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POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

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Introduction to Japanese Parties

During the period that concerns the book, that is, between 1990 and 2010, there are two benchmark years that are noted by “tremors” of big proportion. First, 1993–1994, second, 2009–2010. Prior to 1993–1994 the one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the hall mark of Japanese party system. Some¹ say it is a one-and-a-half party system in which the governing party occupied two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives whereas one-third was occupied by the opposition parties, most importantly by the Japan Socialist Parties and the Japan Communist Parties. It is a party system in which a united Conservative Party and a united Socialist party competed without the former giving a chance to the latter. The one-and-a-half party system was the result of a fierce and fluid party system that prevailed after Japan’s defeat and the occupation by the United States, roughly between 1945 and 1955. In 1955 both the Conservatives and Progressives were united among themselves. Prior to 1955 the Progressives, especially the Socialists, diverged over the terms of the Peace Treaty and the Japan–United States Security Treaty, the right-wing and left-wing Socialists. Prior to 1955 the Conservatives diverged over the distance with which Japan held vis-à-vis the United States, the occupier and the key and only ally. The Liberals were in power and close to the United States whereas the Democrats were out of power and only with coalition with some progressive force stayed in power, albeit briefly. The strong progressive

forces in the National Diet and in terms of public opinion during the immediate postdefeat years reunited in 1955 toward the capturing of power in 1955. To make a counterstrike, the Conservatives united themselves in 1955 too. The end of the Korean War (1950–1953) had an indirect impetus to make such realignments in party system that resulted in the one-and-a-half party system that lasted till the first big tremor in 1993–1994. However, it must be noted immediately that the parliamentary number one position, if not a parliamentary majority position, was held by the LDP in 1993–1994.

The first big tremor took place after the quasi-end of the cold war. By quasi-end I mean that the cold war ended in Europe but not necessarily in Asia. While the Soviet Union collapsed, the People's Republic of China went through the brutal suppression of democratic protesters in 1989, emerging as a vigorous economic actor after the disembargo of the Western and Japanese governments against China in 1991. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained alive and well at a very low-level equilibrium albeit occasional emergencies amidst the rumor a bit like those exaggerated reportings about Mark Twain. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam embarked on the road of opening and reform. So did the Lao People's Republic, if much more slowly and selectively. In terms of preparations for party system change in 1993–1994, however, the domestic demographic and economic factors loom large. Most important is the trend of demographic increase that contributed to 35 years of high-level economic growth since early 1950s. The domestic market demands for products were continuously large to absorb the increasingly mass supply of products, especially consumer products. The governing party switched its support bases from farmers and small business to what was called the new middle mass comprising a huge chunk of those white colors. But as time went on, demographic increase slowed down and was reinforced by the two oil crises in the 1970s and in the 1980s. The Plaza accord of 1985 triggered the bubble formation in Japan toward 1991 when it collapsed and brought Japan to a 15-year-long stagnation. It was during the early period of stagnation that the long-governing party lost power. The much-vaunted new middle mass disappeared during the stagnation period. The bundle of smaller opposition parties was formed and took power if briefly in 1993–1994.

The second benchmark was 2009–2010. After the 1993–1994 interlude, the LDP regained its power in coalition with the Socialists in 1994–1996 and then with the Komei Party 1996 onward. However, the support bases of the LDP kept shrinking amidst

