirit that tends to guide much of IR is often similar to the Rankean concept of history, *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*, or broadly 'let the facts speak for themselves.' At the same time, this tradition brings some historians into the direction of quasi-constructivism in the sense that its thrust is to delve into the minds and impulses, hearts and passions, and memories and psycho-history of individuals and nations. Before Americans' 'invented' constructivism, many Japanese historians of IR felt that they had been a constructivist all the way through.

The fourth current of postwar IR is informed by the recent introduction of perspectives and methodologies of American political science. In the prewar period, the absorption of European social scientific thought – in the form of the works of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Leon Walras, and Alfred Marshall – constituted the antidote to strong Marxist influence in the social sciences. After 1945, American social sciences played a similar role. American style IR has many components, of which two are most important: a proclivity for the formulation of theories and for vigorous empirical testing. This intellectual tradition became stronger from 1970 through 2000.

It is important to note these four diverse currents are clearly evident in Japan's IR studies even today and that they coexist fairly amicably without many efforts made toward integration. Most associational activities like framing sessions of the annual conventions and of allocating journal pages are determined by the more or less equal representation of four blocs, i.e. history, area studies, theories, and substantive issues. Diversity without disciplinary integration – if not without organizational integration – is one of the features of the academic community of Japan in part because of the strong legacy of the four diverse major social science traditions originating from the one-and-a-half century experience of nation building, economic development, war, and then peace.

The strong tenacity of the four traditions embedded within the Japanese IR community sometimes makes it hard for some of more bumi putra Japanese academics to discuss matters with much more heavily, US- influenced (or arguably neo-colonial) East Asian neighbors like Korea, Taiwan, and China (Inoguchi, 2008). But various efforts to liberate Japanese academics from their slightly insulated academic community have been underway on the basis of their long accumulation of academic achievements. The most vigorous of these efforts is the launching of a new English-language journal, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* (published twice – now three times – a year by Oxford University Press). Its founding editor happens to be the author of this article. Referees are globally distributed depending on the expertise of a subject dealt with in a manuscript. Roughly 50% of referees are from North America and about 30% of referees are from Asia including Japan and Australia. Also submissions exhibit a roughly similar pattern of geographical distribution. It is remarkable that the journal has been slowly but fundamentally transforming the Japanese IR community into an entity that is far more intensely interested in the generation and transmission of ideas and insights on a global scale than before. Publications of their works in English language by Japanese academics have been on the steady increase. Roughly 100 members out of its 2,000 odd members have published their books in English and more than 300 members have published their articles in English. Since the number of American Ph.Ds in Japan is pitifully small, some six percent of all the members of the Japan Association of International Relations, compared to East Asian neighbors, say, Korea's (60 percent of the Korean Association of International Studies have their American Ph.Ds), their efforts at making inroads into the global community are laudable. In tandem with it, the perception of the Japanese IR community held by the global IR community seems to be changing slowly. To see how soon *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* starts will provide a venue for new schools of thought in IR, perhaps the period of five years since its first publication is too short.

3 Key framing questions of japan's international relations since 1945

In order to see more closely the substance of IR research in Japan, I now turn to the past half a century of the development of IR in Japan in terms of the key framing questions that have driven intellectual agendas in the field (Inoguchi, 2008). It is very important to note at the outset that in Japan the four great debates as conducted in the United States were not reproduced. Japanese IR academics have been much more deeply rooted in their own historical soils than East Asian neighbors. Furthermore, these four traditions and

their influences on Japanese IR have been self-sustaining in a more or less mutually segmented fashion. But the question is not to Japanize IRTs, but to historicize and contextualize some of those American IRTs and to generate insights and propositions much more sensitive to historical and cultural complexities. Other social science disciplines such as economics and sociology had been pursued in Japan since well before World War II, but IR was relatively new, introduced as in many places, only after the war. Three key questions that may be identified in the development of the discipline of IR since 1945 are as follows:

1. What went wrong with Japan's international relations?
2. What kind of international arrangements best secure peace?
3. Why is it that so much remains to be desired in our diplomacy?