stagnation. The reformist and populist prime minister Junichiro Koizumi (r. 2001–2006) boosted the fortunes of the governing party for a while with its policy line of deregulation and market liberalization. Three mishap-ridden prime ministers (r. 2006–2009) holding power for one year or less, one after another without holding general elections, thoroughly disappointed the electorates, however. The Democratic Party of Japan's party manifesto singularly emphasizing on sustaining people's daily life is number one priority amidst post-Lehman hard time and enabled it to gain a parliamentary super majority in 2009. Yet the no less prepared and mishap-full prime ministers Yukio Hatoyama (2009–2010) and Naoto Kan (2010–present) brought down popularity ratings quickly after assuming premiership. Anticipating the almost inevitable decrease of parliamentary seats in a general election Kan cannot call for one. It looks as if avoiding holding a general election were preparing the downfall of Naoto Kan in an intermediate term. In terms of support bases of the Democratic Party and the LDP increasing convergence is the most important feature. Next important is the weight unions and quasi-public sectors carry for the Democratic Party in a negative reaction to the Koizumi-led liberalization and privatization policy line. A bulk of the support bases of the LDP was largely dispersed. Increasingly atomized and left alone electors are lured by simple slogans, good looks, and apparent charisma reasonably well mixed. This feature of politics is getting universal. But the crux of the problem is that such politicians rarely come to center stage. *Zeitgemaessheit* (harmony with the time) is not easy to achieve. Therefore, most of the time politics becomes that of scandals and mishaps amplified hundred times and full of policy promises yet devoid of achievements. This is the time of what John Keane² calls monitory democracy as contrasted to representative democracy. Not only government monitors citizens but also citizens monitor government both relentlessly and whimsically.

Old Parties and New

Four kinds of new parties can be identified: (1) mushroom parties that sprang during 1945 and 1955; (2) those parties in the opposition that tried to fill the gap between the opposition for its own sake, that is, ideological opposition and the opposition that aims at achieving policy during the period of solid dominance of the LDP, for example, the Komei Party, the Democratic Socialist Party; and (3) splinter parties that made exit from the LDP, for example, the New Liberal Club, the

Japan Renewal Party, the new Liberal Party, the Conservative Party during the period of LDP dominance; (4) smallish parties that are meant to serve a well-specified social group, for example, women's party, Okinawan People's Party.

1. *Mushroom Parties*. Year 1925 legislated established universal male suffrage. But it was only during the occupation universal suffrage was established, male and female, was established. It was also only during the occupation that some Leftist parties were liberated from the 1925 legislated internal security law. The Social Mass Party made advances in the 1931 House of Representatives election. But the Japan Communist Party and some anti-imperial parties were banned even before 1925. Thus the first postwar general election in 1946 gave rise to many parties that sprang like mushroom after rain. Those mushroom parties disappeared as extreme hunger, semipermanent unemployment, and shortage of food and medicine steadily increased.

2. *Nonideology-First Parties Exit*. The one-and-a-half party system was a product of the cold war. The issue of the Peace Treaty and the Japan–United States Security Treaty made electorates straitjacketed by the Left-Right confrontation on security, free trade, and many others. Some of those who felt bound by rigid ideological tenets went out like the Democratic Socialist Party (b. 1962) who quit the Japan Socialist Party. Some of those who felt left alone without assistance formed a religiously oriented political party like the Komei Party (b. 1956), which was built on the Buddhist organization called the Soka gakkai. The former was amalgamated by the Democratic Party of Japan. The latter is now called the New Komei Party.

3. *Splinter Parties A*. The big tremors gave birth to many splinter parties before and after. The long hegemony of the LDP inevitably gave rise to many leader-aspirants who anticipated that they might not be able to reach the top leader's position due to overcrowded competition in an established large party. In Chinese proverb, you had better become hen's mouth than cow's tail.³ When the LDP was thrown out of power in 1993 some party members formed splinter parties.

When the anti-LDP coalition government collapsed in 1994, some formed new parties in an attempt to become hen's mouth rather than cow's tail. The newly legislated political reform laws in 1993–1994 stipulated that each political party receive a certain amount of money from the Ministry of Internal Communications and Affairs in proportion to the size of party members and parliamentary members.

Its primary aim is to prevent politicians from receiving bribes and to discourage politicians from collecting a huge amount of money by themselves. Secretary general of each party assumes power to allocate money for those purposes of advancing each party's strength. Some formed one party after another in order to get complete control of such money. Therefore post-1993 years witnessed many splinter parties. The fall of the LDP from power in 2009 witnessed a few splinter parties.