All these three questions are interrelated with each other. But it is very important to note that as time goes on, the shift has been taking place from question one via question two through question three. The first question, which goes back to the days when Japan's IR led to war, then to defeat, and to the occupation of the country, is still one of the key framing questions in the study of IR. It has drawn IR students to study history – diplomatic history as well as other aspects of modern Japanese history in the related areas of economics, sociology, and political science. The economics perspective focuses on the productive capacity and production relationships of the Japanese economy whose alleged distortions drove the country into a wrong, long war. The sociology perspective focuses on the study of alleged feudalistic social relations and state-led social mobilization that were eventually manipulated and mobilized by the state to support and sustain that war. Political science devoted time to the study of the alleged pitifully insufficient democratic arrangements and institutions – the Imperial Diet, political parties, the bureaucracy, elections, the armed forces, etc. Most of the foremost postwar scholarship of the third quarter of the twentieth century has revolved around this first key question. Masao Maruyama is the foremost scholar addressing the question in his *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japan* (Masao, 1963). If one has to choose only one key framing question in the Japanese social science communities in the latter half of the twentieth century, 'What went wrong?' is everyone's choice. In this sense, Japan's social science community has been living under the long shadow of World War II irrespective the oft-heard chorus of 'do not forget the past.'

In the study of IR, the key framing question that attracted students was Japan's diplomatic interactions with foreign powers. The then newly founded Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) compiled and edited the multivolume work on Japan's 'Road to the Pacific War' (*Taiheiyo senso e no michi*), mobilizing virtually all the scholars and diplomatic historians, of

which some were Marxists, active in the field in the 1950s and 1960s (Kokusai seiji gakkai, 1963). The approach it employed was predominantly descriptive, rather than analytical or theoretical, in sharp contrast to the other disciplines that adopted interesting mixtures of Marxism and culturalism in attempting to address similar issues.

This landmark Pacific War study asks the big what-went-wrong question and devotes chapter after chapter to tracing and examining absorbing details of the diplomatic and political dynamics of Japan's external relations. As the work is based primarily on studies of the recently released public documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the volumes are full of newly revealed details that led to the disaster. Most actors were portrayed as having done the right thing in executing their duties at places they were assigned to. The problem was that collectively their dutifulness and diligence did nothing to avert war with the rest of the world. Rather each individual actor's dutifulness and diligence led to collective disasters of a gigantic proportion. The past presidents of the JAIR include many who were involved in this massive study and remained leaders in the field long after the work was completed and published. In that sense as well, the key framing question had a very strong impact on the entire discipline. Diplomatic history has been a strong presence in JAIR throughout the last half a century.

In tandem with the JAIR Pacific War project, newspapers and magazines played an important role in framing the academic agendas of IR. For the press, the key framing question was the second: What are the best arrangements to secure peace? Debate unfolded on the subject of peace with the allied powers; Should the San Francisco Peace Treaty have been signed? In the context of the Cold War, what was the right choice: a partial peace with the Western powers or a total one including all the Allied powers? Nambara Shigeru, a political philosopher and President of the University of Tokyo, took the latter position in the collectively signed appeal to total peace (Shigeru, 2005; Tsuchiyama, 2005).

The former position was called realism, the latter called idealism. The great debate on realism versus idealism unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s. At a glance it resembles to the first great idealism–realism debate in the United States. But in Japan, unlike in the United States, realism's victory over idealism was somewhat incomplete. (Parenthetically, the second great debate between traditionalism and the scientific school did not take place either. The behavioral revolution did not take place in Japanese IR. The third great debate between neorealism and neoliberalism did not take place in Japan either. Nor is the fourth great debate between rationalism and reflectivism taking place. Many Japanese academics feel that they have been practicing reflectivism, rather, for long before it was preached by Americans, although they were less articulate and sophisticated about methodology.) The salience

of this debate in the most widely read newspapers and popular magazines was such that the main arena of discussion was journalism, not academia, and the individuals who were involved in the journalistic debates became the best known names in the field.

There is nothing wrong with the debate itself. Intellectuals who speak out in the media have played immensely important roles throughout the last 60 years. The problem was that the professionals in the academic community of IR itself ended up becoming less rigorous in their scholarship than their colleagues in other fields of the social sciences. The second framing question was basically a policy question, but given the way in which Japanese society is organized, there is little likelihood that members of academia can develop careers as experts on policy or become well versed in policy affairs and well connected in policy-making circuits. Intersectoral labor mobility is so limited that even scholars active in the journalistic debates over policy could not realistically aspire to active involvement in policy making circuits as part of their careers. What looked like policy debates, therefore, was in fact mostly illusory. Ultimately, the 'journalist academics' came to constitute a special species within academia. The situation in Japan forms a strong contrast to the case of the United States where professionalization has made great advances for the last half a century and academics have established themselves by an autonomous/autocentric dynamism.

The third framing question is a more recent one. Although in a sense it is similar to the second, it has led to empirical rather than theoretical investigations of what should be done. In this sense, the third framing question encouraged scholars to carry out empirical studies of an often meticulous nature. This thrust became dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. Atsushi published meticulously researched books on Japan–United States policy discussions on the market and trade liberalization of agriculture and large retailing shops (Atsushi, 1991). Atsushi has been quite active in commenting on policy and politics in TV programs since then onward. Also Masayuki published a well-conceptualized work on the international political economy of US dollars and Japanese yen (Masahiko, 2001). He has been quite active as a coeditor of a monthly magazine in which he regularly contributes a policy column. However, unlike empirical studies in the United States, those of Japan do not necessarily feel driven to place their research in grandiose and occasionally almost Procrustean theoretical schemes. Competition among IR academics has somewhat increased in tandem with growth of the membership of JAIR. As of January 2005, the number is slightly more than 2,000.

The above portrayal may give the impression that the field of IR has been directly affected by Japan's own development. Diplomatic history, quasi-policy debates, and empirical analyses are depicted as the shifting salient genres predominant in each period of postwar Japanese development. As the key

framing questions changed from the 1940s through the 2000s, empirical analyses of various aspects of Japan's foreign relations have become a dominant genre.

A natural question to ask here is whether dynamic debates have been taking place among Japan's four traditions. Over the long years since 1945, the first two traditions, *Staatslehre* and Marxist, seem to be waning in their influence. Instead, the latter two, historically oriented studies and American social science influenced studies have been on in the ascendance. But the basic tenacity of these four traditions over many years has much to do with the lack of political science and IR departments on campus, which are autonomous in appointment and budget – and in terms of academic discipline. Parenthetically, the absence of an institutionalized political science department has a lot to do with the nineteenth century origin of nurturing bureaucratic elite candidates in legal training and with the fear of producing a bundle of unemployed young elites trained in 'political science' which could be subversive to the 'system.' Therefore, the waning and waxing of these four traditions have much to do with the development of Japanese society, i.e. rapid industrialization, the achievement of a high-income society and the relative decline in the state's influence rather than with the dynamic debates amongst them. (i) 'Idealism' in the third quarter of the 20th century was to be replaced by 'realism' in the post-Vietnam war years, and (ii) 'Realism' in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century was to be replaced by the proliferation of other streams of thought, constructivism, institutionalism, feminism, and so forth. By Idealism, I mean the tendency to place pacifism at the helm according to Article 9 of the Constitution and to play down the role assigned to Japan by the Japan–US Security Treaty. By realism, I mean the tendency to place alliance with the United States as the highest priority and to play down the role envisioned by the Constitution at the time of its drafting process. Having examined, albeit briefly, Japan's IR during the interwar, war, and postwar (and within it, post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post 9/11) periods, I now take a closer look at these authors who were active in theorizing of Japan's IR.