4. *Splinter Parties B.* The extraordinary ups and downs of popularity ratings of prime ministers and political parties seem to encourage some to form new splinter parties from the Democratic Party of Japan. Most prominent is the Ichiro Ozawa-led splinter party called People's Life First (LF) Party. And more lately, the extraordinary ups and downs of popularity ratings of prime ministers and political parties seem to encourage some to form new splinter parties from the Democratic Party of Japan.

Electors and Parties

Turnout at General Elections

Turnout at general elections (table 7.1) points at an important trend, that is, an earlier trend under one-party-predominant system of a slowly declining trend of turnout started to rebound after 1996. Note that the House of Representatives has two election rules, that is, proportional representation and one person chosen with one vote per person from a district. It is clear that the election law legislated in 1993 and implemented since 1994 did impact turnouts.⁴ Uncertainty and fluidity in party politics seemed to increase the level of turnout. Note also that the trend of dealigning and realigning were taking place. During 1993–1994 the coalition of the anti-LDP parties lasted for one year. In 1994–1996 the Socialists formed coalition with the LDP. Since 1996 the LDP allied with the Komei Party till 2009. During Junichiro Koizumi's reign (2001–2006) it looked as if the LDP had come back to a self-sustaining strength. The oppositions looked seemingly exceeding feeble as can be guessed from the low figure of turnout in 2003. And a resounding victory of the LDP in 2005 gave such speculation a modicum of credibility. Yet after the three LDP prime ministers who dodged calling for a general election successively for three years gave the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) a serendipitous

Table 7.1 Turnout of Japan's general elections and votes obtained by relevant parties, 1990–2009

<i>Year</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2009</i>
Turnout (%)							
P	73.3	67.2	60.0	64.5	59.9	67.5	69.3
D			59.6	62.5	59.8	67.5	69.3
Seats (% of votes)							
LDP	275 (46.1)	223 (36.6)	269 (38.6) (32.8)	233 (41.0) (28.3)	237 (43.9) (35.0)	296 (47.8) (38.2)	119 (38.7) (26.7)
DPJ				127 (27.6) (25.2)	177 (36.7) (37.4)	113 (36.4) (31.0)	308 (47.4) (42.4)
DP			52 (10.6) (16.1)				
Lib				22 (3.4) (11.0)			
KMP	45 (8.0)	51 (8.1)		31 (2.0) (13.0)	34 (1.5) (14.8)	31 (1.4) (13.3)	21 (1.1) (11.5)
JSP	136 (24.4)	70 (15.4)					
SDPJ			15 (2.2) (6.4)	19 (3.8) (9.4)	6 (2.9) (5.1)	7 (1.5) (5.5)	7 (2.0) (4.3)
JCP	16 (8.0)	15 (7.7)	26 (12.6) (13.1)	20 (12.1) (11.2)	9 (8.1) (7.8)	9 (7.3) (7.3)	9 (4.2) (7.0)
JNP		35 (8.0)					
RebP		55 (10.1)					
HarP		13 (2.6)	2 (1.3) (1.0)				
RenP			156 (28.0) (28.0)				

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Home Office Election Department, 'Results of the House of Representatives Election, complete edition, 1990–2009')

opportunity to grab power in 2009 with its overwhelming victory and turnout level.

Votes Obtained by Relevant Parties, 1990–2010

The key trend of 1990–2010⁵ is that of a formation of a two-party system. Prior to 1990 splinter parties from the LDP were looking for opportunities to join possible anti-LDP coalitions. It came in 1993. Most small parties joined it to lead the LDP to step down from power. But it lasted only for one year. After 1994 those small parties searched for ways to beat the LDP. One of those searches resulted in the merger of two anti-LDP parties, the Democrats and the Liberals in 2001. The newly born DPJ comprised most of the 1993 anti-LDP coalition. Since 2001 both the LDP and the DPJ competed self-consciously, as is clear from those figures in Appendix 7.A. It represents clearly the formative process of a two-party system. Besides these two large parties, the old smaller parties were on the steady decline. The Japanese Socialist Party disappeared in 1994 and its successor, the SDPJ, is shrinking fast. The Japanese Communist Party have been on the steady decline. So is the Komei Party. It internal feud split itself into two, more or less, in 1996. Since then it has also been on the steady decline. The LDP's loss of power in 2009 resulted in a few splinter parties.