4 Three theorists as an illustration of Japanese IRTs

The following three thinkers are chosen to illustrate that something akin to fledging theoretical developments whereas seen in the 1930s or at a critical juncture of deepening democracy and run away fascism. (i) They represented some of the then most noted scholars in philosophy, international laws, and economics. (ii) They vigorously articulated their thoughts which are resonant with the Japanese IR thoughts and practices after World War II as well.

4.1 Nishida as an innate constructivist

Identity is one of the key concepts in IR study. Yet, it is a key concept that is not easy to 'grasp adequately by Anglo-American positivist methods alone' (Williams, 1996; Ong, 2004). Nishida attempted to fix this thorny issue of Japanese identity in IR when Japan was allocating between East and West. The question is: How to resurrect the historical consciousness of the Japanese in an environment where 'what is perceived is "as a normative inferiority induced by a Western civilization that views itself as intellectually culturally and morally superior."' (Ong, 2004). The thrust of his philosophy of identity can be summarized as follows.

He rejects Cartesian logic and adopts dialectic. Yet, his dialectic is more Hegelian. In his dialectic, a thesis and an anti-thesis coexist without forming a synthesis. Contradictions manifest themselves in concrete forms. Contradictions do not necessarily move in the direction of a new synthesis without an innate self-contradiction. 'Rather it rejects decontextualized things; it seeks to see things in their appropriate contexts'. (Nishett, 2003; Ong, 2004). He argued that Japanese identity emerges through a coexistence of opposites, Eastern and Western. In his own words,

Simply put, if every real thing is concrete and determined it is because it is the expression of a greater reality taking shape, and this greater reality is the universal. The identity of an individual, its self-determination, is at the same time the manifestation of the self-identity of the universal determining itself through the individual. (Heisig, 2001)

What is striking of Nishida's philosophy is that he is envisaging to make Japanese identity construction, not parochial but universally understood. Nishida's orientation is qualitatively very different from those works of Nihonjinron in the 1980s and 1990s which argue that Japanese culture is unique, exceptional, and thus parochial. In his own words,

The distinctiveness of the Japanese is only of local value; it is enhanced when its core can be extracted and translated into something of world scope. (Heisig, 2001).

Much of American constructionists swim in the vocabulary of rationalism. But Nishida lives in the philosophy of nothingness (Shigeru; Tsuchiyama, 2005). I argue that Japanese theories in this area are very profound. Once articulated by such authors as Ralph Pettman and Christopher Goto-Jones, Nishida's innate construction becomes clearly comprehensible by readers of all persuasions. The proto-construction in Japan seems to be developed further the European style interpretive models which have been absorbed

much since the late nineteenth century. In short, Nishida's relevance to the present scholarship as a precursor to identity analysis cannot be overstressed.

4.2 Tabata as an international law theorist presupposing the natural freedom of individuals

State sovereignty is one of the key concepts of IR study. Tabata Shigejiro, well versed in the long tradition of international law, state sovereignty, and democracy, put forward his theory of international law, remarkably presaging the advent of a democratic, anti-western, and anti-hegemonic international law.

How to treat state sovereignty is a key question in international law. Discussing the equality of states, Shigejiro (1946), in his works written before 1945 but published in a book form thereafter, emphasizes that the concept of equality of states presupposes both the recognition of the natural freedom of individuals and duties arising from natural law (Tetsuya, 2003; Tetsuya, 1996). Tabata takes the popular sovereignty theory as developed by Emmerich de Vattel and Samuel von Pufendorf in contrast to the state sovereignty theory as developed by Hugo Grotius. The Grotian theory of state sovereignty was more widely and strongly accepted during the interwar period as a universalist position. Yet, the Grotian theory of state sovereignty tends to accommodate what existed in his early modern times, and presupposed the Hobbesian concept of self-preservation in a constant struggle with one another in the international community. In a contrast, Pufendorf, for one, developed the argument that only on the basis of equality of individuals can one envisage the equality of states in which such normative duties as 'thou shalt not hurt others' prevails.