The volatility of relevant parties⁶ shows one striking result: high volatility figures vindicate the high level of uncertainty and fluidity, uncertainty about how electors vote for parties and fluidity about how parties form coalition. At this point it may be useful to note that old-fashioned representative democracy seems to metamorphose itself into what John Keane⁷ calls monitory democracy, by which Keane means that instead of assuming electors of a certain type of sociological and ideological attributes and parties of similarly conceived deputies and doctrines, both electors and government have become monitoring actors in both directions with the slogan of transparency and accountability making best use of mass media and micro media (personal computer and mobile phone), electors swing intermittently. The adoption of the mixed electoral system, proportional representation, and one person from one district, in 1993, has reinforced this trend. Prior to 1993 the electoral system basically accommodated both large and small parties in one district by electing one to five persons (mostly two or three persons) from one district with one vote. In a similar vein, the adoption of the scheme of publicly funding political parties in proportion to votes and seats obtained and members registered, in 1993, has reinforced this trend.

Social Characteristics of the Electors of Relevant Parties

Most important of what sociological profiles of relevant parties tells us is that the sociological explanation of party membership does not bring us very far. Nevertheless, some general observations which go beyond⁸ are useful. The old parties, the LDP, the Communist Party of Japan (JCP), and the Komei Party (KMP), are generally older in their support bases. Gender-wise the LDP is weaker than the other two. Education-wise, the support bases of the JCP and the KMP are very well educated at cadre level whereas at the mass level they are slightly less educated. The support base of the LDP is slightly less educated and close to national average. The support base of new parties including the DPJ is slightly better educated especially at cadre level. Occupation-wise, the LDP used to be based on farmers and small business in the early years. In the high-growth period its support bases relied on what Yasusuke Murakami (1986) calls the new middle mass, that is, those varying middle income strata riding high on the steady income rise during the 1960s through the 1980s. Now its support base has shrunk, because of demographic decline, income decrease, and government deficits and associated decline of local party chapters. The occupational support bases of the DPJ comprise the new middle class of reduced size. Salient of its support bases is the weight of trade unions of government and semiprivatized formerly government agencies (including postal unions). The former contains Democratic Socialist Party- (DSP) backed (earlier Japan Socialist Party [JSP]) union members. The latter contains postal, railroad, telephone enterprise managers and workers, especially postal enterprises unions and managers whose vaunted solidarity made a difference in the 2009 general election as well. Religion does not seem to differentiate political party support patterns very much. But the Komei Party is based on a Buddhist sect called *Sokagakkai* whose members are all religious. The LDP and the DPJ contain some religiously organized groups as their supporters. Important to note here in relation to religion is the Yasukuni shrine. The LDP contains the right-wing groups that tend to be conservative, nationalistic, hawkish. The DPJ contains very small groups that are against respecting the national flag and reciting the national anthem because of their legacy of war. None of the DPJ cabinet members participated in the ritual of paying respect to those dead in the war at the Yasukuni shrine the last summer in 2010. Prime Minister Naoto Kan paid a visit to the Arlington Cemetery in the United States in his first official visit to the United

States though. In relation to immigration, citizenship, and religion, Japan has steadfastly kept its policy line of limiting immigrants. Yet a large number of Chinese immigrants are granted citizenship largely because of marriage with Japanese citizens. A large number of Koreans have chosen Japanese citizenship. Although size is small, Philippines and Brazilians (largely of Japanese ancestors) work at service and manufacturing sectors. A small number of Indians work as professionals in information technology and financial service sectors. The Islamic population is very small. But foreign students from Islamic societies like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran have built a tiny mosque-space on campus at some large universities. Members of the National Diet include those whose parent(s) are from Korea, Taiwan, and Finland. The current minister of administrative renovation Ren Ho (Lian Fan) was born of a Taiwanese father and educated at Aoyama *Gakuin* and Peking universities.