Tabata's theory took dramatic applications both in 1944 and in 1950 (Tetsuya, 2003, 2004). In 1944, he argued against the negation of equality of states under the scheme of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area and for the immediate independence to be accorded to Western colonies in Asia with the equality of states materialized under the scheme. During the Allied Powers's occupation, he argued in 1950 against a peace treaty only with the non-communist Allied Powers. He argued that concluding a peace treaty with some of the Allied Powers, but not with others, is tantamount to the negation of the concept of equality of states. The bearers of sovereignty are citizens and democratic principle ought to be observed in concluding a peace treaty as the government proposed to do. Since public opinion was arguably against it by more than slight margins, Tabata was riding upon it. Tabata argued for the transcendence of state sovereignty on the basis of equality of states, and popular sovereignty would lead to peace.

One is struck by his consistency and integrity in sticking to the equality of states and its popular democratic foundations when he argued the world of states. By doing so, he argued against retaliation prevalent in the interwar

period and against the hegemonic unilateralism in the immediate postwar period. By 2005, Japan has become one of the major rule makers relinquishing the role of a rule taker in global governance in a number of policy areas (Inoguchi, 2005). In this area as well, Japan's IR has laid down the basis of some niches which are more likely to grow in the near future. At the dawn of the 2000s, just to give a few examples, Japanese international law academics are busy theorizing 'inter civilizational law' especially with regard to different conceptions of human rights, making rules and norms of trans national business transactions, formulating schemes of 'special drawing rights' of peacefully generative nuclear energy through neo-multinationalism (Yasuaki, 1998; Hurrell, 2004; Inoguchi 2005).

4.3 Hirano as an economist placing regional integration higher than state sovereignty

Regional economic integration has been one of the key concepts in the study of IR. Having escaped the fate of being further marginalized in the world economy, despite the lack of tariff autonomy for the long period between 1856 and 1911, many Japanese economists were eager to build a more robust economic strength on their own feet as well as with Japan's neighbors. In 1924, Hirano argued that modernity and its contractual social principle (read capitalism) could be replaced by constructing a communitarian social principle (read socialism) (Yoshijiro, 1924). When socialism, communism, and anarchism were widely considered to be dangerous thoughts, Hirano used the concepts communitarian and contractual to denote socialism and capitalism. Hirano was the leader of one of the competing Marxist analyses of Japan, arguing that the Meiji Restoration represented the absolute monarchy, Japanese style and the task of revolutionaries is to accelerate Japan's capitalist development further, thus precipitating a socialist revolution. In 1944, he argued for a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area by noting that instead of the struggle among imperialist sovereign powers, his cherished goal of upholding a communitarian principle might be materialized at long last. Whether his dramatic turn to the support of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area was a real or disguised *tenko* (relinquishing an anti-government position and transforming oneself into a pro-government position due to suppression and inducement) is a moot question. The following year Japan was defeated and the Communist Party welcomed the US-led Allied Powers as a liberating force (Johnson, 1990).

Seeing the pre-1945 and post-1945 Japanese thoughts a little more continuously, one can see a striking co-working of extraordinary divergent thinkers pouring their thoughts into the idea of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area. Saburo Okita, a young bureaucrat with an engineering degree, and

Hotsumi Ozaki, a young journalist, worked together for Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who became Prime Minister during critical years of 1939–41, Hotsumi Ozaki received capital punishment for treason against the state as a spy ring of Richard Sorge, a Soviet Spy. Saburo Okita climbed in the post-war era the ladder in the bureaucracy and articulated the idea and policy of regional integration together with John Crawford, Australian National University.¹ The Japanese theory of regional integration in the form of the flying geese pattern of development grew out of their thinking of the 1930s and 1940s.² The theory was revived in the 1970's, hence demonstrating persistence.

5 Provisional answer to the question, 'Are there any theories of international relations in Japan?'

In order to answer the question, we have examined the four major currents of Japan's IR to see that the *Staatslehre* was interested in policy rather than theory, that historicism wanted to have detailed and meticulous descriptions of events and personalities on the basis of verifiable documents, in part for its own sake, in part to disguise one's political position due to the limited degree of freedom before 1945, in part to construct norms and logics of actors a la proto-constructivism, that Marxism did represent very theoretical analyses until 1970s by when academics and non-academics alike were largely demarxise in Japan, and that positivism, American style, did not become hegemonic in Japanese IR. If we define theories of IR as narrowly defined positivistic theories of IR, American style, Japanese IR can be characterized as not producing theories of IR. Neither hegemonic stability theory nor democratic peace theory is born. Positivism is not a major current in Japan's IR. Needless to say, theory-conscious, empirical studies without grandiose pretension are not in shortage.³

Yet, in part to give a qualified answer to the question, we have illustrated the three proto-theoretical arguments as revealed by Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano Yoshitaro. They all developed quite robust theoretical arguments, which are characterized as an innate constructivist, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law and a Marxist theorist of regional integration, respectively. Indeed, they generated theories of sorts that would have universal audiences if their language was rendered into English and published in an appropriate publication forum.

The beauty of these three theorists is that they have resonance to the kinds of issues that confront Japan's IR in the 2000s.

1 Okita's work can be seen in Okita (1987) and Crawford/Okita (1982).

2 For Akamatsu Kaname's theory of economic development published in 1930s see Korhonen (1994).

3 Furthermore, such authors as Motoshi Suzuki, Keisuke Iida, Yasaku Horiuchi, and Takashi Inoguchi are vigorous in this are of study.

First, as Japan's difficulties with regard to the Yasukuni shrine, to the East Asian summit in Kuala Lumpur, and to the United States military bases in Japan illustrate, Japan's identity between the West and the East (Asia) has not been well sorted out. Second, the flying geese pattern integration suggests the market conforming and yet developmental hierarchy conscious, bilateral liberalization strategies, which is slightly at odds with the multilateral regional integration agreement strategy. Third, the border transcending, people-based pacifism is not withering away. Rather in the process of revising the Constitution's Article 9, the Liberal Democratic Party's draft retains the basic pacific posture intact whereas the existence of armed forces called the Self Defense Forces is explicitly acknowledged.

To sum up, my answer is no, if theories of IR are understood as narrowly positivistic theories, American style. Qualified yes, if theories of IR include constructivists, normative theories, positive theories, and legal theories as well as works representing less than rigorously formal theorizing effects.

More indirectly but possibly more fundamentally, I might as well speculate that the following six factors are important to stress when we try to understand the nature of Japan's IR scholarship in terms of theoretical continuity.

1. Japan's IR research has been developing like a mosaic with different methodological traditions harmlessly co-existing each other. Unlike IR in the United States where political science gives the crucial disciplinary framework, IR in Japan accommodates different disciplinary traditions like diplomatic history, international law, and international economics, area studies, and various political theories. This amalgamate nature of Japan's IR community makes it more difficult to produce IR theories.
2. Japan's IR research is a most *bumi putra* IR in East, South-east and South Asia because it was not colonized by the West. Colonialism was an avenue to acquiring foreign language which tends to facilitate IR study. The US-led Allied occupation during the period 1945–1952 was conducted by indirect rule. By which I mean that Americans stood at the top while Japanese bureaucrats were mostly kept intact except for some small percentage of those regarded to have been tainted by war crimes. Indirect rule is too shallow to change many things. This is most conspicuous when we compare IR in Japan with those in Korea, Taiwan, and China, let alone in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The major difference between Japan on the one hand and Korea, Taiwan, and China on the other is the extent of ease with which they absorb largely from American style IR theories.
3. Japan's IR research operates in a slightly different framework from the King/Verba/Keohane positivistic methodology bible suggest. It reflects the historical and cultural legacies some of which may be most usefully

glimpsed at through such postmodern angle of Ralph Pettman's work (King, *et al.* 1994; Pettman, 2004).

Items (4), (5), and (6) underline some major historical geocultural trends that Japan has undergone for the preceding five centuries since its early modern period. I insert these items to stress the fact that the development of IRTs is deeply affected by historical paths of IR.