Internal Party Life and the Size and Role of Membership

Party membership was not very high in Japan until 1993 except for the JCP and the KMP, both vaunting of party organizational discipline.⁹ When the law of publicly funding political parties was legislated in 1993, those parties that seek public subsidies have been arduous about recruiting and registering party members and building local chapters because the amount of money that comes from the Ministry of Internal Communications and Affairs depends primarily on these figures.¹⁰ The JCP steadfastly refuses relying on government subsidies. To turn to the long-governing party, the LDP, prior to 1993, party finance was dependent on each politician's personal organizations that receive donations from business firms and associations and individual supporters. Party leaders were always chosen by forming the coalition of clientelistic factional bosses. However, that's not the case any longer. Party president is now chosen in the election by electoral college that comprises parliamentary party members and non-parliamentary party members of local chapters. Party finance's purse is controlled by secretary general in principle. But practice seems to be guided by consensus of party executive position holders unless party president is a very strong man. The governing party, the DPJ, a party of merger gradually enlarging itself, seems to run the party with intermittently strong personalistic flavor. Prime Minister Naoto Kan has

refused to contain any one of his rival, Ichiro Ozawa's followers in his cabinet, for instance. Most parties are national. Only two or three from Okinawa and Hokkaido, new and peripheral territories, contain parties only locally alive and active like the Okinawa Social Mass Party (Okinawa) and the Party of Our Land (Hokkaido).

I now turn to leaders.¹¹ Let me start with Naoto Kan, DPJ leader and prime minister. He was long a man of nongovernmental organization. His education was in engineering at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. For some unknown reasons, most opposition party leaders in Japan have been educated in science and engineering. Naoto Kan is one. DPJ's former president, Yukio Hatoyama, was a professor of computer science with his Ph.D. at Stanford. JCP's leaders' education was predominantly physics. LDP leaders like Yoshida, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Fukuda, Ohira, Nakasone, and Miyazawa have been educated mostly in law. Kan is from Yamaguchi, the prefecture that has produced the largest number of prime ministers since 1868 including Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Abe. He does not have many solid and loyal followers and most cabinet positions were assigned by the preference of his cabinet secretary, former lawyer, Yoshito Sengoku, who belongs to Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara's faction. Kan climbed the ladder largely by his sharp tongue against government and bureaucracy and when inside government as health minister in 1993 by his audacious heroic action that Health Ministry abide by court decision when government was sentenced as guilty for its mis-permission of a certain medicine for a certain disease. Sadakazu Tanigaki, LDP's president, was a lawyer. He did law at the University of Tokyo. When his father, a parliamentary member, passed away, he was a very young second-generation politician. He is a tall athlete, strong at kendo and cycling. He is best known for his persuasion of Koichi Kato, his factional boss rising to compete with the then prime minister Yoshiro Mori, not to run for party presidential election called Kato uprising. Tanigaki's district is located in a mountainous district of Kyoto prefecture. This prefecture happens to contain the castle town of Mitsuhide Akechi, a general who assassinated Nobunaga Oda, the unifier of Japan of the warlord period in the mid-sixteenth century. Akechi was executed shortly after. The popular memory of him is that he is haunted by Akechi's precedent of his district and that he hesitates from taking bold action (remember his mild and moderate words about the DPJ government). JCP's leader, Kazuo Shii, was educated in physics at the University of Tokyo and climbed up the party ladder. He speaks clearly and with smile. Natsuo Yamaguchi, representative of

the Komei Party, was educated at the University of Tokyo and studied economics. Yamaguchi speaks very clearly with his astuteness and agility. Ichiro Ozawa, who is often called a shadow shogun, was most recently defeated by Kan in the party presidential election in autumn in 2010. He is one of the rare politicians in Japan who directly speak to the point. He has the record of manipulating prime ministers from behind for many years and the record of quitting parties and creating new ones a number of times. He was educated in law at Keio University and like Tanigaki, his father politician, passed away when he was in his early twenties. He was secretary general of the LDP at 43. He is most likely to be indicted by special prosecutors' office this autumn, 2012, for his handling of political money.

Programs and Ideologies

Japanese political parties have two kinds of documents/statements. First, parties have the founding documents that declare their abiding political doctrines and principles, second, election manifestos that are announced normally in January in party annual congress in anticipation of elections.¹² The founding documents tend to reflect those years of founding parties and sometimes appear arcane. Like the Japanese constitution, parties rarely change the documents on principles and passions at the times of founding parties. The founding documents tend to be vague, not necessarily policy specific.¹³ They tend to be aspirational. Issuing election manifestoes is a recent practice, dating back to just 20 years. Prior to 1990 or thereabout political parties responded to a set of questions put forward to them by newspapers in a very limited space, area by area, like the economy, security, aging, demographic decline, and innovations. The coverage was comprehensive. This style of election manifestoes were most commonly used for academic analysis of manifestoes like in the Inoguchi¹⁴ chapter included in the Budge et al.¹⁵ volume. Nowadays election manifestoes use perhaps more than 1,000 times as many letters as old-style election manifestoes. Essentially election manifestoes have become visibly important for the past two decades, 1990–2010. The preceding three decades witnessed old-style manifestoes of crisp tone. The further preceding period, 1945–1960, was characterized by no manifestoes but by passions and slogans. Over years of more than half a century some ideologies have changed. Most notably, the Japan Socialist Party changed its own name to become Social Democratic Party of Japan, and ceased its opposition to the Japan–United States

Security Treaty. The Japanese Communist Party explicitly changed sometime in the 1960s that its political strategy is through parliamentary means not by revolutionary methods. The LDP has not changed the two abiding political goals of constitutional revision and defense empowerment. But in practice no way of securing two-thirds of parliamentary members, a constitutional requirement for revision and no prospect for securing defense budget which has been in fact declining for the past decade.

The two-dimensional mapping reveals that there are two key dimensions, conventional macroeconomic policy versus reform oriented social policy and Conservative foreign policy versus Liberal foreign policy.¹⁶ Most striking in this map is the closeness between DPJ candidates and DPJ supporters on foreign policy dimension and the remoteness between LDP candidates and LDP supporters on both dimensions of economic policy and foreign policy. The latter contributed to the downfall of the LDP in the 2009 general election.

Personalized Leadership and the Question of Populism

During the period between 1990 and 2010 personalization of leadership is intermittently visible whereas populism is increasingly tangible.¹⁷ Suggested good indicators of the two concepts are: (1) appointment patterns of ministerial and executive positions surrounding leaders and (2) a certain mix of oratorical appeals, good looks, and charisma, ranked by newspapers, TVs, blogs, twitters. But more measurable indicators are (1) prime minister's popularity (%) minus support for his party (%) and (2) party local chapters' support over parliamentary support in party presidential election.

Personalization of leadership is intermittently visible during the period.¹⁸ Most visible and widely recognized is Junichiro Koizumi (r. 2001–2006). He is a man of individualism and individual initiatives. He does not like having his parliamentary followers. He delegates key matters on two persons, his elder sister-secretary in charge of accounts and his chief secretary in charge of appointments and logistics. He is a man of pithy words. He loves seeing opera, kabuki, playing to learn how to perform his politics of leadership. When he called for general election in 2005 focusing on postal reform, he quoted passages from Don Quixote, that is, encouraging himself before moving on to fight. Half a year before his announcement of

retirement, he gave a big garden party when *sakura* blossomed; he quoted a sixteenth-century warrior's wife, Galasha Hosokawa and her poem, sung immediately before her suicide when the castle was besieged by her husband's rivals in his absence; that is, like *sakura*, which knows when to bloom and when to end, men become men only when they know when they should put an end to their life.