4. More substantively, Japan's IR evolved with three stages: (i) its beginning as a small peripheral country whose ruler was 'legitimized' by Chinese rulers in the latter's fledging tributary system mostly during a period leading to and including periods of Qin and Han dynasties, (ii) its endogenizing period in which tributary missions and trades were suspended and then private trade flows with sporadic quasi-tributary trades dominated the scene during the one millennium of Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties, and (iii) its maturing period of developing its own Japan-centric world order during a few centuries of early modern Japan in which the Tokugawa *bakufu* (military government) ruled the nation in almost exclusive charge of Japan's external defense and commerce plus internal communications and security with some 300 domains keeping *de fact* autonomy (Takashi, 2005, n.d).
5. Three distinctive features of Japan's IR as most clearly glimpsed at from the fledging Japan-centric regional order in the early modern period are as follows: (i) permeable insulation whereby Japan absorbs higher civilizations such as ideographs, religion, weapons, and institutions – selectively and taking time – without letting them fully permeate and swamp the country (Schaeede and Grimes, 2003). It was the case not only with China and Korea in the ancient times but also with Portugal and Spain in the medieval times and also with Britain and the United States in modern times. (ii) Friendship with and distance from China and the West: Japan's relationship with China and Korea resembles to that of Britain with Europe (Inoguchi, 1995). Japan is ambivalent to the Continent like Britain is. In other words, Japan is part of Asia, but somewhat separate from Asia. (iii) Japan-centric world order whereby external actors were largely left for a certain adjacent domain to handle like the Satsuma domain *vis-à-vis* the Ryukyu kingdom, the Tsushima domain *vis-à-vis* the Chosun kingdom, the Matsumae domain *vis-à-vis* the Ainus and Russia whereas the Tokugawa bakufu monopolized external trade and conducted only at Deshima port of Nagasaki mostly with Dutch and Chinese.⁴ In 1818, Chinese Emperor Jiaqing distinguished in Jiaqing huidian two groups of foreign countries: tributary states and mutually trading states. Tributary states were Korea,

4 For details see Fairbank (1968), especially on those chapters on the Ryukyu and on Korea. As for Japan's relations with Russia see Fujita (2005).

Vietnam, and England, for instance, whereas mutually trading states were the Netherlands, France, and Japan, for instance. To China, Japan was an economic animal without being respectful by sending tributary missions whereas to Japan, China was non-state trading actors without formal relationship (Masataka, 1972).

6. Japanese style of integration has three distinctive features which developed on domestic, regional, and global scale step by step. (i) It focuses on transportation and the market.⁵ During the early modern period internal commerce was encouraged across 300 odd domains. The Tokugawa *bakufu* consolidated social infrastructure like roads, bridges, ports, storehouses. During the modern period ports, ships, coal, oil, and tax autonomy were keys. During the post World War II period, population, official development assistance, foreign trade, technological cooperation, and foreign direct investment were keys. (ii) It makes use of evolutionary developmental maturation within Japan, in Asia and the world over. It is sometimes called the flying geese trade and development pattern whereby the leading goose is followed by lieutenant geese, and then by laggard geese (Korhonen, 1994). Just like the development of commercial routes, linking Osaka and Edo (Tokyo) and other ports nationwide was crucial in forging the national domestic market in early modern Japan; the development of industry in Asia (light industry like textiles, clothes, footwear, food, heavy industry like steel, petrochemicals, machines, through electronic and information industries) was pursued through official development assistance, trade and direct investment, in conjunction with the Japanese development of a certain stage (one step earlier). In an era of globalization, complex patterns are forged case by case to determine where Japanese style functional integration can go. In the current discussion in Japan on East Asian community building, functional integration is a key word in the Japanese debate. In other words, economic, financial, technological, and organizational linking is first sought after without paying too much attention to security, ideas, values, institutions and so on (Inoguchi, 2005). (iii) The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was conjured up by the Japanese Imperial Army when necessary weapons and energy resources were dried up at home and near abroad when the Japanese Imperial Navy lost the entire Western Pacific for its sphere of control. It contained the ideas of racial equality, anti-monopoly by the West, and the equality and solidarity of East Asia. However, the idea was not backed up by either military might or economic resources let alone by political practice in 1944 or 1945. However, some authors like Nishida, Tabata, and Hirano hoped in their own respective way that the Japanese destruction of Western colonialism,