He is a man of sharp prioritizing. His appointment style is keeping secrecy until the last moment of his announcement consulting no one except for those whom he wanted to appoint. Most importantly, he plays politics of targeting an enemy by portraying it as if he were an enemy who did not think of moving forward to a bright future. When the House of Councilors voted no to his policy of postal privatization, he asked rhetorically that if the National Diet said no to his policy, he wanted to call for general election to see whether people agreed or not with Koizumi and thus twisted the policy issue to the issue of popular confidence in prime minister. Populism is defined as engineering popular support for whatever policy prime minister wants to put forward.

Populism is not necessarily as prime minister's tendency to focus on the kind of policy folks like to see materialized. Government deregulation and trade liberalization are not normally a popular policy candidate at hard time. Postal liberalization was not a popular issue. But he transformed it as confidence in a determined and self-confident prime minister who wanted to move forward with people despite considerable pains. Next to Koizumi, Morihiro Hosokawa (r. 1993–1994) evinces personalized leadership and populism.¹⁹ Having spent a decade as governor of Kumamoto, he formed a personalized new party with the manifesto essentially of getting rid of LDP-style old politics and jointly shaping a new politics. In the 1993 general election all the anti-LDP parties advanced their number of votes and seats. Yet the LDP was the largest party still if not a majority party. The anti-LDP coalition was formed with Hosokawa as prime minister to overwhelm the LDP in the House of Representatives. Hosokawa was media-savvy and successfully legislated a set of political reform in 1993, some consequences of which we live in: a fledgling two-party system, personalized leaders, and atomized electors.

A little controversially, Ichiro Ozawa should be considered under this category.²⁰ Ozawa got a resounding victory in the 2009 general election after three poor LDP prime ministers hesitated to call for a general election successively. Ozawa as secretary general of the DPJ put the slogan right: livelihood first at hard time with concrete and

specific promises of two tangible money provision to weak social actors: children and farmers. His leadership style is literally personalized leadership style. He was a key drafter of political money reform bill as secretary general of the party coalition under Hosokawa to make public money allocated in proportion to the number of votes obtained and seats secured for each party in the National Diet. Also, he saw to it that political money thus supplied by government be controlled by secretary general of each party. When he lost secretary generalship, he quitted an old party and created a new one that he now controls effectively. However, his money scandals arose and he was forced to quit after the 2009 general election. In the 2009 general election he amassed his followers elected successfully with nearly half of the DPJ seats in the House of Representatives. He speaks clearly but normally slowly and with one- or two-second-long silence intermittently inserted in speech, and his head moves as if he nods to what he has just said, which gives the impression that he is a man of country folks. His campaign style is also populist in the sense that he targets for his campaign speech demographically thin and industrially weak places. Instead of standing at a big podium, he stands on a shabby-looking wooden box used for packing fruits, with audience amounting to just two dozens or so. He is televised wherever he goes. This gives a favorable impression that he cares for people. The combination of personalized leadership and populism is increasingly salient in Japanese politics. Those prime ministers who are not mentioned here are basically neither mass-media-savvy nor adept at catching popular cause, and nor able to carry out such performance successfully. “Calm down and carry on” does not apply here. “Heat up and carry out” should be the slogan. Therefore, even if politics increasing calls for personalized leadership and populist performance, many leaders cannot carry such a role well. If one asks who adopted a popular discourse, it is sensible to choose Junichiro Koizumi, Morihiro Hosokawa, and Ichiro Ozawa. *Zeitgemäßheit* does matter in personalized leadership and populist discourse.

*Postscript

The prospect for a next general election is clear: both the governing party head, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and the largest opposition head, Sadakazu Tanigaki, agreed in August 2012 in a tet-a-tet secret meeting that a next general election will be called for by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda “chikaiuchini (in a near future).” (28 August, 2012)

Notes

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8. Appendix 7.C.
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10. Appendix 7.E.
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