5 On the early modern development of social infrastructure see Rozman (1974).

its idea and military might, would help pave the way somehow eventually to the liberation of the colonized East by Japan; however, awkward its implementation was and however self-contradictory its ideas were. Nishida thought of it as a way of helping Japan establish its own identity; Tabata thought of it as a way of establishing a less state sovereignty founded international law; and Hirano thought of it as a way of equality based regional integration. All the three dreamt implausible and impossible dreams because the idea ended in the mere imposition of coercion when Japan was totally at the mercy of United States military attacks (Inoguchi, 2007). If the military might of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy had not been completely replaced by the United States Armed Forces, a greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere might have been triggered to start forging itself.

Toward the end, I might as well add a few words about American hegemony in IRT and research. A few reasons why American IR gives a much larger and stronger profile other than those already noted may be elaborated. In my view, in part because of multiple anonymous peer review, in part because of its sheer size, in part because of use of *lingua franca*, and in part because of link between hiring/promotion and assessment of publication performance, the American academic community has developed a dynamic, competitive, and auto-centric quality. Other IR communities have not matched its vigor and strength. Perhaps, West Europeans have built a community which has arguably developed strength in a number of niche areas on a par with Americans. Such European-based IR journals such as *Review of International Studies*, *European Journal of International Relations*, and *Journal of Peace Research* which have registered their respective niche and position in the world market are a clear testimony to this assessment. Yet, one might have to note the 'out flows' of American authors penetrating these and other 'outstanding' journals. To state in a reverse direction, there are other non-American outstanding journals here because 'outstanding' in part because of the 'outflows' of American-residing authors. West Pacific Asians have been trying to build strength on their own feet as much as possible. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* has spear-headed the publication in the region of a journal which is purported to set up a forum in which discussions from within and without not only bring the academic level of articles upward but also trigger the fusion of ideas and the enrichment of insights to be brought to bear on the better and deeper understanding of IR in the region International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, <http://irap.oxfordjournals.org>. Compared to, say, the *Pacific Review*, a journal with a similar regional focus, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* has been less preoccupied with the rather stereotyped comparison between Western European and Pacific Asian regionalism (a highly institutionalized one and an

open house one) and more interested in more historically and culturally contextualized analysis of regionalism. Yet, its strength remains to be improved substantially before it can claim its position of one of the world-renowned academic focal points.

As a footnote, I might as well add that Japanese political scientists have moved forward to world center stage, a sort of. Two articles in the June 2005 issue of *American Political Science Review* are coauthored by political scientists with Japanese names and one of the articles in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, which was the most widely read article (of all the Sage journals) in June 2005, is coauthored similarly (Hill and Matsubayashi, 2005; Imai, 2005; Goldsmith, 2005). In other words, Japanese strength cannot be underestimated. All the three articles are very solid and positivistically spirited and executed ones. In an era of deepening globalization, ideas diffuse and permeate fast, and en masse. The fact that the latter article on anti-Americanism has been read most frequently seems to suggest that Japan's IR research has started to enhance world wide acceptance without so much playing down its *bumi putra* characteristics. In a similar vein, some non-Western theories of IR have been made far more comprehensible thanks in part to Western authors like Ralph Pettman who decipher and represent many metaphysics like Taoist strategies, Buddhist economics, Islamic civics, Confucian Marxism, Hindu constructivism, Pagan feminism, and animist environmentalism (Pettman, n.d).

Acknowledgements

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan guided me through out. Participants in the conference in Singapore, July 11–12, 2005 made me aware of some blind spots in my paper. Two anonymous referees helped me improve my paper in a number of important ways. I thank them all.

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